7 Aristotle and the Cartesian Theatre

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1 Introduction

Nothing might seem more alien, from an Aristotelian standpoint, than the idea of the mind as an internal theatre, where mental objects appear on a stage under theatre lights, so to speak, to be viewed by a ghostly spectator sitting in the dark.[1] The interiority and privacy suggested by such a model, often associated with Descartes, and the notion of the subject as a homunculus, seems distinctively modern;[2] and indeed many have thought that Aristotle offers an escape from it. Yet discussions of Aristotle are often framed in a way that has these Cartesian implications, even though few scholars, if challenged directly, would be willing to admit it. A fair question, then, is whether Aristotle's remarks do commit him to such views, or whether these are rather something that *we* bring to the table unwittingly in trying to interpret him. I shall argue that it is largely, if not wholly, the latter.[3]

A key part of the difficulty, I would argue, stems from the most common way of translating Aristotle's terminology, above all the term *phantasia* and its cognates, which play a central role in his psychology. Although "imagination" and its cognates are now widely acknowledged to be inadequate or misleading—a false friend deriving from its translation into Latin as *imaginatio*—some still continue to use it, thinking it sufficient to add a cautionary note about modern usage, since "imagination" has connotations of creativity and hypothetical thought that the Greek *phantasia* does not, at least not in Aristotle's time.[4] But this is not enough. Even if one acknowledges the etymological connection of *phantasia* with the notion of *appearing*—the noun derives from the verb *phantazesthai* and so ultimately from the verb *phainesthai*, "to appear"[5]—it is commonly assumed that Aristotle's use of the cognate noun *phantasma* can still be correctly rendered as "image".[6] It is here, I suggest, that Cartesian troubles often take root. For an image, in common parlance, is something we *view* or *look* at: it is a first-order *object of awareness* or experience.[7] Talk of images, therefore, naturally invites the assumption that whenever we have an experience, *there is something* that appears to us, even in non-paradigmatic experiences like dreams

and delirium. In such cases, where there is no external object of an appropriate sort, this assumption leads one to posit an *internal object* that can be viewed and inspected, so to speak, by the mind's eye.

Talk of "images" is not innocent, then. It tempts us to posit inner objects and so inner viewers, replicating inside of us what ordinarily transpires when we perceive, namely, embodied perceivers viewing public objects in external surroundings, in the light of day and without obstruction. Accounting for the nature of such inner items and our relation to them would be challenging enough. But if this model is further taken to apply to all experiences, including perception itself—as it sometimes is, through what is sometimes called "the argument from illusion" or "the argument from hallucination"—then the ordinary observation of our environment, which in many respects is open to view, will be explained by a hidden inner viewing. But this internal perception also stands in need of explanation, in which case regress beckons, as Theophrastus argued long ago.[8] Worse still, as Sextus Empiricus later saw, it raises the spectre of scepticism. For if the only things we are immediately aware of are, as it were, portraits or effigies within the mind, how, the worry runs, can we ever have knowledge of the external things we represent, with which we have no direct contact? It seems to leave the mind locked in a dark room.[9] So the stakes are high.

At the same time, there are passages where, at least on a first reading, Aristotle does seem to speak of viewing internal objects; and so, one might argue, he is committed to the consequences of such talk, at least implicitly, however we translate these terms. This worry, I shall argue, dissipates on closer inspection: all these passages can be read naturally without such implications. Aristotle does allow (as anyone should) that we can visualize various scenarios and also reflect on our mental states. But neither of these require a homuncular model. Furthermore, while his theory maintains that *phantasmata* are representations and in some sense likenesses of what they represent, they are not themselves viewed and do not look like the objects they are about. They are states of our body, bearing representational content, *in virtue of which* we can imagine or visualize things, as well as remember, desire, dream, and even think. But they are not themselves the *objects* of these states and activities: the objects, rather, are what they represent. Aristotle is thus not committed, even inadvertently, to a Cartesian theatre.

2 Visualization

Some of Aristotle's terminology has been thought to suggest, just on its own, a commitment to viewing internal objects. When taken in context, none of it actually implies this. But some readers may still find it hard to shake the impression. So let's begin by considering the strongest case for such a reading, before seeing why it is misconceived.

There can be no question that Aristotle sometimes speaks of experiences we would describe as "visualization".[10] In the chapter in which he formally introduces *phantasia*,[11] he distinguishes it from belief as follows (*DA* III.3, 427b18–20):[12]

> τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστίν, ὅταν βουλώμεθα. πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες.
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> This state [*sc. phantasia*] is up to us, whenever we wish. For it is possible to place something before our eyes [πρὸ ὀμμάτων], as people using mnemonic techniques do when they construct images [εἰδωλοποιοῦντες] and place [them before the eyes].[13]

Being in such a state, he continues, is something "like viewing figures in a painting" (ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ, 427b23–24) insofar as it needn't produce an emotional reaction in us, even when what is depicted is arousing or terrifying. And a little further on, he distinguishes *phantasia* from perception by noting that "visions appear to those whose eyes are shut as well" (φαίνεται καὶ μύουσιν ὁράματα, 428a16). He clearly has such experiences in mind when explaining the difficulties in interpreting dreams at the end of his essay *De divinatione per somnum* (2, 464b5–16). He compares what happens to *phantasmata* to the disturbance of reflected images in water (τοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὕδασιν εἰδώλοις, b9): the latter become so distorted that the reflection and images are no longer similar to the "genuine things" they are reflections of (οὐδὲν ὁμοία γίνεται ἡ ἔμφασις καὶ τὰ εἴδωλα τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς, b10–11). Hence,

> δεινὸς δὴ τὰς ἐμφάσεις κρίνειν εἴη ἂν ὁ δυνάμενος ταχὺ διαισθάνεσθαι καὶ συνορᾶν τὰ διαπεφορημένα καὶ διεστραμμένα τῶν εἰδώλων, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἵππου ἢ ὁτουδήποτε, κἀκεῖ δὴ ὁμοίον τι δύναται τὸ ἐνύπνιον. ἡ γὰρ κίνησις ἐκκόπτει τὴν εὐθυονειρίαν.
>
> [T]he person who is skilled at discriminating reflections [in water] is someone able to quickly discern and identify the fragmented and distorted images as being [an image] of a human or a horse or anything whatsoever; correspondingly, then, a dream can [undergo] something similar, as change disrupts vivid dreaming.[14]

Aristotle does not expressly say here that *phantasmata* themselves are what is visualized.[15] Nonetheless, the comparison with reflections is plainly phenomenological: in both cases, there is difficulty recognizing just what our experience is of and, when we do, it is on the basis of perceived similarities, of what something looks like. In contrast, in a vivid dream the likeness is more obvious (464a28–32, b7).

Some might be tempted to conclude that this sort of visualization is always involved in *phantasia*. For if one assumes that a *phantasma* is an image—the assumption I am challenging here—then Aristotle's general characterization of *phantasia* as "that in virtue of which we say that we come to have a *phantasma*" (ἡ φαντασία καθ' ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν γενέσθαι, 428a1–2) might seem to be describing visualization. Some might even take this to be implied by the etymology of *phantasia* that Aristotle offers, linking it to vision (*DA* III.3, 429a2–4):

> ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὄψις μάλιστα αἴσθησίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ φάους εἴληφεν, ὅτι ἄνευ φωτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν.
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> Since sight is the preeminent sense, its name [sc. *phantasia*] is also taken from light [*phaos*], because it is not possible to see without light.

Although Aristotle does not explicitly spell out what this etymology is meant to show, in context it is meant at least to support his claim that *phantasia* is similar to the perception from which it is produced (428b13–14, 429a1–2). But an imagistic reading might take it to further suggest that *phantasia* "illuminates" inner objects for the mind, much as sunlight does for vision.

In quite a few passages, Aristotle speaks of placing things "before one's eyes" when engaged in various forms of reasoning. In deliberating about the future, for example, one can game out various scenarios by using *phantasmata* and thoughts in the soul "as though one were seeing" (ὥσπερ ὁρῶν, III.7, 431a6–8).[16] A similar technique can be used in theoretical or scientific reasoning: in order to refute the belief that rivers originate from underground reservoirs, he says, one only needs to put the suggestion "before one's eyes" (πρὸ ὀμμάτων) to see that the volume of water involved would require, impossibly, a reservoir larger than the whole earth (*Mete*. I.13, 349b15–19). He thinks that we do something similar in mathematical reasoning, too, which one might have otherwise assumed was entirely abstract: when considering (ἐν τῷ νοεῖν) geometrical figures, he says, we place something "before our eyes" (πρὸ ὀμμάτων, 450a4–5) and focus on certain features to the exclusion of others, a fact Aristotle takes to be evidence for his general thesis that it is not possible to think without a *phantasma* (νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος, *Mem*. 1, 449b31). Indeed, when he claims that one always contemplates something "together with a *phantasma*" (ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμα τι), he explains it (γάρ) by saying that *phantasmata* are "like *aisthēmata*, though without the matter" (ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά ἐστι, πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης, *DA* III.8, 432a8–10; οἷον αἰσθήματα, III.7, 431a14–15).[17] In fact some even translate *aisthēma* as "percept", that is, as something *presented* in perception;[18] and Aristotle once describes *aisthēmata* as being perceptible themselves (αἰσθητὰ ὄντα, *Insomn*. 2, 460b2–3).[19] On another occasion, he even speaks of "the eye of the soul" (τὸ ὄμμα τῆς ψυχῆς, *EN* VI.12, 1144a30).[20]

Yet as suggestive as these passages may seem, none of them in fact implies a Cartesian theatre with inner objects, much less a homuncular spectator. The temptation to read them that way has more to do with what we bring to the text than with the details they actually contain. For convenience, I will consider these locutions in reverse order.

1 The Mind's Eye

The phrase "the eye of the soul" might sound to some like John Locke's notion of an inner sense, according to which consciousness is just "the perception of what passes in a Man's own mind".[21] It has even been argued that Aristotle expresses this view himself at *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.9, 1170a29–b1, which in the standard edition (OCT) reads that we "perceive that we perceive and perceive that we think", whenever we do either.[22]

On closer inspection, though, any evidence these passages seem to offer is a mirage. The appeal to *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.9 begs the question: it crucially depends on an unnecessary textual emendation by the editor, Ingram Bywater, who explicitly justified it on the grounds that *it would bring Aristotle's text in line with Locke's view*.[23] Nor is Aristotle referring to introspective awareness when he speaks of "the eye of the soul" in *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.12, but rather something *outwardly* directed: he is speaking of the practical discernment in those of excellent character who have "the eye of experience" (ὄμμα τῆς ἐμπειρίας, *EN* VI.11, 1143b14). The metaphor is based on an analogy spelled out earlier in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and elsewhere:[24]

> sight : body :: intellect : soul

Both expression and analogy are Platonic in origin.[25] However this sort of "vision" is to be understood, it is indisputably a high intellectual achievement for both Plato and Aristotle, concerning the nature of reality outside of us, not the awareness of items that "pass within our minds".

2 Placing Something "Before the Eyes"

In contrast, when Aristotle speaks of placing things "before the eyes", he clearly has in mind what we call "visualization", though of course there is no reason to restrict the notion involved to the sense of vision.[26] We can equally conjure up other types of sensory experiences in a similar way—the aroma or flavours of a favorite dish, the sound of a train

passing through the night, the feeling of ice cold water on the back of our necks. Such experiences are notable for the way they can bring to mind the phenomenal character of certain sensible qualities and various collateral aspects of the experience: they possess some of the specificity and detail we associate with the fully engaged perceptual experience of objects in our immediate environment. Accordingly, in *Poetics* 17 Aristotle urges poets to place the plot (μύθος) "before their eyes as much as possible" (μάλιστα πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον), to ensure that its details are coherent: "For by seeing things as clearly as possible, in the way one would if present at the events in question, [the poet] will discover what is fitting and be least likely to overlook inconsistencies".[27] The notion of conveying a scene as vividly and realistically as possible, "as if one were present" (ὥσπερ παρ' αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος), is an idea that goes back in Greek literature to Odysseus' praise of the blind poet Demodocus, who sings "as if he were present himself" (ὡς τέ που ἢ αὐτὸς παρεών) as an eyewitness or (in his case) "heard it from someone else" (ἢ ἄλλου ἀκούσας, *Od*. VIII.491), a notion reprised in Plato's *Ion*.[28]

Yet none of these experiences, not even those we refer to as "daydreaming", are of a sort we would mistake for genuine perceptual experiences, as one might with some dreams or hallucinations. Placing things "before one's eyes" is like perception only in certain respects. It includes some of the detail distinctive of perception, but the experience is not exactly like perception, as lived. In particular, it does not present objects to us with the immediacy and presence they have in actual perceptual experience.[29] It might be for reasons such as these that Aristotle describes *phantasia* in his *Rhetoric* as "a kind of weak perception" (αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, I.11, 1370a28–29).[30] Accordingly, we might wonder whether Aristotle's references to placing things "before the eyes" require anything like a Cartesian theatre, in which inner objects are present to the self in a more immediate and direct way than external objects. If anything, our ordinary experience in perception is more vivid.

It is a striking fact, then, that of the 17 occurrences of the phrase πρὸ ὀμμάτων in Aristotle's works, 11 of them are in the *Rhetoric* and all but one concern *metaphor*.[31] Vivid metaphors are descriptions that are evocative of our experiences of objects or scenarios. Aristotle's examples all involve language drawn from more concrete domains, put forward as analogous to the subject; and the most effective metaphors are those that signify ongoing action and activity (ὁρᾶν δεῖ … πραττόμενα, III.10, 1410b34; ἐνεργείας, b36; ἐνεργοῦντα, III.11, 1411b25). In each case, though, what "produces something before the eyes" (πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποεῖν) are *words*—that is, written or spoken expressions. The experience they produce, moreover, does not consist in our observing *them*: expressions are not much to look at or even listen to, taken on their own, since words do not in general resemble what they signify (apart from onomatopoeia and certain self-referential cases). But then when Aristotle speaks of "placing things before the eyes" in connection with *phantasia* and *phantasmata*, he needn't think that the resulting visualization consists in our viewing *them*. Visualization may simply be an effect they produce, just as it is with vivid language.

The general idea might be clearer from two more familiar examples. The image files on your computer can, in conjunction with the right software, produce visible representations of objects on a monitor screen. But you would look in vain to find anything inside the computer, in the circuits and storage devices where the files reside, that *looked like* those objects. These image files, moreover, consist of information that can be accessed and further manipulated, even when nothing is projected on the monitor screen. The image files thus possess representational content without themselves looking like external objects or needing to be viewed at all; and their ability to produce images on the screen is to be explained in terms of this content. The underlying idea here does not depend on the fact that computer data is digital and symbolic either. Consider a slightly older example, one that is analog. Vinyl records encode information in their grooves that, when a phonograph needle runs through them and sends them through an amplifier system, can produce sounds through speakers. The physical features of the grooves don't sound like music, of course, because they don't emit sound themselves. We don't hear them or direct any other intentional attitude towards them. When we listen to the music they contain, it is the sounds they produce from the speakers.

Phantasmata, I would argue,[32] are like this. They are not miniature paintings or theatre productions, but something more like image files or phonograph records. With the requisite equipment—in this case, the animal's perceptual system—they produce experiences in animals like visualization, memory, and dreams. But in general they do not themselves *resemble* or *look like* what they represent. The change (κίνησις) that constitutes *phantasia*[33] is distinct from both the experience of visualization and the objects that seem to appear in such experiences. These individual changes, which Aristotle refers to as *phantasmata*, occur in the peripheral sense organs and travel through the blood to the central sense organ, which they affect so as to produce experiences qualitatively similar perceptions (*Insomn*. 3, 461a25–b21, 462a8–15). Moreover, Aristotle explicitly distinguishes between periods when these internal changes (ἐνουῦσαι κινήσεις) are active (αἱ ἐνεργείᾳ) in remembering, dreaming, and the like, and periods where they merely have the *power* to be (αἱ δυνάμει, *Insomn*. 3, 461b12–13, b17);[34] in fact, he explicitly notes that in certain circumstances we are *unaware* of them (ἀφανίζονται, *Insomn*. 3, 461a3; λανθάνουσι, *Div. Somn*. 1, 463a9). These changes can be stored and transformed, as well as accessed in these states and in thoughts,[35] and they account for the content of such experiences, at least in part. That *phantasmata* persist and retain their content even when

not active—and thus when there is no visualization or experience of any sort connected with them—conclusively demonstrates that they are not themselves images or objects of visualization by nature; and given their material constitution, it is doubtful whether they can ever be the object of any such attention. They can *produce* such experiences and account for their content. But they are not *themselves* images.

These observations lead to a more general one. Visualization is a phenomenon that *everyone* must acknowledge: it is a datum that any adequate psychological theory has to explain.[36] Yet plainly not all theories are committed to a Cartesian theatre thereby. Talk about viewing internal objects is not an innocent description of the phenomena, but a model used to explain it. It assumes that visualization is like perceiving in a much stronger sense than we considered above. It claims that there are inner objects of a special kind, which are perceived internally and directly by the subject, in virtue of which the subject can entertain contents about the world (a view often described as "indirect realism"). Even though the kind of perceiving and the kind of object involved are not exactly like ordinary kinds, they are supposed to be the same in this crucial respect: in both, one has an intentional attitude directed at an object and its features. These are substantive theoretical commitments, and they do not follow simply from acknowledging visualization.

That this model is questionable, both on its own terms and for its explanatory value, hardly needs to be belabored: it threatens to commit us to ghostly objects and a homunculus, while only delaying the fatal question about how this internal acquaintance is itself accomplished, thus beckoning regress. It also goes beyond describing the phenomenological datum in another key respect, though the point is more subtle. The datum is merely that when we visualize, we *seem* to be seeing something (or at any rate something like seeing, in some attenuated sense). But from the fact that we seem to be seeing something it doesn't follow that *there actually is something* that we are seeing or attending to—it may only seem like there is. This temptation to infer, via existential generalization, the existence of some object, even if not a public external object, is highly questionable on its own. But it is also one that Aristotle does not explicitly make in these passages.

The bottom line, then, is this. The passages examined so far commit Aristotle to the phenomenon of visualization, something everyone must acknowledge. But none of them commits him to a theoretical model like the Cartesian theatre. Aristotle only describes the explanandum in these terms, not the explanans; and nothing yet tips the scales in favor of any particular model. There can be little doubt that Aristotle intends *phantasia* to explain visualization, among other phenomena. But none of the textual evidence so far determines its precise character, in particular whether *phantasmata* are themselves objects of awareness.

3 Regarding a *phantasma* in Itself or "as a Copy" (*Mem.* 1)

Someone might concede that such expressions do not themselves commit Aristotle to a Cartesian theatre, but object that there are *other* passages that do. For there are passages where Aristotle says that we "consider" or even "perceive" a *phantasma*; and this, it might be argued, surely involves viewing an internal object.[37]

1 The Problem of Presence in Absence

The passage occurs as part of Aristotle's extended response to an *aporia* about memory, concerning "presence in absence" (*Mem.* 1, 450a25–27):

> ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις πῶς ποτε τοῦ μὲν πάθους παρόντος τοῦ δὲ πράγματος ἀπόντος μνημονεύεται τὸ μὴ παρόν.
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> But one might have the following difficulty: how on earth does one manage to remember what is not present, given that when the modification is present, the object is absent?

