

POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN MOROCCO DURING  
THE EARLY <sup>C</sup>ALAWĪ PERIOD (1659-1727)

by

Patricia Ann Mercer

Thesis submitted for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
in the University of London

1974



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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

This thesis has two aims: firstly, to provide a summary of Moroccan political history over the years 1659-1727, which saw the <sup>C</sup>Alawī dynasty established; and secondly, by making use, for the most part, of contemporary source material, to provide a critique of indigenous tradition concerning the period, as summed up in the nineteenth century "Kitāb al-Istiqsā..." .

Contemporary material suggests that the <sup>C</sup>Alawī dynasty was effectively launched from Fes, the metropolitan base of the parvenu sultan al-Rashīd. Thereafter came imperial emancipation from Fāsī tutelage, and the inauguration of a deteriorating relationship between sultan and metropolis. Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl, al-Rashīd's successor, moved his capital to Meknes. There he fostered a personal military and magnate following, developed along culturally standard lines. This won him dynastic victory, and brief military ascendancy in the critical regions of the Sus and Algerine march, tricked out with easy gains from a prestige programme of mujāhid warfare.

Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's tide turned in 1692, with Algerine invasion of his territory. The subsequent decade was characterised by renewed and strenuous efforts at maintaining territorial maxima. The empire was scoured for slave recruits to the standing army. This swollen army failed to save the sultan, in 1701, from the Algerine trouncing which precipitated his retirement from personal campaigning. Thereafter, Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl was a palace ruler of fluctuating territory, and the object of repeated filial challenge. Assets which shored up his central authority were: a link with the

commerce of a debilitated Fes; a continuing working relationship with tribute-bearing magnates, involving gross power-delegation; and a force of troops held in reserve as a military deterrent.

Contemporary evidence eliminates the view of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl as a swingeing monarch who, by 1692, had reduced all his provinces to orderly submission. By emphasising his latter-day problems, it points to his longevity as the key to the establishment of the <sup>c</sup>Alawī dynasty.

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FOR MY MOTHER AND FATHER

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis has been an unconscionable time "a' growing". I would never have completed it without the support of others. My thanks are overwhelmingly due, in the first place, to my personal supervisor, Dr. Michael Brett. For three and an half years, in vacation as well as term, he has been willing to give me uncountable and careful hours of his time, in order to point out ways and ideas, modules, errors and booby-traps. It was his unfortunate lot to have in myself a first Ph. D. student somewhat over-given to displays of temperament. But he has a sovereign patience, as well as gaiety and sympathy. Without him, I could never have written. For his perfectionist's sake, I particularly regret mistakes and shortcomings that may be found in what, eventually, I have written.

I am also grateful to Professor Roland Oliver, and to the staff of the African History section of the School of Oriental and African studies, among whom it is necessary to mention, in particular, Dr. Humphrey Fisher, and Professor Richard Gray, the kindly mentor of my M.A. studies, who first set me on the path of research. The School is also to be thanked for its financial support over the academic year 1972-3.

During my all too brief stay in Morocco, I was given the willing and courteous, if slightly mystified help of the staff of the Bibliothèque Générale and National Archive in Rabat. I should like, in particular, to note the attention given by M. Boujendar. In Rabat, also, I spoke with M. Germain Ayache, M. Paul Berthier, M. Bernard Rosenberger and Dr. Ross E. Dunn. All gave me valuable information and advice. M. G-S. Colin, in addition to giving me his time and interest, had the generosity to allow me to photocopy

a manuscript in his private possession. My personal Maghribī horizons were also broadened in England, in discussions with Allan Meyers, Thomas Whitcomb and Dr. Abdelkader Zebadia.

Finally I must pay due to the support of two "home-bases". Over the last two years my parents have, with gentleness and concern, withstood the financial and personal stresses of having an adult daughter in the latter-day throes of producing a thesis. The work was partly written in their house, and can only be dedicated to them, with love. In London, there was much appreciated comradeship. This has come from all the fellow-inhabitants of an eccentric Camden Town ménage. Among these, I must mention Dr. John Tosh, a willing and interested master of constructive criticism and gamesmanship; and my dear brother Nicholas, a mathematician who never bothered to count the hours he spent upon a sister, never failed to understand the loneliness of long hours of writing, never failed to listen and never failed to understand.

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A NOTE UPON ORTHOGRAPHY AND TRANSLITERATION

These were tangled matters for decision. Proper names posed the greatest problems. It will be seen that I have adopted an "orthodox", diacritically marked format for the proper names of all Muslims, with the exception of modern writers in European tongues who have chosen for themselves a Roman spelling of their names. For toponyms I have adopted, in most cases, the European format, whether French, English or Spanish, which I considered to be the most familiar and easily identifiable. Exceptions were made in the case of obscure toponyms without any well-known European nomenclature (e.g. "Jabal Fāzzāz"), and in the case of places which no longer exist (e.g. Dilā' ; Dār ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al). For the names of indigenous groupings I have, in most cases, adopted a precise Arabic format, making exceptions in the case of the global Berber linguistic groups "Chleuh" and "Beraber", and in the case of the Snassen (properly Banū Yisnāsīn), whose name denotes a well-known region as well as a people.

In transliteration, I have adopted the equivalence recommended by the Encyclopaedia of Islam, with the following exceptions:

- j     (instead of 'dj' )
- q     (instead of 'k' )
- .. Īya   (instead of the terminal '..iyya')

The 'g' in the word "sharāqa" is a rendering of the Maghribī letter ( **ق** ).

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS EMPLOYED IN THE THESIS

- A.M. .... "Archives Marocaines"
- B.M. .... British Museum
- B.N.P. .... Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris
- C.O. .... Colonial Office Papers of the Public  
Record Office, London.
- E.I. .... Encyclopaedia of Islam
- S.I. .... "Les Sources Inédites de l'Histoire  
du Maroc" ed. H. de Castries and  
continuator.
- S.P. .... State Papers of the Public Record  
Office, London.

A New Map of the  
KINGDOMS OF  
FEZ, MOROCCO &c.



Anonymous but common eighteenth century English map of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā, here reproduced from the frontispiece to J. Braithwaite's "History of the Revolutions in the Empire of Morocco, upon the Death of the late Emperor Muley Ishmael" (London, 1929)



A PROLOGUE: THE SOURCE MATERIAL AND ITS PROBLEMS.

The period from 1659 to 1727 covers the years between the political emergence of al-Rashīd, first <sup>C</sup>Alawī sultan of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā, and the death of his brother and successor, Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl. Source material for this period is unevenly distributed, both geographically and chronologically. Geographically there is a marked bias towards the affairs of the northerly part of the region. Within indigenous source material, this bias is the product of interplay between a court and a city. The affairs of the <sup>C</sup>Alawī imperial capital, which was based first at New Fes, and then at nearby Meknes, redounded upon the affairs of the citizenry of metropolitan Old Fes. And the corporate intellectual and literary tradition of this last-named metropolis has predominated within the Maghrib al-Aqṣā from the period until the present day (1). A parallel northerly bias within European source material is the outcome of European predilections: diplomacy, focused upon the <sup>C</sup>Alawī capital; maritime commerce, for which Sale and Tetuan were the major Moroccan entrepôts; and residual crusading fervour that was phasing into mercantile imperialism. This last-noted enthusiasm drew its mass of "copy" from matters bound up with the wrack of fifteenth and sixteenth century European expansionism: the affairs of the small and squalid European enclaves which studded the Atlantic and Mediterranean littorals of the far Maghribī north-west.

The chronological imbalance in source material divides the period at around the opening of the eighteenth century. Under this division,

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(1) Fes dominates the <sup>C</sup>Alawī sections of E. Lévi-Provençal's classic study of Moroccan historiography and biography: "Les Historiens des Chorfa" (Paris, 1922). Here the Murrākushī intellectual sphere figures comparatively peripherally. It is only in the present century that Murrākushī scholars have attempted to imitate the Fāsī in producing works of tabaqāt literature designed to give a collective expression to the <sup>C</sup>Murrākushī contribution to the cultural life of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā. (Lévi-Provençal, pp. 385-6 cf. M. Lakhdar: "La vie littéraire au Maroc sous la dynastie <sup>C</sup>Alawide" (Rabat, 1971) pp. 5-6

the period falls into a primary span, for which political developments within the Maghrib al-Aqṣā can be relatively well-documented, and a secondary span for which available evidence is considerably more tenuous. The imbalance is the result of a complex of accidents. It will be seen that, by an ill chance, the most valuable bodies of indigenous and of European source material fall into debility together, at around 1700. Furthermore, in 1701, the ageing sultan Ismā'īl entered a long period of retirement. He no longer conducted campaigns personally, and rarely even left his palace in Meknes. A number of his sons struggled with each other for pre-eminence. Their main sphere of activity lay within the south of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā, beyond the immediate interests of Fes or of European commentators. For much of this period the north was a region of relative political quiescence, lightly percolated by vague and shocking rumour from the south.

The received version of the history of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā within the early <sup>C</sup>Alawī period is dominated by an indigenous literary tradition. This literary tradition has been summed up within the relevant section of the "Kitāb al-Istiḡṣā..." of al-Nāṣirī (2), the work which, during the Protectorate, gained acceptance as the consummate authority upon all but the final disorderly years of pre-Protectorate Moroccan history. The "Kitāb al-Istiḡṣā..." was written during the reign of Ḥasan I. Its author was a minor government official of Saletin birth, whose postings enabled him to gather material from throughout the country (3). Al-Nāṣirī's work was remarkable in that it was the first known attempt

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- (2) Aḥmad ibn Khālīd al-Nāṣirī al-Slāwī: "Kitāb al-istiḡṣā li-akhbār duwal al-maghrib al-aqṣā" (Cairo, 1894. Second edition: Casablanca, 1956). A French translation of part IV of this work, the section relevant to the <sup>C</sup>Alawī sultans, was made by E. Fumey, and published as "Chronique de la dynastie alaouie au Maroc" in "Archives Marocaines" (henceforward A.M.) Volumes IX and X. (Paris, 1906 and 1907)
- (3) Biographical and bibliographical details concerning al-Nāṣirī and the "Kitāb al-Istiḡṣā..." are contained within Lévi-Provençal's "Les Historiens des Chorfa" (pp. 350-368)

by a Moroccan to write a national history. It is otherwise unsurprising: a lengthy and painstaking but essentially traditional piece of Muslim historiography. Its author largely repeated or conflated evidence from established sources for each period. Early <sup>C</sup>Alawī history was not this author's major concern. For his liveliest sphere of interest was not the dynasty, but the jihād, the struggle with Christendom. The tormented political viewpoint to which the jihād was central, is expressed very clearly within al-Nāsiri's final chapter, scratched to a finish upon Hasan's death in 1894. Its keynote was an atavistic nationalism, aligned with something approaching despair. The author regarded his country as the last repository of decent Muslim values and of relatively low prices (4). Yet he was obsessed by its political weakness in the face of the military and technical ascendancy of Christian powers, and by the relentless inflation which he associated with the encroachment of the European economy. Circumspectly, he repudiated the road he knew to have been taken by the Sudanese Mahdī, and fell enthusiastically into agreement with Hasan's policy of eschewing war with European powers. An unsolicited fatwā of his own composition defended at length the sultan's placation of Christendom (5). Yet the author took an obvious and personal literary

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(4) "...ahl<sup>al-</sup>maghrib aqall al-umam ikhtilāṭan bihim. fa-hum arkhaṣ al-nās as<sup>C</sup> aran. wa arfaqahum ma<sup>C</sup> aṣhan. wa ab<sup>C</sup> adahum ziyyan wa<sup>C</sup> ada min hā'ulā'i al-franj. wa fī dhalika min salāma dīnihim. mā lā yukhfā bi-khilāfi miṣr wa 'l-shām wa qhayrihimā min al-amsar. fa-innahū yabluḡhunā<sup>C</sup> anhum mā yaṣammu<sup>C</sup> an al-ādhān."

("...Among nations, the people of the Maghrib is that which has had the least social contact with them (the Europeans). And this is the population with the lowest prices, and the easiest subsistence. The people have recoiled from the dress and the life-style of these Europeans. Herein lies the security of their religion. It is well-known that circumstances are quite different in Cairo, and in Damascus, and in other metropolitan cities besides these two. The information that reaches us concerning them, deafens the ears") ("Kitāb al-Istiḡṣā...", Casablanca text, Vol. IX p. 208)

(5) "Kitāb al-Istiḡṣā..." tr. Fumey A.M. Vol. X pp. 343-356 cf. Casablanca text Vol. IX pp. 184-192

compensation for the political humiliations of his own day, by recounting the past victories of Maghribī Muslims. In the context of the author's work as a whole, the entire <sup>C</sup>Alawī period to date was thereby effectively diminished. For none of al-Nāṣirī's eighteenth and nineteenth century sources could match, for example, the high mediaeval glories which studded the "...Rawd al-Qirtās..." (6)

But indeed it would have been impossible for al-Nāṣirī extensively to laud, or even to document the reigning <sup>C</sup>Alawī dynasty's opening years, from the material he had to hand. For the period 1659-1727, the author made use of four major sources. In chronological rank, these were the "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." of al-Ifrānī (7), the "Nashr al-Mathānī..." of Muḥammad ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Qādirī (8), the "Bustān al-Zarīf..." of al-Zayyānī (9), and the "Jaysh al-<sup>C</sup>aramram..."

- (6) Ibn Abī Zar<sup>C</sup>: "Al-anis al-muṭrib bi rawd al-qirtās fī akhbār mulūk al-maghrib wa tārīkh madīnat fās" ed. C.-J. Tornberg as "Annales regum Mauritaniae" (Uppsala, 1843) and translated by A. Beaumier as "Histoire des souverains du Maghreb et annales de la ville de Fès" (Paris, 1860) This fourteenth century work was used as a major source for al-Nāṣirī's history of the Almohade period ( "Kitāb al-Istiḡṣā...", Casablanca text, Vol. II Part II cf. the French translation by Ismaél Hamet in "Archives Marocaines" Vol. XXXII, Paris, 1927)
- (7) "Nuzhat al-hādī bi-akhbār mulūk al-qarn al-hādī". This work, issued during the latter half of the reign of Isma'īl (Lévi-Provençal: pp. 112-114 and 120-121) is today best known in the edition and companion French translation of O. Houdas: "Nozhet el-hadi; Histoire de la dynastie saadienne au Maroc (1511-1670)" ( Paris, 1888 and 1889)
- (8) "Nashr al-mathānī li-ahl al-qarn al-hādī <sup>C</sup>ashr wa 'l-thānī" This work, issued in 1768 (Lévi-Provençal: p. 323) was lithographed in Fes in 1310/1892-3, and issued in two volumes, the division being made at the year 1080/1669-70. From the lithograph, a French translation was made of the part of the work covering the eleventh century A.H. This was issued in two parts, as volumes of "Archives Marocaines", under the title "Nachr al-Mathānī de Mouhammad al-Qādirī". The first part (A.M. Vol. XXI, Paris, 1913) covers the period 1000-1049 A.H. = 1591-2 to 1639-40, and was translated by A. Graulle and M.P. Maillard. The second part (A.M. Vol. XXIV, Paris, 1917) covers the period 1050-1100 A.H. = 1640-41 to 1688-9), and was translated by E. Michaux-Bellaire.
- (9) "Al-bustān al-zarīf fī dawlat awlād mawlāy <sup>C</sup>alī al-sharīf". This work, which draws to a conclusion in 1816, remains in MS form. The MS consulted was that numbered D. 1571, in the possession of the Archive of the Bibliothèque Générale in Rabat.

of Muḥammad Akansūs (10). These are four diverse works. But they have a common negative factor. None was written out of a primary devotion to early <sup>C</sup>Alawī history. Within all four works, the formalities of acknowledgement and interest were extended to the establishment of the dynasty, under its first two sultans. But, in each case, the relevant matter was recounted relatively briefly, by an author fundamentally absorbed in the treatment of other **business**.

Thus the "Nuzhat al-Ḥadī..." is essentially an history of the Sa<sup>C</sup>dī sultans, who preceded the <sup>C</sup>Alawī line as the dynasty governing the Maghrib al-Aqṣā. Four final chapters, which trace the <sup>C</sup>Alawī genealogy and rise to power, merely provide a brief coda to the work as a whole. In such a context, the author's assertion that the <sup>C</sup>Alawī sultan Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl ruled territories wider than those of the cynosure of latter-day conquerors, Aḥmad al-Dhahabī al-Mansūr al-Sa<sup>C</sup>dī (11) reads simply as glib obeisance. Al-Ifrānī's disparity in concern for the Sa<sup>C</sup>dī and <sup>C</sup>Alawī dynasties is extraordinary for a work written during the reign of the <sup>C</sup>Alawī sultan Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl, and as such has aroused comment (12). It is indeed possible that a secondary work by al-Ifrānī, a short and thin biography of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl (13), which grants greater detail to the safe topics of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's ancestry, and to preliminary <sup>C</sup>Alawī history, than to events of the sultan's own day, was tossed off as a form of insurance, to counter the possibility that the author's major work might bring him into ill-favour at court. In this light, the "Nuzhat al-Ḥadī..." itself may be seen as a work written for personal amusement. It exhibits a delight in folk-tales, word-play and chronogrammes. And its historical content obviously derives from its author's sense of personal identification

(10) "Al-jaysh al-<sup>C</sup>aramram al-khumāsī fī dawlat awlād mawlāna <sup>C</sup>alī al-sijilmāsī" Fes lithograph of 1336=1918

(11) "Nuzhat al-Ḥadī... ed./tr. Houdas p. 305 of the text, 505 of the translation.

(12) Lévi-Provençal pp. 121-2

(13) This work, the "Zill al-warīf fī mafākhīr mawlāna ismā<sup>C</sup>īl ibn al-sharīf" was issued in Fes in 1133= 1720-21. When Lévi-Provençal wrote, it was considered "lost" ("Les Historiens des Chorfa" P. 114). It has since been discovered and privately printed (Rabat, Imprimerie Royale, 1962).

with Marrakesh. He was "Ifrānī by origin , but Marrakesh was his den" ("al-wufrānī al-nijār, al-murrākushi al-wijār") (14). And the "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." can be seen to express the author's devotion to the Sa<sup>C</sup>dī, as a dynasty based upon Marrakesh. Circumspectly, al-Ifrānī virtually ignored the fortunes of Marrakesh as an ex-capital, under the early <sup>C</sup>Alawī rulers. His comment was confined to a subdued keening for one of the city's lost architectural glories, the al-Badī<sup>C</sup> palace of Aḥmad al-Mansūr al-Sa<sup>C</sup>dī, which the sultan Ismā<sup>C</sup>il ordered to be demolished (15).

The "Nashr al-Mathānī..." of al-Qādirī is essentially a work of biography rather than history. It is the major work of tabaqāt literature to come from the eighteenth century Maghrib al-Aqṣā, and has dominated subsequent compilations referring to its period (16). Its author, an Hasanid sharīf, came from an established family of Fasi religious literati. His work was essentially Fāsī hagiography, designed to cover the eleventh and twelfth Hegiran centuries chronologically, by an annual grouping of obituaries. For many individual years, the author rounded up the relevant tarājim by setting down events of the year. As one authority for his annual material, al-Qādirī cited Abū <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh al-Ṭayyib ibn Muḥammad al-Fāsī (17). This scholar seems identifiable as a clan member of one of the leading religious communities of the city of Fes, the zāwiyat al-Fāsī. As he died in 1701 (18), this "al-Fāsī chronicler" cannot have been the lone source writer of al-Qādirī's annals. Certain of these annals predate his lifetime; others post-date his death. But his hand may be traced within the notable expansion of al-Qādirī's annual-material evident for

(14) "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." ed./tr. Houdas p. 309 of the text, 511 of the translation.

(15) ibid. pp. 113-4 of the text, 193-4 of the translation.

(16) For biographical and bibliographical details referring to this author and the work in question, see Lévi-Provencal pp. 319-326 and Lakhdar pp. 112-115

(17) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." A.M. Vol. XXI (tr. Graulle and Maillard) pp. 387 and 390 cf. Vol. XXIV (tr. Michaux-Bellaire) p. 3

(18) For biographical details concerning this scholar, see Lévi-Provencal (pp 242 and 283-4), who knew nothing of his connection with the "Nashr al-Mathānī...", but was aware of his hand in other works.

the second half of the seventeenth century. The sparse eighteenth century annals of the "Nashr al-Mathānī..." may be attributed to a weak continuator. If strung together, these notes from an "al-Fāsī chronicle" provide evidence for the existence of a "lost" seventeenth century source of major importance: a bedrock of archaic material from which al-Qādirī, in the "Nashr al-Mathānī..." made one of the major surviving selections.

This chronicle material has its limitations. It obviously emanated from a prosperous but narrow milieu: the savant oligarchy of <sup>c</sup>ulamā' associated with the Qarawiyyin, "queen"-mosque of Fes. The priorities of this circle are reflected within the annalist's "Barchester"-like obsession with religious politics. Its worldly comfort is illustrated by one telling detail: the annalist's summing up of the rigour of 1673 siege conditions with the note that, during that year, many were forced to invalidate the festivities of <sup>c</sup>Id al-kabīr by the immolation of a calf rather than a sheep (19). The chronicle material is heavily biased towards Fes. Only rarely are events from other parts of the Maghrib, or the outer world, even noted. They appear occasionally, as events of high significance, "news" brought in from outside. Further, the annals are clogged by a standard chronicler's pre-occupation with signs and portents, and with natural catastrophe, often as fleeting and localised as thunder and hailstorms.

However, the chronicle material has three characteristics that give it peculiar value. Although not impeccably accurate, this material has some claim to chronological reliability, in so far as this can be judged by its dating of events well-known to general history. It gives a correct date for a major Ottoman campaign in the

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(19) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 225-6

Balkans (1094 A.H./1683 A.D.) (20), for the abandoning of Tangier by the English (1095 A.H./1684 A.D.) (21), and for the opening of the siege of Ceuta (1106 A.H./1694 A.D.) (22). Further, for the textually rich period of the latter seventeenth century, the chronicle contains evidence of the varying economic fortunes of the city of Fes, as expressed in notes upon fluctuations within the relative values of silver and copper currencies, and within the price of city market grain. As a last virtue, there may be cited the chronicle's remarkable political inertia. The annals of the "Nashr al-Mathānī..." are quite alien in tone from the laudatory formal tarājim of <sup>C</sup>Alawī sultans included within the main text. They exhibit no compunction over the admission of a sultan's ill-success. The ruler's misfortunes would be recorded, because these had socio-economic repercussions upon the city. Thus, note upon a rumour that the sultan Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl had been defeated outside Tlemsen, during the famine year of 1680, was accompanied by information that the "black market" price of the "sa<sup>C</sup> al-nabawī", or standard corn measure, had shot up to twice the officially appointed rate (23).

Al-Qādirī's annals were obviously not constructed purely from material taken from this putative "al-Fāsī chronicle". Occasionally the annals contain acknowledged interpolations from oral traditions current during al-Qādirī's own lifetime. And there are certain trimmings by which the latter author showed his personal deference to the dynasty. Thus, clear "al-Fāsī" information that the rising power of al-Rashīd had, in 1664, aroused Fes to armed opposition, is followed in

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(20) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 357

(21) ibid. p. 371

(22) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Fes lithograph. Vol. II p. 159 of the first notation. (The notation of this volume is irregular.)

(23) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 338



al-Qādirī's text by the sugary assertion that God had ordained that al-Rashīd should obtain power, and that his reign would be blessed by the majority of the faithful (24). But such hedging was unusual. For the most part, al-Qādirī would seem to have transmitted chronicle material in a fashion that was straightforward, albeit, as will be seen later, incomplete.

The "Bustan al-Zarīf..." of al-Zayyānī (25) was overwhelmingly al-Nāsirī's most important source for the early <sup>C</sup>Alawī section of his "Kitāb al-Istiḡsā...". The work can be seen to have provided al-Nāsirī with a framework for insets taken from the other three major sources, as well as from minor works of reference. Al-Zayyānī was for half a century an high government servant to the <sup>C</sup>Alawī sultans Muḥammad III (1757-1790) and Sulaymān (1792-1822). He was also the chief architect of an historical tradition concerning <sup>C</sup>Alawī rule within the Maghrib al-Aqṣā, down to the days of his own retirement in Sulaymān's last years. The "Bustān al-Zarīf..." is al-Zayyānī's major work of <sup>C</sup>Alawī history, and deals with the dynasty from its origins until 1816. A second historical work by the same author, the "Turjumān al-Mu<sup>C</sup>rib..." (26), is an universal history, of which the thirteenth and final chapter (27) contains a more succinct account of roughly the same period. A third work of al-Zayyānī's, the "Turjumānat al-Kubrā..." (28), is a compendium of geographical notes and personal

(24) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 165

(25) For additional biographical and bibliographical details concerning this author, see Lévi-Provencal pp. 142-199 and Lakhdar pp. 319-26

(26) In full: "Al-turjumān al-mu<sup>C</sup>rib <sup>C</sup>an duwal al-mashriq wa 'l-maghrib"

(27) This chapter, edited and translated by O. Houdas as "Le Maroc de 1631 à 1812" (Paris, 1886), is comparatively well-known. It is to this work that the reference "Turjumān" will hereafter refer.

(28) "Al-turjumānat al-kubrā allatī jama<sup>C</sup>at akhbār ma<sup>C</sup>mūr al-<sup>C</sup>alam barran wa bahran". This work was probably issued c. 1820. It contains notes on events from the latter end of the second decade of the nineteenth century. The work has recently been published in an edition made by <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Karīm al-Fīlālī. (Casablanca, 1967)

memoirs, containing passages which illuminate the author's general outlook.

Al-Zayyānī's <sup>C</sup>Alawī history is focused upon the years following the accession of Sayyidī Muḥammad III. For the period from 1757 onwards, the author's copious personal information, culled from a close association with government, makes his writing of history akin to the writing of memoirs. But the author had less of a close interest in the years preceding 1757. And his record of the earliest <sup>C</sup>Alawī history, that covering the years preceding the death of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl, can be seen to have its own peculiar purpose: that of serving as a somewhat stylised prologue to the author's main matter.

The material from which this prologue was constructed may be divided into three: a skeletal framework of Fāsī material; a body of Central Atlas traditions deriving from the author's own ethnic inheritance; and items, both traditional and documentary, that would seem to have been inserted in support of the view of early <sup>C</sup>Alawī history current at court during the author's own lifetime. The three strands of material are susceptible to differentiation on grounds of content and narrative style. Of the three corpora, the Fāsī material will be seen to be relatively reliable. But the Atlas strand to al-Zayyānī's narrative is demonstrably an overblown will o' the wisp. Similarly, the author's "court" material can be shown to be misleading, even when it has documentary basis. The conclusory section to this thesis is designed to illustrate aspects of the mythology associated with early <sup>C</sup>Alawī history. The myths have all been derived from acceptance of al-Zayyānī's Atlas and court material at its face value.

Al-Zayyānī's Fāsī material has clearly been derived from a source identifiable with the "al-Fāsī chronicle" underlying the annals included in the "Nashr al-Mathānī...". It includes a number of passages that are identical with passages within al-Qādirī's annals. These are unlikely to have been simply derived from the "Nashr al-Mathānī...", the earlier

work. For there are other narrative points at which al-Zayyānī gives an essentially Fes-oriented passage in more precise detail than is found within the "Nashr al-Mathānī...". Examples are al-Zayyānī's notes upon al-Rashīd's currency reforms, and upon the campaign of Ismā'īl in 1677 against Aḥmad ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Dilā'ī, which was followed by a Fāsī triumph (29). There are yet further passages, given by al-Zayyānī alone, which seem to derive from the same Fāsī body of material. They have the same terse style, and show a marked obsession with the concerns of Fes. This is evident in minutiae, such as the inclusion within the record of major campaigns, of the enumerated fatalities of the rumāt fās, or citizen militia of musketeers (30). To set al-Zayyānī's information upon Fes against his meagre notes for the period upon other major cities of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā, is to demonstrate very clearly the Fāsī bias to al-Zayyānī's early 'Alawī history. For this period, the affairs of Marrakesh and of Tarudant are noted only in connection with major crises in the history of the dynasty. Even less attention is granted to other urban centres. Thus, within the "Turjuman" version of the fifty-five year long reign of Ismā'īl, Sale is not mentioned once.

Al-Zayyānī's Central Atlas material consists of a string of rural campaign stories recounted in a discursive manner, and with the misleading immediacy of folk-tale. All this material refers to peoples of one language group: the Atlas Sanhaja of tamazight-speakers, referred to by linguists as "Beraber" (31). The inclusion of this material is a reflection of the author's complex cultural heritage. The Zayyānī

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(29) "Turjuman" pp. 11 and 14 of the text, 22 and 27 of the translation; "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS. pp. 27 and 30

(30) "Turjuman" pp. 14 and 17 of the text, 27 and 33 of the translation; "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS. pp. 30 and 33

(31) E. Laoust: "Mots et Choses Berbères" (Paris, 1920) Preface pp. ix and xiii to xvi.



grouping of the author's own day formed one branch of the Ayt U Mālū, a confederation of "Beraber" peoples from the region of the "Jabal Fāzzāz", or hill-country rising above that stretch of terrain between Fes and Marrakesh that is called the Tadla. Al-Zayyānī claimed that one of his forefathers, a rural imām from Argū, in the Adekhsan region of the Tadla, had been brought to the notice of the sultan Ismā'īl, when that sultan was on campaign in the area; subsequently the imām had been co-opted into the sultan's home-bound following (32). As Lévi-Provençal has noted, al-Zayyānī himself knew his ancestral region well, although he had been born and bred in Fes: he traced his own rise in government, from the status of clerk, to that of trusted political advisor, to an incident in 1773, when his knowledge of the Adekhsan region saved an army of Sayyidī Muḥammad III from ambush (33). Further, al-Zayyānī maintained a sense of ethnic identity. In one autobiographical note, he claimed to be "no sharīf, but a city-bred Berber" (34). And, by Berber, al-Zayyānī meant "Beraber". For, although the author knew the global usage of barbar, as a distinguishing term opposed to arab, he was accustomed to use barbar upon its own, exclusively to indicate members of his own language group. He employed a medley terminology of proper names to cover those groupings of Berbers, tashalhaft or zenatiya speakers (35) who were linguistically alien to him.

However, the ultimate determining factor in al-Zayyānī's approach

(32) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 36

(33) "Turjumān" pp. 79-80 of the text, 145-6 of the translation cf. Lévi-Provençal pp. 151-2. The French author relied here upon the "Kitāb al-Istiqsa..." (Cairo text, Vol. IV pp. 108-9) for a fuller version of the incident. The original full text is to be found upon pp. 109-10 of MS No. D. 1571 of the "Bustān al-Zarīf..."

(34) Lévi-Provençal p. 144 The quotation is based upon a note that he had taken from a variant Saletin MS of the "Turjuman al-Mu<sup>c</sup>rib..." (f. ii) to which he had access.

(35) Lack of source material prevents the construction of an adequate language map of Morocco for the period. For a twentieth century list of self-acknowledged Moroccan Berber groupings, as subdivided by language, see the Preface to E. Laoust's "Mots et Choses Berbères". A modern language map is here reproduced. (See preceding page)

to early <sup>C</sup>Alawī history, was his career as a government servant. As the Adekhsan incident indicates, the author was proud to note that service to the makhzan, the central imperial administration, had been of primary concern to him, even in his ancestral country. It is curious to note that both al-Qādirī and al-Nāsirī were capable of expressing a sentimental nostalgia for Dilā', the great zāwiya, or religious house, in the Tadla region (36), whose authority over Fes and the central Maghrib al-Aqṣā was superseded by the rise of the <sup>C</sup>Alawī (37). There is no trace of such sentiment within the writings of al-Zayyānī.

The author's bias towards the reigning dynasty led to the inclusion within his early <sup>C</sup>Alawī "prologue", of material reflecting dynastic priorities: a bloc of traditions concerning the political emergence of the <sup>C</sup>Alawī; information upon the origin of military forces associated with the dynasty; and architectural notes upon the construction of Meknes as an imperial capital. The bias led the author into standard paths of modification: reticence concerning defeat, and the occasional ennoblement of a sultan's enemies to a rank which did not disgrace him. Thus the "al-Fāsī chronicle" record of an encounter during the winter of 1678-9 between the army of the sultan Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl, and Ayt <sup>C</sup>Attā Berbers from the Saharan flank of the Anti-Atlas (38) was adapted by al-Zayyānī into a notice of a hard-fought battle with three rebel brothers (39).

But the major dynastic distortion imposed by al-Zayyānī upon his material was not standard, but particular. It hinged

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(36) See R. Henry: "Où se trouvait la Zaouïa de Dilā'?" ("Hespéris" Vol. XXXI, Paris, 1944 pp. 49-54) and M. Hājji: "Al-Zāwiya al-Dilā'iya..." (Rabat, 1964) pp. 34-8. The latter author has suggested an identification of Dilā' with the later "zāwiyat Ishaq".

(37) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 224 cf. "Kitāb al-Istiḡṣā...", Casablanca text Vol. VII pp. 37-8 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX pp. 49-50

(38) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 289

(39) "Turjumān" p. 17 of the text and 33 of the translation cf.

"Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 33

upon the central position with which the author endowed the career and policies of Sayyidī Muḥammad III. This was the sultan whom al-Zayyānī served in various capacities throughout his reign, and for whom he felt an affection that survives within personal anecdotes. By the time al-Zayyānī completed his major historical writings, Muḥammad III had been dead for more than a quarter of a century. Yet the author did not disguise his relative contempt for the reigning sultan Sulaymān ibn Muḥammad, whom he seems to have considered a weakling by comparison with his father. Even in his concluding panegyric to the "Turjumān al-Mu<sup>c</sup>rib...", al-Zayyānī felt bound to point out that Sulaymān was not so great a ruler as his father had been, and that he had at times taken ill advice (40). And, in al-Zayyānī's late work, the "Turjumānat al-Kubrā....", whose completion post-dated a period during which Sulaymān had been the victim of intense internal unrest, the sultan was subjected by the author to deft criticism for his soft dealings with the Beraber (41). The conclusory section of this thesis will illustrate al-Zayyānī's tailoring of early <sup>c</sup>Alawī historical material with specific dynastic intent: that of ensuring that Sayyidī Muḥammad III would not be overshadowed by his ancestry, any more than he was overshadowed by his son.

The "Jaysh al-<sup>c</sup>aramram..." of Muḥammad Akansūs is the fourth, the latest, and quantitatively the least significant of al-Nāṣirī's major

(40) "Turjumān" p. 107 of the text, 195 of the translation.

(41) "wa lamma būyī<sup>c</sup> a waladahu amīr al-mu'minīn mawlānā sulaymān mulk... sāsaḥum siyāsa wālidihī bi 'l-rifq wa 'l ḥilm wa 'l iqḥdā<sup>c</sup> an hafawātihim. fa-atfā'ahum ḥilmihi wa afsadahum<sup>c</sup> adlihi wa lam yarḥuf lihim hadd."

("And then authority was vested upon his son, our master Sulaymān commander of the faithful. He governed them (the Beraber) according to his father's government, with gentleness and kindness, averting his attention from their offences. Indeed he smothered them with kindness, and ruined them with fair dealing, and no sword was sharpened against them")

("Turjumānat al-Kubrā...." ed. al-Fīlālī p. 71)

sources for the early <sup>C</sup>Alawī period. Its author was by origin a "Chleuh", or tashalhaft-speaking Berber from the Sus, who became a well-known religious and literary figure of mid-nineteenth century Marrakesh (42). He claimed to have served in his youth as wazīr to Sulaymān, and was court poet to two subsequent sultans. He was led by court associations into an identification with the <sup>C</sup>Alawī dynasty as strong in its own way as that exhibited by al-Zayyānī. Among his minor works were letters set into his "Rasā'il adabiya", written in the name of the sultan Sulaymān, and including ruminations upon the burden of the exercise of government (43). The "Jaysh al-<sup>C</sup>aramram..." was essentially an <sup>C</sup>Alawī history down to the author's own day. Akansūs borrowed heavily from standard sources until the recounting of affairs with which he was personally acquainted. He was particularly dependent upon al-Zayyānī. However, he could criticise al-Zayyānī for being both careless and crudely outspoken. And he did make minor independent accretions to al-Zayyānī's text: pieces of tradition emanating from his own interests as a Sūṣī, a man of letters, and a government servant.

The literary tradition sewn together within the "Kitāb al-Istiṣṣā..." has largely framed the view of early <sup>C</sup>Alawī indigenous history that is set forth within standard modern works (44). It has thus far been found impossible to comment upon the literary tradition with **evidence from an**

(42) For biographical and bibliographical details concerning this author, see Lévi Provençal pp. 200-217 cf. Lakhdar pp. 342-351 cf. R. Lourido Diaz: "Ensayo Historiográfico sobre el sultanato de Sidi Muhammad b. <sup>C</sup>Abd Allah" (Granada, 1967) pp. 54-55

(43) Lakhdar pp. 348-9

(44) H. Terrasse: "Histoire du Maroc, des origines à l'établissement du Protectorat français" Vol. II (Casablanca, 1950) pp. 244-278 cf. Ch.-A. Julien ed. R. le Tourneau: "Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord, Tunisie-Algérie-Maroc, de la conquête arabe à 1830" (Paris, 1952) pp. 223-240 cf. J. Brignon et. al. "Histoire du Maroc" (Casablanca, 1967) pp. 239-253



indigenous archive. No central corpus of archives survives from the early <sup>C</sup>Alawī period (45). And it will be seen later that it is improbable that government of the period was sufficiently sophisticated administratively for the creation of an orderly archive at the centre of makhzan affairs (46). However, there do exist three bodies of evidence with the combined potential for a reformulation of the "Istiqṣā..."-bound view. The first of these is the archaic skein of Fāsī material set into the "Nashr al-Mathānī..." and the works of al-Zayyānī. The second comprises contemporary and near-contemporary indigenous sources extraneous to the main tradition. The third is European material. Thus far, no recognition has been given to the peculiar value of the Fāsī material within the main tradition. And thus far extraneous sources from the two latter categories have been used essentially to supplement rather than to criticise the "Istiqṣā..." tradition. It is the aim of this thesis to go further: to use the three corpora of "alternative evidence" firstly to reconstruct a modified outline of early <sup>C</sup>Alawī political history, and secondly to illuminate the major distortions which have been imposed upon that history by the iron views of al-Zayyānī.

Note will now be taken of some of the chief indigenous and European items from the latter two corpora of "alternative evidence". Additional sources from Fes are amid works of indigenous material that are extraneous to the "Istiqṣā..." tradition. Because no central archive exists, particular importance attaches to a published corpus of makhzan letters,

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(45) The pre-Protectorate material within the palace archives of the Bibliothèque Royale in Rabat has now been classified. Recently, material dating from 1790 onwards has been set open to view. According to M. Germain Ayache, who worked upon these archives until the mid 1960s, earlier material within this palace corpus is scanty and, for the early <sup>C</sup>Alawī period under examination, non-existent. See: "La Question des Archives Historiques Marocaines" in "Hespéris-Tamuda" Vol. II (Rabat, 1961) pp. 311-326 cf. personal conversation April, 1972.

(46) See Chapter IV pp. 164-167

addressed to two successive shuyūkh of the zāwiyat al-Fāsī, whose descendents kept them within the family (47). Roughly half these letters are attributable to the sultan Ismā'īl, on grounds of seal or signature. Of the remainder, two at least were despatched on behalf of Zaydān ibn Ismā'īl, heir-presumptive over the central part of Ismā'īl's reign; others came from notable government officials. The most striking among these letters are ten which concern Ismā'īl's standing guard of ʿabīd or black slaves, and the vexed question of the legal recognition of their relationship to the sultan as his slaves or, at the very least, as his lawfully conscripted soldiers. From the al-Fāsī side of this correspondence, there survives one fatwā (48), tactful, but essentially a rebuttal of imperial demands.

A further Fāsī record, from an unusual slant, is the Hebrew chronicle begun by Saʿdya ibn Danān, and continued by his transcriber and descendent, Samuel ibn Saʿl ibn Danān. This chronicle, in the form worked upon by its editor and translator Vajda (49), seems to date from the early eighteenth century. Its extracts recount, in an erratic and garbled form, events from 1646 onwards, as seen from the claustrophobic viewpoint of the Fāsī millāh or Jewry.

There are two major sources which provide the nearest approach to an indigenous and provincial counter-weight to the period's prevailing Fāsī bias. Together, they provide complementary evidence on the impingement, at the distant local level, of the early ʿAlawī makhzan. The first of

(47) Muhammad El-Fasi: "Lettres Inédites de Moulay Ismaël" in "Hespéris-Tamuda" Special edition, 1962, as issued in honour of the tricentenary A.H. of Ismā'īl's accession (pp. 31-85). Hereafter this source will be referred to as "Lettres Inédites..."

(48) Edited and published by Muhammad El-Fasi, as an appendix to his brief celebratory "Biographie de Moulay Ismael", which formed a companion article to the edition of the letters noted above. ("Hespéris-Tamuda" Special edition, 1962 pp. 25-9)

(49) G. Vajda: "Un recueil de textes historiques judéo-marocaines" Texts Nos. XXI to XXVI in "Hespéris" Vols XXXV (Paris, 1948) pp. 352-8 and XXXVI (Paris, 1949) pp. 139-162

these bodies of material is provided by texts relevant to the period to be found within the corpus of Tawātī documents upon which A.-G.-P. Martin based much of his "Quatre Siècles de l'Histoire Marocaine 1504-1912" (50). Obvious caution must be exercised in the use of this material. Martin, an officer-interpreter in the Tawātī region newly occupied by the French at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, was a cavalier historian. He was accustomed to paraphrase rather than to translate the chronicle material of which he made use. Only vaguely did he indicate the whereabouts of original texts. Yet his transcribed administrative documents have a rarity value, as evidence as to the character of the leading reins which held a remote Saharan complex in some degree of peaceable fiscal subjection to sultans based within the Atlas arc. And one skein of the chronicle material used by Martin has some claim to individual respect. This is the material which the author footnoted as being derived from the eighteenth century chronicler "Sidi Bahaia", otherwise Mawlāy Ḥashīm ibn Aḥmad. A descendent of this scholar collaborated with the local French administration early in the twentieth century (51), and may be considered some guarantor for the translation. And "Sidi Bahaia" himself may be seen to amplify notes upon Saharan affairs that are touched upon in material from the inner Maghrib al-Aqṣā.

Orderly and even peaceful administration is the keynote to much of Martin's Tawātī material. Warfare and intrigue create the face of

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(50) Paris, 1924. A.-G.-P. Martin had intended to publish much of the evidence contained within this work as part of his earlier volume "Les Oasis Sahariennes" (Paris, 1908). However, the information was suppressed until after the establishment of a French Protectorate over Morocco, because it contained data as to the authority which Moroccan sultans had established over Tuat at intervals from the late sixteenth century onwards, and thus went to support Moroccan claims to the region, as against those of France in Algeria.

(51) Martin: "Quatre Siècles..." p. 62 (Note 4) It is to the "Quatre Siècles..." that the reference Martin will hereafter refer.

government shown within the "Rihla du Marabout de Tasaft" (52), the translation of an unusual rustic composition which spotlights the confusion wrought by a central government assault upon the Tagoundaft region of the High Atlas, during a short period in the early eighteenth century. The work is a product of filial piety. It tells of the reaction of local political leaders, and particularly of the author's father, the "marabout" of the title, to the stresses of two government expeditions. The second of these, which brought troops and artillery into high mountain reaches, induced clusters of mountain "Chleuh" who were customarily regarded as inaccessible to plains government, to make an obeisance to the <sup>C</sup>Alawī sultan. The author's father, however, maintained a dogged **resistance to all government approaches.**

The peculiarly quaint character of this composition arouses a certain unease as to its authenticity. But its rambling style, together with its narrative focus upon the minutiae of a political crisis as it affected one family, make it unlikely that any but its first person author would have wished to fabricate a work quite so personal in its untidiness. Furthermore, the existence of one of its central characters, its "villain", <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Karīm, bāshā of Marrakesh, unknown to the mainstream of source material, is vouched for by one obscure note in which an English consul recorded his death (53).

Two keen students of this work, Justinard the translator, and Robert Montagne, the sociologist of High Atlas Berberdom (54), saw in it essentially a precious record of local history, and in particular, a source

(52) Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥājj Ibrāhīm al-Zarhūnī: "Rihlat al-wāfid fi akhbār hijrat al-wālid" translated under the above title, and annotated by Col. F. Justinard (Paris, 1940)

(53) S.P. 71 (16) f. 563 Memo. of Anthony Hatfield, Tetuan, 11/8/1718

(54) R. Montagne: "Un épisode de la "siba" Berbère au 18<sup>e</sup> siècle" in "Hespéris" Vol. XXVIII (Paris, 1941) pp. 85-97

of evidence for the depth in time of the mechanics of High Atlas "laffs" or checkerboard systems of alliance (55). Montagne was also concerned to stress the alien culture of the mountain. He seized upon an isolated incident, the pre-campaign consultation of mountain jinn by an agricultural grouping, as their acknowledgement of the "true gods" of the mountain (56). He thereby set aside the stolid provincial piety which pervades the text as a whole, and ignored the role of the author's father as an uncompromisingly Muslim and well-respected local imān. Such an approach distorts the tone of al-Zarhūnī's work, which is not a cliché in Berber separatism. Its author was separatist in that, like al-Zayyānī, he knew a cultural identity defined by language: his home country, in its widest sense, was the Sus, seen as the land of the "Chleuh" or tashalhaft speakers (57). But he and his rural compatriots saw in the <sup>c</sup>Alawī makhzan a fact of life, and in its doings a source of varied fascination. Further, the intransigence of the author's father was singular. His co-equals and friends knew, in appropriate circumstances, how to capitalise upon the opportunities a central government provided, using the web-lines of bribery and marriage alliance by which that government had infiltrated their mountain country.

To pass from the rural Tasaft narrative to a discussion of contemporary European material is violently to cross cultures. Quantitatively, European material has been of great significance to this study. It has the predictable deficiencies of approach and

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(55) For the most lengthy exposition of the "laff" system, see R. Montagne: "Les Berbères et le Makhzen dans le Sud du Maroc" (Paris, 1930) pp. 182-216

(56) Montagne: "Un épisode de la 'siba'..." p. 90

(57) al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard pp. 139-140

cover inseparable from alien commentary, but the advantage of contemporaneity. However, its most valuable corpus, the French, parallels indigenous material by faltering at around the same chronological point: the end of the seventeenth century. Renewed wealth, to be found within English material, dates only from the very end of the early <sup>C</sup>Alawī period.

European material chiefly details European interests marginal to the internal politics of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā. For the most part this material was the by-product of two inter-twined concerns: firstly, the inroads into European shipping made by Moroccan corsairs; and secondly, the affairs of European nationals who were held captive in Morocco, largely as a result of these corsair deprivations. These captives formed a group of limited size (58) which pride and ideology made the object of acute diplomatic and religious concern. In Catholic Europe there were religious orders entirely devoted to the ransom of Catholic captives held in "Barbary". Protestant governments took the initiative on behalf of their own nationals. The twin priorities of shipping and ransom dominate published "Barbary" literature in particular. The books were normally a by-product of diplomatic missions, or of the activities of ransom pressure-groups. Frequently they were, nominally or in truth, the work of grateful ransomees, and written to a formula, with the obvious aim of arousing a generous pity for Christian sufferings at the hands of the infidel. Only a small proportion of this literature holds value for the student of internal Moroccan political history. The most outstanding of the individual authors who lend spice to the dough will be noted within the following brief and eclectic account of European source material for the period.

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(58) See H. Koehler: "Quelques points d'histoire sur les captifs chrétiens au Maroc" in "Hespéris" Vol. VIII (Paris, 1928) pp. 177-187, for the view that it was rare during this period for Christian captives in Morocco, of all nationalities combined, to number more than a thousand.

This European source material is best classified by language. For the product of diplomacy, commerce and religious interest is inter-related. And even the formal distinction between archival and published sources has been blurred by the massive serial publication of archives, bound up with re-editions of early published texts, that was inaugurated by de Castries (59). The archival surveys of J.-L. Miège suggest that, for many languages, the Italian, the Spanish, the Portuguese and the Scandinavian, surviving material for the period, relevant to Morocco, is thin to non-existent (60). Geographical proximity makes the Spanish lacuna particularly tantalising. But, for the source-starved latter half of the period which corresponded with the ravaged early years of Felipe V (1700-1746), the documentation of the Archivo General de Simancas is known to be in a state of acute general debility (61). And the mass of known documentation upon relations between Morocco and Spain dates only from 1766, the year which saw Muhammad III's somersault into friendship with the ancient Spanish enemy (62).

It remains true that, for the period, the only unbroken line of free Christian Europeans resident within the Moroccan interior was Spanish. Its men were friars, representing a medical mission founded in Sa<sup>c</sup>dī times, and financed by the Spanish government. Its aim was to maintain the Christian morale of Spanish captives in Morocco. The

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- (59) H. de Castries et. al. : "Les Sources Inédites de l'Histoire du Maroc: Première Série (Dynastie Saadienne); Deuxième Série (Dynastie Filalienne)". (Paris, from 1905 and in progress. Henceforward S.I. 1<sup>re</sup> or 2<sup>e</sup> together with Volume number and details.
- (60) J.-L. Miège: "Le Maroc et l'Europe (1830-94)" Vol. 1 (Paris, 1961) pp. 34-7
- (61). H. Kamen: "The War of Succession in Spain" (London, 1969) p. 422
- (62) M. Arribas Palau: "Documentos sobre Marruecos en el Archivo Historico Nacional de Madrid" in "Hespéris-Tamuda" Vol. IX (Rabat, 1968) pp. 65-72

mother-house of the mission followed the capital. During the period it shifted from Marrakesh to Fes and thence to Meknes. For all but the years 1674-80, its personnel was Franciscan. Documents of the Franciscan order provided the basis for the early eighteenth century "Mission Historial de Marruecos" (63). This is an ecclesiastically authorised work of monumental length, but relatively limited historical value. Its approach to infidel politics and society is myopic and hostile, and it contains only dispersed jottings upon matters unrelated to the "cure of souls". Surviving Franciscan archives held within the later Tangier mission have been examined by the Franciscan authors Castellanos (64), Rosende (65) and Koehler (66). The records are quite literally parochial, and for the most part, post-date the period.

There is voluminous surviving material in French for the second half of the seventeenth century. Flurries of writing were provoked by the exchange of embassies. Two important diplomatic ventures from France to Morocco were those of St. Amans in 1682-3, and of Pidou de St. Olon in 1693. Two Frenchmen, Germain Mouëtte and Jean-Baptiste Estelle, dominate European comment upon Morocco for this first half of the period.

Mouëtte was an individual captive, taken at sea by a "Sallee-man" in 1670, and ransomed in 1681, after successive periods of residence within Sale, Fes and Meknes. Two works attach to his name. The "Relation..." (67) is an hasty and racy piece, typical of fund-raising

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- (63) Fray Francisco Jesus Maria Del Puerto: "Mission Historial de Marruecos" (Seville, 1708)
- (64) M.P. Castellanos: "Apostolado Serafico en Marruecos" (Madrid and Santiago, 1896). Only part one of this mission history was ever written. It ends at 1704.
- (65) P. Rosende: "Los Franciscanos y los cautivos en Marruecos" in "Archivo-Ibéro-Americano" (Madrid, Vol. I. Jan-Feb. 1914)
- (66) H. Koehler: "L'Église chrétienne du Maroc et la Mission Franciscaine 1221-1790" (Paris 1934) A piece of sentimental hagiography, countered by the sober and generous article cited above (P. 33 Note (58))
- (67) G. Mouëtte: "Relation de la captivité du sieur Mouëtte dans les Royaumes de Fez et de Maroc" (Paris, 1683).



ransom literature. But the "Histoire..." (68) is a serious work. It was drafted while the author was still resident in Morocco (69) and purports faithfully to recount the fortunes of the reigning <sup>C</sup>Alawī dynasty from its origins, up to the year of the author's departure for France. It is the most detailed, as well as the earliest account of its period. Culturally it is oddly hybrid, swerving from a Christian to a Muslim bias, For, together with his own journal, and information taken from fellow-captives, Mouëtte made use of a mass of material taken from a single Muslim informant, a Fāsī tālib whose name he transliterated as "Bougiman". This tālib was kātib to one of al-Rashīd's generals, and subsequently an employee of Ismā'īl's, whom Mouëtte assisted in his calligraphic work upon palace buildings (70). The ensuing friendship captured the devout Catholic Mouëtte into the orbit of Fāsī reporting. At many points the "Histoire..." parallels indigenous "al-Fāsī chronicle" material. For one event, the murder of the general who had been "Bougiman"'s master, the two sources give an identical date (71). And it is possible to see Fāsī, or at least northerly weakness in Mouëtte's occasional collapse from relatively sober narration into the transmission of tall tales of the military glory and wealth to be won in remote Saharan regions (72). These are likely to be echoes

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(68) G. Mouëtte: "Histoire des conquestes de Mouley Archy, connu sous le nom de roy de Tafilet, et de Mouley Ismaël ou Seméin, son frère et son successeur à present régnant, tous deux rois de fez, de Maroc, de Tafilet, de Sus etc., contenant une description de ces royaumes..." (Paris, 1683) A re-edition of this work, to be cited hereafter, is contained within S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. II pp. 1-201

(69) ibid. pp. 9-13

(70) ibid. pp. 8-9

(71) "Nashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 224 cf. Mouëtte: "Histoire..." p. 67

(72) Mouëtte: "Histoire..." pp. 43-4 and 135-7

of the trans-Saharan expeditions which had taken place during the reign of Ahmad al-Mansūr al-Sa<sup>c</sup>dī.

France maintained consuls in Sale and in Tetuan from 1683 until 1716. Among these consuls, the outstanding personality was Jean-Baptiste Estelle, representative of France in Sale between 1690 and 1698 (73). He conducted a dense diplomatic correspondence (74). And his information may be traced within much of the material set into the published work of the ambassador Pidou de St. Olon (75), whom Estelle accompanied from Tetuan to Meknes. Estelle's reports have the limitations imposed by their being made most usually from Sale, an hispanophone town (76) at the periphery of Moroccan politics. But their vigour and intelligence is unquestionable. Their author was perhaps over-wily for his own good. It is not impossible that, with the aid of forged correspondence, he engineered the very embassy of 1693 with which he was associated: a diplomatic abortion which set Franco-Moroccan relations for the period upon a downward track (77). He was apparently ousted from Sale by local authorities, in the dealings

- (73) J-B. Estelle should not be confused with his father, Pierre Estelle, established as French consul in Tetuan in 1686 (S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. II No. LXXX pp. 486-7 "Provisions de consul pour Pierre Estelle", Versailles, 11/4/1685 cf. ibid. pp. 486-7 Footnotes (1) and (3).
- (74) See S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vols. III and IV passim.
- (75) F. Pidou de St. Olon: "L'estat present de l'empire de Maroc" (Paris, 1694) tr. Peter Motteux as "The Present State of the Empire of Morocco" (London, 1695). Future references are to the Motteux translation.
- (76) MouÛtte: "Relation..." Preface p. iii
- (77) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XXII pp. 159-211 Memo. of Pidou de St. Olon dated Toulon, 7/11/1693. This memorandum includes a translation of a letter from Isma<sup>c</sup>il to the ambassador, insisting that the sultan had requested Jean-Baptiste Estelle merely to further the import of French goods, and not to arrange an embassy. The allegation would explain the puzzled and cool reception which the French ambassador received. Bogus diplomacy, with the aid of forged correspondence, was characteristic of the period. Over the years 1710-1713, Ventura de Zari, a "Moroccan ambassador" to Queen Anne was maintained in London at varying degrees of formality, before finally being unmasked as a "broken Greek" sent to England to purchase spotted deer for the sultan's park (S.P. 71 (15) f. 237 to (16) f. 204 passim.)

which preceded a similarly futile embassy from Morocco to Versailles (78). His tame successors were to be decreasingly informative.

It has been noted previously that European material upon Morocco in the early eighteenth century is thin. It is dominated by two parallel works of French ransom literature, written in the aftermath of three **separate** missions undertaken by Trinitarian and Mercedarian fathers in unison. The expeditions were made in 1704, 1708 and 1712. Their grand total of success was the liberation of forty--three slaves from captivity in Meknes. The earlier and more informative work is that of the Trinitarian Dominique Busnot (79) whom <sup>de</sup>Chénier, French consul at Mogador in Muhammad III's day, and the first European to write a general history of Morocco (80), used "faute de mieux", as a continuator to Mouëtte. Busnot was not writing as an historian. He used a captive's eye view of episodes in recent Moroccan political history, along with atrocity and escape stories, to pad out the meagre details of his thwarted personal experiences overseas. The result was "Grand Guignol". Its avowed aim was to give "une vive idée du Genie des Maures" (81). Yet Busnot's work is not valueless as a source. It includes snippets of information which can be checked against alternative material, including the author's own correspondence from Morocco (82). The companion work,

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(78) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. V. No. LXXIII p. 473 J.-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain, Marseille, 6/11/1699. The letter indicates that the consul was afraid to return to the Saletin post, from which he had come on "leave" the previous year.

(79) D. Busnot: "Histoire du Règne de Moulay Ismael" (Rouen, 1714)

(80) L.-S. de Chénier: "Recherches Historiques sur les Maures et l'Histoire de l'Empire du Maroc" (Paris, 1787) translated into English as "The Present State of the Empire of Morocco" (London, 1788: two volumes, of which the second is the "History".) Future references are to this translation.

(81) Busnot p. 60

(82) This has been partly reproduced within S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI.

the "Relation...de la Mercy" (83) was produced a decade later, apparently as a Mercedarian fund-raiser to counter the earlier Trinitarian work, whose content it follows very closely. The Mercedarian piece has a disarming flow which suggests "ghosting" and, although it contains details alien to Busnot's text, was clearly written with an eye upon the earlier composition.

Much of the original material in English contemporary with the period falls into two chronologically riven categories. The first is associated with the English possession of Tangier between 1662 and 1684. The second post-dates the English capture of Gibraltar in 1704. "Tangier" material is voluminous, but rarely touches upon events vital to the internal politics of Morocco (84). Its most valuable items are the correspondence and pamphlets associated with the inept Howard mission from Tangier to Fes in 1669, and with the final period of the English possession, dating from governor Kirke's visit to Meknes in 1681, until the port's evacuation. The latter-day "Gibraltar" material is of more value, particularly for the last decade of the period, during which Great Britain was becoming the Christian power with which Morocco had closest relations. Symbolically, the termination of the French consulates in 1716 was succeeded, in the following year, by the appointment of Anthony Hatfield, a Tiṭwāni merchant, as the first English consul to Morocco since the days of Charles I (85).

