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==United States==
In the [[United States]], the traditional privilege of "fair comment" is seen as a protection for robust, even outrageous published or spoken opinions about public officials and [[public figure]]s. Fair comment is defined as a "common law defense [that] guarantees the freedom of the press to express statements on matters of public interest, as long as the statements are not made with ill will, spite, or with the intent to harm the plaintiff".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.hfac.uh.edu/comm/media_libel/libel/definition.html|title=http://www.hfac.uh.edu/comm/media_libel/libel/definition.html|publisher=|deadurl=yes|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20050830085000/http://www.hfac.uh.edu/comm/media_libel/libel/definition.html|archivedate=2005-08-30|df=}}</ref>
 
The defense of "fair comment" in the U.S. since 1964 has largely been replaced by the ruling in [[New York Times Co. v. Sullivan]], 376 U.S. 254 (1964), (U.S. Supreme Court). This case relied on the issue of [[actual malice]], which involves the defendant making a statement known at the time to be false, or which was made with a "reckless disregard" of whether the statement was true or false. If "actual malice" cannot be shown, the defense of "fair comment" is then superseded by the broader protection of the failure by the plaintiff to show "actual malice".