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Accident: LATAM Chile A20N at Lima on Nov 18th 2022, collision with fire truck on takeoff
By Simon Hradecky, created Friday, Nov 18th 2022 22:36Z, last updated Monday, Oct 2nd 2023 17:24Z

A LATAM Chile Airbus A320-200N, registration CC-BHB performing flight LA-2213 from Lima to Juliaca (Peru) with 102 passengers and 6 crew, was accelerating for takeoff from Lima's runway 16 at about 15:11L (20:11Z) when multiple fire trucks with flashing lights and sirenes sounding crossed the runway in front of the accelerating aircraft. The crew rejected takeoff at high speed (at about 125 knots over ground) but wasn't able to avoid contact with fire truck #3 although the truck tried to turn around turning right (into direction of the aircraft). The right main gear collapsed causing the aircraft to veer right towards the right hand runway edge coming to a stop partially off the runway about 2500 meters/8300 feet down the runway. A fire erupted around the right hand engine (PW1127G), all occupants were able to evacuate the aircraft. 4 passengers received serious and 36 passengers received minor injuries. The aircraft sustained substantial damage, the fire truck was destroyed. Two fire fighters on board of the truck involved in the collision did not survive, a third fire fighter on the truck involved received serious injuries.

The airline reported all occupants of the aircraft survived the accident. There were 102 passengers and 6 crew on board.

Lima's Airport Authority reported all passengers were "doing well" and are receiving the attention of their teams. According to recordings the fire truck(s) entered the runway without clearance. The fire trucks had been responding to another aircraft that had suffered mechanical problems. On Nov 19th 2022 the Airport Authority reported that works to remove the aircraft from the runway have begun. In the late evening of November 19th 2022 the airport authority announced, the aircraft had been moved off the runway in a very complex operation, repair works on the runway have begun. The runway had received extensive damage both in depth and length.

On Nov 20th 2022 Lima's Airport Authority (LAP) reported in a written communique, that a pre-planned response time exercise was performed by the Rescue Team, in which it was to prove that a response to an emergency on the runway would not take any more than 3 minutes. The exercise had been coordinated between the airport and the Air Traffic Authority (CORPAC) and set to be carried out between 15:00 and 16:00 local time on Nov 18th 2022. CORPAC (Control Tower) confirmed the start time of the exercise at 15:10L, the impact with the LATAM aircraft happened at 15:11. The exercise was duely authorized under the current aeronautical regulations. (Editorial note: this communique does not mention, whether the vehicles were cleared to enter the runway by tower or whether the pre-coordination with CORPAC also included that the vehicles would be cleared to enter the runway without actual tower clearance, in other words tower would halt all traffic at 15:10L).

On Nov 21st 2022 Peru's Ministry of Transport and Communication in its role as Civil Aviation Authority stated, that the communique by LAP was essentially correct, however, this communication and coordination did not mean that the trucks had been cleared to enter the active runway. The exercise is authorized, but this does not mean that using this exercise there is anyone cleared to enter the runway, in particular if there is an aircraft moving on the runway. At this time there is no comment available, whether the trucks were cleared to enter the runway or not. However, the ministry confirmed the LATAM aircraft was cleared for takeoff.

Medical Services reported 102 passengers and 6 crew were evacuated from the aircraft, 24 passengers were taken to hospitals with injuries. The numbers were later updated stating 4 passengers received serious and 36 passengers minor injuries.

The head of the fire fighters at Lima Airport reported that two fire fighters persished in the accident, a third was taken to a hospital with serious injuries and is in the Intensive Care Unit in stable condition. Later the head of the firefighters added, the surviving fire fighter was diagnosed with a fracture at the base of his skull, severe head trauma including bruises of the brain stem and facial trauma, the vital functions are stable, the neurological compromise can only be assessed at a later time. The next 24 hours will be crucial. On Nov 21st 2022 the condition of the injured firefighter was still assessed critical.

An ATC report states in writing that the rescue vehicle entered runway 16 from the west at the height of taxiway B without authorization and collided with flight LA-2213. Emergency procedures were invoked and rescue vehicles cleared onto the runway to deal with the accident. The runway was NOTAMed closed.