Memory is always of the past, in contrast with perception, which Aristotle says is of an object presently acting on one's senses (449b13–18, b27–28). If so, then the events remembered are not merely absent, but no longer exist, and the objects involved might not either. Because of this difference, Aristotle cannot account for memory in the same way he accounts for perception. When we perceive an object, he maintains, the activity of perception is one and the same as the activity of its object, and so they come to be and cease to be at the same time (*DA* III.2, 425b25–426a27, esp. 425b25–27, 426a25–28). But if remembered objects and events no longer exist, they cannot be active while we are remembering them: Aristotle does not seem to allow for the possibility of activity existing on its own, detached from its subject after it has ceased to be.[38] Remembering must occur in some other way.

Aristotle takes this opportunity to introduce a representational theory of memory. The original perception occurs in such a way as to leave behind a kind of impression, like the seal people produce using signet rings; and this impression represents what occurred earlier, similar to a sort of picture (*Mem.* 1, 450a27–32; cf. b2–3, 5, 10–11):

> δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι δεῖ νοῆσαι τοιοῦτον τὸ γιγνόμενον διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ τοῦ σώματος τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν, <u>οἷον ζωγράφημά τι</u> τὸ πάθος οὗ φαμεν τὴν ἕξιν μνήμην εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ γιγνομένη κίνησις ἐνσημαίνεται <u>οἷον τύπον τινὰ</u> τοῦ αἰσθήματος, καθάπερ οἱ σφραγιζόμενοι τοῖς δακτυλίοις.

> It is clear that we must conceive of this state, which comes about through perception in the soul and in the part of the body that has it, to be *like a sort of picture*, the possession of which we call "memory". For the change that occurs is imprinted, *like a kind of impression* of the perceptual stimulation, just like people producing a seal with their rings.

The comparison with seals has well known antecedents not only in Plato's *Theaetetus* but even earlier in Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*.[39] What interests us is the particular way in which Aristotle deploys the idea. He does not say that this impression represents its object by being viewed or in some other way perceived, or even that it bears any resemblance to it—to what extent and in which ways specifically it is like a picture are not stated.[40] But the context requires that the kind of impression involved is able to represent something no longer present; and it is precisely because such a representation itself persists that it can help explain why we remember a given thing on a given occasion. As he goes on, moreover, he speaks of the impression as a *phantasma* and how it depends on material conditions in the subject's body: if these conditions are not suitable, the impression will not "remain in the soul" (οὐ μένει τὸ φάντασμα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ) and in some cases it might not even take hold in the first place (450a32–b11 at b10–11). As should be clear, no visualization is involved at such points. The *phantasma* is not an image but a *trace*, a side effect of the original perceptual stimulation, whose persistence allows us to retain a memory, even while we are not currently remembering.[41]

It is only later when Aristotle reprises the *aporia* of presence in absence at greater length that he explicitly introduces a specific role for awareness (450b11–20):

> ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ συμβαῖνον περὶ τὴν μνήμην, πότερον τοῦτο μνημονεύει τὸ πάθος, ἢ ἐκεῖνο ἀφ' οὗ ἐγένετο; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο, τῶν ἀπόντων οὐδὲν ἂν μνημονεύοιμεν· εἰ δ' ἐκεῖνο, πῶς αἰσθανόμενοι τοῦτο μνημονεύομεν οὗ μὴ αἰσθανόμεθα, τὸ ἀπόν; εἴ τ' ἐστὶν ὅμοιον ὥσπερ τύπος ἢ γραφὴ ἐν ἡμῖν, ἡ τούτου αἴσθησις διὰ τί ἂν εἴη μνήμη ἑτέρου, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοῦ τούτου; ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργῶν τῇ μνήμῃ θεωρεῖ τὸ πάθος τοῦτο καὶ αἰσθάνεται τούτου. πῶς οὖν τὸ μὴ παρὸν μνημονεύσει; εἴη γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸ μὴ παρὸν καὶ ἀκούειν.[42]
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> If this, then, is what happens regarding memory, does one remember (i) this modification or (ii) that from which it arose? For if [we remember] the former (i),[43] we could not remember anything absent; whereas if instead [we remember] the latter (ii), how by perceiving [αἰσθανόμενοι] this [modification] do we remember what is absent, which we are not perceiving? And if it is like an impression or a drawing in us, why would the perception of this [ἡ τούτου αἴσθησις] be a memory of something else, rather than of this very thing? For the person exercising memory considers [θεωρεῖ] this modification and perceives [αἰσθάνεται] it. How then will they remember what is not present? For then it would be possible both to see and hear what is not present.

Although initially set up as a dilemma about the proper object of memory, the first horn is clearly a non-starter. As Aristotle states at the outset of the treatise, memory is of something past that is no longer present (449b15, b27–28), although the modification is present—indeed, that was the point of positing it in the first place. So the modification cannot be what one remembers (μνημονεύει, 450b12). The problem with the second horn, on the other hand, is twofold and can again be framed as a dilemma. If (*a*) remembering is perceiving in the standard sense and yet also of something absent, then perception does *not* have to be exclusively of what is present, contrary to what Aristotle had earlier claimed (449b13–14, b27), and we should be able to see and hear what is not present after all. But of course we can't. So this option, too, should be a dead letter for Aristotle; in fact, he never retracts or reformulates his initial temporal division of the objects of perception, memory, and expectation. On the other hand, if (*b*) remembering is *not* perceiving in the standard sense, but merely involves some kind of an awareness of the trace, how does it ever manage to be about anything other than the trace?

2 Two Ways of Regarding a Phantasma

In what immediately follows, Aristotle responds to the *aporia* by taking up the second horn of the initial dilemma and drawing a distinction between two different ways of regarding or considering a *phantasma*. When taken in one of these ways, he suggests, our attention *can* be directed to something else (450b20–27):

> ἢ ἔστιν ὡς ἐνδέχεται καὶ συμβαίνειν τοῦτο; οἷον γὰρ τὸ ἐν πίνακι γεγραμμένον ζῷον καὶ ζῷόν ἐστι καὶ εἰκών, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἄμφω, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ἔστι θεωρεῖν καὶ ὡς ζῷον καὶ ὡς εἰκόνα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν φάντασμα δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν καὶ αὐτό τι καθ' αὑτὸ εἶναι [θεώρημα] καὶ ἄλλου φάντασμα. ᾗ μὲν οὖν καθ' αὑτό, θεώρημα ἢ φάντασμά ἐστιν, ᾗ δ' ἄλλου, οἷον εἰκὼν καὶ μνημόνευμα.
>
> Or is there a way in which this is possible and in fact occurs? For example, the figure drawn on a tablet is both a figure and a copy, and this same single thing is both, even though what it is for each to be is not the same, and it is possible to consider [θεωρεῖν] it both as a figure

> and as a copy. In just this way too one must conceive of the *phantasma* in us, which is both something in itself and a *phantasma* of something else [ἄλλου]: insofar as it is something in itself, it is something considered or a *phantasma*, while insofar as it is of something else [ᾗ δ' ἄλλου] it is like a copy [οἷον εἰκὼν], that is, a reminder.[44]

Though often discussed, this distinction has not been subjected to close examination, as though its meaning were straightforward and obvious. But it can be spelled out in subtly different ways, with significantly different consequences, which, I shall argue, affect how we understand the awareness involved.

Virtually everyone who discusses this passage takes the expression "of something else" (ἄλλου, 450b25) to be an objective genitive, specifying the intentional object of the *phantasma*: to consider a *phantasma* in this way is to consider it insofar as it is *of* or *about* something other than itself. In one sense, this is surely right. A *phantasma*, on Aristotle's view, is a representation and possesses content, and its content is clearly part of what is at issue in the distinction being drawn. The difficulty arises when we take this characteristic to be the point of the contrast, as most people do: on that reading, everything will depend on whether the *phantasma* is understood *as a representation* or rather as something "in itself" (καθ' αὑτό), which is usually taken to be something purely phenomenal and subjective.[45] Accordingly, the Greek εἰκών—rendered above neutrally as "copy"[46]—is frequently translated as "image", "picture", "likeness", or other cognate terms, in order to indicate that the difference turns on whether it is taken to be a representation. Call this the "REPRESENTATIONAL READING". Some have even suggested that Aristotle intends it to generalize to *all* intentional states and so might even *require* that the *phantasma* be regarded in this way if it is to represent anything at all.[47]

On a representational reading, however, it is extremely difficult to understand what it would be to regard a *phantasma* "in itself" (καθ' αὑτό). Even if we don't think, with G. R. T. Ross, that it amounts to a "contradiction" to regard a *phantasma* as something other than a representation (1906, 257), since of course it *will still be* a representation—in Aristotle's view, they are "one and the same, though different in being" (τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἐστὶν ἄμφω, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἀμφοῖν, 450b22–23)—it is unclear just *which* aspects are in view when we regard it in this way. Consider the analogy with artistic representations more closely. Suppose you are looking at one of J. M. W. Turner's paintings in the Tate Gallery. You can of course take it (*a*) as a seascape, as one does, and so as being of something other than itself, for example, a turbulent sea just before sunset. What would it be to regard it "in itself"? One way is to consider (*b1*) its physical aspects, that is, of the painting as built up from strokes of oil paint or other media on a stretched canvas having certain spatial dimensions, the sort of features often listed on the accompanying placard. Another way is to view it (*b2*) as a purely visual pattern of colours and shapes, in low relief under light, much as one might view the abstract compositions of Wassily Kandinsky or Kazimir Malevich's suprematist works.

How well would any of these apply to *phantasmata*? Very few commentators elaborate in any detail what it is to view a *phantasma* in itself, but those who do specify it along the lines of (*b1*) or (*b2*).[48] But it takes only a moment to see that neither reading has any plausibility. Apart from heartburn or palpitations, none of us has any awareness of modifications in the region around the heart as such, in line with (*b1*).[49] He himself advances the details of his theory, including the physiology, abductively as a hypothesis that would best explain the phenomena (δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ νοῆσαι, *Mem*. 1, 450a27). But it cannot be that we are merely aware of a collection of lines or colour patches, along the lines of (*b2*). This sort of dissociated point of view, where we view things abstractly as pure patterns, without recognizing them *as* anything familiar, is simply not true to the phenomenology of any of the states Aristotle is discussing in these passages. Even if we occasionally find ourselves in such states, they are not the sorts of case at issue. Far from honing a distinction that might solve Aristotle's original puzzle, such a reading would be strangely irrelevant.

It should not be any surprise, then, that most commentators just fudge the issue and describe viewing a *phantasma* "in itself" as viewing it as a "mere image" or "picture", without further elaboration.[50] If that differs from either (*b1*) or (*b2*), it is only because it involves taking it *representationally*, as being *of* something, like an image of Coriscus or a house, or like the painting of a storm at sea in (*a*) above. But then the representational reading *is* perilously close to the "contradiction" G. R. T. Ross had in mind: it holds that in taking a *phantasma* in itself and so *not* as being "of something else", we nonetheless take it as a representation of something else. The representational reading thus leaves us with no good options: they are either implausible or irrelevant, in line with (*b1*) or (*b2*), respectively, or incoherent and contradictory, in line with (*a*).

The mistake all representational readings make, I would suggest, is to construe the expression "of something else" (ἄλλου, 450b25) as indicating the intentional or representational character of *phantasmata* quite generally, thereby taking the contrast Aristotle draws to be between their representational and non-representational aspects. Another and more promising possibility would be to take them to differ only with regard to a *specific type* of representation, thus allowing a *phantasma* to be representational under both aspects. Indeed, this may be the more charitable way of construing what some commentators say, when they describe a *phantasma*'s being "of something else" as *referring* to some actual item in the world or as being *true of* it, even though none of them states this view clearly and unambiguously, and often shift back and forth between referential language and more broadly representational language.[51] If being

"of something else" is understood relationally or *de re* in this way, then in the contrasting case, when we regard a *phantasma* in itself, the *phantasma* can still be viewed as a representation and as possessing content; it is just that we would not at that moment view it as *referring to* or being *true of* some actual item in the world. Call this the "REFERENTIAL READING".

Insofar as it avoids the absurdities of a representational reading, a referential reading is obviously preferable. It is also right to focus on the object of memory specifically, since that after all is a feature of the puzzle that this distinction is meant to explain. But apart from such advantages, it remains largely conjecture. It doesn't show how these ideas derive from details in the text, which does not contain any of Aristotle's normal language for speaking about reference or relations, apart from the single genitive "of something else" (ἄλλου). What Aristotle speaks about instead is whether a *phantasma* is or is taken to be a "copy" (εἰκών). When we look at that notion more closely and see how Aristotle deploys it, we will find that he has something much more specific in mind than a relation to an object, and this has a direct bearing on the kind of awareness involved.

3 Copies

To begin with, it is important to emphasize that to be a representation is *not* to be a copy: a *phantasma* does not have to be a copy or be viewed as one in order to have representational content, as is sometimes assumed.[52] *All* the *phantasmata* under discussion have content.[53] With that in mind, now consider the following passage, which comes immediately after the one quoted at the beginning of the last subsection and elaborates the notion of a copy (450b27–451a2):

> ὥστε καὶ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ ἡ κίνησις αὐτοῦ, ἂν μὲν, ᾗ καθ αὐτό ἐστι, ταύτῃ αἰσθάνηται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ, οἷον νόημά τι ἢ φάντασμα φαίνεται ἐπελθεῖν, ἂν δ ᾗ ἄλλου καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ὡς εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ καί μὴ ἑωρακὼς τὸν Κορίσκον ὡς Κορίσκου· ἐνταῦθά τε ἄλλο τὸ πάθος τῆς θεωρίας ταύτης καὶ ὅταν ὡς ζῷον γεγραμμένον θεωρῇ, ἔν τε τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ μὲν γίγνεται ὥσπερ νόημα μόνον, τὸ δ ὡς ἐκεῖ ὅτι εἰκών, μνημόνευμα.
>
> Consequently, whenever its change is activated, if the soul perceives [the *phantasma*] just as it is in itself,[54] then it seems to strike one like a certain sort of thought or *phantasma*; whereas [if the soul perceives it] as being of something else, it is just like when one considers something in a drawing as a copy [ὡς εἰκόνα]—as being [a copy] of Coriscus, for example, when one doesn't have Coriscus in view.[55] In this case, the modification in this act of considering is different from when one considers it as a drawn figure: in the latter case, it occurs in the soul as a mere thought, whereas in the other case, because [one considers it as] a copy, it [occurs in the soul as] a reminder.

The very first clause in this passage, "when its change is *activated*" (ὅταν ἐνεργῇ ἡ κίνησις αὐτοῦ, 450b27),[56] confirms the claims made above at the end of Section 1 (pp. 175*f.*). Prior to experiences like the ones Aristotle describes here, the *phantasmata* in question are not active, though they have the power to be; they are at that point simply stored in memory. They are therefore not images: no visualization, or indeed any other experience involving them, occurs at that time. But since the content they bear is preserved, they should still be regarded as representations, as Aristotle himself states when he first posits them at the beginning of the *aporia* (450a27–32).

The passage then turns to two ways of reflecting on a *phantasma* when it is active, for which Aristotle uses the verbs "perceive" (αἰσθάνεσθαι) and "consider" or "regard" (θεωρεῖν). It is clear from his subsequent elaboration that it has content when regarded in either way—indeed, the very same content, as it is the same, unchanged *phantasma*—and it is only how one regards it that differs. In one case, the subject takes the content of the *phantasma* simply on its own. In the other, the subject takes it in such a way that it *also* brings to mind something else that is absent, for which it serves as a "reminder" (μνημόνευμα). This idea has antecedents in Plato, unsurprisingly, and Socrates' discussion of reminders in the *Phaedo* is illuminating. In explaining how we recollect forms, he appeals to ordinary cases of recollection. It is how he describes the relationship between the reminder and what is remembered that is of particular interest:

> Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἴδωσιν λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἴωθε χρῆσθαι, πάσχουσι τοῦτο· ἔγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδὸς οὗ ἦν ἡ λύρα; τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις· ὥσπερ γε καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη. —Μυρία μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. —Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησίς τίς ἐστι; μάλιστα μέντοι ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέληστο; —Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. —Τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς· ἔστιν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθῆναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι; —Πάνυ γε. —Οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου ἀναμνησθῆναι; —Ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη.
>
> Do you know that lovers experience this, when they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their boyfriends frequently use: they both recognize the lyre and grasp in thought the figure [εἶδος] of the young man whose lyre it is? This is recollection, just as on seeing Simmias one often recollects Cebes, and countless other cases like that. —Countless indeed, Simmias said. —So then, he said, is this sort of thing a kind of recollection? Especially when one experiences this regarding things one has previously forgotten and not seen for some

> time. —Certainly, he said. —Well then, he said, can one recollect a man on seeing a picture of a horse or a picture of lyre, or recollect Cebes on seeing a picture of Simmias? —Absolutely. —And so also recollect Simmias himself on seeing a picture of Simmias? —Most assuredly.

Resemblance, it should be noted, is not necessary: some reminders are similar to what they are reminders of, but—as Socrates goes on to point out (74a2–3)—others are different. In every case, though, they bear a specific causal relation to what is remembered. In Plato's work more generally an εἰκών or "copy" essentially involves causality. A copy is not merely similar to what it is a copy of, but is reproduced *from it*, something Proclus emphasizes in his commentary on Plato's *Parmenides*, as both A. E. Taylor and F. M. Cornford approvingly point out.[57]

If Aristotle's view is informed by this Platonic background, as seems likely, a copy or εἰκών will not merely be "*of* something else" in an intentional or representational sense, but also be "*from* something else" (ἄλλου): a memory *causally derives from* what it is of, where the genitive case indicates origin as much as object.[58] To regard something as a copy is to regard it as something that *traces back* to something it was produced from and which may no longer be present. If it refers to such an object, it does so only in virtue of this causal relation. Call this the "CAUSAL READING".

While a causal reading would not be a plausible model for intentionality generally, it turns out to be quite apt for memory specifically. The sense in which a *phantasma* is a copy and hence "of something else" is one that is characteristic of recollecting the earlier experience from which it stems and is precisely what Aristotle thinks memory requires.

4 The Solution of the Puzzle

Aristotle's distinction when read in this way makes much better sense of the context, not only with regard to the source of the puzzle, concerning memory, but also with regard to his treatment of individual cases in the subsequent section where he applies his solution. He distinguishes several states having to do with memory: (i) *genuinely* remembering, (ii) *merely seeming* to remember, and (iii) *doubting* whether one is remembering. Aristotle considers this last case first.[59] A person who does not know (οὐκ ἴσμεν) whether they are remembering might be in doubt (διστάζομεν) as to whether they are actually remembering, even though their experience does in fact stem from having perceived earlier (ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθέσθαι, *Mem.* 1, 451a2–5). In this case, the *phantasma* is in fact a copy, even though the person doesn't regard it as such.[60] If that person later concludes that it is a memory after all, Aristotle explains, it is because they have switched from regarding it "as itself" to regarding it as being "of/from something else" (ὅταν θεωρῶν ὡς αὐτὸ μεταβάλλῃ καὶ θεωρῇ ὡς ἄλλου, a7–8). The subject thus vacillates over whether the content of their mental state is in fact a reproduction *of an earlier experience*: even when a mental state is a copy of an earlier experience, a subject might think that it is not, or at any rate not be sure whether it is, and so take different stances about its causal origins.

