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{{short description|Theory in the history of war}} |
{{short description|Theory in the history of war}} |
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{{Refimprove|date=October 2020}} |
{{Refimprove|date=October 2020}} |
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{{Globalize|date=February 2023|2=Western world in its examples,}}[[File:Time out of Mind - geograph.org.uk - 1409506.jpg|thumb|A British [[Napoleonic Wars]] [[Historical reenactment|reenactor]] watching modern [[Military helicopter|military helicopters]] fly over his camp, exemplifying the vast differences in each generation of warfare]] |
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{{History of war}} |
{{History of war}} |
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In [[military history]], the term "'''generations of warfare'''" refers to the concept of five "[[Generation|generations]]" in [[War|warfare]], with each generation having different [[Military tactics|tactics]], [[Military strategy|strategies]], and [[Military technology|technologies]]. The generations of warfare are sometimes dubbed as "4GW" or "5GW". The term originated in 1989 to describe "the changing face of war" over time, initially only referring to the emergence of the fourth generation, but eventually seeing the addition of a fifth generation.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Defense Technical Information Center|url=http://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA521639|title=DTIC ADA521639: Military Review. Volume 87, Number 3, May-June 2007|date=2007-06-01|language=english}}</ref><ref name=":1" /> |
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There are five generations of warfare: |
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The concept of four "generations" in the history of [[modern warfare]] was created by a team of [[United States]] analysts, including [[William S. Lind]],<ref name=":0">{{Citation |last1=Lind |first1=William S. |last2=Nightengale |first2=Keith |last3=Schmitt |first3=John F. |last4=Sutton |first4=Joseph W. |last5=Wilson |first5=Gary I. |date=October 1989 |title=The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation |url=http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/lind/the-changing-face-of-war-into-the-fourth-generation.html |work=Marine Corps Gazette |pages=22–26 }}</ref> for the purpose of an argument for "the changing face of war" entering into a "fourth generation". The generations of warfare are sometimes dubbed as "4GW"<ref>{{Cite book|last=Defense Technical Information Center|url=http://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA521639|title=DTIC ADA521639: Military Review. Volume 87, Number 3, May-June 2007|date=2007-06-01|language=english}}</ref>. |
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* '''First-generation warfare''' refers to [[Ancient history| |
* '''First-generation warfare''' refers to [[Ancient history|ancient]] and [[Post-classical history|post-classical]] battles fought with massed manpower, using [[phalanx]], [[Line of battle|line]], and [[Column (formation)|column]] tactics with uniformed soldiers governed by the [[Nation state|state]].{{Dubious|date=June 2022|reason=The definition is different in the corresponding section}} This generation came to an end around the mid-nineteenth century due to rapid improvements in the range, accuracy, and rate-of-fire of many weapon systems. |
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⚫ | * '''Second-generation warfare''' refers to [[industrial warfare]], evolving after the invention of the [[rifled musket]] and [[breech-loading weapon]]s and continuing through the development of the [[machine gun]] and [[indirect fire]]. This generation predates the widespread effective use of [[Military vehicle|motorised vehicles]] in battle and [[combined arms]]. The term ''second generation warfare'' was created by the [[United States Armed Forces|U.S. military]] in 1989. |
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⚫ | * '''Third-generation warfare''' focuses on using [[Late modern period|late modern]] technology-derived tactics of leveraging speed, stealth, and surprise to bypass the enemy's lines and collapse their forces from the rear. Essentially, this was the end of linear warfare on a tactical level, with units seeking not simply to meet each other face to face but to outmaneuver each other to gain the greatest advantage. [[Armoured warfare|Armoured units]], [[military aircraft]], and [[airborne forces]] began to play an increasingly critical role in operations, with the development of strategies such as [[Blitzkrieg]] and [[deep operation]]. |
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⚫ | * '''Second-generation warfare''' |
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⚫ | * '''Fourth-generation warfare''' as presented by Lind et al. is characterized by a [[Postmodernity|post-modern]] return to [[decentralized]] forms of warfare, blurring of the lines between [[war]] and [[politics]], [[combatants]], and [[civilians]] due to states' loss of their near-monopoly on combat forces, returning to modes of conflict common in pre-modern times. [[Guerrilla warfare|Guerrilla]] groups, [[Private military company|private military contractors]], and [[paramilitary]] organisations play a prominent role in fourth-generation warfare. |
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⚫ | *'''Fifth-generation warfare''' is conducted primarily through [[Kinetic military action|non-kinetic military action]], such as [[Social engineering (political science)|social engineering]], [[misinformation]], and [[Cyberattack|cyberattacks]], along with emerging technologies such as [[artificial intelligence]] and fully [[Autonomous robot|autonomous systems]]. Fifth generation warfare has been described by Daniel Abbot as a war of "information and perception".<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|last=Abbott|first=Daniel|title=The Handbook of Fifth-Generation Warfare|publisher=Nimble Books|year=2010|pages=20}}</ref> |
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⚫ | * '''Third-generation warfare''' focuses on using [[ |
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⚫ | * '''Fourth-generation warfare''' as presented by Lind et al. is characterized by a |
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⚫ | *'''Fifth-generation warfare |
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== First generation == |
== First generation == |
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[[File:Erstes pr. Bataillon Leibgarde in Schlacht bei Kollin.jpg|left|thumb|A Prussian [[Leibgarde (military)|Leibgarde]] battalion using line and column formation tactics during the [[Seven Years' War]]]] |
