"THE GREATEST FAILURE IN ALL HISTORY"

V

BOOKS BY JOHN SPARGO

"THE GREATEST FAILURE IN ALL HISTORY"

RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BOLSHEVISM

BOLSHEVISM

AMERICANISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY EXPLAINED

HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK ESTABLISHED 1817

"THE GREATEST FAILURE IN ALL HISTORY"

A Critical Examination of

The Actual Workings of

Bolshevism In Russia

BY

JOHN SPARGO

AUTHOR OF

"BOLSHEVISM" "THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BOLSHEVISM"

"RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM"

"SOCIAL DEMOCRACY EXPLAINED"

HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS

NEW YORK AND LONDON

THE GREATEST FAILURE IN ALL HISTORY

Copyright, 1920, by Harper & Brothers

Printed in the United States of America

Published August, 1920

o-u

To The

MISGUIDED, THE MISTAKEN,

AND THE MISINFORMED

Who Have Hailed Bolshevism in Russia as the Advent of

A NEW FREEDOM

I Submit a Part of the Indisputable Evidence Upon Which, as a Socialist, Who Believes in Democracy in Government and In- dustry— and in the Generous Individualism Which Commu- nism of Opportunity Alone Can Give — I Base My Condemna- tion of Bolshevism as a Mad Attempt, by a Brutal and Degrading Tryanny, to Carry Out an Impossible Program

NOTE

MY thanks are due to many friends, in this coun- try and in Europe, for their kindly co-operation, assistance, and advice. I do not name them all — partly because many of them have requested me not to do so. I must, however, express my thanks to Mr. Henry L. Slobodin of New York, for kindly placing his materials at my disposal; Dr. S. Inger- man of New York, for his valuable assistance; Mr. Jerome Landfield of New York, for most valuable suggestions; Prof. V. I. Issaievof London, for personal courtesies and for the assistance de- rived from his valuable collection of data; Dr. Joseph M. Goldstein, author of Russia, Her Economic Past and Future; Mr. Gregor Alexinsky; Mr. Alexander Kerensky, former Premier of Russia; Madame Catherine Breshkovsky; Dr. J. O. Gavronsky of London; the editors of Pour la Russie, Paris; Gen. C. M. Oberoucheff, military commander of the Kiev District under the Provi- sional Government; Mr. J. Strumillo, of the Rus- sian Social Democratic Party; Mr. G. Soloveytchik of Queen's College, Oxford; to the Institute for Public Service for the diagram used on page 65; and, finally, my old friend and colleague of twenty- five years ago, Col. John Ward, C.B., C.M.G., member of the British House of Commons, founder of the Navvies' Union, whose courageous struggle against Bolshevism has won for him the respect and gratitude of all friends of Russian freedom.

J. S.

CONTENTS

PAGE

NOTE vii

PREFACE xi

I. WHY HAVE THE BOLSHEVIKI RETAINED POWER? . i

II. THE SOVIETS 8

III. THE SOVIETS UNDER THE BOLSHEVIKI .... 20

IV. THE UNDEMOCRATIC SOVIET STATE 38

V. THE PEASANTS AND THE LAND 67

VI. THE BOLSHEVIKI AND THE PEASANTS .... 90

VII. THE RED TERROR 140

VIII. INDUSTRY UNDER SOVIET CONTROL 192

IX. THE NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY — I . . . 240

X. THE NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY — II . . . 280

XI. FREEDOM OF PRESS AND ASSEMBLY 309

XII. "THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT" . . 352

XIII. STATE COMMUNISM AND LABOR CONSCRIPTION . 369

XIV. LET THE VERDICT BE RENDERED 410

DOCUMENTS 453

INDEX 473

PREFACE

LIKE the immortal Topsy, this book may be said to have "just growed." In it I have simply assembled in something like an orderly arrange- ment a vast amount of carefully investigated evi- dence concerning the Bolshevist system and its workings — evidence which, in my judgment, must compel every honest believer in freedom and democracy to condemn Bolshevism as a vicious and dangerous form of reaction, subversive of every form of progress and every agency of civilization and enlightenment.

I do not discuss theories in this book, except in a very incidental way. In two earlier volumes my views upon the theories of Bolshevism have been set forth, clearly and with emphasis. On its the- oretical side, despite the labored pretentiousness of Lenin and his interminable "Theses," so sug- gestive of medieval theology, Bolshevism is the sorriest medley of antiquated philosophical rubbish and fantastic speculation to command attention among civilized peoples since Millerism stirred so many of the American people to a mental process they mistook for and miscalled thinking.