In the next case he considers, (ii), one thinks one is remembering, but isn't really, an experience familiar to many of us. Aristotle, though, picks the more dramatic case of Antipheron of Oreus and others plagued by delusions, where there is no dispute as to whether they are in error: they take their *phantasmata* to be genuine memories, when they are often just confabulations (451a8–11; cf. 2, 452b24–26).[61] Aristotle's explanation in this case is the diametric opposite of his earlier one: in all such cases the subject takes a *phantasma* to be a copy, when in fact it isn't, and so thinks the content of their experience is a copy of an earlier one, when it is not—it may be an amalgam, stemming from various experiences, but by hypothesis it is not the copy of a single one just like it. The nature of Antipheron's mistake again is causal: it concerns the origins of his *phantasma*.

The sweet spot of genuinely remembering, (i), only occurs when both conditions are satisfied, namely, (*a*) one has a *phantasma* that is reproduced from an earlier perceiving and so is in fact a copy and (*b*) one takes it to be a copy as well. Obviously, one might not know whether one's *phantasma* is in fact a copy. But Aristotle's point is that one cannot be genuinely remembering, in the full sense, without taking the *phantasma* to be a copy—that is simply part of what remembering consists in (2, 452b26–28).[62] At the same time it is not enough just to take it to be a copy of an earlier experience. It must also be a copy in actual fact. The two conditions are independent.

Aristotle thus applies his original distinction at two different points: (*a*) whether the *phantasma* involved *is* a copy or not; and (*b*) whether the subject *takes* or *regards* it as a copy or not.[63] These two applications, moreover, can vary independently and so cross-cut one another, resulting in four possible cases. Depending on the *phantasma* and one's attitude towards it, one of the following cases will obtain:

Table 7.1 Being a copy and being regarded as one

a copy	genuinely remembering	doubting/denying remembering
not a copy	merely seeming to remember	[being in a non-memorial state]
	regarded as a copy	**not regarded as a copy**

The exhaustiveness of this division confirms that Aristotle's purpose in introducing the distinction between regarding a *phantasma* as a copy and in itself is a narrow one, which he introduces in order to explain the differences between various states having to do with memory. All other intentional states will be cases where the *phantasma* is neither a copy in the relevant sense, nor regarded as one (the lower right quadrant of Table 7.1). It follows that the corresponding notion of a "copy" is likewise restricted. It requires a specific causal history, where the *phantasma* reproduces and duplicates the earlier perceptual experience it derives from. Merely having some perceptual stimulation or other in its causal ancestry is not sufficient.

5 Higher-Order Awareness in Memory

If this interpretation is correct, then it affects which conclusions should be drawn about the mental attitude we have towards these *phantasmata*. For it should be evident from the range of cases discussed that having this mental attitude is not required for a *phantasma* to actually be a copy or for it to possess representational content: a *phantasma* will have content and may even be a copy, independently of whether it is regarded in this way or not. But the cases Aristotle canvasses also shed light on whether this attitude implies a Cartesian theatre. The context strongly suggests that it does not. When we perceive something as a copy "of something else" (ἄλλου), it serves as a reminder of that other thing (μνημόνευμα, 450b25–26), so that we remember not this modification (τὸ πάθος), but "that *from which* it arose" (ἐκεῖνο ἀφ' οὗ ἐγένετο, b12–13). But what precisely is that? It is often assumed in these discussions that it must be an external object, event, or fact,[64] since these are the sort of things that we ourselves standardly say we remember: an old classmate, the date of a historical event, or the Pythagorean theorem. But according to Aristotle those are not the objects of *mnēmē*, customarily translated as "memory" (as so often, due to the Latin cognate). Aristotle insists that *mnēmē* is restricted to episodic or personal memories of past *experiences*.[65] It is not just that a memory originates from an earlier experience on his view (449b18–21). We must also be *aware that we experienced it earlier*—this is a necessary condition of *mnēmē*. He states it twice in very similar terms, once at the beginning of the chapter and the second towards the end when he reiterates the point:

> ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν ἢ ἤσθετο ἢ ἐνόησεν (449b22–23).
>
> For whenever one is actively engaged in remembering, in every case one thus says in one's soul that one earlier heard or perceived or thought this.

> ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ τῇ μνήμῃ, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν, ὅτι εἶδε τοῦτο ἢ ἤκουσεν ἢ ἔμαθε προσαισθάνεται ὅτι πρότερον[66] (450a19–21).
>
> For whenever one is actively engaged with memory, as indeed we said earlier, in every case one perceives in addition that one earlier knew or heard or learned this.

The phrase "says in one's soul" in the first passage is of course metaphorical—Aristotle surely does not have in mind subvocalizing or even "speaking silently" in one's head whenever one remembers. But he cannot mean anything like judgement either, which Plato characterizes as a kind of internal speech.[67] For immediately before the second of the quotations above, Aristotle argues that while some non-human animals have memory, none has belief or reason.[68] Accordingly, they don't have concepts, much less language,[69] and so can't judge, much less literally say, that they have experienced something before. The second quotation above, in fact, is meant to explain (γάρ) what happens whenever any animal, human or non-human, remembers and so restates the condition expressed in the first quotation. But with one significant difference: he replaces the phrase "says in one's soul" with "*perceives* in addition" (προσαισθάνεται). Aristotle, that is, understands this necessary condition of memory in terms of perception, not speech or judgement, precisely because it does apply to both humans and non-humans.[70] This is much as one would expect from his earlier insistence that even when we remember objects of thought, it is principally in virtue of our perceptual powers and our perceptual awareness that time has elapsed (*Mem.* 1, 449b30–450a25, esp. 450a9–19).

What is involved, then, in the form of memory Aristotle calls *mnēmē* cannot be anything more than an *awareness* or *recognition* that what is present to the mind has a certain pastness to it, as the content of an earlier experience: we literally have a feeling of *déjà vu*.[71] This sort of feeling is distinctive of a certain kind of personal recollection, where what we remember, as Richard Sorabji puts it (following a suggestion of Elizabeth Anscombe's), is not so much external objects or events, as our past *views* of them.[72] As such, it constitutes a phenomenological datum that *any* account of this sort of memory ought to acknowledge and attempt to explain.

It is this specific form of memory that provides the context for the problem of presence in absence we started from. Not all forms of memory do: it does not arise, for example, when I remember what the quadratic formula is or the capital of Bhutan. In contrast, when I recall looking out from a play house in the Bronx zoo when I was four, there is a legitimate question as to what distinguishes this from daydreaming a scene that is qualitatively identical. The difference, Aristotle suggests, is to be explained by the fact that in the first case, rather than just taking

a visualization on its own, I also regard it as a copy of a past experience. Perceiving it this way is not so much a matter of scrutinizing a picture, but a form of *recognition*: it is a matter of regarding it in a certain way, of seeing it *as familiar*, as something I have gone through before.[73] This reading is confirmed by Aristotle's description of cases where we doubt that we are remembering: although the relevant changes in fact arise "*from* an earlier perceiving" (ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθέσθαι), we vacillate as to whether they "*conform with* having perceived" (κατὰ τὸ ἠσθῆσθαι, 451a4). In order to genuinely remember, the *phantasma* must not only be an imprint of an earlier perceptual stimulation (οἷον τύπον τινὰ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, 450a31), the subject must also regard it as having come from that earlier experience. No amount of conscious inspection of a *phantasma* could reveal that it was a copy in this sense. What matters instead is our attitude towards it.[74]

If that is right, then talk of "perceiving" or "regarding" a *phantasma* is much more innocent than it may have seemed initially. It is *not a first-order viewing* of the *phantasma*, but a higher-order attitude towards it. To regard a *phantasma* as a copy is to *reflect* on an experience like visualization and to take it to reproduce our own past experience, that is, in addition to the visualization, we take the *content* of the experience to be something we have perceived or experienced before ("what I am experiencing now is something that I have experienced before"). Indeed, it is precisely because it is a higher-order attitude that it can also refer to what is now past—something first-order perceptions cannot do (*Mem.* 1, 449b13–14, b27; cf. 450b15). To regard the *phantasma* "in itself", in contrast, is *not* to adopt such a higher-order attitude towards our experience, but simply to enjoy its content, just as it is—it is *not* to take it as anything further.

Higher-order awareness is not something that belongs to all visualization, much less to every representational state, or even to everything that we ourselves would call a "memory". It is peculiar to cases where we seem to be having a personal or episodic memory of a past experience. Not all such cases are genuine memories, moreover. The higher-order attitude in question is prone to error and open to doubt, as Aristotle himself makes clear; it is not an infallible form of inner acquaintance. It is therefore very different from the one involved in the Cartesian theatre, where everything that "passes before the mind" is observed by an inner self or homunculus, and still less one where a homunculus says to itself that the theatre production is a representation of something else beyond its immediate access. Aristotle's solution to the *aporia* gives no reason to think he is committed to any of that. All he is claiming is that on occasion we reflect as to whether we are remembering in this episodic way, a phenomenological datum that any account must acknowledge, and he explains it in terms of our attitudes towards such experiences. He does take this higher-order reflection to be a kind of perceptual awareness specifically, which I have suggested is a kind of recognition. It also requires a sense of time, which not all animals have (*Mem.* 1, 450a18–19), since it involves regarding it as something experienced previously. Additionally, it presupposes that such animals have the capacity to take something as *F*, however rudimentary. But this, I would argue, is something Aristotle thinks is a feature of perception generally, even in animals that lack concepts and the power of judgement in any more substantive sense.[75]

The crucial point, then, comes down to this. The higher-order awareness involved only concerns our regarding the content as previously experienced. It is not required for the content of the *phantasma* itself. Which item we remember (or seem to remember) is determined by the content of the *phantasma*, which is itself a function of the magnitudes and causal powers of the change that constitutes it, and not by any higher-order attitude we take towards it.[76]

Corroboration of this general line of interpretation can be found in a digression in the second chapter of *De memoria*. We do not think of things that are "large and far away", he argues, by means of a direct causal connection with the object, for example, by thought's "stretching out" (τῷ ἀποτείνειν) from the subject to make contact with the object, since we would think in the same way about such things even in cases where they do not exist and so could not be reached (καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὄντων ὁμοίως νοήσει, 452b9–11). We think of them instead by complex changes taking place within us that *model* what is thought about in precise ways: parts of the change within us have magnitudes that stand in relation to each other in the same proportions that magnitudes in the object have in relation to each other, including how these magnitudes and relationships change over time (b11–16).[77] Aristotle never says that we survey or observe such a model, or even that we visualize it by putting it "before our eyes".[78] He simply says that the subject thinks of objects *by undergoing the change* that exhibits this proportional relation structure (τῇ ἀνάλογον κινήσει, b11–12). Such a model is no doubt a *phantasma*. But it has the content it does merely in virtue of possessing these features and embodying this relation structure, which in turn enables it to underwrite the content of thoughts based on it. But to do this, it does not need to be viewed or regarded itself in any way at all.

A useful contrast is with Plato's analogy of the painter in our souls in the *Philebus* (38e–40c). His concern in the immediate context is broader, regarding belief quite generally, but especially perceptual beliefs (38b–e). In cases where our different experiences come together and we form a judgement, Socrates says that there is a "scribe in us" (παρ' ἡμῖν γραμματεύς) who writes this statement down, our soul being like a "book" (ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ βιβλίῳ τινὶ προσεοικέναι, 38e–39a); and there is a painter (ζωγράφον) as well, who subsequently sketches copies of these statements in our soul (τῶν λεγομένων εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων γράφει, 39b6–7; τὰς τῶν δοξασθέντων καὶ λεχθέντων εἰκόνας, b10–c1, d7), at least

for perceptual beliefs (b8–c1). In such cases, Socrates says, the subject in some way *sees* these copies "within himself" (ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρᾷ πως, c1). With our hopes too, we can visualize wished for scenarios (ὁρᾷ, 40a9–11), like our possessing great wealth and luxury, where we *observe* what we have freely painted within ourselves (ἐνεζωγραφημένον αὐτὸν ἐφ' αὑτῷ … καθορᾷ, a11–12), which he also refers to as "painted *phantasmata*" (τὰ φαντάσματα ἐζωγραφημένα, a9).

Now here, as elsewhere, one can argue that Plato's vivid personifications are merely playful: just as there is obviously no literal writing or painting going on in our souls, one might claim that Plato is not seriously committed to any sub-personal agents creating and viewing representations either.[79] My point is simply this: Plato says things that much more directly suggest a Cartesian theatre, which would have to be reinterpreted or explained away. Aristotle, in contrast, never says anything as strong. If his remarks can be understood in a more neutral way, as I have suggested they can, then they should be.

4 Mistaking Dreams for Waking Reality (*Insomn.* 3)

The evidence we have seen shows that Aristotle speaks of certain conscious experiences like visualization, as well as reflective higher-order awareness of our own experiences. But such remarks in themselves are not probative, as these are data that all theories must acknowledge, and different theories will account for them in different ways. To show that Aristotle is committed to the Cartesian theatre, we would need clearer evidence that *in his theoretical account* he posits internal objects of awareness to explain familiar phenomena such as perception or memory: that, for example, it is *by being aware of* a sense-datum or an image that I perceive or remember the external object that it represents or, for reasons like those I have suggested, that it causally derives from or otherwise belongs to. None of the evidence we have seen so far, not even talk of "perceiving a *phantasma* as a copy", requires that.

The strongest evidence for a commitment to the Cartesian theatre I am aware of comes from Aristotle's essay on dreams, in a discussion of how, while dreaming, we often take ourselves to be perceiving external objects. In this case, it is not the phenomenological description that is at issue, but the theoretical account Aristotle offers to explain this phenomenon and how he correlates it with what goes on during actual waking perception. On one reading (also reflected in most translations), it looks like Aristotle is committed to internal objects of awareness, not only in dreams, but in perception as well. If so, then he is committed to a form of indirect realism of a questionable sort, and all my efforts thus far have been for naught.

As often, it is useful to look at Aristotle's remarks against the backdrop of Plato's discussions, to see the ways in which the former develops certain elements or departs from them. In a remarkably underdiscussed

passage in the *Theaetetus*, Socrates raises a difficulty about how one can tell whether one is awake or just having a vivid dream, and indeed he presents it as something that the young Theaetetus is already familiar with, as something he "has often heard asked" (πολλάκις … ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτώντων, *Tht.* 158b8–c8; cf. 157e1–158e4):

> ΣΩ. Ὁ πολλάκις σε οἶμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτώντων, τί ἄν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδεῖξαι, εἴ τις ἔροιτο νῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι πότερον καθεύδομεν καὶ πάντα ἃ διανοούμεθα ὀνειρώττομεν, ἢ ἐγρηγόραμέν τε καὶ ὕπαρ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμεθα.
>
> ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄπορόν γε ὅτῳ χρὴ ἐπιδεῖξαι τεκμηρίῳ· πάντα γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀντίστροφα τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ. ἅ τε γὰρ νυνὶ διειλέγμεθα οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ δοκεῖν ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι· καὶ ὅταν δὴ ὄναρ ὀνείρατα δοκῶμεν διηγεῖσθαι, ἄτοπος ἡ ὁμοιότης τούτων ἐκείνοις.
>
> SOCRATES: It is a question you have often heard asked, I think: what evidence could anyone offer, were someone to ask right now whether, at this very moment, we are sleeping and dreaming everything that we are thinking, or whether we are awake and speaking to each other in reality.
>
> THEAETETUS: He would be completely without the evidence needed to show this, since the two correspond to each other in every detail, like duplicates. Nothing precludes our thinking while we are in fact asleep that we are having the discussion we have been having just now. In fact, whenever, while dreaming, we think we are recounting a dream, their similarity to one another is uncanny.

What is significant for our discussion is the claim that these experiences can, on occasion, be so similar phenomenologically as to be indistinguishable from each other, or at any rate close enough that a subject might have great difficulty in telling them apart: when dreaming, we seem to perceive and interact with objects just as we do while awake. We might reasonably wonder not just how to tell them apart, but how to understand the structure of this experience such that we could make such a mistake, especially in comparison with actual perceiving.

The epistemological question does not trouble Aristotle much, even though he doesn't believe there is any telltale sign internal to the experience phenomenologically that could distinguish them. He brushes aside such sceptical worries with contempt: no one in Libya, he says, tries to walk to the Odeon after having dreamt of being in Athens.[80] He seems to take it for granted that in general we *can* tell whether we are awake or dreaming, even if there are times while dreaming when we cannot. How we sort these out is in his view a matter of other collateral information we have concurrently and whether our judgement is made with a clear head,

as we would say.[81] Sometimes we are aware that we are asleep, a higher-order awareness he again expresses with "perceives" (αἰσθάνεσθαι), and so have what we would call a "lucid dream" (462a2–8):

> οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις, ἐὰν μὲν αἰσθάνηται ὅτι καθεύδει καὶ τοῦ πάθους ἐν ᾧ ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑπνωτικοῦ, φαίνεται μέν, λέγει δέ τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὅτι φαίνεται μὲν Κορίσκος, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ὁ Κορίσκος (πολλάκις γὰρ καθεύδοντος λέγει τι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὅτι ἐνύπνιον τὸ φαινόμενον)· ἐὰν δὲ λανθάνῃ ὅτι καθεύδει, οὐδὲν ἀντιφήσει τῇ φαντασίᾳ.
>
> So too during sleep: if a person perceives that they are asleep and their sleepy condition in which the perception occurs, then although something appears, something in them says that although Coriscus appears, Coriscus is not there.[82] For often when a person is asleep something in his soul says that what appears [τὸ φαινόμενον] is a dream. But whenever someone is not aware that they are asleep, nothing will speak against the *phantasia*.

Some elements here should be familiar. The kind of perception involved here is explicitly higher-order, much like what we encountered with states connected with memory: it involves reflection on the type of first-order experience we are having. Likewise, we need not take the talk of "speaking in one's soul" as requiring a fully formulated assertion, even silently, but simply a kind of *perceiving as*—one affirmatively *takes* one's experience as a dream and so discounts what appears as not real. In addition, notice that Aristotle does not commit himself to anything more than having an experience and a higher-order awareness of it. He doesn't voice any commitment to observing special objects in a special way, much less a homunculus, as would be required by the Cartesian theatre. He merely describes a phenomenological datum that virtually anyone would accept, namely, that sometimes while we are dreaming we are aware that we are,[83] together with his appeal to *phantasia* as the underlying function that accounts for dreaming in general.