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⚫ | In 1648, at the end of the [[Thirty Years' War]], the [[Peace of Westphalia|Treaty of Westphalia]] gave a practical sovereignty to the [[List of states in the Holy Roman Empire|German states]], which until then were semi-independent components of the [[Holy Roman Empire]]. This more firmly established the sovereignty of the nation state, which meant, among other things, that governments would have exclusive rights to organize and maintain their own militaries. Before this time, many armies and nations were controlled by religious orders and many wars were fought in [[Melee|melee combat]], or subversively through [[bribery]] and [[assassination]]. The first generation of modern warfare was intended to create a straightforward and orderly means of waging war.<ref name="Lind">{{Citation |last=Lind |first=William S. |authorlink=William S. Lind |date=January 15, 2004 |title=Understanding Fourth Generation War |url=http://antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702 |work=[[antiwar.com]] |accessdate=February 7, 2010 }}</ref> |
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⚫ | Alternatively, it has been argued that the Peace of Westphalia did not solidify the power of the nation state, but that the Thirty Years' War itself ushered in an era of large-scale combat that was simply too costly for smaller mercenary groups to carry out on their own. According to this theory, smaller groups ''chose'' to leave mass combat—and the expenses associated with it—in the domain of the nation-state.<ref>{{cite book |last=Echevarria |first=Antulio J. II |title=Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths |date=November 2005 |url=http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub632.pdf |work=[[Strategic Studies Institute]] |publisher=[[United States Army War College]] |access-date=2014-04-26 |archive-date=2018-04-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180422084158/http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub632.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> |
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[[File:Hohenfriedeberg - Attack of Prussian Infantry - 1745.jpg|thumb|left|300px|Prussian infantry advancing in line and column formation at the [[Battle of Hohenfriedberg]] in 1745]] |
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⚫ | In 1648, at the end of the [[Thirty Years' War]], the [[Peace of Westphalia|Treaty of Westphalia]] gave a practical sovereignty to the [[List of states in the Holy Roman Empire|German states]], which until then were semi-independent components of the [[Holy Roman Empire]]. This more firmly established the sovereignty of the |
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⚫ | Alternatively, it has been argued that the Peace of Westphalia did not solidify the power of the nation |
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The increased accuracy and speed of the [[rifled musket]] and the [[breech-loading weapon|breech-loader]] marks the end of first generation warfare; the concept of vast lines of soldiers meeting face to face became impractical due to the heavy casualties that could be sustained. Because these technologies were adopted gradually throughout the Americas and Europe, the exact end of the first generation of modern warfare depends on the region, but all world powers had moved on by the latter half of the 19th century.<ref name=Lind/> |
The increased accuracy and speed of the [[rifled musket]] and the [[breech-loading weapon|breech-loader]] marks the end of first generation warfare; the concept of vast lines of soldiers meeting face to face became impractical due to the heavy casualties that could be sustained. Because these technologies were adopted gradually throughout the Americas and Europe, the exact end of the first generation of modern warfare depends on the region, but all world powers had moved on by the latter half of the 19th century.<ref name=Lind/> |
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In order to create a more controlled environment for warfare a military culture was developed that, in many ways, is still visible in the armed forces of today. Specially crafted uniforms set soldiers apart from the general populace. |
In order to create a more controlled environment for warfare, a military culture was developed that, in many ways, is still visible in the armed forces of today. Specially crafted uniforms set soldiers apart from the general populace. |
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An elaborate structure of [[Military rank|rank]] was developed to better organize men into units. Rules for [[Parade (military)|military |
An elaborate structure of [[Military rank|rank]] was developed to better organize men into units. Rules for [[Parade (military)|military drills]] were perfected, allowing line and column maneuvers to be executed with more precision, and to increase the rate of fire in battle. |
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Control of media information |
Control of media and information released during the war and the production of [[counterfeit money]] in order to devaluate the enemy's economy were used for the first time during the Napoleonic Wars. |
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Examples |
===Examples=== |
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*[[English Civil War]] |
*[[English Civil War]] |
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*[[Anglo-Spanish War ( |
*[[Anglo-Spanish War (1654–1660)|Anglo-Spanish War]] |
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*[[Seven Years' War]] |
*[[Seven Years' War]] |
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*[[American Revolutionary War]] |
*[[American Revolutionary War]] |
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== Second generation == |
== Second generation == |
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[[File:German machine gun detachment creeping into action, May 7, 1915 (30982753741).jpg|left|thumb|German infantry and machine gun units advancing during [[World War I]]]] |
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[[File:Red army soldiers, end of 1920s-beginning of 1930s.jpg|thumb|left|200px|Technological developments such as the [[Maxim gun]] gave smaller units the ability to operate more independently]] |
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In the 19th century, the invention of the breech-loading rifled musket meant longer range, greater accuracy, and faster rate of fire. Marching ranks of men straight into a barrage of fire from such weapons would cause tremendous rates of casualties, so a new strategy was developed. |
In the 19th century, the invention of the breech-loading rifled musket meant longer range, greater accuracy, and faster rate of fire. Marching ranks of men straight into a barrage of fire from such weapons would cause tremendous rates of casualties, so a new strategy was developed. |
