Douma chemical attack: Difference between revisions

On 6 July 2018, an interim report was issued by the [[Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons]] (OPCW). Various [[chlorinated]] [[organic chemicals]] ([[dichloroacetic acid]], [[trichloroacetic acid]], [[chlorophenol]], [[dichlorophenol]], bornyl chloride, [[chloral hydrate]] etc.) were found in samples, along with residues of explosive, but the designated laboratory 03 stated that no [[Chemical Weapons Convention|CWC-scheduled chemicals]] or [[nerve agent]] related chemicals were detected. In September 2018 the UN Commission of Enquiry on Syria reported: "Throughout 7 April, numerous aerial attacks were carried out in Douma, striking various residential areas. A vast body of evidence collected by theThe Commission suggests that, at approximately 7.30 p.m., a gas cylinder containing a chlorine payload delivered by helicopter struck a multi-storey residential apartment building located approximately 100 metres south-west of Shohada square. The Commission received information on the death of at least 49 individuals, and the wounding of up to 650 others."<ref name=IICI2018report>{{cite report |author=UN Human Rights Council |author-link=United Nations Human Rights Council |authors= |date=9 August 2018 |title=Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic |url=https://undocs.org/A/HRC/39/65 |publisher=United Nations |access-date=30 June 2019 |id=A/HRC/39/65 |section=VI. Ongoing investigations |page=17}}</ref>

A document was leaked in 2019 containing an engineering assessment by a current or former OPCW Inspection Team leader and, according to a statement from the director, liaison officer for OPCW in Damascus.<ref>{{cite report |author= |author-link= |authors=((OPCW TWG on Investigative Science and Technology)) |date=26 February 2018 |title=SUMMARY OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD'S TEMPORARY WORKING GROUP ON INVESTIGATIVE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY |url=https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/SAB/en/sab-27-wp01_e_.pdf |publisher=Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons |page=13 |docket= |access-date=27 June 2019 |quote= }}</ref><ref name="OPCW Remarks 28.05.19" /> According to the document, the evidence encountered at the site indicated the liquefied-chlorine cylinders were not dropped from helicopters, but manually placed in their respective locations. This dissenting assessment was not included in the final report.<ref>{{cite news|last=Fisk|first=Robert|authorlink=Robert Fisk|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190603054327/https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/douma-syria-opcw-chemical-weapons-chlorine-gas-video-conspiracy-theory-russia-a8927116.html|title=The evidence we were never meant to see about the Douma 'gas' attack|work=The Independent|date=23 May 2019|access-date=31 May 2019}}]</ref> Subsequently the head of the OPCW stated that this document had been produced by an OPCW member, however it "pointed at possible attribution, which is outside of the mandate of the [Fact-Finding Mission] with regard to the formulation of its findings." Fernando Arias, Director-General of the OPCW, said the staff member who produced the document was a liaison officer at the OPCW Command Post Office in Damascus and was tasked with temporarily assisting the FFM with information collection at some sites in Douma. Arias said 'all views, analysis, information and opinions are considered. This is what the FFM did with the information included in the publicly disclosed document; all available information was examined, weighed and deliberated. Diverse views were expressed, discussed and considered against the overall facts and evidence collected and analysed. With regard to the ballistics data collected by the FFM, they were analysed by three external experts commissioned by the FFM, and working independently from one another. In the end, while using different methods and instruments, they all reached the same conclusions that can be found in the FFM final report.'<ref name="OPCW Remarks 28.05.19">[[OPCW]], [https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/06/Remarks%20of%20the%20Director-General%20Briefing%20for%20States%20Parties%20on%20Syrian%20Arab%20Republic%20Update%20on%20IIT-FFM-SSRC-DAT.pdf Remarks of the Director-General at the Briefing for States Parties on Syrian Arab Republic:Update on IIT-FFM-SSRC-DAT], 28 May 2019</ref> According to [[EA Worldview]], Arias indicated that the memo was "considered but was not fit for the conclusion" of the FFM’s report. Scott Lucas further reported that Arias had confirmed that the Syrian government was "refusing any follow-up by the Investigations and Identification Team, denying visas and access to information held by Damascus".<ref>{{cite web | url=https://eaworldview.com/2019/06/solving-a-mystery-the-deadly-chemical-attack-on-syrias-douma-and-a-new-document/ | title=Solving a Mystery: The Deadly Chemical Attack on Syria’s Douma and a New Document | first=Scott | last=Lucas | date=12 June 2019 | publisher=EA Worldview | accessdate=22 June 2019 }}</ref><ref> The Guardian, 25 November 2019 [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/25/chemical-weapons-watchdog-opcw-defends-syria-report-after-leaks]</ref><ref> Bellingcat 25 November 2019[https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2019/11/25/emails-and-reading-comprehension-opcw-douma-coverage-misses-crucial-facts/ emails and reading comprehension]</ref>