Main Tabs Group
Vertical Tabs
ISKP identifies with Salafism, a distinct ideological movement in Sunni Islam. In particular, the group associates with an extreme branch of Salafism known as Wahhabism.[122] ISKP’s ideology is predicated on an extremist interpretation of Islamic scripture and anti-Shiite sectarian views.[123]
In general, the Islamic State adheres to “the Prophetic methodology” – a term it has coined in its press, billboards, and propaganda – meaning that the group follows the prophecy and example of Muhammad.[124] The grand strategic aim of the Islamic State is to rule all historically Muslim lands in a caliphate that ultimately defeats the West. As an affiliate, ISKP supports this objective by facilitating the group’s military expansion outside of Iraq and Syria and legitimizing its status as a trans-regional organization.
ISKP also aimed to challenge Al Qaeda and the Taliban as the leaders of the global jihadist movement. In particular, ISKP has asserted that it is the true successor of the global jihad, which Al Qaeda has forsaken. ISKP has also claimed that the Taliban was merely a nationalist movement, not a proponent of global jihad. ISKP’s main goal is to maintain Khorasan as a Wilayat (province) of the global IS caliphate, rather than challenge IS central leadership for dominance over the jihadist movement.[125]
Although ISKP does not directly participate in politics, the group does have overarching political goals. IKSP seeks to establish “Khorasan Province,” a region in Afghanistan in which the Islamic State movement would have full territorial and political control akin to another caliphate.[126]
To attract more recruits and reinforce its brand in Afghanistan, ISKP incorporated many of the brutal tactics employed by the Islamic State (IS).[127] IS often used suicide bombers to clear a path for other militants, and ISKP similarly has carried out several attacks with combined suicide bombers and shooters. For example, in July 2017, ISKP conducted an inghimasi attack against the Iraqi embassy in Kabul. Inghimasi refers to well-trained commandos who are prepared both to fight conventionally and to carry out suicide missions. In this specific attack, one of the two militants detonated his suicide vest, while the other fired on the embassy.[128]
ISKP’s primary militant adversary is the Taliban. ISKP fought the Taliban for territorial control over Afghanistan and thus frequently targeted the group in its attacks.[129] The hostility between the two groups stems both from ideological differences and competition for resources. IS accused the Taliban of relying on a small ethnic and nationalist base for its support, which lacked a widespread Islamic appeal.[130] ISKP’s harsher rhetoric and its opposition to peace talks with the United States drew militants to defect from the Taliban.[131]
Before their respective withdrawal and collapse, ISKP was also a staunch enemy of the United States and the Republic of Afghanistan. ISKP and the Afghan government initially refrained from challenging one another. However, once ISKP had secured power in Nangarhar, the Afghan government started working to halt the spread of ISKP in July 2015.[132] In return, ISKP changed its policy of tolerance toward the Afghan government to one of open aggression.
The government’s new strategy coincided with the series of lethal U.S. airstrikes against three top ISKP leaders in July 2015, for which the Afghan government claimed to have provided intelligence support. The Afghan government subsequently announced its official plan to unite with the United States in combating ISKP and unveiled a new unit tasked with fighting the group. IKSP blamed the Afghan government for this increased targeting. ISKP also condemned the government for its persecution of Pakistani militants, its cooperation with the Pakistan Army and ISI, and its support of local, Taliban-backed uprisings against ISKP.