No one who is capable of honest and straight- forward thinking upon political and economic

xiv PREFACE

have made it their special task to keep well informed concerning developments in Russia. These friends not only replied to my specific questions, but sent me from time to time practically every item of interest concerning developments in Russia. As a result, I found myself in the possession of an im- mense mass of testimony and evidence of varying value. Fully aware of the unreliability of much of the material thus placed in my hands, for my own satisfaction I weeded out all stories based upon hearsay, all stories told by unknown persons, all rumors and indefinite statements, and, finally, all stories, no matter by whom told, which were not confirmed by dependable witnesses. This winnow- ing process left the following classes of evidence and testimony: (i) Statements by leading Bolsheviki, contained in their official press or in publications authorized by them; (2) reports of activities by the Soviet Government or its officials, published in the official organs of the government; (3) formal docu- ments— decrees, proclamations, and the like — is- sued by the Soviet Government and its responsible officials; (4) statements made by well-known Rus- sian Socialists and trades-unionists of high stand- ing upon facts within their own knowledge, where there was confirmatory evidence; (5) the testimony of well-known Socialists from other countries, upon matters of which they had personal knowledge and concerning which there was confirmatory evidence. Every scrap of evidence adduced in the following pages belongs to one or other of the five classes above described. Moreover, the reader can rest assured that every possible care has been taken to

PREFACE xv

guard against misquotation and against quotation which, while literally accurate, nevertheless mis- represents the truth. This is often done by un- fairly separating text from context, for example, and in other ways. I believe that I can assure the reader of the freedom of this book from that evil; certainly nothing of the sort has been intentionally included. While I have accepted as correct and au- thentic certain translations, such as the transla- tions of Lenin's Soviets at Work and his State and Revolution, both of which are largely circulated by pro-Bolshevist propagandists, and such collections of documents as have been published in this coun- try by the Nation — the Soviet Constitution and certain Decrees — and by Soviet Russia, the official organ of the Soviet Government in this country, I have had almost every other line of translated quotation examined and verified by some competent and trustworthy Russian scholar.

The book does not contain all or nearly all the evidence which has come into my possession in the manner described. I have purposely omitted much that was merely harrowing and brutal, as well as sensational incidents which have no direct bearing upon the struggle in Russia, but properly belong to the category of crimes arising out of the elemental passions, which are to be found in every country. Crimes and atrocities by irresponsible individuals I have passed over in silence, confining myself to those things which reflect the actual purposes, methods, and results of the regime itself.

I have not tried to make a sensational book, yet now that it is finished I feel that it is even worse

xvi PREFACE

than that. It seems to me to be a terrible book, e cumulative effect of the evidence of brutal '• oppression and savagery, of political trickery and ""chicane, of reckless experimentation, of adminis- trative inefficiency, of corrupt bureaucratism, of outraged idealism and ambitious despotism, seems to me as terrible as anything I know — more terrible than the descriptions of czarism which formerly harrowed our feelings. _; When I remember the monstrous evils that have been wrought in the name of Socialism, my soul is torn by an indescrib- able agony.

Yet more agonizing still is the consciousness that here in the United States there are men and women of splendid character and apparent intelligence whose vision has been so warped by hatred of the evils of the present system, and by a cunning propaganda, that they are ready to hail this loath- some thing of hatred, this monstrous tyranny, as an evangel of fraternalism and freedom; ready to bring upon this nation — where, despite every short- coming, we are at least two centuries ahead of Bolshevized Russia, politically, economically, mor- ally— the curse which during less than thirty months has afflicted unhappy Russia with greater ills than fifty years of czarism.

They will not succeed. They shall strive in vain to replace the generous spirit of Lincoln with the brutal spirit of Lenin. For us there shall be no dictatorship other than that of our own ever- growing conscience as a nation, seeking freedom and righteousness in our own way.

We shall defeat and destroy Bolshevism by keep-

PREFACE

xvu

ing the light shining upon it, revealing its ugliness, its brutality, its despotism. We do not need to adopt the measures which czarism found so un- availing. Oppression cannot help us in this fight, or offer us any protection whatsoever. If we would destroy Bolshevism we must destroy the illusions which surround it. Once its real character is made known, once men can see it as it is, we shall not need to fear its spread among our fellow-citizens. Light, abundant light, is the best agent to fight Bolshevism.

JOHN SPARGO.

