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Changing short description from "Phrase by an Arab leader about the consequences of a Jewish state" to "Arab leader's 1947 comment on war with a Jewish state" |
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{{Short description|Arab leader's 1947 comment on war with a Jewish state}}
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The '''Azzam Pasha quotation''' was part of a statement made by [[Abdul Rahman Hassan Azzam]], the Secretary-General of the [[Arab League]] from 1945 to 1952, in which he declared in 1947 that, were a war to take place with the proposed establishment of a [[Jewish state]], it would lead to "a [[war of extermination]] and momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the [[Mongol empire|Mongolian massacre]] and the [[Crusades]]."<ref name="karsh"/>
The quote was universally cited for decades as having been uttered on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and the Arab states several months later. The source of the quote was traced by the computer scientist [[Brendan McKay (mathematician)|Brendan McKay]] to an October 11, 1947, article in the Egyptian newspaper ''Akhbar al-Yom'', titled "
The historian [[Efraim Karsh]] considers this quote a "genocidal threat".<ref name="karsh" /> The Israeli historian [[Tom Segev]] has disputed Karsh's interpretation, saying that "Azzam used to talk a lot" and pointing to another statement from May 21, 1948, in which Azzam Pasha declared his desire for "equal citizenship for Jews in Arab Palestine".<ref name=Segev/>
== Historical context ==
In August 1946, the head of the Arab department of the [[Jewish Agency for Israel|Jewish Agency]] [[Eliyahu Sasson]] visited [[Cairo]] to lobby for partition in Palestine. He proposed a deal where Egypt would convince the Arab states to accept partition and in return the Jewish Agency would lobby on behalf of the Egyptians to persuade the British to transfer their troops on the Suez Canal bases to the new Jewish state. Surprisingly, the Egyptians were very receptive to this offer. Sasson reported back:<blockquote>In his [Azzam’s] view there is only one solution and that is: partition. But collective debates and discussions are required in order to arrive at this solution. As the Secretary of the Arab League, he cannot appear before the Arabs as the initiator of this suggestion. His position is very delicate. He is married to seven wives (that is, he is the Secretary of seven Arab states), each one fearing her fellow wife, competing with her and trying to undermine her. He can see fit to support partition on two conditions: If one of the Arab states will find the strength and the courage to take the initiative and to propose the matter at a meeting of the League, and if the British will request that he follow this line.{{Sfn|Doran|1999|p=99}}</blockquote>The [[United Nations Special Committee on Palestine]] was set up in May 1947 to develop proposals for [[United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine|the partition of Palestine]]. Recommendations to this effect were made in September of that year. The majority plan proposed a distinct [[two-state solution]], the minority plan foresaw a [[Federal Palestine|federal state]]. Though the Jews had accepted the majority plan, the Arab countries were unanimous in their negative reactions to both plans, and openly spoke of taking up arms were either of these proposals enacted.<ref>Ronald J. Berger,''The Holocaust, Religion, and the Politics of Collective Memory: Beyond Sociology,'' Transaction Publishers, 2012 p. 176.</ref><ref>[[Henry Laurens]], ''[[La Question de Palestine]],'' Fayard, Paris 2002, vol.2 p.593.</ref> For [[Ernest Bevin]], the [[Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs|British Foreign Secretary]], the majority plan would only lead to an outbreak of generalised violence, as clearly unjust to the Arabs, whilst the minority plan was inapplicable since it assumed a prior accord between Jews and Arabs.<ref>Henry Laurens, ''La Question de Palestine,'' p.594</ref>
On September 15,<ref>[[Howard Sachar|Howard Morley Sachar]],''Europe leaves the Middle East, 1936–1954'', Knopf, 1972 p.494, gives October the 14th. This date however is not that given by Abba Eban himself. See A. S. Eban, 'Note of Conversation with Abdel Rahman Azzam Pasha,' London, Sept. 15, 1947,' in Neil Caplan, ''Futile Diplomacy,'' Frank Cass, 1986, Vol. 2, pp. 274–76; Laurens, ''Question de Palestine'', vol. 2 p. 680 n. 103 for additional bibliography.