One might well think the situation was otherwise, though, in the passage that immediately precedes this one, which describes the "bad" case, where one is taken in and mistakes one's dreams for waking experience. Aristotle begins by noting how perceptual stimulations (αἰσθήματα), in addition to giving rise to perceptual experience, also leave behind a trace in the peripheral organs; and how at night when the animal falls asleep, the blood carries these traces, now activated, down to the heart, which for Aristotle is the central organ of perception (*Insomn.* 3, 461b11–21).[84] He then discusses how we come to be deceived in the following terms (461b21–30):

> τούτων δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὑπόλειμμα τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθήματος καὶ ἀπελθόντος τοῦ ἀληθοῦς [αἰσθήματος] ἔνεστι. καὶ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι τοιοῦτον οἷον Κορίσκος, ἀλλ' οὐ Κορίσκος. ὅτε δὲ ᾐσθάνετο, οὐκ ἔλεγε Κορίσκον τὸ κύριον καὶ τὸ ἐπικρῖνον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνον Κορίσκον τὸν ἀληθινόν. ᾧ δὴ καὶ αἰσθανόμενον λέγει τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὴ παντελῶς κατέχηται ὑπὸ τοῦ αἵματος, ὥσπερ αἰσθανόμενον τοῦτο κινεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν κινήσεων τῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, καὶ δοκεῖ τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές· καὶ τοσαύτη τοῦ ὕπνου ἡ δύναμις ὥστε ποιεῖν τοῦτο λανθάνειν.
>
> Each of these [changes], as was stated, is a trace [ὑπόλειμμα] of the perceptual stimulation in activity, which is present even when the real one[85] is not; and it is true to say that it is just like Coriscus, though not Coriscus. When [the subject] was perceiving [earlier], the authoritative part pronouncing judgement did *not* say that [this is] Coriscus, but rather *because of it* [διὰ τοῦτο] said that that person is the real Coriscus. Now the part with which[86] one says this while perceiving is, unless it is completely overwhelmed by blood, changed by the changes in the sense organs *in just the way it was while perceiving* and what is similar is itself thought to be the genuine thing. But the power of sleep is so great that it makes us unaware of this.

Aristotle's remarks here are ambiguous at several points and so admit of different interpretations. But the basic framework is not in doubt. He distinguishes (*a*) "the perceptual stimulation in activity" (τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθήματος, 461b22)—described earlier as the "perceptual stimulation present in the sense organs when the senses are active" (ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις ἐνεργουσῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, 2, 459a27–28)—from (*b*) the "remnant" (ὑπόλειμμα) or trace the perceptual stimulation leaves behind;[87] and it is (*a*), the stimulation that occurs during actual perception, that he refers to as the "true" or genuine one (τοῦ ἀληθοῦς) which is no longer present (ἀπελθόντος, 461b22–23). According to Aristotle's theory, the trace, which is a *phantasma*, is similar to the perceptual stimulation, because of the way it is generated from it.[88] It can therefore produce a similar effect on the central organ, an experience qualitatively like perceiving, and as a result we might mistakenly think we are perceiving when we are not, at least if our judgement is impaired, as it is during sleep.[89] Aristotle's claim, moreover, that what is similar seems itself to be "the real thing" (δοκεῖ τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές, 461b29) is likely meant to call to mind Plato's characterization of dreaming at the end of *Republic* V: "Isn't dreaming just this, namely, that someone thinks, either while asleep or awake, that what is similar is not just similar, but the very thing it is like?"[90]

But what, exactly, is supposed to be mistaken for what in this passage? Aristotle's use of pronouns and descriptions is less than fully explicit. At the minimum, we mistake one kind of *experience* for another and think we are perceiving external objects when in fact we are not, but

just dreaming—call this, for obvious reasons, the "MINIMAL READING". But someone might think that an even more specific error is involved, namely that when we are taken in by a dream, we mistake one sort of *object*, an internal one, for an external object such as Coriscus.[91] I will refer to any interpretation committed to this general line of approach as an "OBJECT READING", even though there are several ways it can be spelled out. In its most common form, this reading is *imagistic*: while dreaming, what we are aware of is an image or mental object and because it resembles or looks like Coriscus, we can mistake the image for Coriscus himself, at least when our critical judgement is sufficiently impaired during sleep.[92] Such a reading might seem to gain additional support from the discussion that immediately precedes it in context, in which Aristotle compares the likeness (ὁμοιότητα) of traces to what we see in cloud forms, which we liken to people and centaurs.[93] Clouds, after all, are visible objects that look like the objects in question, at least to some extent, much as reflections on the surface of water do, even when disturbed by ripples—another comparison Aristotle draws earlier in the chapter.[94]

If this sort of object reading were correct, however, it would have serious implications for how genuine perception occurs as well. For Aristotle explicitly contrasts this "bad" case with what happens in the "good" case, when the subject actually is perceiving (ὅτε δὲ ᾐσθάνετο, 461b24) and does *not* assert that it is Coriscus (οὐκ ἔλεγε Κορίσκον, b25).[95] Instead the subject, "on account of this" (διὰ τοῦτο)—that is, on account of the *phantasma*—says that "*that* person" is the real Coriscus (ἐκεῖνον Κορίσκον τὸν ἀληθινόν, b26). In an imagistic object reading, then, there would be an image present not only in dreams, but *in genuine perception as well*. The only difference is that when we are perceiving, we don't mistake the image for an external object, because we are awake and in possession of our judgement.[96] The imagistic reading thus commits Aristotle to a form of INDIRECT REALISM: whenever we perceive objects in the world, we do so *by being aware* of an internal object, an image, that resembles the external one (in the good cases, at any rate).[97] Aristotle's theory would thus be similar to Locke's and to classic sense datum theories, insofar as they all share the following commitment: in every experience, there is some internal object of which we are aware, whether or not there is also an external one corresponding to it; and even when there is, it is by being aware of the internal object that we can be said to perceive the external one.

This sort of object reading is demonstrably false, though. The item that is said here to be "just like Coriscus" (τοιοῦτον οἷον Κορίσκος, 461b23) cannot be a mental image, since, according to Aristotle, it is a change *in the bloodstream*.[98] He makes this explicit when he applies the analogies with clouds and reflections in water to the target case of dreams. Traces of perceptual stimulations are changes that persist in a latent state in the peripheral sense organs until they are reactivated during sleep, when the commotion due to fresh perceptions ceases. "As [these changes] are released", he continues (461b17–19),

> καὶ λυόμεναι ἐν ὀλίγῳ τῷ λοιπῷ αἵματι τῷ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις κινοῦνται, ἔχουσαι ὁμοιότητα ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν στοῖς νέφεσιν.
>
> they begin to move *in the little remaining blood* in the perceptual organs, containing a likeness like those in clouds.[99]

To retain an object reading, then, we would have to drop the construal of *phantasmata* as mental images and take the objects of awareness to be physiological changes instead. But that is hardly tenable. To claim that changes in the blood *resemble* external objects and their interactions, such that a cardiologist might read off the content of our experiences simply by observing the blood around the heart, would be comical enough.[100] But to claim that whenever we perceive or dream, *we ourselves* are immediately aware of how these internal bodily changes *look*—not to mention how they *sound*, *smell*, *taste*, or *feel*—simply beggars belief.[101] And to suggest that Aristotle himself was so credulous seems excessively uncharitable. If the trace is a change in the bloodstream, then insofar as it is such a change, it doesn't look or sound or smell or taste or feel any different than a dark, warm, flowing blood would.

One might be tempted to reply that we don't perceive changes in our blood *as such*—that would be absurd—rather we "perceive" them *as representations* and are thereby aware *of what they represent*.[102] But at that point we are no longer really talking about perceiving the change *as an object*, but claiming instead to be aware of its *content*. If so, then we should just abandon talk of *phantasmata* as the objects of awareness, in favor of speaking of the contents they possess, and avoid any ludicrous claims about being regularly aware of the insides of our body. And once we have given up special internal objects and attitudes, we have given up the Cartesian theatre as well.

This alternative—call it the "CONTENT READING"—makes better sense of the text quoted above. Notice that this text does not mention perceiving or being aware of the trace of the perceptual stimulation, but merely states that the trace *is* similar to the external object, Coriscus (τοιοῦτον οἷον Κορίσκος, 461b23). Similarity does not require subjective resemblance, of one thing looking like another. It may involve just objective similarity, due to the sharing of certain properties or characteristics. And we know from elsewhere that Aristotle insists on such objective similarity, both for the original perceptual stimulation and the trace produced from it. The perceptual stimulation is produced when the perceptible object acts in the appropriate way on the sense organ, and the organ

receives the perceptible form of this object "without the matter" (*DA* II.12, 424a17–24; III.2, 425b23–24).[103] The perceptual stimulation, in turn, produces a *phantasma*, which, as we have seen, is "like a kind of impression" (οἷον τύπον τινά) of the stimulation (*Mem.* 1, 450a31), which can be stored and later reactivated. Because of the way they are produced, the latter is a similar change to the original perceptual stimulation, and in Aristotle's view therefore gives rise to an experience with a similar content.[104] In fact, on one not unreasonable interpretation, these changes have the content they do in virtue of sharing relevant physical characteristics of the object, specifically (i) the ratios of certain physical magnitudes and (ii) the causal powers to affect the central perceptual organ in the same way.[105] *Aisthēmata* and *phantasmata* are thus states of the body that bear content, such that when they affect the central organ of perception, they issue in experiences that, respectively, are either perceptions with that content or phenomenally like them (*Insomn.* 2, 460b22–27).[106]

The content reading thus does not go much beyond the minimal reading first mentioned. While dreaming, we often mistake the *experience* we are currently having for the experience we have when genuinely perceiving and so *seem* to see or perceive the objects we ordinarily would while awake. But we have this experience, with this content, simply in virtue of *having* certain bodily states that preserve certain features of the external object, *not* in virtue of *perceiving* or *being aware* of them or indeed any other internal object, whether mental or physiological. Aristotle, therefore, is not committed to indirect realism, much less a Cartesian theatre. When we are actually perceiving, we are aware *of the external objects themselves*, and not of some intermediary, even though we perceive external objects in virtue of such changes *taking place* in our perceptual system. In dreams and experiences involving visualization, we *seem* to be aware of such external objects, but there are in fact no actual objects that we are aware of, internal or external. The content and phenomenology of our experience is instead to be explained by the properties of the underlying *phantasmata*.

5 Conclusion

Most contemporary interpreters, in short, are trying to have it both ways. They want to (i) deny any commitment to the Cartesian theatre and yet maintain (ii) that *phantasmata* are internal objects of awareness. But if the general line of argument here is correct, they need to come clean. If they insist on (ii), they should just accept a commitment to the Cartesian theatre and a subject who is aware of these objects, where these will be either (a) special mental objects, like images and sense data, or alternatively (b) changes in our bloodstream. Both versions, moreover, will be forced to read *De insomniis* 3 as committed to a form of indirect

realism, where in waking perception we perceive external objects by being aware of these internal objects, whether they are construed as sense data or changes in the blood. It is hard to see either of these options as credible.

The more sensible option is to hold the line with (i) and instead deny (ii). Aristotle does acknowledge various kinds of conscious experiences such as visualization and higher-order reflection on our mental states, along with the mistakes we sometimes make due to similarities in the phenomenal character of some of our experiences. But this is all a *description of the data* that anyone should accept, rather than a theory that seeks to explain it. By themselves, they do not commit Aristotle to the model of the Cartesian theatre, which seeks to *explain* ordinary experience by positing inner objects and an internal awareness of them, thus replicating the basic structure of external perception. Such a view is a direct consequence of two tacit assumptions made by nearly all interpreters. They assume that on Aristotle's view,

1 Whenever we have an experience, *there is some object* that our experience is immediately directed at.
2 In quasi-perceptual experiences such as visualization and dreams, the immediate object of experience is a *phantasma* (and so in perceptual experiences as well, on this reading of *De insomniis* 3).

Both are mistaken. *Phantasmata* cannot in general be objects of experience, against (2), because Aristotle does not posit special mental objects or think that we are aware of changes in our bloodstream as such. The reason interpreters are reflexively tempted by (2), I would suggest, is that they take (1) for granted and so are in search of a suitable object in cases where external objects are absent. The fact that Aristotle regularly posits and appeals to *phantasmata* to explain the content of such experiences makes them seem like a ready-to-hand candidate to serve as the objects of such experiences.

We should not yield to such temptations. Aristotle is not committed to (1). In such experiences, we *seem* to see or otherwise perceive things, but in reality we do not: in such cases, *there are no objects* of which we are aware, even though there seem to be. But then *phantasmata* cannot be their objects, *a fortiori,* since on Aristotle's view they do exist in such cases. The only interpretation of his claims that is both consistent and charitable is the content reading offered here. Such experiences have content, but no object. *Phantasmata* are the content-bearing representations that underlie such experiences: they are changes in the body that bear content in virtue of their physical magnitudes and the power they have to affect the central organ in determinate ways. When these changes become active and affect the central organ, we have conscious experiences that seem like perceiving something and can further reflect upon them,

all without our ever directly viewing such internal changes or having first-order perceptions of them, not to mention special mental objects. On the occasions where Aristotle says that we "perceive" or "consider" *phantasmata*, he is referring to *higher-order* perception, where we regard the content of the experiences they underwrite as having a particular origin, as being from either an earlier experience (when remembering or merely seeming to) or an external object (when mistaking a dream for waking perception). They have content, but no present object. Such higher-order attitudes, moreover, are just the familiar ones we think people ordinarily make: either the *déjà vu* inherent in personal memory or the delusion during dreams of being awake and actually perceiving. None of them on their own entails a Cartesian theatre or a homunculus.[107]

Notes

1 Ridicule of this model is associated most famously with Gilbert Ryle, who speaks numerous times of treating the mind as a "private theatre" and a "second theatre" (Ryle 1949, 56, 155, 158, 167, 207*f.*, 222, 245, 255), which he associates with the Cartesian tradition. But the precise phrase "Cartesian Theatre" is from one of his former students, Daniel Dennett 1991, esp. Ch. 5; cf. 1986, 131, 190. One also finds it in Putnam 2013, 589–590. For opposition to the idea that the ancient Greeks had such a notion, see Rorty 1979, Ch. 1, §5, esp. 50–51.

2 Or at any rate, something we see expressed clearly only later in antiquity, for example in the writings of Neoplatonists like Augustine, where the relation to Descartes is not entirely accidental: see e.g., Matthews 1977, 25, Burnyeat 1982, 28–29, 33. Cary 2000 argues that the inner self is a specifically Christian idea, invented by Augustine, though drawing on the earlier Platonist tradition.

3 Putnam 2013 argues that the representationalist interpretation I have long defended would commit Aristotle to indirect realism and so to the Cartesian theatre (586–590, 600). Although some interpreters do think Aristotle accepts indirect realism (see n. 97 below), I have always rejected it; on my interpretation, subjects do not perceive objects in the world *by being aware* of internal representations; it suffices for them to *have* these representations in the relevant parts of the cognitive system (something Putnam acknowledges at one point (605) in his more detailed criticisms of my view at 599–607). The present essay can be seen as an extended examination and defense of this key point.

4 E.g., Hamlyn 1968 [1991], 129; Labarrière 1984, 17–21; Wedin 1988, 23 n. 1, though taken with 91*f.*; Hankinson 1990, 41–42; Turnbull 1994, 319 n. 1; Busche 1997, 568; Charles 2000, 120, 128 n. 34, 137–138; Labarrière 2000, 269 n. 1; Morel 2000, 36–37, 38–39; Birondo 2001, 57 n. 1; Taormina 2002, 35; Repici 2017, 29; Bloch 2007, esp. 62; Polansky 2007, 51 n. 32; Johansen 2012, 199; Shields 2016, 274*f.*, 389; Castagnoli 2019, 243; cf. Lang 1980, 386 n. 60. Freudenthal 1863 objects to the translation "Einbildung", but still understands it in terms of images (26 n. 1). Gallop 1996 shifts between using "imagination" and "appearance" (see esp. x, 22–23, and his glossary entries for *phainesthai*, *phantasia*, *phantastikon*, *phantazein*, and *phantasma* on 188*f.*), even though he recognizes that no image is involved in certain cases, such as when the sun appears to us to be a foot across (141). Rees 1971 questions the translation (see esp. 494–496), but regards many of the cases (though not all) to involve mental images. Against this trend, Cohoe 2016 and similarly Chappell 2017, 399*f.* defend the traditional rendering at 343 n. 14 with very few reservations; see also Lefebvre 1997, who defends it at much greater length (see below).

Many scholars now preserve the Greek or transliterate it, rather than translating it, but nonetheless take *phantasmata* to be objects of awareness like images: Watson 1982, 100; Modrak 1986, 47 n. 1; 1987, 7; Flury 1988, 71; Watson 1988, ix–x; Granger 1992, 167*f.*; Lorenz 2006, 119, 160; Stevens 2006, even though she favors the translation "apparition" (183–184); King 2009, 44*f.*, esp. n. 154; Moss 2012, 52; Scheiter 2012, 251*f.* esp. n. 1; Johansen 2012, 199*f.*; Sheppard 2014, 1*f.*; Strevell 2016, *passim*, but esp., 86*f.* Cf. Everson 1997, 194, 197, though he expressly denies that they are mental entities (203).

Against this general trend, some scholars have challenged any tight connection of *phantasia* and imagery, while still conceding that imagery is involved in some cases: Nussbaum 1978, Schofield 1978, Frede 1992, though she treats *phantasmata* as images and includes after-images, 284*f.*; King 2004, 31 n. 28; 2009, esp. 6; 2018, 9–10, 15 and Sorabji 2004 [1972], xv–xvi.

French writers sometimes translate *phantasia* and *phantasma* as "représentation", but in a way that may include imagery, e.g., Bodéüs 1993 and Frère 1996; in English, see King 2009. Lefebvre 1997 critiques this tendency, in favor of the traditional "imagination", though none of the arguments seem decisive. I am more sympathetic with Labarrière, who endorses the translation "représentation" with some qualifications (1997, 140, 148*f.*, 151, 167, and more positively in 2003, 20*f.*). On the uses of *phantasia* and *imaginatio* in the Latin tradition, see Flury 1988 and Bakhouche 2009.

5 Hicks 1907, 460–461; Lycos 1964, 496–497; though Warnock 1976 wrongly claims that the word *phantasia* "*means* 'how the object appears'" (38, my emphasis). For an excellent discussion of the different cognate forms, especially *phantazesthai*, see Schofield 1978, 131*f.* n. 15 and also 116*f.*; on the early historical development of the term, Bundy 1927, Ch. 1 has only modest value. For a survey of philosophical (and some literary and rhetorical) uses of *phantasia* and its cognates, from Plato to Plotinus, see Lefebvre 1995. For *phantasia* in Plato specifically, see Silverman 1991; Follon 2003; Collette 2006; Vernant 1979 is also relevant on his discussions of images.

The verb *phantazesthai* occurs only three times in Aristotle's genuine works, once in a non-technical sense, regarding how privation might be conceived (φαντασθείη), when one focuses one's attention on it (ἀτενίζοντι τὴν διάνοιαν, *Ph.* I.9, 192a14–16), and twice technically: (i) objects of desire move us simply by being thought or envisaged (τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι, *DA* III.10, 433b11–12), and (ii) successive guesses come to mind (φαντάζεται) especially quickly in those with an excess of black bile (*Div. Somn.* 2, 464b1). The 20 or so occurrences of *phantazesthai* in Plato all concern how features of external objects manifest themselves, where a psychological subject is implicit at best, with only a few exceptions: taboo dreams (*R.* IX, 572b1), the magnitude of pleasures (*Phlb.* 51a7), what one believes to be causally responsible (*Hp. Ma.* 300c10); possibly also in the discussion of flavours and colours (*Ti.* 65e4, 67e4).