" NESTLEDOWN," OLD BENNINGTON, VERMONT, Afay, 1920.

"THE GREATEST FAILURE IN ALL HISTORY"

'THE GREATEST FAILURE IN ALL HISTORY1'

WHY HAVE THE BOLSHEVIKI RETAINED POWER?

THE Bolsheviki are in control of Russia. Never, at any time since their usurpation of power in November, 1917, have Lenin and Trotsky and their associates been so free from organized internal opposition as they are now, after a lapse of more than two and a quarter years. This is the central fact in the Russian problem. While it is true that Bolshevist rule is obviously tottering toward its fall, it is equally true that the anti-Bolshevist forces of Russia have been scattered like chaff before the wind. While there is plenty of evidence that the overwhelming mass of the Russian people have been and are opposed to them, the Bolsheviki rule, nevertheless. This is what many very thought- ful people who are earnestly seeking to arrive at just and helpful conclusions concerning Russia find it hard and well-nigh impossible to understand. Upon every hand one hears the question, "How is it possible to believe that the Bolsheviki have

2 "THE GREATEST FAILURE

been able for so long to maintain and even increase their power against the opposition of the great mass of the Russian people?"

The complete answer to this question will be developed later, but a partial and provisional answer may, perhaps, do much to clear the way for an in- telligent and dispassionate study of the manner in which Bolshevism in Russia has been affected by the acid test of practice. In the first place, it would be interesting to discuss the naivete of the question. Is it a new and unheard-of phenomenon that a despotic and tyrannical government should increase its strength in spite of the resentment of the masses? Czarism maintained itself in power for centuries against the will of the people. If it be objected that only a minority of the people of Russia actively opposed czarism, and that the masses as a whole were passive for centuries, no such contention can be made concerning the period from 1901 to 1906. At that time the country was aflame with passionate discontent; the people as a whole were opposed to czarism, yet they lacked the organized physical power to overthrow it. Czarism ruled by brute force, and the methods which it developed and used with success have been adopted by the Bolsheviki and perfected by them.

However, let a veteran Russian revolutionist answer the question: Gen. C. M. Oberoucheff is an old and honored member of the Party of Socialists- Revolutionists of Russia and under the old regime suffered imprisonment and exile on account of his activities in the revolutionary movement. Under the Provisional Government, while Kerensky was

IN ALL HISTORY" 3

Premier, he was made Military Commissary of Kiev, at the request of the local Soviet. General Oberou- cheff says:

"Americans often ask the question: 'How can it be explained that the Bolsheviki hold power? . . . Does this not prove that they are supported by the majority of the people?' For us Russians the reply to this question is very simple. The Czars held power for centuries. Is that proof that their rule was supported by the will of the people? Of course not. They held power by the rule of blood and iron and did not rest at all upon the sympathies of the great masses of the people. The Bolsheviki are retaining theirrpower to-day by the same iden- tical means. . . . Russia of the Czars' time was governed by Blue~~gendarmes. _/(Great Russia of to-day is ruled by Red gendarmes. The distinc- tion is only in color and perhaps somewhat in methods. The methods of the Red gendarmes are more ruthless and cruel than those of the old Blue gendarmes."

The greater part of a year has elapsed since these words were written by General Oberoucheff. Since that time there have been many significant changes in Russia, including recently some relaxation of the brutal oppression. Czarism likewise had its periods of comparative decency. It still remains true, however, that the rule of the Bolsheviki rests upon the same basis as that of the old regime. It is, in fact, only an inverted form of czarism.

As we shall presently see, the precise methods by which monarchism was so long maintained have been used by the Bolsheviki. The main

4 "THE GREATEST FAILURE

support of the old regime was an armed force, consisting of the corps of gendarmes and special regiments of guards. Under Bolshevism, cor- responding to these, we have the famous Red Guards, certain divisions of which have been main- tained for the express purpose of dealing with internal disorder and suppressing uprisings. Just as, under czarism, the guard regiments were specially well paid and accorded privileges which made them a class apart, so have these Red Guards of the Bolsheviki enjoyed special privileges, in- cluding superior pay and rations.

Under czarism the Okhrana and the Black Hun- dreds, together with the Blue gendarmes, imposed a reign of terror upon the nation. They were as corrupt as they were cruel. Under the Bolsheviki the Extraordinary Committees and Revolutionary Tribunals have been just as brutal and as corrupt as their czaristic predecessors. Under the Bol- sheviki the system of espionage and the use of provocative agents can be fairly described as a continuance of the methods of the old regime.