Embassies were most productive of information. Two luckless naval

- (83) Anon: "Relation de ce qui s'est passé dans les trois voyages que les Religieux de l'Ordre de Notre-Dame de la Mercy ont faits dans les États du Roy de Maroc pour la rédemption des captifs en 1704, 1708 et 1712, par un des Pères Députés pour la Redemption..." (Paris, 1724) The mass of this work has been reproduced in an edition contained within S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI (pp. 613-812)
- (84) This material has already been the object of a bland study written from the English imperial viewpoint: E.M.G. Routh's "Tangier: England's lost Atlantic Outpost" (London, 1912)
- (85) S.P. 71 (16) f. 490 J. Addison to Admiral Cornwall, Whitehall, 6/5/1717 cf. G. Fisher: "Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa 1415-1830" (London, 1957) Appendix I p. 324

missions to Meknes in 1713--14 and 1718 were followed by the highly successful 1721 embassy of Commodore Stewart, of which a by-product was the publication of John Windus's compendium of first and second-hand material: "A Journey to Mequinez..." (86). Among the sources acknowledged by the author, particular importance appertains to unpublished material taken from a "Mr. Corbiere", said to have lived in Morocco, and known the court at Meknes (87). Corbiere is otherwise known from a passing note in Busnot's work, referring to the first decade of the eighteenth century (88), and an English archival note from 1713 (89). No direct acknowledgements to Corbiere are made within Windus's text. But his contributions are tentatively identifiable by style. Windus, as narrator of the events of 1721, wrote in a beguilingly light vein. But his text is periodically interspersed by ponderous and disdainful notes upon the Miknāsī court and episodes in its recent history. These read like the work of another hand.

Braithwaite's book (90) emerged from a further and far less satisfactory embassy from Gibraltar to Meknes, undertaken in 1727--8, in the months following the death of the sultan Ismā'īl. It is a sardonic and for the most part independent work. Its author, a young army captain from the Gibraltar garrison, was perhaps the most acute of all the European commentators noted so far. He was certainly the only author who refused to discuss the Christian captives of Meknes within the usual conventions of martyrology (91). Unfortunately, the scope of Braithwaite's

(86) J. Windus: "A Journey to Mequinez etc" (London, 1721)

(87) op. cit Preface p. ii

(88) Busnot p. 239

(89) S.P. 71 (16) f. 93 Memo. of "Mr. Corbiere" dated 12/5/1713, detailing the current fighting strength of Moroccan corsair vessels.

(90) J. Braithwaite: "The History of the Revolutions in the Empire of Morocco upon the Death of the late Emperor Muley Ishmael" (London, 1729)

(91) ibid. pp. 352-4

work is limited, and merely grazes the period under direct examination.

English bibliography has its share of ransom literature. The memoirs of Francis Brooks, and the anonymous autobiography edited by Simon Ockley (92) form perhaps the most valuable items from this weak collection. As a maverick to such literature comes the problematic "autobiography" of Thomas Pellow (93), supposedly the first-hand reminiscences of an English renegade who, as court page and then army officer, lived in Morocco for twenty-three years between 1715 and 1738, before making his escape and returning in peace to Cornwall and the Anglican church. Since its resurrection in 1890 by the bibliographer Brown (94), the work has been variously estimated. Its most recent student, Mme. Morsy-Patchett, is willing to discount its more overt borrowings, and to treat the work as fundamentally an whole, recounting the experiences of a single individual (95). The renegade Pellow certainly existed (96). And there is equally no doubt that the author of the autobiography as it stands was acquainted with one or more informants who knew contemporary Morocco well. But to equate this author with an individual "Pellow", even via the mediation of a "ghost writer", is to belie the nature of the work. The book is patch-work, thrown together to create a picaresque novel of the Defoe school. It is possible to identify much of the published material which, as text or inspiration, went to create it. The "lees" not otherwise accounted for, amount to banal

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- (92) F. Brooks: "Barbarian Cruelty" (London, 1693). Anon: "An account of South-West Barbary" ed. S. Ockley B.D. Henceforward to be cited as "Ockley".
- (93) "The history of the Long Captivity and Adventures of Thomas Pellow in South Barbary" written by Himself (London, no date).
- (94) "The Adventures of Thomas Pellow of Penryn, Mariner: three and twenty years in captivity among the Moors" ed. R. Brown (London, 1890)
- (95) M. Morsy-Patchett: "La longue captivité et les aventures de Thomas Pellow" in "Hespéris-Tamuda" Vol. IV (Rabat, 1963) pp. 289-311
- (96) Braithwaite p. 192 cf. S.P. 71 (16) ff. 583-8 A list of English captives at Meknes, dated 29/9/1719 and including, in the listed crew of the "Frances" of Falmouth, one "Tho. Pellow: Boy Turn'd Moor".

and undated campaign records, accompanied by a profusion of personal and place names that are frequently verisimilitudinous in their outlandish spelling. But these mean little within an obviously fictional context.

Certain fundamental cautions should be applied to the appreciation of European material for the period. The material is not always simple contemporary commentary. Published work, and even some archival reporting, forms part of a loose tradition at the head of which stands the monumental "Descrittione dell'Africa..." of Leo Africanus (97), which dates from the early 1520s. Either directly, or by way of Marmol Carvajal (98) this work continued to serve as a standard mine of supplementary information to seventeenth and eighteenth century European authors attempting to give a general account of Morocco. The "Descrittione..." is a work of unrivalled value. It includes the only extensive survey of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā made prior to the nineteenth century. And this survey is unique, as the work of a "Moor" deliberately attempting to interpret his homeland for the benefit of aliens. Much of its information may indeed be treated as static, recording circumstances known still to have prevailed in the nineteenth century and later; these may include many of the details of life in Fes, Leo's beloved home city (99). But some of the notes cannibalised by later authors are likely to have been erroneous for the early <sup>C</sup>Alawī period. A striking example is Leo's account of Marrakesh.

(97) After stylistic polishing, this work was published within the compendium of Giovanni Battista Ramusio: "Delle navigationi et viaggi" ff. 1-95 inclusive (Venice, 1550) as "Della descrizione dell'Africa et delle cose notabili che quivi sono". Its most recent edition has been a French "Description de l'Afrique", edited and translated by A. Epaulard et. al. (Paris, 1956)

(98) Luis <sup>del</sup> Marmol Carvajal: "Descripción general de Africa" (Granada and Malaga, 1573 and 1599) The author of this work used vast tracts of Leo's "Descrittione..." to pad out evidence culled from his own crusading experiences within Morocco. In 1667 his work was seminally translated into French by N. Perrot d'Ablancourt as "De l'Afrique Vols. I and II (Paris publication).

(99) See R. le Tourneau: "Fès avant le Protectorat" (Casablanca, 1949) pp. 76-7 and 292

His plangent and antiquarian notes upon the ruined former capital of the Almoravides and Almohades re-emerged in writings that post-dated the spectacular building programme of Ahmad al-Mansūr al-Sa<sup>dī</sup> (100).

The existence of Leo's master-text was peculiarly convenient in that the horizons of contemporary first-hand European knowledge of Morocco were, during the early <sup>C</sup>Alawī period, usually limited. Merchants were for the most part confined to the ports. With rare exceptions, diplomatic and religious envoys knew only the road from coast to capital. And from 1680 onwards, European captives were congregated in Meknes as servants to the palace community (101): their only opportunity for wide geographical experience was co-option into the train of a military expedition.

Intellectually, European horizons were similarly constrained, European commerce was a natural and prevailing obsession. Its importance for the country at large may be set into perspective by notes upon the size of coastal merchant communities (102). Captives, and the ransom missionaries they spoke to were fascinated by imperial palace politics. But the fascination was customarily expressed in the lurid terms of backstairs gossip. MouÛtte was the only captive-turned-author capable of extensive literary elevation above this level.

Sympathy is indeed a rare factor in European comment upon Moroccan society and politics of the period. Hostility prevails. According to Simon Ockley, Professor of Arabic at Cambridge in the early eighteenth

(100) For an example, comparison may be made between the Murrakushi notes of Leo (ed. Ramusio ff. 17-18) and those of Pidou de St. Olon (tr. Motteux pp.15-17)

(101) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 125

(102) The privateer Doublet who visited Agadir in 1683 found that its "Doane" where European merchants were housed, contained two individuals besides himself (S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. 1 no. CXCII p. 596 Extract from the Journal of Jehu Doublet. Exact dating obscure) Braithwaite listed the entire expatriate community of Tetuan for 1727. It was made up of five English or Irish merchants, one French merchant, one Greek merchant and two Spanish friars ( p. 59).



century, and heavy-handed editor of an afore-mentioned piece of ransom-literature, Morocco was a land in:

"...Temper, Genius and Breeding...as much inferior to that of the Polite Asiaticks (amongst which the Persians do most deservedly claim the Preference) as can be conceived," (103)

Such an opinion was an abstraction from persistent cultural tensions expressed most succinctly in the alley-way jihād of the inland towns, where Europeans were subjected to hooting and stone-shying (104).

These tensions seem to have been particularly acute within the Maghrib al-Aqṣā. Braithwaite echoed Ockley in exempting from condemnation "they of Algier, Tripoli, Tunis" and "the Turks" as comparatively "polished and civilised" (105). This polarisation of European sympathies in relation to North Africa is well-expressed by reaction to one event. In 1692, an Algerine expeditionary force triumphed over <sup>C</sup>Alawī defending forces, upon <sup>C</sup>Alawī territory. Jean-Baptiste Estelle expressed the hope that the sultan's disgrace "devroit luy abattre un peu de sa fierté" (106). Meanwhile, his English and French counterparts in Algiers rejoiced in gleeful fellowship with the Algerines: "Our Dey" (107), "notre invincible monarque" (108) had been victorious.

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(103) "Ockley" Preface p. xix

(104) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux pp. 49-50 cf. Braithwaite pp. 214-15

(105) Braithwaite p. 351 cf. "Ockley" loc. cit.

(106) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CLXVII J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain  
Sale, 12/9/1692 p. 515

(107) S.P. 71 (3) f. 499 Memo. of consul Baker, Algiers, 18/7/1692

(108) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CXLV Consul Lemaire to the  
"échevins" of Marseille, Algiers, 13/8/1692

CHAPTER I : THE <sup>C</sup>ALAWĪ CAPTURE OF FES

Leo, in his division of Africa, split the northernmost reaches of the continent into "Barbary", the maritime region of rationality and law, and "Numidia", across the Atlas, the land of the palm-groves, and first of the regions beyond the pale of civilisation. For the Maghrib al-Aqṣā<sup>1</sup> the distinction is certainly valid geomorphically: rigorous relief all but divides the area today known as Morocco into a green sweep of interior land, and an outer world of steppe, desert and oasis. Yet, in human terms, this division should be seen as a two-way filter. The Atlas requires a deep respect in winter, but has nevertheless been in one sense a spur to communication. The ecological diversity of its inner and outer flanks has promoted a trading pattern dominated by the counter-change of dates for grain. For the north of the green interior, a land corresponding to Leo's "kingdom of Fes", the prime date country is the oasean complex of Tafilelt, spanning the valleys of the Ziz and Rheris. A more southerly sphere, Leo's "kingdom of Marrakesh" has a corresponding bond with the great oasis of the Dar<sup>C</sup>a valley.

The interior lands present their own linguistic and cultural patchwork. Athwart this diversity there is one major cleft. It is enshrined in the "Chleuh" parlance that would divide the land from the Anti-Atlas to the Mediterranean into a "Sus" or familiar, mountain-hedged south, and a "Gharb", paradoxically the "north": the land beyond Marrakesh (1). These regions are a "greater Sus" and "greater Gharb", englobing far more territory than their lesser namesakes, the riverain plains of the Wādī Sūs and Sebu.

Before the present century, government within the Maghrib al-Aqṣā oscillated between two centres. Periodically it was based at or near to Fes, economic hub of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā's most fertile grain

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(1) See, for example, the customs and beliefs cited in E. Westermarck: "Ritual and Belief in Morocco" (London, 1926) Vol. I pp. 178 and 179

country; and periodically at Marrakesh, a city built upon arid and stony ground, but nevertheless, a capital strategically better placed for challenging the fiscally tantalising lands of "greater Sus", which combined a prosperous and multi-faceted economy, with a grimly defensible terrain. The sixteenth century had seen the re-establishment of government at Marrakesh, under the Sa<sup>C</sup>dī princes, a dynasty of Dar<sup>C</sup>ī origin and "sharīfian" claims. But the years which followed the death of its most notable ruler, Aḥmad al-Manṣūr, in 1603, saw the disintegration of the comprehensive Sa<sup>C</sup>dī state. The mid-seventeenth century can be seen as an hiatus between the dissolution of a Murrākushī centre of political gravity, and the re-establishment of a wide-ranging government, to be based this time within the "greater Gharb", firstly at Fes, and then at Meknes, an half-day's journey away, across the plain of Saīs.

From around 1640, the authority of Sa<sup>C</sup>dī sultans shrivelled dramatically, to cover little beyond Marrakesh and its Hawz, or surrounding plain (2), home of the Shabbānāt, and of other Arabic-speaking peoples with whom the Sa<sup>C</sup>dī rulers were closely associated. Elsewhere within the Maghrib al-Aqṣā, there had developed scattered nodes of political and military authority. This was most commonly exercised by leaders who were endowed with the grace of religious prestige, but whom it might be best to follow al-Qādirī in describing as "ru'asā'", or "chieftains". The bases of all four major chieftains of the 1650s were associated with route-ways rather than great urban centres. Thus the southernmost of these strongholds, Illigh, was a mountain zāwiya sited in the coastal reaches of the Anti-Atlas. It overlooked the Atlantic route from the "Qibla" or western Sahara.

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(2) In the terminology of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā, hawz may cover the rural skirt of any city. However, the unqualified usage of the term indicates the environs of Marrakesh. This last usage will be followed within this thesis.

But it was distant by nearly an hundred rugged miles from the city of Tarudant, on the Wādī Sūs, which was the southernmost of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā's major commercial centres. The northernmost base, Alcazarquivir, capital of the mūjahid chieftain al-Khadir Ghaylān, was a moderate market town of the far north west, set midway between Sale and Tetuan, the country's two chief marts for maritime trade. Dilā', a second mountain zāwiya was sited beneath the southernmost range of the Middle Atlas, in the Tadla region (3), overlooking the most direct route between Fes and Marrakesh. Sills of Dilā'ī suzerainty seeped across the Atlas into Tafilelt. Here, and across the hills dividing the oasean region from Fes, there was political confrontation between Dilā' and a fourth chieftaincy, this last being based within Tafilelt itself.

This last Fīlālī chieftaincy was the perquisite of certain members of a clan of local shurafā', the <sup>C</sup>Alawī. In Tafilelt, as elsewhere, shurafā' were literally nobles, in that they claimed descent from the Prophet, and consequential privilege and respect. However, in Fīlālī society, nobility was spread wide and thin. In terms of real social ascendancy, the significance of "sharīfian" status was minimal. Arabs, Berbers and shurafā' were simply three broad categories into which the population could be divided (4). The society of the Fīlālī plain was dispersed among qusūr, the characteristic mud-fortresses which the region had known for centuries (5). Within such a society, it was

(3) See Prologue P. 25 (Note 36)

(4) Mouette wrote, by hearsay, of "Tafilet": "Les peuples de cet État sont de trois sortes, et sont composez de chérifs, d'Arabes et de Barbares. Les premiers sont descendus de l'imposteur Mahomet..." ("Histoire..." p. 195)

(5) In translation, Idrisī's description of "Sijilmasa", a section of Tafilelt, runs: "...elle n'a point de citadelle, mais elle consiste d'une série de palais (qusūr), de maisons (diyār) et de champs cultivés le long des bords d'un fleuve..."  
R. Dozy & M.J. de Goeje: "Description de l'Afrique et de l'Espagne par Edrisi" (Leyden, 1866) p. 60 of the text, 69 of the translation.

difficult for a political leader to rise above the status of primus inter pares, master of his home-qasr. Even in the 1690s, the puzzled Jean-Baptiste Estelle was, by hearsay, to describe the capital city of Tafilelt as a single "castle" flanked by wattle and daub huts (6). During the 1630s, al-Sharīf, known to dynastic history as the founder of <sup>c</sup>Alawī political fortunes, would seem to have been notably unsuccessful in his bid for extensive suzerainty. His political career, which combined the inter-qusūr raiding endemic to the region, with an attempt to play off against each other two powerful chieftains, the murābitān of Dilā' and of Illigh, ended with a period of captivity in the hands of the latter. Muḥammad, the eldest of al-Sharīf's more prominent sons, was thus able to come to prominence during his father's lifetime. He knew greater success as a raiding leader, and became known as "amīr" of Tafilelt (7). Undoubtedly his political ambitions spread beyond that region. But the most important extensions to his suzerainty would seem to have been oasean, possibly westwards into the Dar<sup>c</sup>a (8), and certainly south-eastwards, into the Tawātī knot of settlements, whither he led armies in 1645 and again in 1652, and whither he was able to send his quwwad (9). He is likely to have been the amīr al-bilād of Sijilmassa who, in 1662, granted letters of introduction to the pilgrim al-<sup>c</sup>Ayyāshī, to cover a journey to Tuat, and who was then accepted as suzerain as far to the east as Aougrou (10).

At this period, the social and economic links between Fes and Tafilelt are likely to have been such as to give the city firmly the

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(6) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. EXLIV p. 704 Memo. of J.-B. Estelle putatively dated to October, 1698.

(7) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 38

(8) "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." ed./tr. Houdas p. 301 of the text, 498 of the translation.

(9) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin pp. 51 and 52-3

(10) al-<sup>c</sup>Ayyāshī: "Rihla...", as partially translated by A. Berbrugger in "Voyages dans le sud de l'Algérie et des États barbaresques..." ("Exploration Scientifique de l'Algérie" Vol. IX Part I Paris, 1846) pp. 11 and 26-7

edge over the oasis. The city had attracted a resident Fīlālī community which represented a cross-section of society. It included acknowledged shurafā', and a prosperous core sufficiently numerous to be transferred willy-nilly, later in the century, to inhabit houses evacuated by the entire Jewish community of Meknes (11). Probably, however, it was dominated by needy migrants, the "vil popolo" of south-eastern oases, noted by Leo as willing to undertake menial tasks around Fes (12). Tafilelt is unlikely to have had a reciprocal attraction for the Fāsī. The Fīlālī economic heart of Sijilmasa along the lower Ziz, should not be equated commercially with the high mediaeval Sijilmasa, major desert port of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā. Contemporary evidence for the mid-seventeenth century points to a maritime route, by way of the coastal Sus, as the most significant path for the direct import into the inner Maghrib al-Aqṣā of the vital long-range commodity, trans-Saharan gold. Details from the narrative of the pilgrim al-<sup>C</sup>Ayyāshī, show that Tafilelt did have links with the Saharan gold market: southern merchants might travel out from Tafilelt as far as Tuat, to profit from a bi-metallic rate of exchange that stood at twenty-four silver mūzūnāt to the gold mithcal, an improvement over the standard Fīlālī rate of forty (13). But this did not deprive Tafilelt itself of a Fāsī reputation as a poverty-stricken region (14), source only of its own typical products: dates, mutton, and the bolts of peculiarly fine woollen cloth that were known to Europeans as "filleris". In her demand for these commodities, Fes was a "buyer's market", for Fes was

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(11) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 144 and 349

(12) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 74

(13) al-<sup>C</sup>Ayyāshī ed./tr. Berbrugger pp. 22-23

(14) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 195

a source of grain. And for grain, the inhabitants of Tafilelt would bring their goods up to the metropolis (15).

Seventeenth century Fes was "the general Store-House of all Barbary" (16):

"...grandement riche, d'autant que c'est où se fait tout le trafic du pays, et c'est elle qui fournit Tafilet et les autres provinces éloignées de tout ce qu'elles ont de besoin," (17)

From Leo's notes, it may fairly be assumed that the traffic of Fasi daily life, including the provision of foodstuffs, timber, charcoal, and the raw materials for industry, involved not only peoples from the city's immediate environs, and from the nearby dîr or "piedmont" of the Middle Atlas, but also groupings from the landward slopes of the Rif, from as far to the north-east as Tetuan. In the early eighteenth century it would be recorded that, under peaceable conditions, weekly caravans passed between Tetuan and Fes (18). Other routeways had periodic significance. These included the upland way from Tafilelt, which came into its own after the autumn date harvest (19). More important was the route which led eastwards from Fes into the "Cherg" or march-country dividing the northern Maghrib al-Aqṣā from the Ottoman Regency of Algiers. For the most highly developed complex of Fasi export trade was that associated with Muslim lands to the east. A major enterprise was that associated with the overland pilgrimage from the northern

(15) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J.-B. Estelle putatively dated to October 1698 p. 704

(16) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 140

(17) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 183

(18) Braithwaite p. 66

(19) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 8. In the final days of the caravan trade, it would be noted that, during the date season, the caravan traffic between Tafilelt and Fes multiplied eight-fold. See E. Aubin: "Le Maroc d'Aujourd'hui" (Paris, 1904) p. 297

Maghrib al-Aqṣā, as much a mercantile as a religious expedition (20). The making-up of the pilgrimage caravan was, ideally, an annual event (21). Customarily it congregated around Fes (22), and passed by way of the Taza corridor into Ottoman territory, one tributary to the grand stream that would eventually travel from Cairo to Mecca.

Access to valid military sanctions was of vital significance to the security of the Fāsī pattern of trade and supply. The citizenry was thus caught up in a standard dilemma, expressed in an ambivalent relationship between "Fās al-Bālī", and "Fas al-Jadīd", the "old" and "new" cities of the metropolis. Fās al-Bālī was the citizens' town; Fās al-Jadīd had been, since its construction in Marīnid days, the site of palace and "government presence". The society of Fās al-Bālī was dominated by an urban aristocracy of men of high religious standing, including Idrissid shurafā' who claimed descent from the city's founder (23). According to its genealogical heritage, this aristocracy had seen a number of reigning dynasties come and go. And in Waṭṭāsid days, Leo had noted a contemptuous reluctance on the part of such "huomini di riputazione e di bontà" for any personal association with Fās al-Jadīd (24). Yet, in the absence of strong imperial government, it was upon the urban aristocracy that there fell the responsibility for ensuring the external order necessary to the equable conduct of Fāsī life. Incidents from the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries

(20) Developed, if late accounts of the pattern of trade associated with this caravan are contained within W. Lempriere's "A Tour from Gibraltar..." (London, 1791) pp. 343-353 and R. Thomassy's "Le Maroc et ses Caravanes ou Relation de la France avec cet Empire" (Paris, 1845) pp. 30-64

(21) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, directed via Marseille, 19/7/1690 p. 316

(22) In 1728, Braithwaite saw the pilgrimage caravan being made up outside Meknes, as Fes, its customary starting point, was under siege. He was told that the caravan was only half the customary size (pp. 256-7).

(23) For studies of Fāsī shurafā' based upon a seventeenth century source, see the twin articles by G. Salmon: "Les Chorfa idrisides de Fes" and "Les Chorfa Filala et Djilala de Fes" in A.M. Vols I (Paris, 1904) pp. 425 ff. and III (Paris, 1905) pp.97-158, respectively.

(24) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 43



suggest that it was religious leaders who were accustomed to lead the civic militia. So it may be assumed that these city fathers knew the pragmatic advantages of recognising a political authority that proved capable in the field.

Early in the 1640s there had been established within Fās al-Jadīd a governor and garrison loyal to Muḥammad al-Ḥājj, the murābit of Dilā', who was then paramount within the central Maghrib al-Aqṣā. Dilā' was militarily most notable for its command of rural contingents of tamazight-speaking Berbers from the Central Atlas region. However, the Dilā'ī garrison within Fās al-Jadīd would seem to have been made up of Filālī troops (25), presumably drawn from the factions said to have rallied to Dilā' during a period of overt confrontation in Tafilēlt between Muḥammad al-Ḥājj and the <sup>c</sup>Alawī leader al-Sharīf (26). A brawl between this garrison and the old city disturbed the summer of 1650 (27). The most notable consequence of this brawl was the summons into Fās al-Bālī of Muḥammad ibn al-Sharīf of Tafilēlt, and his proclamation as the city's sultān (28). The move is likely to have resulted from civic defiance of Dilā', rather than from any specific desire to woo the <sup>c</sup>Alawī. For the new sultān's credit was brief. Ten weeks after his entry into the city, following defeat by Dilā'ī troops from the Central Atlas, Muḥammad was summarily ejected from Fās al-Bālī (29), as a military inadequate. After some months, the "old city" returned to a peaceable relationship with Dilā', with civic honour saved by the appointment of a new governor, son to Muḥammad al-Ḥājj himself (30). Two years later

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(25) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 39

(26) "Turjumān" p. 2 of the text and 4 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 9

(27) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 38 cf. "Turjumān" pp. 5 of the text and 9-10 of the translation.

(28) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." loc. cit. cf. "Turjumān" p. 5 of the text and 10 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 19

(29) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 39 cf. "Turjumān" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

(30) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 40 cf. "Turjumān" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

the city profited from its re-recognition of Dilā'. Fāsī religious leaders (fugahā') travelled to Dilā' itself, and were able successfully to negotiate the aid of Muḥammad al-Ḥājj and the zāwiya forces in the punishment of the Ḥayāyna, a grouping from the city environs who had been pillaging citizens' property (31).

But such aid from a centre over one hundred miles distant from Fes was ponderous of access, and is not known ever to have been obtained again. The city annals of subsequent years are shot through with the flicker of economic uncertainty. Three times over the years 1653-6, the civic currency required adjusting, once because the fals or standard petty bronze coin for daily transactions had lost all credence in the market (32). These fluctuations may signify interruptions in the pattern of supply to the city. Concurrently the Fāsī were, apparently of their own initiative, sending ḥarakāt, punitive military expeditions, into regions economically vital to themselves. In 1655 the aim was punishment of the Banū Zarwāl (33) "Jabalī", or "hill-men" from the south-western Rif, whose territory verged upon the route from Fes to Tetuan, and who, in Leo's day, had been subject to the Waṭṭāsīd sultans of Fes (34). In the following year, military aid was sent to Taza, first town along the eastward trunk-route (35). The season of this attack co-incided with the season of date-caravans which, according to Leo could, in the Taza region, all too easily devolve into skirmishes (36).

The period from 1653 onwards saw, also, expansion of the chief-taincy at the westerly edge of the Fāsī political horizon. Al-Khaḍīr

(31) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 57

(32) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. pp. 62, 81 and 86

(33) ibid. p. 73

(34) Leo ed. Ramusio ff. 51-2

(35) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. pp. 86-7

(36) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 54

Ghaylān, the mujāhid (37), extended his authority over the peoples of the north-western flood-plains which fanned out "even as a Bowling-green" (38) from the Sebū crossing, north of Fes, to the Atlantic. Demographically this region was unpromising as a sphere for the flexing of political ambition. Seventeenth and eighteenth century European eyewitnesses re-iterated that its itinerant Arabic-speaking population was notably scanty. The "douars" or tent-crescents which excited the commentators' disgusted fascination, were rare objects (39). However, Ghaylān is likely to have had relatively easy access, if not to men, at least to European munitions. The sleazy Christian enclaves strung out along the coastal edge of his domain, were typically centres for arms trading (40).

Three deaths of political significance to the Maghrib al-Aqsā occurred in 1659. In Fes there died Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥājj, second and last of the city's governors from the house of Dilā'. The succession of a zāwiya nominee was barred by the usurpation of one al-Duraydī, allegedly an insubordinate garrison officer from Fās al-Jadīd (41). At around the same time, Marrakesh saw the end of Aḥmad al-Abbās (42), the last titular Sa<sup>c</sup>dī sultan. He was treacherously assassinated by his khal or "kinsman-on-the-mother's

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(37) For further information upon this warrior, see A. Peretié: "Le Rais El-Khadir Ghailan" in A.M. (Vol. XVIII, Paris, 1912) pp. 1-186. This is a copious study, based partly upon English Tangier material.

(38) Windus p. 82

(39) See, for example, Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 21 cf. Windus pp. 82-3 and 205-6 cf. Braithwaite pp. 136 and 138-9

(40) For arms-smuggling in Tangier under the English, see: Anon: "A discourse concerning Tangier" (London, 1680) p. 28

(41) "Nashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 106 cf. "Bustān al-Ṣarif..." MS p. 24

(42) "Nuzhat al-Ḥadī..." ed./tr. Houdas pp. 207-8 of the text and 340 of the translation cf. Del Puerto Vol. V Ch. XXVIII pp. 543-4

side (43), Karūm al-Hāj̄j, chieftain of the Shabbānāt from the Hawz. Karūm al-Hāj̄j thenceforward became master of Marrakesh. Meanwhile, in Tafilelt, the death of the <sup>C</sup>Alawī founding-father al-Sharīf had, according to tradition, driven one of his younger sons, al-Rashīd, into flight from his mistrustful brother Muhammad (44)

Memory of the early period of al-Rashīd's travels survives only within a medley of dateless folk-weave. Two relatively early and elaborate accounts of the prince's progress are given by Moūtte in his "Histoire", and by al-Qādirī in the "Nashr al-Mathānī...". (45). They seem to represent successive stages in Fāsī tradition concerning the <sup>C</sup>Alawī. Both would have it that the prince left Tafilelt virtually alone, and that he subsequently travelled between centres of contemporary authority, incognito until his inevitable unmasking. Slaves figure in both versions of the story. According to Moūtte's complicated tale, there was a "black" involved in al-Rashīd's two bids at escaping from his brother (46). And al-Qādirī passed on a legend, at once racy and sentimental, which told how the prince, after discovery and flight from Dilā', proved himself, along the road, worthy both of his ancestors, and of his political future, by rescuing a caravan from rural ambush. In this he was aided by two black slaves, who alternately loaded the two muskets with which he demonstrated a sultan's marksmanship (47). In Moūtte's version of the story, al-Rashīd had offered his services to Dilā' as a mercenary. The bedrock

(43) The term khāl (pl. akhwāl) signifying "maternal uncle", was employed by authors of the period to cover a member of the grouping identified with a man's mother. Ideally the relationship between a man and his akhwāl should have been peculiarly close.

(44) "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." ed./tr. Houdas p. 301 of the text, 499 of the translation cf. "Turjuman" p. 7 of the text, 12 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 21

(45) Moūtte: "Histoire..." pp. 15-19 cf. "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 97-101

(46) Moūtte: "Histoire..." pp. 15-16

(47) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. pp. 98-9

beneath these tales could be the memory of a period during which al-Rashīd had acted, not quite as a lone adventurer, but as a condottiere upon a small-scale: the master of a petty force of black slave-soldiers or abīd. Such soldiers were noted to be in al-Rashīd's company, by an eyewitness, at an early stage in his career when he was still an adventurer (48).

All accounts of al-Rashīd's travels would agree that, at some point prior to 1664, they brought him into the "Cherg" or eastern march-country. The "Cherg" is a complex of widely variant peoples and regions. It includes the Angad desert, a necessary obstacle to travellers moving eastwards from Taza. This bleak region provides the Maghrib al-Aqṣā with a natural eastern frontier: a grey wilderness of sandy earth, terebinths and wandering pastoralists. Reporters from either side of the period dwell both upon the hostility, and upon the elusive character of the Angad peoples, many of whom would seem to have followed a transhumance pattern of enormous sweep that could take them seasonally as far as the oasis of Figuig (49).


Other "Chergi" groupings were sedentary and thronging. The hill-peoples whose territories flanked the Angad were zenatiya-speaking Berbers. Probably, as today, they were unusually numerous for rural populations (50). Leo had noted that the Snassen hills, which lie

(48) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. I No. XLI R. Fréjus: "Relation d'un Voyage fait dans la Mauritanie..." (hereafter; Fréjus ) p. 154

(49) Early reporters on the Angad and its peoples include Leo (ed. Ramusie f. 58) and the eighteenth century L.R. Desfontaines (ed. M. Dureau de la Malle, as "Fragments d'un Voyage dans les Régences de Tunis et d'Alger fait de 1783 à 1786" in "Voyages dans les Régences de Tunis et d'Alger" (Paris, 1838 p. 177) Further data is given by the nineteenth century commentator M.E. Carette in "Du commerce de l'Algérie avec l'Afrique centrale et les États barbaresques" (Paris, 1844) quoted Thomassy pp. 66-7.

(50) A population map of contemporary Morocco, prepared by the Laboratory of Physical Geography in Rabat, notes Snassen country in particular as an area of extraordinary density in rural population, inexplicable in terms of natural circumstances alone (J.Martin et. al: "Géographie du Maroc" Paris, 1964 p. 59)

# THE "CHERG"



Sketch-map of the "Cherg" or north-eastern march of the Maghrib al-Aqsa.

Scale: 1:2,000,000

100 km.

between the Angad town of Oujda and the lower Moulouya were, although harsh and difficult of access, densely populated and capable of furnishing ten thousand fighting men (51). In the eighteenth century, Shaw was to re-iterate his judgements, adding a note upon the difficulty of subjecting these "Beni Zenessel... Kabyles" to "Tingitanian" taxation (52). In Leo's day, the wide bay to the west of the Moulouya mouth, and the north of the Snassen hills, had been one customary anchorage for Venetian galleys trading with Fes (53). During the mid-seventeenth century, the region seems still to have supported a Mediterranean trade in wax (54) and in foodstuffs (55). A cornucopian capacity to supply comestibles cheaply was one of the northern Maghrib al-Aqṣā's most notable economic propensities (56). It seems clear that the populations adjoining this northern stretch of coast willingly exploited the propensity, and ignored the Islamic legal ban upon supplying Christian traders with goods vital to subsistence. This attracted the French who, during the 1660s, reconnoitred the nearby offshore Shafarina islands, with a view to the establishment of a naval and trading base which might encroach upon the existing Italian connection (57).

The "Sebkha" or salt-flat between Tlemcen and Oran was alien

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(51) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 62

(52) T. Shaw: "Travels and Discoveries relating to several Parts of Barbary" (Oxford, 1738) p. 17

(53) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 52

(54) Fréjus p. 183

(55) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 179

(56) S.P. 71 (13) f. 789 Memo. of Lord Howard on the question of victualling Tangier, dated Tangier, 14/12/1669

(57) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. I No, XIX pp. 49-50 François de Beaufort to Colbert, Majorcan waters, 24/4/1662.

from Angad plain and hill-country alike. This was the country of the Banū Amir, a settled Arabic-speaking people who were noted by Marmol Carvajal in the sixteenth century for their ability to defy the Turks (58), and who later continued to be "numerous and warlike" (59). During the seventeenth century, the Banū Amir lived effectively under the suzerainty of the Spaniards of the presidio of Oran, to whom they paid protection money (60). It was by way of these people that there was funnelled a profitable trade in grain, between "Oranis" and southern Spain (61).

From the landward Muslim viewpoint, the entire rural "Cherg" would seem to have been, in the mid-seventeenth century, politically "no-man's land". Its economic centre was the city of Tlemsen. But Tlemsen, the capital of an independent mediaeval kingdom, had fallen into the shadow of Algiers, headquarters of the Ottoman Regency into which Tlemsen itself had been absorbed as an Ottoman outpost. The one-time capital is likely already to have collapsed into a fraction of the space enclosed by its own walls (62). Allegedly it could be held by a garrison of fifty or sixty janissaries (63). Such a force was of a size to police a town, but not a march.

It was within this march that al-Rashīd was able to raise the popular following that would hoist him to power. There is a tradition that al-Rashīd's success within the "Cherg" had been prefaced by an

(58) Marmol Carvajal tr. Perrot d'Ablancourt Vol. I p. 80

(59) Shaw p. 52

(60) "Ockley" p. 23

(61) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. XXII Memo. of Pidou de St. Olon dated Toulon, 23/8/1693 p. 201

(62) In the mid-1730s, Shaw had noted that: "...There is not above one sixth part remaining of the old Tlemsen, which, as I compute, might have been above four Miles in Circuit.". He attributed this decline to a Turkish sack of 1670 (op. cit. p. 49). However, J. Ogilby's version of O. Dapper's "Africa", published in London in 1670, already pointed to a notable diminution in the economy and size of Tlemsen. (\*)

(63) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. I. No. XXIX p. 84 Memo. of Admiral Trubert from the flagship off Alhucemas, 1/11/1664



expansionist "Chergi" episode in the career of his elder brother Muhammad (64). This tradition must be discounted. It will be seen to rest solely upon the evidence of an undated and textually dubious letter from an unknown "Dey of Algiers" to an unnamed "sharīf". This was incorporated into the dynastic tradition by al-Zayyānī, upon Muhammad's behalf (65). Al-Rashīd's own real venture into the "Cherg" must therefore be recognised as the acceptance, within the march, of a total alien as military commander.

It was the teeming sedentaries rather than the thieving pastoralists, with whom al-Rashīd's ties were crucial. Snassen and Banū Amir alike were to be among the groupings associated with his name. It seems to have been within Snassen country that al-Rashīd, the future sultan, was first accepted as a political leader in his own right. A spectrum of accounts would all suggest that the key to this acceptance was al-Rashīd's capture, by "coup de théâtre", of a point named Dār ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al.

Dār ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al as a town or fortress no longer exists. But its existence, and indeed its strategic importance in the seventeenth century seem unquestionable. It appears to have been a stronghold, and also a centre around which local forces could be recruited. In 1609, it had been used as a base from which two Sa<sup>c</sup>dī princes in flight from a third had gathered an army of shorāqa, or "easterners", with which they went on to take Fes (66), as al-Rashīd was to do. After al-Rashīd's death, the place was to be used again, as one centre for the

(64) "Turjūmān" pp. 3-5 of the text, 5-9 of the translation of "Bustān al-~~Sharīf~~..." MS pp. 10-13

(65) See: Epileque Part II Pp. 322-327

(66) "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." ed./tr. Houdas pp. 197 of the text, and 317-8 of the translation of "S.I. 1<sup>re</sup> Pays-Bas Vol. I, No. CLII Memo. of P.M. Coy to the States-General, dating from 1609 pp. 463-4

operations of his nephew, Ahmad ibn Muhriz, a contender for the succession (67). The site of Dār ibn Mash<sup>C</sup>al can now be assessed only approximately. There seems little doubt that it lay within or adjoining Snassen territory, as was remembered in eighteenth century Snassen tradition (68). A number of maps of Morocco standard in Europe during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries include the toponym. Of these maps, possibly the most reliable is the crude sketch drawn up by MouÛtte, with the help of his chief informant "Bougiman" (69). This inserted Dār ibn Mash<sup>C</sup>al as a fortress at the edge of the Snassen hill-country, to the east of the Moulouya, well inland, and overlooking the Angad routeway from Taza to Oujda. Here a stronghold would have been well-poised both to command the main route from Fes into the Regency, and to make contact, by way of the Moulouya, with trading points on the Mediterranean coast. In the eighteenth century, the <sup>C</sup>Alawī makhzan would maintain a pair of major fortresses within this region (70). In the mid-seventeenth century, an independent master of Dār ibn Mash<sup>C</sup>al would have been finely sited to agglomerate, for his own benefit, the profits of tribute and commerce alike.

Al-Rashīd's venture against Dār ibn Mash<sup>C</sup>al can only tentatively be reconstructed from beneath a mass of coralline legend. No date can be attached to this venture. The relatively late author al-Zayyānī is alone in suggesting that mass force was involved, and in associating this storming with the aftermath of al-Rashīd's victory over his

(67) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 73

(68) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 101. This was one of two variant traditions concerning the site of Dar ibn Mash<sup>C</sup>al, reported by al-Qādirī.

(69) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 9. The relevant section of this map, here reproduced, is taken from the frontispiece to the second volume of S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France.

(70) Shaw p. 16 One of these fortresses, "Borg el Wed", is marked upon this author's frontispiece map.

The Germain MouÛtte - "Bougiman" map of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā, as reproduced in the frontispiece to "Les Sources Inédites de l'Histoire du Maroc" : Deuxième Série  
France. Volume II



brother Muḥammad (71). Possibly he extrapolated from the earlier suggestion that it was at Dār ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al that Muḥammad was buried (72). Earlier source-writers (73) set the attack upon Dār ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al into the haze of al-Rashīd's primal association with the "Cherg", and imply that the place was taken by stealth and trickery: a successful guerrilla exploit. This is a credible version of events. And it can be believed that al-Rashīd's attack upon Dar ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al was made with the connivance of a local rural chieftain "Shaykh al-Lawātī (74), apparently an acknowledged leader among the Snassen (75) Dār ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al could have been a focus for the envy of his followers.

Despite early suggestions to the contrary, caught even by Europeans on the fringe of Maghribī politics, it is unlikely that "Darbinmeshaal" was, in al-Rashīd's day, actively "commanded" by the Jewish "petty Prince" (76), who, in one or another "avatar" is set into all standard Arabic sources. As B.A. Mojuetan has pointed out in a recent thesis (77), Maghribī society of this date is unlikely to have been sufficiently flexible to encompass an independent Jewish ruler. Mojuetan takes the extreme view that the Jew of Dār ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al never existed, but was instead a fabrication of early <sup>c</sup>Alawī propaganda, designed to win over to the parvenu sultan al-Rashīd a gullible populace nurtured upon an age-old corpus of Maghribī legends

- (71) "Turjumān" pp. 7-8 of the text, 15 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 22
- (72) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 164
- (73) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 17-18 cf. al-Ifrānī: "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." ed. Houdas pp. 301-2 of the text, 499 of the translation cf. al-Qadiri: "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. pp. 100-101
- (74) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 100
- (75) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 19
- (76) Anon. (initialled S.L.) "A letter from a gentleman of the Lord Ambassador HOWARD's Retinue" (London, 1670) p. 2. (hereafter, S.L.) The letter is dated at Fes, Nov. 1st. 1669.
- (77) "The Rise of the <sup>c</sup>Alawī dynasty in Morocco 1631-1672" Ph. D. (London, 1969) Chapter IV

in which Jewish princes figure. Certainly the tales of al-Rashīd's assassination of the Jew of Dār ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al read like anti-Semitic versions of the tale of Aladdin's cave. Yet it seems unnecessary to eliminate the Jew altogether. Mouëtte set two figures within the "castle" of "Dar-Michal", a governor, and a Jew who had dominated the local trade. It was standard practise for Jewish financiers to be associated with Maghribi magnates of the day; parallel figures to the "king's Jews", bound for their own security, and a specialised complex of financial purposes, to European mediaeval monarchs (78). Even at the zāwiya of Dilā<sup>t</sup>, where political authority was associated with Islamic intellectualism, there was a Jewish community established (79). And the contemporary provincial population of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā's northern fringe had its Jewish element. The merchant adventurer Fréjus, on his journey of 1666 through the Middle Rif, gave "Moors and Jews" as the typical description of populations he by-passed.

A wealthy Jew associated with the fortress of Dār ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al could have been an arms trader. Within the 1669 account of the "gentleman of the Lord Ambassador Howard's retinue", which is decidedly hostile towards al-Rashīd personally, there lie two accounts of the disposal of individual prominent Jews by "Muley Archeid". The two accounts are suspiciously parallel. The first involves the "petty prince" of "Darbinmeshaal" as noted above. It is a tale of vicious treachery towards a Jewish host, excused by "a small provocation culled from the Law of Mahomet" (80). The second

(78) For further information see J.W. Parkes: "The Jew in the Mediaeval Community" (London, 1938)

(79) Chronicle of Sa<sup>c</sup>dya ibn Danān. Text no. XXI as edited and translated by Vaida in "Un Recueil de textes historiques judeo-marocaines" in "Hespéris" Vol. XXXVI (Paris, 1949) p. 140

(80) S.L. p. 2

is a more sober and detailed account of judicial murder:

"Another Jew named Joseph Ben-Simon, a very great Trader, and one that had Correspondents in many Places, did run the same Fortune. He supplied the Moors with many Commodities, especially with Powder and Shot, Guns and other Weapons, which he conveyed out of Spain by stealth. At last his Wealth made him guilty of Death, for he was accused of Adultery, and although common report pronounced him innocent, he lost his Life and had his Estate seized for the Kings Use." (81)

This reads like a second version of the same incident, and is credible. The Jewish gun-runner, with widespread commercial contacts and particularly close links with the Peninsula, fits well into the context of Judeo-Moroccan trade of the period. Like most of the maritime commerce of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā, the arms-trade, both open and clandestine, was dominated by Jews (82). The sordid elimination of a local arms-trader could well have been a touch-piece for the transformation of al-Rashīd's relations with the Snassen and neighbouring groupings, providing him perhaps with a cache of arms, as well as the wealth with which rumour would accredit the capture of Dār ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al.

The acquisition of a strategic base, together with the flamboyant distribution of booty can account for al-Rashīd's metamorphosis from alien mercenary into raiding leader. It was part of dynastic tradition that al-Rashīd bought himself the loyalty of a rural following (83). MouÛtte suggests that the capture of Dār ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al was followed up by the acclamation of al-Rashīd as "king" by Shaykh al-Lawātī and his allies (84). But the anonymous English

(81) S.L. p. 3

(82) MouÛtte; "Histoire..." p. 177 cf. "Ockley" p. 122 cf. Braithwaite pp. 88, 90, 106, 168

(83) "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." ed./tr. Houdas p. 301 of the text and 499 of the translation cf. "Turjuman" p. 8 of the text, and 15 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Ṣarīf..." MS p. 22

(84) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 19

statement that al-Rashīd was not yet "king or Emperor" but "General or Great Moukadem" (85) seems to pinpoint the truth. The Fīlālī alien became a local war-leader of increasing geographic range. His first move away from Dār ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al is said to have involved leading al-Lawātī's men against their neighbours of "Quiviane" (86). But his most notable victories seem to have lain in his "wonderful success against the East Arabs" (87). Even al-Zayyānī, who was cautious in his treatment of <sup>c</sup>Alawī ventures in the border region (88), allowed that raiding in Snassen company took al-Rashīd as far as Oujda (89). And ventures further east are implied by this author's analysis of al-Rashīd's <sup>c</sup>askar of "easterners" or sharāqa: a ravel of Arab and Berber recruits from the Regency (min wilāyat al-turk) (90), including Banū <sup>c</sup>Amir from "Oranie" and Banū Snūs, zenatiya-speaking hill-farmers from the south of Tlemsen (91). In order to sweep up such a following, al-Rashīd the mugaddam is likely, during the early 1660s, to have directed activities far into territory that, in Algiers, would have been regarded as Ottoman.

The rise of a war-lord with a nexus of power within the "Cherg" was bound to threaten the security of Fāsī-Tilimsānī traffic. But, in the early 1660s, Fes was in no fit state politically to cope with any external military threat. In the aftermath of al-Duraydī's coup within Fās al-Jadīd, the old city dissolved into faction-fighting, with the Andalus quarter supporting and the Qarawiyyin quarter

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(85) S.L. p. 28

(86) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 19-21

(87) S.L. loc. cit.

(88) See: Epilogue Part II pp. 327-8

(89) "Turjuman" pp. 7 and 8 of the text, and 14 and 15 of the translation

(90) "Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS p. 22

(91) ibid. pp. 22 and 27 cf. (for the topographical information)  
Shaw pp. 47 and 51-2

opposing al-Duraydī's authority (92). Meanwhile the military power of the once-sovereign Dilā' was disintegrating. In 1660, at the end of a duel with al-Khadir Ghaylān for the mutual definition of rural territory, Dilā'ī forces had been dramatically worsted. A Fāsī note that from this point the power of Dilā' was tottering (93) has European corroboration: a renegade Spaniard who took part in the major battle reported to the "gentleman" of Howard's entourage that, after this battle, there had been mass defection towards Ghaylān by former subjects of the Dilā'ī "Santo" (94). Over the years 1662-3, Dilā'ī efforts to have al-Duraydī ejected from Fās al-Jadīd were made in the shadow of this defeat, and against a backdrop of severe famine. When, in 1663, Muḥammad ibn al-Sharīf descended upon the environs of Fes as a marauder, leading his hungry Fīlālī following in a raid upon Ḥayāyna territory, Dilā' refused the Fāsī military aid. It was an Ḥasanid sharīf from Tafīlalt, resident within Fes, who led the civic expedition which expelled his "kinsmen", the one-time sultan, from the city's environs (95). Subsequently, in the autumn of 1663, Muḥammad al-Ḥajj ventured as far as Azrou, half-way from Dilā' to Fes. Circumspectly the city's religious leaders entered into negotiations with him. But, once he and they had

(92) Chronicle of Sa<sup>c</sup>dya ibn Danān . Text no. XXI ed./tr. Vajda in "Un recueil de textes historiques judéo-marocaines" in "Hesperis" Vol. XXXV (Paris, 1948) p. 357 cf. "Nuzhat al-Ḥadī..." ed./tr. Houdas p. 303 of the text and 501 of the translation cf. "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 106

(93) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 107

(94) S.L. p. 22 This European account of the battle has a different chronology from that of the "Nashr al-Mathānī...", but its close alignment with the latter in topography makes it clear that the same encounter is under discussion. The context of events into which the indigenous dating is set, gives it the greater reliability.

(95) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 144 cf. "Turjumān" p. 6 of the text and 13 of the translation.



returned to home territory, their oath to him was broken (96).

During the following summer of 1664, the military renown of al-Rashīd escalated dramatically. Muḥammad ibn al-Sharīf, presumably alarmed at his brother's expansionist moves, took an army up to meet that brother upon the Angad plain (97). Al-Rashīd was the victor. He is said to have scooped up his elder brother's following (98). Delicate-minded indigenous authors insist that Muḥammad was neatly eliminated during the fighting. Al-Ifrānī would have him felled by the battle's first shot (99). But earlier European reporters suggest that there was fratricide after the encounter (100).

Fes took acute alarm. The encounter on the Angad plain precipitated a marshalling of the defences of the city, and of its immediate environs. Citizens were ordered to purchase guns and horses. And, in a meeting with representatives of surrounding rural groupings, a common

- (96) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 22 Both the Michaux-Bellaire translation of the "Nashr al-Mathānī..." (A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 158) and the Houdas edition of the "Turjuman" (p. 7 of the text and 14 of the translation), seem to give garbled accounts of this incident. The manuscript version reads:

"balagha muhammad al ḥājj azrū, wa nazala bihi, wa tawajjaha lihi ahl-fās, wa ʿulamā'uhim wa shurafā'uhum, wa bayā'uhū, wa raja'ū wa baqā humālika ilā faṣl al-shitā'. wa raja'a, thumma ḥalafa ahl-fās ma'a al-duraydī"

("Muhammad al-Ḥājj reached Azrou and pitched his camp there. The people of Fes together with their ʿulamā' and shurafā' went out to him, swore an oath of allegiance to him and returned home. He remained there until the rains broke, then returned home himself. Thereupon the people of Fes went into alliance with al-Duraydī")

- (97) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above p. 164 cf. "Turjuman" pp. 7 of the text and 14-15 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 22
- (98) "Nuzhat al-Ḥādī..." ed./tr. Houdas p. 302 of the text and 500 of the translation
- (99) ibid. loc. cit.
- (100) S.L. p. 28 cf. S.P. 71(13) f. 121 Memo. of Captain Fitzgerald dated Sale, 8/11/1664  
Mouštte's more extreme suggestion ("Histoire..." p. 23) that Muhammad was pursued as far as Tafilet before his death, seems contradicted by these earlier accounts.

decision was taken that a stand should be made against al-Rashīd (101). But there was to be no attack upon the metropolis as yet. Instead, al-Rashīd moved into Tafilelt, where he spent nine months in establishing his suzerainty, ousting his nephews, the sons of Muhammad, and gaining the allegiance of shurafa' from its patchwork of qusūr (102). As an historian of the dynasty, al-Zayyānī was at a loss to account for this deviation from the straight road to Fes, except in terms of an arcane strategy or "aqī" (103). It could indeed be argued that, by adding Fīlālī to "Chergi" power, al-Rashīd was developing the capacity to impose a pincer threat upon Fes. But al-Rashīd's moves over the period 1664-6 seem better understood in terms of escalating opportunism than of all-encompassing strategy. And there is no evidence that Fīlālī power was of particular significance to the <sup>C</sup>Alawī raider's ultimate capture of the metropolis.

In the spring of 1665, al-Rashīd made a move in the direction of Fes, by establishing a military base at Taza. The Fāsī militia, together with Ḥayayna levies, went out to challenge him, to their own disgrace. They did not join battle, but were pursued in disorder as far as the Sabu river (104). However, a subsequent skirmish outside the walls of Fes was inconclusive (105). So, presumably with the

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(101) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 164 cf. "Turjuman" p. 8 of the text and 15 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 24

(102) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. loc. cit. cf. Mouštte: "Histoire..." p. 23

(103) "fa-balaḡha al-rashīd amruhum. a<sup>C</sup>rada<sup>C</sup> anhum li-kamāl<sup>C</sup> aqlihi. wa tawajjaha min taza li-sijilmāsa

("News of their doings (i.e. the Fāsī defence preparations) reached al-Rashīd. With an absolute cunning he turned his back upon them, and set off from Taza towards Sijilmāsa.") "Turjuman" p. 8

(104) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. pp. 164-5 cf. "Turjuman" p. 8 of the text and 16 of the translation.

(105) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 177 cf. "Turjuman" loc. cit.

aim of maintaining his following in rewarding employment, al-Rashīd turned to his old activity of rural raiding. The chosen sphere was the Middle Rif, the hinterland of Alhucemas, and of the little Spanish presidio of Peñon de Velez. This was a zenatiya-speaking area, and a region of sedentary agriculture and Mediterranean trade (106) that had economic links with Taza (107). The area had certain parallels with Snassen country. And here al-Rashīd seems to have conducted something of a replay of the pattern of events associated with Dār ibn Mash<sup>al</sup>. From two garbled European accounts it seems possible to gather that al-Rashīd allied with local enemies of the major regional clan, the A<sup>C</sup>rās; that he picked a personal quarrel with the shaykh of this clan; and that he captured both Alhucemas and the shaykh's own personal fortress and treasure (108). The A<sup>C</sup>rās were driven en masse into exile in the presidio (109). One justification for the attack may have been the very existence of friendly relations between the A<sup>C</sup>rās and the presidio: a possible parallel to the earlier association between Dar ibn Mash<sup>al</sup> and Jewry. From around this time, al-Rashīd is known to have laid a veto upon the formerly free and open Muslim provisioning of the Christian enclaves at the edge of his sphere of influence. Skirmishing replaced trade (110). The veto added to al-Rashīd, the bandit mugaddam, a touch of the mujāhid. It also inaugurated, in embryo, the standard early <sup>C</sup>Alawī policy of forbidding a trade with Christendom in provisions, and particularly in grain. (111).

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(106) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. I. No. XXIX p. 84 Memo. of Admiral Trubert, from the flagship off Alhucemas, 1/11/1664

(107) Fréjus p. 183

(108) Fréjus pp. 125-8 cf. Mouette; "Histoire" pp. 23-4 and 27-8

(109) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 23

(110) Fréjus p. 129

(111) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux pp. 21 and 76 cf. Windus p. 207

However, religious scruples did not veto the negotiations which led to al-Rashīd's entry into Fes the next year. MouÛtte's record of crucial dealings between the Jewish communities of Taza and Fes (112) prefaces information aligning with Arabic and with Jewish material. All three agree that al-Rashīd's entry into Fes, in June 1666, was made secretly, at night, by way of the Jewry (113). Al-Zayyānī was sufficiently embarrassed by this record to refer to the millāh or Jewry concerned, as an anodyne piece of nowhere: the "millāh-al-muslimīn" or "Jewry-of-the-Muslims" (114). But the chronicle of Sa<sup>c</sup>dya ibn Danān, supported by MouÛtte, counters this muffling with notes upon the specific plight of the Fāsī millāh in 1666. The Jewry, sited between Fās al-Bālī and Fās al-Jadīd, had suffered particularly from the disorder which had followed al-Duraydī's coup. Caught in the cross-fire between Fās al-Jadīd and the Qarawiyyin quarter of the old city, the millāh had had its traffic with the two subjected alternately to pillage and to total interruption. The Jewish community had known hunger and emigration, punctuated by demands from al-Duraydī, the "persecutor", for heavy contributions (115). Muhammad al-Hājj al-Dilā'ī was no attractive alternative as master of the city. He is said once to have ordered his governor of Fes to destroy synagogues. (116). But the newcomer al-Rashīd promised the Jewish community peace. He kept his word. His days would be remembered within the Fāsī millāh.

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(112) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 24

(113) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 25 cf. Chronicle of Sa<sup>c</sup>dya ibn Danān ed./tr. Vaida Text. No. XXI (Part II) in "Un recueil de textes..." in "Hespéris" Vol. XXXVI (Paris, 1949) p. 139 cf. "Nashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 177

(114) "Turjuman" p. 8 of the text and 17 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 24

(115) Chronicle of Sa<sup>c</sup>dya ibn Danān ed./tr. Vaida Text No. XXI (Part I) from "Un recueil de textes..." in "Hespéris" Vol. XXXV (Paris, 1948) pp. 357-8 cf. MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 25

(116) Chronicle of Sa<sup>c</sup>dya ibn Danān loc. cit.

as an age in which "the lord restored his people Israel" (117)).

A quaint legend came to allow for the annual election of a "Lord of Misrule" by students of the Qarawiyyin university. This legend, a late and extreme piece from the Dār ibn Mash<sup>C</sup>al corpus, told how al-Rashīd took the "house" of the Jew "ibn Mash<sup>C</sup>al" with the aid of the tullāb of Fes (118). The actuality of al-Rashīd's capture of Fes with the aid of its Jews, provides a striking inversion of this legend.