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The contributions of the second generation were responses to technological development. The second generation saw the rise of [[trench warfare]], [[artillery]] support, more advanced [[reconnaissance]] techniques, extensive use of [[Military camouflage|camouflage uniforms]], [[radio]] communications, and [[fireteam]] maneuvers. |
The contributions of the second generation were responses to technological development. The second generation saw the rise of [[trench warfare]], [[artillery]] support, more advanced [[reconnaissance]] techniques, extensive use of [[Military camouflage|camouflage uniforms]], [[radio]] communications, and [[fireteam]] maneuvers. |
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Examples |
===Examples=== |
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*[[American Civil War]] |
*[[American Civil War]] |
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*[[Boer War]] |
*[[Boer War]] |
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*[[Italo-Turkish War]] |
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*[[World War I]] |
*[[World War I]] |
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*[[Spanish Civil War]] |
*[[Spanish Civil War]] |
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== Third generation == |
== Third generation == |
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[[File:A Challenger 1 tank during the Gulf War.JPEG|left|thumb|Tanks advancing alongside armored vehicles and mechanized forces during the [[Gulf War]]]] |
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⚫ | The use of blitzkrieg during the [[Battle of France|German invasion of France]] first demonstrated the power of speed and maneuverability over static artillery positions and trench defenses. Through the use of [[tank]]s, [[mechanized infantry]], and [[close air support]], the Germans were able to quickly break through linear defenses and capture the rear. |
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⚫ | |||
[[File:DesertStormMap v2.svg|thumb|left|250px|Fast advances and maneuvering allowed Allied mechanized forces to quickly penetrate deep into Iraq during the [[Gulf War]]]] |
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⚫ | The use of blitzkrieg during the [[Battle of France|German invasion of France]] first demonstrated the power of speed and maneuverability over static artillery positions and trench defenses. Through the use of [[tank]]s, [[ |
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⚫ | |||
The contributions of the third generation were based on the concept of overcoming technological disadvantage through the use of clever strategy. As linear fighting came to an end, new ways of moving faster began to appear. |
The contributions of the third generation were based on the concept of overcoming technological disadvantage through the use of clever strategy. As linear fighting came to an end, new ways of moving faster began to appear. |
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The emphasis on mobility moved from heavy armor to greater speed, the development of the [[helicopter]] allowed insertions in hostile territory, and advanced [[missile]] technology allowed forces to bypass enemy defenses and strike at targets from great distances. |
The emphasis on mobility moved from heavy armor to greater speed, the development of the [[helicopter]] allowed insertions in hostile territory, and advanced [[missile]] technology allowed forces to bypass enemy defenses and strike at targets from great distances. The speed inherent in these methods necessitated a greater degree of independence allowed to the units on the front lines. |
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The speed inherent in these methods necessitated a greater degree of independence allowed to the units on the front lines. |
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Greater trust needed to be placed in junior officers commanding sub-units by higher-ranking officers—a belief that they could adequately achieve their objectives without micromanagement from higher ranking commanders in command headquarters. |
Greater trust needed to be placed in junior officers commanding sub-units by higher-ranking officers—a belief that they could adequately achieve their objectives without micromanagement from higher ranking commanders in command headquarters. |
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Smaller units were allowed greater decision flexibility to deal with changing situations on the ground, rather than have decisions made for them by commanders who were distant from the front. This began to break down the regimented culture of order that was so important in previous theoretical eras of military [[command and control]]. |
Smaller units were allowed greater decision flexibility to deal with changing situations on the ground, rather than have decisions made for them by commanders who were distant from the front. This began to break down the regimented culture of order that was so important in previous theoretical eras of military [[command and control]]. |
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Examples |
===Examples=== |
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*[[World War II]] |
*[[World War II]] |
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*[[Korean War]] |
*[[Korean War]] |
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*[[Vietnam War]] |
*[[Vietnam War]] |
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*[[Persian Gulf War]] |
*[[Persian Gulf War]] |
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*[[ |
*[[War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)|War in Afghanistan]] |
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*[[Iraq War]] |
*[[Iraq War]] |
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{{anchor| 4GW | Fourth-generation warfare}} |
{{anchor| 4GW | Fourth-generation warfare}} |
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{{main|Fourth-generation warfare}} |
{{main|Fourth-generation warfare}}[[File:Maguindanao guerillas, 1999.jpg|thumb|Guerillas in the [[Philippines]] in 1999|left]] |
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The term "fourth-generation warfare" was first used in 1989 by a team of American analysts, including [[William S. Lind]], to describe warfare's return to a decentralized form. In terms of [[generational modern warfare]], the fourth generation signifies the [[nation state]]s' loss of their near-monopoly on combat forces, returning to modes of conflict common in pre-modern times.<ref name=":0">{{Citation |last1=Lind |first1=William S. |last2=Nightengale |first2=Keith |last3=Schmitt |first3=John F. |last4=Sutton |first4=Joseph W. |last5=Wilson |first5=Gary I. |date=October 1989 |title=The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation |url=http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/lind/the-changing-face-of-war-into-the-fourth-generation.html |work=Marine Corps Gazette |pages=22–26 }}</ref> |