Despite ISKP’s declared hostility against the Afghan government, most of its resources were directed at combating the Taliban. Throughout late 2015 and into 2016, the two groups battled for control over territory in Nangarhar, each time brutally executing and banishing the fighters and sympathizers of the losing group. Certain districts, such as Chaparhar, changed hands multiple times, as the Taliban and ISKP took turns executing elaborate counterattacks.[133]
ISKP has also promoted sectarian violence and targeted civilians who do not adhere to its strict interpretation of Islam and jihadist ideology. Shia civilians are frequent targets of ISKP attacks, including shootings and suicide bombings in Shia neighborhoods.[134] In extreme instances, ISKP has allegedly executed its own fighters. For example, on November 23, 2017, Afghan officials reported that ISKP beheaded more than a dozen of its own fighters in Achin.[135]
Facing growing external pressure, ISKP lost significant territory in 2019. Starting in 2020, ISKP shifted its focus from territorial consolidation to urban warfare campaigns. The group aimed to undermine the legitimacy of adversaries, such as the Taliban, by exposing their vulnerabilities with attacks in Afghanistan’s urban centers. Following this strategy, ISKP militants conducted suicide bombings during a funeral in Nangarhar and attacked students at Kabul University.[136]
The current leader of ISKP, Shahab al-Muhajir, has written a series of books on ISKP strategy. The challenges associated with taking and holding territory made territorial control a difficult strategy. In a 2021 book, Muhajir outlined how groups can gradually grow from hit-and-run attacks to controlling strategic pieces of territory. A group first prioritizes low-cost, high-impact attacks while it focuses on improving its capabilities. Once it is strong enough, a group can begin to seek control over remote territories and eventually establish itself as the main authority over roads and towns. [137]
In a 2023 book, Muhajir advocates for conducting high-impact attacks in enemy strongholds, especially against targets that maximize publicity, such as local officials or foreigners. This strategy is reflected in ISKP operations after August 2021, which attacked large cities in Afghanistan and Pakistan and targeted rival religious figures, minority communities, and foreigners.[138]
Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.
April 18, 2015: ISKP conducted a suicide bombing outside a bank in Jalalabad, Afghanistan (33 killed, 100+ wounded).[139]
May 13, 2015: 6 gunmen allegedly associated with ISKP attacked a bus in Karachi, Pakistan. Although IS claimed the attack, Jundullah (a group allegiant to IS) and the TTP also claimed responsibility. If ISKP’s claim is accurate, this attack would be its first in Pakistan (45 killed, 13 wounded).[140]
July 23, 2016: ISKP conducted a dual suicide bombing in Kabul, Afghanistan, on a group of demonstrators from Afghanistan’s Shiite Hazara minority. The bombing was one of the deadliest attacks in Afghanistan since the invasion of the United States in 2001 (80+ killed, 230+ wounded).[141]
August 8, 2016: ISKP conducted a suicide bombing at a civil hospital in Quetta, Pakistan. The attack took place after several lawyers and journalists had gathered at the hospital to mourn the death of the president of the Balochistan Bar Association in a separate shooting incident earlier that day. Although the attack is attributed to ISKP, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JA) also claimed responsibility (93 killed, 120 wounded).[142]
October 24, 2016: Three ISKP militants attacked 700 unarmed, sleeping cadets at a police training center in Quetta, Pakistan. At least 260 cadets were rescued by Special Services Group commandos in a counter-offensive against the attackers. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) also claimed responsibility for the attack (61 killed, 165 injured).[143]
February 16, 2017: ISKP conducted a suicide bombing at a Sufi shrine in Sehwan, Pakistan, where hundreds of devotees had gathered to perform a religious ritual. The attack appeared to be concentrated on the portion of the shrine reserved for women (100 killed, 250 wounded).[144]
March 8, 2017: ISKP militants dressed as doctors stormed the largest military hospital in Kabul, Afghanistan. The militants, armed with guns and grenades, opened fire on staff and patients after detonating explosives at the hospital gate. After several hours of fighting, Afghan commandos killed all four ISKP attackers (49 killed, 90 wounded).[145]
April 22, 2018: An ISKP militant attacked a voter registration center in Kabul, Afghanistan using a suicide bomb. The casualties were all identified as civilians, most of whom had been waiting to apply for state-issued IDs to register to vote in the upcoming elections (57 killed, 119 injured).[146]