Following entry by way of the Jewry wall, in the company of a small assault force (119), al-Rashīd was able, militarily speaking, to become master of Fes within two days. He took first the "new" and then the "old" city. Al-Duraydī and the two citizen leaders representing the Qarawiyyin and Andalus communities of Fās al-Bālī all fled, but were variously recaptured and put to death within the fortnight (120). But capture of the city cannot be equated with acknowledgement as its sultan. For such acknowledgement, a bay<sup>C</sup>a was necessary. A civic bay<sup>C</sup>a was a formal declaration of allegiance, signed by citizens of known standing and intellectual worth. Once a dynasty was established, a bay<sup>C</sup>a would automatically be drawn up on behalf of a dynastic claimant to power who could pull local political weight. But when the Maghrib al-Aqṣā had no widely acknowledged dynasty, the grant of a bay<sup>C</sup>a was not a "douceur" automatically granted to the nearest man capable of exercising

(117) Chronicle of Sa<sup>C</sup>dya ibn Danān ed./tr. Vajda Text no. XXI (Part II) from "Un recueil de textes..." in "Hespéris" Vol. XXXVI (Paris, 1949) p. 139

(118) See P. de Cénival: "La légende du Juif ibn Mech<sup>C</sup>al et la fête du Sultan des Tolba a Fès" in "Hespéris" Vol. V. (Paris, 1925) pp. 137-210

(119) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 25

(120) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 177 cf. "Turjuman" p. 9 of the text and 17 of the translation.

military power around Fes. Muḥammad al-Ḥājj of Dilā', a murābit whose authority was, in its best days, wielded with sufficient grace and geographical extension for his partisans to think of him as "possessor" of the Maghrib (121), seems to have been granted the Fāsī oath of allegiance. But al-Duraydī, a petty military dictator with only localised power, seems not to have received the honour: "hīlf", or "confederation" had been considered the apposite term for moments of truce between the religious leaders of Fās al-Bālī, and this particular master of Fās al-Jadīd (122).

It seems clear that the city fathers were not at first disposed towards an extension of the bay<sup>c</sup>a to al-Rashīd. Eighteenth century tradition was driven to exonerate shurafā' and fugahā' for their lack of initial support for the invader. The claim arose that, at the time of al-Rashīd's entry into Fes, these eminent citizens, although staunch partisans of the intruder, were all incapable of acting on his behalf, as they were prisoners in al-Duraydī's house (123). This earnest and transparent piece of folklore does not account for the delay of three months which intervened between al-Rashīd's capture of Fes, and the formal reading out in his presence of the bay<sup>c</sup>a by which citizens proclaimed him sultan (124). However, the delay is understandable. For two years, since the victory of the Angad plain, al-Rashīd had been regarded as a threat to Fes: a brigand, with a mass

- (121) "wa kāna ra'īs muḥammad al-ḥājj malaka al-maghrib..." ("And the chieftain Muḥammad al-Ḥājj had possessed the Maghrib...") al-Yūsī: "Al-Muḥādarāt" quoted al-Zayyānī: "Turjumān" p. 9 of the text and 19 of the translation.
- (122) See P. 68 (Note (96)) for a juxtaposition of two relevant verbs: bay<sup>c</sup>a and hālafa.
- (123) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 178-9 Here the author is citing traditions current in his own day among the Fāsī intelligentsia.
- (124) According to "al-Fāsī chronicle" material, the date of al-Rashīd's entry into Fes was 3/Dhū 'l-Ḥijja/1076 = 6/6/1666. The date of the formal reading of the bay<sup>c</sup>a was 18/Rabī<sup>c</sup> I/1077 = 18/9/1666. ("Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above, pp. 177 and 185)

following of rural "easterners", his sharāna. Now he had taken the city by stealth, with the aid of its socially degraded Jewish community. Against this, apart from the factor of brute military power, there stood only al-Rashīd's claim to "sharīfian" birth. This, since the days of Sa<sup>c</sup>di power, may have been commonly regarded as essential to the status of a sultan. Al-Rashīd could and did exploit the advantage of his birth, in accordance with this doctrine (125). But "sharīfian" birth was hardly unusual.

Al-Rashīd, however, combined this birth with pragmatic military ascendancy. And, in the three months following his capture of Fes, the conqueror was able to consolidate the rural basis to this ascendancy. He secured his connections with two populous regions where he had been a successful raider, by entering into marriage alliances. Al-Lawātī of the Snassen was established in Fes as al-Rashīd's father-in-law, with his own palace, and a guard of abīd (126). The father-in-law developed a further, somewhat stylised role, that of "good genius" with a recognised licence to plead with al-Rashīd for the lives of others.<sup>10</sup> Selectivity within one of these pleas, which obtained mercy for a number of Christian nonentities, but sent a former captain-general of Melilla to his death (127), seems to indicate that al-Lawātī maintained his ties with Snassen country, which was within easy reach of Melilla. Parallel to the Snassen link was al-Rashīd's developed association with the Middle Rif. Here al-Rashīd adopted a policy of rapprochement with the A<sup>c</sup>rās. The clan was

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(125) "...and that he might oblige the People to a greater obedience, and more fidelity, he hath given out that he is of the Race of their Prophet Mahomet, and that according to that Law none ought to command in Chief, but one lineally descended from Mahomet." (S.L. p. 28)

(126) Mouatte: "Histoire..." pp. 26-7

(127) Mouatte: "Relation..." p. 56

restored to its Middle Rif influence, and one of its daughters, whom al-Rashīd had first taken to wife in the dealings of the previous year, brought into Fes (128).

Al-Rashīd went on to prove that, unlike his elder brother Muḥammad, the one-time ten-weeks sultan of Fes, he could act efficaciously in the open field. In the late summer of 1666, in an expedition mounted from Fes, al-Rashīd went out to defeat al-Khadir Ghaylān, near to that chieftain's home-base of Alcazarquivir (129). To Fes, the victory meant the removal of one potential menace. For Ghaylān had once, during his tussle with Dilā', come raiding as far as the city's environs (130). It is possible that the victory was accepted within the city as clear validation of the potential usefulness of al-Rashīd's martial capacities. On this point, understanding between al-Rashīd and Fes could have been mutual. Following the battle, the victor made no immediate attempt to winkle the defeated Ghaylān out of his coastal refuge in Arzilla, or to establish personal authority over the bare regions which Ghaylān had dominated. Instead, he returned to Fes, and was swiftly granted a bay'at, formal acceptance as sultan (131). The metropolis had fully accepted the "poacher" at last. He was willing to turn "gamekeeper".

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- (128) Fréjus p. 125 and Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 27-8  
 (129) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 185  
 cf. "Turjuman" p. 9 of the text and 18 of the translation  
 (130) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 106  
 (131) ibid. p. 185



CHAPTER II: A SULTANATE OF FES BECOMES A SULTANATE OF MEKNES

Al-Rashīd's government within Fes began as the token rein of an alliance: in its "sultān" the city had a military champion rather than a potent sovereign. Subsequently relations tautened. As al-Rashīd's territorial reach fanned out over the Maghrib al-Aqṣā until "only some Petty Lords of the Craggy Mountains" did "resist his Power" (1). he increased his scope for subordinating the knightly to the regal aspects of his government. But his interlock with the metropolis endured. Quintessentially al-Rashīd was always the "sultan of Fes". He continued to consult the interests of his capital, and to return there, as to his home base. Never, after the bay'ā of 1666, did he set eyes upon the "Cherg" or Tafilélt.

In his first months, the new sultan secured control of Meknes (2), the nearest town to Fes of any independent significance (3). He outrode a feeble challenge from Dilā': a Berber force, mounted within the Central Atlas for an attck upon Fes, dissolved before making any impact upon the city's rural environs (4). The hispanophone magnates of Sale freely acknowledged al-Rashīd's authority. To Mouṣṣte, this was craven behaviour for the citizenry of a "free town" (5). But, in its recent history, Sale had been noted more for turbulence than genuine political freedom (6). Moreover, it was, topographically, an estuary population cluster with an hinterland that contained only the forest of Mamora, and an area of

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(1) S.L. p. 29

(2) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 185

(3) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 31

(4) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. loc. cit. cf. Mouṣṣte: "Histoire..." pp. 30-31

(5) "...et Sallé, qui estoit une ville libre, aima mieux implorer sa clémence et se soumettre a luy que d'attendre qu'il l'allast visiter." (Mouṣṣte: "Histoire..." p. 29)

(6) See the thesis of B.A. Mojuetan Chapter III passim

thinly populated downland (7). Therefore it was a town whose prosperity depended upon the sea: upon privateering and upon maritime trade, and consequently upon the long-distance communications that were feeders to this trade. Al-Rashīd's defeat of Ghaylān, former master of the Saletin hinterland, and protector to the town's most recent pair of qā'idān (8), imposed upon Sale the necessity for a swift obeisance to the victor.

Tetuan, like Sale, was a town with a significant cosmopolitan trade. Like Sale, it contained an high proportion of inhabitants of "Morisco" descent (9). But whereas Sale faced the ocean from a bleak strand, Tetuan was embedded within a bustling rural economy and society. The interweave of Tetuan with its surrounding hill-country is clearly apparent from Braithwaite's Tiṭwānī notes, particularly those which describe a concerted rebellion of townsmen and hill-folk against attack by a former governor (10). Tetuan's refusal of immediate capitulation to al-Rashīd in 1666 is therefore comprehensible. But, as noted previously (11), Tetuan and its environs were economically important to Fes. Further, Martil, the port of Tetuan, carried maritime pilgrims from the metropolis (12). Therefore, as "sultan of Fes", al-Rashīd's first task was to draw Tetuan and the route thither back into the Fāsī economic orbit.

Early in 1667, al-Rashīd returned to Taza, possibly to round up

(7) Busnot p. 12

(8) S.I. 1<sup>re</sup> Pays-Bas Vol. V. Introduction p. xxvii Note based upon an unpublished Dutch record.

(9) See: J.D. Latham: "The Reconstruction and Expansion of Tetuan: the period of Andalusian Immigration" in "Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honour of Hamilton Gibb" ed. G. Makdisi (Leiden, 1965) pp. 387-408

(10) Braithwaite pp. 9-10 and 110

(11) See Chapter I pp. 50 and 53

(12) S.I. 1<sup>re</sup> France Vol. III No. CXXIX "Lettre écrite en réponse de diverses questions curieuses sur les Parties de l'Afrique ou règne aujourd'hui Muley Arxid, roy de Tafilet" (Paris, 1670). Hersin reproduced and edited as "Relation de Thomas le Gendre..." p. 712

a rural following from the Middle Rif, aliens to the so-called "Jabalī" domiciled to their west. After a spring return to Fes, he departed for the Western Rif, on what was effectively a Fāsī errand. He first attacked the Banū Zarwāl, the "Jabalī" grouping who, during the previous decade, had been the object of independent Fāsī punitive action. The local chieftain was sent back a prisoner to Fes (13). Two months later came al-Rashīd's capture of the town of Tetuan, and the arrest of leading members of its dominant clan, the Naqsīs (14). A campaign which seems to have taken place in the Taza region (15), and was perhaps ancillary to the demobilisation of a rural following, rounded off the military year.

Thus far, the new sultan had simply set his talents as a mugaddam to employment within the Fāsī economic orbit, to the benefit of the city as well as himself. His expedition of 1668 against Dilā' was politically a more sophisticated scheme. Fes had indeed shrugged off the Dilā' administrative yoke. But the eighteenth century nostalgia of the Fāsī author of the "Nashr al-Mathānī...", previously referred to (16), is clear indication that the zāwiya of Dilā' long retained a lingering religious prestige within Fes. Elimination of Dilā' therefore set al-Rashīd the hair-line task of crushing a centre of political power, while avoiding the manufacture of martyrs. Adroitly, the sultan evaded the slur of impiety by nominating, as city governor for the period of the campaign, a civic religious leader who epitomised an

(13) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 185 cf. Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 31-2

(14) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." loc. cit. cf. "Turjumān" p. 9 of the text and 18 of the translation.

(15) Here the "Turjumān" in its Houdas edition (loc. cit.) contains what appears to be a misreading, indicating, most improbably, a campaign against the Snassen (Banū Yisnāsīn). A parallel passage within the "Bustān al-Zarīf..." (MS p. 24) reads "Banū Yisnāga", and may thus refer to rural groupings of "Sanhaja", domiciled between Taza and the Middle Rif proper.

(16) See Prologue P. 25

urbane fusion of fiqh and wird: Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Fāsi, a faqīh from the city's own most noted religious community, the Jazūlī zāwiya of the al-Fāsi (17). This institution was affiliated to the same tarīqa as was Dilā' itself. But, as Gellner has recently pointed out, an urban setting gives to a religious fraternity functions and overtones quite alien from those pertaining within a rural setting (18), even today, when no zāwiya is an independent political power. In 1668, after the political tensions of the previous two decades, members of the zāwiyat al-Fāsi may well have looked upon Dilā' with more rivalry than brotherhood.

According to Mouṣṣte's informant, the Dilā'ī following within the Central Atlas had, since al-Rashīd's accession, been divided to the point of incapacitation (19). But something of a Dilā'ī force was gathered to oppose al-Rashīd's approaching army, only to be defeated in the Tadla in the June of 1668. Subsequently, the Dilā'ī religious community and its immediate dependents, including its Jews, were evacuated from the zāwiya buildings, and escorted with a studied chivalry, into Fes (20). The buildings were then razed to the ground. A succession of embarrassed authors, reporting this event, took refuge in a respect for both victor and vanquished (21). The prevailing tone

(17) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 191 of. "Turjumān" p. 9 of the text and 19 of the translation. Further information upon the al-Fāsi clan, together with a relevant family tree, is to be found within E. Lévi-Provençal's "Les Historiens des Chorfa" pp. 240-247

(18) E. Gellner: "Saints of the Atlas" London, 1969 p. 8

(19) Mouṣṣte: "Histoire..." pp. 30-31

(20) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 200 cf. "Turjumān" pp. 9-10 of the text and 19-20 of the translation cf. Chronicle of Sa'dya ibn Danān ed./tr. Vajda Text. no. XXI (Part II) from "Un recueil de textes..." in "Hespéris" Vol. XXXVI pp. 139-40

(21) Two eloquent proponents of this generous viewpoint were al-Qādirī, in his "Nashr al-Mathānī..." (Volume cited above. p. 200) and al-Nāsiri ("Kitāb al-Istiqṣā..." Casablanca text, Vol. VII pp. 36-8 cf. Fumey translation, A.M. Vol. IX pp. 49-51) A chivalrous exchange emanating from this literary theme is quoted by the contemporary Moroccan scholar Lakhdar. It epitomises regret that an imperfect world had thrust al-Rashīd and the Dilā'ī into mutual enmity ("La vie littéraire..." p. 50)

was set by a re-iterated quotation from the "Muḥadḍarat" of the shaykh al-Yūsī, the Maghrib al-Aqṣā's most famous seventeenth century man of letters (22). He was resident in the zāwiya at the time of its fall, and later wrote of the event in terms that had less to do with Central Atlas politics, than with setting up his master Muḥammad al-Ḥājj as an Islamic type of the philosopher king: an old man calming his anguished kinsmen with his understanding that God had decreed the end of their era (23).

This literary set-piece has drawn attention away from the pragmatic consequences of the fall of Dila'. Among these was a hasty scattering by al-Rashīd's other political opponents. Al-Khadīr Ghaylān, who had been skulking in Arzilla, took to the sea and retreated first to English Tangier (24) and then to Algiers (25). Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Sharīf, most prominent of the sultan's truculent nephews, withdrew from Tafilalet, apparently into the hills to its north (26). During the following months it was possible for al-Rashīd to send a gā'id out beyond Tafilalet to Tuat (27). And, still upon his crest of prestige, it was possible for the sultan, in the February of 1669, to exile the Dila'ī to Tlemsen (28). Clearly his absentee hold over the "Cherg" was sufficiently sure for him to trust that this holy family would be incapable of becoming a focus for "Chergi" disaffection.

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(22) For further information upon al-Yūsī, see Levi-Provencal: "Les Historiens des Chorfa..." pp. 269-72 cf. J. Berque: "Al-Yousi: problèmes de la culture marocaine au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle" (Paris, 1958)

(23) al-Yūsī quoted al-Qadiri: "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 200 cf. al-Zayyānī: "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 25 inter alia.

(24) Routh: "Tangier..." pp. 94-6

(25) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 201 cf. Routh p. 96

(26) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." loc. cit. cf. Mouḥtṭe: "Histoire..." p. 48

(27) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin p. 60

(28) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." loc. cit. cf. "Turjuman" p. 10 of the text and 20 of the translation.

No Fāsī source is so indelicate as to associate booty with the fall of Dilā'. But the extirpation of the great zāwiya was followed by a period during which silver was readily available within Fes. The metal was used to the mutual advantage of city and sultan. Al-Rashīd borrowed fifty-two quintals of silver from Fāsī merchants, as capital to finance the reconstruction of the Sebu bridge, which lay on the main route between Fes and Tetuan (29). And, in the May of 1669, there was minted a new silver currency, the Rashīdiya mūzūna (30). Its circulation seems to have put an end to the currency crises which had marked the previous decade.

Along with financial stability came stronger government. The sultan's next major military expedition was his bid for Marrakesh. In his absence, Fes would have, instead of a prominent civic faqīh, an <sup>c</sup>Alawī khalīfa as governor. This khalīfa, first of a pair of recognised and parallel lieutenants established by al-Rashīd, is virtually certain to have been Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl, the future sultan, and a prince known to the English of Tangier as "the king's onely brother...," (31). Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl was by no means al-Rashīd's only brother by blood. Mouëtte listed eight such brothers sufficiently prominent to be known to him by name (32). Further, disparity in age makes full-brotherhood unlikely. In 1669, al-Rashīd

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(29) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 201 cf. "Turjuman" p. 11 of the text and 21 of the translation. During 1669, an English Tetuan merchant noted that construction work for a bridge was actively underway, commanding the labour of masons and horses from towns in northern Morocco. (S.P. 71 (13) f. 196 Memo. of Robert Ffarindaill, Tetuan, 19/8/1669)

(30) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." loc. cit. cf. "Turjuman" loc. cit. The Rashīdiya coinage was still a prominent currency in Tuat, in the early twentieth century (Martin: "Quatre siècles..." pp. 13-14)

(31) S.P. 71 (13) f. 196 Memo. of Robert Ffarindaill, Tetuan, 19/8/1669

(32) Mouëtte: "Histoire..." pp. 14-15

was approaching forty (33), while Ismā'īl was in his early twenties (34). Ismā'īl must be seen as an "only brother" by designation, a distinguished cadet, singled out from a plethora of agnatic kinsmen because he was able and also young enough to be believed dependable. He had already been granted Meknes as a personal appanage (35). This in itself may have been a distinction. In Leo's day, Meknes had been granted to a favourite brother of the reigning Waṭṭāsīd sultan (36).

The extension of al-Rashīd's authority over Marrakesh and its Hawz is an enterprise which indigenous authors slide into the months immediately following the fall of Dila' (37). The event indeed poses an acute problem of chronology. But it seems most likely to have taken up the summer and autumn of 1669 (38).

It has been noted that, with the withering of Sa<sup>c</sup>dī government, Marrakesh had fallen to the domination of the Shabbānāt (39): an Hawz people of remarkable warrior panache, who had been bound to Sa<sup>c</sup>dī sultans by a series of marriage alliances spanning the period between

- (33) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 58 for the note that al-Rashīd was in his fortieth year when he died.
- (34) al-Ifrānī: "Zill al-warīf..." p. 32 for the note that Ismā'īl was born in 1056 = 1646-7
- (35) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 28
- (36) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 31 cf. (for the identification of the prince)  
Leo ed. Epaulard et. al. Vol. I p. 176 (Note 91)
- (37) The "al-Fāsī chronicle" seems to have recorded that Marrakesh had fallen to al-Rashīd by the beginning of September 1668, less than three months after the fall of Dila' ("Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 200 cf. (for a more impressionistic chronology) "Turjuman" p. 10 of the text and 20 of the translation.)
- (38) This is the chronology of MouÛtte ("Histoire..." pp. 33-6) and, less precisely, of contemporary English evidence (S.P. 71 (13) ff. 196 and 260-263 Memo. of R. Ffarindaill dated Tetuan, 19/8/1669 and Letter of Lord Howard to Charles II dated Tangier 13/11/1669). As well as conflicting with the "al-Fāsī chronicle" as noted above (Note (37)), this chronology conflicts with the Spanish text of Del Puerto, which also dates al-Rashīd's capture of Marrakesh to 1668. However, the latter text is internally suspect. It associates the capture with negotiations said to have taken place in Fes during the months of 1668 when al-Rashīd was pre-occupied with Dila' (Bk. V; Ch XXXIX; p. 595)
- (39) See Chapter I Pp. 54-5

the reign of Ahmad al-Mansūr and the regicide of 1659 (40). In al-Zayyānī's day, the Shabbānāt would be classed, along with associated Arabic-speaking peoples, as "Ma<sup>c</sup>qil", supposedly the descendents of immigrants from the south, or "Qibla", who had come to serve the Sa<sup>c</sup>dī rulers in a military capacity (41). But, in the seventeenth century, the Shabbānāt had their own peculiar myth of origin, which may have served to heighten amongst them a sense of "nous autres", by setting them apart even from Arabic-speaking neighbours. It was claimed that their ancestors were European captives, brought from Spain by the Almohade, Ya'qūb al-Mansūr (42).

The Murrākushī government of Karūm al-Hājī, the usurping Shabbānāt chieftain, was variously estimated. Al-Ifrānī allowed him a sketchy note of approval (43), but European commentators reported that his rule was unpopular (44). He died during the months before al-Rashīd moved upon Marrakesh (45) and was briefly succeeded by his son Abū Bakr. Del Puerto alleged that the death of Karūm al-Hājī actually precipitated a Murrākushī civic invitation to the "sultan of Fes" (46). Such collusion would explain the remarkable ease with which

- (40) S.I. 1<sup>re</sup> Angleterre Vol. III No. XLII Extract from the anonymous "Tragicall life and death of Muley Abdala Melek..." (Delft, 1633) p. 193 cf. "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." ed./tr. Houdas pp. 257-8 of the text, and 428 of the translation.
- (41) "wa ammā ha'ulā'i zirāra wa 'l-shabbānāt wa awlād jirār wa awlād mtā<sup>c</sup> fa-innahum kānū jundīya ma<sup>c</sup>a mulūk al-sa<sup>c</sup>dīya"  
 ("As for the Zirāra and the Shabbānāt and the Awlād Jirār and the Awlād Mtā<sup>c</sup>, they were the military force of the Sa<sup>c</sup>dī kings")  
 ("Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 30)
- (42) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 39-40 cf. S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. II No. XXXVI Anon: "Voyage de M. le Baron de St. Amant" (Paris, 1698), reproduced as "Journal du Voyage de St. Amans" pp. 337-8
- (43) "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." ed./tr. Houdas p. 287 of the text and 477 of the translation.
- (44) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 34 cf. Del Puerto Bk. V Ch. XXXIX p. 595
- (45) "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." loc. cit.
- (46) Del Puerto loc. cit.



al-Rashīd took the "red city". After conducting a casual lateral campaign into the "Jabal <sup>C</sup>Ayyāshī" (47), a north western cheek of the High Atlas, the northern column was able swiftly to enter the southern capital and there obliterate the authority of Abū Bakr ibn Karūm al-Hājī. This acceptance of a "sultan of Fes" within Marrakesh "sin correr mucha sangre" (48), could have had an economic undertow. Al-Ifrānī associated the rule of Karūm al-Hājī with a Murrākushī famine (49). And it is known to have been customary during the period for the region of Marrakesh to import grain from its north (50). During a period of unusual food-shortage, al-Rashīd's army could have taken on the guise of a relief-column. A gaggle of merchants typically accompanied any haraka (51). On this occasion, such merchants, bringing with them the comestible spoils of a lateral raid, could well have been taken into Marrakesh as welcome visitors.

Lack of Murrākushī civic opposition provided al-Rashīd with scope for a political purge which offered a sharp contrast to the gloved treatment he had meted out to the Dilā'ī. Abū Bakr and a number of other living members of the family of Karūm al-Hājī were executed. And, with gruesome symbolism, the body of the dead chieftain himself was exhumed from its place within the Sa<sup>C</sup>dī tombs and burned (52). Here it would seem that al-Rashīd was exaggerating his own honour with a pageant of concern for the defunct Sa<sup>C</sup>dī, implying that it was lèse majesté

- (47) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 201
- (48) Del Puerto Bk. V Ch. XXXIX p. 595
- (49) "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." ed./tr. Houdas p. 287 of the text and 477 of the translation.
- (50) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 p. 700
- (51) Chronicle of Sa<sup>C</sup>dya ibn Danān ed./tr. Vajda Text no. XXI (Part II) from "Un recueil de textes..." in "Hespéris" Vol. XXXVI p. 141 cf. al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed. Justinard p. 51
- (52) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 35 cf. "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." loc. cit. cf. Del Puerto Bk. V Ch. XXXIX p. 596

for Karūm al-Hāj̄j, a simple warlord, to have put a "sharīfian" sultan to death.

In its metropolitan role, Marrakesh was entropôt to a wide segment of the inward-facing Atlas. This made it appropriate for the conqueror to forge his way from the biddable "red city" into the less biddable mountains. In an extension of his summer campaign, al-Rashīd took mountain fortresses (53), and seems to have been able to cross the Atlas into inner Sus (54). But he was drawn back from the Sus by northerly concerns. A group of his dissident kinsmen, headed by sons of his brother Muḥammad, had infiltrated the mountains above Taza (55) at a season when, for this particular year, the pilgrimage caravan might be threatened. So al-Rashīd prepared to withdraw to Fes. He appointed a second khalīfa, a nephew, Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz, to be keeper of the city of Marrakesh.

The role of Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz did not exactly counter-balance the role of Ismā'īl within Fes. The lad was less than twenty years of age (56) and his command, absolute in formality, may be interpreted as the installation of a figurehead to <sup>C</sup>Alawī forces. Although established "pour califfe ou vice-roy du royaume, avec une autorité absolue" he had "pres de luy des capitaines experimentez" (57). Associated with elevation to office was the khalīfa's marriage with Lalla Maryam, a Sa<sup>C</sup>dī princess (58). The alliance may have been designed to epitomise

(53) S.P. 71 (13) f. 196 Memo. of Thomas Warren, dated Tangier 30/8/1669

(54) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 36 cf. S.P. 71 (13) f. 265 Lord Howard to Charles II, Tangier, 13/11/1669

(55) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 48, as compared with the garbled "al-Fāsī chronicle" material reproduced in the "Nashr al-Mathani..." (ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 209), citing the sultan's nephews as the nephews of "al-Abyad". English notes support MouÛtte's identification of the sultan's enemies (S.P. 71(13) (second notation) ff. 37 and 131 Lord Howard to Charles II, Tangier, 10/2/1670 N.S. and 24/4/1670)

(56) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 57-8

(57) ibid. p. 35

(58) ibid. pp. 35 and 61 cf. S.P. 71 (13) ff. 260 and 263, Lord Howard to Charles II, Tangier, 13/11/1669.

for the benefit of the Murrākushī, an <sup>C</sup>Alawī succession to Sa<sup>C</sup>dī government of their city. At the same time, it neatly disassociated al-Rashīd himself from any suggestion that he might need such a buttress to his personal authority. As Lalla Maryam was also kin to the Shabbānāt, the marriage may also be seen as a diplomatic bauble tossed in the direction of the Shabbānāt masses, still undefeated in the Hawz (59).

The winter of 1669-70 saw the flight or execution of al-Rashīd's enemy kinsmen from the Taza region (60). Their removal set al-Rashīd free to make a definitive bid for the elimination of Illigh, and the military mastery of inner Sus, which was now the only significant region of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā which did not see al-Rashīd as its suzerain. To bid for the entire Sus was ambitious. In addition to a mountain shell, the region had its man-made defences:

"...quantité de châteaux et de villages ou les Barbares sont fortifiés. Ils y ont chacun deux ou trois armes, pour changer, en quoy ils fondent leurs richesses. Les Susis sont plus adroits aux armes et plus guerriers que tous les autres Barbares." (61)

The fire-arms and associated gunpowder were largely of local manufacture, but could be respected by an European commentator (62)

Yet the attractions of the Sus were manifold. The region had the glint of riches. The "inner Sus" valley had been noted in commonplace, from the time of Idrīsī, for its canny industry (63). And comment from the early <sup>C</sup>Alawī period vouches for Sūsī prosperity. The region was

(59) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 37-8

(60) ibid. p. 48 cf. S.P. 71 (13) Second notation ff. 37 and 131 Lord Howard to Charles II, Tangier 10/2/1670 N.S. and 27/4/1670

(61) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 198

(62) Anon: "Journal du Voyage de St. Amans..." p. 336

(63) Dozy and de Goeje: "Description de l'Afrique...." pp. 61-2 of the text and 71-2 of the translation.

known for its mineral wealth, which included veins of the money metals silver and copper (64). In food-production, it countered a degree of aridity with a rich and commercially developed sea-fishery (65). Most vitally, the Sus seems to have contained, at this period, the most significant route by which trans-Saharan gold filtered into the Maghrib al-Aqṣā. This point is open to question (66). Contemporary European reporters from the early <sup>c</sup>Alawī period tend to give remote-hand accounts of Moroccan "Guinea" trade, which lack attention to precise detail (67). But there are notes which suggest that, over northerly reaches, the predominant trans-Saharan route in employment was aimed at the Sus, and swung even further to the west than did Jawdar Pasha's Lektaoua road to Timbuktu (68). <sup>c</sup>Alī Abū Ḥassūn, murābit of Illigh for over thirty years (69), is said to have enjoyed the profits of a periodic caravan trade with Timbuktu (70). In his prime he had been described, presumably with geographical grandiloquence, as:

- (64) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. XCIII Memo. of consul Périllié on Moroccan trade, Sale, Jan. 1689 p. 234
- (65) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo of J.-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 p. 703
- (66) The mid-seventeenth century is a dark age for the study of trans-Saharan traffic. It lies midway between two rich fields of study: the classic gold-centred mediaeval period, of which the most recent investigation is contained within the work of V. Magalhães-Godinho: "L'économie de l'empire Portugais aux XV<sup>e</sup> et XVI<sup>e</sup> siècles" (Paris, 1969) pp. 100-127; and the nineteenth century, which has provoked re-examination of the trade as a comprehensive exchange of commodities, work pioneered by J.-L. Miège in "Le Maroc et L'Europe..." Vol. II pp. 146-54; Vol. III pp. 74-5 and 358-66; and Vol. IV pp. 381-85
- (67) See, for example, the "Relation de Thomas le Gendre" pp. 706-12 and Windus pp. 210-13
- (68) See H. de Castries: "La Conquête du Soudan par el-Mansour (1591)" and its appendix "Relation de l'Anonyme Espagnol" in "Hespéris" Vol. III (Paris, 1923) pp. 433-478, for an analysis of the route from the Dar<sup>a</sup> to the Niger bend, which would seem, from comparison with Leo (ed. Ramusio f. 73) to have prevailed within trans-Saharan traffic from the Maghrib al-Aqṣā, throughout the sixteenth century.
- (69) "Relation de Thomas le Gendre" p. 705
- (70) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. I No. LXII Memo. of H. Prat, Marseille, 8/6/1669, p. 271.

"Siddy Ali of the South, who hath cutt of the golden trade and usurpes in Suz the province scituate between Atlas and the river Senega." (71)

It seems probable that, over this period, any Fāsī bound for the Niger bend made use of a prevailing parabolic westerly route that avoided the appalling Tanézrouft, rather than travel more directly by way of Tafilelt and Tuat. Fāsī rumour of MouÛtte's day associated the road to the "country of the blacks", and access to its fabled wealth, with control of the Sus (72), rather than control of Tafilelt or Tuat. And, towards the end of the seventeenth century, imperial gold caravans are said to have proceeded towards the north of the empire by way of Tamanart in the coastal slopes of the High Atlas (73).

The extension of al-Rashīd's military authority southwards to cover the entire Sus may therefore be seen as an enterprise likely to have had Fāsī backing. But the sultan seems nevertheless to have made the city a concession, in order to purchase its continuing support over the period of his absence. This probable concession was the removal of an imperial nuisance from the civic environs: those shorāqa, or "easterners", who had accompanied al-Rashīd in his progress towards Fes. Upon the city's northerly outskirts were laid the foundations of a fortress, the "Qasbat al-Khamīs". Its name is associated with the shorāqa, a party of whom were supposedly detailed to build it (74). But it is known that, at the time of MouÛtte's ransom, in 1680, the fortress remained incomplete, supposedly because of the threat to Fes which

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(71) S.I. 1<sup>re</sup> Anleterre Vol. III No. XCIII Anon. Leconfield MS No. 73: "A brief relation of some latter occurrents in the state and kingdom of Morocco" dated by the editor to c. 1638 p. 468

(72) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 43, 135-7 and 197

(73) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CI Nemo. of J-B. Estelle. Sale, 29/7/1697 p. 529

(74) "Turjuman" p. 11 of the text and 23 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 27

its commanding position would have allowed it to impose (75). This lack of completion is in line with a tradition recorded by al-Zayyānī; that the Fāsī were able to persuade al-Rashīd to set his sharāqa at a distance from the city, and quarter them upon lands between the Sebu and Warga (76). Here the sharāqa could present no immediate threat to Fes, or to its suburban stipple of orchards and vegetable plots (77); but, as a "jaysh", or grouping distinguished for land-tenure by military service, they could act to Fāsī advantage, as a rough-handed "government presence" near to a section of the route from Fes to Tetuan. A clue to the date of the displacement is an incident from 1670: the public execution within Fes of a party of highway robbers from the Awlād Jamā<sup>c</sup>a (78), a grouping from the rural region to which al-Rashīd's sharāqa were allegedly dismissed. Their arrest could have been symptomatic of the activity of newly settled sharāqa.

Isma<sup>c</sup>īl, the khalīfa of Fes may thus have been deprived of a close-settled horde of <sup>c</sup>Alawī supporters. But he was granted a fillip to his personal status. In the April of 1670, apparently as a preliminary to the coming campaign, the sultan arranged for his brother a marriage, celebrated with sufficient splendour to receive notice within "al-Fāsī chronicle" (79). The alliance seems likely to have been politically significant, designed to balance the favour

(75) "Hors la ville, dans un lieu appelé le Commice, est un château que Mouley Archy avoit commencé, et qui est demeuré imparfait, pour le prejudice qu'il apporteroit si ceux qui auroient esté dedans s'y fussent soulevez, à cause qu'il est sur un lieu éminent et commande la ville, qui est dans une plaine" (Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 188)

(76) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 27

(77) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 183 cf. R. le Tourneau: "Fes avant le Protectorat" pp. 483-7

(78) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 211 cf. "Turjuman" p. 11 of the text and 22 of the translation

(79) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 209 cf. "Turjuman" p. 21 of the text and 11 of the translation

previously granted to Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz. But there seems no justification for al-Nāṣirī's allegation that Ismā'īl's bride was, like the bride of his fellow-khalīfa, a woman of Sa'dī birth (80). It is possible that she was the "princesse de Touet", whom Mouette alleged had been married to Ismā'īl in 1666, as a preliminary to an earlier campaign (81). For, in 1666, al-Rashīd is unlikely to have been in contact with Tuat, then granting temporary shelter to his exiled nephew Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad. But by 1670, his qā'id al-Nāṣir is known to have laid claim to the region (82). This marriage may have cemented the claim.

But, for 1670, any Tawātī link was overshadowed by the Sūsī venture. Al-Rashīd's High Atlas victories of the previous year were enough to give even the Shabbānāt the hope of rich Sūsī pickings to come. When al-Rashīd's southbound army reached Marrakesh, Shabbānāt warriors abandoned their skirmishes with the forces of Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz, and rallied to the sultan of the "Gharb" (83). This may have amounted to al-Rashīd's re-inforcement by several thousand cavalymen (84). The Shabbānāt were followed by a mass of Haha peoples who flooded to al-Rashīd's haraka as it took the coastal route southwards. They were joining a general with an unbroken record of victory who no longer needed formally to ally himself with rural hordes: all offers of matrimonial connections were refused (85).

The Sūsī campaign was no total pacification of the "Chleuh" heart-

(80) "Kitāb al-Istiqsā..." Casablanca text, Vol. VII p. 30 cf. Fumey translation, A.M. Vol. IX p. 53

(81) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 28

(82) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaiā" quoted Martin pp. 59 and 60-61

(83) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 40-41

(84) Both Mouette and an anonymous English commentator casually but independently put the fighting strength of the Shabbānāt, within their "Hawz" home-country, at six thousand ("Histoire..." p. 67 cf. S.P. 71 (14) f. 259 Anonymous Memo. dated Sale, 1/5/1673)

(85) "Tous les checs des Arabes...le vinrent trouver avec plusieurs présens et lui amenèrent plusieurs de leurs filles...Mouley Archy...refusa les filles qui lui avoient esté présentées, et, sans les voir. les chargea de présens et les remit entre les mains de leurs pères" (Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 41)

land. But it involved the elimination of Illigh as a node of political power. The reigning murābit, Muḥammad ibn <sup>c</sup>Alī Abū Ḥassūn, was brought into confrontation with al-Rashīd at the end of a decade during which Illigh had been at the eye of complex internecine rivalry (86). In 1670, his divided clan definitively lost to al-Rashīd the control of major Sūsī economic centres, including Tarudant (87). The murābit himself fled southwards from Illigh. Allegedly he went towards an allied "kingdom of the Sudan" (88). By this kingdom, contemporaries presumably meant Bambara Segou. Despite rumours to the contrary, echoes perhaps of the trans-Saharan expeditions of the reign of Aḥmad al-Mansūr, it seems highly unlikely that al-Rashīd pursued his enemy southwards across the desert, or came into personal confrontation with the forces of Segou (89). For, over the winter of 1670-71, the sultan is known to have been back within the "Gharb" (90). In his train came the Shabbānāt who, together with <sup>c</sup>abīd or black slave soldiers, were the troops most closely associated with al-Rashīd's two last years (91).

Fes may thus have engineered the removal of one alien body of troops, only to be irked by the proximity of the equally alien Shabbānāt. And by this date, the sultan's line of victories may be

(86) "Relation de Thomas le Gendre" p. 705

(87) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 36 and 41-2 cf. "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 210-11 cf. "Turjuman" p. 11 of the text and 22 of the translation.

(88) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 43

(89) This rumour, apparently an eddy within an European tradition of writing headed by Mouette, was still current, with flamboyant ramifications, in the days when James Grey Jackson was consul in Mogador, more than a century after the supposed event ("An account of the Empire of Morocco" London, 1809 p. 295 and footnote to pp. 295-6). The developed tale, with its unconvincing suggestion of a counter-invasion of the Sus from Segou, was taken up by M. Delafosse and set into "Haut-Sénégal-Niger" (Tome I) (Paris, 1912 pp. 247-8) and into the same author's "Les débuts des troupes noires au Maroc" in "Hespéris" Vol. III (Paris, 1923 pp. 1-11)

(90) Mouette: "Relation..." p. 57 cf. "Turjuman" p. 11 of the text and 22 of the translation.

(91) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 44, 48 and 67



thought to have set him above the challenge of a querulous citizenry as to his personal following. Echoes of al-Rashīd's heightened power around the metropolis in the aftermath of the 1670 Sūsī campaign are to be found in MouÛtte's allegation of the sultan's latter-day bullying of citizens (92). But there were concurrent compensations for Fes. Much of the profit of the Sūsī campaign seems to have been ploughed back into the metropolis. A Fāsī building programme gives some indication of the scale of these profits. Into this programme there was set the most impressive of grace-notes to relations between sultan and city: the madrasat al-Sharratīn, allegedly "le plus magnifique" (93) of any such institution in Fes. A library was added to the southern face of the Qarawīyyīn (94). And a new palace was built in Fās al-Jadīd, for al-Rashīd himself (95). Its associated economy would have been tied firmly to the metropolis.

The sultan could now afford luxuries outside the range of finance. Such were certain niceties of prestige appropriate to a Muslim ruler: a local pilgrimage for himself, and the despatch of a mujaḥid cavalry force to harass English Tangier (96). These moves aligned with ordinances designed to enforce public morality (97). All, together with the building programme, filled out al-Rashīd's governmental image. Further, the once tireless military champion made a bid towards becoming a palace ruler. He set a subordinate general from the A<sup>C</sup>rās in command

(92) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 45

(93) ibid. p. 185 cf. "Turjumān" p. 11 of the text and 22 of the translation

(94) Lakhdar: "La vie littéraire..." p. 48. The information is taken from an inscription set into the relief of the library masonry.

(95) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 186-7 cf. "Turjumān" pp. 11 of the text and 22-3 of the translation

(96) "Turjumān" pp. 11-12 of the text and 23 of the translation  
cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 27

(97) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 45

of a follow-up expedition into the Sus (98). It was probably from this expedition that there was despatched the token force which, in the September of 1671, arrived in Timbuktu to receive the formal allegiance of its warring "Orman" factions (99).

In less than six years, al-Rashīd had risen from the standing of a marauder at the gates of Fes, to that of suzerain over a vast territorial span. But, outside of Fes, where his government can be seen in terms of a rough, but on-going understanding with the citizenry, al-Rashīd's authority seems to have had little basis beyond the prestige that sprang from an accumulated chain of striking but lucky victories. Further, there was an in-built flaw to this authority. The elevation of two khalīfatān carried obvious risk. And, while al-Rashīd hunted in the Rif, during the early months of 1672, he heard that Ahmad ibn Muhriz had gone, with Marrakesh, into open rebellion (100). The episode was short-lived. The young prince was betrayed and captured while trying to make for Christian soil. He was sent in disgrace to Tafilelt (101). His uncle thereby inaugurated the imperial <sup>c</sup>Alawī development of Tafilelt as a spreading "dower house" for less favoured kinfolk (102). Marrakesh submitted once again to al-Rashīd. Chance prevented this submission from being more than a passing nod. In the April of 1672, al-Rashīd died in his prime: he was unexpectedly killed in a riding accident in a

(98) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 221 cf. "Turjumān" p. 12 of the text and 23 of the translation.

(99) Anon. "Tadhkirat al-nisyan fī akhbār mulūk al-sūdān" ed./tr. O. Houdas and E. Benoist as "Tedzkirat en-Nisiān..." (Paris, 1899 and 1901) pp. 158 of the text and 257-8 of the translation.

(100) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 54 cf. "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. loc. cit.

(101) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 58

(102) For this function of Tafilelt in Ismā'īl's day, see Busnot (Chapter III *passim*). Gerhardt Rohlfs described the developed <sup>c</sup>Alawī percolation of nineteenth century Filālī society ("Reise durch Marokko" Bremen, 1868, part translated by de Tonnac as "Le Tafilelt d'après Gerhardt Rohlfs" in "Renseignements Coloniaux" Aug. 1910 Vol. II pp. 243-57).

Murrākushī park.

One memory of al-Rashīd would be that of a sultan whose reign had compounded the civic delights of open roads and low prices. MouÛtte passed on Fāsī nostalgia to this effect (103). The nostalgia was probably heightened by the disorder which followed al-Rashīd's death. The main current within this turbulence may be seen, ironically, to have been determined by al-Rashīd's own pre-arrangement of the political arena within his empire. This current was immediately vitalised by the unexpected removal of its author. Succession to al-Rashīd in 1672 was bound to involve a tussle. Al-Rashīd had sons of his own (104). But the two boys "en bas age" noted as being under the Fāsī tutelage of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl at the end of their father's reign (105) are likely to have been offspring of one or both of the sultan's politically significant A<sup>c</sup>rās and Snassen marriages. If adult, princes of such birth would have been able to attract the military support of their akhwāl or maternal "kin". But the succession of a minor was out of the question. Further, al-Rashīd's expulsion of rival chieftains from the Maghrib al-Aqṣā meant that only an <sup>c</sup>Alawī prince could make a swift bid to be sultan. And, of <sup>c</sup>Alawī candidates, only the two khalīfatān, Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl and Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz, were possessed of significant political and military status. A third prince, al-Ḥarrān, brother to al-Rashīd and to Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl, had shadowy ambitions. But, in 1672, he had only the weak base of Tafilelt, where he had been al-Rashīd's <sup>c</sup>Alawī governor (106).

The immediate succession crisis was a predictable race for acclamation

(103) "...les chemins qui avoient toujours esté remplis de voleurs, furent rendus libres. Et par ce moyen le commerce estant assuré, l'abondance commença a regner en tous lieux, et toutes choses devinrent à...bon marché" (MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 45)

(104) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 338

(105) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 61-2

(106) ibid. p. 28

between Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl and Ahmad ibn Muḥriz. Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl had the immediate advantage of proximity to Fes, and the city formally acknowledged him (107). Ahmad ibn Muḥriz, despite the support of al-Ḥarrān, and a summons from Tafilelt by his Murrākushī allies, was unable to organise his position in the south with sufficient speed to prevent Marrakesh also from falling to his rival (108). So, following the standard dissident's pattern of retreat to a strategically placed rural region, the former Murrākushī khalīfa withdrew to the High Atlas. There he allied with the shaykh of "Guilaoa", or "Glāwī", who dominated the "al-Fayja" mountain saddle which separated the "Ḥawz" of Marrakesh from the Dar<sup>c</sup>a valley (109)

Meanwhile Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl, in Marrakesh, arranged for a symbolic move which implied rejection of the southern capital, and a counter-identification of al-Rashīd's memory both with Fes and with himself. He brought his brother's remains northwards, to be re-interred within the mausoleum of a Fāsī scholar-saint, <sup>c</sup>Alī ibn Ḥirzihim (110). As a "douceur" towards Fes, this failed. Fās al-Bālī was set to negotiate the terms upon which it would truly accept a successor to al-Rashīd. In the late August of 1672, the Fāsī citizenry mounted a surprise attack upon a column of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's troops, about to leave the city's outskirts for Tafilelt (111). The city then summoned Ahmad ibn Muḥriz, barely known within the north, to be a figurehead to its resistance (112). The defection of the metropolis touched off a wider dissolution of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's authority. The

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(107) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 221 cf. "Turjuman" p. 12 of the text and 24 of the translation.

(108) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 62-4

(109) ibid. p. 65

(110) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 224 cf. "Turjuman" loc. cit.

(111) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 67 cf. "Nashr al-Mathānī..." loc. cit.

(112) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 68 cf. "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. pp. 224-5 cf. "Turjuman" p. 13 of the text and 25 of the translation.

Shabbānāt precipitately abandoned the new sultan, and returned, bag and baggage, to the Hawz, in order to lay siege to Marrakesh upon their own account (113). Peoples of the Sebu valley, or "inner Gharb", summoned al-Khadir Ghaylān back from his exile in Algiers. In the November of 1672, he was ushered by the Algerine Turks towards Tetuan, in the company of certain Tiṭwānī Naqsīs exiles. He was well received throughout his own former sphere of influence (114).

Meanwhile, Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz had left the al-Fayja region, and come by a date route from Tafilelt to Taza, by way of Debdu (115). He came in the autumn, and was accompanied by a Fīlālī force (116) which could well have been a rabble of date-vendors. In Taza he received notable re-inforcements, sent out from Fās al-Bālī (117). Yet he did not dare to approach the metropolis. Meanwhile, Ismāʿīl was reluctant to confront the capital. He maintained a small garrison of abīd in Fās al-Jadīd (118), but moved the mass of his available troops against Taza (119), leaving orders that the garrison should not engage in combat with the Fāsī citizenry upon its own initiative (120). Civic leaders organised attacks upon the fortifications surrounding the "old city". One notable sortie was led by

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(113) ".....en plein midy, plians leurs bagages, les mirent sur leurs chameaux, avec leurs femmes et leurs enfans...Ils furent mettre le siège devant Maroc, après avoir ruiné tout le país par où ils passèrent." (Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 67-8) cf. S.P. 71 (14) ff. 259 and (copy) 260 Anonymous Memo. dated Sale, 1/5/1673)

(114) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 69 cf. "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.W. Vol. XXIV p. 225

(115) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 68 cf. "Nashr al-Mathānī..." loc. cit.

(116) Mouette: "Histoire..." loc. cit.

(117) cf. ibid. p. 69 cf. "Relation..." p. 67  
cf. S.P. 71(14) ff. 259 and (copy) 260 Anonymous Memo. dated Sale 1/5/1673

(118) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 70

(119) ibid. p. 69

(120) S.P. 71 (14) ff 259 and (copy) 260 Anonymous Memo. dated Sale, 1/5/1673

an Idrissid sharīf (121). In the spring of 1673, the Fāsī "Grandees" were allegedly "resolved to dye rather than surrender" (122). They could be resolute in the unlikelihood of starvation: it is for this period that the "al-Fāsī chronicler" delineated the deprivations of the "Grandees" under siege conditions in terms of the difficulties of obtaining sheep for the due celebration of the sacrifice of <sup>C</sup>Id al-Kabīr (123).

Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl gained the ascendancy after deciding upon a lateral military gamble that proved successful. He shifted his attentions away from Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz in Taza, and towards the western plains, where Ghaylān was established. A minor spring campaign, led by a lieutenant of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's, failed to dislodge the mujaḥid (124). So, in the June of 1673, Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl himself moved the mass of his forces into the environs of Alcazarquivir. Here they met with Ghaylān's followers, dispersed and placidly harvesting (125). The mujaḥid was killed during the ensuing battle. Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl was able to take control of routes which Ghaylān had previously dominated. These included the routes linking Fes with Tetuan and with Sale. Subsequently Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl moved upon Fes, in order peaceably to open negotiations with the city (126). After intensive debate, the city fathers decided to receive him (127). But their ceremonial reconciliation with their sultan was devoid of any civic humiliation. <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī, shaykh of the city zāwiya, and, in MouÛtte's terms "le plus fameux magicien de toute la ville", went hand in hand

(121) "Mouley Drice, l'un des plus fameux de leurs saints et qui descendoit du fondateur de cette ville." (MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 70)

(122) S.P. 71 (14) ff. 259 and (copy) 260 Anon. Memo. dated Sale, 1/5/1673

(123) See Prologue P. 18

(124) S.P. 71 (14) ff. 259 and (copy) 260 Anon. Memo. dated Sale, 1/5/1673

(125) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 71-2

(126) ibid., pp. 73-4

(127) ibid. p. 74

with Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl to the tomb of al-Rashīd, and there exacted from the sultan an oath of peace (128). This was an identification of al-Rashīd with Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl that was made upon the terms of the city, rather than the terms of the sultan.

Entry into Fes gave Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl an immediate advantage in his dynastic duel. Ahmad ibn Muḥriz had made use of his rival's westward diversion against Ghaylān to repeat certain of the "Chergi" moves which had preceded al-Rashīd's career of victory. He had allied himself with sons of al-Lawātī, and captured Dār ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al (129). These moves were now pre-empted. Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl was able to move eastward from Fes along the Taza corridor. By the spring of 1674, he had established his authority over Dār ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al and its environs, and punished the groupings who had rallied to his rival. Ahmad ibn Muḥriz withdrew to Tafilelt, where presumably his Fīlālī following dissolved. He then retreated to the Dar<sup>c</sup>a (130). Dynastic victory did not restore Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's personal confidence in the political security of the "Cherg". It seems to have been at this period that the Dilā<sup>c</sup>ī exiles within Tlemsen were summoned back westwards, and ordered to settle in Fes (131).

The city was about to receive the counter-blow for its proudly calculated period of one year, two months and eighteen days' resistance to Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl (132). He prepared to slide from under the inherited mantle

(128) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 74 cf "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 234

<sup>c</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī had an indigenous reputation as a miracle-worker, to which one of his sons devoted a work of filial piety, entitled "Tuhfat al-akābir fī manāqib al-shaykh <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Qādir" (Lakhdar: "La vie littéraire..." p. 79)

(129) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 73

(130) ibid, pp. 75-6

(131) This summons took place at some point preceding a Tilimsānī revolt against its Turkish garrison, dated to Rajab 1085 = Oct.-Nov. 1674. Al-Qādirī rendered thanks that, by this date, the Dilā<sup>c</sup>ī had left Tlemsen and were therefore safe from harm ("Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 244)

(132) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 234

of a "sultan of Fes", by abandoning personal identification with the metropolis, and associating the seat of government with a more docile town: his old appanage of Meknes. Preparations for the withdrawal began in 1674, when the foundations of a new Miknāsī palace complex were begun (133). Meknes, at a distance of forty miles, was too near to Fes to be considered in political isolation from the great city. In the mid eighteenth century,<sup>de</sup> Chenier noted that, in good weather, it was possible to make the return journey from Meknes to Fes within a single day (134). But there was a tradition of enmity between the two places (135). Meknes was the nearest urban centre to Fes with any pretensions to economic independence. Its environs were noted for agricultural prosperity, and for the existence of a large and valuable salt pan (136). In the declining days of the Waṭṭāsīd sultanate, the Miknāsī orbit had allegedly produced one third of the revenues of the "kingdom of Fes" (137). The place was therefore well-suited to the establishment of a gobbling palace economy.

The initial palace establishment was skeletal, comprising building labourers and guards. But even the transfer of building labour from Fes to Meknes meant the transfer of an enterprise and a consumer group. The enterprise was considerable. The qā'id who was made superintendent of the building site was also made titular governor of Meknes, and of Tamesna, the modern Chaouia, in order that he might have financial

(133) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 111

(134) L.S. de Chenier, 1788 English translation Vol. I. pp. 82-3

(135) Leo had somewhat naively noted of the Miknāsī populace: "tengono grande odio col popolo di Fez, ne si fa alcuna manifesta cagione!" (ed. Ramusio f. 31)

(136) Busnot p. 248

(137) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 31



scope for buying in the materials necessary for the construction of the palace (138). The consumer group was similarly considerable. The palace building force may never have reached the vast complement of 30,000 attributed to it in the late estimate of Windus (139). But it is likely always to have numbered thousands. For the mode of construction in use, that of pounding "tabby", an earth-lime mixture, between a framework of wooden boards (140), did require intensive labour. The Meknes building workers are a body whom it has been customary to regard simply with compassion (141). But its small and, from the point of view of source-material, heavily over-exposed Christian minority, is known to have been by no means penniless (142). And its sad indigenous majority, made up from rural levies, and from convicted criminals (143), did at least require feeding.

Three years would elapse before there was any major transfer of high palace personnel from Fes to Meknes. In the interim, Isma<sup>c</sup>īl survived a double political crisis centred upon Marrakesh. In the summer of 1674, the sultan took an haraka through the Tadla, defeated the Shabbānāt force which had come up to meet him, and re-took the southern capital. There he set up an A<sup>c</sup>rās qā'id. He then retired northwards, conducting a punitive campaign into the "Jabal Fāzzāz" on the return journey (144). In the following year, 1675, Isma<sup>c</sup>īl

(138) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux pp. 116-117

(139) Windus p. 114

(140) Busnot pp. 155-6 cf. Windus p. 24

(141) The anonymous "Relation...de la Mercy" contains a rare extension of European compassion to the "Moorish" majority of the work-force (p. 655)

(142) Braithwaite pp. 352-3

(143) "Turjuman" pp. 13 and 29 of the text, and 25 and 54 of the translation.

(144) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 77-9

was brought back to the "Hawz" by the need to face Ahmad ibn Muhriz once again (145). This prince had come to Marrakesh by way of the Dar<sup>c</sup>a and Tarudant. His political acceptance within "Inner Sus", in combination with his old Glāwī connection in the "al-Fayja" region could have been sufficient to re-fuse his links with Marrakesh. So no great credence need be given to Mouette's narrative details which suggest that the boudoir politics of the Sa<sup>c</sup>dī woman Lalla Maryam were vital preliminaries to her husband being invited back into the southern capital (146). However, the woman's position as symbolic inheritrix of the Sa<sup>c</sup>dī tradition within Marrakesh may have been diplomatically significant in drawing the Shabbānāt into a coalition with Ahmad ibn Muhriz that used the "red city" as its base.

Ahmad ibn Muhriz was able to hold Marrakesh for two years, in a defence marked by at least one battle sufficiently significant to warrant report in "al-Fāsī chronicle" (147). The period was otherwise notable chiefly for strife within the besieging forces. At this period, Ismā'īl "shrugged off" those allies from northern hill-country who had been particularly associated with his brother al-Rashīd, and whom, in a sense, he had inherited. He rounded upon the A<sup>c</sup>rās, whom he accused of conspiracy with their clan-fellow, his qā'id who still remained in Marrakesh. The clan, including members left behind in Fes, was all but extirpated (148). Al-Lawātī of the Snassen figured equivocally alongside this episode. He was allowed personally to survive, possibly because he held the status of father-in-law to Ismā'īl himself. But his

(145) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 80

(146) ibid. pp. 80-81

(147) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 249  
cf. Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 93-4

(148) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 85-90 cf. "Turjuman" p. 13 of the text  
and 23 of the translation.

court status evaporated (149). His lapse from favour was probably consequent upon the earlier disloyalty of his offspring. He was the father of sons who had allied with Ahmad ibn Muhriz two years previously.

It is probable that Ismā'īl was able to dispense with allies whom he considered dubious, because he had the resources to buy others. Windus accounted for Ismā'īl's progress over this period in terms not only of "Courage and Vivacity", but also of:

"...the Help he met with from the Jews, particularly Memaran their Governour, who supplied him with Money to carry on the War against his Opposers." (150)

This note is not written in any tone of Sheridan-esque anti-Semitism. And it has the corroboration of indigenous Jewish tradition, in which this period was remembered as particularly notable for Jewish merchant association with the expansion of Ismā'īl's authority (151).

The surrender of Marrakesh to Ismā'īl in the summer of 1677 followed private dynastic dealings. After employing his brother al-Harrān as go-between, Ismā'īl is said to have agreed to allow his nephew to withdraw in peace into "inner Sus" across the High Atlas, with the independence of his government over the Wādī Sūs and Dar<sup>c</sup>a valleys recognised (152). Ahmad ibn Muhriz would never again "stand in" as heir to the Sa<sup>c</sup>dī: symbolically, he left Lalla Maryam behind him in her Murrākushī palace (153).

Following the withdrawal of Ahmad ibn Muhriz and his personal

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(149) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 89

(150) Windus p. 117

(151) Chronicle of Sa<sup>c</sup>dya ibn Danān ed./tr. Vajda Text No. XXI (Part II) in "Un recueil de textes...", "Hespéris" Vol. XXXVI (Paris, 1949) p. 141

(152) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 102-5

(153) ibid. p. 104

military entourage, Ismā'īl's army was allowed into the city of Marrakesh. Partial sack followed, and a number of Murrākushī magnates were either put to death or mutilated (154). This provided a grim contrast with the courteous 1673 dénouement to the siege of Fes. However, punishment for Ismā'īl's former opponents was not inevitable. Those Shabbānāt who had chosen not to follow Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz into retreat had their proffer of service to Ismā'īl accepted. But this was to be service at a distance. The force was, in the first instance, ordered to migrate to the environs of Melilla (155). Here they were neatly interposed between Snassen country and the region once dominated by the A<sup>C</sup> rās.