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The simplest definition includes any war in which one of the major participants is not a [[Sovereign state|state]] but rather a [[violent non-state actor]]. Classical examples, such as the [[Third Servile War|slave uprising under Spartacus]] or the [[Mercenary War|mercenary uprising]] that occurred in Carthage after the [[ |
The simplest definition includes any war in which one of the major participants is not a [[Sovereign state|state]] but rather a [[violent non-state actor]]. Classical examples, such as the [[Third Servile War|slave uprising under Spartacus]] or the [[Mercenary War|mercenary uprising]] that occurred in Carthage after the [[First Punic War]], predate the modern concept of warfare and are examples of this type of conflict. |
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[[File:Maguindanao guerillas, 1999.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Guerillas in [[Maguindanao massacre|Maguindanao]], 1999]] |
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Fourth generation warfare is defined as conflicts which involve the following elements: |
Fourth generation warfare is defined as conflicts which involve the following elements: |
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* Are complex and long term |
* Are complex and long term |
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Fourth-generation warfare theory has been criticized on the grounds that it is "nothing more than repackaging of the traditional clash between the non-state insurgent and the soldiers of a nation-state."<ref>[http://mackenzieinstitute.com/on-fourth-generation-warfare/ On Fourth Generation Warfare], ''The Mackenzie Institute''</ref> |
Fourth-generation warfare theory has been criticized on the grounds that it is "nothing more than repackaging of the traditional clash between the non-state insurgent and the soldiers of a nation-state."<ref>[http://mackenzieinstitute.com/on-fourth-generation-warfare/ On Fourth Generation Warfare], ''The Mackenzie Institute''</ref> |
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===Examples=== |
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* [[Colombian conflict]] |
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* [[Israeli-Palestinian conflict]] |
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* [[Myanmar conflict]] |
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* [[The Troubles]] |
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* [[War against the Islamic State]] |
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== Fifth generation == |
== Fifth generation == |
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{{Main|Fifth-generation warfare}} |
{{Main|Fifth-generation warfare}} |
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[[File:Pro-Russian bot farm in Ukraine (2022).jpg|left|thumb|An office belonging to [[Russian web brigades]] captured by Ukrainian forces during the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]]]] |
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Fifth-generation warfare "5GW" is an emerging term defined by the combination of [[Cyberwarfare]] an [[Social engineering (political science)]]. Abbott and Rees/Herring have described fifth generation warfare as "the deliberate manipulation of an observer's context in order to achieve a desired outcome"<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1034693066|title=Cyber security : power and technology|date=2018|others=Martti Lehto, Pekka Neittaanmäki|isbn=978-3-319-75307-2|location=Cham, Switzerland|oclc=1034693066}}</ref><ref name=":1" /> |
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Fifth-generation warfare is warfare that is conducted primarily through [[Kinetic military action|non-kinetic military action]], such as [[Social engineering (political science)|social engineering]], [[misinformation]], [[Cyberattack|cyberattacks]], along with emerging technologies such as [[artificial intelligence]] and fully [[Autonomous robot|autonomous systems]]. Fifth generation warfare has been described by Daniel Abbot as a war of "information and perception".<ref>{{Cite book|last=Abbott|first=Daniel|title=The Handbook of Fifth-Generation Warfare|publisher=Nimble Books|year=2010|pages=20}}</ref> |
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Colonel [[Thomas Hammes]], of the U.S. Marine Corps, describes the need for a new generation of warfare due to the fact that "[warfare has] slid so far away from national armies that often it is impossible to tell 4GW fighters from simple criminal elements".<ref name=":0" /> |
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Key elements of fifth generation warfare is highlighted by [[Misinformation]] along with the [[cyberattack attribution problem]]. The "cyberattack attribution problem" is defined by the difficulty in determining the origin of a given cyberattack due the re-use of code and use of [[deception technology]] or "Honeypots" in software. This has resulted in a given piece of infrastructure being disabled, or denied service, and in any many cases being destroyed with loss of human life<ref>{{Cite news|last=Nast|first=Condé|title=The untold story of a cyberattack, a hospital and a dying woman|language=en-GB|work=Wired UK|url=https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ransomware-hospital-death-germany|access-date=2021-06-28|issn=1357-0978}}</ref>, without the opposing force knowing who was responsible. This has evolved into fully distributed code being executed out of control of its creator. One of the most prominent examples of this is the [[Mirai botnet]]<ref>{{Cite news|title=The Mirai Botnet Was Part of a College Student Minecraft Scheme|language=en-US|work=Wired|url=https://www.wired.com/story/mirai-botnet-minecraft-scam-brought-down-the-internet/|access-date=2021-06-28|issn=1059-1028}}</ref>, which was developed by a student and ended up being forked and used to disrupt much of Liberia's internet access<ref>{{Cite web|title=Did the Mirai Botnet Really Take Liberia Offline? – Krebs on Security|url=https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/11/did-the-mirai-botnet-really-take-liberia-offline/|access-date=2021-06-28|language=en-US}}</ref>. |
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Hammes continued, adding that fifth generation warfare is "marked by the increasing power of smaller and smaller entities". With the increasing availability of commercial, open source, and classified data sets, commercial and individual entities have the ability to alter the course of modern history. |