Czarism developed an immense bureaucracy; a vast army of petty officials and functionaries was thus attached to the government. This bureau- cracy was characterized by the graft and corruption indulged in by its members. They stole from the government and they used their positions to extort blackmail and graft from the helpless and unhappy people. In the same manner Bolshevism has de- veloped a new bureaucracy in Russia, larger than the old, and no less corrupt. As we shall see later on, the sincere and honest idealists among the Bol-

IN ALL HISTORY" 5

sheviki have loudly protested against this evil. Moreover, the system has become so burdensome economically that the government itself has become alarmed. By filling the land with spies and making it almost impossible for any man to trust his neigh- bor, by suppressing practically all non-Bolshevist journals, and by terrorism such as was unknown under the old regime, the Bolsheviki have main- tained themselves in power.

There is a still more important reason why the Bolshevist regime continues, namely, its own adaptability. Far from being the unbending and uncompromising devotees of principle they are very generally regarded as being, the Bolshevist leaders are, above all else, opportunists. Notwith- standing their adoption of the repressive and op- pressive methods of the old regime, the Bolsheviki could not have continued in power had they re- mained steadfast to the economic theories and principles with which they began. No amount of force could have continued for so long a system of government based on economic principles so ruin- ous. As a matter of fact, the Bolsheviki have con- tinued to rule Russia because, without any change of mind or heart, but under pressure of relent- less economic necessity, they have abandoned their theories. The crude communism which Lenin and his accomplices set out to impose upon Russia by force has been discarded and flung upon the scrap-pile of politics. That this is true will be abundantly demonstrated by the testimony of the Bolsheviki themselves.

No study of the reasons for the success of the

6

Bolsheviki can DC regarded as complete which does not take into account the fact that Russia has been living upon the stored-up resources of the old order. When the Bolsheviki seized the reins of govern- ment there were in the country large stores of food, of raw materials, of manufactured and partially manufactured goods. There were also large num- bers of industrial establishments in working order. With these things alone, even without any augmen- tation by new production — except, of course, agri- cultural production — the nation could for a con- siderable time escape utter destruction. With these resources completely in the hands of the government, any opposition was necessarily placed at a very great disadvantage. The principal spokesmen of the Bolsheviki have themselves recognized this from time to time. On January 3, 1920, Pravda, the official organ of the Communist Party — that is, of the Bolsheviki — said:

We must not forget that hitherto we have been living on the stores and machinery, the means of production, which we inherited from the bourgeoisie. We have been using the old stores of raw material, half-manufactured and manufactured goods. But these stores are getting exhausted and the machinery is wearing out more and more. All our victories in the field will lead to nothing if we do not add to them victories gained by the hammer, pick, and lathe.

It must be confessed that the continued rule of the Bolsheviki has, to a very considerable extent, been due to the political ineptitude and lack of coherence on the part of their opponents. The

IN ALL HISTORY" 7

truth is that on more than one occasion the over- throw of the Bolsheviki might easily have been brought about by the Allies if they had dared do it. The chancelleries of Europe were, at times, positively afraid that the Bolshevist Government would be overthrown and that there would be no sort of government to take its place. In the archives of all the Allied governments there are filed away confidential reports warning the govern- ments that if the Bolsheviki should be overthrown Russia would immediately become a vast welter of anarchy. Many European diplomats and states- men, upon the strength of such reports, shrugged their shoulders and consoled themselves with the thought that, however bad Bolshevist government might be, it was at least better than no govern- ment at all.

Finally, we must not overlook the fact that the mere existence of millions of people who, finding it impossible to overthrow the Bolshevist regime, devote their energies to the task of making it en- durable by bribing officials, conspiring to evade oppressive regulations, and by outward conform- ity, tends to keep the national life going, no matter how bad the government.

'THE GREATEST FAILURE

II

THE SOVIETS

THE first articulate cry of Bolshevism in Rus- sia after the overthrow of the monarchy was the demand "All power to the Soviets!" which the Bolshevist leaders raised in the summer of 1917 when the Provisional Government was bravely struggling to consolidate the democratic gains of the March Revolution. The Bolsheviki were in- spired by that anti-statism which one finds in the literature of early Marxian Socialism. It was not the individualistic antagonism to the state of the anarchist, though easily confounded with and mis- taken for it. It was not motivated by an exaltation of the individual, but that of a class. The early Marxian Socialists looked upon the modern state, with its highly centralized authority, as a mere in- strument of class rule, by means of which the capitalist class maintained itself in power and in- tensified its exploitation of the wage-earning class. Frederick Engels, Marx's great collaborator, de- scribed the modern state as being the managing committee for the capitalist class as a whole.