Subsequently, while the sultan was still engaged in the punishment of Marrakesh, he received news of the political intrusion into the Central Atlas region of a lone Dilā'ī, Aḥmad ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh, grandson to the murābiṭ Muḥammad al-Ḥājj. This young Dilā'ī had gone on pilgrimage from Tlemsen, but taken the opportunity of Ismā'īl's involvement in the "Ḥawz" to return from the east. He had picked up a small Turkish escort for the last lap of his journey. Hastily Ismā'īl gathered together a rag-bag local following:

"Cette nouvelle fit cesser les cruautés que le Roy exercoit sur le peuple de Maroc et luy fit publier un pardon général pour tous ceux qui voudroient l'accompagner dans son retour à Fez. Il fit suivre ses troupes de toutes les cafilles ou peuples d'Arabes, qui vinrent se mettre sous son obéissance..." (156)

There were concurrent dynastic disturbances within Tafilelt (157). But dealing with this secondary problem was postponed. Three successive

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(154) "Turjuman" pp. 13 of the text and 26-7 of the translation of. Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 106 and 108

(155) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 106

(156) ibid. p. 108

(157) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 261 cf. "Turjuman" p. 14 of the text and 27 of the translation

expeditions into the Central Atlas were undertaken in order to eliminate the final spasm of Dilā'ī military power. The last and most brutal was led by Ismā'īl himself. It failed to take hold of the Dilā'ī leader, but was nevertheless a complex and crushing demonstration of the military power which Ismā'īl could muster at this juncture (158).

Loyal service to Ismā'īl during the siege of Marrakesh and its Central Atlas coda made political fortunes. This was a period for the advancement of "new men", to whom rumour would persistently allot improbably humble origins (159): a shorthand indication that their power came not from local ascendancy, but from the sultan's fostering. In 1677, Ghaylān's former sphere of influence in the western plains received a new qā'id, <sup>C</sup>Umar ibn Ḥaddu al-Ḥammāmī (160). Like Ghaylān he was based at Alcazarquivir, and was destined to have close, if Janus-faced relations with the Christian infidel: these combined harassment of the enclaves, at the head of a local following of mujāhidūn (161), with the conduct of diplomatic relations with Europeans (162). A kinsman of <sup>C</sup>Umar, <sup>C</sup>Alī ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh al-Ḥammāmī, was set over Tetuan (163). Members of this Ḥammāmī clan, mujāhid captains recognising the sultan, would dominate both western plains and Western Rif throughout the remainder of the reign. They were men of ability, as would be averred by the Europeans whom they encountered. Samuel Pepys, for instance,

- (158) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 107 and 110 cf. "Turjuman" p. 14 of the text and 27 of the translation.
- (159) Examples of such rumours are given by Pidou de St. Olon (tr. Motteux pp. 116 and 121) and by Windus (p. 202)
- (160) Routh: "Tangier..." pp. 160-161
- (161) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 112
- (162) For the qā'id's reception of the Kirke mission from Tangier in 1681, see: Anon: "The last account from Fez...containing a Relation of Colonel Kirk's Reception at Mequinez etc" (London, N.D.) pp. 1-4
- (163) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 150 and 200 cf. M. Dawūd: "Tārīkh Titwan" Vol. I. (Tetuan, 1959) p. 258

recognised in <sup>C</sup>Alī ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh a "Moor" of personal distinction (164).

Advancement similar to that of the Hammāmī came in 1677 to men of the Rūsī clan. <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh al-Rūsī, who had been a companion of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl in the mahalla or military camp outside Marrakesh, was appointed governor of Fās al-Bālī in absentia. After the third and final Central Atlas campaign against the Dilā'ī intruder, <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh, one of that campaign's victorious generals, was able to enter Fes in triumph, to take up his post. His father was made master of probate (abū 'l-mawārīth)(165). Members of his clan would for fifty years continue to be Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's effective representatives within Fās al-Bālī.

The crisis of 1677 may also have seen the nascence of a military corps later to be closely associated with the sultan: the corps of Udāya, a crack cavalry force which would stand in relation to Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl as the Shabbānāt had stood in relation to Sa<sup>C</sup>dī sultans. An individual general, "Leudaya", was a distinguished cavalry commander during the third Central Atlas campaign of 1677 (166). It is possible that he led a body of the troops swept together from the environs of Marrakesh. Memory of this service may lie embedded in al-Zayyānī's "just-so-story" as to how Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl, in 1677, founded the Udāya, as a corps gathered from among his own akhwāl, serendipitously located in the Hawz (167)

Tradition was later to amplify al-Zayyānī's association of the Udāya with the Shabbānāt (168). But, in Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's day, the two groupings

(164) "The Alcade (<sup>C</sup>Ali ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh) and his company appeared like very grave and sober men. His discourse and manner were very good and, I thought, with more presence of mind than our master's..." S. Pepys ed. J. Smith: "Journal at Tangier" from "The Life, Journals and Correspondence of Samuel Pepys Esq. F.R.S." Vol. I (London, 1841) p. 370

(165) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 260

(166) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 110

(167) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 29 cf. Epilogue Part II Pp. 317-18

(168) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." loc. cit. cf. al-Nāsiri: "Kitāb al-Istiqsā..." Casablanca text Vol. VII p. 50, Fumey translation, A.M. Vol. IX p. 66

Al-Nāsiri's developed tradition, which would make the Shabbānāt one division of the Udāya would seem to spring from military nomenclature among the "Udāya" of his own day, quartered on lands to the south of Sale. See: J. le Coz: "Les tribus guichs au Maroc: essai de géographie agraire" in "Revue de Géographie du Maroc" Vol. VII (Rabat, 1965) pp. 3-52 Map. p. 14

were distinct. Ismā'īl made no attempt to associate the Shabbānāt personally with himself. After the first dismissal, outside Marrakesh, the force was scattered into different provinces. Thus, one troop of Shabbānāt was sent into the Tadla, to be met there by St. Amans in 1683 (169). And, according to al-Zayyānī, other Shabbānāt, in association with members of a fellow Hawz grouping, the Zirāra, were sent to garrison Oujda, to build three neighbouring "Chergi" forts, and to contain the Snassen (170). Al-Zayyānī knew the eastern march forts personally (171). So his notes on their garrisoning may be accredited. But his concept of the policy behind their deployment may be dismissed. He claimed that the Shabbānāt and Zirāra had been the oppressors of the Hawz, and that the Snassen, against whom they were pitted, owed allegiance to the Regency (172). But it has been seen that, during the very early years of <sup>C</sup>Alawī history, the Snassen had been noted most particularly for their association with al-Rashīd. And it is thus straightforward to assume that Ismā'īl's aim in setting Shabbānāt and Zirāra around Snassen country was simple neutralisation: the tilting against each other of two bodies of warrior tribesmen who had each been closely associated with other political leaders, including Ismā'īl's living rival Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz, and whose loyalty to Ismā'īl personally was thus equally to be thought questionable.

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(169) "Journal du Voyage de St. Amans" pp. 337-8

(170) "Turjumān" p. 18 of the text and 34 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS. p. 34

(171) Al Zayyānī was in 1792 nominated governor of Oujda. He once took shelter in al-<sup>C</sup>Ayūn, a major "Chergi" fortress, allegedly built by the followers of a Zirārī qā'id ("Turjumānat al-kubrā..." p. 140 cf. "Turjumān" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." loc. cit.

(172) "līmā kānū <sup>C</sup>alayhi min al-zulm wa 'l-ḥawr bi-qabā'il al-hawz....  
(reference to a Zirārī qā'id)...wa amaruhu bi 'l-tadyīq <sup>C</sup>alā  
banī visnāsīn idh kānū shī<sup>C</sup>at al-turk"

("Since they (the Shabbānāt and Zirāra) oppressed and maltreated the peoples of the "Hawz", ...he ordered him (their qā'id) to constrain the Snassen, who were disposed to favour the Turks")

("Turjumān" loc. cit.)

From 1677 onwards, Ismā'īl had Meknes as his own capital, to be the cynosure for forces loyal to himself. Following his Central Atlas victory, the sultan travelled to his new Miknāsī palace, and, with a wolf-sacrifice, inaugurated its habitation (173). Imperial authority over Fes was affirmed from the Miknāsī base. In the December of 1677, Ismā'īl appointed a new gādī of Fes, Abū Abd Allāh Bardalla (174), who may be presumed to have been outstanding in his loyalty as a "sultan's man", as he was still in office twenty years later (175). Soon afterwards in a pageant-like gesture that was typical of his style of government, the sultan conducted a personal Fāsī victory parade, to clinch the earlier al-Rūsī triumph. He brought the recently rebellious al-Harrān of Tafilelt with him to the metropolis. There, as "the sultan benignant", he ceremonially pardoned his errant brother in full view of the Fāsī citizenry. Thereafter, he graciously consented to be the guest of the city fathers, over the feast of Id al-Kabīr (176). Significantly, this was the season at which it was appropriate to present formal hadāyā or gifts to the ruler (177). Then, having demonstrated to Fes an easy exercise of the upper hand, Ismā'īl retired to Meknes.

The palace at Meknes would never be completed to its master's satisfaction. As is well-known, the sultan was his own grand architect, and as much "addicted" to the issue of summary demolition orders, as to the issue of instructions for building (178). Physically, therefore,

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(173) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 111

(174) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 260-261

(175) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 12 p. 53

(176) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 261

(177) S.I. 2<sup>B</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J.-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 pp. 694-5

(178) Windus pp. 115-116 For an analysis of the Miknāsī palace complex from an architectural point of view, see H. Terrasse "Histoire du Maroc" Vol. II pp. 266-8



the Miknāsī palace complex underwent more than half a century of heaving protean development, before its present outline emerged. Yet the palace had its permanent aspects. It dominated the "pittiful Country Town" (179) that Meknes had previously been, like a gigantic mahalla or imperial camp. Its lime-white walls and glittering green-tile roofs caught the eye from a distance of miles (180). Local assets, such as lime-kilns (181) were requisitioned to serve its needs. A gaggle of "camp-followers" came to settle in "nouala" or reed-huts, outside the town gates (182). Within the town, palace denizens and dependents eventually predominated (183). And, even in MouÛtte's day, the palace guard alone could be estimated as eight thousand (184). Among the palace dependents there must be counted the Miknāsī Jews. The qa'id of the Jewish community of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā seems to have moved to Meknes with the sultan. He was granted the contract for provisioning the palace (185), and was also responsible for the preliminary quartermastery of imperial campaigns (186). It seems likely that the price for this Miknāsī contract was paid in real estate. The old town houses of the Miknāsī Jews were surrendered to the sultan in 1682, as residences free for his renting out (187). The bargain was apparently worth-while. The new Miknāsī Jewry, built with labour detached from the palace building site (188), came to be seen as the most visibly prosperous commercial centre of the developed capital. (189).

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(179) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 71

(180) Busnot p. 14 cf. Braithwaite p. 286

(181) Busnot p. 15

(182) Busnot loc. cit. cf. Del Puerto Bk. VI Ch. III p. 640

(183) Del Puerto Bk. VI Ch. III pp. 639-40

(184) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 176

(185) Busnot p. 20

(186) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle , <sup>/Sale, p. 111</sup> 11/8/1693

(187) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 349

(188) T. Phelps: "A true account of the captivity of Thomas Phelps"  
(London, 1685) p. 13

(190) Busnot p. 15

The analogy of the mahalla or military camp could be extended to the Miknāsī palace personnel. According to a classic analysis, Islamic government could be divided between the spheres of the "pen" and the "sword" (191). It will be stressed later that Ismā'īl's government maintained the "pen" at a rudimentary stage of development (192). Men of the "sword" were the buttresses of the state. In this, Ismā'īl's government conformed to tradition of recent centuries. Leo's account of the sixteenth century Wattāsīd administration within Fes portrays a government whose designated officials were for the most part military captains, holding posts of responsibility either within the household staff of the sultan's army as arrayed for campaign, or as tax-gathering military governors within the provinces. At the head of a list of captains, quartermasters, stable-masters, rural commissaries and the like, there figured only two civil servants of high degree: a "maggior consigliere", presumably a "wazīr", and a "secretario" who trebled as "thesorriere" and "maggiordomo" (193). The military bias to this list is echoed to an even more striking degree in a second and more haphazard piece of itemisation drawn up by MouÛtte: his conclusory list of the "Familles Illustres" of Morocco (194). Here, amid a plethora of magnate families and individuals, of generals governors and saints, and of the living and the dead, there are to be found only two men who might be thought of as purely civil officials: a defunct "visir", and the somewhat specialised "maistre-d'hotel ou des serrails de Fes". "Zelquetin", the officer named as "tresorier", is known

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(191) ibn Khaldūn: "Mugaddima..." ed./tr. de Slane as "Les Prolegomènes d'ibn Khaldoun" (Paris, 1865) Vol. II pp. 46-8

(192) See Chapter IV Pp. 164-166

(193) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 43

(194) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 200-201

from his later career to have been a general.

Yet although Ismā'īl's government was of a markedly military cast, the forces at the sultan's disposal were as yet unremarkable. The troops with which Ismā'īl won control of the region within the Atlas arc, during the first five years of his reign, were probably dominated numerically by followers of provincial quwwād. MouÛtte described the practicalities of muster during Ismā'īl's early years as follows:

"Il range lui-mesme ses troupes en bataille, les paye par ses mains et en fait la revue en personne; et afin de voir si le nombre qu'il a payé à ses alcaïdes est complet, il les fait assembler sur les bords de quelque profonde rivière, dont les quays de costé et d'autre sont gardez ...puis, le premier jour, il fait passer l'infanterie, le second la cavallerie des Arabes, et le troisième les troupes de sa maison..." (195)

Cavalrymen were not only "Arabes" or rural horsemen. They came from town and country alike. A proportion of such troops from both town and country would seem to have owed the sultan the favoured but onerous jaysh service, known to have existed since Sa<sup>c</sup>dī times. This involved liability to regular military service in exchange for the remission of taxation (196). For townsmen, such service went along with the grant of a mount (197). However, the majority of troops in the first two categories noted by MouÛtte may be thought of as na'ība troops. These owed military service to the sultan by lot, and simply as his subjects. They were allowed no remission of taxation. Indeed, in the towns, the muster of such troops was carried out with the aid of the tax-roll (198).

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(195) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 149

(196) A zahir of Ahmad al-Manṣūr, dating from 1588, demanded permanent jihād service from a branch of the Shabbānāt domiciled in the Agadir region, and granted remission of taxation in exchange. (J. le Coz: "Les tribus quichs au maroc" pp. 3-4)

(197) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 p. 695

(198) ibid.

The sultan's <sup>c</sup>askar or standing guard (199) which formed the third body of troops mentioned by MouÛtte, was as yet, by the standards of the second half of Isma<sup>c</sup>ïl's reign, a force of limited proportions and mixed constitution. It was an institution cast in an ancient and not even particularly Islamic mould: that of the bodyguard alien from the fabric of local society, and identified with the ruler in person. It was already dominated by the force of <sup>c</sup>abïd which had germinated in the days of al-Rashïd. However, in MouÛtte's day, these <sup>c</sup>abïd had not yet come numerically to swamp the sultan's following of <sup>a</sup>lāij, or European renegades. Renegades had been prominent within Isma<sup>c</sup>ïl's forces outside Marrakesh (200). And, of the three gates to the Miknāsï palace of MouÛtte's day, two were said to be guarded by "blacks" and one by renegades (201). Tentatively this may be put forward as an indication of the contemporary ratio of the sultan's <sup>c</sup>abïd to the sultan's <sup>a</sup>lāij.

<sup>c</sup>Abïd and <sup>a</sup>lāij may both be seen as living socially in limbo except for the bonds by which they were linked to a military commander. The showy little procession which celebrated a Christian's conversion did not mark the convert's acceptance into Muslim society (202). It merely marked a formal surrender of the mores of Christendom. Co-option into military service was the general rule (203). And MouÛtte noted

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(199) When describing a military force, al-Zayyānï would use either of the two terms jund or <sup>c</sup>askar. The latter term seems to have indicated "standing army". This was the meaning retained by the word in the latter nineteenth century (R. Mauduit: "Le Makhzen Marocain " in "Renseignements Coloniaux" Paris, 1903 p. 302)

(200) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 96 and 106

(201) MouÛtte: "Relation..." p. 148

(202) The social distinction was symbolised by a bar against the convert's marriage to any but a slave girl, or the daughter of another renegade. For casual note of this bar, see Busnot p. 157 and Braithwaite p. 349. For subsequent commentary in greater sociological detail, see de Chénier (English translation of 1788) Vol. I. pp. 155-6 and Lemprière p. 342

(203) Thus the English renegade "Pilleau" was described as "...at present a Soldier, as all the Renegadoes are, who have no particular Trade or Calling." (Braithwaite p. 192)

with satisfaction that the life of an European who had "turned Moor" continued to be one of slavery (204). In an ethnic sense, however, the a<sup>c</sup>lāi may be seen as the tail-end of one military tradition, about to give way to another. From its earliest Islamic centuries, successive rulers within the Maghrib al-Aqsā had employed cohorts of European troops, including the primordial saqāliba (205), the rūm or free Christian mercenaries of the later Middle Ages (206), and the Sa<sup>c</sup>dī a<sup>c</sup>lāi. All these had been troops of honourable status. Europeans could describe the a<sup>c</sup>lāi or "elches" of Ahmad al-Manṣūr al-Sa<sup>c</sup>dī as his "best souldiers" (207), and followers of his grandson as "elshes of quality" (208). But during the early <sup>c</sup>Alawī period, the status of the a<sup>c</sup>lāi collapsed. European respect for the renegade as a soldier gave way to embarrassed scorn for the "poor white". Renegades were MouÛtte's "enfants perdus" (209) and, later, Braithwaite's "worst Set of People of all here... sad, drunken, profligate Fellows, half-naked and half-starved" (210). This plummet in reputation is likely to reflect a real deterioration in the quality of European soldiery willing to undertake Maghribi service.

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(204) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 175

(205) As an instance, saqāliba were cited by al-Bakri (tr. W. MacGuckin de Slane as "Description de l'Afrique Septentrionale par el Bekri" Algiers, 1913 pp. 93 of the text and 187-8 of the translation) in a context in which they appear as advantaged slave troops who, around the year 900 A.D. demanded their freedom from the lord of the Middle Rif state of Nukur.

(206) For information on the rūm, see J.M.J.L. Mas Latrie: "Relations et commerce de l'Afrique septentrionale ou Maghreb avec les nations chrétiennes du moyen age" (Paris, 1866) and J. Alemany: "Milicias Cristianas al Servicio de los Sultanes Musulmanes del Almagreb" from "Homenaje a D. Francisco Codera" ed. D. Eduardo Saavedra (Saragossa, 1904) pp. 137-155

(207) S.I. 1<sup>re</sup> Angleterre Vol. II No. LXXXIV George Tomson to Robert Cecil, Marrakesh, 30/10/1603 p. 233

(208) S.I. 1<sup>re</sup> Angleterre Vol. III No. XCIII Leconfield MS No. 73 p. 467

(209) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 93

(210) Braithwaite p. 349

In a period of expanding European armies (211), when "the recruiting officer" could become an established European literary figure, early <sup>C</sup>Alawī sultans offered no unusual financial draw to bring in European mercenaries from a wide catchment (212). They had access to two narrow and erratic stocks of European recruits: captives taken by the corsairs, and fugitives from the enclaves. Of these, the fugitives in particular were men unlikely to be malleable into a <sup>C</sup>lāi troops of high quality (213).

The salvation of the early <sup>C</sup>Alawī <sup>C</sup>askar was the development of an imperial corps of <sup>C</sup>abīd. The corps was, for the seventeenth century, an <sup>C</sup>Alawī innovation. It will be stressed later that no major force of black troops attached to the Sa<sup>C</sup>dī sultans (214). The early association of <sup>C</sup>abīd with al-Rashīd has already been noted (215). By the end of al-Rashīd's reign, <sup>C</sup>abīd were being employed, not simply as the sultan's personal guards, but in sufficient numbers to be despatched upon a tax-raiding haraka, under the commander whom MouÛtte knew as "Bousta" (216). The services of "Bousta" were inherited by Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl (217). A round figure for Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's following of black troops, tossed out for 1672, was two thousand (218). By the end of the 1670s, the black guard, quartered in

(211) See G.N. Clarke: "War and Society in the Seventeenth Century"  
(London, 1958)

(212) Braithwaite dismissed the renegade pay of his day as "20 Blanquils a Month, which is twenty Twopences, and a little Flower". Officers were paid in proportion (p. 349)

(213) Such fugitives were commonly criminals and pressed men, deserting from the appalling conditions of service which characterised all the enclaves with the exception of Portuguese Mazagan. Tangier literature endorses MouÛtte's picture of a drain in sorry manpower from these alien pustules. An anonymous author of 1680 strongly urged an improvement in the terms of Tangier service, as "melancholy drunken fits" took many men into "running to the Moors" (MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 182 and 194-5 cf. Anon: "A Discourse concerning Tangier" (London, 1680) p. 22)

(214) See Epilogue Part I Pp. 286-8

(215) See Chapter I Pp. 55-6 and the present chapter P. 91

(216) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 44

(217) ibid., pp. 78 and 201

(218) ibid. p. 68

tents around the new Miknāsī palace (219) had expanded so far that, as noted previously, one estimate of its size could be eight thousand (220).

It is possible that, from the beginning of his reign, Ismā'īl was wary of the possibility of a military coup along the lines which, in 1671, had led to the seizure of the reins of Algerine power by the dīwān of janissaries. For, in his first decade, Ismā'īl established the pattern by which he would conduct relations with his abīd, to the very end of his reign. In the days of MouÛtte, as in the days of Windus, he meted out to his guard an adroit blend of vicious discipline and gaudy favour, that produced docility towards himself, and a compensatory insolence towards his subjects (221). Further, he would allow only adolescents from his corps of black page-boys close to his person. These pages were the musket-toting lads known to all European reporters (222). Busnot knew them as the "Chafferats" (223), a possible rendering of shafarāt. These adolescents are likely to have graduated to a corps d'élite within the Miknāsī guard, and thus given to the officer echelons of Ismā'īl's askar an increasingly negroid aspect. Few renegades were taken young enough to fulfil an apprenticeship within the sultan's service parallel to that undergone by the "little Blacks" (224).

Counter to the accepted tradition, set into al-Zayyānī's texts for the latter 1670s, it can be maintained that the primary guard of abīd was built up without recourse to any dramatic raking of the country for slave recruits. There was a domestic source of natural increase for the

(219) MouÛtte: "Relation..." pp. 151-2

(220) See the present chapter P. 108 (Note (184))

(221) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 175-6 cf. Windus pp. 139-143

(222) See, for example, MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 176 cf. Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux pp. 113 and 150 and Windus loc. cit.

(223) Busnot p. 205

(224) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 150

force. For whereas the European renegade woman was an exotic rarity, black slaves of both sexes were brought into the Maghrib al-Aqṣā. Leo alleged that his own contemporaries in the Dar<sup>c</sup>a region specifically encouraged their slaves to breed (225). And the young pages of Mouṣṣṣe's day were said to be the sons of palace serving women (226), Harātīn, dark-skinned sedentaries from the oases (227), formed a further pool of manpower that could have been tapped on the sultan's behalf. During the reign of Muḥammad III, direct recruitment from the oases is known to have been an accepted mode of replenishing the ranks of the sultan's army (228). This practise aligned with the oasean antecedents of the <sup>c</sup>Alawī. And it is known from Tawātī records that slaving was ancillary to mid-seventeenth century oasean warfare (229). Finally, there was the self-generating process by which hadāyā, presentations of tribute to the sultan, added recruits to the very military sanction which rendered hadāyā politic. Magnates and tribes alike are recorded as having included, within their "douceurs" to the sultan, numbers of black slaves that could run into hundreds (230).

Hadāyā were also a regular source for the supply of cavalry horses (231). Half the <sup>c</sup>abīd guard of Mouṣṣe's day was mounted (232). And, in time, the sultan's stables would become one of the wonders of Meknes,

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(225) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 73

(226) Mouṣṣe: "Histoire..." p. 176

(227) See Appendix A Pp. 335-337

(228) Thus in 1172/1758-9, the harātīn from three oasean groupings along the Ziz were pressed into military service, on the pretext that they were dissident. Nine years later, a qā'id who was himself a wasif, or high ranking palace slave, was despatched to gather in a force of <sup>c</sup>abīd from the "Qibla" or western Sahara. ("Bustān al-zarīf..." MS pp. 100 and 108)

(229) Timmi MS and the chronicles of al-Tawātī and al-Amūrī quoted Martin pp. 47, 55 and 56

(230) Mouṣṣe: "Histoire..." pp. 98, 99 and 111

(231) ibid. pp. 98 and 99 cf. Del Puerto Bk. I Ch. XV p. 59

(232) Mouṣṣe: "Histoire..." P. 176



recognised as such in both indigenous and European writing (233).

The stables are evidence of a glory in horse-flesh that was, at this period of the history of the Maghrib, distinctive to the martial mores of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā. In the neighbouring Regency of Algiers, the prime soldier was the janissary infantryman. But cavalry, in the early <sup>C</sup>Alawī Maghrib al-Aqṣā, was rated far above infantry:

"...a Horseman being in the highest Esteem imaginable amongst them, and the Foot the contrary, insomuch that those who command thousands of them are not esteemed equal to the Commanders of fifty Horse..." (234)

It was the <sup>C</sup>abīd cavalry who fought alongside the sultan's person in battle (235). Cavalry skills and glittering trappings governed military and political displays almost exclusively. Tilting, or its musket-bearing development, "la<sup>C</sup> b al bārūd" were the standard expressions of festivity and welcome (236). An anonymous companion of governor Kirke of Tangier, who had witnessed "Moorish" celebrations could assert that:

"...their chief breed of Horses...for shape and speed are certainly the most Noble and Rarest Kind in the World. Their Horses Habits and Furniture, on Festival Daies, make up a Figure of extraordinary State and shew their emulating one another...and though they are plain and poor in everything else, yet the Trappings of their Bridles and Saddles are rich and fine to an incredible degree." (237)

It will be seen that Ismā<sup>-C</sup>īl's cavalry was perhaps more effective as an expression of conspicuous display around Meknes, than as the spearhead of a war-machine, poised to combat an alien army.

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(233) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux pp. 72-3 cf. Windus p. 175  
cf. "Turiuman" p. 15 of the text and 28 of the translation

(234) Windus p. 143

(235) Mouëtte: "Histoire..." p. 159

(236) For examples, see the "Journal du Voyage de St. Amans" p. 317, cf. S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Tetuan June 1693 pp. 78-9 cf. Windus pp. 8-9 and 152-155  
cf. Pidou de St. Olon tr. Mottuex pp. 67-8

(237) "The Last Account from Fez..." p. 2

CHAPTER III: ISMĀ'ĪL'S YEARS OF INCREASING ASCENDANCY

Foreshortening within the indigenous tradition has granted to Ismā'īl, for the first half of his reign, a standard image: that of the tireless and aggressive warrior who, for twenty-four seasons, never passed an entire year in his palace (1). This is iconography. After 1677, when he was relatively sure of his military supremacy within the Atlas arc, Ismā'īl frequently proved that, as a war-leader, he could be cautious, procrastinatory and fickle. Only gradually did he accommodate himself to the burdens of territorial expansion beyond the Atlas arc. It is true that the period 1678-90 can superficially be seen in terms of successful aggression. These years saw the full extension of Ismā'īl's purely dynastic suzerainty within the Maghrib al-Aqṣā. They also saw peripheral victories in the jihād. But these victories form part of an overall paradox to Ismā'īl's reign. They came to the sultan when his military policies were not at their most heavy-handed.

Over the years 1678-80, retreat enabled Ismā'īl and his household to survive a major trial by natural disaster. During the early months of 1678, a serious outbreak of plague swept inland from Tetuan (2). It did not subside for over two years. "Al-Fāsi chronicle" noted the ferocious measures undertaken in the spring of 1678 for the protection of the sultan and his entourage. Abid troops were set at river-fords

(1) Thus, al-Zayyānī noted, with reference to the year 1104/1692-3:

"fa-innahu aqāma fī tamhīd al-maghrib wa ḥurūb al-thuwwān wa 'l-khawārij  
c alā dawlat arba<sup>c</sup> wa ishrayn sana. lam yuqām bihā fī dārihi sana wāhida"

( Thus he spent twenty-four years of his reign in setting the Maghrib to order, and in wars against rebels and dissidents. During that time there was not a single year in which he remained in his own house".)

("Turjumān" ed. Houdas p. 25 of the text cf. 46 of the translation)

(2) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 112 cf. "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 227-8

with orders to slaughter travellers attempting to reach Meknes or Fes from plague-stricken northern towns. But the miasma reached Fes, and the city's extramural "Suq al-Khamis" was fired, in an attempt at hygiene (3).

The crisis forced Ismā'īl into the conduct of an extensive haraka. For the first time, as sultan, he would cross the Atlas. This move had some of the trappings of venture and aggression. But it was fundamentally governed by the sultan's interest in self-preservation. In the May of 1678, Ismā'īl completed what muster he dared. This included a summons to the Fāsi militia, the last men allowed to travel between Fes and Meknes before communications between the cities were ruptured (4). Muḥriz, the sultan's eldest son was left in Fes as vice-roy (5). But the mass of the imperial household and army was lumbered clear away from Safs, on to the plateau of the upper Moulouya (6). The subsequent track of this monstrous caravan, during a twenty month long expedition was, for the most part, an extensive promenade of Ismā'īl's eastern and southern territorial perimeters.

The journey involved the sultan in incidental forays, in certain of which he was involved personally. But these forays were atypical. MouÛtte, in his "Histoire..." gives an extensive account of this haraka, as experienced by a party of European captives who, as orderlies, formed part of its company (7). His narrative makes it clear that much of the expedition was militarily flaccid. Its first expression of aggression was a feeble

(3) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 227 For the siting of the "Suq al-Khamis" on the northern outskirts of the "old" and "new" cities of Fes, see R. le Tourneau: "Fes avant le Protectorat" p. 383

(4) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. pp. 227-8

(5) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 113

(6) MouÛtte: "Relation..." p. 66 cf. "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 278

(7) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 114-125

summer tax-raid upon Moulouya peoples, ending in negotiation. A subsequent move into Tafilelt, Ismā'il's only known visit, as sultan, to the dynastic homeland, was essentially a royal progress among the minor shurafā'. That clique of <sup>C</sup>Alawī kinsmen, including the recently pardoned al-Harrān, which was opposed to Ismā'il's authority, avoided confrontation with the haraka in Tafilelt, by slipping into "Chergi" country far to the north, and awaiting the sultan's departure.

It was at this stage that Ismā'il took the major risk of the expedition. After summoning re-inforcements from Fes, where the plague was still rampant (8), he took his army westward into the difficult country of the Ayt <sup>C</sup>Attā Beraber, which centred upon the "Jabal Saghrū", or north-eastern spur of the Anti-Atlas. The mountain Ayt <sup>C</sup>Attā were able so to maul the infantry of the imperial military column (9) that Ismā'il's demands of them had to be reduced to the bare essentials of peace with honour: formal submission, the promise of an open road for travellers through Ayt <sup>C</sup>Attā country, bound for Marrakesh, and, as a peculiarly chimerical token of suzerainty, an acknowledgement of the sultan's right to demand of these hill-folk jihād-service at need (10). It is possible that Ismā'il was demoralised by his effective defeat at Ayt <sup>C</sup>Attā hands. He shrank from the possibility of further military encounter. Rather than remain in Ayt <sup>C</sup>Attā country, or take his following west or south into regions currently under the suzerainty of Ahmad ibn Muhriz, the sultan took the risk of a midwinter crossing of the High Atlas by way of the snow-fraught "al-Fayja" region. He met with no military challenge here. For although the Glāwī shaykh who was local chieftain

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(8) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 117 cf. "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 289

(9) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 119 cf. "Nashr al-Mathānī..." loc. cit.

(10) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." loc. cit.

was father-in-law to Ahmad ibn Muhriz, he had been insulted by his son-in-law's contraction of a further marriage alliance with a rival Sūsī chieftain. He accepted Ismā'īl's bribe, and let the alien army pass. However, as a security measure, to prevent provocative looting, the sultan was forced to execute a number of his own thievish followers. Dire weather conditions involved the expedition in heavy losses in manpower, beasts, treasure and equipment (11).

The next seasonal year, from January 1679 to January 1680, was a period in which the sultan's moves lacked military drama, to carry a certain implication of exhaustion. The plague continued to smoulder within the cities. So Ismā'īl continued his perambulation. He "lived off the land", levying contributions from the open plains of "Tamesna", the modern Chaouia, before striking inland into the Tadla, the region where his Dilā'ī enemy Ahmad ibn 'Abd Allāh still lurked. No major moves were made against this enemy. The sultan merely supervised the construction of a bridge and a fort, while a subordinate general conducted minor forays into the hills (12). The sultan had now been absent from Meknes for over a year. Possibly he was uneasy as to the surviving strength of loyalty to himself within Meknes and Fes. For while he was still absent from these, the cities of Saïs, he arranged for his authority to be blazoned there, in the grim melodrama of a showpiece execution. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Manzārī, the sultan's wazīr, who may once have been governor of Fās al-Jadīd (13), and who had more recently been a companion of the

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(11) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 121-2 and 161-2 cf. "Turjuman" pp. 18-19 of the text and 33-4 of the translation of "Bustan al-Zarif.." MS p. 43

(12) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 124

(13) This is to accept al-Nāsiri's MS reading of the wazīr's name, and the consequent identification, and to reject the reading "Elmetrari" given by Houdas ("Kitab al-Istiqsa..." Casablanca text, Vol. VII pp. 48 and 61; "Turjuman" ed./tr. Houdas p. 19 of the text and 34 of the translation.)

long haraka, was executed upon a trumped-up charge of personal morality. His remains were despatched to be dragged through Fes and then through Meknes (14). Clearly this calculated piece of frightfulness was an example of Ismā'īl's technique of "government by pageant".

Chance then favoured the sultan. Aḥmad ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh al-Dilā'ī was taken by the plague. His death seems to have enabled Ismā'īl confidently to return to Meknes, with an advance guard of his abīd only. This return, in the January of 1680 (15), can hardly be deemed the triumph (16) that al-Nāsirī wished to imply. But it was the return of an accepted ruler. It was the festival season: "la Pasque de Leide Cubir", and "tous les grands du royaume...vinrent faire leurs complimens avec de presens" (17). The sultan was now free to widen his military horizons.

During the period 1680-90, and indeed down to 1701, Ismā'īl had three major spheres of military concern: the "Cherg", the Sus and the jihād. The significance of both "Cherg" and Sus is relatively easy to gauge. Both were regions which were prosperous in themselves; and they were crossed respectively by the major pilgrimage route, and what was probably the major gold-route of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā. Between the two there was an obvious geographical polarity which would eventually involve the sultan in two-way military tension. But, for a decade, Ismā'īl's cautious approach to military entanglement allowed the two regions to alternate as spheres of military priority.

(14) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 124 cf. "Turjumān" p. 19 of the text and 24 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 33

(15) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 125

(16) "wa waṣala al-sultān ilā mīknāsa. fa-ihtalla bi-dār mulkihi. wa iḡta<sup>C</sup>ada arīka <sup>C</sup>izzihī"

("And the sultan reached Meknes, took possession of his royal palace and sat upon his glorious throne") ("Kitāb al-Istiḡsa...", Casablanca text. Vol. VII p. 61)

(17) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." loc. cit.

By comparison with the demands of "Cherg" and Sus, the jihād, a coastal struggle, may be seen as merely ancillary to imperial policy. It was never the object of personal campaigning on the part of the sultan. Ismā'īl's was essentially an inland empire, to which the coast was literally of marginal significance. Ismā'īl's great officers were typically haraka generals. There existed no Moroccan parallel to the Algerine tā'ifa of the ru'asā' or privateer captains. And, on Ismā'īl's behalf, the mujāhid Ahmad ibn Haddu al-Hammāmī would make the boast:

"...My master, whom God preserve, has no need of the sea, or of maritime affairs to make him great and prosperous...for less than would suffice for the building and entertaining of one ship, he can maintain a thousand horsemen, that are more worth than a thousand ships." (18)

When faced with the nascent "gunboat" policy of European powers, bent on putting an end to the depredations of Moroccan corsairs, Ismā'īl, although he had a private and, as will be seen later (19) increasing interest in the little Saletin corsair fleet, was loth to spare troops to defend his own ports against alien reprisal. Watch and ward along the coast was habitually assigned to local men, or to troops of low quality. A landward bias also kept Ismā'īl's practical involvement in warfare with the Europeans of the enclaves at a low level. Here the jihād was essentially petty, localised warfare. From 1680 onwards, it was to be carried out in the sultan's name, and with at least the token assistance of imperial troops. But fundamentally it was the concern of regional quwwād commanding peoples of the Hapt and Western

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(18) Translation of a letter from the "Alcaid Hamet" to "The captain of Tangier, Kirke the English", included in S. Pepys: Miscellanea Vol. II p. 381 and quoted in Routh: "Tangier..." p. 234 (Footnote)

(19) See Chapter V Pp. 227-8

Rif whose territories adjoined the coastal outposts of the aliens.

But the jihād was nevertheless an instrument of imperial policy. It will be seen that the victories of the mujaḥidūn were systematically publicised by the sultan, in an attempt to enhance the glamour and legitimacy of his rule. To public opinion within the Maghrib al-Aqṣā, Christendom was the ideal enemy. It has been noted that, in one of its rare touches upon foreign affairs, the "al-Fāsī chronicle" which emanated from the literary intelligentsia, recorded the victories of the Ottoman Balkan campaign of 1683 (20). And there were wider expressions of martial religious fervour. Northern townfolk, apparently unconcerned that in celebrating a seasonal midsummer festival they were carrying out a practise belonging essentially to the jāhiliya rather than to Islam, would on "St. John's Day" organise processions and mock-battles in celebration of the holy war:

"...at which time the gravest People will be passing through the streets with wooden Horses, Swords, Launces and Drums, with which they equip the Children that can scarce go, and meet in Troops in the Street, and engaging, say 'Thus we destroy the Christians!'" (21)

It was against such an ideological backdrop that Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl was working when he aligned military manoeuvres of his own in accordance with the progress of the coastal war with the Christians.

The sultan Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's formal intervention in the jihād dates from the spring of 1680, and should be set into the context of widespread natural disaster. The plague was in its final spasms, and throughout

(20) See Prologue Pp. 18-19

(21) Windus p. 46 Leo simply recorded that on "St. John's Day" it was customary for the Fāsī to light straw bonfires throughout their city (ed. Ramusio p. 38). The more developed notes of Windus imply the grafting of latter-day ideological content on to an ancient festival, after the fashion in which Guy Fawkes Day developed.



the Maghrib al-Aqṣā, the spring rains failed catastrophically (22). Set into both the "Nashr al-Mathānī..." (23) and MouÛtte's "Histoire..." are detailed accounts of elaborate religious ceremonies involving prayers for rain. The final processions within Meknes were led by Ismā'īl himself, as imām of the people (24). The cloudless skies would seem to have demanded acts of public expiation. When the sultan, in March (25), issued a command to <sup>C</sup>Umar ibn Ḥaddu al-Ḥammāmi that he should lay siege to Tangier, he may well have been making a gesture of flamboyant piety, parallel, on the grand scale, to his orders for the destruction of the little Catholic shrines within the Miknāsī building site (26).

The siege marked the intensification of the jihād rather than its move into an entirely novel phase. <sup>C</sup>Umar ibn Ḥaddu, the lieutenant of Ismā'īl's who had slipped into Ghaylān's old sphere of influence, had been skirmishing intermittently with the Tangier troops ever since 1677 (27). And the sultan's hard military commitment to this siege was of the lean cut that became standard in such affairs. Ismā'īl despatched to the mujāhid commander's aid "quelques troupes de...Noirs" from his own guard. They were to accompany the locally raised army which the qā'id

(22) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 9 and 135

(23) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 335-6

(24) MouÛtte recorded that "une sécheresse générale...avait gâté tous les grains et les fruits" and noted that, after several processions, Ismā'īl "le 17 mars,...se revêtit d'un vieil habit tout crasseux et d'un méchant turban sur la teste, et, les pieds nus, il sortit du palais, accompagné de tous ceux de sa Cour, aussi pieds et testes nues, et de tout le peuple de la ville en pareil estat. En cet equipage, il visita toutes les mosquées des saints de sa loy..." ("Histoire..." p. 126)

(25) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 128 cf. Anon: "An Exact Journal of the Siege of Tangier" (London, 1680) p. 1

(26) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." loc. cit.

(27) See Chapter II P. 104 and Routh: "Tangier..." pp. 160-169

mustered at his own provincial capital Alcazarquivir (28). The deployment of a few cabīd outside Tangier is unlikely markedly to have weakened the military forces at Ismā<sup>o</sup>īl's own disposal. The sultan himself never visited the siege.

The mass of Ismā<sup>o</sup>īl's forces were, for this campaigning summer, destined for the "Cherg". The preliminaries to this, the sultan's first major eastward move, suggest that he wished to preface the campaign by establishing an understanding with the city of Fes. Late in April, Ismā<sup>o</sup>īl summoned to Meknes the aged <sup>o</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī, shaykh of the zāwiyat al-Fāsī. He came personally to receive the shaykh at the most notable sanctuary in Meknes, lodged him in one of the new-built wings of the palace and, in his honour, proclaimed a general amnesty for prisoners. It is possible that the sultan was also financially generous to his guest. Immediately upon his return to Fes, the shaykh began extensions to the buildings of his zāwiya (29).

This visit may signify more than the public establishment of amity with a notable civic sage. It is possible that the sultan was toying with the idea of a bid for Tlemsen, and that he wished the shaykh to activate in his favour the unofficial diplomatic links by which Tlemsen was connected with Fes. Fes and Tlemsen were sister cities, linked by the transverse eastward route of the northern pilgrimage. Under political or economic pressure, merchants of either city might shift their business to the other. During the seventeenth century there seems to have been a marked westward shift by Tilimsānī who were opposed

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(28) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 128

(29) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 337

to government from Algiers (30). Of those citizens who remained, there may have been a number who, during the first decade of Ismā'īl's reign, seriously considered exchanging Algerine for <sup>C</sup>Alawī rule. The religious expression of such political views would have been association with the dominant Shādhiliya tariqa, to which all the important fraternities of the contemporary Maghrib al-Aqṣā, including the Jazūlī "way" of the al-Fāsī, were also affiliated (31). The minority sympathy with Algiers was expressed, in Tlemsen, by association with the Qādiriya clan of the Awlād Sayyidī Shaykh (32). During a Tilimsānī uprising against the Turks, in the autumn of 1674, the city's Shādhiliya zāwiya of Sayyidī Abū Madyān had been destroyed (33). In 1680, Mouette alleged that Tilimsānī "Moors" were continuing to request Ismā'īl's aid against Algerine forces, as they had been doing for some time (34)

Fāsī citizens of 1680 would have had an interest in the sultan's acquisition of Tlemsen. Its capture would have removed the fiscal barriers to trade (35) between the two cities. And it is possible that, in an hungry year for Fes, this would have facilitated a westward flow of grain from the agricultural whorl to which the smaller city of Tlemsen was hub. According to "al-Fāsī chronicle", the Fāsī granaries

- (30) D. Dapper: "Africa..." ed./tr. Ogilby p. 208. The origin of this piece of secondary source material is unknown. But the existence of a Tilimsānī community in Fes earlier in the seventeenth century is vouched for by al-Ifrānī, who noted mob attacks upon this community during 1610 riots ("Nuzhat al-Hādī..." ed./tr. Houdas p. 234 of the text and 388 of the translation)
- (31) For a summary of Sūfī religious affiliations in the Maghrib al-Aqṣā, see E. Michaux-Bellaire "Les Confréries Religieuses au Maroc" in A.M. Vol XXVII (Paris, 1927) pp. 1-86 and in particular pp. 72-82
- (32) A. Cour: "L'établissement des dynasties des chérifs au Maroc, et leur rivalité avec les Turcs de la Régence d'Alger 1509-1830" (Paris, 1904) p. 247
- (33) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 244
- (34) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 134
- (35) The existence of such barriers is implied within "Ockley"'s allegation that, within Morocco, traders from the Ottoman Empire paid lower taxes than did other alien merchants (p. 40).

had been exhausted since the time when the jihād had been declared; there seems to have been heavy associated inflation in the city (36). But it will be seen that Fāsī hopes were dashed by the actual course of the "Chergi" campaign. The expedition demonstrated that Ismā'īl was no military champion of purely Fāsī interests, and that fundamentally the concerns of city and sultan were divergent.

Before his departure eastward, Ismā'īl received a fillip to his prestige at second hand: the capture of two outlying bastions to the Tangier defences, Fort Charles and Fort Henrietta. A truce with the English followed (37). The victory was blazoned forth, and the victor received in triumph at the palace gates (38). This mujaḥid victory was the only remarkable achievement by Ismā'īl's forces during the year 1680. It will be noted that al-Zayyānī endowed Ismā'īl's first easterly expedition with considerable military and political moment (39). But, as recounted by Mouḥtte (40), the sultan's ḥaraka of 1680 emerges as an expedition quite as dilatory and self-preservatory as the long ḥaraka of the previous two years. Ismā'īl's priority seems to have been the feeding of his army during a famine-summer, and, once again, its preservation from plague. In late June, the sultan's column moved eastwards, away from the capital's pestilence. It moved into the territory of groupings from the Angad plain, who are alleged two years previously to have rallied

(36) Nashr al-Mathānī... ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 335 and 358

(37) Mouḥtte: "Histoire..." pp. 129-131 cf. Routh: "Tangier..." pp. 175-80

(38) The sultan: "...envoya publier par toutes les rues de Miquenez, qu'Amar Hadou son esclave avoit remporté une signalée victoire sur les Anglois, en ayant tué un grand nombre, fait quantité de captifs, et pris dix-huit pièces d'artillerie...at lorsqu'Amar arriva avec ses depouilles, le Roy l'alla recevoir comme triomphant hors des portes de son chateau." (Mouḥtte: "Histoire..." p. 131)

(39) See Epiloque Part II Pp. 328-9

(40) Mouḥtte: "Histoire..." pp. 131-2 and 133-4

to his dissident Fīlālī kinsmen, refugees within their country during the sultan's temporary occupation of Tafilelt (41). Local murābitūn persuaded the sultan to accept a mediated settlement. But only at the end of the presumably harvest-stripping summer did Ismā'īl stir his following into a move upon Tlemsen. By this time, the Turkish garrison of its citadel had been effectively re-inforced, in expectation of his attack. The sultan was presented with a letter from Algiers, threatening positive military action if he did not confine himself to accepted frontiers. After petty wrangling, he received news that Meknes was plague-free and withdrew.

A startling note within "al-Fāsī chronicle" implies that, within Fes, the haraka had been expected to move more decisively in the eastern march. For late August, there is recorded the news that the sultan had been defeated outside Tlemsen and that, in consequence, the already inflated price of grain had taken an additionally vicious upward flight (42). The news of defeat is dismissable as rumour. But it may still be inferred that Ismā'īl's military moves had failed to match Fāsī economic hopes. The expedition seems also to have fallen below Ismā'īl's expectations. He may have hoped that the expectant Tilimsānī populace would rise on his behalf. And his mood upon his return to Sals may be judged from the plaintive note within "al-Fāsī chronicle" that, upon his passing through Fās al-Jadīd, after having reached the gates of Tlemsen, the sultan refused to spend even a single night in the proximity of Fes itself, but went on straight to Meknes (43).

(41) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 116

(42) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 338

(43) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. loc. cit.

The return is here dated to 3/Shahbān/1091 = 29/8/1680. MouÛtte's narrative ("Histoire..." p. 134) implies a September date that overcrowds his later tale-telling.

Within weeks of his inglorious return to Sals, Ismā'īl nipped a political development in the bud by demoting the titular vice-roy of Fes: the ill-beloved eldest son Muhriz, whom two years previously he had left in token authority over the plague-ridden metropolis. Fāsī notables journeyed to Meknes in support of the claims of Muhriz (44). It seems probable that these Fāsī notables had made of the young prince a civic protégé. It is consequently likely to have been for his father's political security, rather than for the licentiousness adduced by MouÛtte (45), that the young prince was dismissed to Tafielt, along with the sons of al-Rashīd (46).

The successor of Muhriz within Fes was his half-brother Muḥammad. Muḥammad was still a child, too young for his beguiling by the Fāsī yet to be of great significance to his father. Twelve was the most advanced estimate of his age given by any member of Kirke's Tangier mission, which met with the young prince during his first year of office (47). However, unlike Muhriz, who was henceforward to be a minor political figure, Muḥammad was to be significant dynastically for the next quarter of a century. His singling out at a young age for titular eminence, and his later retention of that eminence can most plausibly be accounted for by the suggestion that personal charm graced both the boy and his mother. All that is known of the mother is that she was European. Her nationality was variously attributed by European commentators and is irrelevant. As a "Renegado Christian" (48) she was, in the terms of local society, effectively of slave origin and without kin. Her union with Ismā'īl could thus have brought him no political advantage whatsoever. Yet, along with

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(44) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 338

(45) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 134

(46) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. loc. cit.

(47) "The last account from Fes..." p. 3

(48) ibid. loc. cit.

her son, she was set up in al-Rashīd's former palace in Fās al-Jadīd, with her own court: the move was a combination of estrangement and promotion.

The removal to Fes of an European "queen" may have co-incided with an increase in the Miknāsī palace status of another of Ismā'īl's womenfolk, <sup>c</sup>Ayisha Mubārka the "Black Queen" (49). Unlike the alien mother of Muḥammad, <sup>c</sup>Ayisha was a woman about whose person followers of her husband would congregate, in the role of real or notional kinfolk. As will be seen, <sup>c</sup>Ayisha came eventually to symbolise the relationship of the cavalry corps of Udāya to Ismā'īl (50). In 1680, the corps of Udāya is known to have been developing. During that year, a fort known to Mouëtte as "Ludḅya" was constructed next to the new Miknāsī palace, as a citadel for its defence (51). It has been noted that the Udāya are likely to have originated in 1677, with the sultan's scooping into his train of a rabble of Hawz and Murrākushī men (52). Tradition suggests that the Udāya force expanded in stages, and that the second wave of its recruits came from beyond the Atlas (53). For the year of dearth 1680, there may have been an influx of potential Udāya recruits, migrants from "the Province where old Muley was born" (54) and from similar oasean regions, brought across the Atlas by drought.

Drought may also have provided the impulse to the extension of Ismā'īl's suzerainty across the Atlas, as far to the south-east as Tuat.

(49) "La Reyna Negra" : Del Puerto Bk. V. Ch. 43 p. 616

(50) See Chapter IV Pp. 170-174

(51) Mouëtte: "Relation..." p. 148 cf. "Histoire..." p. 190

(52) See Chapter II Pp. 103 and 105

(53) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 29

(54) Thus Braithwaite described the place of origin claimed by the "Lydyres" of his own day p. 24

As noted previously, al-Rashīd had maintained a representative in Tuat for a period at the end of his reign (55). But it seems improbable that there was any direct continuation of a link between Sa'is and Tuat during Ismā'īl's early years. Until 1677, Ismā'īl was engrossed in his duel with Ahmad ibn Muhriz for mastery within the Atlas arc. During this period, the politics of the south-eastern oases are likely to have been conducted in effective isolation from those of the interior Maghrib al-Aqṣā. In 1677, Ismā'īl sent out to Tafilelt a qā'id of his own, Hamdūn (56). However, the sultan seems to have wielded little Fīlālī authority over the next few years, except during his short period of personal intrusion into Tafilelt in 1678. Ismā'īl's half-brother al-Harrān is likely to have been seen as primus inter pares among the leading Fīlālī shurafā'. However, at a point probably to be dated to the autumn of 1680, the sultan was able to command his qā'id Hamdūn to lead a Fīlālī haraka out as far as Tuat. Other commanders, including al-Harrān, seem to have accompanied the qā'id on this expedition (57). This Fīlālī coalition may well have been a "spin-off" from economic disarray. Tafilelt, dependent upon the lower Ziz and Rheris for the irrigation of its palm-groves, is likely to have been affected by the 1680 drought. But Tuat, which draws its water from subterranean reservoirs ("foggara") (58), may well have been spared disaster. The expedition seems to have taken revenue in kind, as well as

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(55) See Chapter II P. 90

(56) Mouëtte: "Histoire..." pp. 106 and 116

(57) The chronology is that of Mouëtte ("Histoire..." p. 135). But the expedition he noted seems identifiable with that dated to 1678, and set into the Tawatī record of one "al-Tamentiti" (quoted Martin p. 64). This expedition was said to have been led by three of Ismā'īl's quwwad, one of the Hamdūn, the others "al-Mahdī" and 'Alī, all accompanied by al-Harrān. It seems necessary to subordinate this chronology to that of Mouëtte, who noted that in 1678, al-Harrān, then at odds with Ismā'īl, had retired to the Angad region. ("Histoire..." p. 116)

(58) J. Despois and R. Raynal: "Géographie de l'Afrique du Nord-Ouest" (Paris, 1967) p. 451 cf. Capitaine L6: "Les foggaras du Tidikelt" in "Travaux de l'Institut de Recherches Sahariennes" Vol. X (Algiers, 1953) pp. 139-179 and Vol XI (Algiers, 1954) pp. 49-77



in "Rashīdiyya" currency (59). It may be seen as the instrument with which Saïf and Tafīlet reached out to Tuat together, to compensate for the failure of the September date harvest in oasean regions nearer to the Atlas. In broader terms, it marked a new period in the economic subjection of Tuat to a sultan in Saïf. Three further Tawāṭī expeditions would be mounted from Saïf during the early 1680s (60).

The extension of Ismā'īl's authority over Tuat is remarkable in terms of distance. The Sus, Dar<sup>C</sup>a and "Qibla", which included regions far nearer to Meknes than was Tuat, had as yet been left to the suzerainty of Ahmad ibn Muhriz. The disproportion is evidence of the comparative ease with which an intermittent authority based upon the ḥaraka could be extended along a geographically open route. It may also be evidence of Ismā'īl's continuing reluctance to engage with his nephew in the rough country that hedged "inner Sus".

There was to be no urgency to Ismā'īl's movements against Ahmad ibn Muhriz, for as long as the nephew's interests remained limited to "Chleuh" country and to its southern fringe. It is true that an army supposedly pitched against Ahmad ibn Muhriz was mustered in Saïf during the spring of 1681 (61). But in Mouḥtte's opinion this army was destined only for Marrakesh (62). The campaign which Ismā'īl envisaged may have been essentially defensive: a counter demonstration of force in the face of a nephew whose military reputation was searing. During the previous year, Ahmad ibn Muhriz had been occupied in a "Qiblan" war, of which reports had come back to Meknes, along with a gift of twelve eunuchs, which the nephew presented to Ismā'īl (63). The reports included the tale of a mighty victory,

(59) "al-Tamentiti" quoted Martin p. 64

(60) "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin p. 65

(61) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 345  
cf. "Turjuman" p. 19 of the text and 35 of the translation of.  
"The last account from Fez..." p. 2

(62) Mouḥtte: "Histoire..." p. 145

(63) ibid. pp. 135-7

won by Ahmad ibn Muhriz at Taghaza, over a Sudanic prince, son to a fabulously wealthy king. This tale may well have been simple rumour, a by-product of the exotic gift, and one further northerly echo of the Sudanic expeditions of the reign of Ahmad al-Mansūr. The character of the tale is to be judged by its details on the bravura of Ahmad ibn Muhriz in storming the walls of Taghaza. Taghaza was a bleak salt-mine, which by this date is likely to have been in its last stages of habitation, if not deserted (64). Even in its heyday, it had been simply an huddle of huts and caverns (65). The Saharan battle reports need evince nothing more than the pre-occupation of Ahmad ibn Muhriz, in a drought year, with the protection of his southern frontier from the greenward migration of desert peoples. The gift to Ismā'īl may even be seen as a wheedling indication that the nephew, currently under pressure, desired to maintain the established territorial delimitation. Nevertheless, both "al-Fāsī chronicle" (66) and the drama of Mouette's narrative make it clear that, by 1681, an highly enhanced opinion of the military prowess of Ahmad ibn Muhriz had become widespread within Sals. This added menace to a northward diversion of the prince's interests. He moved into his father-in-law's High Atlas territory of the Banū Zaynāb, adjoining the "al-Fayja" region (67). From here he was well-poised to make a bid for Marrakesh.

But in 1681, Ismā'īl's threat of a southerly counter-move was not to be carried out. The affairs of the jihād intervened. In early April, peace was made with the English of Tangier (68). In the aftermath, the mujāhidūn, under the leader of 'Umar ibn Ḥaddu, were diverted towards Mamora, the

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(64) R. Mauny: "Tableau Géographique de l'Ouest Africain au Moyen Age..." (Dakar, 1961) p. 116

(65) R. Mauny et al. "Extraits tirés des Voyages d'Ibn Battuta" (Dakar, 1966) p. 35 cf. Leo ed. Ramusio f. 77

(66) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 345

(67) "Turjumān" p. 19 of the text and 35 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 34

(68) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 346 cf. Routh: "Tannier..." pp. 208-9

least defensible of the Spanish enclaves. Within four days, Mamora, whose water-supplies had been cut, was ready to capitulate (69). The capitulation was carefully staged as a theatrical set-piece for the enhancement of the sultan's glory. The Spanish authorities within Mamora were willing tamely to accept terms which involved the surrender of the town's heavy field-pieces, and the enslavement of its garrison, barring the six officers and a chaplain (70). Ratification of these terms was deliberately delayed until the sultan, summoned post-haste, could arrive at Mamora in person, to receive the ceremonial submission of its captain general (71). Subsequently, provincial governors throughout Ismā'īl's domains were commended each to organise a week's celebrations (72). The show did not betray the regional interest which lay at the centre of mujāhid political gravity. Ismā'īl took the guns and the captives; but 'Umar ibn Ḥaddu was kept complaisant. He and his following were granted the town's booty. They built two new settlements on the outskirts of the former Spanish fort (73).

It is possible that this capture of Mamora, a second port to Sale (74), endowed Ismā'īl with sufficient glory to outweigh, within the Atlas arc, the risen prestige of Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz. The whole campaigning season lay ahead, and the incidents surrounding Mamora's capitulation had not been of a weight sufficient to induce military exhaustion. But the projected

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(69) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Micheaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 346 cf. L. Galindo y de Vera: "Historia, vicisitudes y política tradicional de España respecto de sus posesiones en las costas de Africa" (Madrid, 1884) pp. 275-6

(70) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 147-8

(71) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." loc. cit. of. "Turjumān" pp. 19 of the text and 35-6 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 34

(72) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 148

(73) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 150 cf. "Turjumān" p. 19 of the text and 36 of the translation. The origin of al-Naṣirī's suggestion that the town was repopulated by Suesi abid ("Kitāb al-Istiqṣā...", Casablanca text Vol. VII p. 63 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 84) is unknown. It would seem unreliable, as Ismā'īl had not yet set foot in the Sus.