6 E.g., Freudenthal 1863, 16, 25*f.*; Rodier 1900, I.167, 191, 193, 195, 199; II.415, 428, 511; Beare 1906 describes them as "presentations" to "the mind's eye" (291*f.*; cf. 296, 300, 310, 312*f.*) and treats it as an object of awareness throughout 450a20–29 in his 1908; G. R. T. Ross 1906, 257; Hicks 1907, 141, 458, 459, 467, 529, 530, 538; Hett 1936 [1957] regularly

uses "mental images" and "mental pictures"; Bundy 1927, 71–75, even referring to it once as a "picture for the inner eye" (74); W. D. Ross 1924, 143; 1955, 278; 1961, e.g., 281*f.*, 304, 306; Siwek 1933, 315*f.* n. 376; 1940, 270; 1963, 156 nn. 43 and 45; Block 1960, 98*f.*; Blum 1969, 72, 73*f.*; Rees 1971, 501, cf. 497, 498, 499; Hamlyn 1968 [1991], 63, 64, 65*f.*, 72, 131, 146, 147, 150; Lanza 1971, 1068–1070; Sorabji 1972, 2–8, 14–17, 72, and strongly reaffirmed in the introduction to the second edition, Sorabji 2004 [1972], xi–xx, though at one point he denies that they are objects, but "only a means by which" to apprehend other objects (xx); Lang 1980, 385*ff.*; Watson 1982, 105, 110, 113; Labarrière 1984, 27; Wiesner 1985, esp. 183, but also 175*f.*, 177, 181, 189; Watson 1988, 29, 33; Wedin 1988; Shankman 1988; Hankinson 1990, 42 (with a caution on its translation in certain contexts at 61 n. 11), 49, 52; Cocking 1991, 18–19; Tye 1991, 2*f.*; Frede 1992, 284*f.*, 288*f.*, 290*f.*, 294; Horn 1994, 128, 130, 134, 145; Turnbull 1994, 320, 327 *et passim*; Annas 1986 [1992], 304 (though contrast 308); Sorabji 1992, 203; Busche 1997, 568, 569; Lefebvre 1997, 601, 603, 605, 606, 613, and esp. 616; Romeyer-Dherbey 1998, 28, 30–33, especially his emphasis on the "sguardo della coscienza" and "sguardo dell'anima" directed at *phantasmata* (33, 35); Wiesner 1998, 121*f.*, 128; Charles 2000, 137*f.*; Labarrière 2000, esp. 275, 277; Morel 2000, 35; 2006, 56*f.*, 62–64, 67, 72, 74–76; Taormina 2002, 36, 57, 58; Repici 2017, *passim*, but esp. 29*f.*, cf. 19, 26*f.*; Bloch 2007, esp. 64–70; Gregoric 2007 equates them with images and suggests they are placed "before our mind's eye" (100, also 105, 113*f.*); Sassi 2007, 27, 35–37, 41–42; Johansen 2012, 199, 203, 232; Scheiter 2012, esp. 260, 264, 266, 269; Sheppard 2014, 9; Cohoe 2016; Shields 2016, e.g., 56, 63, 65, 280, 338*f.*, 344–346 (though contrast 281, 366); Chappell 2017, 399, 402, but esp. 401, where she insists that our perception of "internal" *phantasmata* is "no less genuinely perception than 'external' hearing and seeing are" and so presumably first-order perception; Castagnoli 2019; Sassi 2019, 359.

Some use other translations than "image", but still regard *phantasmata* as objects of awareness: Modrak refers to them as "sensible characters" or "sensible contents" of which one can be aware (1986, 48, 49, 58; 1987, e.g., 7, 33*f.*, 82*f.*, 86, 91, 95, 205 n. 16; cf. 87), and as the "internal objects" of *phantasia* (99); van der Eijk 1994 occasionally renders *phantasma* as "Erscheinung" (e.g., 45, 48, 334); Gallop sometimes uses "appearance" (1996, which suggests a phenomenal object, something we are aware *of*, 48*f.*) and thinks that Aristotle uses *phantasma* for the "apparition" or dream figure that appears to us, rather than the whole dream episode (9*f.*, 14–16, 23), though Gallop emphasizes the diverse semantic range of the term (22–25, 188*f.*), including cases where there cannot be a mental image (147*f.* n. 35 *ad* 460b19–20 and b20–22); Frère 1996 translates *phantasma* as "représentation" but also regards it not only as the object of *phantasia* (334, 336), but as an "image" that is "entrevue" and "vue", comparable to artistic images and natural reflections (335, 336*f.*); Greenstein 1997 transliterates *phantasmata* throughout and follows Nussbaum in not equating them with images (7*f.*), but rather "interpretations" (11*f.*), yet nonetheless treats them as objects of awareness in perception (10) as well as memory (12, 15), where the latter are distinguished by being "picture-like" (20); Labarrière 1997 insists that a *phantasma* must be understood as "quelque chose qui se présent à nous, c'est-à-dire qui nous 'apparaît'", whether or not we regard it as an image (159, 167), though he thinks it likely is an image in the case of dreams (160 and esp. n. 28), all formulations he repeats at Labarrière 2002, 93 (cf. 106), with the addition that "ceux-ci sont eux-mêmes des mouvements auxquels nous sommes ou non attentif" (103; cf. 100); Busche 2001 characterizes them as "rein innere Sinneserscheinungen" (19, 58) and "Vorstellungsgebilde" (57–60). Quite a few authors use a cognate of "apparition": Cambiano and Repici 1988, 121, 122, 127, Labarrière 2003, 23, 26, Veloso 2004, 456, 474*f.*, Stevens 2006, 185 n. 7; 2009, *passim* (who also speaks of it as an "apparition mentale" at 39). Strevell 2016, like Beare 1906 (see above), speaks of *phantasmata* as "presentations" throughout, though see esp. 129; Strevell also regards them as "present intentional object[s]" (118, cf. 125, 132*f.*, 188–191, 201), although he vacillates as to whether this amounts to a form of indirect realism (118*f.*, 123*f.*, 171, 184) or direct realism, where the past event is itself perceived (120*f.*, 173*f.*). Parsons 2016 might also be counted in this larger group (e.g., 77*f.*, 80).

Others take a more qualified position, allowing that *phantasmata* are objects of awareness in some cases, but not all. Thus, while Nussbaum and Schofield deny that the word *means* "image", they both seem to allow that in certain contexts *phantasma* may *refer* to an image, and Schofield even says that it might be "aptly translated" that way in those cases (Nussbaum 1978, 242–244 with 249–250; Schofield 1978, 116; Lefebvre 1995, 109, 136). Polansky 2007 treats the term as ambiguous, but thinks "image" is appropriate in some contexts and that in any case the *phantasma* can be an object of awareness (414–415, 424). King 2009 likewise rejects any equation between images and *phantasmata*, which he translates as "representations", but nonetheless thinks that they can be images (43, 45, 53, 55, 57, 59, 79) and that we can perceive representations (31) as images of what they represent (37); on the other hand, he denies that it is a kind of "inner perception, like external perception, but inside us" (43). See also King 2004, 41, 98; 2018, 12, 20, 21. Lorenz's position 2006 is unclear: he frequently speaks of "representations" where *phantasmata* are at issue in Aristotle's texts, which he recognizes are not always active (170, 172), and so his view might be compatible with the one defended here; but he sometimes speaks about *phantasmata* as "a kind of *phantasia*" (151, cf. 134 n. 29) and claims that visualizations are *phantasiai* (160, 162; cf. 119 n. 1), indeed through *phantasia* one can "apprehend" items one is not currently perceiving, including prospective situations (134, 136).

Birondo offers a hybrid position of the opposite sort: he takes all *phantasmata* to be mental images, like the predominant view, but claims that not all *phantasiai* involve *phantasmata*; in fact, he argues that one must hold this if one is to maintain the view that *phantasmata* are mental images (2001, esp. 58, 61*f.*). But one can just as easily invert this reasoning and employ *modus tollens* in place of his *modus ponens*: if every case of *phantasia* involves *phantasmata*—as Aristotle seems to claim (*DA* III.3, 428a1–2)—then *phantasmata* are *not* mental images. Birondo grants that the underlying physiological conditions are a necessary condition for all *phantasia* (68), but not sufficient for visualization (69), both points on which we agree. Where we differ is that he thinks *phantasmata* are themselves the images visualized, which I deny.

For accounts closer to my own, see Osborne 2000, 261*f.*, 276 and esp. 283*f.*, Rapp 2001, 79–87 (with criticisms of my view, 87–91); Weidemann 2001, 101, Osborne 2007, esp. 81, 88*f.*, Corcilius 2008, Teil i, Ch. 5, but esp. 211–215, Herzberg 2010, 58–60 and Corcilius 2014, although he once seems to allow that *phantasmata* can be the object of awareness and other faculties (80). Note in particular Osborne's statement that *phantasia*, while it has "presentational" activities, does not

present an alternative inner set of objects to perception or thought, as though one watched an internal slide show of fantastic images, a virtual world. … φαντασία is directing our attention not to an internally created image, but to the world that is so constructed. We remain observers of the forms directly encountered in perception, not observers of our inner cognitive experiences … (2000, 283*f.*, with similar statements at Osborne 2007, 81, 88*f.*).

7 Recent psychological research on mental imagery, it is important to note, does *not* adhere to this common usage (see Thomas 2014, esp. §1): it focuses on how information is encoded in the underlying representations—roughly, whether all representations are symbolic or whether some are analog—where these are *not* taken to be immediate objects of awareness, a point Sorabji 2004 [1972] rightly emphasizes (xiii–xiv). These theories are not, therefore, concerned with "images" in the sense used by most of the interpreters cited in the previous notes, but instead the sorts of representation I will be arguing for here (see, for example, Ned Block's introduction in his 1981, 2*f.*, 5*f.*, 9). To avoid confusion, I will use "image" in the way Sorabji and other interpreters have used it, to refer to an internal object of awareness.

For a valuable overview of the issues in the current debate, with an enormous annotated bibliography, see Thomas 2014. For classic presentations of the psychological research, see Kosslyn 1980, 1983, Shepard and Cooper 1982. For philosophical assessments, see Block 1981 and Tye 1991 (who takes Aristotle to be committed to images that can be introspected at 2*f.*).

8 Theophrastus, *Sens.* §21, 505.12–15 Diels:

> As regards hearing, when [Empedocles] explains that it occurs by means of internal sounds, it is extraordinary that he thinks it is clear how people hear, by having put a sound inside, like a bell's. For although we hear external sounds by means of that [*viz.* the internal sound], how in turn do we hear *it* when it resounds? For the same thing remains to be examined.

ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τὴν ἀκοὴν ὅταν ἀποδῷ τοῖς ἔσωθεν γίνεσθαι ψόφοις, ἄτοπον τὸ οἴεσθαι δῆλον εἶναι πῶς ἀκούουσιν, ἔνδον ποιήσαντα ψόφον ὥσπερ κώδωνος. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἔξω δι' ἐκεῖνον ἀκούομεν, ἐκείνου δὲ ψοφοῦντος διὰ τί; τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λείπεται ζητεῖν.

I read τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ in the last line with both mss P and F, instead of following Wimmer's correction τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸ (accepted by Diels). The crucial move comes in the last two sentences, each introduced by "for" (γάρ): Theophrastus' question, "how do we hear the internal sound?" implies that (i) an inner sound will be explanatory only if the subject *hears* it; but on Empedocles' account (ii) hearing always occurs by a *distinct* inner sound. These two assumptions, when taken together, are sufficient to generate the regress. But if Empedocles denies either, he thereby undercuts the motivation for positing another sound in the first place. I am grateful to István Bodnár for discussion of this point.

This sort of complaint recurs in more recent commentators as well: see e.g., Welsch 1987, 93, 186–188, 195 (who, as it turns out, also cites Theophrastus' argument in 187 n. 75).

9 The portrait argument: Sextus Empiricus, *M* VII.358; *P.* II.75. The mind as locked up in a dark room: *M* VII.353. For discussion of these arguments, see Caston (*in progress*).

10 As Blum 1969, 71 and Schofield 1978, 105 rightly point out, although Schofield seems to envisage an even broader role for visualization than I do; see also Schofield 2011, 124, 128*f.*, 131, 132, 134. Sheppard 2014 more

correctly maintains that while Aristotle does "refer to visualization" (9), a central theme in her excellent book, he uses *phantasia* in the psychological works for more general concerns and "not the specific phenomenon of visualization" (27). The point on which we disagree is whether *phantasmata* are themselves images, which she takes to be "undeniable" (9, 10) in line with the predominant view (see n. 6 above), while I think it is a mistake with significant consequences. A similar assessment could be made about the emphasis on visualization in Lefebvre 1997.

11 For a close reading of the chapter, see my 1996.

12 For the *DA*, I have used the text of A. Förster 1912. All translations, unless otherwise noted, are my own.

13 Although this is the only occurrence of εἰδωλοποιεῖν in Aristotle's works, he uses *eidōlon* elsewhere for external images, especially reflections: he notes in *Insomn.* 3 that in turbulent water no image appears (οὐδὲν φαίνεται εἴδωλον, 461a15; see also the longer elaboration in *Div. Somn.* 2, 464b6–17 at b9, 11, and 14, discussed just below). They can even occur in the air ahead of one (*Mete.* III.4, 373b2–7), perhaps a remnant of Democritus' use of them in his theory of vision. But as Horn 1993 rightly argues (280), εἰδωλοποιεῖν is not a synonym in Greek for *phantasia* or a metaphorical use of it (against Frede 1992, 280 n. 3). On *eidōla* more generally in Greek thought, see Saïd 1987 and the response in Vernant 1990a, 228–238; also cf. Vernant 1990b, 34–41. On its use in Plato, Vernant 1979. For a critical assessment of the evidence for *eidōla* in Democritus' theory, see Burkert 1977, 103–108.

14 *Div. Somn.* 2, 464b12–16. Following LMX with Siwek, I read ὁμοίον and τι but omit τοῦτο, against Drossaart Lulofs, Ross, and van der Eijk, who instead read ὁμοίως τί and also (apart from van der Eijk) τοῦτο after τὸ ἐνύπνιον, with the sense "[recognizing] what this dream [means]". On vivid dreaming (εὐθυονειρία), see Gallop 1996, 184.

15 Though this is sometimes assumed, e.g., Shankman 1988, 144–144a.

16 In the Ps.-Aristotelian *Problemata*, we similarly find the remark that our dreams are most often about what we have done or will do or intend to do, since our reasoning and imagination place these "before our eyes" (XXX.14, 957a21–25).

17 Cohoe 2016 assumes that *DA* III.7 requires first-order awareness of *phantasmata* (354*f.*, esp. n. 38), but that may be because he mistranslates αἰσθήματα as "objects of perception" (346, 348). Cohoe seems to assume throughout that if visualization or awareness is involved, it must be awareness *of phantasmata*, but it is the latter claim I am contesting, not the former.

18 E.g., Beare 1908, *ad* 450a31; Bundy 1927, 76; Block 1961, 8; Lang 1980, 389; Bynum 1987, 170; Price 1996, 297–299; King 2009, 70*f.*, 89; 2018, 16*f.*; Johansen 2012, 233; Chappell 2017, 388; and Castagnoli 2019, 244, 250, 251. Others understand it in a similar way, as something of which we are aware, without using the word "percept": Freudenthal 1863, 25*f.*; Beare 1906, 287, 289; W. D. Ross 1924, 144; Matson 1966, 101; Sorabji 1972, 82*f.*; Schofield 1978, 119; Modrak 1986, 58 n. 28; Welsch 1987, 383; Horn 1994, 130, 134; Cohoe 2016, 346, 348; and possibly Busche 1997, 573. Everson should also be considered in this category: he takes the *aisthēma* to be something of which we are aware (1997, 175, 177), and that we perceive the external object *because* we are aware of the *aisthēma* (177 and esp. n. 87); he similarly speaks of the presentation of a *phantasma* and our awareness and indeed perception of it (e.g., 194). Both, in his view, are "affections of the same material system" (197 and esp. 198 n. 26), though,

and he expressly denies that they are mental entities (203). In this respect, his position is similar to King 2009, 71; cf. also King 2004, 98*f.*, where he not only argues that we are aware of the affection in "innere Wahrnehmung", but also that it is a "Nebenprodukt der Wahrnehmung" that does not occur with all perceptions, but only some.

For a correct understanding of *aisthēma* as the perceptual stimulation, that is, the initial change in the organs brought about by the perceptible object that underlies perception, but which can persist afterwards, see Wedin 1988, 36*f.* (cf. 20*f.*); Morel 2000, 48; Sassi 2007, 32; and Strevell 2016, 134–136. van der Eijk 1994 seems to belong to this camp as well (194, 213), though on occasion he characterizes the effect as an "innere Erfahrung" (194).

19 For discussion, see n. 96 below.

20 Cited by e.g., Rodier 1900, II.406 *ad* 427b18.

21 *Essay concerning Human Understanding* II.i.19 Nidditch. Busche seems to construe this phrase this way (1997, 568*f.*; 2001, 59, 61), and it is suggested by Beare 1906, 291*f.* On Locke's notion of the inner sense, see *Essay concerning Human Understanding* II.i.4: "This Source of *Ideas*, every Man has wholly in himself: And though it be not Sense, as having nothing to do with external Objects; yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be call'd internal sense."

22 E.g., Kahn 1979, 28–30. Others, such as Johansen 2005 and Gregorić 2021 (this volume), have argued that Aristotle is at least committed to an inner sense view on the basis of his arguments about higher-order perception in *De anima* III.2. It would take extended discussion to sort out the latter claims properly. But in such interpretations, Aristotle's regress argument in *De anima* III.2 will be invalid, and that seems like a sufficient reason to demur on inner sense readings, given that valid reconstructions are available. For this criticism, see Kosman 2005; for more charitable readings, see Kosman 1975 and Caston 2002.

23 Bywater 1892, 64–65. Kahn acknowledges that the emendation is necessary for this interpretation but defends it as correct (1979, 28–29). For a discussion of the textual issue, as well as the translation of the passage as it appears in the manuscripts, see Caston 2002, 774–775 esp. n. 49.

24 *EN* I.6, 1096b28–29; *Protr.* B70 Düring. See also the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rh. ad Alex.* 1421a22.

25 The expression occurs famously at *R.* VII, 533d2, as well as at *Sph.* 254a10; Plato also speaks of the "sight of the intellect" (τῆς διανοίας ὄψις) at *Smp.* 219a3. The analogy of sight to intellect is explicit at *R.* VII, 518b7–519a5, but is also presupposed by the entire analogy of the Sun in *R.* VI (507a–509b). See also *Alc.* I, 132d10–133c6.