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=== Precursors === |
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The [[Facebook–Cambridge Analytica data scandal]], [[Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections|Russian Interference]] Controversy and following [[Attempts to overturn the 2020 United States presidential election]], may have marked the precursors for fifth-generation warfare. In the example of Cambridge Analytica, open source and grey market data sets were used to verifiably influence social opinion<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Gibney|first=Elizabeth|date=2018-03-29|title=The scant science behind Cambridge Analytica's controversial marketing techniques|url=https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-03880-4|journal=Nature|language=en|doi=10.1038/d41586-018-03880-4}}</ref>. In the latter example of The 2020 [[Stop The Steal]] movement, Facebook released a detailed report on how their internal analytical tools had failed, and outline how next generation systems were being deployed to prevent the spread of what they defined as misinformation<ref>{{Cite web|title=Stop the Steal and Patriot Party: The Growth and Mitigation of an Adversarial Harmful Movement|url=https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/full-facebook-stop-the-steal-internal-report|url-status=live|access-date=2021-06-28|website=BuzzFeed News|language=en}}</ref>. These examples of covering and responding to the 2016 Election data scandals, foreign interference, and the following attempts to overturn the United States 2020 election pose tremendous challenges for US government, social media and mainstream media companies<ref>{{Cite web|title=Artificial Intelligence Has the Power to Destroy or Save Democracy|url=https://www.cfr.org/blog/artificial-intelligence-has-power-destroy-or-save-democracy|access-date=2021-06-28|website=Council on Foreign Relations|language=en}}</ref>. The resulting normalization of misinformation has led to a significant decrease of American trust in media<ref>{{Cite web|last=Salmon|first=Felix|title=Trust in media hits new crisis low|url=https://www.axios.com/media-trust-crisis-2bf0ec1c-00c0-4901-9069-e26b21c283a9.html|access-date=2021-06-28|website=Axios|language=en}}</ref>. Additionally, this non-kinetic conflict between organized groups, political parties, and individuals has impacted international relations the way that traditional conflict or diplomatic disputes would have before<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Silverstein|first=Naomi|title=The New Geopolitical Space in the Information Era: A Neuroscientific Approach to National Security|url=https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4062&context=isp_collection|journal=SIT Graduate Institute}}</ref>. |
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=== Emergence in combat === |
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A further evolution of fifth-generation warfare took place during the [[2021 Israel–Palestine crisis]], and was arguably its first use of [[Kinetic military action]]. On May 13th, 2021, the [[Israel Defense Forces]] (IDF) announced falsely on [[Twitter]]<ref>{{Cite web|title=IDF air and ground troops are currently attacking in the Gaza Strip.|url=https://twitter.com/idf/status/1392953390443991040|url-status=live|access-date=2021-06-28|website=Twitter|language=en}}</ref>, and on the record to [[The Wall Street Journal]], that "IDF air and ground troops are currently attacking in the Gaza Strip"<ref>{{Cite web|title=Tweet|url=https://twitter.com/felschwartz/status/1392994317686513665|url-status=live|access-date=2021-06-28|website=Twitter|language=en}}</ref>. The IDF had announced that an Israeli invasion of Gaza had begun. The New York Times reported the following day that the announcement had been a deception,<ref>{{Cite news|last=Halbfinger|first=David M.|date=2021-05-14|title=A Press Corps Deceived, and the Gaza Invasion That Wasn't|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-disinformation.html|access-date=2021-06-28|issn=0362-4331}}</ref> that no Israeli troops had stepped foot in Gaza. IDF Further clarified the statement declaring that the intent of the announcement was to expose opposing [[Hamas]] forces and destroy tunnel networks<ref>{{Cite web|last=Gross|first=Judah Ari|title=IDF: Overnight bombardment targeted Hamas's tunnel network under Gaza City|url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-overnight-bombardment-targeted-hamass-tunnel-network-under-gaza-city/|access-date=2021-06-28|website=www.timesofisrael.com|language=en-US}}</ref>. [[Yaakov Katz (journalist)|Katz]] and Bohbot describe separately in their book "Weapon Wizards", how [[IMSI-catcher]]<nowiki/>s and cellular network analysis were used to identify and destroy Hamas tunnels<ref>{{Cite book|last=Katz|first=Yaakov|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/947145695|title=The weapon wizards : how Israel became a high-tech military superpower|date=2017|others=Amir Bohbot|isbn=978-1-250-08833-8|edition=1st|location=New York|oclc=947145695}}</ref>. The [[IDF Spokesperson's Unit|IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) Spokesperson's Unit]] followed with an announcement two weeks later declaring that the conflict was the "First AI war". IDF continued to describe a system built by [[Unit 8200]] that fused "signal intelligence ([[Signals intelligence|SIGINT]]), visual intelligence (VISINT), human intelligence ([[Human intelligence|HUMINT]]), geographical intelligence ([[Geospatial intelligence|GEOINT]])"<ref>{{Cite web|title=Israel's operation against Hamas was the world's first AI war|url=https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/gaza-news/guardian-of-the-walls-the-first-ai-war-669371|access-date=2021-06-28|website=The Jerusalem Post {{!}} JPost.com|language=en-US}}</ref>. While such [[Battlefield management system|Battlefield management systems]] have existed for years before the 2021 Gaza crisis, the announcements themselves, combined with social media and next generation technologies represent a stark contrast to the Lind definition of fourth-generation warfare. |
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There is no widely agreed upon definition of fifth-generation warfare,<ref>{{Cite book|last=Michael|first=George|title=Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance|publisher=Vanderbilt University Press|year=2012|pages=156}}</ref> and it has been rejected by some scholars, including William S. Lind, who was one of the original theorists of [[fourth-generation warfare]].<ref>{{Cite book|last=Abbott|first=Daniel|title=The Handbook of Fifth-Generation Warfare|publisher=Nimble Books|year=2010|pages=125}}</ref> |