(74) S.I. 2<sup>B</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J.-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 p. 705

southward move against Ahmad ibn Muhriz was abandoned. The indefatigable reporter Germain MouÛtte, who was ransomed in the May of 1681, could view the land he so gratefully left as a divided empire, whose towering unifier al-Rashīd had been succeeded by two rival princes (75).

It seems likely that Ahmad ibn Muhriz only drew down upon himself attack from Ismā'īl in the north, by his own renewed intervention in the "Cherg". Both indigenous and European sources record the rumour that, before the opening of the campaigning season of 1682, the southern prince made diplomatic contact with Baba Ḥassān, Dey of Algiers, with a view to a dual-pronged attack upon Ismā'īl (76). It also seems possible that, with the understanding of the Dey, Ahmad ibn Muhriz entered into dealings with frontier groupings from the politically sensitive eastern march. St. Amans, waiting in Algerine waters on the eve of his embassy to Morocco, recorded the rumour that "un chef d'Arabes" had organised "quelques levées" in the name of the "roy de Sus", nephew to the Moroccan sultan (77); the context implies a border location for this activity.

However, events of 1682 ruptured any possibility of collusion between Algiers and the ruler of the Sus. Baba Ḥassān indeed brought an army westwards (78). He was able to punish Tlemsen in a sack that was well-remembered in the days of Shaw's eighteenth century travels (79)

(75) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 60

(76) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. II No. XX p. 252 Prat to Seignelay Marseille, 15/8/1682 cf. "Turjuman" p. 19 of the text and 36 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 34

(77) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. II No. XXI p. 254 St. Amans to Seignelay, 11/9/1682. St. Amans' informant was Père Jean le Vacher, who straddled the roles of vicar apostolic and French consul in Algiers.

(78) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. II No. XX p. 252 Prat to Seignelay Marseille, 15/8/1682 cf. No. IV St. Olon to Seignelay Genoa, 3/6/1682 pp. 208-9

(79) Shaw: "Travels and Observations..." p. 49 cf. S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III p. 75 Memo. of consul Piolle in Algiers, dated 17/5/1687, and recalling, in the context of a renewed threat from Ismā'īl against "Tremessen", the "pillage que Babassan avoit fait en cette ville".

By mid-June, there was an uncouth envoy of Ismā'īl's in Constantinople (80), presumably despatched to protest against border incursions by the Algerine troops, incursions which al-Zayyānī's tradition inflated into an invasion of Snassen country and the capture of Dār ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al (81). However, by this time, Algerine border aggression was evaporating under external pressure. Cherchell lay under the threat of bombardment by a French fleet under Duquesne, and Baba Ḥassān was forced to retreat to its defence. He made peace with Ismā'īl, who had brought an army into the "Cherg" against him. As part of this agreement, the Dey is alleged himself to have put down the rising of frontier peoples who favoured his Sūsī ally (82). Ismā'īl himself was currently at peace with major European naval powers. The early months of the year had seen Moroccan ambassadors in both Paris and London. But there was a convenient religious veto against conflict with fellow Muslims under pressure from the infidel (83). This freed the sultan from "Chergi" involvement, and offered him the opportunity to turn southward in pursuit of Ahmad ibn Muhriz.

Ismā'īl's entry into "inner Sus" was an unprecedentedly bold venture. It marked a serious and complex expansion of the sultan's military horizons. Unlike the relatively open "Cherg", the Sus was protected by terrain from being the object of relatively brief summer campaigning. Prior to this first Sūsī expedition, Ismā'īl's army was seen, in the June of 1682, massing

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(80) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. II No. XII p. 229 Guilleraques to Louis XIV,  
Pera, 13/6/1682

(81) "al-turk jā'ū bi-mahallatihim. wa istawla<sup>c</sup> alā bānī yiznāsīn wa <sup>c</sup>alā  
dār ibn mash<sup>c</sup>al"

("...the Turks came with an armed force and took possession of Snassen (country) and of Dar ibn Mash<sup>c</sup>al") "Turjuman" p. 19 of the text cf. 36 of the translation.

(82) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. II No. XXI p. 254 St. Amans to Seignelay,  
Algerine waters, 11/9/1682. Information from Père Jean le Vacher.

(83) It could be alleged that Ismā'īl would have pursued the Algerine army in 1682, "si les docteurs de sa loy ne l'eussent empêché, luy ayant représenté que c'estoit contre leur religion de poursuivre leurs frères tandis qu'ils estoient attaqués par des Chrestiens" (S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. II No. XX p. 252 Prat to Seignelay, Marseille 15/8/1682)

outside Sale (84). It was not to return to Sals until the November of 1683 (85). For Ismā'īl the expedition was unfortunate. Paucity of eye-witness evidence makes it impossible to detail Sūsī opposition to the sultan of the "Gharb". But the course of Sūsī events suggests that around the figure of Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz there had coalesced both the civic force of Tarudant, and the rural resistance of "Chleuh" countryfolk, and that Ismā'īl had therefore to wade across a recalcitrant province. When the French embassy of St. Amans reached Ismā'īl's mahalla in the December of 1682, it was still stationed in High Atlas mountain country, considerably to the north of Tarudant (86). The city of Tarudant itself was only invested during the following spring, when Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz retreated thither (87). At this point, Sūsī opposition to Ismā'īl reached a violence discernable even as filtered through the medium of "al-Fāsī chronicle". 1683 saw three successive and bloody encounters in the region of Tarudant. In all of these, Ismā'īl would seem to have been worsted (88). His situation may have been complicated by commissariat problems: this was yet another year of dearth (89). In the late summer of 1683, Ismā'īl accepted a renewal of peace with his nephew (90), and retreated to Sals, leaving Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz peaceably to re-inforce his

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(84) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. II No. XIV p. 234 St. Amans to Seignelay, Toulon, 2/7/1682. Information from Sale, by way of the "echévins" of Marseille.

(85) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 357

(86) "Journal du Voyage de St. Amans" pp. 328-9

(87) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 356

(88) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ibid. loc. cit. cf. "Turjumān" pp. 19-20 of the text and 37 of the translation

(89) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 357

(90) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ibid. p. 356 cf. "Turjumān" loc. cit.  
cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 35

own authority within the Sus. In the September of 1683, the nephew, in a genial mood, was re-establishing mastery over the Sūsī port of Agadir (91). The uncle's mood was such that, on his return to Sals in November, he refused to receive a courtesy visit from the Fāsī a<sup>c</sup>yan (92).

The sultan may have been well aware that these a<sup>c</sup>yan had made good use of his absence. The unlucky dry spring of 1683 had caused considerable social disturbance within their metropolis. Hungry members of the Fāsī populace had forcibly to be made to return to the city, after fleeing their responsibilities (93). Civic dignitaries seem to have extracted what advantage they could from this social miasma. The adolescent vice-roy Muḥammad was set up in public, to distribute free food to the starving. The distribution was made, not from the palace, but from the zāwiyat al-Fāsī (94). The location of this hieratic action suggests that, during the period of his father's southern absence, the young prince, like his half-brother and predecessor Muḥriz before him, had been drawn into a degree of identification with the magnates of Fās al-Bālī. The advantage of such an identification would have been mutual. In this context, "al-Fāsī chronicle" gave to the young vice-roy the sobriquet of "the scholar" ( "al-<sup>c</sup>alim" ). This implies that Muḥammad, the prince without maternal kin, had already become identified with a "pressure group" who might act for him in lieu of such kinfolk: the ulama<sup>c</sup>. Henceforward, this growing son of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's would always be Muḥammad al-<sup>c</sup>Alim, the schoolmen's prince. And, for as long as his father allowed him to remain within the city of Fes, he may be thought of as an inheritor of the

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(91) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. II No. CXCII Extract from the journal of the privateer Jean Doublet pp. 597-9 (Dating corrected in Volume V of the series No. LXXXI p. 528)

(92) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Belleire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 357

(93) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 356

(94) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ibid. loc. cit.

tradition of al-Rashīd: an <sup>C</sup>Alawī prince who identified himself with Fāsī interests.

Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's warrior credit cannot have been high during the early months of 1684. But the sultan's prestige was about to receive a gratuity. Since the summer of 1683, the evacuation of Tangier by its English garrison had been a prospective certainty (95). There were blatant preparations for departure, including the destruction of the port's fortifications and famous mole. Meanwhile, the enclave was kept under token and amicable siege, at the command of the qa'id of Tetuan, <sup>C</sup>Alī ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh al-Ḥammāmī (96), whose following came from the Western Rif. Samuel Pepys, a witness to one stage of the evacuation procedures, was able to meet this "Alcade", exchange pleasantries with a "Moorish" sentry, and watch the mujāhidūn idly pacing their own camp "almost like ghosts, all in white" (97). When the evacuation was completed, in February 1684, these mujāhidūn needed only to enter and rebuild the ruined town (98). To this acquisition of the hulk of a small port, a prize was added by chance. The move into Tangier concentrated <sup>C</sup>Alī ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh's followers in the town's general vicinity when, in early April, a flagship of Spain ran aground near to Ceuta. Its abandoned cargo, which was effectively presented to the Muslim infidel, included coined money and a battery estimated at 80 cannon. A contingent from Fes was sent out to aid the local Rifī Ghumāra in the thankless task of dragging the cannon into Meknes (99).

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(95) Routh: "Tangier..." pp. 274-251

(96) "Turjumān" p. 20 of the text and 38 of the translation of "Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS p. 35 cf. Routh: "Tangier..." loc. cit.

(97) S. Pepys ed. J. Smith "The Life, Journals etc..." Vol. I. pp. 370-371, 424 and 433

(98) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 371-2 cf. "Turjumān" p. 20 of the text and 38 of the translation.

(99) "Turjumān" loc. cit. cf. S.I. 2<sup>B</sup> France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle dated 19/7/1690 p. 312



Their safe delivery may be assumed to have proved <sup>C</sup>Alī ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh a loyal servant to Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl.

In Meknes, the latter end of 1684 is likely to have been taken up with preparations for Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's second bid to take the Sus. One sullen captive from the Miknāsī palace building site, who was only too relieved at the sultan's departure from his own vicinity, carefully noted the date upon which the great haraka made for the south: January 1st. 1685. He further remarked that, whatever the outcome, "Fight Dog, Fight Bear", it was two or three years before the sultan's return was to be expected (100). In envisaging such an unprecedented period of absence from the lands within the Atlas arc, campaigning in a region where he had already met with severe defeat, Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl had clearly subordinated his characteristic caution to a straightforward desire for the acquisition of his nephew's rich territory.

There was little threat to his own sovereignty within the Atlas arc. But the devolution of power associated with the sultan's absence from the region influenced particular political fortunes. As vice-roy, at the centre of government in Meknes, there was left the adolescent prince Zaydān (101), Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's eldest son by <sup>C</sup>Ayisha Mubārka, the woman to be associated with the cavalry corps of Udāya (102). This seems to have been Zaydān's first induction to political prominence. As will be seen, his status among Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's sons would later be paramount. Maintenance of order within the provinces was entrusted to great quwwad. Bias within European source material makes Tetuan the best known of such provincial commands.

(100) T. Phelps: "A true account of the captivity..." pp. 8 and 12. The author's terming January 1st "New Year's Day" indicates that he was using the "New Style" chronology.

(101) It was to Zaydān as vice-roy that Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl, still within the Sus in the November of of 1686, addressed a letter giving instructions for the protection of the restored Spanish Franciscan mission in Meknes (Del Puerto Bk. VI Ch. IV pp. 648-9)

(102) For discussion of the problem of <sup>C</sup>Ayisha Mubārka's relationship to the growing corps of Udāya, see Chapter IV Pp. 170-174

It is from this period of Ismā'īl's second Sūsī campaign that 'Alī ibn 'Abd Allāh can be seen to have held court and government like a petty sultan. His state was publicly demonstrated when, in the September of 1685, he arranged a magnificent wedding in Tangier for one of his sons (103), a ceremony that was possibly ancillary to the son's establishment as governor over the new Muslim town. The qā'id of Tetuan had a responsibility which particularly distinguished him. He conducted diplomatic relations with European powers, acting always in the sultan's name but enjoying a wide scope for discretion (104). The first of this qā'id's known series of letters written to Louis XIV on behalf of his master, dates from the month following Ismā'īl's second departure for the Sus (105). Within the developing diplomatic status of 'Alī ibn 'Abd Allāh there may be discerned the embryo of the "niyāba" of Tangier, the pre-Protectorate government office through which all European correspondence with the sultan was necessarily channelled (106).

During the sultan's three years of absence from Sals, over the period 1685-7, the mechanism of his government continued at least to turn over. Tuat was granted the remission of half its taxation as customarily assessed (107). But no known graces were extended to peoples within the Atlas arc. Obligations in the matter of defence are those for which most evidence survives. During Ismā'īl's first Sūsī expedition, the coastal regions had enjoyed peace. But during this second expedition, the Atlantic

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- (103) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. II No. CIV Extract from the journal of the French naval officer Brodeau pp. 536-9
- (104) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. V. Extract from the journal of Pierre Estelle, at Tangier, for the November of 1686 p. 10
- (105) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. II No. LXXVI pp. 474-7 'Alī ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Hammāni to Louis XIV 7/Rabi' I/1096 = 11/2/1685
- (106) R. Mauduit: "Le Makhzen Marocain" pp. 298-9 cf. G. Ayache: "La question des archives historiques marocaines" p. 371
- (107) Imperial zahir discovered at Aougrouit and reproduced in translation by Martin p. 65

littoral was under persistent threat from the sea. Correspondingly, demands were made upon coastal peoples, and upon the militia of the inland towns. Three months after the sultan's departure, the citizens of Sale were fined for failing to keep an adequate guard of the coast: a night-raid by English ships had destroyed two Saletin corsair vessels sheltering in Mamora harbour (108). During the following year, 1686, when a French fleet under d'Estrées cruised off Tangier for several weeks of the early summer, a force from the interior, under the nominal command of one of Isma<sup>c</sup>il's sons, was brought to the assistance of <sup>c</sup>Alī ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd Allāh. This re-inforcement was rumoured largely to be made up of the citizen militia of Fes and Marrakesh (109). These men had been made to pay towards the waging of the campaign. Allegedly they were terrified that they might be ordered to march south, to join companions who were with the sultan himself, under an al-Rūsī commander (110).

The sultan, once reluctant to become involved in the Sus, was now making a determined effort towards its acquisition. The immediate campaign was concentrated around Tarudant, in a siege that took two years. This siege was punctuated by bloody skirmishes, and by a series of attempts to undermine the city walls (111). It was the city with which Isma<sup>c</sup>il was at war. His dynastic rival-in-chief Ahmad ibn Muhriz

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- (108) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. II No. C Fernando Superviela, French vice-consul in Cadiz, to Seignelay, 9/7/1685 pp. 521-2 cf. Vol. III No. CXIII Memo of J-B. Estelle, Sale, 19/7/1690 p. 318
- (109) "...la plus grand partie est composée de marchands et d'autre gens de famille de Fez et de Maroc" (S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. II No. CXLVIII p. 652 Consul Périllie to Seignelay, Sale, 8/8/1686)
- (110) Périllie to Seignelay loc. cit. cf. "Turjuman" p. 21 of the text and 40 of the translation
- (111) A near-contemporary supplement to the indigenous tradition on this siege is to be found within the unpromisingly entitled work of a former English slave, Francis Brooks: "Barbarian Cruelty". Brooks knew personally the three survivors among four Englishmen who had bought their freedom by joining the sultan's corps of "pioneers" outside Tarudant, and remaining there until the successful conclusion of the siege.

was eliminated from the struggle at a relatively early stage (112). He left the city on a private errand, accompanied only by a small guard of his abīd, ran across a similarly small party of Ismā'īl's men, and was shot dead during the ensuing skirmish (113). His death ended more than thirteen years of personal opposition to Ismā'īl, but was of minimal significance to the siege. As figurehead to Rudānī resistance Ahmad ibn Muhriz was smoothly replaced by his uncle al-Harrān, who had opted to join nephew rather than brother in the dynastic struggle (114). The succession was in line with the Rudānī formality that resistance to an Alawī sultan from the "Gharb" should, whenever possible, be made in the name of an Alawī prince. But the ease of this particular succession suggests that any Alawī prince might be adopted by the city, with equal convenience.

The death of Ahmad ibn Muhriz may have caused more pertinent dismay to Ismā'īl himself than to his enemies within the city walls. Dynastic tradition is incorrect in asserting that Ahmad ibn Muhriz was killed incognito (115). More contemporary information suggests that the man who killed "Mully Hammet" knew the identity of his victim perfectly well, and innocently expected a reward for having put an end to the sultan's rival. Instead he was dragged at the mule-tail. His body was afterwards exposed at "a place where the Country People used to come into the Camp" (116), as a warning to the army and to local "Chleuh" alike that the persons of members of the dynasty were to be regarded

(112) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. II No. CV pp. 543-4 Perillie to Seignelay, Sale, 18/11/1685

(113) Brooks pp. 18-20 cf. "Turjumān" p. 21 of the text and 39 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 35-6

(114) "Turjumān" p. 40 of the text and 21 of the translation cf. al-Ifrānī: "Zill al-warīf..." p. 56 cf. Brooks p. 19

(115) "Turjumān" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 35

(116) Brooks pp. 18-20 (Quotation: p. 20)

as inviolable.

In the March of 1687, Ismā'īl's forces were able to breach the wall of Tarudant and take the city (117). The storming and massacre implied in al-Zayyānī's narrative (118) should be taken as literary convention. Ismā'īl's victory seems to have been relatively leisurely, and preceded by negotiation. The memory of al-Harrān's "escape" (119) may conceal his pre-arranged evacuation of Tarudant, analogous with the evacuation of Marrakesh by Ahmad ibn Muhriz before its capture by Ismā'īl in 1677. As for the fate of the populace:

"Mully Ishmaell entred his men and took both the City and Castle, and promised the people he would be kind to them; but when he took the Town, he secured their Arms, Ammunition and Treasure, and carried the people of that place to Macqueness." (120)

The note on "Treasure" aligns with northern rumours concerning an heavy and systematic spoliation of Tarudant, aimed at the city's social and economic ruin (121). The allegation of mass deportation interlocks with the chronicle record that a new population, the Rīfī community of Fes, was ordered to migrate to Tarudant, after

(117) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. XVII p. 41 Catalan, French consul in Cadiz, to Seignelay, 14/4/1687, quoting information recently received from Pierre Estelle in Tetuan.

Al-Zayyānī's chronicle material dated the capture of Tarudant to Jumada I 1098, a month crossing the March and April of 1687 ("Turjumān" p. 21 of the text and 40 of the translation)

(118) "fa-dakhalahā 'anwatan bi 'l-sayf" ("He entered it (the city) by force at sword-point") ("Turjumān" loc. cit.)

(119) "wa haraba al-harrān" ("And al-Harrān fled") "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS. p. 36  
Al-Ifrānī's glutinous "Zill al-Warīf..." suggests that al-Harrān was pardoned by his brother and exiled to the Hijāz ( p. 56)

(120) Brooks pp. 20-21

(121) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. XVII p. 41 Catalan to Seignelay, Cadiz, 14/4/1687 cf. No. XCIII Memo. of consul Perillié on Moroccan trade, dating from January 1689 p. 234

Isma<sup>C</sup>il had made the place into a "ghost city" (122).

In terms of al-Ifrānī's dynastic myopia, the "fath rūdāna", or victory over Tarudant, was an event of great moment which marked the accomplishment of Isma<sup>C</sup>il's "tamhīd" or ordering of his empire. Decorously he shifted its date by seven months, into an alignment with the year's festival of Id al-Adhan, or Day of Immolation. And he claimed that the city's fall entailed willing submission by the peoples of "further Sus" (123). This view is open to wide question. It will be seen that, in the long term, Isma<sup>C</sup>il's capture of Tarudant was an hollow victory. It did not lead to the city's economic ruin. Mushroom-like, Tarudant was within two years noted as functioning, apparently efficiently, as the economic centre for "Moorish" and Jewish merchants of the Sus, and as the clearing-house for debts contracted in the course of Agadir trade (124). Nor did the fath rūdāna entail the shrivelling of Sūsī opposition to government from the "Gharb". On the contrary it may be seen as having committed Isma<sup>C</sup>il to a protracted military occupation of "further Sus", a region which would come to be regarded as "the thorn in the sultan's foot" (125).

Admittedly, the fall of Tarudant carried an immediate éclat. As news of the city's surrender spread, the victor was granted

(122) "wa amara bi-khurūj ahl al-rīf alladhīna bi-fās yi'tūna li-suknā tarudānt haythu lam yubqqa bihā aḥad"

("And he gave orders for the migration of the Rīfī community of Fes, and for their coming to settle in Tarudant, For not a single person remained there.") ("Turjuman" p. 21 of the text cf. 46 of the translation)

(123) al-Ifrānī: "Zill al-Warīf..." p. 56

(124) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. XCIII Memo. of Perillie dating from January 1689 pp. 234 and 235

(125) "Cette espine que le roy de Maroc a dans le pied luy fait une grande peine." (S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CIII 3-B, Estelle to Pontchartrain Sale, 23/10/1697 p. 535)

ostentatious expressions of loyalty. In Tetuan, <sup>C</sup>Alī ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh organised "grandes festes" by way of victory celebrations (126). And Muḥammad al-<sup>C</sup>Alim, the vice-roy of Fes, journeyed all the way to Tarudant with an escort of Fāsī <sup>C</sup>ulamā', shurafā' and a<sup>C</sup>yān, in order to congratulate his father (127). The deputation may symbolise Fāsī hopes for the subsequent exploitation of the Sus.

Meanwhile, in Algiers, there were rumours that conflict with the victorious sharīf was imminent (128). These rumours were apparently fed by the sharīf himself. In the May of 1687, the Dey al-Ḥājj Ḥusayn, commonly known as "Mezzomorto", is said to have received a bombastic communication from Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl. This communication approximated to a declaration of war. Allegedly it harked back to "Chergī" events of five years previously, and amounted to a demand by Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl for the surrender of Tlemcen, together with the value of deprivations made by Baba Ḥassān within that city (129). Rumour rebounded back into the Maghrib al-Aqṣā. A consignment of tents, which Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl commissioned from Sale, were believed in that city to be destined for a projected "Chergī" campaign (130).

However, even by the time Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's letter was said to have arrived in Algiers, a chill had fallen upon the euphoria of the Rudānī victory. The sultan had already discovered that the subjection of Tarudant was not the subjection of the Sus. He was not militarily

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- (126) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. XVII Catalan to Seignelay, dated Cadiz, 14/4/1687, and containing information from Pierre Estelle in Tetuan. p. 41
- (127) "Turjumān" p. 21 of the text and 40 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 36
- (128) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. XIX Memo. of Piolle, French consul in Algiers, 19/4/1687 p. 45
- (129) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. XXIX Memo. of Piolle, Algiers, 17/5/1687 p. 75
- (130) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. LIV Périllie to Seignelay, Sale, 26/7/1687 p. 133

free to come north to put force behind his threat of a "Chergi" campaign, or to defend his own Atlantic littoral, under renewed French naval threat. News came to Sale of a six months' veto upon any departure from the supposedly victorious sultan's army (131). The coast was left essentially to its "home-guard" pattern of defence (132). In the July of 1687, the news in Tetuan was that the sultan was still engaged at "Tolidan" (133). Laudatory accounts of his exploits need indicate no more than that he was still engaged in heavy fighting. The eventual date at which Ismā'īl abandoned personal campaigning within the Sus is likely to have been autumnal, and a matter of season rather than decisive victory. A lieutenant "Zacatin", whom MouÛtte had known as Ismā'īl's "treasurer" (134), and who was sufficiently close to the sultan to be referred to in conventional parlance as his "uncle" (135), was detached from the sultan's army, set in command of a sizeable body of cavalry (136), and left in the Sus with orders to prosecute Ismā'īl's interests. Ismā'īl himself led the main body of his troops northwards. A tax-raiding force, headed by an al-Rūsī commander, would seem to have been hived off from this army upon its homeward march, and despatched to Tuat. There, from the end of January 1688, qusūr-ruining government troops made up for the previous two and an half years of fiscal lenience (137).

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- (131) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. XXIV p. 70 Périllie to Seignelay Sale, 12/5/1687
- (132) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III Nos. XXIV and LIV pp. 70 and 133, Périllie to Seignelay, Sale, 12/5/1687 and 26/7/1687
- (133) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. LII pp. 128-9 Pierre Estelle to Seignelay, Tetuan, 26/7/1687
- (134) See Chapter II Pp. 109-110 and MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 200
- (135) "Ockley" p. 54
- (136) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. LXII p. 162 Périllie to Laony Sale, 10/2/1688
- (137) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" and corroborative Timmi document, quoted Martin pp. 65-7



Meanwhile, the sultan himself returned to Meknes (138).

In Meknes, Ismā'īl received news of challenge within both Sus and "Cherg". "Zacatin"'s forces were embroiled with "Chleuh" mountain men (139). To the east, a muted confrontation was being mounted within the Regency. For, since the victory over Tarudant, Ismā'īl's reputation within Algiers had allegedly been "redoutable" (140). From the spring until the November of 1687, Mezzomorto had dawdled about his own capital, allegedly expecting that Ismā'īl would make some move against him (141). And, in the January of 1688, following a short expedition against his own southern march (142), the Dey moved an army into the "Cherg". The timing of this move suggests that the Algerine troops were poised to face the sharīf who had newly come northwards. But a pose of neutrality was carefully preserved. The Dey's forces were turned, not against Tlemsen or against rural peoples of the march, but against the Spanish presidio of Oran, which they beset as mujāhidūn from the January of 1688 until the following August (143).

It is possible that Mezzomorto's donning the mantle of a mujāhid saved Ismā'īl from the immediate obligation of carrying out a threat to Tlemsen which he had issued in the bubble of victory over Tarudant, and which he may not have wished to make good. However, at the end of August 1688, the moral barrier posed by the siege of Oran was lifted. Thereafter, Ismā'īl was urged to move eastwards even by Porte diplomacy.

(138) S.I. 2<sup>B</sup> France Vol. III No. LX p. 152 Translation of a letter from Abd Allah al-Rusi to Périllie dated Meknes 12/1/1688, and suggesting that the consul come to the capital for an audience of the sultan.

(139) S.I. 2<sup>B</sup> France Vol. III No. LXII p. 162 Périllie to Laony, Sale, 10/2/1688

(140) S.I. 2<sup>B</sup> France Vol. III No. LV p. 138 Memo. of Piolle, Algiers, 2/10/1687

(141) S.I. 2<sup>B</sup> France Vol. III Nos. LV and LVI Memos. of Piolle, Algiers 2/10/1687 and 29/11/1687 pp. 138 and 140-141

(142) S.I. 2<sup>B</sup> France Vol. III No. LVI Memo. of Piolle, Algiers, 29/11/1687 p. 141

(143) L. Galindo y de Vera: "Historia, vicisitudes..." pp. 279-282.

Mezzomorto was currently at odds with his suzerain, the Ottoman sultan Sulaymān III. An Ottoman envoy, Khalīl Aga, was despatched towards the Maghrib al-Aqṣā with a letter that was rumoured to grant its sharīf a diplomatic "free hand" to move against the Regency (144). However, the "free hand" was kept in rein. Khalīl Aga was kidnapped by Mezzomorto as his ship passed through Algerine waters in the October of 1688 (145). Ismāʿīl's only immediate reprisal for the insult was an act of petty high-handedness: in November he seized a party of French captives who had been taken by Algerine corsairs, but afterwards disembarked upon <sup>c</sup>Alawī territory (146).

The Sus was still an escalating military commitment. Reinforcements to "Zacatin"'s army of occupation, under the command of Ahmad ibn Haddu al-<sup>c</sup>Abtār (147) passed through Sale in the December of 1688 (148). Yet, even in the same month, there was a prefiguration of a separate and major campaign. A consignment of military baggage carts was set under construction by Saletin joiners, at the imperial command. The labour was singular, in that wheeled traffic was little known in the contemporary Maghrib al-Aqṣā. Périllie, the French consul in Sale, believed that the carts were destined for the "Cherg" (149).

The new year brought further indications that the sultan might be intending to move eastwards. Ismāʿīl was at pains to refurbish his relations with Fasī notables, after a fashion reminiscent of the

(144) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. III No. XC p. 223 Vauvré to Seignelay, Toulon, 9/11/1688

(145) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. III No. LXXXV pp. 214-15 Ismāʿīl Pasha, exiled Pasha of Algiers, to Louis XIV, Tetuan, 22/Dhū 'l-Hijja/1099 = 17/10/1688

(146) Brooks pp. 77-8 cf. S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. III No. LXXXVIII pp. 220-221 Catalan to Seignelay, Cadiz, 8/11/1688

(147) This officer is not to be confused with the mujāhid captain Ahmad ibn Haddu al-Hammāmī al-Battuwi.

(148) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. III No. XCII p. 231 Des Augiers, naval envoy, to Seignelay, Sale, 5/1/1689

(149) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. III No. XCI p. 228 Périllie to Seignelay, Sale 25/12/1688

preliminaries to his first "Chergi" campaign. Ismā'īl was not a ruler noted for lavish hospitality or financial ostentation. His personal frugality and public stinginess were standard points for European comment (150). Yet, in February 1689, he invited the <sup>C</sup>ulamā' of Fes to feast with him, in celebration of the conclusion of a series of lectures in commentary upon the Qur'ān. Money was distributed at the feast (151). In March, Algerine vessels were noted to be flitting Moroccan ports (152). According to report, Algerine troops were brought to mass in the region of Tlemsen (153).

Yet Ismā'īl failed to carry out the expected eastward venture. The Franco-centric Périllie saw this reluctance to expand along a geographically open north-eastern frontier as Ismā'īl's betrayal of his own "grand dessein" (154). It is simpler to see that caution once again prevented the sultan from making an aggressive move that might have had dire consequences. There was continuing unrest within the Sus, and rumours of further unrest in Marrakesh and in Tafilélt (155). All could have provided considerations to weigh against Ismā'īl making any flamboyant gesture against the Regency.

The sultan turned instead to the jihād as a source of renown to be obtained with greater military economy. Aḥmad ibn Ḥaddu al-Ḥammāmī, qā'id of the north-western plains, and brother and heir to <sup>C</sup>Umar ibn Ḥaddu, the victor over Mamora (156), was ordered to muster an army at his provincial capital of Alcazarquivir, for an attack upon the presidio of Larache. He

(150) For examples of such comment, see Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 60 cf. Busnot pp. 40 and 52 cf. Windus pp. 121 and 137

(151) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 411

(152) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. XCVII p. 244 Périllie to Seignelay, Sale, 25/3/1689

(153) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CII Périllie to Seignelay, Sale 16/7/1689 p. 264

(154) ibid. pp. 263-4

(155) ibid. p. 263

(156) "Turjuman" p. 19 of the text and 36 of the translation.

was granted the services of a party of French renegade "pioneers" (157), but seems otherwise, at this stage of events, to have been left to his own resources. The siege was opened in the August of 1689 (158) and lasted four months. Its chief distinction was an heavy use of the "pioneers"' gunpowder (159). An early estimate of the army of attack at 24,000 foot to 4,000 horse (160) is doubtless highly inflated. But the proportions given are not unsuitable to siege warfare. And, when seen within the wider context of a society besotted with cavalry skills, they tell their own tale as to the quality of the soldiery brought to mill around the presidio. The sultan took no personal part in the assault upon Larache. He was not even summoned formally to take part in its highlights. But it seems that he remained in Meknes while the siege continued, leaving subordinates to suppress Murrākushī disturbances, and to direct the continuing Sūsī warfare (161). At the end of October, the mujāhidūn took the town of Larache, as distinct from its little citadel (162). From this point onwards, a Muslim victory was inevitable. Deftly the sultan sent in a detachment of his own abīd, together with levies from the civic militia of a number of towns (163). Three weeks later, in mid-November, the defending forces surrendered upon terms

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(157) "Ockley" p. 12

(158) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 411  
cf. S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CIII Périllié to Seignelay, Sale  
8/9/1689 pp. 268-9

(159) L. Galindo y de Vera: "Historia, vicisitudes..." pp. 283-4 cf.  
al-Ifrānī: "Nuzhat al-Hadi..." ed. Houdas pp. 406 of the text and  
506-7 of the translation.

(160) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CIII Périllié to Seignelay 8/9/1689  
p. 269

(161) ibid. p. 270

(162) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CV Périllié to Seignelay, Sale 6/11/1689  
p. 275 cf. "Turjuman" p. 22 of the text and 42 of the translation.

(163) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CV Périllié to Seignelay, 6/11/1689  
loc. cit.

which non-Spaniards delighted to record as shameful: the chief officers and friars arranged to go free, along with their possessions and church plate. Ismā'īl took the cannon and ammunition, and was permitted to enslave almost the entire surrounding populace, which was estimated at above 1,600 and included around one hundred officers (164). Ahmad ibn Haddu's followers were allowed to repopulate the port (165), which became a quiet haven for ship-building, fishing and "pirating in Row-boats" (166). The gā'id built a residence in the town: the "Summer-house" Braithwaite saw nearly forty years later (167).

Capture of this shallow-water port was of no particular advantage to Ismā'īl's total command of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā. Yet, from a partisan Muslim viewpoint, the taking of Larache was a noble achievement. It was a victory for the forces of Islam which, unlike the taking of Mamora and of Tangier, had involved a period of genuine warfare. It was celebrated in poetry which forebore to stress the sultan's absence from the scene, and which, somewhat ill-advisedly, went on to threaten Ceuta and Oran (168). The victory was carefully wrung for its propagandist value. The Larache gates were dragged into Meknes (169). And, according to "al-Fāṣī chronicle", there was issued in January 1690 an imperial zahir that black shoes were no longer to be worn; for their

- (164) S.I. 2<sup>a</sup> France Vol. III No. CVII Périllie to Seignelay, Sale 18/11/1689 pp. 280-81 cf. Brooks pp. 45-7 cf. "Dockley" pp. 5-7 cf. "Turjuman" pp. 22-3 of the text and 42-3 of the translation. Curiously, Périllie's figure of 1634 for the total number of Spaniards enslaved is not far from al-Zayyānī's round estimate of 1,800.
- (165) "Turjuman" p. 23 of the text and 43 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 40
- (166) Braithwaite pp. 295 and 299
- (167) ibid. p. 296
- (168) Al-Nāṣirī referred to three such pieces of verse, and quoted in extenso two poems, the works of Fāṣī literati of Ismā'īl's day ("Kitāb al-Istiqṣā..." Casablanca text, Vol. VII pp. 73-76 cf. Fumey translation, A.M. Vol. IX pp. 99-103)
- (169) Windus, thirty years later, saw the gates set up in Ismā'īl's palace. (p. 102)

wear was alleged to have begun as a sign of mourning for the surrender of Larache to the Spaniards in 1610 (170).

Politically Ismā'īl was now in the ascendant. Victory in the jihād co-incided with a maximal extension of his Miknāsī grip over the Sus. By the March of 1690, Aḥmad ibn Ḥaddu al-<sup>C</sup>Attār had returned from the Sus. He was granted high palace favour, and appointed governor of Sale, Safi and Agadir (171). The honours indicate that the commander's previous year's campaigning within "Chleuh" country had made its mark. And indeed it would be two years before any further rumour of Sūsī unrest reached the French consulate in Sale. More than four years would pass before Aḥmad ibn Ḥaddu al-<sup>C</sup>Attār had to return to the re-inforcement of "Zacatin"'s army of occupation (172). The early 1690s may thus be seen as years during which the sultan of the "Gharb", by way of his lieutenants, achieved a degree of authority over "Chleuh" country that he will be seen to have found difficulty in regaining at later stages of his reign. This Sūsī victory seems to have been a valid, if temporary expression of forcible pacification, which should properly overshadow al-Zayyānī's well-known tales of pacification among the Beraber of the Central Atlas (173).

Recognition within the Sus had brought Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz into alliance with "Qiblan" peoples of the western Sahara (174). Now that Ismā'īl in his turn was overlord of the Sus, he may have made parallel alliances. Windus transmitted the memory of such an alliance in the language of

(170) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Fes lithograph of 1892 Vol. II p. 136 of the first notation.

(171) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CXII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, directed by way of a Marseille intermediary and dated 6/7/1690 pp. 297-8

(172) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CLXXXI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Tetuan 27/2/1693 p. 559 cf. Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo. of the same, Sale 19/10/1694 pp. 303-4

(173) See Prologue Pp. 22-24 and Epilogue Part I Pp. 294-303 for notes upon the weakness of this Beraber material.

(174) Moušte: "Histoire..." p. 135

decorously riggish romance, saying of Isma<sup>ḥ</sup>īl that:

"In the year 1690, before he was Master of Sahra, there came a Woman from that People to him who, hearing of her coming, went to meet her on Horseback, at the head of twenty thousand Men. She told him the People of Sahra were desirous to put themselves under his Protection, but that he must fight her at Launce-play, if he had a mind to have her, at once the Pledge of their Fidelity, and the Prize of his Victory. She set him hard at first, but afterwards suffered herself to be over-powered, was put among the rest of his Women, and Troops were sent to protect the Frontiers of Sahra." (175)

The anecdote echoes an indigenous tradition concerning a marriage alliance between Isma<sup>ḥ</sup>īl and a Saharan woman that, as a result of dynastic metabolism, would later be blown out of all due proportion (176). Behind Windus's stylised narrative there seems to lie only the suggestion that Isma<sup>ḥ</sup>īl was now sufficiently prestigious a ruler for certain desert peoples freely to accept his suzerainty, and to seal the bond with the gift of one of their daughters. The note upon "Troops" subsequently being sent to the south suggests that the sultan was able to capitalise upon the alliance by making some moves in sheltered territorial expansion. Thus it is known that, during the 1690s, imperial renegade troops were being sent, in the mass, to the Dar<sup>ḥ</sup>a valley (177). It is even possible that the despatch of a force of Isma<sup>ḥ</sup>īl's soldiery to Timbuktu dates from this expansionist period. Timbuktu lay at the end of the Sūsi gold-route. And the existence of Isma<sup>ḥ</sup>īl's Timbuktu garrison is vouched for by a latter day note upon sub-Saharan strife of the early 1740s, in which a part was played by troops who bore the name

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(175) Windus p. 136

(176) See Epilogue Part II Pp. 313-16 for further discussion of this matter .

(177) "Ockley" p. 26

of Ismā'īl's Maghribī men (178). It is likely to have been such intervention which astonishingly made "Ismā'īl, sultan of the Arabs" (sultān al-<sup>c</sup>arab) a name to conjure with at the Niger bend, even in the mid nineteenth century (179).

In the July of 1690, Jean-Baptiste Estelle, as the newly appointed French consul in Sale, remitted one of his first and most dutifully copious consular reports (180). The report gave a brief assessment of the contemporary situation of Morocco and of its ruler. Estelle was young (181) and eager; and in tailoring his information for the benefit of a government currently at war with Spain, he may well have accentuated the positive aspects of Ismā'īl's sovereignty, in the hopes of encouraging French interest in a Moroccan alliance. Yet, as son to the contemporary French consul in Tetuan (182), the young Estelle was no stranger to Maghribī affairs. In their chronological context, his notes may be regarded with respect: a respect ironically heightened by afterknowledge of the reverses which Ismā'īl was to see during the coming decade. The affairs of Sus, jihād and "Cherg" all find their place within the report. All serve to demonstrate Ismā'īl calmly in the ascendant. The sultan was described as being currently dynastically secure and thus, within a context that specifically included the Sus, "paisible possesseur de ces grands et vastes pays" (183). In writing of the sultan's disputes

(178) "Tadhkirat al-Nisyan..." ed./tr. Houdas and Benoist p. 74 of the text and 119 of the translation.

(179) B.N.P. A. MS 5259 f. 66B Shaykh Ahmad al-Bakkāy to al-Hāji <sup>c</sup>Umar (Information from Dr. A. Zebadia)

(180) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CXIII pp. 310-319 Memo. dated 19/7/1690 and directed by way of a Marseillais intermediary,

(181) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CI Périllié to Seignelay, Sale  
7/7/1689 p. 258

(182) See Prologue P. 37 (Note (73))

(183) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle directed via Marseille, 19/7/1690 p. 311



with "le Roy Catholique", the consul noted that Mamora and Larache had already fallen to ill-armed forces of attack. He could therefore predict an imminent Moroccan capture of the three remaining Spanish enclaves (184). There was little for Estelle to say concerning conflict within the "Cherg". Concentrating upon the actions rather than the rumours of the previous decade, he recorded that war with the Algerines was a rarity (185). In suggested explanation he pointed out that Moroccans, even though they regarded the Turks as heretics, had commercial and pious interests in remaining at peace with their eastern neighbours: for it was important that the annual pilgrimage caravan be allowed to proceed freely towards Cairo and Mecca (186).

One facet to Estelle's account of Ismā'īl's person is interesting but questionable, even for 1690, and even within a context designed to delineate the sultan as a savage worthy of respect. The reporter described Ismā'īl as "naturellement valeureux et indefatigable à la guerre" (187). The judgement suggests that its author had been over-influenced by the sight of a deal of ceremonial tilting and la<sup>c</sup> b al-bārūd around Meknes. For Estelle was here perpetuating a commonplace. Since the capture of Marrakesh in 1677, Ismā'īl's record in the field would seem only partially to justify his glorification as a warrior. Only the Sus, during Ismā'īl's two expeditions thither, had seen bitter warfare to which the sultan had personally been a war-leader; and even in the Sus, credit for the degree of makhzan ascendancy obtaining in 1690 would seem to have rested with the

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(184) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle directed via Marseilles, 19/7/1690 pp. 315-16

(185) ibid. p. 315  
 (186) ibid. p. 316  
 (187) ibid. p. 315

commanders who had followed up their master's unfinished rural campaigning. The "Cherg" had been associated less with war than with "alarums and excursions". And military credit within the jihād must obviously go to the great mujāhid captains. Estelle's praise for Isma<sup>-C</sup>īl the warrior suggests that this sultan's majesty was wielded with one important sleight: a capacity for extensive delegation without personal loss of martial reputation.

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CHAPTER IV: THE POLITICS OF EQUILIBRIUM  
ADMINISTRATION, SUCCESSION AND RURAL PACIFICATION

Administration and Palace

Alien contemporaries, with eyes upon Meknes, and little knowledge of the deep Moroccan interior, could describe Ismā'īl as a despot. According to Jean-Baptiste Estelle, the sultan was able to govern "ce vaste Empire avec un pouvoir si absolu que tout tremble sous ses ordres" (1). The claim aligns with the historians' common view that Ismā'īl achieved an ascendancy over the Maghrib al-Aqṣā that was of a force and magnitude which made it alien in nature from the government of his successors, and which was unsurpassed until the imposition of the Protectorate (2). Conversely, the claim accords ill with modern sociological assessment of bygone and beleaguered Maghribī polities. Gellner has summed up the "traditional North African state" as hopelessly weak: no "oriental despotism", but a flimsy net, capable of catching an hold over meek towns, but incapable of achieving an impress upon a rural society defined by tribalism and Islam, rather than the fiat of a central government (3).

It is possible to take a median view, and to maintain for Ismā'īl's empire the concept of monarchy, while modifying its absolutism. Contemporary European assessment of Ismā'īl's government as absolutism is obviously to be treated most gingerly. It resulted from the transposition to an alien society of contemporary European thought-patterns. Thus MouÛtte was thinking in Erastian terms when he stated that the sultan was spiritual

(1) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to the October of 1698 p. 687

(2) E. Michaux-Bellaire: Article "Makhzen" in E.I. 1st. Edn. Vol. III p. 168 cf. Terrasse Vol. II pp. 263-4 and 286

(3) E. Gellner: Introduction to "Arabs and Berbers" ed. E. Gellner and C. Micaud (London, 1972) pp. 15 and 18

and temporal sovereign of his empire, because he appointed the qudāh (4). Other Europeans saw the hallmark of a centralised monarchy in the sultan's lack of any formal council. To Jean-Baptiste Estelle, this was government at the royal whim (5), not government whose forms were rudimentary. In the same vein, Busnot was able to dismiss the sultan's great officers or "Alcayds" as courtiers, surrounding their master "par forme", while his council was kept "tout entier dans sa tête" (6). The European view of Ismā'īl as a despot was in all probability intensified by the more grisly rituals of Miknāsī court life. The sultan was the object of formalised gestures of deference. Great officers walked shabby and barefoot in their master's presence, and attendants contorted their bodies in accordance with his physical movements (7). The execution of criminals and of palace offenders, by the sultan's orders and often by his hand was, as every foreign eyewitness stressed, casual and commonplace. All this was part of the display of majesty according to the conventions of pageant: ceremony which served to heighten the distinction of a ruler whose grandeur lay in the size of his bodyguard, and whose apparel and public demeanour generally held nothing to indicate great rank (8). Court phenomena of this nature cannot be translated into evidence for an absolute authority over the empire at large.

At an opposite pole, discussion of the sultan's wider authority in terms of land-tenure gives that authority the appearance of an unrealistically precarious economic basis. For, if MouÛtte is to be believed, there was no recognised array of crown estates, and it was

(4) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 160

(5) S.I. 2<sup>a</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle putatively dated to the October of 1698 p. 693

(6) Busnot p. 45

(7) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 163 cf. Windus pp. 95 and 124-5

(8) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux pp. 92 and 150-151 cf. Busnot pp. 22-3

necessary to define the sultan's revenue in terms of tribute (9). Oblique corroboration for the general truth of this assertion, in relation to lands within the Atlas arc, if not to Tafilelt, may be traced within the sultan's efforts throughout his reign to acquire property in a private capacity. His acquisition in 1682 of the Jews' houses in Meknes provides one example of such behaviour. The consequences of the dynasty beginning its sovereignty in comparative poverty may perhaps be traced within the standard European stress upon the sultan's relentless financial avarice. Europeans in general did not appreciate the territorial limitations within which this avarice might be expressed. Even the regions of Ismā'īl's empire whose relief made them relatively accessible must be seen as honeycombed with waqf, or, in the local terminology, "hubus" territories: islands of relative fiscal and administrative immunity, tied to pious foundations. Braithwaite, on his journey from Tetuan to Meknes, passed through an hubus region which seems identifiable with the territorial orbit of Wazzan, a provincial zāwiya whose founding sharīf had first risen to local prominence in the mid seventeenth century (10). Here was "the seat of a living Saint, the most famous one in the whole Country", the people of whose town were "all his Vassals, and the Produce of the Country all round the Town, at his Disposal, the People paying no other Taxes but to him." (11)

Yet, lack of a "demesne", and the existence of territorial immunities did not deprive the sultan of a power basis. That power basis is best understood in terms of authority over men. Windus gave the quintessence

(9) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 164

(10) E. Michaux-Bellaire: "La Maison d'Quezzân" in "Revue du Monde Musulmane" (Paris, May 1908) pp. 25-34 cf. the tarjama of "Mawlay Abd Allah Sharif" in the "Nashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 262-266

(11) Braithwaite pp. 129 and 131

of the sultan Ismā'īl's provincial administration in the following words:

"His manner of governing is by Alcaydes, who have no Commission, but receive their Authority only by his saying, 'Go govern such a Country, be my General or Admiral!..'" (12)

The bonds linking the sultan with such quwwād may be seen as the sinews of Ismā'īl's government. For it was the quwwād who brought in tribute to Meknes.

It is impossible fully to analyse the administrative role of quwwād. Only an handful of individual governors are known by name, and not all of these held power contemporaneously. The combined territorial cover of the quwwād is therefore impossible to estimate. But it is possible to say that quwwād wore the personae of "sultan's men". They were not merely "autonomous power-holders who had their positions ratified from the center" (13). It is true that certain well-known quwwād originated as local chieftains. But in accepting the role of provincial qā'id they became identified with the sultan. Thus, <sup>C</sup>Alī ibn Yshshu, the Zammūr leader who became one of Ismā'īl's generals while retaining authority within Beraber territory at the Middle Atlas foot, would be murdered at his master's death (14). New quwwād who had ousted previous local chieftains were identified with the sultan from the time of their advancement. The conventional expression of such identification was the myth of humble birth, which has been noted as being attached to the Hammāmī and the Rūsī, "new men" of the latter 1670s (15). Further, there were certain quwwād who rose

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(12) Windus p. 121

(13) Gellner: Introduction to "Arabs and Berbers" p. 15

(14) S.I. 2<sup>B</sup> France Vol. IV No. LXI J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain Journal for August 1695 p. 355 cf. "Turjumān" pp. 24-5 and 30 of the text and 45-6 and 56 of the translation.

(15) See Chapter II Pp. 104-5

from the ranks of the palace guard (16). It would seem unquestionable that these last were popularly identified with the central government.

It was conventionally believed that a sultan's qa'id began his political career destitute at the sultan's hands. An informant of Windus gave a cynical account of the preliminaries to the advancement of a new imperial governor:

"Now...the Emperor never beats a Man soundly, but the Man is in the high way of Preferment, and it is ten to one but His Majesty passing by him in Chains a few Days after, and finding him in a sad pickle, he calls him his dear Friend, Uncle or Brother...sends for a Suit of his own Cloaths (which is a great Compliment) makes him as fine as a Prince, and sends him to govern some of his great Towns; for by this means he is sure he has not left him worth a Groat, and will make a careful Computation of what he may get in his Government..." (17)

Retention of the post of qa'id and identification with the central government were both maintained together by the rhythmic transmission to the capital of festival hadāyā. The making-up of a tribute caravan was complex and costly (18) and, in Braithwaite's words:

"...it was Muley Ishmael's Policy to extort so much from his Governors that in return they had no way left to supply him but by making themselves odious to the People, and in this lay his greatest Security." (19)

Following a visit to Meknes, the sultan's favour to a qa'id could be delicately expressed by the gift of a caftan or of a queen's ribbon (20). The real reward was permission to continue in office. To this there might be added a degree of influence at court. A major governor was

(16) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 176 cf. Windus p. 144

(17) Windus p. 145

(18) Del Puerto Bk. I Ch. XIV p. 59 cf. S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. XXV Memo. of J-B. Estelle dated 12/9/1693 p. 221 Both sources independently describe the make-up of a qa'id of Tetuan's annual hadīya.

(19) Braithwaite p. 36

(20) J. de la Faye: "Relation en forme de journal de voyage pour la redemption des captifs aux royaumes de Maroc et d'Alger...pendant les années 1723, 1724 et 1725" Paris, 1726 p. 240

likely to maintain a courtier as his agent (21). And Jean-Baptiste Estelle noted that the sultan was "facile à se laisser séduire... par ses alcaïdes ou gouverneurs de provinces et de villes" (22).

Away from Meknes, the provincial qā'id enjoyed the profitable aspect of his persona as "sultan's man": the localised devolution upon himself of much of the sultan's authority. Like the power of the sultan, the power of a qā'id was not to be expressed in terms of land-ownership. No estates were attached to the office of governor as such (23). However, in granting a governorship, the sultan made the grant of a territorial sphere open for exploitation. The qā'id had the power to extract tribute, to deploy troops upon his own as well as the sultan's behalf (24) and, pragmatically, to levy contingents of forced labourers into his personal service (25). He also enjoyed the profits of what might be termed "low justice": cases involving offences which were less than capital, and could therefore be settled in the absence of qādī or sultan (26).

A qā'id maintained his own khalīfa to act over periods when he was resident at court. He also maintained an infrastructure of subordinate officers (27). The latter would seem to have been civil as well as military. A characteristic of early <sup>c</sup>Alawī government was dispersal of bureaucracy. Much of the incidental tedium and expense of administration was localised. Quwwad were responsible for assessing as well as gathering

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(21) Busnot p. 207 cf. al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 147  
cf. Braithwaite p. 35

(22) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle dated 19/7/1690  
directed via Marseille p. 312

(23) Windus p. 227

(24) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle putatively  
dated to the October of 1698 pp. 694-5 & 696

(25) Braithwaite p. 12

(26) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo of J-B. Estelle , putatively  
dated to the October of 1698 p. 696

(27) ibid., p. 694

cf. Del Puerto Bk.I. Ch. XIV p. 54



in rural tribute (28). Urban tax-rolls were kept by the town governors (29). Similarly the records of the Saletin customs dues were worked out by the kuttāb of the governor of Sale port and, as a rule, maintained within Sale. They would be summoned to the sultan's notice in evidence only if the sultan were dissatisfied with the relevant sums that came to him in revenue (30).

Certain Tawātī documents admirably illustrate the administrative format by which much paper-work was localised. Incoming open letters from the central government contain demands for the Qur'ānic zakāh, or a proportion thereof, expressed in the most amiable and general terms (31). By contrast, the documents drawn up locally, to record the make-up of a "dīfa" or fiscal "meal" for the sultan, are detailed and complex (32). They list contributions towards the whole, as gathered from various groupings within the oasean population. The wide range in the sums as listed carries the implication of care within local assessment.

The corollary of dispersed bureaucracy was the retention of the Miknāsī civil administration in relatively low profile. Aliens

(28) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 107

The practicalities of a peaceable early <sup>c</sup>Alawī "gharāma" are unlikely to have altered far beyond the pattern described in relation to groupings or "casts" of the attenuated Sa<sup>c</sup>di realm of the 1630s: "...the chief Alcaid who is designed for the service, being come to the country where the gram is to be levied, sends to the chief Sheck of the cast, which may consist of three or four hundred dores; of him informing himself of the true number, hee sends to the particular Sheck of each doar, and allotteth to each tent a souldier..."

(S.I. 1<sup>re</sup> Angleterre Vol. III No. XCIII Leconfield MS No. 73 p. 484)

(29) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to the October of 1698 p. 695

(30) ibid. p. 709

(31) Martin: translations of open "sharīfian" letters formally addressed to the inhabitants of the Tawātī complex and dating from Sha<sup>c</sup>ban 1096 (= 3-31 July 1685) and 10/Safar/1111 (= 7/8/1699) pp. 65 and 74

(32) MSS found at Timmi and Aoulef containing taxation records of the Tuati contributions of 1099 (1687-8) and 1108 (1696-7) reproduced in translation by Martin pp. 65-7 and 71

customarily floundered in the attempt to grapple with the nerves of this administration, and might list an highly eclectic team of central government officials. Thus Pidou de St. Olon grouped together a "Grand Mufti", a chief eunuch, a treasurer whom he identified with the contemporary Rūsī governor of Fes, and, fourthly, the superintendent of the Miknāsī palace building site (33). It would seem that the sultan had no minister fulfilling the European imaginative mould of the "Grand Vizier" as drawn from the Ottoman court of the "Grand Signior". The conventional clerical companion of the Maghribī sultan was a simple tālib, demurely holding a copy of the Qur'ān, mute guarantee of the legality of the sultan's decisions (34). The term wazīr has already been noted as being in administrative use. But no wazīr seems ever to have enjoyed outstanding court rank. Thus <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Rahmān al-Manzārī, the wazīr of the plague years was remembered chiefly for the circumstances of his death, as the victim of a showpiece execution which implies that man and office combined token status with expendibility. A later wazīr, Muḥammad ibn al-Wahhāb, had insufficient personal authority for a letter sent under his name alone to be thought fit to carry weight with the shaykh of the al-Fāsī zāwiya: he wrote in tandem with <sup>c</sup>Abd Allāh al-Rūsī the sultan's qā'id of Fes (35). A certain al-Yahmādī would be remembered in sentimental nineteenth century tradition

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- (33) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux pp. 116-118. By the "Grand Mufti", the author may have meant the qā'dī of Fes or of Meknes. J-B. Estelle was better informed than Pidou de St. Olon was, in 1698, he noted that Morocco had no "grand moughity" as such (S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV. No. CXLIV p. 697). A note within al-Fāsī chronicle pertaining to a clerical squabble of 1677, carries the suggestion that in Fes, the country's greatest centre of learning, it was customary for the function of "muftī" to be subsumed within that of "qā'dī". ("Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 261)
- (34) "Il fait toujours porter devant lui l'Archeran par son Talbe, comme la regle de ses Conseils, et le niveau de sa Conduite." (Busnot p. 48)
- (35) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 25 dated 9/Muharram/1109 = 28/7/1697 p. 72

as Ismā'īl's most notable minister, and the personal companion of his sorrows (36). This al-Yahmadī existed, and was a man of some personal standing. There survives, in addition to government correspondence of his own (37), a volume of verse dedicated to this wazīr by the poet 'Alī Misbāḥ al-Zarwālī, who acted as his private secretary (38). However it seems possible to suggest that al-Yahmadī's posthumous fame grew as a fictionalised notoriety within literary circles, fired by the verses, and by the wazīr's own reputation as a bibliophile (39). The minister was unknown to European commentators on the Miknāsī politics of his period, the 1690s. Further, he may be seen as an isolated figure who founded no administrative tradition. The great court figures of Ismā'īl's closing years who came to the notice of Windus, would include, in addition to members of the royal family, generals, guardian eunuchs, principal Jews and the merchant manager of a crown monopoly (40). But Windus knew of no great minister. And in the months following Ismā'īl's death, Braithwaite would dismiss Ismā'īl's administration as a government markedly uncouth in that therein "none but military Men" had been "encouraged" (41).

Among the variety of notables whom a succession of European commentators considered to hold the office of "treasurer", the most credible is the guardian eunuch noted by Windus (42). For Ismā'īl's

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(36) Akansūs quoted al-Nāsiri: "Kitāb al-Istiqsā...", Casablanca text Vol. VII pp. 65-6 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX pp. 86-7

(37) Three of the "Lettres Inédites..." carry al-Yahmadī's name, as recipient of the first and author of the second and third. They are the letters numbered 20 ( 8/Dhū 'l-Qa'da/1104 = 12/7/1693); 23 ( 2/Ramādān/1108 = 25/3/1697 ); and 24 (undated) pp. 67 and 69-70

(38) "Sanā al-muhtadī ilā ma'ākhir al-wazīr al-yahmadī" cited by Lakhdar in "La vie littéraire..." pp. 172-3

(39) Lakhdar op. cit p. 53

(40) Windus pp. 109, 152-5, 186, 196-8, 209 and passim.

