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== '''Methodology For Strategic Communications''' == |
== '''Methodology For Strategic Communications''' == |
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The National Defense University defined Public Diplomacy, one of the weapons available to nations in waging strategic influence, as "a form of international political advocacy directed openly by civilians to a broad spectrum of audiences...It is aimed at civilians and is confined in the main to forms of advocacy available to host governments. It seeks to elicit popular support for solutions of mutual benefit that avoids threats, compulsion, or intimidation. It is not a form of political warfare, although it may be used in combination with political warfare."<ref>Paul A. Smith, On Political War (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1989), p.7.</ref> |
Information operations are known by many names -- public diplomacy, strategic influence, political warfare -- but the purpose is the point. It's vital for America to advance national security by changing the way people think about our country and challenging the negative messages spread by our adversaries. <ref>Washington Times, Editorial August 3, 2009: Fighting the war of ideas [http://http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/03/fighting-the-war-of-ideas/]</ref>The National Defense University defined Public Diplomacy, one of the weapons available to nations in waging strategic influence, as "a form of international political advocacy directed openly by civilians to a broad spectrum of audiences...It is aimed at civilians and is confined in the main to forms of advocacy available to host governments. It seeks to elicit popular support for solutions of mutual benefit that avoids threats, compulsion, or intimidation. It is not a form of political warfare, although it may be used in combination with political warfare."<ref>Paul A. Smith, On Political War (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1989), p.7.</ref> |
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The War of Ideas in the simplest sense can be defined as a clash of opposing ideals, ideologies, or concepts through which nations or groups utilize strategic influence to promote their interests abroad. The “battle space” of this conflict is the target population’s “hearts and minds” while the “weapons” can be anything from TV programs, newspaper articles, the internet, blogs, official government policy papers, traditional as well as public diplomacy, or radio broadcasts, just to name a few.
Methodology For Strategic Communications
Information operations are known by many names -- public diplomacy, strategic influence, political warfare -- but the purpose is the point. It's vital for America to advance national security by changing the way people think about our country and challenging the negative messages spread by our adversaries. [1]The National Defense University defined Public Diplomacy, one of the weapons available to nations in waging strategic influence, as "a form of international political advocacy directed openly by civilians to a broad spectrum of audiences...It is aimed at civilians and is confined in the main to forms of advocacy available to host governments. It seeks to elicit popular support for solutions of mutual benefit that avoids threats, compulsion, or intimidation. It is not a form of political warfare, although it may be used in combination with political warfare."[2]
Use During The Cold War
During the Cold War, the United States and other Western powers developed a robust infrastructure for waging a ‘‘war of ideas’’ against the communist ideology being promulgated by the Soviet Union and its allies. During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the so-called golden age of U.S. propaganda, counterpropaganda, and public diplomacy operations, the U.S. government carried out a sophisticated program of overt and covert activities designed to shape public opinion behind the Iron Curtain, within European intellectual and cultural circles, and across the developing world.[3]The United States was able to reach as much as 50-70% of the populations behind the Iron Curtain during the 1950s through their international broadcasting.[4]High-level interest in such operations waned during the 1970s, but received renewed emphasis under President Ronald Reagan, the ‘‘Great Communicator,’’ who, like Eisenhower, was a firm advocate of the informational component of America’s Cold War strategy.[5]
However, with the end of the Cold War official interest once again plummeted. During the 1990s, Congress and the executive branch disparaged informational activities as costly Cold War anachronisms. The budget for State Department informational programs was slashed, and USIA, a quasi-independent body that reported to the secretary of state, was disestablished, and its responsibilities were transferred to a new undersecretary of state for public diplomacy.[6]
Use in the War on Terror
Terrorism is a form of political and psychological warfare; it is protracted, high-intensity propaganda, aimed more at the hearts of the public and the minds of decisionmakers, and not at the physical victims.[7]There is growing recognition among U.S. government officials, journalists, and analysts of terrorism that defeating al-Qaida— arguably the preeminent challenge to U.S. security—will require far more than ‘‘neutralizing’’ leaders, disrupting cells, and dismantling networks.[8]The 9/11 Commission concluded in its final report, eliminating al-Qaida as a formidable danger ultimately requires ‘‘prevailing in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism.”[9]
Americans, in general, are fundamentally opposed waging what seems as a blatantly ideological struggle seems quite unnatural to Americans and other Westerners, who tend to downplay intangible factors such as ideas, history, and culture as political motivators, preferring instead to stress relatively more concrete driving forces such as personal security and physical well-being.[10]
The United States military has recently began incorporating a strategic communication into their overall battle operations in the War on Terror, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition to the military’s traditional role of using force they are beginning to use political as well as ideological warfare against the enemy as a method of influencing the local populations into opposing say the Taliban or al Qa’ida. The ancient Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu once said that to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. [11] The War of Ideas attempts to “break the enemy’s resistance.”