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On October 11, the editor of ''[[Akhbar el-Yom]]'', [[Mustafa Amin]], ran an interview he had obtained from Azzam Pasha to report on the outcome of the summit. The article was entitled "A War of Extermination", and in one passage contained the following words.<ref name="karsh"/>
{{Quotation|text=I personally wish that the Jews do not drive us to this war, as this will be a war of extermination and momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Tartar massacre or the Crusader wars. I believe that the number of volunteers from outside Palestine will be larger than Palestine's Arab population, for I know that volunteers will be arriving to us from [as far as] India, Afghanistan, and China to win the honor of [[shaheed|martyrdom]] for the sake of Palestine {{omission}} You might be surprised to learn that hundreds of Englishmen expressed their wish to volunteer in the Arab armies to fight the Jews.|title=
In early December 1947 Azzam told a rally of students in Cairo that "The Arabs conquered the Tartars and the Crusaders and they are now ready to defeat the new enemy," echoing sentiments he had expressed to a journalist the previous day.<ref>{{cite news|title=British Institute Gutted; Demonstration near Cairo|newspaper=The Times of India|date=December 3, 1947|page=5}} {{cite news|author=Margaret Pope|title="Will Fight to Finish," Says League Official|newspaper=The Scotsman|date=December 1, 1947|page=2}}</ref>
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Azzam's quoted first sentence, without its initial caveat, appeared in English in a [[Jewish Agency]] memorandum to the United Nations Palestine Commission in February 1948.<ref>Jewish Agency for Palestine, Memorandum on acts of Arab aggression to alter by force the settlement on the future government of Palestine approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, Submitted to the United Nations Palestine Commission. Lake Success, New York. February 2, 1948. A copy appears in [https://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/710 UN document S/710].</ref> During the next few years, the same partial sentence appeared in its correct 1947 setting in several books.<ref>{{cite book|last=Stone|first=Isidor Feinstein|author-link=I. F. Stone|title=This is Israel|publisher=Boni and Gaer|year=1948|page=21}}; {{cite book|last=Zilliacus|first=Konni|author-link=Konni Zilliacus|title=I choose peace|url=https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.237184|publisher=Penguin Books|year=1949|page=[https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.237184/page/n256 259]}}</ref> However, by 1952, many publications, including one published by the Israeli government, had moved its date to 1948,<ref>{{cite book|last =Levin|first=Harry| author-link=Harry Levin| title=I saw the Battle of Jerusalem|publisher=Schocken Books|year=1950|pages=164–165}} {{cite book|last =Carlson|first=John Roy|author-link=John Roy Carlson|title=Cairo to Damascus|url =https://archive.org/details/cairotodamascus013892mbp|url-access =limited|publisher=Alfred A. Knopf|year=1951|page=[https://archive.org/details/cairotodamascus013892mbp/page/n297 266]}} {{cite book|last=Learsi|first=Rufus|title=Fulfillment: the epic story of Zionism|url=https://archive.org/details/fulfillmenttheep008764mbp|publisher=World Publishing Company|year=1951|page=[https://archive.org/details/fulfillmenttheep008764mbp/page/n405 384]}} {{cite book|last=Schechtman|first=Joseph|author-link=Joseph Schechtman|title=The Arab Refugee Problem|publisher=Philosophical Society|year=1952|page=6}} {{cite book|author=Israel Office of Information|title=The Arabs in Israel|url=https://archive.org/details/TheArabsInIsrael|date=January 1952}}</ref> specifically to May 15, 1948, shortly after the outbreak of the [[1948 Arab–Israeli War]].<ref name="karsh"/> As the war got underway, ''[[The Jerusalem Post]]'' quoted a further declaration from him:
{{blockquote|
== Quotation source and authenticity debate ==
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Tom Segev, also an historian, disputes this interpretation, saying that "Azzam used to talk a lot" and pointing to another statement from May 21, 1948, in which Azzam Pasha declared his desire for "equal citizenship for Jews in Arab Palestine".<ref name=Segev/> In response to Segev, Karsh wrote that while it is true that Azzam was prepared to allow survivors of the destroyed Jewish state to live as ''[[dhimmi]]s'', in his view "this can hardly be considered an indication of moderation".<ref name="karsh2">Efraim Karsh, [http://newenglishreview.org/blog_display.cfm/blog_id/39610 'Haaretz: The Paper for Thinking People?,'] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130209135924/http://newenglishreview.org/blog_display.cfm/blog_id/39610 |date=2013-02-09 }} at [http://www.newenglishreview.org/ New English Review], December 16, 2011.</ref>
[[Michael Scott Doran]] offered a different view on Azzam's goals. In his opinion:<blockquote>The flimsy alliance that the Egyptian authorities pretended to let King Abdallah lead into battle was, at one and the same moment, an anti-Israeli and an anti-Jordanian instrument. Cairo viewed the coalition not as a weapon for destroying Zionism but, rather, as a catapult designed to hurl the Jordanian army at the Israelis. The distinction between these two conceptions is indeed fine, but significant nonetheless. In military terms, the goal of the coalition was to liberate as much Palestinian territory as possible and to weaken, if not defeat, the enemy. In political terms, however, its purpose was to prevent the partition of Palestine between Israel and Jordan by forcing Amman, first, to make war against Zionism, and, second, to refrain from cutting a deal with the enemy without the authorization of Cairo.