(41) Braithwaite p. 351

(42) Windus p. 109

"treasury" was essentially "treasure": it consisted of a growing hoard of trophies, jewels and ornamental saddles as well as coined money (43). The army might receive donations from this hoard, but not the palace administration. The running expenses of the palace were ordered separately. Thus the revenues earmarked to cover that most grandiose of governmental economic enterprises, the construction of the Miknāsī palace itself, were, as has been noted previously, gathered and dispersed in a system that was quite separate from the central coffer (44). Similarly, the women's quarters were administered as a distinct institution: here the sultan's principal queen oversaw the doling out of appropriate supplies (45).

The monstrous plethora of imperial children born within the women's quarters would seem to have been raised with the greatest thrift that circumstances allowed. The sole ornaments of price worn by most of Ismā'īl's sons and daughters were the baubles with which they were each presented at birth by the country's Jewish community (46). The sultan's prestige allowed him customarily to dispose of his daughters without granting them a dowry (47). And the sons were brought up as urchins, "thievish and ravenous as kites" (48). The education received by Muhammad al-<sup>C</sup>Alim was quite exceptional. Most of Ismā'īl's sons were endowed only with a slave, an horse, and the limited care their mothers could give them (49). European visitors to Meknes were astonished that,

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(43) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 p. 693

(44) See Chapter II Pp. 99-100 cf. Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux pp. 116-117

(45) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 p. 694

(46) de la Faye p. 160

(47) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 loc. cit.

(48) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 97

(49) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 loc. cit.

in this capital, a prince would accept a small "tip" (50).

Only the sons of Ismā'īl's favourites could hope for more than "what was absolutely necessary for their Subsistence" (51). In accordance with the pattern set for Ismā'īl's eldest son Muhriz, the majority of these boys were regularly dismissed, at adolescence, to Tafielt, the one region where the sultan seems to have been able to dispose of land in quantity. In Tafielt, each son was customarily granted a plantation of date-palms (52). Early in the 1690s it was noted that the export of dates was a Fīlālī monopoly, by imperial decree (53). Ismā'īl was a sultan whom MouÛtte is well-known to have credited with the outlook of a grocer (54). In this particular matter of Fīlālī trade, he may well have been fostering the commercial interests of members of his own immediate family.

#### The Udāya Succession

Exile to the simple life and political nullity was never the fate of certain of Ismā'īl's sons. And even recall from Tafielt was possible. Thus, Muhriz was occasionally noted in battle upon his father's behalf, after the date of his first dismissal (55). Favourite sons continued to be made titular vice-roys within towns and provinces. A seventeenth century work of dynastic eulogy, which recounted <sup>c</sup>Alawī history down to the 1690s selected eight of Ismā'īl's sons to name as notables of whom their father might be proud (56). These sons had been nurtured to battle

(50) Busnot pp. 59-60

(51) Braithwaite p. 205

(52) Windus p. 190

(53) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 34

(54) MouÛtte: "Relation..." pp. 150-151 quoted Ch.-A. Julien p. 228

(55) For example in the "Relation de St. Amans" (S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. II No. XXXVII Diary note for 10/12/1682 p. 340)

(56) Ahmad ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd al-<sup>c</sup>Azīz al-<sup>c</sup>Alawī: "Al-anwār al-husniya..." c. 1690/1102 Published Casablanca, 1966 pp. 88-9

from childhood. Jean-Baptiste Estelle in 1690 described the nine and ten year old princes playing at full-tilt, bare-back astride war-horses. He further noted that sons of full age, some "alcaydes de divers pays, provinces et cantons", were already the protagonists of an endemic internecine warfare which gave a straightforward preview of the power-struggle inevitable at Ismā'īl's death (57).

The sultan could well have taken an ambivalent approach to this squabbling. To a certain extent he could afford to regard the tussles with a bland equanimity. In Estelle's words:

"Celuy qui règne aujourd'hui dit que...cela donne lieu a tous les enfants d'estre guerriers." (58)

Such an attitude upon Ismā'īl's part need not have been impolitic. Mutual combat kept his sons occupied; and, at this period, their struggles had not yet been grafted on to provincial or civic unrest. Nevertheless, in 1690, it was already clear to contemporaries that Ismā'īl had cut one swathe through his sons' rivalries, by designating an heir. This heir-presumptive was Zaydān, who had first come to prominence as the adolescent vice-roy of Meknes, during the years of his father's second Sūsī campaign (59). In 1690, Estelle recorded that Zaydān was paramount among the sultan's sixty mounted sons, and that he was the one adult son who was kept close to his father's side (60).

Zaydān's grooming for pre-eminence is likely to have been associated with Ismā'īl's fostering within Saifs of the cavalry corps

(57) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle 19/7/1690  
directed by way of Marseille p. 315

(58) ibid. loc. cit.

(59) See Chapter III P. 140

(60) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle 19/7/1690  
directed by way of Marseilles loc. cit.

of the Udāya. For this corps was bound up with the figure of Zaydān's mother. The heir-presumptive, his mother, and the Udāya may be thought to have risen together in Miknāsī prominence. All three are likely to have been fostered deliberately by a sultan concerned to manufacture a military following linked with himself and his line, as the Shabbānāt had been linked with Sa<sup>C</sup>dī sultans.

The corps of Udāya was a creation of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's which eventually came to number several thousand (61). During Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's reign members of this corps were stationed only within Saīs, firstly at Meknes and latterly also at Fās al-Jadīd (62). The force seems to have undergone considerable metamorphosis during its first decades. Contemporary trace-references and dynastic tradition alike suggest that the Udāya company was built up in stages, beginning with an initial recruitment which swept a Murrākushī and "Ḥawz" rabble into the train of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's fierce Central Atlas campaign of 1677 (63). By the middle years of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's reign, the Udāya had become a corps with a distinctively aristocratic air. In their close personal association with the monarch, the Udāya could be compared with the wider corps of Cabīd. But there was one marked distinction between Cabīd and Udāya. It was not a distinction of complexion. Udāya were commonly dark-skinned. It was a distinction of status. The Udāya were free warriors, bound to the sultan in alliance rather than servitude. The bonds were those of a social fiction: that the Udāya were an agnatic kin-group, communally linked with Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl through relationship to a woman, his "black queen".

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(61) Braithwaite p. 157

(62) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 29-30 cf. Del Puerto Bk. V Ch. 43 p. 616 and Bk. VI Ch. 3 p. 639

(63) See Chapter II Pp. 103-4

Del Puerto described the Udāya in their "imago" state as:

"Los primeros hombres... todos Mulatos oscuros de un linage, que llamen LUDEAS que son Cavalleros de el Rey, y oy los mas estimados, porque son parientes de la Reyna Negra; y assi essan los mas fantasticos y sobervios. Es buena gente de guerra, pero no salen sino quando el Rey se pone en campana; y por esso tienen todos sus armas, y cavallos, sin pagar garrama." (64)

It will be noted later that dynastic mythology came to associate the Udāya with Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's mother (65). But there is no doubt as to the identity of the "Reyna Negra" who formed the personal linchpin to the Udāya alliance. She was <sup>c</sup>Ayisha Mubārka, named within the chronicle material transmitted by al-Zayyānī (66), and unquestionably wife rather than mother to Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl. Facets of her role as Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's principal queen are indicated in the variety of names attached to her within the historical notes of Busnot. Here she appears variously as "la Sultane", "Laïla Aïcha", "l'infame Loudais" and, most frequently, and in deference to the name of her eldest son, as "Zidana".

During the 1690s, when this son had reached warrior age, <sup>c</sup>Ayisha Mubārka came to enjoy notoriety and palace power. She cut a startling figure about Meknes. Free from the restraints which palace custom imposed upon her women companions, she would appear in public, girt with a sword and carrying a lance (67). She was alleged to have considerable influence over her husband. Bemused Europeans who saw in her only "a Mollatto, of a very plain and disagreeable Person" (68)

(64) Del Puerto Bk. V. Ch. 43 p. 616

(65) See Epiloque Part II Pp. 317-319

(66) "Turjumān" p. 18 of the text and 34 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 33-4

(67) "Ockley" p. 96 cf. Busnot p. 54

(68) "Ockley" pp. 95-6



were delighted to attribute this influence to witchcraft (69).

Zaydān's designation as heir-presumptive, and the associated court enhancement of his mother, together raise problems as to <sup>C</sup>Ayisha's identity, and as to the nature of her relationship to the Udāya to whom she was formally "sister". It seems certain that <sup>C</sup>Ayisha had been associated with Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl from the beginning of his reign. The association is vouched for by European estimates as to the approximate age of Zaydān when he came to be of military note (70). Yet <sup>C</sup>Ayisha seems not to have taken paramount status among Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's womenfolk until some years after her marriage. MouÛtte covered the first nine years of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's reign in detail. He tattled away upon the Murrākushī politics that were supposedly conducted by Lalla Maryam, principal wife of Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz (71). But he gave no indication that any wife of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl held any comparable status or position of influence. And while he knew three of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's sons by name, he made no mention of the boy Zaydān. Yet, in different contexts, he knew "Udāya" as the name of both a general and a fort (72).

A possible solution to the problem may lie in the identification of the dark-skinned <sup>C</sup>Ayisha Mubārka with the "princesse de Touet" allegedly bestowed upon Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl by al-Rashīd (73). European commentary of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's middle years retained a garbled tradition that the sultan's principal

(69) Thus Jean-Baptiste Estelle wrote of the sultan's "premiere femme, qui est mere de Moulay Zidan, quy est maistresse de l'esprit de ce prince (et, ce dit-on, la magie y a part)...". (S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XLI Memo. dated Sale, 2/5/1694 p. 267)  
cf. Busnot p. 53 cf. "Ockley" p. 96

(70) Jean-Baptiste Estelle in the July of 1690 described Zaydān as being aged around eighteen to nineteen (S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo. directed by way of Marseille 19/7/1690 p. 315)

(71) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 80-81

(72) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 110 and "Relation" p. 148

(73) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 28

wife had been given to him long previously by his brother (74). One officer who definitely claimed blood relationship with <sup>C</sup>Ayisha had as his patronymic "ibn <sup>C</sup>Attā" (75). This was the patronymic cited by al-Zayyānī as belonging to the second of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's principal Udāya commanders (76). The Ayt <sup>C</sup>Attā, a wide confederation of Beraber peoples seem even during the seventeenth century to have percolated out from their "Jabal Saghrū" heartland as far to the south-east as Tuat, a region from which they had, around 1660, been able to exact tribute (77). If the identification of <sup>C</sup>Ayisha with the "princesse de Touet" is correct, then her court anonymity during Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's early years could be explicable in terms of a break in the political and fiscal links between Safs and Tuat which al-Rashīd had forged (78). However, the re-opening of <sup>C</sup>Alawī political contact with Tuat, late in 1680, could well have encouraged the rallying to Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl of men claiming clan-fellowship with a Tawātī and <sup>C</sup>Attā bride whom Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl had married in the days of his brother. The very exoticism of free recruits from a distant casean region could have encouraged Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl to employ such men as the focus to a rag-bag force of recruits with a "Qiblan" (79) name, which he was already in the process of agglomerating. The consequence could have been privilege for <sup>C</sup>Ayisha and her sons, and a blanket identification of the corps

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(74) Thus Del Puerto alleged that "la Reyna, principal Muger de Muley Ismael...oy la Senora Reynante", had originally been a slave-girl bought from al-Rashīd. A similar rumour was passed on by Busnot. Its grounding would seem to have been European slave gossip of the early eighteenth century. ("Mission Historial..." Bk. I. Ch. X p. 36 cf. Busnot p. 52)

(75) Braithwaite p. 95 The reference relates to a named maternal uncle of Ahmad al-Dhahabī, Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's successor, and second son to <sup>C</sup>Ayisha Mubarka.

(76) "Dustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 30

(77) Martin pp. 55 and 56, quoting the casean chroniclers al-Tawātī and al-Amurī, of whom the first was an eighteenth century author.

For an extended discussion of Ayt <sup>C</sup>Attā expansion desertwards from the Jabal Saghrū, see Ross E. Dunn: "Berber Imperialism: the Ayt Atta Expansion in South-East Morocco" in "Arabs and Berbers" ed. E. Gellner and C. Micaud pp. 85-107

(78) See Chapter II P. 90 and Chapter III P. 131

(79) See Appendix B. Pp. 338-339

with the newcomers, as the "single lineage" Del Puerto believed he knew (80). Evidence that the corps had not always been monolithic would survive within al-Zayyānī's tradition of successive waves of Udāya recruits, and of two distinct founding Udāya generals, of whom the second, Muḥammad ibn Ḥattā, would be regarded as "son" to Abū Shafra, the first (81).

The period crucial to the consolidation of the Udāya as a force close to the monarchy is likely to have been the period of Ismā'īl's second expedition into the Sus, over the years 1685-7, when Zaydān, "sister's son" to the Udāya was made titular Miknāsī vice-roy. Loyal Udāya service over this period may even have accounted for the subsequent securing of Zaydān's status as heir-presumptive, and also for the establishment of Udāya officers themselves as a military elite around Meknes. Al-Zayyānī noted that these officers were endowed with a particular slice of imperial revenue: the nawā'ib or customary dues received from zawāyā (82). From Ismā'īl's middle years, Udāya are known to have predominated among the inhabitants of al-Riyād, an area of the capital in which Ismā'īl's most prominent courtiers built their houses, and which formed the nearest Miknāsī equivalent to a fashionable suburb. In Del Puerto's early eighteenth century account of Meknes, the area was noted as an Udāya quarter (83). And it was described by al-Zayyānī, in the plangent context of its razing to the ground in the

(80) See the present chapter P. 171 (Note 64)

(81) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 29-30. For a more extended discussion of the problems posed by the indigenous tradition as to the origin of the Udāya, see Epilogue Part II Pp. 317-321

(82) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 29

(83) "REAT EI AMBAR...donde viven los principales Alcaydes, por ser lugar privilegiado de Justicias; porque sus moradores son aquellos LUDEAS" (Del Puerto Bk. VI Ch. III p. 639)

early 1730s, as :

"...the town of al-Riyād which was an ornament to Meknes... in it were the houses of the governors, and the secretaries, and the Udāya and the administrative officials of the sultan Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl." (84)

European notes support the indigenous tradition of al-Zayyānī, which states that Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl detached a body of troops from his primal Miknāsī force of Udāya, and sent them to garrison Fas al-Jadīd. No firm date can be attached to the posting of these troops to the metropolis. But the move is likely to have preceded 1693, a date for which Pidou de St. Olon recorded that Old Fes was known to have a "white" and New Fes a "black" population (85). For the remainder of the reign, Udāya cavaliers, whose numbers were to reach an estimated three to four thousand, would exercise within the environs of Fes "the power of collecting the King's Taxes, and gathering into the King's Magazines his Wheat, Barley etc." (86). The garrison's existence would provide an obvious line of tension between sultan and city. In the days of al-Rashīd, the Fasī had wished to prevent the establishment, within the immediate environs of their city, of a sizeable body of alien troops: al-Rashīd's "shirāqa" (87). Now the citizens were constrained to live cheek-by-jowl with a corps of "sultan's men", and accept the inevitable associated harassment. According to Braithwaite, the "Ludyres...practised" their assigned duties with a "rigorous...hand" (88).

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(84) "madīnat al-riyād allatī kānat zīna miknāsa...wa fīhā dūr al-<sup>C</sup>ummāl wa 'l-kuttāb wa 'l-udāya wa ahl-dawlat al-sultān ismā<sup>C</sup>īl" ("Turjumān" p. 39 of the text cf. 71 of the translation)

(85) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 27

(86) Braithwaite p. 157

(87) See Chapter II P. and "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 27

(88) Braithwaite pp. 157-8

### Rural Pacification

For Ismā'īl, the opening 1690s were years elicked over with an appearance of consolidation: years during which the sultan enjoyed the profits of a far-flung taxation frontier, possessed the renown of a victor, and could hope for an orderly "Udāya" succession that would align with one joint of his military power-base. One cautionary note must be inserted. This stage of Ismā'īl's reign has long been falsely lit by a will o' the wisp. Within a myth which al-Zayyānī built into the indigenous tradition, the years leading up to 1692 were years during which Ismā'īl crowned the elimination of dynastic opposition to his person with the completion of a rigorous pacification of his kingdoms. To al-Zayyānī this pacification was "tamhīd" : a more trenchant "tamhīd" than the establishment of a merely dynastic supremacy, for which al-Ifrānī made use of the same word (89). This "tamhīd" involved a purposeful military programme that was expressed in a series of memorable rural campaigns. According to al-Zayyānī's view of Ismā'īl's reign, this programme of pacification was brought to a definable conclusion in 1692, with a momentous expedition into the "Jabal Fāzzāz" or Central Atlas (90). Problems connected with this largely dubious body of tradition will be examined in the "Epilogue" to this work.

The rural pacification that may genuinely be attributed to Ismā'īl's period is better understood in terms of equilibrium than forcible achievement. Its essence was the provision of security for bona fide travellers passing across the sultan's territories. This

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(89) al-Ifrānī: "Zill al-Warīf..." pp. 52-56

(90) "Turjumān" pp. 23-25 of the text and 43-46 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 40-41

was a theme summed up in a quaint saw gleaned by Shaw during his

"Chergi" travels of the 1730s:

"...that, during the long Reign of the late Muley Ishmael  
...a Child (according to their Manner of speaking) might  
safely carry a Piece of Money upon his Hand from one End  
of the Kingdom to another..." (91)

and continued in the most frequently repeated of al-Zayyanī's literary flourishes concerning Ismā'īl's period: that during the sultan's latter days, a dhimmi or a woman could travel from Oujda to Wādī Nūn without fear of molestation (92). These commonplaces belong to the world of a sultan's public image, and do not imply dogged imperial police work. Al-Zayyanī's own expansion of the theme of the undisturbed traveller implies that, even ideally, the provision of rural security was a localised responsibility, analogous with the localised responsibility for bureaucratic paper-work. Further, it was security for the notable and well-to-do: no security at all for travellers who could not prove their good faith. Thus the author claimed that the paradisaical Maghrib al-Aqṣā of Ismā'īl's day had been a land in which:

"...there remained no place in which pretenders or criminals might find a refuge. A stranger seeking a night's lodging at a wayside hamlet or village would not be accepted. Instead he would be seized until he had produced an authorisation for his appearance. For if they (the local populace) let him go,

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(91) Shaw p. 17

(92) "Tur iumān" p. 28 of the text and 52 of the translation cf.  
"Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 40-41

The artificiality of this flourish is underlined by its employment of the word "dhimmi", inappropriate to the society al-Zayyanī knew, which held only one protected community, that of the Jews, customarily referred to by the author as "al-yahūd".

they would be held responsible for anything he stole or plundered, and for any crime he committed." (93)

Contemporary material supports tradition in implying the successful imposition of localised responsibility for security, within those regions known to Europeans. Thus Pidou de St. Olon praised Ismā'īl's "Justice...in respect of Robbers and Murderers", and noted that clearing of the highways had been effected at the local level by the sultan "causing those who live near the Place where...the crime is committed to be punish'd with Death or a Fine" (94). Jean-Baptiste Estelle noted that the local populations who were held communally responsible for crimes committed within their region, would watch travellers carefully, and prevent them from journeying by night (95).

The sultan should not be seen as personally involved in such peace-keeping at the local level. It is indeed true that, in the days when al-Rashīd was newly sultan and "champion of Fes", out to prove his mettle, direct onslaught upon rural brigandage had involved the sultan and his personal following. But delegation of such duty is likely soon to have become the rule. Thus it has been seen that the party of Awlād Jamā'a bandits, whose execution was an highlight of Ismā'īl's vice-regality of Fes, are likely to have been brought to justice, not by the sultan, or even his khalīfa, but by al-Rashīd's

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(93) "wa lam yubqa minhum li-ahl al-da'awī wa 'l-fasād mahall ya' wūna ilayhi wa yatamanna'ūna (Text: yamtani'ūna) bihi hattā anna majhūl al-hāl idhā bāta fī hillat aw dashra, yaqbidūnahu ilā an tutabayyana barā'atuhu. wa-in sarrahūhu yu'addūna mā sarraahu wa nahabahu aw iqtarafahu min al-harām"

("Turjumān" p. 29 of the text cf. 55 of the translation)

(94) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux pp. 103-4

(95) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 p. 693

estranged sharāqa troops (96). Even at this point, Ismā'īl's involvement with the safety of travellers may have been, as it later became, ritualised: a matter of public relations, expressing the "good ruler"'s personal association with peace and order. Thus, as sultan, Ismā'īl would execute highway robbers in public, with his own hand, as a show for the benefit of the representative of a foreign power (97). He would amiably cross-question high-ranking visitors as to their security upon the routeway, knowing that such visitors had had the scrupulous escort of a series of great quwwād (98). And, paternally, he would berate local shuyūkh who came to be received in Meknes, with an insistence upon their responsibility for keeping the roads clear (99).

There is no straightforward link between Ismā'īl's fort-building and the degree of rural peace established during his reign. Al-Zayyānī made a well-known note that Ismā'īl was responsible for the construction of seventy-six fortresses (100). Taking this note as his starting point, de la Chapelle worked to demonstrate that forts provided a web which traced out the major routeways of Ismā'īl's empire. And he dated a majority of these forts to Ismā'īl's own period (101). In the Epilogue to this work, it will be suggested that evidence for dating any fort specifically to Ismā'īl's reign is rarely definitive. This sultan's reputation as "fort-builder extraordinary" may be too comprehensive. More significantly, it must be pointed out that the building of a rural fort did

(96) See Chapter II p. 89

(97) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CXII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, as interpreted by Magny, Marseille, 6/7/1690 p. 300

(98) "Journal du Voyage de St. Amans" p. 332

(99) al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 112

(100) "Turjuman" p. 16 of the text and 31 of the translation.

(101) F. de la Chapelle: "Le Sultan Moulay Isma'il et les Berbères Sanhaja du Maroc Central" in A.M. Vol. XXVII (Paris, 1931) p. 25 and Footnote (2) covering pp. 25-28



not necessarily imply pacification, either in the real or the euphemistic sense. The character of the fort's garrison, and the relationship of that garrison to the society in which it was embedded, was of greater significance than its physical defences. For these defences were not always impressive. The Maghrib al-Aqsā lagged behind seventeenth century developments in Vaubanesque fortification. Some of the Moroccan works still standing in 1808, and attributable in part to Ismā'īl's reign, were indeed sufficiently massive and complex to arouse at least the qualified appreciation of Napoleon's envoy Burel (102). But these fortifications were chiefly citadels. Many rural forts, particularly those now lost entirely to sight, are likely to have been less imposing. The first "Qasba Tadla" of Ismā'īl's reign was built, under the sultan's own supervision, inside three months (103). It seems probable that such a fort followed a form noted by de Chénier and, later, in greater detail, by Burel, as being common in areas of rural Morocco: that of the simple blank-walled enclosure, devoid of towers or machicolation, and inhabited only under crisis conditions (104): the Maghribi version of a "peel tower".

In her recent study of Ismā'īl's military policy (105), Magali Morsy

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(102) A. Burel: "Mémoire Militaire sur l'Empire de Maroc présenté a Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale le 3 juin 1810, rédigé en avril 1810" ed. J. Caillé as "La Mission du Capitaine Burel au Maroc en 1808" (Paris, 1953) pp. 75-76

(103) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." pp. 124-5  
The "Qasba Tadla" that still stands, which local tradition came to attribute to Ismā'īl (Ch.-E. de Foucauld: "Reconnaissance au Maroc 1883-4" Paris, 1888 p. 57) may indeed date from Ismā'īl's reign, but seems to have been built under the direction of his son Ahmad al-Dhahabī, viceroy in the Tadla region during the latter part of his father's reign ("Turjumān" p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation)

(104) de Chénier Vol. I pp. 86-7 cf. Burel op. cit. p. 77

(105) M. Morsy: "Moulay Isma'il et l'armée de métier" in "Revue de l'histoire moderne et contemporaine" Vol. XIV April-June 1967 pp. 97-122

focused attention upon one particular province, Tamesna, the modern Chaouia. She concluded that here, during Iamā'il's reign, there were six forts providing an adequate "infrastructure politico-militaire" for maintaining the local populace in direct submission to Meknes. (106) As the author admitted, Tamesna is likely to have been a relatively placid province during the period. It included the hinterland of Sale, and is thus the probable regional source for Jean-Baptiste Estelle's observation that, on the authority of the local qa'id, a single abd could go out tax-collecting among villagers, armed only with a baton (107). It seems over-bold to attribute such placidity to the shadow of government fortifications. The existence of two of the author's six named forts, and the garrisoning of both by renegades, seem vouched for only by references taken from the late and dubious source "Pellow" (108) Of the remaining four establishments, two are described as "forteresses de tribus", garrisoned by local contingents. No evidence appears to survive as to the garrisoning of the fifth or sixth fort. But the last-named, Mers el Guemenat, was merely a simple fortified enclosure. It guarded a market place, and may indeed have been a "peel tower", functioning essentially to the benefit of local society.

In regions more notable than Chaouia for their defiance of central government behests, the construction of forts is likely to have been a matter of some political and social moment. But the fort's essential significance rested in its men, rather than its "tabby" walls. In certain key regions it was Iamā'il's policy to deploy alien garrisons, literally "foreign bodies", as a scattered irritant across rural society. According

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(106) M. Morsy op. cit. pp. 111-112

(107) S.I. 2<sup>a</sup> France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, 19/7/1690  
directed by way of Marseille p. 314

(108) For notes upon the deficiencies of "Pellow" as a source, see  
Prologue Pp. 41-2

to an indigenous tradition noted previously, the pattern was set by the instructions given to the Ma<sup>q</sup>il followers of the Zirārī qā'id of Oujda in the late 1670s: that his followers should build three new forts at key points within Snassen country, to be used as bases for harassment of the Snassen, and in particular for their constraint (tadyīq) from trespass upon the Angad plain (109). Al-Zayyānī was not so invariably blunt in describing relations between rural groupings and neighbouring garrison troops. Orderliness is implicit in his note that local populations from around individual forts were detailed to bring their lawful Qur'ānic dues into the appropriate fort, for the sustenance of its troops and their horses (110). But the frequent working of the system in practise may have been well summed up in Braithwaite's callous but succinct account of the life-style of typical renegade detachments:

"...generally sent to garrison remote Castles upon the Confines of the Country, where they are obliged to rob for their Subsistence, until the Country People knock them on the Head." (111)

The value of a fort as an indication of a "government presence" is likely to have varied with the pattern of surrounding dwellings. In the Central Atlas dīr or piedmont, where the local populace were tent-dwellers as late as the 1890s (112), the qusūr of the makhzan had the advantage of being the only local buildings. This singularity is picked out by one credible word in al-Zayyānī's conclusion to his folk-memory tale of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's last great Central Atlas campaign: the

(109) "Turjumān" p. 18 of the text and 34 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 34 of Chapter II P. 106

(110) "Turjumān" pp. 18-19 of the text and 35 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

(111) Braithwaite p. 350

(112) W.B. Harris: "The Nomadic Berbers of Central Morocco" in "The Geographical Journal" (London, 1897 pp. 638-45) pp. 639 and 642-3

note that the loyalist Yimmūr qā'id <sup>C</sup>Alī ibn Barka was instructed to set up at Tishghālin, for his thousand followers, a building described not as a fort (qal'a) but as an "house" (dār) (113). In oasean qusūr-country, where the typical domicile was the communal mud-castle, government forts would have been less noticeable. As one agglomerated sedentary group among many, the makhāzini of the governor's following would have slotted with particular ease into the pattern of local rivalries. But their walls would have given them no strategic advantage. Muhammad al-Ṣafar, sent to Tuat in 1693, with orders there to establish a permanent base centred upon the reconstructed Sa<sup>C</sup>dī qasba, seems notable for having proceeded about his governorship with diplomacy and delicacy (114).

In no region were forts seen as the final expression of central political authority at the local level. Even al-Zayyānī, who made fort-building part of the stylised framework of his campaign accounts, made it obvious that the building of forts did not mean the definitive subjection of rural populations. The author, as will be seen, gave a mass of data upon fort-building in Snassen country and in the Central Atlas (115). But his narrative suggested that, within both regions, punitive expeditions were necessary after the forts had been built. And in Tuat, a region that was customarily upon relatively placid terms with the makhzan, the one recorded major insurrection against Muhammad al-Ṣafar is said to have been put down, not by the relatively helpless governor himself, but by the interposition of a relief

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(113) "Turjumān" p. 24 of the text and 46 of the translation

(114) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin pp. 70-71

(115) For a critique of this data, see Epilogue Part I Pp. 284-5 and 308-9

expedition led by the gā'id ra'sihi (116) Ghāzī Abū Ḥafra (117).

Throughout the empire, the ultimate government sanction for ensuring compliance and the raising of taxes for a central coffer, was not the static fort, but the armed ḥaraka, tautologically mobile. The threat of such an expedition seems to have been a more effective curb to rural peoples than the reality of a fort. Among the most comp<sup>ant</sup> inhabitants of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā during the early <sup>c</sup>Alawī period were the sparse itinerant groupings from the tent crescents of the downlands and flood plains of the far north-west, the regions best known to European observers. These were regions without rural forts. But they were regions easily vulnerable to expeditions mounted from Meknes or Tetuan. Significantly, even the populace of the "Jabal Ḥabīb", who were set into a finger of the Western Rif, and thus had the advantage of relatively difficult terrain, were customarily willing to buy off the threat of an ḥaraka by negotiations with the governor of Tetuan (118). The inhabitants of more open north-western country seem to have been, from the makhzan viewpoint, ideally behaved. Their placatory approach towards the representatives of authority, or towards those who lay under its peace, is epitomised in their swift and free supply of provisions to those travelling under government auspices (119). Herein lay true pacification. For the intensity of the repugnance that could lie behind such good offices is

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(116) The title of an expeditionary commander who was not a provincial governor:

"...he sends them to gather the Tribute of some Country, with the Title of an Alcajde; and if he remains by him without any employment...he is called Alcajde of his Head, which is a sort of Alcajde titular or Reforme." (Windus p. 144 cf. (for a note employing the same title) al-Nasiri: "Kitab al-Istiqsa...") Casablanca text, Vol. VIII p. 35 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 313)

(117) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin p. 79

(118) Windus pp. 77-8

(119) "Journal du Voyage de St. Amans" p. 319 cf. Windus pp. 73-4 cf. Braithwaite p. 134

to be inferred from Busnot's record of the purification by fire of the sites along the Sale-Meknes route where his Christian party had rested, duly fed and guarded for the night (120).

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(120) Busnot p. 12

CHAPTER V: YEARS OF HUBRIS AND NEMESIS

The decade 1691-1701 was, for Ismā'īl, a period that began in military ascendancy and Islamic splendour. But it continued with reverses which the sultan's boldest military experiments and endeavours were unable to stave off. And it ended in débâcle.

During the early months of 1691, the one source of possible unease for Ismā'īl was the continuation of signs pointing to impending war in the "Cherg". In the February, there was a two-man Moroccan embassy to Algiers. Its errand was superficially cordial, but it was dismissed by al-Hājj Sha'bān Dey as a "spy" embassy (1). In May the honours were icily returned. An envoy from Algiers spent a month in Meknes demanding reparations for losses resulting from border-raids carried out by Ismā'īl's subjects (2). He seems to have gained no satisfaction, and Jean-Baptiste Estelle veered towards the opinion that a "Chergi" war with the Regency was imminent (3).

But Ismā'īl took no personal eastward initiative. Over the summer and autumn of 1691, the sultan's own interests seem to have run to a politic self-indulgence. Still capitalising on the fall of Larache, he awaited a grandiose exchange of captives: the barter of the hundred officers taken from the fallen presidio for more than a thousand "Moors" from Spain (4). The suggestion of rescue implicit within the exchange

(1) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. III No. CXXIII Lemaire, French consul in Algiers to Pontchartrain 13/2/1691 p. 345

(2) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. III No. CXXX Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale, 16/6/1691 p. 375

(3) ibid. loc. cit.

(4) Negotiations leading towards this barter had one delightful by-product: the "Rihlat al-wazīr fī 'ftikāk al-asīr" written by Ismā'īl's envoy to Spain, the kātib Hammū al-Wazīr al-Ghassānī. As an account of the author's experiences in Madrid, the work is alive with fascination combined with cross-cultural astonishment, and constitutes a worthy counter-blow to the number of contemporary and for the most part disdainful works which emerged from European embassies to early Alawī Morocco. (See the translation by H. Sauvaire as "Voyage en Espagne d'un ambassadeur marocaine" Paris, 1884 cf. Lakhdar "La vie littéraire..." pp. 122-125 )

may, for many of the "Moorish" ransomees, be misleading. At this period "Moors" resided in Spanish ports in considerable numbers. Some were slaves, or at least open to impressment as such (5). But the allegation that, in this case, normal Spanish currency restrictions had been relaxed in order to allow the ransomed "Moors" to bring home their earnings (6) suggests that the slave status of many among the vast party was marginal. However, the barter gave Ismā'īl scope for the enactment of one of the major pageants of the reign. On the 18th, October 1691, the ransomees arrived in Meknes for a long and euphoric ceremony of individual welcome by the sultan. Jean-Baptiste Estelle, an eyewitness, described the ceremony. The gā'id of Tetuan approached:

"...venant avec douze tambours audevant battant à leur mode, et deux grands pavillons verts, couleur de son Prophète, qu'on luy portoit devant; les Mores le suivoient. Ensuite le Roy les attendoit à la porte de son palais...Ils s'aprocherent tous de luy et ce prince...les baisa tous l'un après l'autre au visage, les hommes; pour les femmes, il ne voulut pas les voir. Le nombre de mille Mores estoit compose de 700 hommes et de 300 femmes. En après, il leur donna un habit a chacun, tellement que l'honesteté que ce prince fit a ces Mores le mirent (sic) si bien dans le coeur de ses sujets que l'on entendoit partout que: "Vive le Roy et qu'il regne de longues années!" Il avoit besoin de cette politique pour se mettre bien dans le coeur de ses sujets..." (7)

This Miknāsī euphoria was soon to be cooled from the east, by the most severe military crisis of Ismā'īl's reign: the threat and eventual reality of a Turkish invasion. The pious sultan would be subjected to a punishment haraka.

An apparently contemporary, if outrageously biased account of the

(5) "...amongst the several towns situated on the coast of Spain, there may be Moores purchased at very reasonable rates, such as are aged, blind or lame. Its no matter, all will pass so they have life."  
(S.P. 71 (16) f. 271 Paddon, naval envoy to Morocco, to Bolingbroke, Tetuan, 5/4/1714)

(6) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CXXXVI Letter from a Spanish Franciscan to Ahmad ibn Haddu al-Hammāmī, Ceuta, 12/9/1691 p. 397

(7) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CLI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale 2/3/1692 p. 454



conflict of 1691-2 is contained within the "Daftar al-Tashrifāt" of one Muḥammad, an Algerine kātib, and a fervent admirer of al-Ḥājj Shaḥbān Dey (8). This "Daftar al-Tashrifāt" suggests that preliminary aggression came from the west: that in November 1691, Zaydān, acting upon his father's orders, led an army northwards from the Sahara upon an extensive border raid that culminated in a battle with the Turkish Tilimsānī garrison. The narrative is invective-ridden: Ismāʿīl was a qā'imī or petty commander, his son a bastard, and his following maḥūsīān or heathens. The narrative is also stylised. Thus, the invaders were said to have come three days' march into Algerine territory, to have fought with the Turks for three days and three nights, and to have precipitated a declaration of war that was made against them after three days of deliberation in the diwān of Algiers (9). Beneath the bluster and the neatening there seems to lie the record of a limited but relatively successful raid in the Tlemsen region, led by the young Zaydān. It is possible that here rests, in embryo, the foundation of al-Zayyānī's puzzling tale of dynastic "derring-do": the narrative of Zaydān's expulsion of the Turks from Tlemsen in 1700, and of his subsequent raid upon the palace of a "Bay of Mascara" (10).

The November raid could have been treated as an act of impudence. But it was seized upon by al-Ḥājj Shaḥbān Dey as justification for a major campaign designed to put an end to such incursions. Ismāʿīl's potential strength was respected. Both the sea and the land forces of Algiers were

- (8) Portions of the "Daftar al-Tashrifāt", together with a nineteenth century and a modern French translation have been reproduced within de Castries' "Les Sources Inédites..." Vol. III as text No. CLXIV pp. 499-513, which will be cited hereafter.
- (9) "Daftar al-Tashrifāt" pp. 501-2 of the text and 505-6 of the modern French translation cf. S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. III No. CXLVII p. 432 Lemaire to Pontchartrain, Algiers, 31/12/1691
- (10) "Turjuman" p. 25 of the text and 48 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 41-2 Further discussion of al-Zayyānī's treatment of this affair will be given in the Epilogue to this work, Part II Pp. 332-3

mobilised against him with smooth and efficient deliberation. In December a force of three thousand janissaries was despatched by sea to Kerchtil, the nearest port to Tlemsen that was not in infidel hands (11). For 1692, the customary naval support lent by Algiers to the Ottoman fleet was refused in advance. Corsair activity was forbidden for three months. All available vessels were required as troopships (12). Isma<sup>CC</sup>il took alarm and, as a gesture of goodwill, sent off to Algiers the hundred and twenty out of his thousand-odd ransomed "Moors" who were of Algerine birth. With them there allegedly came the promise of an embassy which would explain away the recent border clash (13). But inexorably the Algerine preparations continued. The mass of the forces at the Dey's disposal were for this year loaded in the direction of Tlemsen **and beyond** (14). Only a token force was despatched to the eastern march with the Regency of Tunis (15). In the spring, further reinforcements, janissaries, spahis and Kabyles, were sent by sea to the Tlemsen region. Overland there was sent an haraka, centred upon a small force of Turks, to which were gathered indigenous groupings from the Regency. On the 6th. April, the Dey himself left Algiers in style, to join his army (16).

Given the unease of contemporary Algerine politics, and the parallel weakness of his eastern to his western frontier (17), it would seem that

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- (11) "Daftar al-Tashrifat" p. 502 of the text and 506 of the modern French translation cf. S.I. 2<sup>a</sup> France Vol. III No. CXLVII Lemaire to Pontchartrain, Algiers 31/12/1691 p. 432
- (12) S.I. 2<sup>a</sup> France Vol. III No. CXLVI Dusault, French Algiers merchant, to Pontchartrain 30/12/1691 p. 430
- (13) S.I. 2<sup>a</sup> France Vol. III No. CXLIX Dusault to Pontchartrain 14/1/1692 pp. 437-8
- (14) S.P. 71 (3) f. 455 Memo. of consul Baker, Algiers, 7/1/1691 O.S. cf. S.I. 2<sup>a</sup> France Vol. III No. CLIV Al-Hajj Sha<sup>CC</sup>ban Dey to Pontchartrain 3/Rajab/1103 = 21/3/1692 pp. 473-4
- (15) "Daftar al-Tashrifat" pp. 502 of the text and 505-6 of the modern French translation.
- (16) S.I. 2<sup>a</sup> France Vol. III No. CXLI Lemaire to Pontchartrain, Algiers 19/5/1692 p. 486
- (17) For a general history of Algiers during the period see H.-D. de Grammont "Histoire d'Alger sous la domination Turque (1515-1830)" Paris, 1887 Chapter XVIII

the Dey was staking his political survival upon the assumption of a short and sharp victory in the field. Shortly before his departure, it was predicted that only the "vieux barbons de la milice" would be left as a token of his government within Algiers (18). But the gamble succeeded admirably. A mass of border groupings rallied to the Dey's army until he was over-loaded with "Moorish" cavalry (19). This could have been an embarrassment, had it not been for the total incompetence of the defence-forces with which he was met. Ismā'īl forebore to go into the field himself. Instead he entrusted his army to the care of the young Zaydān (20), who can have been little more than twenty. More senior generals are known to have been with Zaydān (21). But the military history of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā over the previous fifteen years would suggest that none were accustomed to full-scale battle in open country. The Dey's army was given sufficient leeway to reach al-Mashārī<sup>c</sup>, a ford across the Moulouya. There it was not even challenged. According to reports reaching the French consulates, the Regency forces were able to attack Zaydān's army while it was in camp. Its survivors fled from the carnage amid heavy losses in horses and equipment (22). The way to Fes lay wide open. But the Algerine troops advanced only as far as Taza, two days' journey from Fes itself (23). There the Dey encamped. In all

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- (18) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CLV Dusault to Pontchartrain, Algiers 22/3/1692 p. 475
- (19) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CLXII Dusault to Pontchartrain, Algiers 20/5/1692 p. 487  
cf. Brooks p. 79
- (20) Brooks p. 80 cf. "Turiumān" p. 26 of the text and 44 of the translation  
cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 40
- (21) In the following year, <sup>c</sup>Alī ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd Allāh al-Hammāmī, qā'id of Tetuan was reportedly still suffering from a wound in the arm, received during this campaign (S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle Tetuan, 11/8/1693 p. 76)
- (22) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CLXVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale 12/9/1692 p. 525  
cf. "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Fes lithograph of 1892 Vol. II p. 157  
(Al-Zayyānī's texts give no reference to this encounter).
- (23) Brooks p. 80 cf. "Daftar al-Tashrīfāt" pp. 503-4 of the text and 508 of the modern French translation.

likelihood he was waiting to be bought off. His alternative would have been the drastic step of laying siege to Fes, a city which may already have grown disgruntled with Ismā'īl (24), but which would probably not freely have opened its gates to an Hanafī invader.

In Meknes, Ismā'īl opened his treasury with a startlingly free hand (25) and gathered up an heterogeneous following, ranging from members of his own guard of ʿabīd to Christian slaves (26). The last were troops whose use epitomised military desperation. Then, accompanied by men of religion who would act as mediators (27), the sultan went to meet the Dey. Peace was swiftly brought about, and the Algerine army withdrew (28). According to Jean-Baptiste Estelle, Ismā'īl, in Taza, made to the Dey a number of clear-cut diplomatic concessions (29). It seems over-sophisticated to see the interim Taza agreement in these terms. The "Daftar al-Tashrifāt" in its own theatrical style, recorded only a request by Ismā'īl for "pax": the "amān" (30). English report alleged that Ismā'īl bought peace with an advance payment of "an horse and furniture which cost 200,000 crowns and forty-eight Mules laden with Gold" (31). Such notes ring true. Formal submission reinforced with heavy bribery was the standard Maghribī

- (24) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CLXVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale, 12/9/1692 p. 527
- (25) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to the October of 1698 p. 693
- (26) Brooks pp. 81-2 cf. S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CLXVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle Sale, 12/9/1692 p. 526
- (27) Memo. of J-B. Estelle (as immediately above) loc. cit.
- (28) According to al-Zayyānī's chronicle material, Ismā'īl joined Zaydān after ʿId al-Saghīr which, in 1692, fell in mid-June ("Turjumān" p. 24 of the text and 44 of the translation). According to the "Daftar al-Tashrifāt", the bulk of the Algerine troops, transported by sea, were back in Algiers before the end of July (p. 504 of the text and 508 of the modern French translation).
- (29) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CLXVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale, 12/9/1692 p. 527
- (30) "Daftar al-Tashrifāt" loc. cit.
- (31) S.P. 71 (3) f. 245/495 Memo. of consul Baker, Algiers, 15/7/1692 O.S. cf. Brooks p. 82 (which, curiously, quotes the same sum in treasure.)

response to defeat by a punishment haraka.

A more serious bid to forge a durable agreement between Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl and Algiers followed in August, when the Dey and his forces were back in their capital (32). An <sup>c</sup>Alawī embassy travelled to Algiers. It contained high-ranking government officials, and was formally led by <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Malik (33), a son of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's who was newly rising to prominence. But this prince was as yet an adolescent of around fifteen (34). And the embassy as a whole seems to have been dominated by <sup>c</sup>ulamā' (35). Its numbers included Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib ibn Muḥammad al-Fāsi, identifiable as the major original "al-Fāsi chronicler" (36). It is possible to see this embassy partly in Fāsi terms, as an attempt by the city's religious aristocracy to restore the peaceable relations with the Regency that the recent blow to <sup>c</sup>Alawī military reputation had presumably made necessary to the future security of the pilgrimage caravan. For it would seem that the city identified closely with the mission, and feared for its safety. The chronicler reported, presumably with satisfaction, that when the city received a false report that the entire embassy party had been murdered, the consequence was communal civic mourning, which postponed celebration of the feast of <sup>c</sup>Ashūra until there was reassurance that the envoys were safe (37). The envoys were indeed safe. But it will be seen that their mission brought no secure peace to the "Cherg". For

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(32) "Daftar al-Tashrifāt" p. 504 of the text and 508 of the modern French translation.

(33) ibid. p. 504 of the text and 509 of the modern French translation cf. "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Fes lithograph of 1892 Vol. II p. 157 of the first notation

(34) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. III No. CLXVII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale, 12/9/1692 p. 528

(35) According to the "Daftar al-Tashrifāt", the mission numbered one hundred and twenty, and was dominated by "grands marabouts" (p. 509 of the modern French translation).

(36) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. loc. cit.  
For an identification of the major "al-Fāsi chronicler" see Prologue p. 17

(37) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. loc. cit.

the defeat of 1692 was no curb to Ismā'īl's military style. Indeed, his ignominious capitulation to the Algerine Turks outside Taza urged the sultan into moves which may be interpreted as attempts to recoup losses in men, in resources, and in military prestige.

The most expansive of these attempts by Ismā'īl to restore his own strength, was impressment into the corps of abīd of a mass of raw recruits scoured from within the Atlas arc. The consequences of this impressment reverberated for years, and its memory was simplistically to be enshrined within the well-known indigenous tradition as to the foundation of Ismā'īl's army of "abīd al-Bukhārī" (38). This impressment may have followed immediately upon defeat. In the August of 1692, the qā'id of Tetuan included, within his annual hadīya, uniforms for abīd (39). The item was also included within the hadīya for the following year (40). Direct references to mass conscription date from 1693. For the spring of that year, Jean-Baptiste Estelle recorded that negotiations of his own, concerning the reception of the French ambassador Pidou de St. Olon by the aforementioned qā'id of Tetuan, had fallen to pieces, allegedly as a result of the qā'id's pre-occupation with fulfilling the sultan's summary demand for twelve thousand blacks (41). Of this vast and presumably nominal quota, some hundreds seem actually to have been assembled and despatched to Meknes. On its own journey to Meknes, the embassy party met a force of abīd drawn up at a ford, for the benefit of the Christians. Pidou de St Olon

(38) For a critique of this tradition, see: Epilogue Part I Pp. 279-292

(39) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CLXVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale 12/9/1692 p. 521

(40) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XXV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale 23/10/1693 p. 221

(41) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Tetuan 11/8/1693 pp. 71-2

guessed that these men were the Ṭiṭwānī recruits (42). From the July of 1693 there survives an administrative memorandum which refers to the mustering and registration of ʿabīd from two associated Arabic-speaking groupings of the Sebu plain, the Banū Mālik and the Sufyān ("al-tajammūʿat (sic)...wa ʿl-dīwān ...al-mushtamil ʿalā ʿabīd banī mālik wa sufyān") being carried out according to the sultan's instructions while he himself was on campaign (43).

The practical mechanics of conscription are likely to have been flagrantly questionable. The proportion of recruits who were genuine slaves cannot be known. Pragmatically, co-option could frequently have been carried out upon the basis of colour alone. Free negroes and mulattos, the detritus of the slave population of previous generations, had long formed a section of Maghribi society (44). De Chenier was to note that it was:

"...customary among the Moors to marry their male and female negroes, and, after a certain period, to restore them to freedom." (45)

But he tartened his own sentimental picture of the merry and simple lives led by communities of these free negro labourers by the proviso that they were "considered as slaves among the Moors, even after they" were "restored to liberty" (46). This last note adds to the credibility of an extended account of Ismaʿīl's quest for slaves that is contained

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(42) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XXII Memo. of Pidou de St. Olon  
Toulon, 7/9/1693 p. 170

(43) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 20 Muhammad ibn Qāsim to Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Yahmadi 8/ Dhū ʿl-Qāda/ 1104 = 12/7/1693 p. 67

(44) Thus, from the high mediaeval period comes al-Bakrī's curious account of an independent community of negroes (sūdān) living in a disease-wasted creek between the Sebu mouth and Arzilla (al-Bakrī ed./tr. de Slane p. 87 of the text and 176 of the translation, noted by M. Brett in "Ifriqiya as a Market for Saharan Trade from the Tenth to the Twelfth Century A.D.", "Journal of African History" Vol. X (3) (London, 1969) p. 355

(45) de Chenier (English translation Vol. I) p. 280

(46) ibid. p. 282

within the narrative of John Windus. This account, associated in the text with a 1698 bid for the co-optation of manpower from the city of Fes, alleges that:

"...the Emperor appointed all the Records of the Country to be searched, that Discovery might be made of such as were descended from Slaves or Renegadoes. In this Search were committed a great many Cruelties; and many thousands of poor People, either for private or public Piques, or being of a duskier Complexion than ordinary, if they could not produce long Scrowls of their Genealogies, notwithstanding their having lived free for Ages, and enjoyed comfortable Fortunes, were declared Slaves, their Estates and Persons seized for the Use of the Emperor; and some were forced by Torture, to desire their Friends to call them their Slaves: and if they happened to be poor, after the pretended Patron had received a Ducat, or sometimes less from the Emperor's Officers, he was forced to be at the Expence of two or three more, to send them handsomely cloathed to the Emperor." (47)

Horror-stricken though its reporting of the crudities of impressment may be, this account does indicate that it was necessary for makhzan agents of the quest for recruits to work within at least a show of paper legality. All available evidence, including the late material set into al-Zayyānī's texts (48), would suggest that the mass of recruits to Ismā'īl's expanded <sup>c</sup>abīd force was taken from regions socially and economically central to the sultan's domain. Here, where impressment was blatant, the sultan was acutely concerned to obtain a slick of legal acquiescence to the activity which built up his "slave army". Complaisant jurists expressed such acquiescence by adding their signatures to a dīwān or muster-roll of recruits to the new force (49):

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(47) Windus pp. 215-216

(48) "Turjumān" p. 15 of the text and 29 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 31-2

(49) Thus Muhammad ibn Qāsim wrote to al-Yahmādī, with reference to the dīwān: "bāna (sic) <sup>c</sup>ulamā' fās al-mashhūrīn kullihim/ wada<sup>c</sup> ū aydahum <sup>c</sup>alayhi"

("It was brought to the attention of all the most famous Fāsī scholars. They set their hands to it.")

"Lettres Inédites..." No. 20 dated 8/Dhū '1-Qa<sup>c</sup>da/1104 = 12/7/1693 p. 67



documentation which seems identifiable with the sultan's list noted by Windus:

"...a Register made of the unfortunate People found, or forced to be Slaves, signed by all his Cadies,...so that they and their Children are become Slaves by a Form of Law." (50)

There exists a curious manuscript which, in deference to a margin note linking it with the reign of Isma'īl, has been judged to be a copy of part of this register (51). It lists, grouping by grouping, an astonishing total of 6586 slaves ("wusfān") from a rural region within the economic orbit of Fes: the country of the Banū Zarwal, and of two associated "Jabalī" peoples. Its vocabulary is, for the most part, carefully legal. It stresses the slave status of the individuals named, sometimes to the extent of referring to them as "al-mamālīk al-ariqqā' al-wusfān". But the standard ascription of ownership within this text is given in terms associated with inheritance ("irth /mawrūth"). Such terminology gives rise to a suspicion that the relevant slave-ownership was frequently technical: that individuals living as free men may well, as Windus alleged, have been classed for makhzan purposes, as the slaves of prominent neighbours, on the pretext that a master-slave or master-client relationship had existed between their mutual ancestors. This might account for the record that "slaves" in thousands were to be found within a region whose rural economy might be thought to have held little place for them. Leo described

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(50) Windus p. 216

(51) The MS is now in the possession of M. G. S. Colin, who believes it to be a copy of an authentic register. The copy itself is written on paper of a quality no more than a century old, and would appear to be the work of a scribe practising calligraphy. Its relationship to an original dīwan would be incapable of precise definition. Perhaps the best argument for its authenticity in general, if not in detail, lies within its format: a mass of names set within a framework of repetitious formulae. It would seem an unlikely candidate for late, original composition.

the country of the "Beni Guazerwal" as a densely populated and agriculturally rich region, whose inhabitants were noted for their frequent skirmishes amongst themselves (52). Such a pattern of life, which may be assumed to have persisted, would have given rise to a mass of "publick and private Piques", to which a government levy in manpower would have provided a rich opportunity for the resolution.

During the 1690s, recruits to the new "slave army" or "jund min al-wusfan" (53) were kept near to the capital, ready for deployment when they were not actively in the field. In 1698, Jean-Baptiste Estelle would state, in relation to slave troops, that Isma<sup>c</sup>il:

"...peut avoir a present vingt-cinq mil, tous armés d'un sabre et d'un fusil, et chacun son cheval. Il en tient deux mil a Miquenes pour sa seureté, et le reste aux environs de Miquenes, a dix lieues autour, pour les avoir dans un jour assemblés, quand il en pourra avoir besoin." (54)

This division between an inner two thousand and an outer mass could reflect an important contemporary split within the "black army", of which Estelle, with the blanket racial perceptions of an European may have been unaware. As indicated previously (55), the abid of Isma<sup>c</sup>il's early years had been militarily an highly regarded and, in part, lengthily-trained corps. Many had grown up in the imperial service, graduating by way of the sultan's personal guard of musket-toting adolescent pages. These "Young Rogues" (56) seem most commonly to have been born and, more latterly, deliberately bred from parents of

(52) Leo ed. Ramusio ff. 51-2

(53) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 10 Isma<sup>c</sup>il to Muhammad ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Qadir al-Fasi 25/Dhu 'l-Hijja/1108 = 15/7/1697 p. 50

(54) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle putatively dated to October 1698 p. 692

(55) See Chapter II Pp. 113-115

(56) Windus p. 142

recognised slave status (57). During the mid 1690s, however, when the sultan's army of <sup>C</sup>abīd would seem to have been swollen with raw adult recruits, pressed men in thousands, that army can no longer have been dominated numerically by a professional core. But such a core may have continued distinct and, at least in part, resident within Wajh <sup>C</sup>Arūs, the <sup>C</sup>abīd garrison suburb to the north-west of Meknes (58).

For an understanding of Ismā'īl's military circumstances in the mid-1690s, it is necessary to reverse, upon the pivot of its own chronology, the traditional two-tier model of the development of Ismā'īl's slave army. As will be seen (59), this tradition tells of a primary generation of raw recruits, taken in the late 1670s, and succeeded, some sixteen years or so later, by a steadily expanding force constituted from among its own progeny, and trained in the sultan's service from childhood. This tradition would date Ismā'īl's first recruitment of children for training to 1100 A.H./1688-9 A.D. (60). The chronology implies that, during the mid-1690s, when this first group of boys rose to military age, there opened a period of marked increase in the quality of troops at Ismā'īl's disposal. In actuality, the mid-1690s, as the years of mass-impressment, are likely to have known an increase in the quantity, but a severe adulteration in the overall quality of the troops claimed by the sultan as his slaves. During this period Ismā'īl could

(57) Thus, from information gained in 1693, Pidou de St. Olon referred to Ismā'īl's policy of deliberately encouraging the progeniture of young slave recruits, by the arrangement of marriages between adult slaves, and the use of these slaves' provincial postings "like a Nursery to serve him upon occasion" (Motteux translation p. 128)

(58) "Tur iumān" p. 16 of the text and 30 of the translation cf.  
Busnot p. 182 cf. Windus p. 185

(59) See Epilogue Part I Pp. 281-283

(60) "Tur iumān" p. 22 of the text and 42 of the translation cf.  
"Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 36

and did deploy "blacks" in thousands. Such deployment did not necessarily mean, as it would have done in his early years, that the sultan was setting "crack regiments" into the field. It may indicate instead the use of newly pressed men in large numbers. Such gross but makeshift manoeuvres may be seen as a clue to the chequered character of Ismā'īl's military career during the nine years following the al-Mashāri<sup>c</sup> defeat.

Over the winter of 1692-3, which followed this disgrace, Ismā'īl prepared personally to take the field, with the aim of recouping both honour and authority among the populous groupings of his eastern march. At the time of the Turkish invasion, the fluid limit of <sup>c</sup>Alawī suzerainty in the "Cherg" had shifted alarmingly far to the west. A show of <sup>c</sup>Alawī force within march country was necessary to the regaining of the old <sup>c</sup>Alawī eastern taxation frontier. This put Ismā'īl to the politically awkward necessity of campaigning at the edge of the Regency without provoking a second counter-move from Algiers. So, at court, before the campaign opened, he was careful verbally to insist upon his regard for the friendship of the Ottoman sultan (61). And he chose, as the designated victims of his eastward haraka, the Banū <sup>c</sup>Amir of "Oranie". This grouping inhabited open country, and could be envisaged as easy and suitable prey for a swift summer expedition. More vitally, the Banū <sup>c</sup>Amir were "moros de pazes", effectively subject not to Algiers, but to the Spaniards of Oran. Consequently, an haraka aimed at their punishment could be given a mujāhid gilding, as a blow aimed at a people "qui

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(61) Thus Pidou de St. Olon recorded that, during his audience of the sultan in the June of 1693, which immediately preceded the "Chergi" haraka, Ismā'īl welcomed the French as fellow allies of the "Grand Seigneur" (S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. XXII Memo. of Pidou de St. Olon, Toulon, 7/9/1693 p. 172).

frequentoit parmy les Chrestiens sans...ordres et sans aucun raison" (62). and who had recently joined the Spaniards in a raid upon fellow Muslims (63). The expedition was preceded by a pilgrimage to the shrine of Idrīs I at Zerhoun (64). And it could be referred to by a makhzan official as an "harakat al-sa<sup>C</sup>īdat al-mubāraka" (65): a pious venture.

In Fes, a city whose ulamā' had recently helped to forge a peace treaty with the Regency, the pious venture may well have been seen as dangerous meddling along the eastern march. Ismā'īl seems to have believed that the loyalty of Fes was not to be relied upon in his absence. For he took the precaution of removing Muḥammad al-<sup>C</sup>Alim from the vice-regality of the city (66), setting into Fes as his temporary successor, the as yet innocuous adolescent <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Malik (67). By this date Muḥammad al-<sup>C</sup>Alim had been vice-roy in Fes for thirteen years, and his identification with the city may be seen as a political bond far stronger than the aura of simple popularity based upon virtue, which Jean-Baptiste Estelle cited as the reason for the prince's destitution (68). That destitution may be seen as a signpost pointing towards the divergence of imperial and civic interests.