August 17, 2019: An ISKP suicide bomber detonated and explosive in the men’s section of a heavily attended wedding in Kabul. Other ISKP militants detonated an explosives-laden vehicle when emergency services arrived at the scene. Most of the attendees were members of the Shia Hazara minority, whom ISKP doctrine considers “apostates” (63 killed, 180+ injured).[147]
August 2, 2020: ISKP demonstrated a renewed capacity for sophisticated attacks in a raid on a Jalalabad prison in August. The militants detonated an explosive vehicle at the prison’s main gate, then stormed the building. The gunmen freed hundreds of prisoners (though many were later recaptured) and executed several Taliban members who were detained at the prison. It took nearly 24 hours for Afghan security forces to fully repel the attackers (29 killed, 50 wounded).[148]
August 26, 2021: An ISKP suicide bomber detonated an explosive at the Kabul Airport during the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. Following U.S. withdrawal from the country, the entrance to the airport was guarded by U.S. military personnel and was crowded with Afghans attempting to flee the country. The bomber was able to use the crowd as cover and force their way to the gate, where the explosion could kill U.S. personnel and Afghan civilians. The deadliness of the blast raised questions about the cause of death for those killed in the attack – in particular, the possibility that U.S. and coalition forces killed some civilians after the explosion. A Pentagon report claims that U.S. fire after the attack comprised only warning shots and that any apparent bullet wounds were inflicted by ball-bearings in the explosive (183+ killed, unknown wounded).[149]
April 18, 2022: ISKP launched ten rockets from northern Afghanistan over the Amu Darya river into a military base in Termez, Uzbekistan. Both the Uzbek government and the Taliban denied that an attack occurred.[150] If the ISKP claim of the attack is true, it would mark ISKP’s first venture beyond its conventional area of operations.[151] The bomber reportedly trained in Afghanistan and was an Afghan refugee (60+ killed, unknown wounded).[152]
July 30, 2023: ISKP carried out a suicide bombing that targeted an election rally in Bajaur District, Pakistan. The rally was for the for a religious political party active in Pakistan, known as Jamiat Uleme-e-Islam-Fazal. The attack confirmed that ISKP had survived the Taliban’s attempts to eliminate the group (60+ killed, 100+ wounded).[153]
January 3, 2024: Two ISKP militants conducted a suicide bombing at a memorial service in Kerman, Iran. The targeted crowd had gathered to commemorate Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani, who was assassinated in Iraq in 2020 by a U.S. drone.[154] (94 killed, unknown wounded).[155]
January 28, 2024: Two militants with ties to the Islamic State opened fire on civilians in the the Roman Catholic Church of Santa Maria in Istanbul, Turkey. The militants were believed to have ties to ISKP.[156] After the attack, the Islamic State’s media agency issued a statement claiming responsibility and asserting that the violence was part of a new campaign in response to Israeli military actions in Gaza.[157] (1 killed, 0 wounded).
March 22, 2024: At a rock concert at Crocus City Hall in Moscow, Russia, four Tajik gunmen fired on a crowd of Russian civilians. After the attack, ISKP said its soldiers had killed “a lot of Christians,” as well as blamed Russia for the “blood of Muslims on its hands.” This referred to Russia’s military operations in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Syria[158] (144 killed, 551 wounded).[159]
Vertical Tabs
- January 14, 2016: The U.S. Secretary of State designated ISKP as a foreign terrorist organization in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.[160]
- November 2, 2017: The Australian Government designated ISKP as a terrorist organization under its Criminal Code Division 102.[161]
- June 21, 2018: The Indian Home Ministry designated ISKP as a terrorist organization under the anti-terror law and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967.[162]
During the initial months of ISKP’s rule in Nangarhar, villagers viewed the group as a benign and positive alternative to the Taliban. Unlike the Taliban, which forcibly took from the local population, ISKP sourced its own food and shelter and did not impose a tax. It also allowed both male and female schools to operate.[163] Initially, ISKP commanders claimed that the group had no quarrel with the Afghan government and was instead focused on opposing the Taliban and its link to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).[164]