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The term 'fifth-generation warfare' was first used in 2003 by Robert Steele. The following year, Lind criticised the concept, arguing that the fourth generation had yet to fully materialize.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Abbott|first=Daniel|title=The Handbook of Fifth-Generation Warfare|publisher=Nimble Books|year=2010|pages=209}}</ref> |
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'''Fifth generation warfare is defined by:''' |
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In 2008, the term was used by Terry Terriff,<ref name=":02">{{Cite book|last=Terriff|first=Terry|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=A8n4KWqVifUC|title=Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict|publisher=Routledge|year=2008|pages=42|isbn=9780415413572 }}</ref> who presented the [[2003 ricin letters]] as a potential example, but stated that he was not entirely sure if it was a fifth-generation attack, claiming "we may not recognize it as it resolves around us. Or we might look at several alternative futures and see each as fifth generation."<ref name=":02" /> Terriff argued that while fifth-generation warfare allows "super-empowered individuals" to make political statements through [[terrorism]], they lack the political power to actually have their demands met.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Terriff|first=Terry|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=A8n4KWqVifUC|title=Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict|publisher=Routledge|year=2008|pages=50|isbn=9780415413572 }}</ref> |
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* [[Psychological warfare]], in particular cognitive warfare |
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*[[Misinformation]] |
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* [[Cyberattack|Cyberattacks]] |
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** "Honeypot" [[Deception technology]] |
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* [[Social engineering (political science)]] |
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* [[Social media]] |
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* [[Mass surveillance]] |
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** [[Open-source intelligence]] |
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** Commercially available [[Social media analytics]] |
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** Open source and grey market Data Sets |
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** Commercially available [[Satellite imagery]] |
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** Commercially available Electromagnetic intelligence |
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⚫ | L.C. Rees described the nature of fifth generation warfare as difficult to define in itself, alluding to [[Clarke's three laws|the third law]] of science fiction author [[Arthur C. Clarke]] – "any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic."<ref>{{Cite book|last=Abbott|first=Daniel|title=The Handbook of Fifth-Generation Warfare|publisher=Nimble Books|year=2010|pages=15}}</ref> |
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* Decentralized and highly non attributable [[Psychological warfare]] |
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* [[Electronic warfare]], with the rapid reduction in cost and availability thereof. |
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* |
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[[Alex P. Schmid]] said that fifth-generation warfare is typified by its "omnipresent battlefield", and the fact that people engaged in it do not necessarily use military force, instead employing a mixture of kinetic and non-kinetic force.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Schmid|first=Alex|title=The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research|publisher=Routledge|year=2011|pages=167}}</ref> In the 1999 book ''[[Unrestricted Warfare]]'' by colonels [[Qiao Liang (writer)|Qiao Liang]] and [[Wang Xiangsui]] of the [[People's Liberation Army]], they noted that in the years since the 1991 [[Gulf War]], conventional military violence had decreased, which correlated to an increase in "“political, economic, and technological violence”, which they argued could be more devastating than a conventional war.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Michael|first=George|title=Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance|publisher=Vanderbilt University Press|year=2012|pages=157}}</ref> On the contrary, [[Thomas P. M. Barnett]], believes that the effectiveness of fifth-generational warfare is exaggerated, as terrorism conducted by individuals, such as [[Timothy McVeigh]] or [[Ted Kaczynski]], lacks the support of more organized movements. This was seconded by [[George Michael (professor)|George Michael]], who noted that in the United States, [[gang violence]] was responsible for far more deaths than [[Lone wolf attacks|lone wolf terrorist attacks]].<ref>{{Cite book|last=Michael|first=George|title=Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance|publisher=Vanderbilt University Press|year=2012|pages=166}}</ref> |
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⚫ | |||
== References == |
== References == |
Latest revision as of 16:58, 26 May 2024
This article needs additional citations for verification. (October 2020) |
The examples and perspective in this article deal primarily with Western world in its examples, and do not represent a worldwide view of the subject. (February 2023) |
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War (outline) |
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In military history, the term "generations of warfare" refers to the concept of five "generations" in warfare, with each generation having different tactics, strategies, and technologies. The generations of warfare are sometimes dubbed as "4GW" or "5GW". The term originated in 1989 to describe "the changing face of war" over time, initially only referring to the emergence of the fourth generation, but eventually seeing the addition of a fifth generation.[1][2]
There are five generations of warfare:
- First-generation warfare refers to ancient and post-classical battles fought with massed manpower, using phalanx, line, and column tactics with uniformed soldiers governed by the state.[dubious – discuss] This generation came to an end around the mid-nineteenth century due to rapid improvements in the range, accuracy, and rate-of-fire of many weapon systems.
- Second-generation warfare refers to industrial warfare, evolving after the invention of the rifled musket and breech-loading weapons and continuing through the development of the machine gun and indirect fire. This generation predates the widespread effective use of motorised vehicles in battle and combined arms. The term second generation warfare was created by the U.S. military in 1989.