The haraka into "Oranie" was bloodthirsty and brief. The sultan

- (62) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. XXII Contemporary French translation of a letter from Ismā'īl to Pidou de St. Olon, dated 10/Dhū 'l-Hijja/1104 = 12/8/1693 p. 207
- (63) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. XIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Tetuan 11/8/1693 p. 125
- (64) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. XXII Memo. of Pidou de St. Olon, Toulon 7/9/1693 p. 188
- (65) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 20 Muhammad ibn Qāsim to Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Yahmadi 8/Dhū 'l-Qa'da/1104 = 12/7/1693 p. 67
- (66) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed 19/10/1694, and referring to events of the previous year p. 296
- (67) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 20 Muhammad ibn Qāsim to Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Yahmadi 8/Dhū 'l-Qa'da/1104 = 12/7/1693 loc. cit.
- (68) "Les Mores de Fez adoroient ce prince, qui est liberal, sage et d'une retenue peu commune à ses Mores"...qualities, of course, attributed to Muhammad's part-European parentage! (S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle completed 19/10/1694 loc. cit.)

left for Taza, where his troops were mustering, in the late June of 1693 (69). He was to be back in Meknes before mid-September (70). In the interim, the Banū<sup>C</sup> Amir, warned of the sultan's approach, had retreated en masse towards the protecting Spanish fortress of Oran (71). Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl subjected the fortress to a token day's mujāhid siege (72). But it was neighbouring peoples under Algerine suzerainty who bore the brunt of the expedition's punishment. The consequence was Algerine protest (73) but not Algerine reprisal.

It is thus probable that the expedition was successful in thrusting eastwards the <sup>C</sup>Alawī taxation frontier, and that this success had repercussions at both the local, and the international level. Locally the next three years saw a series of successor raids. They may be seen as a form of "beating the bounds": markedly destructive and essentially rural. There is no known evidence that they were associated with any bid for Tlemsen. Jean-Baptiste Estelle could sum up the ravaging simply as "field-burning" (74). These raids were to be variously led. Their usual commander was a noted black general Mas<sup>C</sup>ūd ibn al-Rāmī, qā'id of Taza. His scratching at the march was quite separate from Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's "Chergī" ambitions as conducted at the level of international politics.

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- (69) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Tetuan, 11/8/1693 p. 125
- (70) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XXV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale 13/10/1693 p. 221
- (71) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Tetuan 11/8/1693 p. 126
- (72) Galindo y de Vera: "Historia, vicisitudes..." p. 284
- (73) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XII Lemaire to Pontchartrain, Algiers 6/8/1693 (p. 52) cf. No. XXV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale 23/10/1693 pp. 222-3
- (74) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XCVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale 29/7/1697 p. 514

Upon the wider scale, Ismā'īl toyed with the idea of recouping military prestige in relation to Algiers, by means of an offensive alliance with Tunis. In the January of 1694 there was a Tunisian envoy within Meknes, who came to Ismā'īl loaded with gifts from Muḥammad Bey, and left amicably (75). For this year, al-Ḥājj Shaḥbān Dey was known to be planning a bold venture against Tunis. According to Tunisian rumour, it was agreed in Meknes that Ismā'īl should, as a diversion, lead an expedition towards Algiers as soon as he knew the Dey's army to have left for the Tunisian march. He would thus provide the Bey with an opportunity to turn aggressor instead of victim (76). Phantasmagorically, the Dey claimed afterwards that this arrangement was linked with an agreement that, at the conclusion of the projected double-pronged campaign, Ismā'īl would be ceded Ottoman territory as far to the east as Tunis itself, while the Bey would take an empire stretching as far as Cairo, within which territory Ismā'īl would be his wazīr (77). At the heart of this flummery could be a trace of proposals for some border adjustment by which the Bey, "ce traître", had promised, in the event of major victory, "de mettre le pays ottoman aux mains des arabes" (78).

This projected international venture of Ismā'īl's was doomed to abortion. Preparations for a major venture into Algerine territory were made and then abandoned, leaving the sultan both at peace with the Regency and in possession of his Tunisian bribe. Jean-Baptiste Estelle, with an over-sophisticated sarcasm, saw in this an example

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(75) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XXXI J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain,  
Sale, 20/2/1692 pp. 241-2

(76) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XXXVIII Auger-Sorhainde, French consul  
in Tunis, to Pontchartrain p. 263

(77) Letter from al-Ḥājj Shaḥbān Dey to Louis XIV, from the camp outside  
Tunis, dated 11/Muharram/1106 = 1/9/1694, and quoted in translation  
in E. Plantet: "Correspondance des Deys d'Alger avec la Cour de France"  
Vol. I (Paris, 1889) p. 418

(78) ibid. p. 419

of admirably astute policy on the part of a barbarian (79). But the sultan's behaviour suggests timidity in the event, rather than cunning duplicity. There seems no doubt that in the spring of 1694 Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl intended to move eastwards. He arranged for his son Zaydān to spend April in Taza, supervising the mustering of an army (80). And he himself was rumoured to have been uncommonly open-handed to the troops assembled there (81). However, it is not certain that this army ever even left Taza. It may have been stalled following the reception of information that al-Hājj Sha<sup>c</sup>bān Dey had despatched a token Algerine force to his western march, when sending the main body of his troops eastwards (82). The Dey would later claim a clear military victory over <sup>c</sup>Alawī forces (83). The claim was probably bluster. During 1694, no rumour of any armed encounter in the "Cherg" percolated through to Jean-Baptiste Estelle in Sale.

Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's relapse into caution may, as Estelle believed, have been influenced by a threat from within his own domains. Muḥammad al-<sup>c</sup>Alim had refused to reconcile himself to a peaceable Fīlālī exile. He had made the standard gambit of a prince fallen upon hard times: that of moving into an alliance, sealed by marriage, with a strategically placed rural grouping. His allies were Ayt <sup>c</sup>Attā (84), whose westernmost territories fringed a Dar<sup>c</sup>a-Marrakesh routeway.

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- (79) "Sa politique pour un barbare est assurément à admirer. Il se moque de toute la Barbarie" (S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 19/10/1694 p. 298)
- (80) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XXXV J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain, Sale 8/4/1694 p. 256
- (81) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XLIII J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain, Sale, 16/5/1694 pp. 276-7
- (82) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XL Lemaire to Pontchartrain, Algiers 30/4/1694 p. 265
- (83) Al-Hājj Sha<sup>c</sup>bān Dey to Louis XIV, the camp outside Tunis, dated 11/Muharram/1106 = 1/9/1694. Quoted in Plantet: "Correspondance des Deys" Vol. I. p. 419
- (84) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 19/10/1694 p. 297



Remote from Safs as it was, this activity of Muḥammad al-<sup>C</sup>Alim's provided a milestone to his father's career. It was the first act of open filial defiance with which Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl had been faced.

The projection and subsequent abandoning of the "Chergi" campaign of 1694 was a signpost to deterioration in Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's standing. It proved the sultan unreliable as an ally of a foreign power. And it is unlikely to have strengthened his grip within his own domains. To subjects who remembered the Turkish victory of 1692, failure to move eastwards is likely to have appeared weak rather than astute. The appearance of imperial debilitation may have fired southern resentment against rule from the "Gharb". For over a year the Sus had grumbled with disturbance (85). By the October of 1694, it was necessary to re-inforce, militarily, government authority within southern regions. An army of <sup>C</sup>abīd, estimated at three to four thousand, went southwards under the leadership of Aḥmad ibn Ḥaddu al-<sup>C</sup>Atṭār, and of the young <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Malik (86). The general went on to inner Sus; the young prince remained as a disciplinarian viceroy in Safi, the contemporary port for Marrakesh (87).

At this point, when Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's prestige in both "Cherg" and Sus would seem to have been low, the sultan turned to the jihād, his source of easy glory in earlier years, and determined that his mujāhidun should capture Ceuta. He may be presumed to have been confident of cheap victory, likely to bring him no greater military difficulty than the siege of Larache had brought. This confidence was

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(85) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CLXXXI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Tetuan 27/2/1693 p. 560

(86) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle completed in Sale, 19/10/1694 pp. 302-3

(87) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. LI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 24/12/1694 p. 312

misplaced.

The mounting of the siege of Ceuta, in the autumn of 1694, was sudden, but carried out according to formula. <sup>C</sup>Alī ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh, the qā'id of Tetuan, who was in Meknes upon his annual tribute-paying visit, was given summary orders to take the Spanish fortress. He is said to have protested the lateness of the season (88). His protests were over-ruled. He was granted a force of five-hundred <sup>C</sup>abīd cavalry (89); a troop of renegades to man fourteen cannon, and to serve as "pioneers" (90); and the formal permission to muster a mass-rabble of his own following of Rif-men, "Brabers or Country People, arm'd in a very strange and unusual Manner", with casual implements (91). Hostilities commenced at the end of October (92). At around the same time, a parallel siege is said to have been laid against the smaller Spanish presidio of Melilla (93). Thus began a conflict which, at an oscillating intensity, was to involve mūjahid — forces, and to compromise the sultan's Islamic prestige for the remaining thirty two and an half years of his reign.

In the Sus, Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's autumn expeditionary force met with relative success. By the January of 1695, Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's writ ran once again far enough to the south for him successfully to order the enfranchisement of the crew of an alien barque, run aground at

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(88) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 19/10/1694 p. 302

(89) "Ockley" p. 10

(90) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 19/10/1694 loc. cit.  
cf. "Ockley" Chapter I: passim.

(91) "Ockley" p. 10

(92) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XLIX Pierre Estelle to Pontchartrain  
Tetuan, 14/11/1694 p. 305

(93) ibid. p. 306

Agadir (94). And by early April, the entire inner Sus was alleged to be quiescent under the authority of Aḥmad ibn Ḥaddu al-<sup>c</sup>Attār, who had sent the ringleader of previous disturbances as a prisoner to the sultan (95).

Meanwhile, within the hitherto uncomplicated jihād, the fortunes of war went decidedly awry. Ceuta had been well re-inforced, and its captain-general showed no inclination to surrender. In the December of 1694, disgruntled civic contingents were sent to swell the numbers of mujāhidūn. Jean-Baptiste Estelle recorded the difficulties experienced by the governor of Sale in rounding up his quota of two hundred civic "volunteers" (96). The civic troops are likely to have included Fāsī, recorded in chronicle material as having contributed to the siege a detachment of five hundred musketeers, of which the personnel was changed every six months (97). Like other mujāhidūn, the newcomers faced an harsh winter (98) and no military progress. In the June of 1695, Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl added an estimated two thousand <sup>c</sup>abīd, together with further civic detachments, to the forces of attack (99) to no avail. No longer could there be any idea that Ceuta would fall with the ease of Larache. The contrast was difficult for Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl to comprehend. Heavy suspicion of collusion with the enemy fell upon the mujāhid captain <sup>c</sup>Alī ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd Allāh(100). In August and in

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- (94) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. LIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale 26/2/1695 p. 328
- (95) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. LXI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 29/9/1695 p. 345
- (96) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. LI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 24/12/1694 pp. 316-17
- (97) "Turjumān" p. 23 of the text and 43 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 40
- (98) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. LVI J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain, Sale 20/3/1695 p. 333
- (99) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. LVIII J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain, Sale 23/6/1695 (p. 338) cf. Memo. of the same, completed in Sale, 29/9/1695 p. 350
- (100) "Turjumān" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

September, two successive and independent quwwād were sent to estimate the strategic worth of Ceuta's defences. Both, honourably or no, are alleged to have vindicated <sup>C</sup>Alī ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh by confirming the impossibility of taking the place (101). Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl refused to accept their verdict, and sent up to Ceuta a further force of <sup>C</sup>abīd, estimated at four thousand (102). By the criterion of manpower, he was committed to the jihād as never before.

A lateral threat to Saḥs boiled up within the "Cherg". In the high summer of 1695, there had been an Algerine embassy in Meknes, protesting at the border incursions of the previous two years. Its summary dismissal (103) provoked the massing of Turkish forces within the Tilimsānī march, a move which the French consul in Algiers could interpret in terms of war (104). In November, as a counter-move, Muḥammad al-<sup>C</sup>Alim, who had slid back into his father's service, was sent eastward at the head of yet another <sup>C</sup>abīd army, said to number four thousand (105). Three months later, in the February of 1696, the prince was ambushed by Turkish troops while he was on a minor tax raid. He was heavily defeated (106). The aftermath was a rumoured threat of invasion from the east (107).

This "Chergi" threat provoked a flurried redeployment of manpower. A force originally destined to accompany Zaydān towards

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- (101) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. LXI Memo. of J-B. Estelle completed in Sale 29/9/1695 pp. 355 and 357
- (102) ibid. p. 357
- (103) ibid. pp. 347-8
- (104) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. LXXI Lemaire to Pontchartrain, Algiers 31/8/1696 p. 425
- (105) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. LXVII Memo. of J-B. Estelle completed in Sale 2/4/1696 pp. 385-6
- (106) ibid. p. 401
- (107) ibid. p. 407
- cf. No. LXX Memo. of the same, completed in Sale 24/8/1696 pp. 416 and 421-2

a proposed vice-regality in Marrakesh was diverted towards the eastern march (108). The siege of Ceuta lapsed into subordinacy. Four thousand of its abīd are said to have been withdrawn thence and taken into the centrally constituted army (109). Yet more recruits were hauled into the sultan's service. Zaydān was belatedly sent to Marrakesh to raise thence a corps of five hundred cavalry; his adolescent brother Ḥāfīz had orders to raise a similar number of troops from Tamesna and Dukkala; and other sons of Ismā'īl were despatched to various points of the empire (110), presumably upon similar errands. Once again, as in the aftermath of al-Mashārī<sup>c</sup>, the sultan was scouring his domains for men. The terms upon which these latest troops were gathered in are likely to have been those of impressment. And it may be thought, from the part "white" and part "black" make-up of a recent Saletin contingent pressed in for Ceuta (111). that in a crisis, the military role of the "pressed man" and that of the "military slave", newly taken, was impossible to differentiate. The two may have been distinguishable only along the hazy line of colour.

In the event, the newly pressed troops were not required to defend the eastern march. Ismā'īl was rescued from the threat of invasion by a turn of fortunes within the Regency. In the August of 1696, news came to Algiers of desertion from (112) and finally of mutiny within the Algerine mahalla in the Tilimsānī march, with the

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- (108) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. LXVII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale 2/4/1696 pp. 401 and 402
- (109) ibid. pp. 406-7
- (110) ibid. pp. 405, 406 and 407
- (111) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. LI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed Sale, 24/12/1694 p. 316
- (112) S.P. 71 (3) f. 677 Memo. of consul Cole, Algiers, 31/8/1696 N.S.

election there of a new Dey, who turned his troops eastwards upon the capital (113). This left the pathway open for a force of Ismā'īl's own, under Mas'ūd ibn al-Rāmī, to carry out the fourth in a series of annual raids into Regency march territory (114). The force was rumoured to have reached "Oranie" before meeting any opposition sent out from Algiers (115).

However, southern crises developed and eventually swallowed many of the troops now available to Ismā'īl. The autumn of 1696 saw an inept conspiracy within Marrakesh that involved the heir-presumptive Zaydān (116). The conspiracy had alleged Sūsī connections but, like all post-1677 disaffection based upon Marrakesh, as distinct from the ultramontane Sūsī heartland, it fizzled pathetically. Like other recent offences upon Zaydān's part (117), his role in this affair was dealt with as a youngster's peccadillo. The heir-presumptive suffered merely a spell within sanctuary, and recall from Marrakesh to Meknes (118). But the fact that the prince had been caught so swiftly by southern disaffection put an end to his vice-regality over "treacherous" (119) Murrākushī. And the affair seems to have

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- (113) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. LXXI Lemaire to Pontchartrain, Algiers, 31/8/1696 p. 425
- (114) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. LXXIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 12/12/1696 pp. 436-7
- (115) S.P. 71 (3) f. 685 Memo. of consul Cole, Algiers, 15/9/1696 N.S.
- (116) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. LXXIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 12/12/1696 pp. 435-6
- (117) For example, the murder of imperial officials in Fes, noted both by Jean-Baptiste Estelle (S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. LXI Memo. completed in Sale, 29/9/1695 p. 355) and, with a different chronology, by al-Zayyānī ("Turjumān" p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation.)
- (118) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. LXXIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 12/12/1696 p. 436
- (119) Ismā'īl had a blanket opinion of Murrākushī and other southerners as traitors. In 1692, he explicitly confined negotiations with the French for the ransom of "Noorish" galley-slaves, to men born within towns of the "kingdom of Fes", and gave Murrākushī treachery as his reason for leaving unfortunate southern captives to their fate. (S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. III No. CLI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Marseille, 2/3/1692 p. 457)

spawned more serious disturbances further south. By the spring of 1697, it could be claimed that the entire "kingdom of Sus" was in a state of disturbance sufficiently severe to warrant the despatching thither of a force of "blacks" estimated at six thousand (120). They were to re-inforce the former "Chergi" army of Mas<sup>C</sup>ūd ibn al-Rāmī which had already been transferred southwards (121), presumably to the gross weakening of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's eastern flank.

The jihād necessarily lapsed into a state of comparative shadow, and could be said to lack "la chaleur qu'ons le comença" (122). But there was no question of the siege of Ceuta being abandoned. By this date it supported a localised armaments industry, under the surveillance of an Irish renegade (123) who seems identifiable with the John Carr whom Braithwaite met thirty years later, when he and his "Foundery" had been absorbed into the palace economy of Meknes (124). The siege also pinned down imperial troops. The Ceuta abīd were chiefly infantry, and therefore, presumably, low quality soldiery; but they were still maintained outside Ceuta in thousands, and were thought to outnumber the "Moors" of the besieging army (125).

During 1697, with forces split between Sus and jihād, Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl showed signs of approaching the exhaustion of his available manpower. Over the summer there were rumours that the petty siege of Melilla

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(120) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. LXXXIX Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 1/5/1697 p. 489

(121) ibid. loc. cit.

(122) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV. No. LXXXVIII Pierre Estelle to Pontchartrain, Tetuan, 29/4/1697 p. 477

(123) "Ockley" pp. 16-18 cf. S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV Memo. of J-B. Estelle No. LXVII, completed in Sale 2/4/ 1696 pp. 400 and 404

(124) Braithwaite pp. 180, 185-6 and 196

(125) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. CV Extracts from the printed "Nouvelles du Sièqe de Ceuta", based upon Dutch information issued in the Hague, and reproduced within the "Gazette de France". Information from the March and April of 1697 p. 540

had been abandoned (126). And in June, following the defeat of Mas<sup>C</sup>ūd ibn al-Rāmī in the Sus, the re-inforcements sent to him at first, under the command of Ahmad ibn Haddu al-<sup>C</sup>Attār, were estimated in hundreds rather than in the customary thousands (127). However, in the July of 1697, it was alleged that a member of sultan's governing clan within Fes, the Rūsī, had been appointed commander of a further army intended for the Sus (128). Significantly, this appointment co-incident with the first stages of a remarkable legal tussle between the makhzan and leading Fāsī <sup>C</sup>ulamā'.

In al-Zayyānī's chronicle material it was recorded that, during Dhū 'l-Hijja 1108, an Hegiran month crossing the May and June of 1697, there was sent to Fes an open imperial letter, addressed to the qādī and to the <sup>C</sup>ulamā', and censuring their refusal to accept the sultan's legal ownership ("tamlīk") of the <sup>C</sup>abīd listed within the dīwān, or military register (129). During the following months, in the year A.H. 1109, there followed a second communication, formally demanding recognition of the sultan's rights to the tamlīk of Fāsī harātīn (130)

(126) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XCIX Pierre Estelle to Pontchartrain Tetuan, 30/7/1697

(127) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XCIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale 18/6/1697 pp. 509 and 510

(128) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale 30/9/1697 pp. 527 and 529

(129) "Turjumān" p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 41

(130) "warada kitāb min <sup>C</sup>indahū <sup>C</sup>alā tamlīk harātīn fās. fa qurī'a <sup>C</sup>alā 'l-minbar"

("There came a letter from him concerning the ownership of Fāsī harātīn. It was read out from the pulpit") ("Turjumān" loc. cit.)

A clue to the dating of this communication may be found within a private letter concerning the harātīn, from whose date the year is missing, leaving only "the first day of Rabi<sup>C</sup>", which for 1697 would have corresponded with the 17th. September. ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 13 Isma'īl to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Qadir al-Fāsī



A storm of private correspondence seems to have been associated with these public communications. A portion of this correspondence, consisting of letters addressed to Muhammad ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī, survives in an accessible form (131). The afore-named recipient of these letters was an high civic dignitary. He lacked the precise status of an official functionary. But, as shaykh of the city zāwiya of the al-Fāsī, he represented the clerisy who were the moral leaders of the city. Further, he was son to the man who, in 1673, had led Ismā'īl by the hand to swear peace with Fes at the tomb of his brother al-Rashīd (132). He was thus an appropriate diplomat for negotiations between sultan and city. And he had the additional significance of being closely associated with the organisation of jihād service by representatives of the Fāsī civic militia (133).

The "al-Fāsī" correspondence of July 1697 indicates urgency: imperial letters ranging in tone from the defensive to the unctuous were being despatched at intervals of a few days (134). The letters themselves do not spell out the precise occasion for this urgency. Indeed, one particularly detailed and querulous letter would imply that the sultan was currently incurring unaccountable legal opposition to a fait accompli. It suggests that the sultan was requesting merely

(131) Five of the "Lettres Inédites...", those numbered 10, 11, 12, 13 and 25 (pp. 48-57 and 70-72) would seem clearly to pertain to the crisis of 1697. Of these, the letters numbered 10 and 13 contain passages of particularly detailed argument.

(132) See Chapter II Pp. 97-8

(133) A ragged section of one imperial letter to Muhammad ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī, associates the "shaykh" with "those five hundred musketeers who were at Tangier" ("tilka al-khamsumā'ia ramallati kanat bi-tanja", and with the forces currently outside Ceuta. ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 13 Date imperfect. p. 57)

(134) Thus, of the "Lettres Inédites...", No. 10 is dated from 25/ Dhū 'l-Hijja/1108 = 15/7/1697. Letter No. 11 dates from three days later, and letter No. 12 from three days later still ("Lettres Inédites..." pp. 50, 52 and 55)

a straightforward legal affirmation of his proprietorship of a slave force already in existence (135), and that in this matter, his concern was only for military discipline, as slaves had personal qualities of which the free soldier was devoid (136). The suggestion is too bland to explain controversy in 1697. For, as has been seen, efforts to obtain jurist signatures to the dīwān of the <sup>C</sup>abīd had been made as early as 1693 (137), and had then met with no known difficulty. Indeed the sultan insisted that Muḥammad ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Qādir himself had lent his legal skills to an appropriate definition of the status of the "wusfān al-qabā'il" (138), presumably the rural "slave" recruits

(135) "...iqtanaynā minhum jundān bi-mujarrad ijtima<sup>C</sup>ihim min wasat qabā'ilihim. wa idkhalihim jund al-jaysh.....iqtanā'ina li-hadhā 'l-jund min al-wusfān. wa qulnā lihim an antum qultum lā yasūqh shirā' hā'ulā'i al-wusfān"

("...from them we acquired an army simply by gathering them together from out of their tribes, and incorporating them into the regular army...We have acquired this army of slaves. But, upon this matter, we declare that you are saying that the purchase of these slaves was illegal") ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 10 Ismā<sup>C</sup>il to Muḥammad ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Fasi 25/Dhū 'l-Hijja/ 1108 = 15/7/1697 pp. 49 and 50)

(136) "wa 'l-wusfān min al-naida wa 'l-hazm wa 'l qābiliya wa 'l-sabr mā laysa fī qhayrihim min al-ahrār...wa hīna yajuddu tarakhiyan min hadhā 'l-dabt alladhī huwa <sup>C</sup>alayhi aw falta lā yahbusu <sup>C</sup>anhā shay'. wa yatruku mā dakhala fīhi min dīwān al-muslimin. wa yaqsidu qabilatahu"

("For in slaves there resides courage, determination, strength and endurance, which are not to be found externally among free men... When there is occasion for any slackening of the control laid upon (a free man), or any unexpected event, nothing prevents him from behaving thus: he forgets what he has taken from the treasury of the Muslims, and heads straight for his tribe" ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 10 Letter cited above p. 49)

(137) See present chapter Pp. 195-196

(138) "...wa qad tatabba<sup>C</sup>ta amx wusfān al-qabā'il kullihā aw jullihā hattā istahqaqtahum bi'l-mūjib al-shar<sup>C</sup>i alladhī lam yubqa li-qabā'il fīhi mā yaqūlu "

("For you yourself disposed of the affair of the slaves from all or most of the tribes, after such a fashion that they stood within the requirements of the law, which does not leave to the tribes what it is said to do in this case") ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 13 Date imperfect P. 56)

taken into the army over the years since al-Mashāri<sup>c</sup>. The correspondence of 1697 redounds with imperial castigation of contemporary scholars, "talabat al-waqt" (139), and implies a reversal of previously acquiescent attitudes.

This reversal seems explicable only as the outcome of a novel bid for the enlistment of slave troops from within Fas al-Bālī, a city previously exempt from such recruitment. The prospect of this recruitment could well have cast into a flurry of dismay the civic <sup>c</sup>ulamā<sup>t</sup> who had acquiesced, without blenching, in the practical crudities of impressment outside the city walls. A bid for Fāsī slave recruits was certainly made, and may be equated with al-Zayyānī's note upon the sultan's demand for proprietorship of the "harātīn fās". One letter from Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl to Muḥammad ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī specifically relates to "the quest for Fāsī harātīn" ("al-baḥth fī harātīn fās") (140). It states that responsibility for this quest had devolved upon <sup>c</sup>Abd Allāh al-Rūsī (141), father to the Rūsī general who in the July of 1697 had been set in command of a Sūsī expedition, and who may therefore be presumed to have been in urgent need of troops from that date onwards. Significantly, <sup>c</sup>Abd Allāh al-Rūsī was himself the co-author of a letter to the al-Fāsī shaykh which urged the shaykh to be amenable to the sultan's requests (142). Further memory of recruitment pressure put upon Fes is to be found within the

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(139) "Lettres Inédites..." For such castigation see, in particular, letter No. 11: Isma<sup>c</sup>īl to Muḥammad ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī, dated the 28/Dhū 'l-Hijja/1108 = 18/7/1697 pp. 50-52 passim.

(140) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 13 Isma<sup>c</sup>īl to Muḥammad ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī Date imperfect. p. 55

(141) ibid. loc. cit.

(142) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 25 <sup>c</sup>Abd Allāh al-Rūsī and Muḥammad ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Wahhab al-Wazīr to Muḥammad ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī, 9/Muḥarram/ 1109 = 28/7/1697 pp. 71-72

account of Ismā'īl's mass co-optation of slaves as given by Windus. He recorded that the Fāsī, although "in some better Condition than the rest of the Country" had, at the culmination of Ismā'īl's great "Search", been approached by the sultan's officials (143).

To hinge the entire legal furore of 1697 upon the narrow issue of a civic quest, is to pose a minor problem of chronology. The first letters of the relevant correspondence with Muhammad ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī date from the last month of 1108 A.H., rather than 1109 A.H., the year of the sultan's public claim to proprietorship of the harātīn fās. But it is possible that pragmatic attempts at impressment, together with a generalised "feeler" correspondence concerning the entire question of the "jund min al-wusfān", antedated the formal claim for civic conscripts. The first surviving letter of Ismā'īl's to the al-Fāsī shaykh Muhammad contains a pointed reference to the current inadequacy of the military support which the sultan was obtaining from Fes along traditional lines of recruitment (144).

The tussle of 1697 brought sultan and city to loggerheads. The more placatory passages within the letter to the al-Fāsī shaykh Muhammad in which Ismā'īl expatiated upon his demand for harātīn fās, suggest that the sultan was meeting with powerful civic opposition

(143) Windus pp. 214 and 215-216

(144) (With reference to the city of Fes)..."...hāluhā...min al-da<sup>C</sup>f  
kathīran hattā innāna aradnā an nakharruja minhā alfayna aw  
thalāthat ālaf (lacuna) lā yusā<sup>C</sup>dūna <sup>C</sup>alayhi wa yaz<sup>C</sup>umūna  
innahum lā yaqdurūna <sup>C</sup>alā 'l-wusūl li-hadhā 'l-<sup>C</sup>adad"

("Its condition...is frequently of such a debility that it gives us a refusal if we try to get two or three thousand men out of it (lacuna) they do not help in this matter, and they pretend that they are unable to reach this quota")

("Lettres Inédites..." No. 10, Ismā'īl to Muhammad ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī 25/Dhu 'l-Hijja/1108 = 15/7/1697 p. 48)

to this demand. The strength of this opposition is likely to have been based upon the difficulty of isolating and categorising "harātīn fās". The term "harātīn" (sg. hartānī) is highly ambiguous in its racial and social connotations. It can only be used with its full ramification of meaning within the context of oasean society, wherein it denotes the share-cropping serf-cultivators who characteristically form a sizeable, if depressed, sector of the population, and who are commonly dark-skinned (145). In the Fes of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's day, the term seems loosely to have covered Saharan immigrants. In this period, as in later centuries, Fes was broadly divided socially according to the criterion of complexion, and dominated by families of "hauts blancs". Del Puerto could maintain that the "Moros de Fez" were a "white" population who only admitted dark-skinned people into their society as a servant class (146). This was the potential source of civic dehiscence which the makhzan, in its demand for harātīn, attempted to exploit. It was insisted that Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's demands for recruitment were directed only at the city's "red-hided" oasean famine-migrants, lawless natural slaves, who were unfit to inhabit a sophisticated

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(145) For an amplified discussion of the connotations of the term hartānī/harātīn, see Appendix A Pp. 335-337

(146) "...es toda la gente muy blanca, y no admiten negros, sino es para criados." (Del Puerto Bk. V. Ch. XLII p. 615)

In amplification of this note there may be cited a nineteenth century Gobineau-esque sketch of the Fasī population spectrum: "Le noyau...consiste en Maures...On les remarque à la couleur claire de leur peau et à leurs beaux traits distingués: ce sont des marchands habiles, tranquilles et dignes dans leur conduite...les couches inférieures de la population, les ouvriers, les portefaix, les petits marchands, sont en grands partis des Nègres esclaves libérés, des métis de Nègres et d'Arabes..." O. Lenz: "Timbuktu" tr. Lehautcourt as "Timbouctou—Voyage au Maroc, au Sahara et au Soudan" (Paris, 1886 Vol. I p. 149)

urban environment (147). The combination of invective and flattery slurred over a dangerous demand. It may be supposed that the race-line was quite impossible to draw precisely, and that the threat of its imposition as a criterion for military impressment cast a broad shadow. Even though the sultan's own chancery-letter implied that persons of genealogical respectability would not be classed as slaves (148), it was made clear that the onus of proving genealogical immunity lay with the individual (149). Men of substance may well have been thereby threatened. For there were recognised

(147) "wa qad<sup>c</sup> alimta...mā taqaddama fī hadhā 'l-qharb min al-zayqh wa 'l-fitan wa mā hiya al-<sup>c</sup>ada fī 'l-nās min al-shuqhl wa 'l-iawalān fī 'l-aqtār. wa khusūsan fī hadhā ahmar al-jild. famahmā kānat majā<sup>c</sup>at aw masqāba....wa fās hiya madīna kabīra wa hādīra min al-hawādir. yahūzu al-nās<sup>c</sup> alā 'l-inhiyāz ilayhā 'l-tamaddun wa 'l-khayr wa 'l-sanā'i<sup>c</sup>. wa lā yukhlaqu min ahl hadhā 'l-jildat al-raqaba min tamaddun wa tanūsi."

("And you know...what has happened here in the west, how there is misdoing and disorderliness, and how here it is the custom for the populace to work and to roam throughout the provinces. And this is especially typical of these red-hided folk, whenever there is famine or hunger....And Fes is a great city and a metropolis. The disposition of its people is towards civilisation and excellence and skills. Civilisation and society are not perfumed by people from this slave race.") ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 13 Isma<sup>c</sup>il to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī. Date imperfect. p. 56)

(148) "wa lā ya<sup>c</sup>lamu bi 'l-far<sup>c</sup> alladhī huwa minhu innahu ishtamala<sup>c</sup> alayhi al-riqq"

("...And if he does not know the clan to which he belongs, then let him be taken into slavery") ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 13 as cited above loc. cit.)

(149) "yajibu al-baḥth wa 'l-taftīsh fī harātīn al-madīna min ajall hadhā ma<sup>c</sup> nā li ya<sup>c</sup> rifa kull wāhid ayna asluhu wa ayna 'l-far<sup>c</sup> alladhī huwa minhu"

("...It is necessary that there should be a quest and an investigation among the harātīn of the city, to establish, in the case of each and every one, his place of origin, and the clan to which he belongs.")

("Lettres Inédites..." No. 13 as cited above. loc. cit.)

oceanic immigrants in Fes who were not men of the "sweeper" class to which Leo had drawn attention (150). In 1682, Ismā'īl had been able to demand rents from Fīlālī residents of Fes whom he summarily ordered to leave the great city for the evacuated Jewish houses of old Meknes (151).

The sultan's argument on the harātīn fās, as expressed to shaykh Muhammad ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Qādir, was clinched by a superficially generous offer, tossed in the direction of the "white" burgesses: that a proportion of the city's militia of musketeers, the "rumāt fās", currently liable for jihād service outside Ceuta, should be replaced by "red-hides" who would be military wusfān in the eyes of the law (152). This was an adroit suggestion. Jihād service was more often irksome than glorious. Over the past fourteen years it had involved Fāsī contingents in cannon-dragging, coast-guarding and camping outside the Ceuta walls. And it was the responsibility of established family men, who were expected to supply their own rations and gunpowder (153). The provision of a substitute warrior was already the customary and lawful mode of evading such service (154).

(150) Thus, of the "Beni Gumi" whose home territory lay 150 miles to the south-east of "Segelmesse", it was noted that "gli habitatori sono poveri e fanno ogni vil mestiero in Fez", The inhabitants of "Segelmesse" itself were likewise a "...vil popolo: e quando vanno fuori, fanno tutto li vil mestieri" (Leo ed. Ramusio f. 74)

(151) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 349

(152) "... (lacuna) wa min hadhā na<sup>C</sup>tabiru mas'ala ahmar al-jild hadhā  
(lacuna) rumāt fās yaqdamūna fī salāhihim. wa nahnu nakhlafu  
lihi<sup>C</sup> adadahum min al-wusfān alladhīna hum jund, allāh subhānahu.

("...thus we have a solution to the problem of these "red-hides"...  
( ). The Fāsī musketeers should come forward as is appropriate, but we are setting up a substitute force of like number, from among the slaves who are part of the army, God be praised for it!")

("Lettres Inédites..." No. 13 Ismā'īl to Muhammad ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī  
Date imperfect. p. 57)

(153) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale  
19/7/1690 pp. 314-315

(154) ibid. loc. cit.

This offer of mass substitution, on the sultan's terms, could have been designed to expose the Fāsī "clergy" to pressure from the Fāsī "laity". For it was the "laity" who were bound to perform jihād-service. The rank and file of the clerisy, fūqahā', shurafā' and members of religious fraternities, were customarily exempt from the obligation (155).

The offer was not taken up. There were, of course, individual ʿulamā' willing to be accommodating. There survives a letter from one unknown ʿalīm to Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fāsī, urging complaisance, and insisting upon the security of the sultan's legal ground (156). But, as a body, the lawmen stood sufficiently firm to be castigated en masse, during the following Hegiran year (157). There is no evidence that Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir himself ever yielded to the sultan a truly conciliatory reply. His only known fatwā upon the question of impressment asserted that received opinion was unanimous as to the freedom of any man whose slave status could not be proven (158): a noble and accurate delineation of the relevant

(155) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 337

(156) Anonymous letter quoted in translation by Muhammad El-Fasi: "Biographie de Moulay Ismaʿīl" p. 16

(157) "wa fī ʿam 1110 jāʾa kitāb al-sultān li-fās. yamdāhu al-ʿamma wa yadhumu al-ʿulamā'"

("And in the year 1110 there came a communication to Fes from the sultan, praising the populace, but castigating the clerisy")

("Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 41

(158) "wa ammā man lam tathbut raqqiyatuhu li-ahad, falā kalām la-nā fihi idh lā khilāf fī mulkihi amr nafsihi. wa lā tasallata li-ahad ʿalayhi bi-bayʿ wa lā bi-qhayrihi. li-anna al-asl fī ʿl-nās huwa al-hurriya."

("As for any man for whom the status of a slave is not established, we cannot say otherwise than that there is unanimity concerning his ownership, as regards his own person. He may not be subordinated to any authority, by sale or by any other process. For the fundamental human condition is one of freedom.") Muhammad El-Fasi: "Biographie de Moulay Ismaʿīl" Appendix p. 29 cf. pp. 19-20 of the main French text.



tenet of Islamic fiqh (159), to be appreciated, in spite of its author's previous co-operation with the sultan's policy of slave conscription outside the walls of Fes. The qādī of Fes, Bardalla, a makhzan appointee with less of a facility for intransigence than the al-Fāsī shaykh, seems likely to have shifted his ground uneasily in reaction to the sultan's demands. A fatwā which he had sent to the sultan by the late July of 1697 was apparently acquiescent (160). But his temporary demotion during the following year (161) would suggest that, throughout the crisis as a whole, he proved himself less than fully co-operative. In the sultan's legal defence, Akansūs asserted that Ismā'īl had taken pains to obtain fatāwā that were favourable to the building up of his army, from the "Mashric" as well as the "Maqhrīb" (162). Such endeavour seems to under-write the weakness rather than the strength of the backing which the sultan could obtain from his own lawmen.

There is no evidence that these lawmen met with any "lay" pressure towards compliance. Windus, in his own quaintly Whiggish terms, summed up Fāsī resistance as defiantly communal, a defence

(159) For discussion of this question, see R. Brunschvig: article headed "Abd" in E.I. (2nd. Edn.) Vol. I. (1954) p. 26

(160) fa-lā budd min...tashīhikim li-mā tadammanathu 'l-ajwibat allatī waradāt min qabla 'l-qādī bardalla wa sahibihī idh lā yūmkunu al-i<sup>c</sup>timād 'alā mujarrad fatawāhumā dūna mutalā<sup>c</sup>atikim wa qubūlikim"

("For it is essential that....your corrected interpretation should for this reason go along with answers already received from the qādī Bardalla and his companion, as it is impossible to place confidence in the fatāwā of these two alone, without your pronouncement and assent.") ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 12 Ismā'īl to Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī, 2/Muharram/1109 = 21/7/1697 p. 53)

(161) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 41

(162) Akansūs quoted al-Nāsirī: "Kitāb al-Istiḡsā...", Casablanca text, Vol. VII p. 88 of Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 121

of "Liberties" much dearer than "Lives or Estates" (163). Less oratorically, Fāsī rejection of the sultan's demands may be interpreted as appreciation that these demands amounted to the "thin end of a wedge". The years 1693 and 1696 are known both to have been noted for heavy-handed impressment of slave troops. During the summer of 1697, when the threat of such impressment seems first to have been imposed upon Fes, the degree and complexity of the sultan's real and potential military involvement in "Cherg", Sus and jihād alike, would have made it clear that conscription along any established pattern would be an on-going process. To grant to the sultan the right to recruit inhabitants of Fes as members of a slave corps, rather than members of a free citizen militia, was a concession heavy with the capacity for escalation.

Moreover, the demand came at a point when there was a relatively low correlation between the demands of sultan and city. The sultan could insist that the military support he was demanding was the foundation of the khilāfa divinely laid upon him (164). He could complain that relations with Fes were not as they had been in the days of his brother al-Rashīd, and recall the relative strength of

(163) Windus p. 216

(164) "wa lā ya<sup>c</sup> zibu<sup>c</sup> an thāqib fahmikim mā aqāmanā 'llāh fīhi min hadhā 'l-mansib alladhī aqāmanā wa tawwaqanā min haml a<sup>c</sup> bā' hadhā 'l-khilāfa...nazarnā fī 'l-jund alladhī<sup>c</sup> alayhi madār asās . al-khilāfa"

("A man of your piercing intellect will not have forgotten what God determined for us in connection with this office to which he appointed us. He hung about our neck the task of bearing the burden of this regency...and we recognised, in the army, the foundation of the regency, to which it is the core.")

("Lettres Inédites No. 10 Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl to Muhammad ibn<sup>c</sup> Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī  
25/Dhū 'l-Hijja/1108 = 15/7/1697 p. 48

military aid granted by the city to that former sultan (165). In its political context this argument seems naive. As has been noted, al-Rashīd had been, in effect, the "sultan of Fes", keeping court within that city, moulding policies that were in accordance with Fāsī interests, and ploughing back into his capital a proportion of the profits of his inexorably successful warfare. In 1697, Ismā'īl, the "sultan of Meknes", confronted Fāsī civic leaders comparatively as a failure, and as a ruler whose policies cut across civic interests. The sultan's bid to maintain control of the turbulent Sus seems to have been associated with the threat that inhabitants of the city would be swallowed into military slavery. The once-successful prosecution of the jihād had, in the siege of Ceuta, come to be waged as an expensive and fruitless cannonade that made no more than banal ideological sense. And, most significantly for Fes, the sultan's eastward adventures had been unprofitable. They had failed to bring Tlemsen within the western orbit. In 1692 they had brought a Turkish army to within two days' journey of the city walls. And they had come to hamper the commerce of Fāsī merchants. The mid 1690s were a period of rolling agricultural glut for the "kingdom of Fes" (166). Yet, eastward tensions had

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(165) (With reference to Fāsī troops) .."...qasarū<sup>c</sup> an al-<sup>c</sup>adad al-ma<sup>c</sup>rūf lihim qablu fī ayyām akhīnā 'l-rashīd"

("They fall short of the number agreed earlier, in the days of our brother al-Rashīd") ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 10 Ismā'īl to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Qadir al-Fāsī 25/Dhu 'l-Hijja/ 1108 = 15/7/1697 p. 48)

(166) In a general account of Morocco, dating from 1698, Jean-Baptiste Estelle described the "kingdom of Fes" as the granary of Ismā'īl's entire empire, and noted that the previous four years had seen a particularly low price for grain: forty sous to the quintal. (S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dating from the October of 1698 p. 696)

brought Ismā'īl to veto the provisions trade with the Regency (167), probably the one trade in which the Maghrib al-Aqṣā had the edge over eastern neighbours (168).

It is improbable that relations between Ismā'īl and Fes ever fully mended after 1697. Such evidence as exists for the period following 1697 goes to suggest that the spasmodic cordiality discernable for the earlier part of Ismā'īl's reign, was at an end. Indeed, henceforward it is possible tentatively to trace a pattern of overall deterioration in relations between sultan and city, bound up with the sultan's successive demands for military and financial aid. The downward slide saw particularly acute crises in 1708, and again in 1718. It saw its logical culmination, after Ismā'īl's death, in the effective mid-eighteenth century shift of the major Alawī centre of government from Saīs to Marrakesh.

Yet in the summer of 1697, there could be a flicker of hope. Ismā'īl's eastward embarrassment diminished briefly. The previous four summers of "Chergi" ravaging by Maghribī troops had come to

(167) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed Sale, 30/9/1697 p. 530

(168) Lemprière, at the end of the eighteenth century, was to record the disadvantage to Maghribi traders upon the pilgrimage route that stemmed from "The manufactures indeed of both ALGIERS and TUNIS" being brought to a greater perfection than those of MOROCCO" (p. 346). It is unlikely that the gradient in quality was any different a century earlier. However the climate of northern Morocco gave it, in European eyes, a cornucopian capacity for agricultural production. It is known that the Regency was accustomed to purchase provisions from the west. Thus, in the August of 1706, there was an Algerine complaint against the French capture of a peaceful vessel sent from Algiers "vers les côtes du Chérif de Maroc, pour y acheter du blé" (Husayn Dey to Vauvrière tr. Pétis de la Croix and quoted E. Plantet: "Correspondance des Deys..." Vol. II p. 50)

provoke a diplomatic protest from Constantinople (169), one of the rare occasions upon which the Porte deigned to grant to the "sharīf of Fes" (170) diplomatic attention of its own initiation. On the feast day of <sup>o</sup>Arāfa 1108, which corresponded to the 29th. June 1697, a deputation presented Ismā<sup>o</sup>īl with a letter from the Ottoman sultan, adjuring him to make peace with the Algerine Turks. Ismā<sup>o</sup>īl appears to have complied with the behests of the embassy with an ingratiating haste. He loaded the chief envoy with gifts, and granted the party an escort overland back to Algiers (171). Open commercial relations with the Regency were re-established in September (172).

The "Chergi" peace set Ismā<sup>o</sup>īl free for a short time to concentrate upon the Sus, where his troops were opposing "Zacatin" whom the sultan had once called his "uncle" (173), but who was now a major dissident commander (174). Government forces had fallen back northwards, and were attempting to assert control over a prime Sūsī strategic point: the mountain gasba of Tamanart, set where the High Atlas ranges fall towards the coast, and said by

(169) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XCVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Tetuan 29/7/1697 pp. 513-14, 516-17 and 519 cf. "Nashr al-Mathani..." Fes lithograph of 1892 p. 160 (First notation)

The suggestion within the "Bustān al-Zarīf..." (MS p. 41) that there was a double protest, over the Hegirān years 1107 and 1108, is associated with the name of an anachronistic Ottoman sultan, and appears to be the result of textual confusion. On this point, the "Tur juman" (p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation) is equally to be discredited, as it attaches the name of yet another anachronistic Ottoman sultan to its dating of a single embassy to the year 1107 A.H. (12th. August 1695-30th. July 1696).

(170) See A. Cour: "L'établissement des dynasties..." p. 207, for an account of Ismā il's attempt, early in the eighteenth century, to ingratiate himself at the Porte, and of the Ottoman ruler's refusal to allow him the title of "sultan".

(171) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XCVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Tetuan 29/7/1697 p. 519

(172) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed Sale, 30/9/1697 p. 530

(173) See Chapter III P. 147

(174) Busnot pp. 80-81

Jean-Baptiste Estelle to dominate the main Miknāsī-Guinea routeway (175). Here, traders and governor alike were defying the sultan for the first time in eight years, in a stance which had warranted the withdrawal of John Carr, the master-bombardier, from outside Ceuta, and his posting to Tamanart (176). In the autumn of 1697, <sup>C</sup>Alawī princes, firstly Zaydān (177) and secondly Muḥammad al-<sup>C</sup>Alim (178) were despatched to the Sus. The latter prince would seem to have been the more successful general; He was credited, in addition, with having won the trust of customarily skittish southern peoples (179).

However, it was to be impossible to consolidate government of the Sus from Meknes before the "Cherg" was re-activated as a sphere of war. An highly placed but maverick prince, <sup>C</sup>Alī, third son to Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl and <sup>C</sup>Ayisha Mubārka (180), had gone over to Algiers during the summer of 1697. At the opening of 1698, he came back westwards to the Tilimsānī march, at the head of an Algerine raiding party (181). The intrusion betokened more than a family squabble. Relations between Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl and Fes were still tense, and the "Cherg" was the politically sensitive region which, within living memory, had launched al-Rashīd to power, and to the capture of Fes. Peace between the sultan and economic capital was therefore patched up.

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- (175) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. CI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 30/9/1697 p. 529
- (176) ibid. pp. 527 and 529
- (177) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. CIII J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain Sale, 23/10/1697 p. 535
- (178) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. CVIII J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain Sale, 23/11/1697 pp. 549 and 550
- (179) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 26/4/1698 p. 596
- (180) Braithwaite p. 20 cf. Anon: "Relation de ce qui c'est passé dans le Royaume du Maroc depuis 1727 jusqu'en 1737" (Paris, 1742) p. 222 Both sources describe <sup>C</sup>Alī as being full-brother to Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's successor Ahmad al-Dhahabī, known to have been full-brother to Zaydān.
- (181) S.I. 2<sup>o</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 26/4/1698 p. 598

Windus recorded that, in 1698, Isma<sup>c</sup>īl abandoned, for the time being, his efforts at obtaining slaves from Fes, "ordered" the citizens "to pay one hundred Quintals of Plate, and gave over his Search;" (182). The fine was accompanied by a gesture of displeasure: the demotion of the qādī and of the shuhūd, or official civic notaries (183). But the demotion of the qādī may only have been a token disgrace. Bardalla is known to have been back in office during the following decade (184)

Meanwhile, at the military level, the sultan initiated counter-moves against <sup>c</sup>Alī and his Regency troops. The swift intensity of the father's reaction contrasts remarkably with the inaction which, four years previously, had greeted Muḥammad al-<sup>c</sup>Alim's flight to the Fīlālī Ayt <sup>c</sup>Atṭā, and the indulgence with which Zaydān's Murrākushī plotting of 1696 had been met (185). Further troops were withdrawn from Ceuta, whose besieging force, by February 1698, is said to have stood at half the size of that of the previous spring (186). And successive contingents were drawn up from the Sus. At the end of January, Aḥmad ibn Ḥaddu al-<sup>c</sup>Atṭār came north (187). In February he was followed by Zaydān (188). And, lastly, Mas<sup>c</sup>ūd ibn al-Rāmī was brought back to his old "Chergi" posting (189). The departure of these three generals left Muḥammad al-<sup>c</sup>Alim as sole major custodian of the Sus, a natural successor to "Zacatin" who had been quietly

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(182) Windus p. 216

(183) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 41

(184) al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 163

(185) See the present chapter P. 209

(186) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLVIII Extract from the "Nouvelles du Siège de Ceuta", for the month of February 1698 (p. 717)  
The information is alleged to have been obtained from a "Moorish" captive.

(187) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 26/4/1698 p. 596

(188) ibid. p. 598

(189) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXX Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 5/5/1698 p. 611

eliminated (190). At a less rigorous moment it had been said that his father dared not leave this charming prince for more than two months together in the same region (191). Now, with no fellow-custodians to watch over him, he had been left in command of the empire's most potentially breakaway region. Fortunately, the sultan had set up a framework for a division of his own empire that would not be of his own making.

Northern affairs remained sufficiently complex for Muhammad to be left in Sūsī isolation. Campaigns of 1698 failed to eliminate <sup>C</sup>Alī from the "Cherg" (192). Meanwhile the jihād diversified. The siege of Ceuta was still maintained, muttering spasmodically, and showing a brief flare-up over the summer (193). But the vital area of confrontation between the sultan and Christendom shifted from land to sea, and from attack to defence. In the May of 1698, the French naval commander Coetlogon was sent out against the Sale corsair fleet (194). By this date, such a move was a declaration of political and economic war upon Ismā<sup>C</sup>il himself.

During the 1690s, the sultan's interests had come to overlay the corsair activities of his subjects. At Martil, the port of Tetuan, there was mounted in 1693 a project for constructing a fleet which might police the straits of Gibraltar, and raid the coasts of Spain (195). Three vessels were ultimately built (196). Sale also saw a

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(190) "Ockley" p. 55

(191) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CVIII J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain Sale, 23/11/1697 p. 550

(192) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV Dusault to Pontchartrain, Algiers, 21/3/1698 (Arch. Affaires Etrangères (3) ff. 379-80) noted p. 598 (Note 2) cf. No. CXX Memo. of J-B. Estelle Sale, 5/5/1698 p. 611

(193) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLVIII Extracts from the "Nouvelles du Siège de Ceuta" covering the period Feb.-Nov. 1698 pp. 717-721

(194) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXXII Instructions from Louis XIV to Coetlogon, Versailles, 28/5/1698 pp. 617-619

(195) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CLXXXI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Tetuan 17/2/1693 p. 559

(196) S.P. 71 (16) f. 93 Memo. of Mr. Corbière, 12/5/1713



period of ship-building by the sultan's order (197). As is well-known (198) Sale also saw the effective imperial monopolisation of corsair activity. In 1690, there had been six Saletin corsair vessels, of which two, said to be the worst-armed, had been the sultan's property (199). However, the seven Saletin vessels of 1698 were effectively Isma'īl's fleet; he was owner of all but one. The exception was the property of his admiral <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh ibn <sup>C</sup>Ayisha (200), who, as the empire's sole corsair of note had, during the 1690s emerged as one of its magnates (201).

But the sultan's personal interest in corsair activity did not mean that the sultan now considered the ports a strategic priority. In response to the demonstration of the French flag before Sale, he procrastinated. In the September of 1698, he allowed for the arrangement of an eight-month truce, by negotiation with d'Estrées, Coetlogon's successor in command, and sent ibn <sup>C</sup>Ayisha as ambassador to France. The backing-and-forth of the eventually fruitless negotiations at Versailles (202) suggest that the admiral was personally far more concerned than was his Meknes-based master for the elimination of the French naval threat, but that he dared not

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- (197) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. XXVII J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain  
Sale, 6/12/1693 pp. 233-4
- (198) See Brignon et. al: "Histoire du Maroc..." pp. 247-8, for speculation upon the depressant economic significance of this development for Saletin corsair activity.
- (199) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale, directed by way of Marseille, 19/7/1690 p. 318
- (200) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 pp. 705-6
- (201) "Ockley" p. 55
- (202) A summary and attempted analysis of these negotiations, stressing French redemptionist concerns, forms an introduction to the fifth volume of "Les Sources Inédites..." 2<sup>e</sup> Série, ed. Ph. de Cossé-Brissac (Paris, 1953) pp. 1-10. This volume is dominated by texts relating to the ibn <sup>C</sup>Ayisha embassy, an unwarrantably over-exposed episode whose consequences for the Maghrib al-Aqṣā were negative and peripheral. Its most interesting feature was ibn <sup>C</sup>Ayisha's seizing the opportunity for sounding out the possibilities of private and peaceful commercial adventuring with a French merchant house.

agree to the relatively bleak terms he was offered. These contained no suggestion that munitions, as well as "Moorish" captives might be bartered for French captives, along the pattern which would be entertained by the English and Dutch, who were not obliged to nod to the papal ban upon arms trading with the infidel (203). By holding out, in hope for the supply of French munitions, Ismā'īl was, in the long run, inviting French attack from the sea.

In the spring of 1699, Mas'ūd ibn al-Rāmī was able to penetrate "Oranie", and to persuade the insubordinate prince 'Alī first to parley, and then to return to his father in Meknes (204). Ismā'īl presumably feared any repetition of princely meddling in the "Cherg" as a stratagem for advancement, and took up the attitude that 'Alī's return had been made too much of a royal progress. 'Alī was threatened with execution, and given the exemplary, but very real physical punishment of a musket-shot drag at the mule-tail. Fines were imposed upon Mas'ūd ibn al-Rāmī, who might be thought to have served his master well, and upon those members of the al-Rūsī clan who had welcomed the prince as he passed through Fes (205).

The sultan's public torment of his own son opened what is likely to have been a period of unease in high circles: a period of "the pageant of the sultan malignant" in which show-piece executions became policy. Ismā'īl's régime was, of course, popularly famed

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(203) Busnot p. 8 cf. S.P. 71 (15) ff. 1-185 (first notation) passim., for documentation covering peace negotiations of 1700 and the aftermath, carried out by 'Alī ibn 'Abd Allāh of Tetuan, on behalf of Ismā'īl, with representatives of William III of Orange. These resulted, over four years, in the ransom of over two hundred English, Dutch and Huguenot captives.

(204) S.I. 2<sup>B</sup> France Vol. V No. XLV "Journal de Louis Bermond", "chancellor" to J-B. Estelle in Sale, Note for the 21/3/1699 p. 269

(205) ibid. p. 270

during his lifetime and later, for being that of a blood-boltered ogre (206). And indeed, his style of government was never devoid of casual killings (207), or of the liquidation of dangerous political figures, of which the elimination of the once-beloved "Za'atin" had provided a recent example. But the public execution of a notable, as an instrument of state, had been alien to Ismā'īl's rule for a period of twenty years preceding 1699. Its last known victim had been the wazīr al-Manzārī, whose execution had followed the sultan's disastrous 1679 winter passage of the High Atlas (208). The punishment of <sup>C</sup>Alī was politically rather than personally vindictive. The prince seems thereafter to have lived within Meknes in ease and favour (209). But his first fate marked the beginning of a series of carefully staged pieces of "frightfulness", and of selective victimisation, presumably designed to encourage an obedience upon which Ismā'īl no longer had the self-assurance to rely. Consequently, fear for life within high circles may be seen as one strand to the subsequent political history of Ismā'īl's empire.

In the June of 1699, <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh ibn <sup>C</sup>Ayisha returned to Sale, loud with complaints of French duplicity (210). The truce was

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(206) Thus an English consul in Algiers, presumably reflecting popular contemporary Algerine opinion, could say of Ismā'īl: "that Inhumane monster diverts himself after dinner by killing his people about him as Domitian did Flyes"(sic) (S.P. 71(3) Memo. of Baker, Algiers 7/1/1691-2 O.S. f. 455)

(207) The number of these was always prone to vertiginous exaggeration. In one area susceptible to investigation in detail, that relating to Christian captives, Koehler, after a close examination of the Miknāsī Christian burial register, noted that, in forty years, 109 captives were recorded as having met their deaths by the sultan's hand or order: a number of unfortunates that is minimal by comparison with easy customary relevant estimates in thousands. ("Quelques points d'histoire sur les captifs..")

(208) See Chapter III Pp. 120-121

(209) Windus p. 181

(210) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. V No. LI "Journal de Louis Bermond" Note for the 10/6/1699 p. 311

ended, and the sultan's Saletin fleet resumed full-scale depredations. Indeed it was expanded. By the end of the year, its numbers had increased from seven to ten (211). Care concerning the possibility of reprisal was tossed aside. In November 1699, a letter to Louis XIV ranted its assertion that bombardment from a French fleet was likely to fall only on open plain ("al-fasiḥ min al-ard") and palm-trees, and that it was therefore impossible to threaten the sultan as neighbouring Barbary powers could be threatened (212). From a ruler based at Meknes, this was hyperbola thrown out from a nub of hard strategic truth (213). But it invited attack from the sea, at a period when the military demands of Sus and "Cherg" were escalating yet again.

Within both regions, it was essentially rural resistance to <sup>C</sup>Alawī authority that was increasing. In the Sus, Muḥammad al-<sup>C</sup>Alim, still his father's vice-roy, was, by the opening of 1700, rumoured to have been driven back upon Tarudant by hordes of mountain "Chleuh" (214). By the following spring, there were similar rumours of massive disaffection within the eastern march, mounted by "Arabes"

(211) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. LXXX Description of Sale by the S<sup>r</sup>.  
de la Maisonfort, Rouen, 28/12/1699 p. 520

(212) "aw zannū an ya<sup>C</sup>malūnā nahnu ka-ahl tūnis wa tarābulus wa adālat  
al-jazā'ir. fa-nahnu wa 'l-ḥamd allāh mā<sup>C</sup>indanā shay' bi 'l-kūshṭa"

("Do they think that they can deal with us as with the people of Tunis and Tripoli, or with the garrison of Algiers? Praise be to God that there is nothing of importance to us along the coast.")