On Nov 21st 2022 CORPAC, Air Traffic Control, stated categorically, that no vehicle had been cleared to enter the runway. CORPAC confirmed there was coordination for an exercise to be carried out by rescue services, however, this did not affect the runway and was to be held outside the runway strip.

The airline reported that they do not know what the fire truck had to do on the runway and why it was there. They had no information about an emergency drill. In any case the normal procedure would be that any vehicle needing access to the runway would need to communicate with tower and obtain clearance to enter the runway. Their aircraft was cleared for takeoff.

The local prosecution office reported two firefighters died in the accident, another one was injured. The office have opened an investigation to determine the facts and possible culpability and are currently reviewing the CCTV recordings.

Peru's Comision de Investigacion de Accidentes de Aviacion (CIAA) opened an investigation into the accident.

On Nov 25th 2022 the CIAA reported a fire truck on an assistance exercise entered the main runway while CC-BHB was in the takeoff run and collided with the right hand wing and engine of the aircraft. Two firefighters were killed, another firefighter was injured. The aircraft crew rejected takeoff and stopped the aircraft about 1500 meters past the point of collision, an immediate evacuation was carried out. Other fire trucks extinguished the ensuring fire and assisted passengers, who received medical care. The aircraft was destroyed. An investigation is ongoing.

On Sunday Nov 20th 2022 at 00:00L (05:00Z) the runway was opened for takeoffs and became fully available some time later. Flight operations at Lima Airport have resumed.

The transcript of the communication on ground frequency (tower frequency not available) in the crucial time between starting of the exercise (20:10:00Z) and the collision reads with all times in UTC (according to the ground recording Recate 6, Rescue vehicle #6, took position on taxiway Alpha near but outside the runway strip at 20:04, obviously being the target of the exercise, Ground cleared Recate 6 to a position 90 meters from the runway axis indicated by traffic cones).

20:10:10 Ground: "Recibido mantenga posicion" ("All received, hold position")
20:10:13 Unreadable
20:10:20 Ground: "Rescate 6 Recibido" ("Rescate 6, roger")
20:10:25 Unreadable
20:10:30 Ground: "Sky 05210 Superficie Buen dia ruede via A mantenga antes de B." ("Sky 05210 Ground Good morning, taxi via A hold before B")
20:10:35 Sky05210?: ""?A?"" unreadable.
20:10:39 Ground: "unreadable del rescate repita distintivo" ("unreadable, rescue, say again callsign")
20:10:52 Ground: "A la vista Rescate ingresando sedes" ("Rescue vehicle in sight, entering base")
20:10:56 Ground: "LAN Peru 2186 Cuando listo contacte Lima TWR 118.1?" ("LAN Peru 2186 When ready contact Lima TWR 118.1")
20:11:00 Ground: "LAN Peru 2023 continue rodaje A1 A punto de espera pista16" ("LAN Peru 2023 continue taxiing A1-A holding point runway 16")
20:11:08 LAN Peru 2186?: "Torre uno ocho coma unreadable" ("Lan Peru 2186? probably reading back the frequency")
20:11:09 ?: "?Listo rodar?"" ("? Ready taxi")
20:11:12 Ground: Jetsmart 7128 ruede via A mantenga antes de B ("Jetsmart 7128, taxi via A hold before B").
20:11:16 Jetsmart 7128: "Mantenerse en bravo ... " ("Jetsmart 7128 Maintaining bravo")
20:11:38 unreadable because being stepped on by ground
20:11:41 Ground: "rescate repito, repito rescate, aeronave siniestrada en pista repito" ("Rescue repeat, repeat rescue, aircraft crashed on runway, repeat", note: there was shouting in the background)

The shouts on the CCTV video showing the emergency vehicles on their way out of the base to the runway indicate surprise and shock.