26 *Insomn.* 3, 461a26–31; *Div. Somn.* 1, 463a12–17 (these differ from yet another passage, *Insomn.* 3, 462a19–28, about actually perceiving sounds and lights while half asleep, as distinct from dreaming). Several scholars have noted before that *phantasia* is not limited to vision: Beare 1906, 298*f.*; Busche 1997, 569; 2001, 60; Greenstein 1997, 11; Labarrière 2000, 281–282; 2002, 96; Osborne 2007, 88; Sassi 2007, 42–43; 2019, 359; Herzberg 2010, 58; Schofield 2011, 124 n. 13; Chappell 2017, 400; cf. Sorabji 2004 [1972], xvii–xviii.

27 *Po.* 17, 1455a22–26 Kassel: δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργάζεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐναργέστατα [ὁ] ὁρῶν ὥσπερ παρ' αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς πραττομένοις εὑρίσκοι τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστα ἂν λανθάνοι [τὸ] τὰ ὑπεναντία.

28 *Ion* 535c1–2: "Your soul thinks it is at the scene of the action" (παρὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν οἴεταί σου εἶναι ἡ ψυχή).

29 This is so even if ancient literary critics regard "making you feel as if you were there" as "characteristic of successful visualization", as Anne Sheppard claims (2014, 36–38 and more generally 20–27). Visualization may allow you to imagine a wealth of perceptual and affective detail, but as Aristotle points out no one would actually mistake it for the genuine perception of our immediate environment (*Metaph.* IV.5, 1010b8–11, cited below in n. 80).

30 His characterization might be even more strongly qualified, if Aristotle intends τις in an *alienans* sense, namely, that *phantasia* is "a weak perception, sort of" and so not fully or strictly an instance of perception.

31 *Rh.* III.2, 1405b12; III.10, 1410b34, 1411a26, a28, a35, b4, b6, b9, b23; III.11, 1411b25. One concerns dramatic delivery, to make the events described seem nearer and so evoke emotion: II.8, 1386a34.

The phrase is not attested in the TLG for any author earlier than Aristotle, and almost all of its later occurrences are in the works of philosophers, mostly Neoplatonists and commentators on Aristotle, although there are a few in Epicurus, Polystratus, Philodemus, as well as Marcus Aurelius; Anne Sheppard also notes (2014, 27–32) similar expressions in a number of Latin authors (Quintillian, Ovid, Josephus), as well as in Plutarch. All of these authors, it should be noted, are speaking of expressive language and its effects. For a detailed discussion of Philodemus' advocacy of vivid language in the treatment of a passion like anger, rather than just arguments, see Tsouna 2007, 204–209, who likewise notes that what "puts something before the eyes" are *descriptions*, which might *produce* visualization (205, my emphasis). The same can be said of a well-known passage from Ch. 15 of Ps.-Longinus' *De sublimitate* devoted to "image production" (εἰδωλοποιία) or as its author would prefer, *phantasia*, at least as it is used in contemporary discussions of literature and rhetoric for cases where "you [sc. the speaker] seem to see what you are saying, due to inspiration and passion, and place it before the sight of your listeners" (ἃ λέγεις ὑπ' ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ πάθους βλέπειν δοκῇς καὶ ὑπ' ὄψιν τιθῇς τοῖς ἀκούουσιν, 15.1), "and made their listeners see" (θεάσασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἠνάγκασεν, 15.2; cf. 15.8). Here again visualization is produced by means of language. In this respect, it is in accord with the author's more general characterization of *phantasia* immediately before, inspired by the Stoics (DL VII.49 = *SVF* 2.52 = LS 33D): "anything that presents a thought generative of speech" (καλεῖται μὲν γὰρ κοινῶς φαντασία πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν ἐννόημα γεννητικὸν λόγου παριστάμενον), even though the author says this usage had only recently gained currency (ἤδη δ' ἐπὶ τούτων κεκράτηκε τοὔνομα). Rosenmeyer 1986 also stresses how Ps.-Longinus' use of *phantasia* crucially involves non-imagistic means (see esp. 203–208).

For discussion of the literary use of *phantasia* in the 1st c. CE for visualization and vividness and its antecedents, see the nuanced and perceptive discussion in Sheppard 2014, Ch. 1 (to which I owe several of the references above). She suggests the phrase may derive from earlier oratorical practice (25*f.*): of the cases she cites, perhaps Ps.-Demosthenes 26.25 (πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ποιησάμενοι) is the most striking. On vivacity and imagery in oratory, see Webb 2009a; 2009b; O'Connell 2017a; 2017b; and 2017c.

32 And have previously argued: see Caston 1998a, 263, 274–279.

33 Aristotle uses the exact same formulation to characterize *phantasia* on three different occasions: he says that *phantasia* is "a change produced by the activity of perception" (γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, *DA* III.3, 428b13, 429a1–2; *Insomn.* 1, 459a17–18). Whether or not one classifies it as a formal definition, it is clearly intended as a canonical description.

34 See the full passage, 461b11–20, for context and the comparison with wooden toy frogs that are submerged when weighed down with salt and

bob to the surface as it dissolves (b15–16). Prior to activity, these changes should not be conceived as the "merely potential existence" of a "mental image" (Sorabji 1972, 16; also Beare 1906, 295; Blum 1969, 73–74), but rather as the *actual* existence of a change that constitutes *phantasia* (κινήσεις φανταστικαί, 462a8) which *has the power* to produce such experiences. For other passages where the *phantasma* is referred to as a change (κίνησις), see *Insomn.* 3, 461a18–19, 462a12; *Mem.* 1, 450a31; 2, 451b17, 452a10–12, 453b2–3; cf. 453a24–31. For some discussion, see van der Eijk 1994, 231–234, who also argues against Freudenthal 1863, 25 that it is mistaken to equate being active with being an object of consciousness (cf. van der Eijk 1994, 41*f.*); van der Eijk thus disagrees with Beare as well, who also equates the two (1906, 332 esp. n. 2; 1908, n. 1 *ad* 461b13).

Bloch 2007 insists that *phantasmata* are images, even though he recognizes that they can be stored without being perceived and infers that "some further kind of awareness seems to be needed in addition to the physical process" (66), so that the *phantasma* can be "brought forward and attended to" (67). But unless we find the idea of unconscious images acceptable (88), we should be led instead to question whether *phantasmata* are images in the first place and consequently whether they themeselves are the object of awareness in these acts, as opposed to the representations that underlie such acts of awareness. King 2009, 6 n. 4 rightly acknowledges that some *phantasiai* do not appear.

35 Stored: *Mem.* 1, 450a30–b11; 2, 453a14–31. Transformed: *Insomn.* 3, 461a8–24, b18–20; cf. *Probl.* XXX.14, 957a5–35. Accessed in thoughts: *DA* III.7, 431a16–17, b2; III.7, 431b8–9; *Mem.* 1, 449b31.

36 It is worth noting that even Ryle acknowledges that there is such a phenomenon in his chapter on imagination in Ryle 1949. He just denies that it involves a kind of seeing or perceiving: see esp. 246, 247*f.*

37 Some of the ideas in this section were sketched in my dissertation (Caston 1992), though in support of a different point about intentionality. They are also mentioned briefly in Caston 1998a, 282 n. 80.

38 Although later Greek commentators worry about how the fragrance of an apple can be separate from the apple and even consider whether its activity can (see Ellis 1990, esp. 297–300), they do not appear to have discussed whether it could persist after the apple's demise. Aristotle himself allows that the activity of one thing can occur in another thing, as teaching does in the pupil (*Ph.* III.3, 202b7–8). But this is contemporaneous with the teacher teaching, and he does not consider what happens if a student only learns the lesson later when the teacher is no longer alive. He also would have rejected the puzzle popular in the 20th c. of how we see long dead stars, because unlike us he denies that light and colour travel through the medium (*Sens.* 6, 446a25–b2, b9–13, 446b27–447a1, 447a8–11) and so, while he thinks that they are very distant, they are still there when we see them. Admittedly he could have considered it in the case of hearing and smelling distant objects, since he thinks these qualities do take time to travel through the medium and so affect a perceiver who is closer before one further away (446a20–25, b2–9, b13–17, 446b28–447a9); and once one allows that there is a temporal gap in at least some cases, it takes only a slightly gruesome imagination to come up with circumstances in which one hears the sound of something that no longer exists. But he never does. The case of memory is thus much more obvious.

39 See esp. Plato *Tht.* 191d, where Socrates speaks of perceptions being impressed onto the wax block of memory, "just as rings imprint their insignia" (ἀποτυποῦσθαι ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα ἐνσημαινομένους, d7–8) and says that we retain a memory so long as the replica of what is remembered (εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ) is preserved (d10); later he also speaks of what comes through the senses as "imprinted on the heart of the soul" (ἐνσημαινόμενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, 194c7–8). Aristotle's explanation of differences in people's ability to retain and remember things in terms of their individual physical constitution (*Mem.* 1, 450a32–b11) also takes several details from Socrates' elaboration of the metaphor at *Tht.* 194c–195a. Lang 1980 is only slightly overstating things when she says that Aristotle "virtually quotes" this passage (389), and likewise Chappell 2017, 398 ("pretty well verbatim").

Yet the basic idea occurs still earlier in Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* (82 B 10 DK). He claims that memory and emotions like fear, love, and desire are due to the soul's being "impressed through sight" (διὰ δὲ τῆς ὄψεως ἡ ψυχὴ κἀν τοῖς τρόποις τυποῦται, §15 Donadi) and that "sight engraves onto the mind copies of things seen" (εἰκόνας τῶν ὁρωμένων πραγμάτων ἡ ὄψις ἐνέγραψεν ἐν τῶι φρονήματι, §17). It is undoubtedly related to the older, but somewhat different comparison of memory to a writing tablet: see esp. Agócs 2019.

Unlike Plato, Aristotle compares not only memory, but perception with seals. For detailed discussion, see Caston (*forthcoming*).

40 This is the essential point Bloch misses in his discussion of "pictorial" and "non-pictorial" representation (67–69). The key question for us is not whether Aristotle takes *phantasmata* to be like pictures in the sense of being representations (he says they are at *Mem.* 1, 450a28–32), or whether they are analog representations (as *Mem.* 2, 452b9–16 strongly suggests they are), but whether they are *objects of awareness* and so in some sense "viewed" and indeed whether they need to be viewed in order to represent anything in the first place. Bloch simply assumes throughout that what is "placed before the eyes" is the *phantasma* itself and so the object of such experience. King 2004 rightly argues that the comparison with pictures does not imply this (41, 43).

41 The notion of a "trace" recurs frequently in the tradition of interpretation. In using it, I intend it only in a causal sense, to capture Aristotle's talk in *De insomniis* 3 of a "remnant" of the perceptual stimulation (ὑπόλειμμα τοῦ ἐν τῆι ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθήματος, *Insomn.* 3, 461b21–22) and the "residual changes" produced from them (αἱ ὑπόλοιποι κινήσεις αἱ συμβαίνουσαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων, 461a18–19), and more broadly his characterization of *phantasia* as a change produced from the change involved in perception (see n. 33 above). As such, a trace need not resemble or look like the perceptible object, even though Aristotle does think there will be some objective similarities, because it shares certain properties of the object. It also need not be "*only* the material cause", a "*merely* physiological imprint", or "*just* a physiological trace", as Sorabji 2004 [1972] sometimes suggests (xv, xviii, my emphases). As I conceive it, it not only underlies experiences like remembering and dreaming, but is responsible for their content.

42 At 450b14, I read the optative μνημονεύοιμεν only found in lesser manuscripts, but accepted by Ross and Bloch, rather than the present indicative μνημονεύομεν, which is more easily explicable as an error. At 450b19 I follow the majority of manuscripts (again with Ross and Bloch) in reading the future μνημονεύσει, rather than the present μνημονεύει in E (accepted by Siwek).

43 Although in Greek the use of demonstrative pronouns in the construction εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο … εἰ δ' ἐκεῖνο might lead one to expect the reverse order ("if the latter … whereas if the former"), the sense of the argument plainly requires the order given above, as translators standardly recognize (e.g., Beare, Sorabji, Bloch).

44 With Förster, Ross, Siwek, and Bloch, I delete the occurrence of θεώρημα at 450b25, which has poorer manuscript support and also creates a false opposition with φάντασμα, as b26 shows. With Siwek (against Ross and Bloch), I reject Freudenthal's deletion of φάντασμα at b25 (1869, 401) as unnecessary.

I have translated ζῷον above as "figure" (following Sorabji 1972, 51 and esp. 84, *ad* 450b21, and also Beare 1908, *ad loc*., n. 1, W. D. Ross 1955, 236 and Labarrière 2000, 278 and esp. 279 n. 15), against its translation as "animal" by e.g., G. R. T. Ross 1906, 107, Wedin 1988, 139*f*. and Chappell 2017, 402. Wedin is right that Aristotle's distinction presupposes that drawn figures are representational (see below), but that does not require the translation "animal". The Greek ζῷον is often used for a painted or drawn figure more generally, and not necessarily for animals: LSJ (s.v., II) lists e.g., Herodotus IV.88, where it is used for a painting of the bridging of the Bosporus.

45 Rodier 1900, II.412*f*.:

> C'est que l'image (φάντασμα) peut ou bien jouer purement et simplement le rōle de phénomène subjectif, ou bien constituer une représentation, une image au sens propre de ces mots, c'est-à-dire ētre l'objet de la mémoire … Dans le premier cas, l'image ne s'accompagne pas de croyance et n'est, par suite, ni vraie ni fausse; dans le second, elle est considérée comme représentant un objet extérieur, ce qui peut donner lieu à la vérité et à l'erreur.

Beare 1906 contrasts taking the *phantasma* "purely and simply as a φάντασμα" and taking it as a "representation of something else" (311); in the sidebar he contrasts a "mere appearance" from a "*representative* appearance" and the "*representative character* of an appearance" (311*f*., original emphasis). G. R. T. Ross 1906, 257*f*.:

> The contradiction, or rather the duality, in the use of φάντασμα here … is really one which goes right down into the heart of the concept of φαντασία and φαίνεσθαι as used by Aristotle. A φάντασμα is at once a sensuous image posited like a simple sensation or a fundamental concept before the mind, and at the same time it claims to represent something objective. In its first aspect, as a simple element in the content of consciousness, it has nothing to do with either truth or falsity; in its second capacity it falls within the domain of synthesis, in which truth and error reside. … Here Aristotle uses it first in the second of the two above senses, but immediately reminds us that properly and *per se* the φάντασμα has no reference to the object, that, so far as it has this, it is considered in a new light—as an εἰκών.

Bundy 1927 contrasts its being an "object of direct consciousness" and open to "direct inspection", with its being "the representation of something else" and an "image" (74*f*.). W. D. Ross 1924 contrasts being aware of an image "as the image *of* something" and supposing it to be a "mere image" (144). Siwek 1963 likewise says that it is only an "imago" when it is of something else; in itself it is merely an "obiectum contemplationis" (156 n. 43). Sorabji 1972: "[I]f the image were not a likeness, it would not be an image *of* anything" (7, original emphasis); "[t]he image is *of* something by being a likeness or copy of that thing" (9, original emphasis); "[i]t is only when we regard our image as a copy, that our attention is directed to Coriscus" (84). Modrak 1987: "the *phantasma* [in memory] represents in virtue of being an *eikōn* … . [This] condition gives him a device for securing the referent of the memory-*phantasma*" (87, cf. 90); and she takes something similar to hold for dreaming and possibly other states as well, though she acknowledges he does not explicitly make this point (104 and esp. 212 n. 81). Morel 2000 contrasts taking the *pathos* "comme un état mental" with taking it "comme le contenu intentionnel de cet état mental" (110 n. 18); in Morel 2006, he says that it is under the second aspect that "l'image *acquiert* une fonction représentative" (75, emphasis mine). Labarrière 2000 has argued that in order for a *phantasma* to be not just an imprint, but "l'empreinte *de* quelque chose, commune empreinte *renvoyant à* quelque chose" it must be "comme un *portrait* ressemblant suffisament à son modele pour qu'on puisse le reconnaître" (277, original emphasis); we regard it as a representation only when we take it in this second way (279*f*.). Bloch 2007 is even more explicit: "[I]n a sense they also have representational content in both [remembering and imagining]; but the whole point of Aristotle's argument is that one *ignores the representational content* of the φάντασμα when one is imagining" (69, emphasis mine; cf. 82); he also contrasts viewing the *phantasma* as something in itself with viewing it "as an image *depicting* something else" (70, emphasis mine). At times, King 2009 also seems to adopt this view (though see n. 51 below):

> [S]imply on its own, a picture is not a picture of something; it is only that when it is taken to be of something. So too with a representation: a representation only refers to something when it is taken to be of that thing. When a representation simply occurs—floats through my mind, as it were—it does not refer to anything beyond itself, it is merely a psychic datum (79*f*.; cf. 84); it is "uncoupled from the external world" (83).

See also his more recent remarks (King 2018), when he characterizes the *phantasma* "in itself" in terms of its "material, *non-representative* aspects" (23, emphasis mine). Wedin 1988 may take a similar stance when he claims, "There is no intrinsic feature of an image or affection that indicates it is *about* another thing" (53); but he later criticizes Beare for holding this view and denies that taking a picture in its own right (καθ' αὑτό) "exclude[s] regarding it as a picture of something or other" (139*f*. at 140).

46 On the translation of εἰκών, see n. 57 below.

47 See Modrak 1986, 61–66, though she later acknowledges that such a view only works for certain cases but "poorly, if at all" for others, and so is "a far cry from a general theory of intentionality" (68*f*.). Also Simon 1934, 23*f*. n. 1 (emphasis mine):

> Ce double aspect, *physique* et *intentionnel*, de la forme répresentative est nettement discerné par Aristote dans la traité *de la Mémoire* (I, 450a, 25). … De mēme, répond-il, qu'un animal peint sur un tableau est un animal et est une figure, et peut ētre considéré ou bien comme un animal ou bien comme une figure, de mēme l'image existant dans notre âme est quelque chose pour son propre compte, et l'image d'autre chose.

48 Viewed in terms of physical or material aspects: this seems to be the clear implication of Simon 1934, 23*f*. n. 1 (quoted above in n. 47). King 2018 once speaks about "fixing on the *material*, non-representative aspects" (23, emphasis mine), though this is not his usual view (see below). Bloch 2007 considers it, saying, "[O]ne might speculate that they are simply physical entities to be viewed by the person or animal" (65), before denying that "we really just perceive a physical *internal* object" (66, original emphasis), especially as Bloch rejects literalism (66*f*.). It is unclear whether Everson

1997 should be counted in this group, for while he emphasizes that the "icons" one is aware of are "not *mental* pictures, but material ones" (203, original emphasis; cf. 198 n. 26), he never says that one sees them *as such*.

Viewed in terms of phenomenal patterns: King 2009 says that one can take a picture "either as a collection of lines, or as an image of something" (58; see also 2004, 103; 2018, 21, 23); it is something that "simply occurs—floats through my mind, as it were—, it does not refer to anything beyond itself, it is merely a psychic datum" (79*f.*, quoted more fully above in n. 45). Labarrière 2000 has something like this in mind when he contrasts appreciating the artist's technique with what it represents (279). Everson 1997 considers this reading briefly, describing a picture for example as a "particular arrangement of colours and shapes" (195), but immediately rejects it (195*f.*; cf. 198). Strevell 2016 also mentions it in order to reject it as a claim about the meaning of ζῷον (176*f.*), aptly citing Jackson Pollock's paintings to illustrate the idea.