Naturally, the state being thus identified with capitalist exploitation, the determination to over-

IN ALL HISTORY" 9

throw the capitalist system carried with it a like determination to destroy the political state. Given a victory by the working-class sufficiently compre- hensive to enable it to take possession of the ruling power, the state would either become obsolete, and die of its own accord, or be forcibly abolished. This attitude is well and forcibly expressed by Engels in some well-known passages.

Thus, in his Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, Engels says:

The modern state, no matter what its form, is essen- tially a capitalistic machine, the state of the capitalists, the ideal personification of the total national capital. The more it proceeds to the taking over of productive forces the more does it actually become the national capitalist, the more citizens does it exploit. . . . Whilst the capitalist mode of production . . . forces on more and more the transformation of the vast means of pro- duction, already socialized, into state property, it shows itself the way to accomplish this revolution. The pro- letariat seizes political power and turns the means of production into state property.

What Engels meant is made clear in a subsequent paragraph in the same work. He argues that as long as society was divided into antagonistic classes the state was a necessity. The ruling class for the time being required an organized force for the pur- pose of protecting its interest and particularly of forcibly keeping the subject class in order. Under such conditions, the state could only be properly regarded as the representative of society as a whole in the narrow sense that the ruling class itself

10

represented society as a whole. Assuming the ex- tinction of class divisions and antagonisms, the state would immediately become unnecessary:

The first act by virtue of which the state really con- stitutes itself the representative of the whole of society — the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society — this is, at the same time, its last independent act as a state. State interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, super- fluous, and then dies out of itself; the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and by the conduct of processes of production. The state is not "abolished." It

-f ' \ \t, -

In another work, The Origin of the Family, Private Property y and the State, Engels says :

We are now rapidly approaching a stage of evolution in production in which the existence of classes has not only ceased to be a necessity, but becomes a positive fetter on production. Hence these classes must fall as inevitably they once rose. The state must irrevocably fall with them. The society that is to reorganize pro- duction on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will transfer the machinery of state where it will then belong: into the museum of antiquities, by the side of the spinning-wheel and the bronze ax.

These passages from the classic literature of Marxian Socialism fairly and clearly express the character of the anti-statism which inspired the Bolsheviki at the outset. They wanted to develop a type of social organization in which there would

IN ALL HISTORY" 11

be practically no "government of persons," but only the "administration of things" and the "conduct of the processes of production." Modern Socialist thinkers have fairly generally recognized the muddled character of the thinking upon which this anti-statism rests. How can there be "ad- ministration of things" without "government of persons"? The only meaning that can possibly be attached to the "administration of things" by the government is that human relations estab- lished through the medium of things are to be administered or governed. Certainly the "con- duct of the processes of production " without some regulation of the conduct of the persons engaged in those processes is unthinkable.

We do not need to discuss the theory farther at this time/ It is enough to recognize that the primitive Marxian doctrine which we have outlined required that state interference with the individual and with social relations J>e reduced to a minimum, if not wholly abolished. ^ It is a far cry from that conception to the system of conscript labor recently introduced, and the Code of Labor Laws of Soviet Russia, which legalizes industrial serfdom and adscription and makes even the proletarian sub- ject to a more rigid and despotic "government of persons" than has existed anywhere since the time when feudalism flourished.

The Bolsheviki believed that they saw in the Soviets of factory-workers, peasants, and Socialists the beginnings of a form of social organization which would supplant the state, lacking its coer- cive features and better fitted for the administra-

12 "THE GREATEST FAILURE

tion of the economic life of the nation. The first Soviet of Workmen's Deputies appeared in October, 1905, in Petrograd, at the time of the abortive revolution. The idea of organizing such a council of workmen's representatives originated with the Mensheviki, the faction of the Social Democratic Party opposed to the Bolsheviki. " The sole aim of the Soviet was to organize the revolutionary forces and sentiment. But, during the course of its brief existence, it did much in the way of relieving the distress. The Socialists-Revolutionists joined with the Mensheviki in the creation of this first Soviet, but the Bolsheviki were bitterly opposed to it, denouncing it as "the invention of semi-bourgeois parties to enthrall the proletariat in a non-partizan swamp." When the Soviet was well under way, however, and its success was manifest, the Bol- sheviki entered it and became active participants in its work. With the triumph of czarism, this first Soviet was crushed, most of its leaders being banished to Siberia.