Related NOTAMs:
A5194/22 NOTAMR A5178/22
Q) SPIM/QMRLC/IV/NBO/A/000/999/
A) SPJC B) 2211191500 C) 2211200500 EST
E) RWY 16/34 CLSD DUE ACFT OBST
A5178/22 NOTAMN
Q) SPIM/QMRLC/IV/NBO/A/000/999/
A) SPJC B) 2211182020 C) 2211191800
E) RWY 16/34 CLSD DUE ACFT OBST

Metars:
SPJC 182200Z 18009KT 9999 SCT015 BKN020 19/14 Q1012 NOSIG RMK TX21.7 PP000=
SPJC 182100Z 19010KT 9999 BKN020 19/14 Q1012 NOSIG RMK PP000=
SPJC 182000Z 18009KT 160V230 9999 BKN021 20/13 Q1012 NOSIG RMK PP000=
SPJC 181900Z 21008KT 180V270 9999 SCT021 21/14 Q1012 NOSIG RMK PP000=
SPJC 181800Z 27006KT 220V300 8000 SCT020 20/14 Q1013 NOSIG RMK PP000=
SPJC 181700Z 27007KT 240V300 9999 BKN020 20/14 Q1013 TEMPO SCT025 RMK PP000=
SPJC 181600Z 24007KT 220V280 9999 OVC020 19/14 Q1014 NOSIG RMK PP000=

The accident (Video: Flying for Real):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=774RvjSnxzo


CCTV: the emergency vehicles on their way to the collision:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cWeGVrzUH3Q


Still image out of CCTV: moment just before the collision:
Still image out of CCTV: moment just before the collision

The remains of the fire truck #3 involved in the collision:
The remains of the fire truck #3 involved in the collision

The aircraft after the fire was put out:
The aircraft after the fire was put out

The aircraft after the fire was put out


By Simon Hradecky, created Monday, Oct 2nd 2023 17:21Z, last updated Monday, Oct 2nd 2023 17:24Z

On Oct 2nd 2023 Peru's CIAA released their final report in Spanish only (Editorial note: to serve the purpose of global prevention of the repeat of causes leading to an occurrence an additional timely release of all occurrence reports in the only world spanning aviation language English would be necessary, a Spanish only or no release does not achieve this purpose as set by ICAO annex 13 and just forces many aviators to waste much more time and effort each in trying to understand the circumstances leading to the occurrence. Aviators operating internationally are required to read/speak English besides their local language, investigators need to be able to read/write/speak English to communicate with their counterparts all around the globe).

The report concludes the probable causes of the accident were:

During the LATAM aircraft being in its takeoff run a Lima Airport Rescue Vehicle entered the runway without clearance by the control tower while in a response time exercise from the new fire station and collided with the aircraft.

This chain of events was caused by lack of joint planning, poor coordination and non-use of ICAO standardized communication and phraseology.

Contributing factors were:

- failure to hold a briefing meeting between airport and Civil Aviation Authority after the first response time exercise to determine errors, deficiencies, discrepancies, missing materials and procedural shortcomings in the development of the exercise in order to arrange improvements for an optimal execution of the second response time exercise.

- The Civil Aviation Authority's (CORPAC) acceptance of the proposal by the airport to carry the response time exercise out from partially implemented facilities that had not officially been handed over to control by CORPAC

- No meetings were held between CORPAC and airport to assess hazards, manage risks and mitigation actions with respect to the new areas and facilities of the airport

- Failure to hold a joint meeting between CORPAC and airport to plan the execution of the second response time exercise, which would participating personnell permitted to know clearly concept and details of the exercise

- Failure to provide instructions to control tower and emergency services for the execution of the second exercise permitting tower controllers to familiarize themselves with the location, designation and operational functioning of new aircraft and vehicle taxiways

- Incorrect application of aeronautical communication principles (clarity and precision) generated a wrong interpretation with CORPAC tower controllers of the execution of the exercise

- The tower controllers did not realize that by permitting the airport to remove the safety cones the only lane for the emergency vehicles to enter the runway was opened

- The erroneous interpretation by airport rescue services that the clearance to begin the response time exercise also included the clearance to enter the runway

- The aerodrome and surface controllers received information about the training exercise only minutes prior to its start, insufficient time to assess the hazards and risks

- Failure to use standard ICAO phraseology for communications between airport rescue services and the control tower

The CIAA analysed, that there was a clear and distinctive difference between the planning of the first response time exercise and the second one, while for the first exercise there had been a joint meeting to prepare and plan the exercise, there was no evidence of such a briefing for the second exercise.