- Third-generation warfare focuses on using late modern technology-derived tactics of leveraging speed, stealth, and surprise to bypass the enemy's lines and collapse their forces from the rear. Essentially, this was the end of linear warfare on a tactical level, with units seeking not simply to meet each other face to face but to outmaneuver each other to gain the greatest advantage. Armoured units, military aircraft, and airborne forces began to play an increasingly critical role in operations, with the development of strategies such as Blitzkrieg and deep operation.
- Fourth-generation warfare as presented by Lind et al. is characterized by a post-modern return to decentralized forms of warfare, blurring of the lines between war and politics, combatants, and civilians due to states' loss of their near-monopoly on combat forces, returning to modes of conflict common in pre-modern times. Guerrilla groups, private military contractors, and paramilitary organisations play a prominent role in fourth-generation warfare.
- Fifth-generation warfare is conducted primarily through non-kinetic military action, such as social engineering, misinformation, and cyberattacks, along with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and fully autonomous systems. Fifth generation warfare has been described by Daniel Abbot as a war of "information and perception".[2]
First generation
[edit]In 1648, at the end of the Thirty Years' War, the Treaty of Westphalia gave a practical sovereignty to the German states, which until then were semi-independent components of the Holy Roman Empire. This more firmly established the sovereignty of the nation state, which meant, among other things, that governments would have exclusive rights to organize and maintain their own militaries. Before this time, many armies and nations were controlled by religious orders and many wars were fought in melee combat, or subversively through bribery and assassination. The first generation of modern warfare was intended to create a straightforward and orderly means of waging war.[3]
Alternatively, it has been argued that the Peace of Westphalia did not solidify the power of the nation state, but that the Thirty Years' War itself ushered in an era of large-scale combat that was simply too costly for smaller mercenary groups to carry out on their own. According to this theory, smaller groups chose to leave mass combat—and the expenses associated with it—in the domain of the nation-state.[4]
The increased accuracy and speed of the rifled musket and the breech-loader marks the end of first generation warfare; the concept of vast lines of soldiers meeting face to face became impractical due to the heavy casualties that could be sustained. Because these technologies were adopted gradually throughout the Americas and Europe, the exact end of the first generation of modern warfare depends on the region, but all world powers had moved on by the latter half of the 19th century.[3]
In order to create a more controlled environment for warfare, a military culture was developed that, in many ways, is still visible in the armed forces of today. Specially crafted uniforms set soldiers apart from the general populace.
An elaborate structure of rank was developed to better organize men into units. Rules for military drills were perfected, allowing line and column maneuvers to be executed with more precision, and to increase the rate of fire in battle.
Control of media and information released during the war and the production of counterfeit money in order to devaluate the enemy's economy were used for the first time during the Napoleonic Wars.
Examples
[edit]- English Civil War
- Anglo-Spanish War
- Seven Years' War
- American Revolutionary War
- Napoleonic Wars
- War of 1812
- Mexican War of Independence
Second generation
[edit]In the 19th century, the invention of the breech-loading rifled musket meant longer range, greater accuracy, and faster rate of fire. Marching ranks of men straight into a barrage of fire from such weapons would cause tremendous rates of casualties, so a new strategy was developed.
Second generation warfare still maintained lines of battle but focused more on the use of technology to allow smaller units of men to maneuver separately. These smaller units allowed for faster advances, less concentrated casualties, and the ability to use cover and concealment to advantage.[3] To some degree, these concepts have remained in use even as the next generations have arisen, so the end of the second generation is not as clearly defined as that of the first. The development of the blitzkrieg highlighted some of the flaws of static firing positions and slow-moving infantry, so this can be considered the beginning of the end for the second generation, at least as the dominant force in military strategy.
The contributions of the second generation were responses to technological development. The second generation saw the rise of trench warfare, artillery support, more advanced reconnaissance techniques, extensive use of camouflage uniforms, radio communications, and fireteam maneuvers.
Examples
[edit]Third generation
[edit]The use of blitzkrieg during the German invasion of France first demonstrated the power of speed and maneuverability over static artillery positions and trench defenses. Through the use of tanks, mechanized infantry, and close air support, the Germans were able to quickly break through linear defenses and capture the rear.
The emphasis on maneuvering and speed to bypass enemy engagement remains a common strategy throughout the world, and collapsing an enemy's defenses by striking at deeper targets is—in a somewhat different way—a major strategy in fourth generation warfare.[3]
The contributions of the third generation were based on the concept of overcoming technological disadvantage through the use of clever strategy. As linear fighting came to an end, new ways of moving faster began to appear.
The emphasis on mobility moved from heavy armor to greater speed, the development of the helicopter allowed insertions in hostile territory, and advanced missile technology allowed forces to bypass enemy defenses and strike at targets from great distances. The speed inherent in these methods necessitated a greater degree of independence allowed to the units on the front lines.
Greater trust needed to be placed in junior officers commanding sub-units by higher-ranking officers—a belief that they could adequately achieve their objectives without micromanagement from higher ranking commanders in command headquarters.
Smaller units were allowed greater decision flexibility to deal with changing situations on the ground, rather than have decisions made for them by commanders who were distant from the front. This began to break down the regimented culture of order that was so important in previous theoretical eras of military command and control.