49 We can of course introspectively reflect on our more general mental condition, which in fact is a physical state: for example, one might wonder whether one had been given a hallucinogen or other drug. But this sort of higher-order awareness of our mental state is more like the kind of awareness I will be arguing for later in this section, and not the sort of awareness of a *phantasma* intended by (*b1*).

50 A good example is one of the earliest: Freudenthal 1863 says that

> Ein Phantasiebild ist nämlich an und für sich ohne alle Beziehung zu einem Objecte; ein Bild, in unserem Innern erzeugt und in sich selbst abgeschlossen. Wie aber ein gemaltes Thier eigentlich auch bloss als ein Gemälde, aber doch zugleich als ein Bild eben diese Thieres angesehen werden kann, so wird auch das subjective Phantasiebild zur Erinnerung, wenn wir es in Beziehung setzen to einem Objecte … Wie also das gemalte Thier bloss ein Gemälde und zwar ein gemaltes Thier ist, so ist auch die Vorstellung an und für sich ein blosses Bild in uns; inwiefern jenes aber das Abbild eines wirklichen Thieres ist, wird auch die Vorstellung zum Abbild eines äusseren Objectes and damit zur Erinnerung (34).

See also the quotations in n. 45 above from Rodier 1900; G. R. T. Ross 1906; W. D. Ross 1924; Siwek 1963; and Bloch 2007.

51 The clearest case is perhaps Everson 1997, who contrasts representations that are "likenesses of something real" with those which are not and points out that both are representational (196). See also Labarrière 2000, who uses the verb "renvoyer" several times (esp. 280*f.*); and King 2009, who likewise uses "refer" (79*f.*), both of which are quoted in n. 45 above; see also King's appeal to the "Verweisungscharakter" of the *phantasma* (King 2004, 41*f.*, 58, 96, 103; cf. 24, 105) and to whether it has a "Bezug zu etwas Weiterem" or is just a "bloßer Vorstellung" (104, 105, 106; cf. 53, 92); and Chappell 2017, 402. Sassi 2007 may also have this sort of reading in mind: she consistently construes the expression "of another" (ἄλλου) in a relational sense ("relativo a qualcosa d'altro", 35; "quanto si riferische ad altro", 37). Although Herzberg 2010 emphasizes several times that the *phantasma* in memory "verweist" to the original perceptual stimulation and is placed by the subject in a "Verweisungszusammenhang" (61–63), the underlying explanation seems to be a causal interpretation much like the one I offer below.

Although this is less clear, it might also be what Rodier 1900 and G. R. T. Ross 1906 have in mind in the passages quoted in n. 45 above, when they contrast the merely subjective character of the *phantasma* and its objective relation to an external object; and I suspect it may be what Stevens 2006, 190 has in mind as well. It is also possible to construe Sorabji in this way when he claims, in the following quote, that our "attention is directed to Coriscus" (although not if he means that the *phantasma* merely *represents* Coriscus when it is taken to be a copy, as he seems to towards the end):

> It is only when we regard our image as a copy, that our attention is directed to Coriscus. If the analogy is to hold between mental images and pictures, it will be only when we regard a picture as a copy that our attention is directed to the object depicted. When we regard a picture in the other way, then, our attention will not be directed to the animal-in-the-picture. We shall think of the picture simply as a figure (1972, 84).

Some of his other remarks suggest a representational reading, though: see n. 52 below.

52 The following authors seem to hold that being a copy is a necessary condition of being a representation or having representational content: G. R. T. Ross 1906 says that Aristotle "immediately reminds us that properly and *per se* the φάντασμα has no reference to the object, that, so far as it has this, it is considered in a new light—as an εἰκών" (257*f.*); Sorabji 1972 states that "if the image were not a likeness, it would not be an image of anything" (7) and "[t]he image is *of* something by being a likeness or copy of that thing" (9); Modrak 1987: "[T]he *phantasma* represents in virtue of being an *eikon*" (87); cf. also Greenstein 1997, 18.

53 As rightly recognized by Annas 1986 [1992], 304; Everson 1997, 195*f.* and possibly Weidemann 2001, 99.

54 Strevell 2016, 210–213 develops a fairly tendentious reading of ταύτῃ at 450b28, not taking the correlative construction sufficiently into account. The immediately preceding clause beginning with ᾗ specifies the precise sense: "[I]f the soul perceives it in just this way (ταύτῃ), namely, as (ᾗ) something in itself". He seems to be led to this because he believes this passage is meant to solve a second *aporia* concerning why one takes the *phantasma* one way rather than another, which does not seem to be clearly in play at all.

55 Following both G. R. T. Ross and Beare, who take the participle to refer to the same time in the hypothetical case. Greenstein 1997 argues against this view, in favor of "having never seen Coriscus" (15–17). But had Aristotle wished to suggest that the one had never seen Coriscus, it is likely he would have used the negative with the aorist rather than the perfect, or specified the past time explicitly (e.g. ἐὰν μὴ τύχῃ προεωρακώς, *Poet.* 4, 1448b17; I am grateful to Kat Furtado for the reference). If one insists on construing it as referring to past time, one would have to acknowledge that this is a *disanalogy* between the two cases (*pace* Greenstein), since while one can, and often does, look at portraits of people one has never met, in Aristotle's view a *phantasma* that is a copy is always of a person or thing one has encountered previously in perception. I would like to thank George Boys-Stones, James Allen, and Kat Furtado for discussion on this point.

56 In 450b28, αὐτοῦ refers back to φάντασμα in b26, as Cooper 1975, 65 rightly argues.

57 Taylor 1915, 284–287; 1926, 357–358 and Cornford 1939, 93–94 only allude to Proclus' commentary while commenting on the second regress argument in the dialogue (132d–133a), where Plato talks about participants as likenesses (ὁμοίωματα) that are "copied" from forms: εἰκασθῆναι, 132d4; εἰκασθέντι, d6; cf. ἐοικέναι, d3; *Ti.* 29b2 (cf. 28b2). But the passage they clearly have in mind is *In Parm.* 912.31–913.14 Cousin, where Proclus differentiates two senses of being "like" (ὅμοιον): in the second sense, one thing is not only like another, but "has the same form *from that thing*" (ὡς ἀπ'

ἐκείνου τὸ ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἔχον, 912.37). Earlier Proclus considers various analogies for participation—reflections in a mirror and the impression of a signet ring in wax (839.20–840.9)—before appealing to copies (840.9–19), and then critiques each of these analogies (840.19–842.14). But the only difference with artistic copies is that Platonic forms are both the model and what produces the copy (841.22–30), something that would be true for Aristotle as well in the natural generation of *phantasmata* from earlier *aisthēmata*. For more in depth discussion of the appeal to copies in the *Parmenides* and Proclus' take on it, see the excellent recent piece by Peacock 2017, §4.

On Aristotle's use of *eikōn*, see esp. Herzberg 2010 and also Greenstein 1997, who argues that Aristotle's insistence on both causal origin and likeness is an improvement on Peirce's notions of separate icons and indices (see esp. 6); cf. also Chappell 2017, 402. On the use of *eikōn* in Greek literature and philosophy more generally, see Saïd 1987. On Plato's distinction in the *Sophist* between *phantasmata* and *eikones*, both being types of *eidōla*, see Vernant 1979, 112–114 and Beere 2019, §2; also Deleuze 1969.

58 Both Greenstein 1997, 18 and Strevell 2016, 176 also stress origin.

59 *Mem*. 1, 451a2–12:

> And sometimes on account of this, even though these types of changes in the soul were produced in us from having perceived earlier, we do not know whether what happens is in line with having perceived, and so we are in doubt as to whether it is a memory or not; whereas at other times it happens that we think and recall that we have heard or seen that earlier. This happens whenever, if one were regarding it as just itself, one switches and regards it as of/from something else. The opposite also happens, as for example in Antipheron of Oreus' case and others who are out of their mind: for they tend to report their *phantasmata* as though they were things that happened and as though they were remembering. This occurs whenever one regards what is not a copy as a copy.
>
> καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνίοτ' οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐγγινομένων ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοιούτων κινήσεων ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθέσθαι πρότερον, εἰ κατὰ τὸ ἠσθῆσθαι συμβαίνει, καὶ εἰ ἔστι μνήμη ἢ οὔ, διστάζομεν· ὁτὲ δὲ συμβαίνει ἐννοῆσαι καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι ὅτι ἠκούσαμέν τι πρότερον ἢ εἴδομεν. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει, ὅταν θεωρῶν ὡς αὐτὸ μεταβάλλῃ καὶ θεωρῇ ὡς ἄλλου. γίγνεται δὲ καὶ τοὐναντίον, οἷον συνέβη Ἀντιφέροντι τῷ Ὠρείτῃ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐξισταμένοις· τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ἔλεγον ὡς γενόμενα καὶ ὡς μνημονεύοντες. τοῦτο δὲ γίγνεται ὅταν τις τὴν μὴ εἰκόνα ὡς εἰκόνα θεωρῇ.

60 King 2009 seems to overlook this case, when he claims that "images [King's translation of εἰκών] only act as images in the sense of being *images of something* when we take them as such" (58, original emphasis). But Aristotle's point in this case is precisely that it *is* a copy (εἰκών) of something, even though we do *not take* it to be in this case—the failure to take it in this way prevents it from being a memory, not from being a copy. Taking a *phantasma* to be a copy is neither necessary nor sufficient for its being a copy (see below). King 2018 recognizes that it is not sufficient when he discusses Antipheron's mistake (26; likewise in his commentary, 2004, 108). My point here is that it is not necessary either.

61 Against King 2009, who surprisingly claims that it is "self-evident" whether one is remembering or not, and hence does not require any criterion (51, 85)—a "memory-*claim* is enough to perform an act of remembering" (51, emphasis mine)—and that one only makes mistakes about *what* one remembers (85, though compare 82 n. 349 and 86 n. 364). In a more recent publication, King rightly acknowledges that being aware that a *phantasma* is a copy is simply a requirement for a state's counting as a genuine memory and so is simply a consequence of the definition (King 2018, 24), rather than a question of self-evidence. This is also the sense in which we should understand Aristotle's remark at *Mem*. 2, 452b26–29.

62 Against Bloch 2007, 102–103; also possibly Greenstein 1997, who claims "as long as a present cognition is a likeness of a past cognition, it is a memory" (6), though he later recognizes that it must be taken to be a copy (18). The error may be due to taking too strictly Aristotle's simplifying restatement of the definition of memory at the end of the chapter (451a15–16), which merely says that memory is possession of a *phantasma* as a copy of that which it is a *phantasma* of" (φαντάσματος ὡς εἰκόνος οὗ φάντασμα ἕξις). But since the phrase "as a copy" is clearly an allusion to the earlier discussion, it should be taken to include both conditions—being a copy and being taken to be such—rather than a change in definition. King 2009 rightly sees that the second condition must be involved, but he fails to see that the first is independent of it; instead he regards taking it to be a copy to be sufficient for remembering the earlier perception (82*f*.), when it is in fact a merely necessary condition.

63 Oddly, Bloch 2007 claims that a *phantasma* is *always* a "likeness" or εἰκών, because it is always "pictorial" (69), thus making everything hinge on (*b*) above, as indeed he claims: he says repeatedly that "the *modus spectandi*, that is, the way in which we view the image" to be the "primary element" in remembering and related phenomena (70; cf. 82, 83, 91, 96, 133). But this overlooks the final sentence of the passage quoted in n. 59 above, which expressly considers a *phantasma* that is *not* a copy or likeness (τὴν μὴ εἰκόνα, 451a11–12). If Bloch were right, Aristotle could not explain Antipheron's mistake in the way he does or more broadly the critical difference between genuinely remembering and merely seeming to remember.

64 E.g., G. R. T. Ross 1906 translates the phrase ζωγράφημά τι at 450a29 as "a picture of the real thing" (105); Beare 1908 refers to it as a likeness of "some person or thing" (311); and Modrak 1987 takes it to resemble "the object remembered" (89); cf. Chappell 2017, 401, 402. Castagnoli 2019 explicitly defends this view at length (see n. 72 below); see also Morel 2006, 51 n. 6, as well as Parsons 2016, Ch. 1 (though she discusses the *aporia* only briefly in Ch. 2, 48*f*.).

65 For discussion, see Annas 1986 [1992], esp. 299–305; also Sassi 2007, 43–45. Such personal memories, I would note, are ordinarily referred to in English as "recollection". But this word has become the customary translation for *anamnēsis* in English, which is the subject of the second chapter of Aristotle's essay; and ironically it is the objects of *anamnēsis* that *we* would standardly say we "remember", the exact opposite of the customary translations in English. Since it would only cause confusion to reverse such entrenched translations, I have opted instead for the tedious remedy of repeating clarifications as necessary.

66 Instead of reading instead of προσαισθάνεται ὅτι πρότερον, Sorabji 1972, 115 reads πρότερον προσαισθάνεται, a word order that can in fact be found in two 14th c. manuscripts (Urb. 37 and Paris. Suppl. graec. 314), though they read προαισθάνεται instead. I think Sorabji is surely right about the sense: πρότερον must be as clarifying the earlier dependent ὅτι clause, construing it effectively as προσαισθάνεται ὅτι πρότερον εἶδε κτλ., much like 449b23, rather than introducing an additional content. The only question is whether it is possible to construe the reading in the bulk of the manuscripts, which all have πρότερον with the second ὅτι-clause, as printed above. This sort of

pleonastic repetition does occur in Greek with longer sentences (Kühner 1872, §551.6); but Aristotle also uses it on occasion in much shorter ones, such as *Somn. Vig.* 1, 454a15–16 (cf. Bonitz 1870 [1955], 538b33*ff.*). I am grateful to Justin Winzenrieth for checking the manuscripts and the suggestion about pleonasm, as well as the references to Kühner and Bonitz.

67 *Tht.* 189e4–190a6; *Sph.* 263e3–264a3; cf. *Phlb.* 38c1–e2. For detailed discussion of the notion, see Duncombe 2016a; also Denyer 1991, 18*f.*

68 450a15–19; *DA* III.3, 428a19–24.

69 Non-human animals lack thought or understanding: *DA* II.3, 414b18–19 (τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς), 415a7–8 (λογισμὸν καὶ διάνοιαν); III.10, 433a12 (οὐ νόησις οὐδὲ λογισμός); *Mem.* 1, 450a15–18 (νοητικόν); *PA* I.1, 641b7–8 (διάνοια); *EN* I.7, 1098a1–5 (λόγος); *EE* II.8, 1224a25–27 (λόγος); *Pol.* VII.13, 1332b3–5 (λόγος). No belief or judgement: *DA* III.3, 428a19–21 (δόξα, πίστις); *EN* VII.3, 1147b4–5 (καθόλου ὑπόληψις), where "universal" here refers back to the belief in a universal proposition (καθόλου δόξα) mentioned earlier at 1147a25 and a31.

70 King 2009 acknowledges this difference (32*f.*), though he does not retract or revise the strongly intellectualist reading of the first formulation he had given earlier in terms of judgement, which he restricted to humans (32); Sassi 2019 also chooses to emphasize the verbal rather than the visual or perceptual character of this state (359), while Romeyer-Dherbey 1998, 34*f.* recognizes that it needs qualification; Annas 1986 [1992] thinks it "remains an unsolved problem" (302*f.*). In contrast, Castagnoli 2019, 242 n. 20 gets it right; Stevens 2009, 39*f.* also seems on the right track; Strevell 2016 notes it too (204). This passage thus provides a partial response to Veloso, who prefers a more intellectual reading of our apprehension of *phantasmata* (Veloso and Rey Puente 2005, 106*f.*; cf. Veloso 2004, 476).

71 King 2018 speaks of an "odour of pastness" (13). The phrase "déjà vu" here should be understood in a broad sense, and not as limited to what is visually represented, a point rightly emphasized by several scholars: Labarrière 2000, 281*f.*; 2002, 96; Sassi 2007, 42*f.*; and 2019, 359. For the broader point about *phantasia* more generally, see n. 26 above.

72 Sorabji 1972, 7 esp. n. 1, and 87; Cooper 1975, 68*f.* also emphasizes this point, though he mistakenly thinks it is a criticism of Sorabji. The following authors agree that it is a representation of a past experience, rather than the external object which that experience is of: Annas 1986 [1992], 304*f.*; Morel 2000, 34; cf. Hicks 1907, 529 and Greenstein 1997, 11, who thinks the question is left open. Remarkably, Bloch 2007 denies that the awareness that one has experienced something before is required for *mnēmē*, as being too sophisticated for many animals and incompatible with not remembering precisely when one experienced something (83*f.*). But he offers no textual basis for this assertion, against Aristotle's assertion in the two texts above that it is required.

Castagnoli 2019 pushes back against this line (247*f.*), arguing that Aristotle is more charitably and naturally read as taking memory, though due to past perceptions and shaped by them, as being of the external object or event that produces those perceptions. But no textual basis is offered for this identification, whereas the reading I offer just below shows how Aristotle himself repeatedly emphasizes that our attitude in such states concerns our past experiences specifically.

73 Beare 1906 says that we "often discover" that something is a likeness and that "the original flashes upon our mind" (312). But there is no second object of awareness in this case, nor does Aristotle suggest that there is—by hypothesis, the original experience is no longer present, and indeed it is precisely this fact that generates the *aporia*.

74 Against Greenstein 1997, 20. Someone might argue that a telltale sign is the representation of temporal distance from the present, which these *phantasmata* possess in addition to their first-order content (*Mem.* 2, 452b7–453a4) and which form the basis of our feelings about how old memories are and allow us to order them temporally (whether correctly or incorrectly). My point is simply that if such *phantasmata* include a "date stamp", it is not open to inspection, visually or otherwise (*contra* Beare 1906, 320), but manifests itself only in the specific higher-order attitude we take towards the first-order content, in how we *recognize* or *take* it. It is unclear to me how exactly Gregoric would come down on this question in his discussions of "time-tags" (2007, 100*f.*, 105*f.*).

75 For a defense of the claim that all perception involves taking some object as *F* (for a specified range of *F*s), see Caston [under review].

76 Caston 1998a, §5.

77 *Mem.* 2, 452b9–16:

> For a person does not think of things which are large and far away by thought extending to that place, as some say vision does; for a person will think in a similar manner even when they do not exist. Rather [it occurs] *by a proportional change*; for in it [sc. thought] there are similar shapes and changes. How, when a person thinks of larger things, will his thinking of them differ from [his thinking of] smaller things? For everything inside is smaller, just as the things outside are also proportional. Perhaps just as it is possible to take something distinct in him to be proportional to the forms, so too [it is possible to take something distinct in him to be proportional] to the intervals.
>
> νοεῖ γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ πόρρω οὐ τῷ ἀποτείνειν ἐκεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν ὥσπερ τὴν ὄψιν φασί τινες (καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὄντων ὁμοίως νοήσει), ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀνάλογον κινήσει ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ ὅμοια σχήματα καὶ κινήσεις. τίνι οὖν διοίσει, ὅταν τὰ μείζω νοῇ, ὅτι ἐκεῖνα νοεῖ ἢ τὰ ἐλάττω; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐντὸς ἐλάττω, καὶ ἀνὰ λόγον καὶ τὰ ἐκτός. ἔστι δ' ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἀνάλογον λαβεῖν ἄλλο ἐν αὐτῷ, οὕτως καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασιν.