On the day of the exercise and accident tower was not aware of the scheduling of the exercise until about 13:58L. During the visit of the CIAA to the control tower it was noticed that the controllers did not have any information about the new facilities like firestation, taxiways Q and R as well as VSR4 (the vehicle service road on which the fire engines ultimately entered the runway).

Coordination on the day of the accident between Tower and emergency services was done by an on call supervisor at the control tower who was not familiar with the exercise and developed an erroneous understanding of the exercise, in particular how the rescue vehicles would approach the runway. No clarification was sought or provided by either party.

At 15:03L the rescue services supervisor requested and received permission to remove the safety cones, however, omitted the information that these were across VSR4 and VSR4 was the intended route of the vehicles. The tower supervisor requested clarification regarding the location of the cones, the rescue supervisor was unable to provice that information demonstrating he was not familiar with the nomenclatura and location of taxiways and roads. The controller was not aware by granting the permission to remove the cones he was enabling unobstructed access to the runway, at the same time the rescue supervisor perceived this as clearance to directly access the maneouvering and runway area.

At 15:10L the exercise started.

Assumed vehicle path by CORPAC and tower (blue), actual path (yellow) (Graphics: CIAA):
Assumed vehicle path by CORPAC and tower (blue), actual path (yellow) (Graphics: CIAA)

Reader Comments: (the comments posted below do not reflect the view of The Aviation Herald but represent the view of the various posters)
@The Legacy
By Tarik on Monday, Dec 11th 2023 11:00Z

Sorry, I automatically translated criminal incompetence into gross negligence so you did not label it like that but it is basically the same thing.

Sorry once again!

BRGDS
Tarik

@The Legacy
By Tarik on Monday, Dec 11th 2023 10:57Z

Please use an algorithm to evaluate the qualification of misconduct before trying to label something as gross negligence.
The three levels of misconduct would be Human Error, At Risk Behaviour and Gross Negligence.

Long story short (and not completely precise), gross negligence is a misconduct where one knows that they are doing something unsafe or unlawful and does it anyway, fully aware of potential harm.

Barring some rare occurrences where that was the case, majority of people are not prone to doing such things because that would mean they are sociopaths.

Although there is a lack of interest in these new generations which translates into them not doing their jobs as well as it would be expected, they are not, however, sociopaths.

That is why we analyse these occurrences to try and find out what went wrong system wise and not to apportion personal blame.

Nice read
By Benur on Tuesday, Nov 14th 2023 22:33Z

I work in the industry and I am all in reading everything I can on accident reports, analysis, whatever...

Being an avid reader of Admiral Cloudberg, I found very much exciting her recent article on this accident on Medium, search for Countdown to Collision if you are interested.

Firings are in order.
By The Legacy on Saturday, Oct 7th 2023 09:23Z

I'm glad to see that the pilots weren't blamed for the accident, but it does make clear that there are some managers at the airport that should not be working at the airport. The sheer lack of coordination and dangerous level of assumptions led to this tragedy. I am all for using accidents as learning experience instead of a punitive one, but I feel this one crosses the threshold between teachable moment and criminal incompetence.

Locking up pilots
By Pilot on Thursday, Oct 5th 2023 14:05Z

The report confirms what was obvious to even the most distant observer just after the event: that there is no reasonable basis conceivable to hold the pilots involved in custody for over 24 hrs.
Even the first reports of that day held that both ATC and the pilots themselves testified the airplane was cleared for take-off, so that the possibly punishable fault would lie, with highest probability, with someone else.
Outrageous�

Final Report
By Hans R. on Tuesday, Oct 3rd 2023 11:35Z

Thank you very much for providing this information. Now we indeed know why it happened what happened. A whole row of slices of the "Swiss Cheese" were crossed, some of them not imaginable at the time of the accident (Tower Controller not familiar with new Runway Design and the location of new Airport Facilities e.g.). But everybody who assumed lack of planning and poor communication was absolutely right.

Videos - no "simulations"
By John on Thursday, Dec 1st 2022 17:55Z

I see two videos on this web page. Neither of them have any "simulations" and neither of them show the aircraft leaving the ground.



