Talk:Von Neumann–Wigner interpretation

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Chalmers quote in objections section Chalmers' own response to his quote is worth including from 'Consciousnes and It's Place in Nature' (2002). There is some irony in the fact that philosophers reject interactionism on largely physical grounds* (it is incompatible with physical theory), while physicists reject an interactionist interpretation of quantum mechanics on largely philosophical grounds (it is dualistic).

and in the footnote he directly responds to points he made in 1996:

I have been as guilty of this as anyone, setting aside interactionism in Chalmers 1996 partly for reasons of compatibility with physics. I am still not especially inclined to endorse interactionism, but I now think that the argument from physics is much too glib. Three further reasons for rejecting the view are mentioned in Chalmers 1996. First, if consciousness is to make an interesting qualitative difference to behavior, this requires that it act nonrandomly, in violation of the probabilistic requirements of quantum mechanics. I think there is something to this, but one could bite the bullet on nonrandomness in response, or one could hold that even a random causal role for consciousness is good enough. Second, I argued that denying causal closure yields no special advantage, as a view with causal closure can achieve much the same effect via type-F monism. Again there is something to this, but the type-D view does have the significant advantage of avoiding the type-F view’s “combination problem.” Third, it is not clear that the collapse interpretation yields the sort of causal role for consciousness that we expect it to have. I think that this is an important open question that requires detailed investigation.

His shift in perspective seems relevant, rather than simply presenting an immature view of his which he later rescinded. 151.229.113.253 (talk) 11:52, 17 September 2015 (UTC) JJBeerReply

Objection

Latest comment: 8 years ago2 comments2 people in discussion

Why is so most of this article on objection? The objection section is so large despite simply amounting to "it is incompatible with materialism, which most physicists subscribe to." --140.32.16.52 (talk) 16:24, 17 November 2015 (UTC)Reply

Maybe the editors dislike this interpretation. Roger (talk) 18:52, 18 November 2015 (UTC)Reply