78 *Pace* Sorabji 1992, 222. This seems to be what Beare has in mind too, when he speaks about having such changes "in our minds" and their being "duly connected in consciousness" (1906, 320).

79 For an in depth examination of the implications of personification in Plato more generally, see Kamtekar 2006.

80 *Metaph.* IV.5, 1010b3–4, b8–11:

> It is astonishing if they worry … whether what appears to dreamers is true rather than what appears to the waking. Clearly, not even they think so. For no one who is in Libya and takes himself during the night to be in Athens sets out for the Odeon.
>
> εἶτ' ἄξιον θαυμάσαι εἰ τοῦτ' ἀποροῦσι … καὶ ἀληθῆ πότερον ἃ τοῖς καθεύδουσιν ἢ ἃ τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἴονταί γε, φανερόν· οὐθεὶς γοῦν, ἐὰν ὑπολάβῃ νύκτωρ Ἀθήνῃσιν εἶναι ὢν ἐν Λιβύῃ, πορεύεται εἰς τὸ ᾠδεῖον.

81 Aristotle would have to say with a "clear heart", as he thinks the heart is the central organ of perception: *Somn. Vig.* 2, 455b34–456a6; *Juv.* 1, 467b18–27; 3, 469a5–20; 4, 469a23–34, b1–6; *PA* II.1, 647a24–31; II.10, 656a27–29; III.3, 665a10–15; III.4, 666a11–18, a34–35; IV.5, 678b2–4, 681b13–17; *MA* 11, 703b23–24. The heart is "clear" when it is not engorged with blood: *Insomn.* 3, 461b27–28; cf. *Somn. Vig.* 3, 458a10–25.

82 The last clause could also be translated as "*[I]t* is not Coriscus" (so van der Eijk, Repici), taking the subject presumably to be the dream *phantasma*. I have chosen the more neutral translation above (with Beare and Gallop), so as not to prejudice the issue.

83 I leave aside views, such as Norman Malcolm's (1959), that deny that dreaming is an actual experience, and claim that there are only (mistaken) dream reports.

84 On the heart as the central organ of perception, see n. 81 above.

85 Reading, with most of the manuscripts, καὶ ἀπελθόντος τοῦ ἀληθοῦς at 461b22–23 (with Siwek, Ross, van der Eijk, and Repici). Some manuscripts, including the oldest (E, 10th c.), have αἰσθήματος after τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, and if one goes this route, Waszink's conjecture τοῦ ἀληθοῦς <τοῦ> αἰσθήματος is not implausible (followed by Drossaart Lulofs and understood by Beare). Without αἰσθήματος, the noun phrase τοῦ ἀληθοῦς is potentially ambiguous: (1) given that αἰσθήματος occurs in the genitive immediately preceding this phrase, it can be understood as supplied and so mean "the true *aisthēma*", where that in turn can be construed either (*a*) as the genuine *aisthēma*, as opposed to the trace produced from it mentioned in the preceding phrase, or (*b*) as the truthful *aisthēma*, as opposed to one that lingers in the sense organs in the absence of the external object and hence is false; and (2) taking τοῦ ἀληθοῦς as an objective genitive and so to refer to the object of the *aisthēma*, namely, the "true", i.e., real, external object, which is now absent. On either version of (1), the presence of αἰσθήματος in some manuscripts can plausibly be explained as the intrusion of a (correct) marginal gloss.

The differences may not matter much to the overall point apart from emphasis or implied contrasts, since in all construals the phrase concerns what happens after the *aisthēma* is initially produced by the (then present) external object. Everson favors (2) above (1997, 196 n. 22), although I think this is unlikely given the phrase's agreement with the genitive τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθήματος that immediately precedes the καί. Beare 1908, in contrast, draws a strong distinction between τοῦ ἀληθοῦς at 461b23 and τὸν ἀληθινόν at b26, on the grounds that only the latter can mean "genuine" or "real"; and so takes b22–23 (for which he reads ἀπελθόντος τοῦ αἰσθήματος ἀληθοῦς) to concern a "truthful" *aisthēma*, now absent (*ad* 461b22, n. 4 and *ad* 461b29, n. 3), in line with (1*b*). This is also favored by van der Eijk 1994, 237–238, appealing to *Insomn.* 2, 459a26–28 and 460b2–3 to confirm that the *aisthēma* can linger after the object is gone. I doubt Beare is right about the terminological distinction, though, given that Aristotle uses ἀληθές in contrast with φαινόμενον (Bonitz 1870 [1955], 32a14*ff.*) and likewise uses ψεῦδος for fake (*Metaph.* V.29, 1024b24–26). He also never refers to the *aisthēma* itself as "residual", as Beare seems to suggest (*ad* 461b29, n. 3), but only the *phantasma* left by it as a trace, consistently distinguishing the latter by putting the word *aisthēma* in the genitive (461a18–19, b22–23). In Beare's construal, the phrase would also make the succeeding lines 461b23–24, which it is meant to support, slightly redundant. If, on the other hand, Aristotle is trying to distinguish clearly between the original *aisthēma* and any of its lingering side effects, then "true" in the sense of genuine is relevant and appropriate, and each phrase including b23–24 makes a distinct point; and it follows that the original *aisthēma* will be "truthful" as well. For that reason I incline towards (1*a*), although (1*b*) is also acceptable.

86 I read ᾧ at b26, with most of the MSS, instead of οὗ found in the remaining ones (followed by Biehl and Siwek) or Ross' emendation ὃ (followed by Gallop, van der Eijk, and Repici). I have also repunctuated the first two sentences, taking the first two clauses together, instead of the second with the third. For discussion of the variations, see van der Eijk 1994, 239–241.

87 *Insomn.* 3, 461b20: ὑπόλειμμα τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθήματος. He uses a similar expression earlier in the chapter as a gloss (taking καί epexegetically, with van der Eijk 1994, 219): "The *phantasmata*, that is, the residual movements resulting from perceptual stimulations" (τὰ φαντάσματα καὶ αἱ ὑπόλοιποι κινήσεις αἱ συμβαίνουσαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων, 461a18–19).

88 *DA* III.3, 428b11–14, 429a4–6; III.8, 432a9–10.

89 *Insomn.* 3, 461a31–b7. Its similar causal power is used to explain a similar error due to phenomenological indiscernibility at *Insomn.* 2, 460b22–25. For discussion, see my 1998a, §5, esp. 276–279.

90 *R.* V, 476c5–7: τὸ ὀνειρώττειν ἆρα οὐ τόδε ἐστίν, ἐάντε ἐν ὕπνῳ τις ἐάντ' ἐγρηγορὼς τὸ ὅμοιόν τῳ μὴ ὅμοιον ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἡγῆται εἶναι ᾧ ἔοικεν; The parallel has, unsurprisingly, been noted before: e.g., Beare 1908, *ad loc.* n. 3; W. D. Ross 1955, 278 *ad loc.* and Repici 2017, 37f.

91 Thus, Bundy 1927 speaks of "taking the internal impressions … as objective realities" (78); W. D. Ross (1955: "[I]t thinks the image it sees is Coriscus himself" (278); Schofield 1978: "[I]t is not just that Coriscus appears to me, but that a trace of my sense-datum of Coriscus appears to me as Coriscus" (122); Modrak 1987 says that the dreamer "takes the residual image of Coriscus for the man himself" (138); Shankman 1988 says Aristotle explains "why the dream presentation is mistaken for the real thing" and that a person might miss "that the 'image' is not the real thing" (159), and ascribes the error to the "inability of the percipient to distinguish the internal image from external reality" (163), who "misidentifies … the *aisthēma* for that actual external object" (164, cf. 168). van der Eijk 1994 says that

> daß man auch, wenn die Traumvorstellung eine ziemlich verzerrte Wiedergabe des ursprünglichen sensibilen Objekts bietet, immerhin der Meinung sein wird, daß es dieses ursprüngliche Objekt ist … daß diese Täuschung darin besteht, daß man das Traumbild als die Wirklichkeit beurteilt, d. h. den Unterschied zwischen dem Traumbild und dem Sinnesgegenstand verkennt—egal, ob das Traumbild diesen Sinnesgegenstand getreu wiederspiegelt … oder das Traumbild eine ganz verzerrte Abbildung des ursprünglichen Sinnesgegenstandes ist (228).

See also his earlier characterizations of the deception: "daß man einen bestimmten Gegenstand A … für Gegenstand B hält" (40, 43); "[e]s hält die Traumerscheinung des Koriskos für den wirklichen Koriskos" (44, 46). Repici 2017 also says the subject "scambia un'immagine somigliante a un oggetto per un oggetto vero" (165 n. 18; cf. 36).

92 *Insomn.* 3, 461b3–7, b27–28; cf. *Somn. Vig.* 3, 458a10–25. Both W. D. Ross 1955, 278 and Modrak 1987.

93 *Insomn.* 3, 461b15–20:

> So [the changes] are present in their power, but when what obstructs them is removed, they become active and are set in motion. They are released within the small amount of blood that remains in the perceptual organs, possessing a likeness just like the forms in clouds that people compare to humans and centaurs as they quickly alter.
>
> οὕτως ἔνεισι δυνάμει, ἀνειμένου δὲ τοῦ κωλύοντος ἐνεργοῦσιν, καὶ λυόμεναι ἐν ὀλίγῳ τῷ λοιπῷ αἵματι τῷ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις κινοῦνται, ἔχουσαι ὁμοιότητα ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τοῖς νέφεσιν, ἃ παρεικάζουσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ κενταύροις ταχέως μεταβάλλοντα.

On the textual variations, see van der Eijk 1994, 234–236.

94 *Insomn.* 3, 461a8–25 (see also *Div. Somn.* 2, 464b5–16, discussed above, p. 171):

> One ought to suppose that each change is produced continuously, just as little eddies form in rivers, which are often similar, but also often disperse into other forms because of a countering force. … In just the same way, in water when something causes excessive motion, no image appears, while at other times one does, but is thoroughly distorted, so that it appears to be another sort of thing than it is, and again when one is at rest, they are clear and manifest, so too in sleep the representations and left-over changes produced from perceptual stimulation are sometimes overshadowed because the aforesaid change being too great; while at other times the visions are disturbed and monsterous, and the dreams are not sound, as happens with the atrabilious, those suffering from fever, and those who are drunk. For all conditions of this sort are gassy, and produce a great deal of change and disturbance.
>
> δεῖ δὲ ὑπολαβεῖν ὥσπερ τὰς μικρὰς δίνας τὰς ἐν τοῖς ποταμοῖς γινομένας, οὕτω τὴν κίνησιν ἑκάστην γίνεσθαι συνεχῶς, πολλάκις μὲν ὁμοίως, πολλάκις δὲ διαλυομένας εἰς ἄλλα σχήματα διὰ τὴν ἀντίκρουσιν. … ὥστε καθάπερ ἐν ὑγρῷ, ἐὰν σφόδρα κινῇ τις, ὁτὲ μὲν οὐδὲν φαίνεται εἴδωλον, ὁτὲ δὲ φαίνεται μέν, διεστραμμένον δὲ πάμπαν, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἷόν ἐστιν, ἠρεμήσαντος δὲ καθαρὰ καὶ φανερά, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν τὰ φαντάσματα καὶ αἱ ὑπόλοιποι κινήσεις αἱ συμβαίνουσαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων ὁτὲ μὲν ὑπὸ μείζονος οὔσης τῆς εἰρημένης κινήσεως ἀφανίζονται πάμπαν, ὁτὲ δὲ τεταραγμέναι φαίνονται αἱ ὄψεις καὶ τερατώδεις, καὶ οὐκ εἰρόμενα τὰ ἐνύπνια, οἷον τοῖς μελαγχολικοῖς καὶ πυρέττουσι καὶ οἰνωμένοις· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη πνευματώδη ὄντα πολλὴν ποιεῖ κίνησιν καὶ ταραχήν.

I read γινομένας at 461a9 with EY and εἰρόμενα at a22 with E (both accepted by Ross). For a discussion of the textual alternatives, see Shankman 1988, 147–149; van der Eijk 1994, 215–216 and 219–220.

95 Or, even more strongly, *denies* that it is Coriscus. Although the latter would be a perfectly acceptable construal of the Greek, I have chosen the weaker one above in order to show that on either construal an imagistic reading is committed to images in ordinary perception. It should also be noted that Aristotle's use of the imperfect in context does not indicate any specific past event, but rather a condition that is meant to hold for perceiving quite generally.

96 In support of this, someone might conceivably cite Aristotle's claim that *aisthēmata* are perceptible themselves (αἰσθητὰ ὄντα, *Insomn.* 2, 460b2–3). But this would be overly hasty, even if one were inclined towards an imagistic reading. Aristotle does not state that these stimulations are *always* perceived, much less that we perceive external objects *by* perceiving the perceptual stimulation or *aisthēma* (as Everson 1997 claims at 177), but merely that they *can* be perceived. And that might well be something that happens only occasionally, in special circumstances, as the context of the remark suggests: Aristotle is discussing the persistence of changes in the organs after the perceptible object has gone away, as the causal origin for dreams. He similarly argues in the next chapter that on falling asleep and on waking we sometimes actually perceive these sorts of changes in our sense organs (κινήσεις φανταστικαὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, *Insomn.* 3, 462a8–12), a reference presumably to what are called "hypnogogic" visions, comparable to "floaters" crossing before our eyes while awake. For a slightly different reading of this awareness, which also denies that the *aisthēma* is a sense datum or mental object, but is instead the perceptual state itself, see Wedin 1988, 37–40.

Aristotle, it should be noted, does occasionally speak of "seeing" a dream (τινες καὶ ἑωράκασιν ἐνύπνια, *Insomn.* 1, 458b21; τῶν ἰδόντων τὸ ἐνύπνιον, *Div. Somn.* 2, 464a4; cf. *GA* V.1, 779a12–14), or the "visions" one has during nightmares (αἱ ὄψεις, *Insomn.* 3, 461a21; *Div. Somn.* 2, 463b18). But these seem more a lapse into ordinary Greek idiom (as e.g., at *HA* IV.10, 537b18 and 19) than the sort of theoretically-loaded claims we are interested in here. In explanatory contexts, Aristotle is much more guarded: a dream is "in a way a sensory stimulation" (αἴσθημα τρόπον τινά, *Somn. Vig.* 2, 455b27), namely, insofar as the *phantasma* underlying the dream is similar to an *aisthēma*, because of the way it is produced from it. The ordinary Greek idiom in no way requires that what we "see" in every dream is the underlying *phantasma* itself.

97 Everson 1997 explicitly embraces this position: "The subject perceives the external object *because* he is aware of that *aisthēma*" (177, emphasis mine; and again at 200); "ordinarily" I will perceive an external object "*in virtue of* being aware of the *aisthēma*" (177 n. 87, emphasis mine; cf. 175, 197). Or again, "[i]n perception, then, the subject is aware of an icon [i.e., a *aisthēma* that is a copy or likeness; cf. 197], which represents an external object, or objects to him" (199); the subject's awareness of such a "representational item" in perception "enters into the explanation of why" it has the content it does (198*f.*). Everson's view differs from early modern resemblance theories in that these representations are material, rather than mental entities (203; cf. 198 n. 26). Moss 2012 also endorses Everson's account: in her words "one perceives the external perceptible object *by being aware* of the *aisthēma* (51 n. 10, emphasis mine). Lefebvre 1997 mentions this reading briefly (588), without specifying his response; it is also implicit in Greenstein's claim that "in perception, phantasms are what is actually seen, heard, smelled, tasted and felt when the sense is active" (1997, 10). For criticism of Everson and Moss, see Strevell 2016, 136–138.

Gallop 1996 might also be committed to this view, when he claims that in such cases we mistake a *phantasma* not for an external object or *aisthēton* (as some of the other interpretations below maintain), but for the "original sense-impression" or *aisthēma* (147; see also 15, 151*f.*) and therefore believe that we are genuinely perceiving external objects. If Gallop takes these to be something accessible in our personal awareness, then it looks like he is committed to a form of indirect realism too: so he says that in normal waking perception, "[t]he subject has a genuine sense-impression of Coriscus, and correctly *attributes it* to a real external object" (151, emphasis mine); and of having an experience *of* a *phantasma* (151*f.*). But Gallop could take this to describe something only at a subpersonal level, which doesn't enter into consciousness, in which case he might be closer to the minimal reading favored here, where one *experience* is mistaken for the other (which is indeed how Gallop often frames it).

98 Neuhaeuser 1878 struggles to deny this, against Baeumker and Kampe (§5, *passim*, but esp. 121, 128–132), but the alternative readings he offers are very strained.

99 See also 460b28–461a8; 461b11–18 (the artificial frogs passage discussed above in n. 34).

100 Although that hasn't stopped some from claiming it: Johansen 2012, for example, explicitly maintains that the *phantasma* might be "an image in the blood" (232), though he offers no further comment or elaboration. van der Eijk 1994 similarly speaks about the changes in the blood "becoming visible" (Sichtbarwerden, 233) and as "detectable" (spürbar, 41; merkbar, 44; bemerkt, 46), though also without any further clarification. Cambiano

and Repici 1988 may have this in mind as well: at any rate, they say that the movements in the blood "presentano una somiglianza con oggetti reali" and that "[l]'apparizione onirica non è altro che l'affiorare alla superficie di questi residui dell'attività percettiva" (124).

Beare 1906, interestingly, at points distinguishes between the image that "presents itself during sleep" (305) from "residual impressions which *give rise to* the images" and "float inwards from the special organ to the central organ in the current of blood" (306, emphasis mine)—the *phantasmata* that present themselves" are "caused purely by the residual impressions" (307)—even though at other points he takes "the remnant or residual impression" itself to "come before the mind's eye" (306). Gallop 1996 makes a similar distinction regarding the movements in the blood and images (22), but likewise does not carry it through consistently. It is also suggested by wording at Strevell 2016, 191–194, 197, though again not consistently (e.g., 202).

101 A point on which Sorabji 2004 [1972] rightly thinks there should be general agreement (xv).

102 This may be what Sorabji 2004 [1972] has in mind when he says that *phantasma* is viewed in the soul and that "it is viewed as if it were before the eyes" (xv). Everson 1997 might also believe that when we are aware of *aisthēmata* or *phantasmata*, we are not aware of them *as* material changes in the blood, but I have been unable to find any explicit qualification or statement on the issue.

103 For my reading of this controversial passage, see now Caston (*forthcoming*).

104 See n. 88 above.

105 Caston 1998a, esp. §§3 and 5, 2005, §4; and now Caston (*forthcoming*).

106 For discussion of this important passage, see Caston 1998a, 276–279.

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