Simulation
By Carruthers Brian on Wednesday, Nov 30th 2022 18:53Z

The simulation included is just nonsense, the aircraft never left the ground and it lost the right engine completely

Prior exercise on August 17
By WxGuy on Monday, Nov 28th 2022 00:29Z

According to an article published today in La Republica newspaper, a similar exercise happened on August 17 this year and they are trying to determine if, on that occasion, there had been explicit authorization [to enter the active runway]. If not, it would imply both LAP and CORPAC had not been adhering to correct procedure.

From the article:

No obstante, como ha informado este diario, el 17 de agosto de este a�o se produjo un simulacro que implicaba el ingreso a pista activa, y que fue aprobado por las instancias involucradas, entre ellas Corpac. Faltar�a saber si en ese caso hubo autorizaci�n expl�cita; si no fue as�, se presumir�a que tanto LAP como Corpac no estaban cumpliendo con el procedimiento estipulado en las normas.

Thank You
By Aircraft Lover on Sunday, Nov 27th 2022 19:05Z

I want to thank The Aviation Herald for the excellent work that you do. Thank you for keeping us updated, and informed, in such a professional way

@ Alex on Sunday, Nov 27th 2022 14:39Z
By Simon Hradecky on Sunday, Nov 27th 2022 16:33Z

Perhaps you check the time line of the videos first before you blame yourself to the bones with a comment like this.

This video is a compilation of several observer videos from different points of view and was included in our coverage at about about 23:30Z on Nov 18th 2022 about one hour after our initial coverage.


Reconstruction video
By Alex on Sunday, Nov 27th 2022 14:39Z

Why to include that "flying for real" video ?
It's misleading, based on nothing, with the airplane which lift off and then crashes back onto the RWY.
It's a reconstruction for kids worth only for Flight Simulator lovers: should not be in this kind of websites.

LATAM Flight LA-2213 - SPJC - Lima- PER�
By Andr�s on Saturday, Nov 26th 2022 15:49Z

3) In this case it was NOT a General Simulation of the Plan, which would have required STOPPING ALL TRAFFIC; Outcoming % Incoming. NOTAMS would be Published/Issued etc.

4) I can imagine that in this case, the Procedure Performed was related to the APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION of the AD. EMERG. PLAN.
Given the new Ad. Configuration, New AFF Base Location, etc. the AFF Service Provider would be tasked with GIVING PROVE of BEING ABLE to achieve the REQUERIMENTS in terms of Time of Response, etc.

5) Failing to PERFORM under the Supervision of the AAC Authorities would/could lead to costs in terms of Time, PR, Costs
etc. hence the Potential for an scenario of PERFORMING UNDER EXTRA PRESSURE, etc.

LATAM Flight LA-2213 - SPJC - Lima- PER�
By Andr�s on Saturday, Nov 26th 2022 15:38Z

2) The AERDROME EMERGENCY PLAN must be subject to constant/permanent evaluations/analysis and amended/re-approved as necessary.
Apart from this the Plan MUST be SIMULATED every certain period of time, in order to Find/Detect non-obvious weak points & MAINTAIN ALL ACTORS INVOLVED in the Loop. This Simulations again will be subject to Evaluation/Analysis and so on.

LATAM Flight LA-2213 - SPJC - Lima- PER�
By Andr�s on Saturday, Nov 26th 2022 15:21Z

Some Points re. EMERGENCY DRILLS:
1) All Emergency Procedures are contained/specified in the AIRDROME EMERGENCY PLAN. The Airdrome Operator is responsible for the making of this plan, and it must then be APPROVED by the relevant "Department" of the CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY. If some of the services provided at the Airdrome as ATC, SECURITY, AFF, etc.
where in the hands of OUTISIDE ACTORS to the ORGANIZATION (AD.OPER.) that Plan must/should be COORDINATED under the Concept
of AIRPORT CDM (Collaborative Decision Making) in order to satisfy everyone's requirements.

Emergency Procedure
By Liam on Saturday, Nov 26th 2022 14:21Z

@Observer

depending on the airport, not all traffic is stopped in an emergency situation. If there are multiple runways, why should traffic be stopped if the remaining runways can be operated safely? Ususally ATC will direct traffic to the other runways. Of course, it depends on the emergency. And emergency vehicles entering an active runway system will also have to request clearance by local ATC. No one is allowed to enter the runway system without clearance.