Even before the formation of the Provisional Government was completed, in March, 1917, the revolutionary working-class leaders of Petrograd had organized a Soviet, .or council, which they called the Council of Workmen's Deputies of Petrograd. Like all the similar Soviets which sprang up in various parts of the country, this was a very loose organization and very far from being a democratic body of representatives. Its members were chosen at casual meetings held in the factories and workshops and sometimes on the streets. No responsible organizations arranged or governed the

IN ALL HISTORY" 13

elections. Anybody could call a mass-meeting, in any manner he pleased, and those who came selected — usually by show of hands — such "depu- ties" as they pleased. If only a score attended and voted in a factory employing hundreds, the deputies so elected represented that factory in the Soviet. This description equally applies to prac- tically all the other Soviets which sprang up in the industrial centers, the rural villages, and in the army itself. Among the soldiers at the front company Soviets, and even trench Soviets, were formed. In the cities it was common for groups of soldiers belonging to the same company, meeting on the streets by accident, to hold impromptu street meetings and form Soviets. There was, of course, more order and a better chance to get representative delegates when the meetings were held in barracks. Not only were the Soviets far from being re- sponsible democratically organized representative bodies; quite as significant is the fact that the depu- ties selected by the factory-workers were, in many instances, not workmen at all, but lawyers, uni- versity professors, lecturers, authors and journal- ists, professional politicians, and so on. Many of the men who played prominent roles in the Petro- grad Soviet, for example, as delegates of the factory- workers, were Intellectuals of the type described. Any well-known revolutionary leader who happened to be in the public eye at the moment might be selected by a group of admirers in a factory as their delegate. It was thus that Kerensky, the brilliant lawyer, found himself a prominent mem- ber of the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's Depu-

14 "THE GREATEST FAILURE

ties, and that, later on, Trotsky, the journalist, and Lenin, the scholar, became equally prominent.

It was to such bodies as these that the Bolsheviki wanted to transfer all the power of the government — political, military, and economic. The leaders of the Provisional Government, when they found their task too heavy, urged the Petrograd Soviet to take up the burden, which it declined to do. That the Soviets were needed in the existing circumstances, and that, as auxiliaries to the Provisional Govern- ment and the Municipal Council, they were capable of rendering great service to the democratic cause, can hardly be questioned by any one familiar with the conditions that prevailed. The Provisional Government, chosen from the Duma, was not, at first, a democratic body in the full sense of that word. It did not represent the working-people. It was essentially representative of the bourgeoisie and it was quite natural, therefore, that in the Soviets there was developed a very critical attitude toward the Provisional Government.

Before very long, however, the Provisional Government became more democratic through the inclusion of a large representation of the working- class parties, men who were chosen by and directly responsible to the Petrograd Soviet. This arrange- ment meant that the Soviet had definitely entered into co-operation with the Provisional Govern- ment; that in the interest of the success of the Revolution the working-class joined hands with the bourgeoisie. This was the condition when, in the summer of 1917, the Bolsheviki raised the cry "All power to the Soviets!" There was not even

IN ALL HISTORY" 15

the shadow of a pretense that the Provisional Government was either undemocratic or unrepre- sentative. At the same time the new municipal councils were functioning. These admirable bodies had been elected upon the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. Arrangements were far advanced for holding — under the authority of the democratically constituted municipal councils and Zemstvos — elections for a Constituent Assem- bly, upon the same basis of generous democracy: universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage, with proportional representation. It will be seen, there- fore, that the work of creating a thoroughly demo- cratic government for Russia was far advanced and proceeding with great rapidity. Instead of the power of government being placed in the hands of thoroughly democratic representative bodies, the Bolshevik! wanted it placed in the hands of the hastily improvised and loosely organized Soviets. At first the Bolsheviki had professed great faith in, and solicitude for, the Constituent Assembly, urging its immediate convocation. In view of their subsequent conduct, this has been regarded as evidence of their hypocrisy and dishonesty. It has been assumed that they never really wanted a Constituent Assembly at all. Of some of the leaders this is certainly true; of others it is only partially true. Trotsky, Lenin, Kamenev, Zino- viev, and others, during the months of June and July, 1917, opposed the policy of the Provisional Government in making elaborate preparations for holding the elections to the Constituent Assembly. They demanded immediate convocation of the Con-

16 "THE GREATEST FAILURE

stituent Assembly, upon the basis of "elections" similar to those of the Soviets, knowing well that this would give them an irresponsible mass-meeting, easily swayed and controlled by the demagoguery and political craft of which they were such perfect masters. Had they succeeded in their efforts at that time, the Constituent Assembly would not have been dispersed, in all probability. It would have been as useful an instrument for their purpose as the Soviets. When they realized that the Con- stituent Assembly was to be a responsible repre- sentative body, a deliberative assembly, they be- gan their agitation to have its place taken by the Soviets. They were perfectly well aware that these could be much more easily manipulated and controlled by an aggressive minority than a well-planned, thoroughly representative assembly could be.