As ISKP grew in strength throughout 2015, it attempted to expand and consolidate its control through a variety of cruel tactics, including summary justice, forced displacement, and executions of clerics and elders.[165] By early autumn of 2015, ISKP had lost much of its popularity among Nangarhar locals. Although the leniency of ISKP’s early rule was initially promising, citizen support dropped as the group began to engage in violent guerilla tactics and enforce Sharia law. ISPK closed schools and clinics; engaged in public executions; killed tribal elders; organized kidnappings for ransom; destroyed of Sufi shrines; and enforced cigarette bans.[166] One of ISKP’s most unpopular policies was its ban on poppy cultivation, which was an extremely important source of income for many families in Nangarhar. Finally, rumors also began to circulate that local families would be forced to provide ISKP militants with brides without dowry payments or consideration for tribe and family lineage. Ultimately, the threats ISKP posed to the physical, economic, and social wellbeing of the citizens of Nangarhar drove public support for the return of the Taliban.[167]
In 2016, the Afghan government attempted to harness local opposition to ISKP by partnering with local militias.[168] However, ISKP pointed to and exaggerated the collateral damage inflicted by U.S. and Afghan military attacks to maintain their dominance.[169] The US and ANSF employed this tactic with more success in 2019, during the assault on ISKP in Nangarhar, where local militias fought to push ISKP out of the province.[170]
ISKP has also found support among urban members of the middle-class. With traditional social structures fractured by war, new recruits were attracted by ISKP’s “pure” Salafi ideology and the promise of a proper caliphate. Many members of the ISKP “Kabul Cell” were radicalized by hardline Salafi students and faculty while enrolled in Afghan universities.[171] During a National Directorate of Security interrogation, an ISKP prisoner claimed that his organization had recruited “many” students from Kabul University who have gone on to engage in militant activities in Nangarhar, Kabul, and even Iraq and Syria.[172]
Over the course of 2023, ISKP sought to sow distrust among local populations by targeting humanitarian international organizations. In particular, ISKP amplified the production and dissemination of various anti-humanitarian books, articles, and pamphlets that explicitly labeled humanitarian international organizations as legitimate targets for violence. For example, two key books – “Rules about Helping the Infidels and Its Harm” and “Rules of Jihad” – provide a doctrinal justification for civilians to reject international aid (even explicitly naming some international organizations) and enact violence against humanitarian workers. ISKP has also used its supporters to organize harassment and violence against humanitarian staff to isolate communities from international organizations and Taliban social services, creating a more conducive environment for ISKP’s propaganda and recruitment efforts. The ISKP has tied this with its anti-Taliban campaign by portraying the Taliban as a weak and corrupt government that relies on foreign powers to provide basic services due to an inability to protect their people. Ultimately, ISKP aims to bolster its jihadist identity and credibility and potentially spur defections from the Taliban.[173]
Rivalry with the Afghan Taliban
Since its emergence in 2015, ISKP has maintained a rivalrous relationship with the Afghan Taliban, which has remained the group’s biggest challengers in Afghanistan. IKSP views the Taliban as ideologically weak and illegitimate, and it has been engaged in a violent competition with the group for resources, recruits, and territorial control.
ISKP has argued that the Taliban relies on a small ethnic and nationalist base for its support and is not a proponent of global jihad.[174] ISKP has criticized the Taliban’s ideological purity, including its recent failure to enforce the strict Sharia punishments; its efforts to establish diplomatic ties with non-Muslim countries; its tolerance of non-Muslims and international organizations operating within Afghanistan; and its reluctance to take action against countries like China (which ISKP accuses of committing atrocities against Muslims). Overall, ISKP portrays the Taliban as having abandoned their religious objectives in favor of political power.[175] Ultimately, ISKP has sought to distinguish its own brand of jihad from rival organizations and assert leadership of the global jihad movement by establishing its own extremism.[176] ISKP has highlighted the Taliban’s departure from ideological purity as a propaganda tool in an attempt to appeal to disaffected Taliban fighters.