LATAM Flight LA-2213 - SPJC - Lima- PER�
By Andr�s on Saturday, Nov 26th 2022 12:05Z

The fact that the new AFF Base Is/were in use is irrelevant in this case, re. the Drill & Accident, up to the moment of the collision, that is.
Cannot see any Vehicle with #6 , as related to the published (From the Web Apps I hope) Freq.Audios 2/2

LATAM Flight LA-2213 - SPJC - Lima- PER�
By Andr�s on Saturday, Nov 26th 2022 11:59Z

By (anonymous) on Saturday, Nov 26th 2022 08:18Z

The video "CCTV: the emergency vehicles on their way to the collision" is taken from 12.0187S, 77.1206W. In the beginning of the video one can see the last vehicle, a pickup truck, turning onto a road. Looking at Google Earth, the building at -12.018876, -77.121906 is perhaps the new ARFF station?

Thanks. Now I can see.The GOOGLE MAPS image doesn't show the newly laid tarmac of the SERVICE ROAD (not Taxy-way) the affected Truck (I assume # 3) used to, a) Leave the Base, b) Cross the Parallel Taxy-way (name ?) c) continue on next/last segment of the the Service Road and d) Enter the active RWY 16, turning Right on it & being struck by the Plane. 1/2


Protocols - part 3 (last)
By Observer on Saturday, Nov 26th 2022 10:42Z

Part 3 (last)
Ok, an aircraft might catch fire still at the terminal bridge and another one might be taxing 2/300 mtrs away. Nevertheless it'd be a different situation than interacting with a running aircraft at V1... or more.
Is there any weak points in the rules?
Shouldn't an emergency action call stop ALL traffic?
Shouldn't the emergency vehicles be notified "caution one aircraft on active runway?"
PS no expert here, just frequent flyer

Protocols pt 2
By Observer on Saturday, Nov 26th 2022 10:40Z

Part 2
It looks like there are worlds apart living in the same environment. Especially in a simulation/excercise.
Moreover, IF the simulation is for an airplane in the field, possibly on a runways or taxiway (as it happened in real shortly after with the damaged aircraft) one could assume there is no movement on active runways or taxiways.

Protocols pt 1
By Observer on Saturday, Nov 26th 2022 10:39Z

Part 1
It is beyond my understanding how a fire truck is called to act on an emergency in the airfield, runways (I doubt those rescue vehicles are called for non aviation/aircraft emergency) whilst the airport (runways) are still operating "normally"
A simulation and an exercise should also involve the concerned aircrafts (taxiing, departing, landing)
I know protocols and procedures are there but it seems they miss this point.

@Andr�s
By (anonymous) on Saturday, Nov 26th 2022 08:18Z

The video "CCTV: the emergency vehicles on their way to the collision" is taken from 12.0187S, 77.1206W. In the beginning of the video one can see the last vehicle, a pickup truck, turning onto a road. Looking at Google Earth, the building at -12.018876, -77.121906 is perhaps the new ARFF station?


LATAM Flight LA-2213 - SPJC - Lima- PER�
By Andr�s on Friday, Nov 25th 2022 21:15Z

* Typo: AUTORIZACI�N ATC(ATC CLEARANCE)

LATAM Flight LA-2213 - SPJC - Lima- PER�
By Andr�s on Friday, Nov 25th 2022 21:11Z

Re. INVESTIGATION, Per ICAO Annex 13 & related DOCs: PRELIMINARY REPORT (Facts/Findings) -30 Days, FINAL REPORT (Conclusions/Recommendations) - 6 Months.
(No �Fully Independent� ala NTSB body there, for what I read, It� directly dependent on the Ministry for Transport & Communications?)

Does someone have a link/access to some Aerodrome Chart. to better understand the whole picture? Does someone know if the NEW/FUTURE TWR & AFF BASE where in use at the time of the accident? No �Fully Independent� ala NTSB body there? (For what I read, It�s directly dependent on the Ministry for Transport & Communications & The General Directorate of Civil Aviation, in that order.)