... In addition, they had no choice but to capture the moral high ground of Arab politics by advocating a policy of no compromise, even though they realized that compromise would be a very likely outcome of the conflict. Calling for the liberation of Palestine, and behaving in a manner consistent with the call, were essential components of the Egyptian project, but they did not constitute its central objective. Thus, partial failure on the battlefield would not constitute a failure of the entire operation, if the maneuver were to result in driving a wedge between King Abdallah and the Zionists. If Cairo stopped short of destroying Zionism and yet still succeeded, say, in creating a Palestinian state sandwiched on the West Bank between Jordan and Israel, then it would have achieved its fundamental goals of preventing the expansion of Jordan and thwarting the creation of an Amman– Tel Aviv axis.{{Sfn|Doran|1999|pp=153-154}}</blockquote>
== Translation ==
<blockquote>Personally I hope the Jews do not force us into this war because it will be a war of elimination and it will be a serious massacre which history will record similarly to the Mongol massacre or the wars of the Crusades. I think the number of volunteers from outside Palestine will exceed the Palestinian population. I know that we will get volunteers from India, Afghanistan and China to have the glory of being martyrs for Palestine. You might be shocked if you knew that many British have shown interest in volunteering in the Arab armies to fight the Jews.{{pb}}This fight will be distinguished by three grave issues; faith, since all fighters believe that his fight for Palestine is the short road to heaven. Second it will be a chance for looting on a grand scale. Third, no one will be able to stop the zealous volunteers who will come from all over the world to revenge the Palestinian martyrs because they know that the battle is an honor for all Muslims and Arabs in the world...{{pb}} Moreover, the Arab is distinguished from the Jew in that he accepts defeat with a smile, so if the Jews win the first battle we will win in the second, third or the last. On the other hand a single defeat of the Jews will destroy their morale.{{pb}} The Arabs in the desert love to go to war. ... I remember once while fighting in the desert I was called to make a peace and the Arabs asked me why do you do that? How can we live without a war? The Bedouin finds enjoyment in war which he does not find in peace!{{pb}} I warned the Jewish leaders whom I met in London about continuing their policy, and I told them that the Arab soldier is the strongest in the world. Once he lifts his weapon, he does not put it down till he fires the last bullet in the battle, and we will fire the last bullet...{{pb}} In the end I understand the consequence of this bloody war, I see in front of me its horrible battles, I can imagine its victims but I have a clear conscience since we were called to fight as defenders and not attackers!<ref>{{cite news| author = Mustafa Amin | title = The Arabs prepare for war | newspaper = Akhbar el-Yom | date = 11 October 1947 | language = Arabic | publication-place = Cairo| pages = 1,9}}</ref></blockquote>
==See also==
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{{reflist}}
== Further reading ==
{{Citebook |last=Doran |first=Michael |title=Pan-Arabism before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1999 |isbn=9780195160086}}
[[Category:1948 Arab–Israeli War]]
[[Category:Anti-Zionism]]
[[Category:Political quotes]]
[[Category:Quotations from military]]
[[Category:1940s neologisms]]▼
[[Category:Prediction]]
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