In addition to this ideological battle, ISKP and the Taliban have been in constant competition for territory and recruits in Afghanistan and Pakistan. ISKP’s ability to attract recruits – including defectors from the Taliban – has posed a direct threat the Taliban’s dominance in Afghanistan.[177] Following the confirmation in July 2015 of Taliban leader Mullah Omar’s death, a significant number of Taliban members defected and joined ISKP. This news also spurred the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) to pledge its forces to the Islamic State.[178]
The enmity between ISKP and the Taliban has endured, especially after the Taliban secured control over the Government of Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the United States. ISKP has spent recent years conducting a series of attacks across Afghanistan in an effort to depict the Taliban government as incapable and increase international pressure on the new government. ISKP regularly targeted Taliban checkpoints and areas with ethnic minorities, including Hazara neighborhoods, mosques, and schools.[179] To emphasize the Taliban’s weaknesses and its inability to secure Afghanistan, ISKP attacked foreign targets in the country. In 2022, ISKP attacked foreign embassies in Kabul, including an attempt to assassinate the Pakistan Head of Mission in Pakistan’s embassy and a suicide attack against the Russian embassy in Kabul.[180] ISKP has also launched attacks abroad, demonstrating that the Taliban has been unable to prevent the country from being used as a launchpad for external terrorist attacks.[181]
Conflicts with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
In the early days of its formation, ISKP recruited militants directly linked to groups such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and other Central Asian groups.[182] ISKP’s extensive recruitment from the TTP created underlying tensions between the two groups, but conflicts did not become public until July 2020. The TTP accused ISKP of being a puppet of regional intelligence agencies and claimed ISKP was created to undermine the jihadist movement in the Khorasan region. After the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021, the TTP reaffirmed its allegiance to the Taliban. ISKP retaliated by accusing the TTP of collaborating with Indian intelligence to carry out attacks in Pakistan. Over the following year, these verbal disputes often escalated into armed confrontations.[183]
Alliance with Lashkar-e-Islam
One of ISKP’s closest allies is Laskhar-e-Islam (LeI). Although LeI has not officially merged with ISKP, the two groups act in such close coordination that many locals in Nangarhar view LeI as a wing of ISKP.[184] By partnering with ISKP, LeI has improved its ability to influence the cross-border land conflicts in which it is engaged, and to gain control of strategic smuggling routes. In return, this relationship has allowed ISKP to broaden its support base and increase its operational capacity.[185]
Ties to other militant organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Furthermore, there are several groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan that bolster the ISKP network. These groups publicly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State’s former leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi but have yet to be formally acknowledged by IS leadership.[186] Ansar-ul-Khilafat Wal-Jihad (AKWJ) is the first Pakistan-based militant organization to have publicly pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. AKWJ, formally known as Tehrik-e-Khilafat-o-Jihad, first pledged allegiance to IS in July 2014, and then again in September 2017. In January 2015, AKWJ pledged allegiance specifically to ISKP leader Hafiz Saeed Khan. The group has allegedly conducted a number of small-scale attacks in Hyderabad and Karachi, targeting state officials and Shiites. AKWJ claims to conduct these attacks in the interest of helping the caliphate and avenging the killings of mujahedeen in Karachi and Khyber Agency.[187] Another group that actively supports IS is the Pakistani Jundullah. The Pakistani Jundullah, a splinter group of the TTP, allegedly pledged allegiance to IS in 2014. The group has conducted limited attacks against Shiite shrines and medical workers in Quetta.[188] Finally, representatives of Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), a mosque widely associated with jihadism, openly support the expansion of the IS caliphate.
There are also several militant groups that have not publicly pledged allegiance to IS, but are supportive of IS and its agenda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. For example, although Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JA) remains outwardly loyal to the TTP, the group praises IS and mirrors its messaging.[189] In addition, 2015, there was unconfirmed speculation that IS encouraged all anti-Shiite militant groups in Pakistan to support the caliphate and proposed that elements of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Ahl-e-Sunnat Wai Jamat (ASWJ) collaborate in Pakistan.[190]
Finally, according to a UN Security Council report, current ISKP leader Shabab al-Muhajir may have ties to the Haqqani militant network. Although the group is part of the Taliban, some member states of the UNSC reported “tactical or commander-level collaboration” between it and ISKP. Other member states “strongly deny” these claims, and the official report stresses that any such relations are based on personal rather than organizational relationships. Regardless, the report concludes that the Haqqani network likely tacitly allowed ISKP personnel movements to attack the former Afghan government.[191] The leader of the Haqqani network, Sirajuddin Haqqan, is the acting Interior Minister of Afghanistan.[192] It is unclear what this means for the future of ISKP-Haqqani relations.
ISKP maintains ideological ties and its formal affiliation with the Islamic State central organization. Though ISKP initially received some aid from IS central (see the “Resources” section of this profile), American and Afghan officials in 2017 reportedly believed that ISKP was not engaging in regular contact with IS central.[193]
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[2] “Islamic State Khorasan Province. Australian National Security, n.d., https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/I....
[3] Osman, Borhan. "The Islamic State in 'Khorasan': How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar." Afghanistan Analysts Network, 27 July, 2016, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-it-began-and-where-it-stands-now-in-nangarhar/; Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf.
[4] Hummel, Kristina. “The Enduring Duel: Islamic State Khorasan’s Survival under Afghanistan’s New Rulers.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, August 30, 2023. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-duel-islamic-state-khorasans-survival-under-afghanistans-new-rulers/.