Thanks, excuse the length. 4/4

LATAM Flight LA-2213 - SPJC - Lima- PER�
By Andr�s on Friday, Nov 25th 2022 21:10Z

All this is origin, in my opinion, of that in-fight we see in the local news and media in general, between some actors. They use the term "AUTORIZACI�N" in reference to both PROYECTED DRILL and the actual maneuvering of the vehicles at the time of the accident. That is because that is the Common Language therm for APPROVAL/ACCEPTANCE in one hand, but also that is how the term CLEARANCE is DEFINED and so appears in the STANDARD RECOMMENDED ATC Phraseology (Doc 4444 Cap.12 ES).
In the English language one would use the terms AUTORIZATION/APPROVAL for the DRILL and CLEARANCE for the actual maneuver. (This have implications in other areas, as the sometimes misunderstood/mixed concepts of AUTORIDAD ATS (ATS AUTHORITY, the INSTITUTION or BODY) & AUTORIZACI�N ATS (ATC CLEARANCE, Re. Flight Plan, etc.) 3/4

LATAM Flight LA-2213 - SPJC - Lima- PER�
By Andr�s on Friday, Nov 25th 2022 21:06Z

2)Re.LANGUAGE and INSTITUTIONAL COMUNICATIONS: We must differentiate between AERONATICAL(OACI) LANGUAGES & Radiotelephony mComunications (FRASEOLOGY).
ICAO Documents are Published in 6 Languages, SPANISH included. One would expect that Aeronautical Authorities & Service Providers in this case conduct their Tasks in reference to the Terms/Definitions accepted in the SPANISH published material.
Re. FRASEOLOGY, The ATSP (ATS Services Provider) in SPJC must, I ASUME (Couldn't gain access to PERU AIP) offer the service in BOTH, being an Int. Airport/Aerodrome. but with a prevalence of South American Operators/Users in general. This would include the Vehicle Conductors when in communications with GROUND or TWR. 2/3

LATAM Flight LA-2213 - SPJC - Lima- PER�
By Andr�s on Friday, Nov 25th 2022 21:05Z

Good day to all.
First time here/Non Native Speaker, PLEASE spare me some patience

Some 1)Observations, 2)Considerations and 3)Questions

1)I've seen that the discussion in the forum is more focused and rational every day.
It's good to see people asking about those areas outside one's expertise or long time interests and not trying to jump to conclusions in general. Kudos to all. 1/3

poor planning
By Skydriver on Friday, Nov 25th 2022 09:45Z

Unfortunately, front line operators (ATC, firemen in the truck and pilots) got caught in what appears likely to be a poorly planned and briefed drill...
Lack of directives, lack of coordination, lack of thorough briefing.

Invisible Target Vehicle Rescate #6
By Captain Crunch on Friday, Nov 25th 2022 07:51Z

O.K., I used the search engine like Hans R. wanted me to. I listened to the Spanish recording. I think ATC ground controller asks Rescate #6 to say his position about four times. It's like ground can't spot him with the binoculars (because he's not where ATC expects him to be?) On other Rescate calls Ground responds with "In Sight, entering base."

Is Rescate #6 also a pickup truck like Rescate #7? I can't find an image of it anywhere. I see a red pickup and a checkered vehicle present during the drill. Also a white and blue pickup. Anyone know?


What I'd like to know is:

Drills usually pretend the taxiway is the runway. In the U.S., I've read it's supposed to be marked as such for the drill. Was it marked as a runway? Was there a Fire Manager in the tower?

@Simon Hradecky
By Captain Crunch on Friday, Nov 25th 2022 02:39Z

Hi Simon,
Spectacular coverage by you, as always!
American Noticias, in a TV report down there, shows a graphic claiming they were supposed to turn Right/South onto the parallel taxiway after the stop sign. Maybe the target vehicle Rescate #6 got lost and went up toward 16/hold Alpha? Then Rescate #3 was scrambled out of the Firehouse, and started looking to the South to spot Rescate #6 to confirm his turn right?

Not seeing Rescate #6 to the South, Rescate #3 keeps going straight and then finally spots him to the North and breaks left up the runway?

We need to hear the ATC briefing before the exercise began; transmissions before 21:10:10. Supposedly, ATC reminded them of what to do. Source:



and:




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