The Bolsheviki wanted to use the Soviets as instruments. In this simple statement of fact there is implicit a distinction between Soviet gov- ernment and Bolshevism, a distinction that is too often lost sight of. Bolshevism may be defined either as an end to be attained — communism — or as a policy, a method of attaining the desired end. Neither the Soviet as an institution nor Soviet government, as such, had any necessary connection with the particular goal of the Bolsheviki or their methods. That the Bolsheviki in Russia and in Hungary have approved Soviet government as the form of government best adapted to the realization of their program, and found the Soviet a desirable instrument, must not be regarded as establishing

IN ALL HISTORY" 17

either the identity of Bolshevism and Soviet government or a necessary relation between the Soviet and the methods of the Bolsheviki. The same instrument is capable of being used by the conservative as well as by the radical.

In this respect the Soviet system of government is like ordinary parliamentary government. This, also, is an instrument which may be used by either the reactionary or the revolutionist. The defender of land monopoly and the Single-taxer can both use it. To reject the Soviet system simply be- cause it is capable of being used to attain the ends of Bolshevism, or even because the advocates of Bolshevism find it better adapted to their purpose than the political systems with which we are familiar, is extremely foolish. Such a conclusion is as irrational as that of the superficial idealists who renounce all faith in organized government and its agencies because they can be used op- pressively, and are in fact sometimes so used.

It is at least possible, and, in the judgment of the present writer, not at all improbable, that the Soviet system will prove, in Russia and elsewhere, inclined to conservatism in normal circumstances. Trades-unions are capable of revolutionary action, but under normal conditions they incline to a cautious conservatism. The difference between a trades-union and a factory Soviet is, primarily, that the former groups the workers of a trade and dis- regards the fact that they work in different places, while the latter groups the workers in a particular factory and disregards the fact that they pursue different trades or grades of labor. What is there

18 "THE GREATEST FAILURE

in this difference to warrant the conclusion that the factory-unit form of organization is more likely to adopt communist ideals or violent methods than the other form of organization? Surely the fact that the Bolsheviki have found it neces- sary to restrict and modify the Soviet system, even to the extent of abolishing some of its most important features, disposes of the mistaken no- tion that Bolshevism and the Soviet system are inseparable.

It is not without significance that the leading theoretician of Bolshevism, Lenin, on the basis of pure theory, opposed the Soviets at first. Nor is the fact that many of the bitterest opponents of Bolshevism in Russia, among the Socialists-Revo- lutionists, the Mensheviki, the Populists, the leaders of the co-operatives and the trades-unions, are stanch believers in and defenders of the Soviet system of government, and confidently believe that it will be the permanent form of Russian government.

For reasons which will be developed in subse- quent chapters, the present writer does not accept this view. The principal objection to the Soviet system, as such, is not that it is inseparable from Bolshevism, that it must of necessity be associated with the aims and methods of the latter, but that — unless greatly modified and limited — it must prove inefficient to the point of vital danger to society. This does not mean that organizations similar in structure to the Soviets can have no place in the government or in industrial management. In some manner the democratization of industry is to

IN ALL HISTORY" 19

be attained in a not far distant future. When that time comes it will be found that the ideas which gave impulse to syndicalism and to Soviet govern- ment have found concrete expression in a form wholly beneficent.

20 "THE GREATEST FAILURE

III

THE SOVIETS UNDER THE BOLSHEVIKI

AFTER the coup d'etat, the Soviets continued to be elected in the same haphazard manner as before. Even after the adoption, in July, 1918, of the Constitution, which made the Soviets the basis of the superstructure of governmental power, there was no noticeable improvement in this respect. Never, at any time, since the Bolsheviki came into power, have the Soviets attained anything like a truly representative character. The Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic stamps it as the most undemocratic and oligarchic of the great modern nations. The city Soviets are composed of delegates elected by the employees of factories and workshops and by trades and pro- fessional unions, including associations of mothers and housewives. The Constitution does not pre- scribe the methods of election, these being deter- mined by the local Soviets themselves. In the industrial centers most of the elections take place at open meetings in the factories, the voting being done by show of hands. In view of the elaborate system of espionage and the brutal repression of all hostile criticism, it is easy to understand that

IN ALL HISTORY" 21

such a system of voting makes possible and easy every form of corruption and intimidation.