The military is beginning to adjust their tactics because the U.S. has realized that sometimes "the more force is used, the less effective it is" and that "some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot."[12]
Terrorists Use of Mass Media
Al-Qaida’s message, disseminated widely and effectively through all forms of mass media, including the Internet, has a powerful appeal in much of the Muslim world.[13] In 2007, an al-Qaeda spokesman described Osama bin Laden's strategic influence of mass media in the Arab world: "Sheikh Usama knows that the media war is not less important than the military war against America. That’s why al-Qaeda has many media wars. The Sheikh has made al-Qaeda’s media strategy something that all TV stations look for. There are certain criteria for the stations to be able to air our videos, foremost of which is that it has not taken a previous stand against the mujahedeen. That maybe explains why we prefer Al-Jazeera to the rest.”[14]
Not only are these multi-media efforts successful in recruiting foreign jihadists, the internet has enabled outside groups to prep potential weapons from afar. In the past a threat of terrorism in the United States generally required a sophisticated plot to get here in the first place. Now that propaganda has no borders, succeptible minds can be influenced remotely. The case of "Jihad Jane" is a recent example of the "war of ideas" reaching across the ocean to create a front line soldier through psychological manipulation. We must re-frame the definition of this conflict to emphasize the importance of fighting on the front lines of cyber-space and not just the battlefield.
Terrorist Media Publication Companies
Terrorists groups are utilizing mass media, particularly the internet, to win the "War of Ideas" because their inability to win a tradtional head-to-head war against a military force. The following list of their media outlets are examples of how they wage this asymmetrical warfare to strategically influence their audience:
Al Qa’ida: as-Sahab (Foundation for Islamic Media Publication)
Hezbollah: al Manar
Hamas: al-Aqsa Television
See Also
United States Information Agency
Further Reading
"Fighting the War of Ideas like a Real War" by J. Michael Waller (The Institute of World Politics Press,2007.)ISBN-10: 0615144632
"The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy" by Walid Phares (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.) ISBN-10: 023060255X
Notes
- ^ Washington Times, Editorial August 3, 2009: Fighting the war of ideas [1]
- ^ Paul A. Smith, On Political War (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1989), p.7.
- ^ William Rosenau,The RAND Corporation, “Waging the “war of Ideas,”(The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, Chapter 72, pp. 1131-1148, 2006)
- ^ Susan L. Gough,‘‘The Evolution of Strategic Influence,’’ USAWC [U.S. Army War College] Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. (7 April 2004), p. 16
- ^ IBID PP.20-24
- ^ William Rosenau,The RAND Corporation, “Waging the “war of Ideas,”(The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, Chapter 72, pp. 1131-1148, 2006)
- ^ J. Micael Waller, Fighting the War of Ideas like a Real War (The Institute of World Polics Press,2007), p.20-21.
- ^ William Rosenau,The RAND Corporation, “Waging the “war of Ideas,” (The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, Chapter 72, pp. 1131-1148, 2006)
- ^ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), p. 363.
- ^ Carnes Lord, ‘‘The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy,’’ in Frank R. Barnett and Carnes Lord (eds.), Political Warfare and Psychological Operations(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989): 22.
- ^ Sun Tzu, Art of War, http://suntzusaid.com/book/3
- ^ U.S. Government's Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, [2]
- ^ Anonymous [Michael Scheuer], Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror (Washington: Brassey’s, 2004), pp. 209–12.
- ^ Angela Gendron,Trends in Terrorism Series: Al-Qaeda: Propaganda and Media Strategy(2007) ITAC Presents Vol. 2007-2.