[5] Jadoon, Amira, Abdul Sayed, and Andrew Mines. "The Islamic State Threat in Taliban Afghanistan: Tracing the Resurgence of Islamic State Khorasan." CTC Sentinel 15.1 (2022): 33-35. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/ ; “ISIS-KHORASAN.” Counter Terrorism Guide, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence. December 2022. Accessed June 24, 2024. https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/isis_khorasan_fto.html ; Eggink, Kees. “ICCT Snapshot: Islamic State - Khorasan Province.” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, January 12, 2024. https://www.icct.nl/publication/icct-snapshot-islamic-state-khorasan-province
[6] Shah, Tayyab Ali. “Pakistan’s Challenges in Orkazai Agency.” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 3 July, 2010, https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/pakistan%E2%80%99s-challenges-in-orakzai-agency; Osman, Borhan. “The Islamic State in ‘Khorasan’: How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar.” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 27 July, 2016, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-it-began-and-where-it-stands-now-in-nangarhar/.
[7] Osman, Borhan. "The Islamic State in 'Khorasan': How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar." Afghanistan Analysts Network, 27 July, 2016, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-i....
[8] McNally, Lauren, Alex Amiral, Marvin Weinbaum, and Antoun Issa. “The Islamic State in Afghanistan: Examining Its Threat to Stability.” Middle East Institute Policy Focus Series 2016-11, May 2016, http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF12_McNallyAmiral_ISISAfghan_web.pdf.
[9] Rassler, Don. “Situating the Emergence of the Islamic State of Khorasan.” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 18 Mar. 2015. https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/situating-the-emergence-of-the-islamic-state-of-khorasan; Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf.
[10] McNally, Lauren, Alex Amiral, Marvin Weinbaum, and Antoun Issa. “The Islamic State in Afghanistan: Examining Its Threat to Stability.” Middle East Institute Policy Focus Series 2016-11, May 2016, http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF12_McNallyAmiral_ISISAfghan_web.pdf.
[11] “Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost.” Counter Extremism Project, n.d., https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abdul-rahim-muslim-dost; Roggio, Bill. “Ex-Gitmo ‘poet’ and committed jihadist denounces Islamic State for attacks on civilians.” FDD’s Long War Journal, 20 July, 2016. https://www.longwarjournal.org/tags/abdul-rahim-muslim-dost.
[12] Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf.
[13] McNally, Lauren, Alex Amiral, Marvin Weinbaum, and Antoun Issa. “The Islamic State in Afghanistan: Examining Its Threat to Stability.” Middle East Institute Policy Focus Series 2016-11, May 2016, http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF12_McNallyAmiral_I....
[14] Rassler, Don. “Situating the Emergence of the Islamic State of Khorasan.” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 18 Mar. 2015. https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/situating-the-emergence-of-the-islamic-state-of-khorasan; Shah, Tayyab Ali. “Pakistan’s Challenges in Orkazai Agency.” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 3 July, 2010, https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/pakistan%E2%80%99s-challenges-in-orakzai-agency; “The Khyber Pass.” National Geographic, n.d., https://www.nationalgeographic.org/media/khyber-pass/.
[15] Rassler, Don. “Situating the Emergence of the Islamic State of Khorasan.” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 18 Mar. 2015. https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/situating-the-emergence-of-the-islamic-state-of-khorasan.
[16] McNally, Lauren, Alex Amiral, Marvin Weinbaum, and Antoun Issa. “The Islamic State in Afghanistan: Examining Its Threat to Stability.” Middle East Institute Policy Focus Series 2016-11, May 2016, http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF12_McNallyAmiral_ISISAfghan_web.pdf.
[17] McNally, Lauren, Alex Amiral, Marvin Weinbaum, and Antoun Issa. “The Islamic State in Afghanistan: Examining Its Threat to Stability.” Middle East Institute Policy Focus Series 2016-11, May 2016, http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF12_McNallyAmiral_I...
[18] Pillalamarri, Akhilesh. “Revealed: Why ISIS Hates the Taliban.” The Diplomat, 29 Jan. 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/revealed-why-isis-hates-the-taliban/.
[19] Dawood, Azami. “Why Taliban special forces are fighting Islamic State.” BBC News, 18 Dec. 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35123748.
[20] Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf.
[21] Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf
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