The whole system of government resulting from these methods proved unrepresentative. A single illustration will make this quite plain:

Within four days of the Czar's abdication, the workers of Perm, in the Government of the Urals, organized a Soviet — the Urals Workers' and Sol- diers' Soviet. At the head of it, as president, was Jandarmov, a machinist, who had been active in the Revolution of 1905, a Soviet worker and trades- unionist, many times imprisoned under the old regime. This Soviet supplemented and co-operated with the Provisional Government, worked for a democratic Constituent Assembly, and, after the first few days of excitement had passed, greatly increased production in the factories. But when the Bolshevist regime was established, after the adoption of the Constitution, the Government of the Urals, with its four million inhabitants, did not represent, even on the basis of the Soviet figures, more than 72,000 workers. That was the number of workers supposedly represented by the dele- gates of the Soviet Government. As a matter of fact, in that number was included the anti-Bol- shevist strength, the workers who had beea out- voted or intimidated, as the case might be. (When the peasants elected delegates they were refused seats, because they we^e known to be, or believed to be, anti-Bolshevists. /'This is the much-vaunted system of Soviet "elections" concerning which so many of our self-styled Liberals have been lyrically eloquent.

22 "THE GREATEST FAILURE

Of course, even under the conditions described, anti-Bolshevists were frequently elected to the Soviets. It was a very general practice, in the early days of the Bolshevist regime, to quite arbitrarily "cleanse" the Soviets of these "unde- sirable counter-revolutionaries," most of whom were Socialists. In December, 1917, the Soviets in Ufa, Saratov, Samara, Kazan, and Jaroslav were compelled, under severe penalties, to dismiss their non-Bolshevist members; in January, 1918, the same thing took place at Perm and at Ekater- inburg; and in February, 1918, the Soviets of Mos- cow and Petrograd were similarly "cleansed."

It was a very ordinary occurrence for Soviets to be suppressed because their "state of mind" was not pleasing to the Bolsheviki in control of the central authority. In a word, when a local Soviet election resulted in a majority of Socialists-Revo- lutionists or other non-Bolshevist representatives being chosen, the Council of the People's Commis- saries dissolved the Soviet and ordered the elec- tion of a new one. Frequently they used troops — generally Lettish or Chinese — to enforce their orders. Numerous examples of this form of des- potism might be cited from the Bolshevist official press. For example, in April, 1918, the elections to the Soviet of Jaroslav, a large industrial city north of Moscow, resulted in a large majority of anti-Bolshevist representatives being elected. The Council of the People's Commissaries sent Lettish troops to dissolve the Soviet and hold a new "elec- tion." This so enraged the people that they gave a still larger majority for the anti-Bolshevist par-

23

ifr b&

ties. Then the Council of the People's Commis- saries issued a decree stating that as the working- class of Jaroslav had twice proved their unfitness for self-government they would not be permitted to have a Soviet at all! The town was proclaimed to be "a nest of counter-revolutionaries." Again and again the workers of Jaroslav tried to set up local self-government, and each time they were crushed by brutal and bloody violence.1

L. I. Goldman, member of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, made a report to that body concerning one of these Jaroslav uprisings in which he wrote:

The population of that city consists mainly of work- men. Having the assistance of a military organization under the leadership of General Alexiev and General Savinkov, the laborers of all the plants and factories took part in the uprising. Before the uprising began the leaders declared that they would not allow it unless they had the sympathy of the laborers and other classes. Trotsky sent a message stating that if the revolt could not be quelled he would go as far as having the city of Jaroslav with its 40,000 inhabitants completely destroyed. . . . Though surrounded by 17,000 Red Guards, Jaroslav resisted, but was finally captured by the Bolsheviki, due to the superiority of their artillery. The uprising was suppressed by bloody and terrible means. The spirit of destruction swayed over Jaroslav, which is one of the oldest Russian cities.

1 The salient facts in this paragraph are condensed from L'Ouvrier Russe, May, 1918. See also Bullard, The Russian Pendulum — Au- tocracy, Democracy, Bolshevism, p. 92, for an account of the same events.