Examples
[edit]Fourth generation
[edit]
The term "fourth-generation warfare" was first used in 1989 by a team of American analysts, including William S. Lind, to describe warfare's return to a decentralized form. In terms of generational modern warfare, the fourth generation signifies the nation states' loss of their near-monopoly on combat forces, returning to modes of conflict common in pre-modern times.[5]
The simplest definition includes any war in which one of the major participants is not a state but rather a violent non-state actor. Classical examples, such as the slave uprising under Spartacus or the mercenary uprising that occurred in Carthage after the First Punic War, predate the modern concept of warfare and are examples of this type of conflict.
Fourth generation warfare is defined as conflicts which involve the following elements:
- Are complex and long term
- Terrorism (tactic)
- A non-national or transnational base – highly decentralized
- A direct attack on the enemy's core ideals
- Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through media manipulation and lawfare
- All available pressures are used – political, economic, social and military
- Occurs in low intensity conflict, involving actors from all networks
- Non-combatants are tactical dilemmas
- Lack of hierarchy
- Small in size, spread out network of communication and financial support
- Use of insurgency and guerrilla tactics
Fourth-generation warfare theory has been criticized on the grounds that it is "nothing more than repackaging of the traditional clash between the non-state insurgent and the soldiers of a nation-state."[6]
Examples
[edit]- Colombian conflict
- Israeli-Palestinian conflict
- Myanmar conflict
- The Troubles
- War against the Islamic State
Fifth generation
[edit]Fifth-generation warfare is warfare that is conducted primarily through non-kinetic military action, such as social engineering, misinformation, cyberattacks, along with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and fully autonomous systems. Fifth generation warfare has been described by Daniel Abbot as a war of "information and perception".[7]
There is no widely agreed upon definition of fifth-generation warfare,[8] and it has been rejected by some scholars, including William S. Lind, who was one of the original theorists of fourth-generation warfare.[9]
The term 'fifth-generation warfare' was first used in 2003 by Robert Steele. The following year, Lind criticised the concept, arguing that the fourth generation had yet to fully materialize.[10]
In 2008, the term was used by Terry Terriff,[11] who presented the 2003 ricin letters as a potential example, but stated that he was not entirely sure if it was a fifth-generation attack, claiming "we may not recognize it as it resolves around us. Or we might look at several alternative futures and see each as fifth generation."[11] Terriff argued that while fifth-generation warfare allows "super-empowered individuals" to make political statements through terrorism, they lack the political power to actually have their demands met.[12]
L.C. Rees described the nature of fifth generation warfare as difficult to define in itself, alluding to the third law of science fiction author Arthur C. Clarke – "any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic."[13]
Alex P. Schmid said that fifth-generation warfare is typified by its "omnipresent battlefield", and the fact that people engaged in it do not necessarily use military force, instead employing a mixture of kinetic and non-kinetic force.[14] In the 1999 book Unrestricted Warfare by colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui of the People's Liberation Army, they noted that in the years since the 1991 Gulf War, conventional military violence had decreased, which correlated to an increase in "“political, economic, and technological violence”, which they argued could be more devastating than a conventional war.[15] On the contrary, Thomas P. M. Barnett, believes that the effectiveness of fifth-generational warfare is exaggerated, as terrorism conducted by individuals, such as Timothy McVeigh or Ted Kaczynski, lacks the support of more organized movements. This was seconded by George Michael, who noted that in the United States, gang violence was responsible for far more deaths than lone wolf terrorist attacks.[16]
References
[edit]- ^ Defense Technical Information Center (2007-06-01). DTIC ADA521639: Military Review. Volume 87, Number 3, May-June 2007.
- ^ a b Abbott, Daniel (2010). The Handbook of Fifth-Generation Warfare. Nimble Books. p. 20.
- ^ a b c d Lind, William S. (January 15, 2004), "Understanding Fourth Generation War", antiwar.com, retrieved February 7, 2010
- ^ Echevarria, Antulio J. II (November 2005). Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths (PDF). United States Army War College. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2018-04-22. Retrieved 2014-04-26.
{{cite book}}
:|work=
ignored (help) - ^ Lind, William S.; Nightengale, Keith; Schmitt, John F.; Sutton, Joseph W.; Wilson, Gary I. (October 1989), "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation", Marine Corps Gazette, pp. 22–26
- ^ On Fourth Generation Warfare, The Mackenzie Institute
- ^ Abbott, Daniel (2010). The Handbook of Fifth-Generation Warfare. Nimble Books. p. 20.
- ^ Michael, George (2012). Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance. Vanderbilt University Press. p. 156.
- ^ Abbott, Daniel (2010). The Handbook of Fifth-Generation Warfare. Nimble Books. p. 125.
- ^ Abbott, Daniel (2010). The Handbook of Fifth-Generation Warfare. Nimble Books. p. 209.
- ^ a b Terriff, Terry (2008). Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict. Routledge. p. 42. ISBN 9780415413572.
- ^ Terriff, Terry (2008). Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict. Routledge. p. 50. ISBN 9780415413572.
- ^ Abbott, Daniel (2010). The Handbook of Fifth-Generation Warfare. Nimble Books. p. 15.
- ^ Schmid, Alex (2011). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. Routledge. p. 167.
- ^ Michael, George (2012). Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance. Vanderbilt University Press. p. 157.
- ^ Michael, George (2012). Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance. Vanderbilt University Press. p. 166.