(S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. V. No. LXXII Ismā'īl to Louis XIV 12/Jumāda I/1111=  
5/11/1699 p. 460)

(213) It may be compared with the tale passed on by Burel, that Sayyidī Muḥammad III had once asked the French consul Salva for an estimate of the cost to Louis XV's government of an expedition aimed at the destruction of his coastal fortresses, and then mockingly offered to destroy them himself for half the price ("Mémoire Militaire..." pp. 66-7)

(214) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. VI Du Plessis-Moreau to Pontchartrain  
Paimboeuf, 25/1/1700 (p. 97). Reported information brought by way  
of a French vessel, out of Sale.

who had rallied to the token Turkish force of occupation currently based there (215). This disaffection seems to mark a second collapse of the "Oranie" taxation-frontier, as re-established in 1693. The collapse may be seen as a consequence of events of the previous three years: Ismā'īl's open capitulation to the Ottoman embassy of 1697, which had returned to Algiers by way of the "Cherg"; and the subsequent adventuring of <sup>c</sup>Alī within the region, which may have aroused disturbance that far outran his personal removal from the scene. In Sale, the deterioration of Ismā'īl's "Chergi" authority could be said to threaten the sultan's relations with an already bitterly malcontent Fes (216). And, over the following year, Ismā'īl would once again treat the "Cherg" as an area of increasingly vital military concern: a testing ground for the efficiency of his authority.

In the May of 1700, the sultan was said to have sent all his available cavalry into the "Cherg" (217), while <sup>c</sup>abīd infantry, under the black qā'id Malik, was despatched to Tangier, which had come under threat from a French squadron (218). At the beginning of July came a two-day bombardment of Tangier. This was Morocco's first recent experience of real, as distinct from looming aggression from the sea, and an example of the growing advance of Europe in the

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(215) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XCIII Manier de la Closerie to Pontchartrain, Sale, 25/5/1700 (p. 149) (The author was in name, if not title, the successor to Jean-Baptiste Estelle in Sale. He was a protege of <sup>c</sup>Abd Allāh ibn <sup>c</sup>Ayisha's French commercial partner.) cf. , for the relatively small scale of the Turkish force within the rural "Cherg", i.e. "fifty tents" consul Durand to Pontchartrain, Algiers, 20/8/1700, quoted in de Grammont: "Correspondance des consuls d'Alger" in "Revue Africaine" Vol. XXXI (Paris, 1887) pp. 437-8

(216) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XIII Manier de la Closerie to Pontchartrain, as above. loc. cit.

(217) ibid. loc. cit.

(218) ibid. loc. cit.  
cf. S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XVIII Manier de la Closerie to Pontchartrain, Sale, 4/8/1700 p. 197

tactical use of naval warfare. An eyewitness from a French vessel could describe the enemy, "nègres" and "Moraille", wading into the sea, evidently expecting a musket-exchange with a landing-party, but subjected instead to cannon-fire from the calm distance of a musket shot and an half (219). The alien fleet was still in adjacent waters at the end of July (220). But Ismā'īl's landward interests prevailed. He withdrew the force of abīd infantry from the coast, and there was concomitant news that horses were being levied from throughout the empire (221). This suggests that the sultan attempted hastily to issue his infantry with mounts, before sending them eastwards. The urgency implied by the use of ill-trained troops is likely to have resulted from opportunism. The main forces of the Regency were set to face the Tunisian march (222). This involvement of al-Ḥājj Mustāfa Dey at a far distance may be thought to have aroused in Ismā'īl hope for an untrammelled opportunity to refurbish his eastern frontier.

One rogue Alawī prince, Alī, had already disturbed his father's interests in the "Cherg". The opportunity would not be offered to another. Zaydān, so far from taking the eastern command, and leading a raid upon Mascara, as the indigenous tradition would suggest (223), was at this point denied the leadership of troops for the "Cherg" (224), who were left to the ultimate authority of Mas'ūd ibn al-Rāmī. In

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(219) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XVI Extract from the "Journal du Chevalier de Fabreques" on board the galley "Victoire", 4-5/7/1700 pp. 171-2

(220) ibid. for the 29/7/1700 p. 180

(221) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XVIII Manier de la Closerie to Pontchartrain, Sale, 4/8/1700 p. 197

(222) de Grammont: "Histoire d'Alger..." p. 270

(223) "Turjuman" pp. 25-6 of the text and 48 of the translation of "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 41-2

(224) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XVIII Manier de la Closerie to Pontchartrain, as above loc. cit.

the September of 1700, while on a minor tax-raid, this general was surprised and defeated by the Algerine battalion of the march. He was perhaps mindful of the fate of <sup>C</sup>Alī, the prince whom he had conducted back to Meknes the previous year, and also of the fine which he himself had recently paid: for he deserted immediately to the Algerines (225). Meanwhile the main forces of the Dey were still operating far to the east, pitted against a Tunisian invading army which they defeated, on the routeway from Constantine to Algiers, in early October (226). At this stage of events, Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl can be seen as drawn on by the bait of continuing opportunity, and driven on by the loss of his leading "Chergi" commander. To extricate himself from this quandary, the sultan made a move unparalleled since 1693. He left a junior son Ḥāfīz as vice-roy in Meknes (227), and went out into the "Cherg" to take command of his troops in person. He reached the march in mid-winter (228).

At first, Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's "Chergi" aims would appear to have been restricted, rural and strictly punitive: in sum, a forcible bid at maintaining his taxation frontier at its outermost limit. Tlemsen was ignored. The <sup>C</sup>Alawī mahalla skulked within the western reaches of the Regency, bedevilling the cold seed-time of agricultural hill-peoples (229). Its activities soon roused Algiers. In the January of

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(225) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XX Manier de la Closerie to Pontchartrain, Sale, 19/9/1700 pp 206-

(226) Pontchartrain to al-Hāji Mustafa Dey, Versailles, 24/11/1700, quoted in E. Plantet: "Correspondance des Deys..." Vol. II p. 9

(227) Del Puerto Bk. VI Ch. XL p. 804

(228) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XXVI Durand to Pontchartrain Algiers, 16/2/1701 p. 241

(229) ibid. loc. cit.

Consul Durand's February estimate of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's distance from Algiers as "trois grandes journées" could have been gleaned from over-alarmist city-gossip. It contains the repetitive Algerine number three, which had adorned the "Daftar al-Tashrifat" (See. P. ) Yet the rumour does indicate that Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl had ventured way beyond bounds acceptable to Algiers.

1701, the Algerine dīwān resolved that the Dey should carry out a spring campaign against Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl (230). This campaign was to be less deliberate and comprehensive than that of 1692. On this occasion there was no naval transport of the troops who were to combat the <sup>c</sup>Alawī menace ; the Algerine corsair fleet was sent eastwards to bring back Regency forces remaining in the Tunisian march (231). But in February an interim force was sent overland against Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl (232). And al-Ḥājj Mustāfa Dey moved westwards in the following April (233). With him were all three "Beys" of the Regency of Algiers. Yet the estimated size of his army, sixteen thousand, was compact by comparison with that of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl: its core was made up of six thousand Turks, of whom five thousand were infantry (234).

It was probably disparity in numbers which led Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl, at this point, into the greatest miscalculation of his military career. The sultan was generally reckoned to have agglomerated an army of cavalry that significantly outnumbered the Turkish force (235). Abandoning the caution of half a lifetime, Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl took this following out along the road to Algiers, to meet the advancing

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(230) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XXIII Durand to Pontchartrain, Algiers, 10/1/1701 pp. 221-2

(231) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XXVIII Durand to Pontchartrain, Algiers, 2/5/1701 p. 247

(232) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XXVI Durand to Pontchartrain, Algiers, 16/2/1701 p. 242

(233) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XXVII Durand to Pontchartrain, Algiers, 14/4/1701 p. 244

(234) ibid. loc. cit.

(235) Busnot (p. 85) gave a figure of 60,000. Contemporary report was rather more cautious. The "Gazette de France", presumably upon the advice of Durand, gave a figure of 50,000 (S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XXIX "Gazette..." extract for 21/5/1701 cf. No. XXVIII Durand to Pontchartrain, Algiers, 2/5/1701) Durand's figures are not impeccable. He gave a later round estimate of 40,000 (S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI p. 250 (Note 2) Durand to Pontchartrain 22/6/1701). The smaller the estimate the more likely. All the reports quoted were gleefully inimical towards Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl



Dey at Djidioua (236). There his army, ill-disciplined, ill-armed and ill-supplied (237) was cut to pieces in an afternoon (238) by the veteran Turkish infantry (239). Its survivors had to retreat through the march country of peoples whose coming harvest Ismā'il had spent the previous four months trying to ruin. The physical horror of this retreat stains even the muted record of the campaign allowed to survive within al-Zayyānī's texts; these elide the defeat, but note that numbers of Maghribī soldiers died of thirst on their return journey towards Saïs (240).

For Ismā'il himself, rumoured to have been wounded in the field (241), the episode was crucial, both as regards eastward ambition, and as regards the sultan's mode of government. After Djidioua, Ismā'il accepted a "Chergi" frontier at the river Tafna, and sent his east-bound troops no further than Snassen country. And he abandoned personal campaigning; there is no record of his ever having commanded an haraka after 1701. At its limits, Ismā'il's empire

- (236) Chronicle of Samuel ibn Sa'īl ibn Danān ed./tr. Vajda Text no. XXV from "Un recueil de textes..." in "Hespéris" Vol. XXXVI (Paris, 1949) p. 148 cf. S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XXIX Extract from the "Gazette de France", 21/5/1701. (p. 250)

The toponyms cited in both texts indicate a battle-site as noted above, along the Mascara-Algiers routeway, and near to the river Chélif. Busnot set the battle in the region of "Tremezen". This assorts ill with his own account of the over-extended supply-lines of Ismā'il's troops (pp. 85-6)

- (237) Busnot. loc. cit. cf. S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XVIII Manier de la Closerie to Pontchartrain, Sale, 4/8/1700 p. 197 This latter text reported poverty in arms and supplies among <sup>c</sup>Alawī troops in the "Cherg", for a date as early as the August before the battle.
- (238) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XXIX Extract from the "Gazette de France" 21/5/1701 loc. cit.
- (239) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI p. 250 (Note 2). Durand to Pontchartrain Algiers, 22/6/1701
- (240) "Turjumān" p. 26 of the text and 48 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS p. 42
- (241) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XXIX Extract from the "Gazette de France" 21/5/1701 loc. cit.

continued fiscally and politically dependent upon the haraka; at its heart, for the next quarter-century, there was a palace-ruler.

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CHAPTER VI: THE PALACE RULER

"Vivre dans une habitation fixe, c'est le plus grand des malheurs: c'est sur le dos des chevaux que se trouve la place du Sultan." (1)

The indigenous tradition of al-Zayyānī, broadly accepted by major secondary sources, would divide Ismā'īl's reign into two periods: an era of successful internal military effort, followed by an era of comparative ease and security (2). This viewpoint has spawned a complex of subsidiary problems: queries as to why Ismā'īl, the pacifier of his realms, was unable, during the latter phase of his reign, to establish an Alawī state more viable than the polity which dissolved at his death into an anarchy torn by his fratricidal sons (3).

There is indeed a case for seeing Ismā'īl's reign as divided into two. But Ismā'īl's last personal campaign, which culminated in the defeat at Djidioua, provides the most illuminating point of division. The milestone significance of this battle does not only rest in its transformation of the sultan into a palace ruler. By making defeat the pivot of Ismā'īl's reign, it lends to the latter half of that reign a perspective that is grim rather than triumphant. This perspective dissipates the need for speculation as to Ismā'īl's short-comings as a state-builder over the long term. During the latter

- (1) Translation of a commonplace quoted by the anonymous author of the "Hulal al-bahiya...", a late nineteenth century work, part translated by E. Coufourier as "Chronique de la vie de Moulay El-Hasan" in A.M. Vol. VIII (Paris, 1906) pp. 330-331
- (2) "Turjuman" p. 25 of the text and 46 of the translation cf. Terrasse Vol. II p. 260 and 263-4 cf. Ch.-A. Julien p. 229 cf. Brignon et. al. p. 244. Of the secondary authors, even Terrasse the most cautious, allows to Ismā'īl a latter day "vingtaine d'années de paix". (p. 264)
- (3) See, for example, Terrasse Vol. II pp. 277-8 cf. Brignon et. al. pp. 245-6

half of the reign, the warrior credibility of the ageing sultan's government may be seen as ever open to question. The interest of this period centres upon the tactics by which the palace ruler maintained his authority.

Understanding of this entire second half of Ismā'īl's reign is, as has been noted (4), bedevilled by the problem of meagre source material. Indigenous chronicle coverage of the period is thin, and there survives no contemporary alien commentary of the calibre that Germain MouÛtte and Jean-Baptiste Estelle provide for periods within the seventeenth century. It is therefore possible to give only a comparatively and increasingly brief resume of Ismā'īl's latter years.

These years began with a period during which Ismā'īl was subjected to internal military challenge. The battle of Djidioua, in April 1701, touched off a major escalation in Susi secession. Thereafter, the old tri-partite pattern of an imperial military concern divided between "Cherg", Sus and jihād, was superseded. The sultan's military investment in jihād and "Cherg" shrivelled away, and the politics of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā came to be dominated by the question as to whether the Sus would be maintained as part of Ismā'īl's empire.

In the early summer of 1701, the formal defection of the Sus began. Muḥammad al-<sup>C</sup>Alim declared himself independent of his newly defeated father (5). He thus became one of a series of <sup>C</sup>Alawī princes

(4) See Prologue Pp. 12-13 and 33

(5) Chronicle of Samuel ibn Sa'īl ibn Danān ed./tr. Vajda Text no. XXV from "Un recueil de textes..." in "Hespéris" Vol. XXXVI (Paris, 1949) p. 154 cf. S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XXXI J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain Paris, 29/6/1701 (pp. 254-5). The news Estelle had received, presumably by way of Sale and Marseille, did not include the name of Ismā'īl's secessionist son. Out of an high regard for Muḥammad al-<sup>C</sup>Alim, Estelle guessed the delinquent, wrongly, to be an half-brother Abū 'l-Nāsir.

of the period whose ambitions were grafted on to "Chleuh" secession. Like his cousin Ahmad ibn Muhriz before him, Muhammad was regarded in the Sus as an independent sultan. His declaration of independence was carried out with deliberation. The Rudānī bay'a in Ismā'īl's favour was annulled by a body of local fugahā' of Murrākushī education; Ismā'īl was informed of the development by letter; and the irate replies issued by the Miknāsī chancery were ceremonially burned in the middle of the Rudānī market place (6).

There was a particular religious bias to this secession which gave it the flavour of an internal Islamic jihād. Muhammad had smoothly carried over into the Sus the tactic of alliance with the clerisy which had previously marked his long vice-regality within Fes (7). In the Sus he was, once again, the prince who loved the schoolmen (8). Here was a deft transference of affection. For the Sus held schoolmen of an alien cast. It was a region from which Fes was regarded as so far slovenly in religious matters as to have all but one of its major mosques incorrectly orientated (9). Sūsī rejection of Sa'īsī domination could therefore be made in the name of true religion. Muhammad's Rudānī clerical supporters were said to have given "new birth to the sunna which had vanished from the capital city of Tarudant" (10). The theme of legitimation by piety was employed upon Muhammad's behalf even within his relations with aliens. Thus, an English Agadir merchant was sent to beg recognition

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(6) al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard pp. 159-160

(7) See Chapter III Pp. 138-139

(8) al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 159

(9) ibid. p. 138

(10) ibid. p. 159

For discussion of the literary tradition concerning relations between Muhammad al-'Alim and Sūsī scholars, see Lakhdar: "La vie littéraire..." (pp. 116-122)

of queen Anne for the government of: "the Indulgent Father, our Priest-like lord and Dove-like King, Prince of the Believers, Protector of Religion, our lord Mahamd", and adjured to tell England of his "truth and sincerity, his justice and piety, his Mercy and Clemency to Christian captives as well as to Mohametan beleivers" (11).

By the nineteenth century, tradition, as passed on by the "Chleuh" author Akansūs, was to see the entire episode of Muḥammad al-<sup>C</sup>Alim's secession as an expression of regional disaffection which the clerisy had dominated. Thus, Akansūs could say of Muḥammad's Sūsī following:

"I speak comprehensively of the region of the Sus, because his (Muḥammad's) activities were entirely confined to that region, and because most of those (Sūsī) who were qualified in knowledge and in piety were with him, as his ardent partisans." (12)

The regional aspect to the secession was evident to contemporaries. Thus, an European merchant reporter would allege that Muḥammad had been "crowned...by the free consent of all the adjacent Countreys" (13). The very declaration of independence would seem to have won Muḥammad local support sufficient to remove the pressure of the

(11) S.P. 71 (15) ff. 127 and 129 Translation of a letter to queen Anne from "Abdalah ben Abdelcader the Andalusian", dated Agadir, Safar 1115 = 16/6/1703-14/7/1703 A.D., and accompanied by diplomatic instructions for its courier, the merchant John Treville.

The letter's florid ascription of Muḥammad may be contrasted with his father's relatively curt diplomatic title: "amīr al-mu'minīn al-mujāhid fī sabīl rabb al-<sup>C</sup>alamin" ("Commander of the faithful and warrior upon the path of the master of earthly beings") See, for examples, S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. II Nos. XXVIII, LVI and LXV Isma<sup>C</sup>īl to Louis XIV Dates various. pp. 293, 406, and 434)

(12) "wa qaulunā <sup>C</sup>āmmat ahl al-quṭr al-sūs li-<sup>anna</sup> zuhūrahū al-tamm innamā kāna humālika wa li-an jull man yantasibu ilā 'l-<sup>C</sup>ilm wa 'l-salāh minhum kāna ma<sup>C</sup>ahu muwāfiqina lihi"

(Akansūs quoted al-Nāsirī: "Kitāb al-Istiḡṣā..." Casablanca text, Vol. VII p. 92 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 126)

(13) S.P. 71 (15) f. 159 Memo. of Bartholomew Vergell, London, 7/9/1706

"Chleuh" mountain men who had been milling around Tarudant for over a year (14). For, in the October of 1701, two European traders had to travel inland as far as Tata, past Tarudant and across the Anti-Atlas, in order to reach Muḥammad and his victorious mahalla (15).

In 1701, Ismāʿīl was in no position to counter his disloyal son. He was in financial straits. The Djidioua defeat had entailed losses in equipment and in "Chergui" revenue. And the defection of Muḥammad al-ʿAlim deprived the sultan of resources that came from or by way of the Sus. Busnot cited Muḥammad's retention of a northward-bound Sūsī gold caravan, as an early indication of the son's defiance of his father (16). Desperately, the sultan attempted to recoup his losses. Allegedly the ad hoc negotiations of the period threatened even the Fāsī millah with compulsory imperial purchase at a knock-down price; the demand was later waived in lieu of an extraordinary contribution from the Jewish community, to be given in money and in military equipment (17).

Politically, Ismāʿīl's priority was concentration upon preventing imperial authority from disintegrating at the empire's heart. There was an exemplary execution. ʿAbd al-Khāliq, the Rūsī governor of Fes, was put to death upon the delayed and feeble charge of his having killed one of the sultan's ʿabīd al-dār or palace guards; he was immediately replaced in office by his own brother, Ḥamdūn al-Rūsī (18).

(14) See Chapter V P. 231

(15) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XXXIII Pierre Bougard to the house of le Gendre, Agadir, 16/11/1701 pp. 260-261

(16) Busnot pp. 80-81

(17) Chronicle of Samuel ibn Saʿīl ibn Danān ed./tr. Váida Text no. XXV from "Un recueil de textes..." in "Hespéris" Vol. XXVI (Paris, 1949) pp. 153-155

(18) "Turjumān" pp. 26 of the text and 48-9 of the translation cf. "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Fes lithograph Vol. II p. 170 of the first notation.

The fruitlessness of intercession upon the unfortunate <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Khāliq's behalf by Fāsī civic religious leaders (19) makes it seem possible that one ground for the governor's selection as victim was a rapprochement between the Rūsī and Fas al-Bālī that might have given Fes another al-Duraydī (20): a localised military despot. The execution may be seen as an oblique shot, fired for the warning of city and governing clan alike. In 1701, Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl dared not flout Fes more directly. After the execution, Zaydān was sent to Fās al-Jadīd as vice-roy (21). The prince's inauguration was accompanied by an appeal to Muḥammad ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī for his mediation between the prince and officers of the civic militia (22). This appeal made no mention of the ḥarātīn fās, and gave the city the option of deciding the terms upon which its military service should be given: terms current in the days of one or the other of two conquerors, Aḥmad al-Dhahabī al-Manṣūr or al-Rashīd (23).

<sup>c</sup>Alī ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd Allāh of Tetuan, the gā'id now regarded as the most eminent of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's officers (24) was rumoured, in 1701, "to have set up for himself" (25). It is possible that his loyalty was retained through his extensive employment by the sultan in his old subsidiary role of diplomat. Henceforward this role would eclipse, although not eliminate the gā'id's role as mujāhid. Europe was

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(19) "Turjumān" p. 26 of the text and 48-9 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 42

(20) See Chapter I P. 54

(21) "Turjumān" p. 26 of the text and 49 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

(22) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 15 Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl to Muḥammad ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī Muharram 1113 = 8/6/1701-7/7/1701 pp. 58-9

(23) ibid. p. 59 cf. Introduction to the "Lettres Inédites..." p. 38

(24) "Ockley" p. 55

(25) S.P. 71(15) f. 119 Admiral G. Rooke to William III, Straits of Gibraltar 8/9/1701 N.S.



seething towards the war of the Spanish Succession. As a neighbour of the Peninsula, the qā'id of Tetuan was, like his master, aware of the possible adverse consequences for his own authority of a Bourbon union between France and Spain. In 1701, a naval peace with England, foreshadowed for a year, was finally patched up (26). Through <sup>C</sup>Alī ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh, Ismā'īl now proffered a Janus-face to Christendom. The now workaday siege of Ceuta (27) was conducted by the same qā'id who, in negotiations with the English, could make the offer of a naval base outside Tangier to a Christian power (28). In no external relations could Ismā'īl afford to be brazen. The year 1702 saw an embassy from Meknes to Algiers, designed to reassure al-Ḥājj Muṣṭafā Dey that no further distress would come to him from the west (29).

Miknāsī authority within the south of the empire continued to slide. The efforts of Ismā'īl's loyalist son Ḥafīz to counter Muḥammad al-<sup>C</sup>Alim in the western High Atlas were a total failure and entailed heavy military losses (30). And, probably during the latter months of 1702, a second loyalist son of Ismā'īl's, <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Malik, fled northwards to take sanctuary in Zerhoun. He had been ousted from his Dar<sup>C</sup> a vice-regality by Abū 'l-Nāṣir (31), a second dissident brother (32), and in consequence was clearly afraid for his life. Muḥammad al-<sup>C</sup>Alim grew bolder. Thus far he had limited his

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(26) S.P. 71 (15) ff. 73-97 passim

(27) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XXIV J-B. Brouillet and P. Gautier to Père Blandinières, Sale, 20/1/1701 p. 266  
Herein lies the allegation that the siege of Ceuta was currently being waged at no cost to the sultan.

(28) S. P. 71 (15) f. 125 Memo. of Admiral G. Rooke, Straits of Gibraltar, Date imperfect cf. S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XXXVIII J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain, Marseille, 3/2/1702 p. 280

(29) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI p. 250 (Note 2). Reference to Archives Nationales, Affaires Étrangères B<sup>1</sup> 118 f. 236 Author unknown.

(30) "Relation...de la Mercy" p. 688

(31) "Turjuman" p. 26 of the text and 49 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 42 The reference gives only the year 1114 A.H., but sets the incident anterior to events from the beginning of 1703.

(32) "Relation...de la Mercy" loc. cit.

ambitions to territories behind the High Atlas. Now he aped his Sūsī precursor Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz, in taking steps which, from his father's point of view, made his extirpation vital. He crossed the mountains and threatened lands within the Atlas arc. In the February of 1703, it was known in Sale that Muḥammad's troops were laying siege to both Marrakesh and Safi (33). At the beginning of March, the prince took Marrakesh (34), allegedly with the support of Hawz peoples (35). In Marrakesh, piety did not prevent brisk action: Muḥammad had the city governor and notables executed, and their houses razed to the ground (36).

At this point, Muḥammad had reached the cultural fault-line between "greater Gharb" and "greater Sus". He was countered by the old sultan's setting Zaydān against him (37), in a duel which meant, pragmatically, a defence of Zaydān's designation as heir. The duel and its consequences were to eliminate both princes as personal foci of political interest; after them, no other sons of Ismā'īl were fully to possess the political ascendancy achieved by either.

The priority was the recapture of Marrakesh and its Hawz into the political orbit of Sāfs. This was a project into which Ismā'īl

(33) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XL Fabron, French consular "chancellor" in Sale, to Pontchartrain, 22/2/1703 p. 288

(34) "Tur iuman" p. 26 of the text and 49 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 42 cf. "Relation...de la Mercy" p. 690

(35) Busnot p. 86

(36) "Tur iuman" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

(37) "Tur iuman" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.  
cf. S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XLI Périllie to Pontchartrain  
Sale, 26/4/1703 p. 290

invested an heavy and apparently escalating concentration of <sup>c</sup>abīd (38). Over the high summer of 1703, the struggle was indecisive. Marrakesh, deprived of its victuals by Muḥammad (39) opened its gates to Zaydān, only to suffer an hideous sack (40). This grim civic victory did not entail Muḥammad's immediate withdrawal from the "Hawz". He may already have been in contact with the Turks of the Regency (41); his subsequent rural defeat of Zaydān (42) co-incided with Turkish troop-movements in the region of Tlemsen (43). For a brief span, Ismā'īl's situation was sufficiently alarming for him to send to Sāfs for master-carpenters to mount the previously ornamental cannon of Meknes into firing position (44). But then the tide turned. Zaydān drove Muḥammad to retreat into inner Sus. Allegedly Muḥammad suffered heavy losses in the Glāwī pass (45). These may indicate a winter crossing rather than military harassment, as Muḥammad's withdrawal seems to have been made in good order. With him went a number of high-ranking prisoners, including two notable generals,

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(38) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XLIV Memo. of Périllie, Sale, 8/9/1703 p. 303 cf. al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 161

The latter author cited as his informant "Brahim bou <sup>c</sup>Abdelli", a petty chieftain from the inner High Atlas dīr, whose court connections by marriage with leading Udāya had forced him to flee Muḥammad's north-bound army, and who was subsequently used by Zaydān as a messenger to his mother <sup>c</sup>Ayisha Mubārka in Meknes.

(39) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XLII Père Blandinières to Pontchartrain Cadiz, 16/7/1703 p. 294

(40) ibid. loc. cit.  
cf. "Turjuman" p. 24 of the text and 49 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS. p. 42

(41) Ginoux, a French Agadir merchant was, for the following year, to refer to links between Muḥammad al-<sup>c</sup>Alim and the Algerines as already in existence. (S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. L. Ginoux to Pontchartrain Agadir, 20/1/1705 p. 324)

(42) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XLII Père Blandinières to Pontchartrain Cadiz, 16/7/1703 pp. 294-5

(43) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XLIV Memo. of Périllie, Sale, 8/9/1703 p. 303

(44) ibid. loc. cit.

(45) al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 161

<sup>c</sup>Alī Abū Shafra, commander of the Udāya of Fās al-Jadīd (46), and the black qā'id Malik (47). The qādī of Marrakesh was also of the company (48). <sup>c</sup>Alī Abū Shafra, who maintained a stealthy contact with the Udāya queen <sup>c</sup>Ayisha Mubārka, was later put to death by Muḥammad (49). The other captive magnates threw in their lot with the dissident. Muḥammad was able to re-establish political authority over inner Sus, but was unable to prevent Zaydān from penetrating the High Atlas in 1704 (50).

Effectively, Ismā'īl's southern frontier now corresponded once again to the delimitation he had accepted in 1677, when he had left the Sus and Dar<sup>c</sup>a to Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz. Thereafter, the sultan was willing to await events. In 1704, the astonished Busnot believed that Ismā'īl was pottering within the eye of a political typhoon:

"Nous avons même vû avec surprise dans le temps de la révolte de Mouley Mahamet, que tout étoit en trouble dans ses principaux Royaumes, qu'on se voyait à la veille d'un revolution générale, pendant que lui seul paroissoit comme un homme sans affaires, donnant Audience aux Etrangers, se plongeant dans les plaisirs de son Serail, employant le reste de son temps à presser les travaux de ses Esclaves, à donner le dessein de ses Batimens, et à en conduire lui même a l'execution, comme s'il avoit été quelque particulier qui n'eut eu autre chose a faire, que d'entrer dans le detail de son tranquille Domestique..." (51)

But the sultan now had some basis for domestic tranquillity. The theatre of conflict between his two most militarily significant sons had been removed to the Sus. The geographical distance of their

(46) Busnot pp. 87-8 and "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 29

(47) "Relation de la Mercy..." p. 691

(48) ibid. p. 692

(49) Busnot p. 90

(50) "Relation de la Mercy..." p. 691

(51) Busnot p. 46

war provided their father with an hiatus during which his authority could be re-affirmed within the Atlas arc. Fiscal and admonitory punishment could now be meted out to regions still within the sultan's political reach. Al-Zayyanī's chronicle material records that, in the aftermath of Muḥammad al-<sup>c</sup>Alim's retreat into inner Sus, demands for extraordinarily heavy fiscal contributions were made of the city of Fes. These demands were associated with the short vice-regality of the sultan's son Ḥāfiz, and with the months that immediately followed it (52). The demands were accompanied by the public execution of a number of Fāsī citizens, at the order of Ḥamdūn al-Rūsī (53) whose brother's fate seems to have assured his own loyalty to Meknes. By the standards of Fes, a city in which there was no living memory of brutality upon the scale of military sack, the vice-regality of Ḥāfiz was a reign of terror. Echoes of its stringency percolated through to Mercedarian fathers who never saw Fes (54). The period features prominently within the Fāsī Jewish chronicle of Samuel ibn Saʿl ibn Danān. His account naturally concentrates upon hardship as experienced inside the Fāsī millah. But he noted that numbers of Fāsī Muslims took an hasty refuge within the millah upon hearing of the accidental death of Ḥāfiz (55). This massed bolt for cover suggests that the much-squeezed Fāsī Muslims believed that the sultan would interpret the accident that had befallen his son while toying with a pistol, as vengeful design

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- (52) "Turjumān" pp. 25 of the text and 49-50 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 42 cf. Chronicle of Samuel ibn Saʿl ibn Danān ed./tr. Vajda Text.no. XXV from "Un recueil de textes..." in "Hespéris" Vol. XXXVI (Paris, 1949) pp. 153-160
- (53) "Turjumān" p. 25 of the text and 50 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.
- (54) "Relation...de la Mercy..." pp. 688-9
- (55) Chronicle of Samuel ibn Saʿl ibn Danān ed./tr. Vajda. Text cited above. pp. 156-7 It seems proper to discount the alternative and gaudy Mercedarian tale of the vice-roy's suicide. ("Relation...de la Mercy..." loc. cit.)

upon the part of the city. However, the vice-roy's death passed without notable repercussions.

By the following year, 1705, the sultan had developed a scheme for amassing revenue from Fes that was more sophisticated than brusque demand. He "moved into" Fāsī trade as previously he had "moved into" Saletin corsair activity (56). His method was the granting out of commercial monopolies to privileged Fāsī traders who may be assumed to have paid for their privilege. In 1705, a group of Fāsī merchants are known to have negotiated with the sultan the grant of an "estancar" or monopoly of the wax and leather trade which formed the staple of contemporary Moroccan commerce with Europe. The result was a sharp rise in the indigenous price of wax and leather products (57). Consequently the number of European merchants in Morocco dwindled, and their trade was re-routed into channels of indigenous commerce linked with Cadiz (58). Because it brought about an adverse change in the terms of trade encountered by European merchants, this monopoly of trade in goods destined for Europe is well known (59). But it is likely that maritime trade was merely a subsidiary aspect of the total Fāsī "estancar". At a later period, Windus noted that the great pilgrimage caravans were:

"....governed by a Person who farms most of the Wax of the Emperor, and for that reason is called the Stankero." (60)

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(56) See Chapter V Pp. 227-8

(57) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. LII Périllie to the Marseille merchant Boyer, Sale 21/12/1705 pp. 329-330

(58) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI pp. 332-3 Note (3) Memo. of consul Bonnal Sale, 1712 and letter from consul la Magdelaine to Pontchartrain Tetuan, 13/6/1713.

(59) For information upon this and other aspects of European trade with Morocco during the latter half of Ismā'il's reign, see S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI pp. 332-3 (Note (3)) and pp. 572-9, for the Euro-centric editorial essay "Etienne Pillet, l'Avanie de 1716 et la Suppression du Consulat de Salé".

(60) Windus p. 207

The "Stankero"'s business was said to be "very great" and to involve a clan of "Brothers" all working together in partnership (61). The clan is identifiable with the <sup>c</sup>Adayyil of Fes. An <sup>c</sup>Adayyil was wax-farmer in 1716 (62). And the <sup>c</sup>Adayyil are known to have been prominent in Fāsī trade and politics during much of the eighteenth century (63). They had close ties with the Fāsī millāh (64) as well as the pilgrimage (65). And they were "sultan's men": one member of the clan, al-Khayyāt <sup>c</sup>Adayyil, would be an early victim of the disturbances which followed Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's death (66).

Initiation of the "estancar" policy may be seen as an attempt to shore up the sultan's finances against the outcome of the Sūsī struggle between Muḥammad al-<sup>c</sup>Alim and Zaydān. In 1705, Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl won an extension of his political hiatus. Events turned in favour of Zaydān, who was as yet maintaining the formalities of filial piety. During the summer, he defeated Muḥammad in Haha, at the maritime fringe of the High Atlas (67), presumably while Muḥammad was attempting to defend his control of the northward gold-route. The battle took an heavy toll of Muḥammad's <sup>c</sup>ulamā' partisans (68). But Muḥammad himself was able to fall back upon Tarudant (69). Zaydān sent his father a large party of eminent

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(61) Windus p. 207

(62) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI : "Etienne Pillet, l'Avanie de 1716..." p. 575

(63) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 69, 70 and 74 cf.  
S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XCVII Coutille, Saletin merchant, to  
Achard, 24/7/1716 pp. 601-2

(64) Chronicle of Samuel ibn Sa'ūl ibn Danān ed./tr. Vaida Text no. XXV  
from "Un recueil de textes..." in "Hespéris" Vol. XXXVI (Paris, 1949)  
p. 157

(65) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 69

(66) "Turjumān" p. 34 of the text and 62 of the translation

(67) al-Zarhūnī of Iasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 162 cf.  
"Relation...de la Mercy..." p. 691

(68) al-Zarhūnī of Iasaft ed./tr. Justinard loc. cit.

(69) Busnot p. 89

prisoners, including the qā'id Malik and the former qādī of Marrakesh (70). These provided Ismā'īl with the opportunity for a wallow in public execution and mutilation (71) that provided a macabre advertisement for his authority. At the same time, the sultan seems to have been refurbishing the military prop to that authority. In the May of 1706 a new demand was made of Fes: that each of its households should provide the sultan with a saddle (72). The demand suggests that the sultan was attempting to mount a new force of cavalry.

Later in the May of 1706, Tarudant fell to the besieging Zaydan. Its populace was butchered (73). Muḥammad al-<sup>c</sup>Alim was captured and despatched to Meknes as a prisoner. He provided the victim within a pageant that was, theatrically speaking, the acme of his father's policy of showpiece brutality. In a grisly ceremony outside Meknes, the prince's left foot and right hand were lopped off; a fortnight later, he died of his wounds (74). This execution was perhaps the most widely publicised event of Ismā'īl's reign, and brought the sultan and his martyred son into curious eddies of notoriety that rippled into eighteenth century French romance (75) and twentieth century "Qiblan" folklore (76) alike. Even hardened contemporaries seem openly to have regarded the execution as distasteful. Fāsī <sup>c</sup>ulamā', led by the qādī Bardalla, officiated at Muḥammad's

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- (70) Busnot p. 91 cf. "Relation...de la Mercy..." pp. 691-2
- (71) Busnot pp. 91-96 cf. "Relation...de la Mercy..." loc. cit.
- (72) "Turjumān" pp. 26-7 of the text and 50 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 42
- (73) S.P. 71(15) f. 159 Memo. of Bartholomew Vergell, Agadir merchant who had fled from Zaydan's army, London 7/9/1706 cf. "Turjumān" p. 27 of the text and 50 of the translation cf. "Relation...de la Mercy..." p. 693
- (74) S.P. 71(15) f. 165 Memo of Bartholomew Vergell, London, 7/9/1706 cf. "Turjumān" loc. cit. cf. "Relation...de la Mercy..." p. 694
- (75) Seran de la Tour: "Histoire de Mouley Mahamet, fils de Mouley Ismael, roy de Maroc", Geneva, 1749
- (76) P. Marty: "L'Emirat des Trarzas" in "Revue du Monde Musulmane" Vol. XXXVI, (Paris, 1917-18) p. 71



funeral and, in mourning, suspended classes at the Qarawiyyin university for one day (77). Admittedly these tokens of respect provided an opportunity for expressing generalised Fāsī resentment against the sultan with some degree of impunity. But they were nevertheless an appropriate tribute to the fallen "schoolmen's prince".

Meanwhile, Zaydān the victor remained within the southern empire he had won. He made no formal renunciation of obedience to his father. But he seems to have kept the revenues of inner Sus to himself (78). He arranged for the repopulation of Tarudant, and of the trading post of Agadir, whose people had scattered at his first approach (79). Resolutely he refused to send back to his father the troops demanded of him in a series of letters which proclaimed the urgent military needs of the north and the jihād (80).

A strange episode occurred over the winter of 1706-7. According to information reaching Cadiz, Ismā'īl remained immured within his palace for a period of nearly two months (81). His non-appearance gave rise to widespread disorder and dismay (82), that was not dispelled by <sup>c</sup>Ayisha Mubārka's public reassurances that the sultan lived (83). It is possible that the sultan was merely suffering from

- (77) Al-Zarkūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 163 cf. Akansūs quoted al-Nāsirī: "Kitāb al-Istiḡṣā..." Casablanca text, Vol. VII pp. 91-2 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX pp. 125-6
- (78) S.I. 2<sup>B</sup> France Vol. VI No. LXVIII Père Busnot to Pontchartrain Cadiz, 15/4/1708 p. 401  
cf. "Relation...de la Mercy..." p. 696
- (79) Busnot pp. 113 and 119 cf. "Relation...de la Mercy..." pp. 696-7 cf. S.P. 71 (15) ff. 159-160 Memo. of Bartholomew Vergell, London, 7/9/1706
- (80) Busnot p. 115
- (81) S.I. 2<sup>B</sup> France Vol. VI No. LIX Père Forton to Pontchartrain, Cadiz 30/1/1707 (p. 368) cf. No. LX Père Forton to Pontchartrain, Cadiz, 27/2/1707 (pp. 369-70) cf. No. LXII Père Busnot to Pontchartrain Cadiz, 3/4/1707 (p. 378)
- (82) S.I. 2<sup>B</sup> France Vol. VI No. LXII Père Busnot to Pontchartrain Cadiz, 3/4/1707 loc. cit.
- (83) S.I. 2<sup>B</sup> France Vol. VI No. LX Père Forton to Pontchartrain, Cadiz, 27/2/1707 pp. 369-70.

a serious illness. But, by the April of 1707, when Ismā'īl was once again to be seen in public in Meknes, it could be widely believed that his disappearance from his subjects' view had been a piece of trickery: a gambit designed to beguile Zaydān into believing his father dead, and consequently, into bringing his troops northwards, to make a bid for power within open country (84). However, Zaydān was not to be lured away from Tarudant and his de facto Sūsī independence.

Yet Zaydān did not succeed in taking the Dar<sup>C</sup>a. This was a region which had fallen away from Miknāsī control in 1702 (85). Abū 'l-Nāṣir the dissident prince who had then become suzerain of the Dar<sup>C</sup>a, had subsequently allied with Muḥammad al-<sup>C</sup>Alim (86). After Muḥammad's defeat, Abū 'l-Nāṣir fled southwards from the Dar<sup>C</sup>a, allegedly towards the "Soudan" (87). The political vacuum he left was filled by the old sultan his father. An incident from 1707 is evidence for a renewal along the Dar<sup>C</sup>a of the long reach of Meknes. In that year Mawlāy Aḥmad ibn Nāṣir, shaykh of the Nāṣiriya zāwiya of Tamgrout, and the paramount Dar<sup>C</sup>ī religious leader, was planning his third pilgrimage along the southern, oasean route. From the remote distance of his zāwiya he acceded to Miknāsī demands first that he should come to Meknes to take leave of the sultan, and then that he should postpone his projected journey altogether (88).

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(84) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. LXIII Père Forton to Pontchartrain  
Cadiz, 8/5/1707 p. 381

(85) See present chapter P. 244

(86) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. L. Ginoux, Agadir merchant, to  
Pontchartrain 20/1/1705 p. 323

(87) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. LXV Père Busnot to Pontchartrain,  
Cadiz, 29/10/1707 p. 388

(88) A. Berbrugger: "Voyage de Moula Ahmad, depuis la Zaouïa en Nas'rīa jusqu'a Tripoli et retour", being translated sections of a rihla modelled upon that of al-<sup>C</sup>Ayyāshī, and contained in "Voyages dans le Sud de l'Algérie et des Etats barbaresques de l'Ouest et de l'Est" reproduced in "Exploration scientifique de l'Algérie" Vol. IX (Paris, 1856) pp. 168-9

According to Lemprière, it was necessary for magnates and court officials to obtain the sultan's express permission to go on pilgrimage. (pp. 344-5)

In the early autumn of 1707, Zaydān died in Tarudant. Indigenous and European reports pass on a variety of predictable allegations as to foul play (89). At the sultan's order, the prince's body was brought back northwards through the Tadla for burial within Meknes. It was escorted by a funeral cortège of several thousand men (90). These possibly represented a proportion of the troops who had gone south with Zaydān in 1703, and who were now, at last, returning to the sultan's command. Effectively Zaydān had two successors: one to the status of heir-presumptive, the other to his southern pre-eminence. A full-brother Aḥmad, somewhat pretentiously surnamed al-Dhahabī, in deference to the great Aḥmad al-Mansūr (91), succeeded Zaydān immediately as recognised heir (92). This Aḥmad al-Dhahabī was decidedly undistinguished personally (93). Thus far he had been remarkable only for the fomentation of violent scuffles around the palace (94). The ease of his advancement underwrites the primacy which, in the sultan's view, invested the sons of <sup>C</sup>Ayisha Mubārka. However, Isma<sup>C</sup>īl did not take the risk of fostering Aḥmad militarily

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- (89) According to contemporary rumour reaching Cadiz in the October of 1707, the prince had been poisoned. Inside three months, it was to be regarded as certain that he had been murdered by his wives. (S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI Nos. LXV and LXVII Letters from Père Busnot to Pontchartrain, Cadiz, 29/10/1707 and 15/1/1708 pp. 388 and 396)  
 Al-Zayyānī alleged that the prince had been murdered by "al-kātib al-wazīr" by whom he may have meant to indicate the man of letters Ḥammū al-Wazīr al-Ghassanī ("Turjuman" p. 27 of the text and 50 of the translation and Chapter V P. 186 (Note (4)))
- (90) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. LXV Père Busnot to Pontchartrain, Cadiz 29/10/1707 p. 389
- (91) "Al-Dhahabī" was the contemporary sobriquet of al-Mansūr al-Sa<sup>C</sup>dī. ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 15 Isma<sup>C</sup>īl to Muhammad ibn<sup>C</sup> Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsī Muḥarram 1113 = 8/6/1701 - 7/7/1701 p. 59)
- (92) Del Puerto in his "Mission Historial...", published in 1708, noted "Muley Hamete Hebi" as Isma<sup>C</sup>īl's most prominent son (Bk. 1 Ch. 10 p. 41).
- (93) Braithwaite pp. 1-2
- (94) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. XVIII Manier de la Closerie to Pontchartrain, Sale, 4/8/1700 p. 197 cf. Busnot pp. 120-121

as Zaydān had been fostered. The new heir was sent to govern the Tadla, and there act as warden of the route from Saïs to Marrakesh (95). He constructed a major fort within the region (96). There, as a political maroon, he would seem to have stayed for much of the remainder of his father's reign. His Tadla base was near to the site of ruined Dilā'. However, the region seems not to have been re-fused politically by the proximity of an important <sup>C</sup>Alawī prince. Zaydān's successor as vice-roy of the Sus was of greater immediate political significance than his successor as heir. This southern inheritor was the former Dar<sup>C</sup>ī rebel prince, Abū 'l-Nāṣir, who chose this point to slide back from exile into a grateful father's good graces (97). His subsequent four years of filial obedience slurred over Ismā'īl's fundamentally endemic Sūṣī problem.

Quiescence in the Sus did not entail any renewal of Ismā'īl's "Chergi" ambitions. In 1707, following a period of crisis on the Tunisian march (98), the see-saw of Algerine military interest had tipped once again to the west. Since the June of 1707, a Turkish force had been laying siege to Spanish Oran (99). Long ago, in 1693, Ismā'īl himself had cast a token shot at this presidio (100). However, in 1707, he was reduced to extracting from the conflict around Oran the opportunity for making an eirenic and pan-Islamic gesture: he

- (95) "Turjumān" p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 41
- (96) "Turjumān" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.
- (97) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. LXVII Père Busnot to Pontchartrain Cadiz, 15/1/1708 pp. 395-6
- (98) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. LI Pontchartrain to Ginoux, Versailles 25/3/1705 p. 327 cf. E. Plantet: "Correspondance des Deys..." Vol. II p. 33 Louis XIV to al-Hājj Mustafā Dey, Fontainebleau, 17/10/1705
- (99) Galindo y de Vera p. 294
- (100) ibid. p. 284

sent the Turkish mujaḥidūn two hundred quintals of gunpowder (101).

Oran fell to the Turks in the January of 1708 (102) Its surrender provoked an oblique demonstration of the degree to which Ismā'īl's own waging of the jihād had become hollow. The sultan subjected his own mujaḥid captain <sup>c</sup>Alī ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd Allāh to a token deposition (103) for having in thirteen years failed to take Ceuta. This was merely a temporary imperial tantrum, directed against an indispensable lieutenant. By the April of 1708, the qa'id was back in office, and in possession of the "estancar" of Titwānī trade with Europe in wax and leather (104). The mujaḥid was thus rewarded for his loyalty to Ismā'īl through difficult years. In relation to Christendom, he was now a local tycoon as well as a diplomat. Certain conventions were maintained. The qa'id continued officially to reside in the "camp before Ceuta". There he received alien envoys, including the Christian merchants with whom he traded (105). His blockade of the presidio was generally regarded as a façade for his flourishing personal interests (106). However, it was punctuated by a regular Friday cannonade, for which stones were the customary and effective ammunition, and for which the gunpowder was provided by the Titwānī Jewish community (107), itself closely enmeshed in commercial links

- (101) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. LXVIII Père Busnot to Pontchartrain  
Cadiz, 15/4/1708 p. 402
- (102) Galindo y de Vera p. 295 cf. "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Fes lithograph  
p. 107 of the second notation
- (103) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. LXVIII Père Busnot to Pontchartrain  
Cadiz, 15/4/1708 p. 403
- (104) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI p. 332 (Note 1) Etienne Pillet to  
Père Nolasque Néant, Sale, 4/4/1708
- (105) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. LXXXIV Bonnal to the Deputés de  
Commerce de Marseille, Tetuan, 1/3/1712 p.490
- (106) Busnot, in an eyewitness account of Ceuta, noted that: "Quoique le  
camp des Maures ne soit qu'a une portée de Fusil de la Place, on  
peut dire qu'elle n'est proprement que bloquée...et que l'Alcayd  
Ali qui les commande est bien aisé d'avoir un prétexte pour  
demeurer sur les Côtes, et se tenir une porte ouverte aux  
Negotiations qu'il entretient avec les Étrangers," (p. 229)
- (107) Busnot pp. 229 and 230

with southern Spain. During the remainder of Ismā'īl's reign there was to be only one flare to disturb this ritualised confrontation; and this clash would be of Spanish, not "Moorish" initiation.

By 1708, Ismā'īl felt sufficiently secure of his authority within Sals to re-open an old quarrel with Fes. Rumour of the associated furor reached ransom missionaries waiting in Sale for permission to approach Meknes. According to the Mercedarian version, it was heard:

"...que le roy de Maroc avoit ôté à la ville de Fes les privileges dont elle jouissoit de tout tems et la réduisoit par là sur la même pied des autres villes. Ces privileges consistoient en partie en ce que les habitans jouissoient d'une espèce de liberté qui empechoit ce Prince de les traiter comme des esclaves..." (108)

and that, in consequence, a deputation of Fāsī "talbes" had gone to Meknes, and had openly upbraided the sultan for his failure to behave as a true "Mussulmin" (109). Busnot's version of the tale concentrated upon successive imperial demands for financial contributions (110). At the nub of the controversy, faintly comprehended within the Mercedarian reference to "esclaves", there lay a renewal of the sultan's insistence upon Fāsī jurist signatures to his military dīwān or register, the daftar al-<sup>c</sup>abīd al-mamlūkīna (111); this carried, as a pragmatic corollary, acceptance of the imperial right to recruit slave-soldiers from the city of Fes itself. In contrast with the demand of 1697, which seems to have erupted from Sūsī military turmoil (112), the timing of this second crisis over the dīwān seems not to correspond with any situation in which the sultan was in dire need of troops. However, it

(108) "Relation...de la Mercy..." p. 714

(109) ibid. pp. 714-15

(110) Busnot pp. 130-131

(111) "Turjuman" p. 27 of the text and 50 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43 cf. Windus p. 217

(112) See Chapter V P. 211

may have been tacitly understood that, once the dīwān had been legally acknowledged, potential slave recruits would be allowed to purchase the right to be left alone. The dispute with the jurists may thus be seen partly in Busnot's terms, as a dispute involving matters fiscal as well as military.

Upon this occasion the sultan was firm. Al-Zayyānī's chronicle material records that non-jurors among the lawmen were arrested, and that one particular family of civic notables, the Awlād Jissūs, was singled out for exemplary persecution (113). This was persecution only by the standards of Fes and restrained by comparison with other episodes from the sultan's previous decade of showpiece brutality: the family was robbed of its possessions, and one of its leading members, a jurist identified by al-Nāṣirī with Abū Muḥammad <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Salām Jissūs (114) who had two years previously been a prominent mourner at Muḥammad al-<sup>C</sup>Alim's funeral (115), was put to public shame in the Miknāsī market place. This fate was sufficient to secure his compliance with the sultan's demands. He was sent back to Fes, personally to arrange for the rounding up of harātīn fās and their despatching to Meknes (116). It seems likely

(113) "Turjumān" p. 27 of the text and 51 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43

(114) Al-Nāṣirī: "Kitāb al-Istiḡsā..." Casablanca text Vol. VII p. 94 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 128

(115) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 163

(116) "wa wajjahahu li-fās li-yuz<sup>C</sup>ija al-harātīn li-miknāsa. fa-qadama wa az<sup>C</sup>ajahum fī rabī<sup>C</sup> al-awwal<sup>C</sup> am 1120"

("And he sent him to Fes to round up the harātīn for Meknes. He came and rounded them up in Rabī<sup>C</sup> I, 1120 (= 21/5/1708-19/6/1708)

("Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43) On this point the text of the "Turjumān" (p. 27 and 51 of the French translation) is confused and seems to have been mistranslated by Houdas.

that it was only within later, clerical tradition that this Jissūs faqīh was transmuted into a martyr to the shir<sup>c</sup>a, by the allegation that he was subsequently murdered by the Rūsī governor of Fes (117). The rival dynastic tradition that he was murdered by the Fāsī populace (118) seems more credible. For the faqīh's ultimate complicity with the sultan would seem equivalent to the setting up of a Fāsī dīwān al-harātīn. This dīwān is known to have existed subsequently, presumably as a register of real or potential civic recruits. A casual reference to this dīwān for the year 1732 (119), makes it clear that its management was a lucrative post.

So Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl won in his tussle with Fes over the matter of the dīwān. His victory can be seen as ultimately Pyrrhic. For it seems to have led to an overall debilitation in Fāsī civic life. From this, Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's own revenues were bound ultimately to suffer. Indigenous and European comment upon the period 1708-9 refers to the emigration into the Algerine Regency of a number of Fāsī citizens (121). There were attempts to prevent this eastward drift. But, as Windus was to note, the ravelling of trade with piety in the Fāsī pilgrimage caravan made a veto upon eastward migration "pretty difficult" (122). Upon at least one occasion, the caravan route was diverted. In 1710

- (117) Al-Nāṣirī, basing his information upon the report of a local Saletin shaykh, Abū Abd Allāh Maḥbūba al-Slāwī ("Kitāb al-Istiqṣā..." Casablanca text Vol. VII pp. 94-5 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX pp. 129-30)
- (118) Akansūs, who claimed to have obtained his information from the sultan Sulaymān; quoted by al-Nāṣirī: ("Kitāb al-Istiqṣā..." Casablanca text Vol. VII p. 95 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 131)
- (119) "Turjūmān" p. 38 of the text and 71 of the translation
- (120) "Turjūmān" p. 28 of the text and 51 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43 cf. Busnot p. 130 cf. "Relation...de la Mercy..." p. 715
- (121) "Turjūmān" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.
- (122) Windus p. 209



the al-Nāṣirī shaykh of Tamgrout, who had at last been permitted to proceed to the holy places, returned homewards by the southern route. On the way, he met the out-going Fāsī caravan at Ain Madi, travelling together with pilgrims from Tafilelt (123). It may be presumed that would-be pilgrims from the "kingdom of Fes" had been ordered to take the desert route that provided an arduous proof of genuine zeal, and was less convenient as a cover for straightforward emigration. Subsequently the Fāsī caravans returned to the aorta leading from Fes to Tlemsen, which was in customary use during the years preceding Windus's record of 1721 (124). Despite their being governed by loyal <sup>Q</sup>Adayyil, these caravans were the object of intense government suspicion, and of official interference that amounted to the application of a partial tourniquet. From the standpoint of 1721, Windus noted, with reference to the traders' "holy pretence of Pilgrimage" that:

"Some Years ago there was an Order to open all the Loads that passed, under the Pretence of searching for Jewels, which made those concerned in the Trade engage to deliver all their Jewels, and pay ten Ducats per Load, to save their being searched; but there did not go the fourth part of what were used to go before." (125)

Over several years, Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's authority was able to survive in juxtaposition with a maimed Fes, and the disaffection of those Fāsī who were not bound up with the "estancar". Indeed, given the violence of the times, the decade leading up to 1718 can be seen as a "St. Martin's summer" for the "sultan of Meknes". It was a decade studded with armed rebellion. But these rebellions were all at the empire's

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(123) "Voyage de Moula Ahmad..." ed./tr. Berbrugger p. 315

(124) Windus p. 208

(125) ibid. pp.207-8

periphery. And they were all overcome, to Ismā'īl's advantage.

The period saw war in the Sus between two of Ismā'īl's sons, Abū 'l-Nāṣir and 'Abd al-Malik (126). By 1712, this war had ended in victory for the former, who declared himself independent of his father (127). However Abū 'l-Nāṣir's dissidence would lack the time and scope for development along the lines traced out by Muḥammad al-'Alim. The years 1711-1714 saw a flexing of the sultan's grip over lands along the southern perimeter of his empire. In 1711, a Tawātī revolt against the local imperial governor was crushed by an expedition mounted from Meknes, and commanded by Ghāzī Abū Ḥafra (128), a qā'id newly risen to court prominence (129). This revolt was followed in 1712, by a mass expedition to Meknes on the part of Tawātī notables, eager to demonstrate their loyalty (130). In the same year, Ismā'īl was able to affirm his authority over the Dar<sup>a</sup>, and have its governor executed (131). And, when Abū 'l-Nāṣir was killed in a localised "Qiblan" battle, also in 1712 (132), 'Abd al-Malik, his 'Alawī successor in the Sus, made no attempt to bid for his predecessor's independent status. Indeed, in 1714, Ismā'īl was able successfully to command 'Abd al-Malik to pay a filial visit to Meknes, and to bring with him his personal military following of abīd, for the re-inforcement of his father's central military authority. (133).

(126) Busnot p. 127

(127) "Turjumān" p. 27 of the text and 51 of the translation cf. S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No LXXXVI Père Busnot to Pontchartrain Cadiz, 10/7/1712 pp. 494-5

(128) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" and Oufrane MS, quoted Martin pp. 79-80

(129) Busnot p. 133

(130) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin p. 81

(131) "Turjumān" p. 27 of the text and 51 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43

(132) "Turjumān" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

(133) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 18

By this stage, Ismā'īl's imperial and paternal authority had a military power basis that had seen changes since the close of the sultan's warrior years. The two major props of the makhzan were still the provincial quwwād and the standing guard. But the roles of both quwwād and guard had undergone development and diversification.

Among the quwwād there were now individuals who were territorial magnates upon a titanic scale. These men were most usually referred to by the title of "bāshā", which was imprecise in its distinction from qā'id, but which apparently denoted a peculiarly sweeping degree of political or military power. Two highly significant provincial bearers of this title were firstly the Bāshā Aḥmad of Tetuan, who in 1713 succeeded his father <sup>c</sup>Alī ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd Allāh, as governor and mujāhid captain (134); and secondly, the Bāshā <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Karīm, who is known, by the same year, to have been Ismā'īl's governor in Marrakesh (135). The sphere of influence granted to <sup>c</sup>Aḥmad ibn <sup>c</sup>Alī of Tetuan had, by Windus's day, apparently engulfed the neighbouring government of his kinsman Aḥmad ibn Ḥaddu al-Ḥammāmī of Alcazarquivir, and could be compared in area with the kingdom of Portugal (136). <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Karīm was, from 1713 onwards, granted an even more extensive range for his "free hand": the whole of greater Sus, stretching southwards from Marrakesh to the "Qibla" (137). Such men were locally paramount: local sultans. During Ismā'īl's latter years, the Bāshā Aḥmad was said never to appear in public with an escort of less than four to five hundred men (138), and to be as "absolute in his Province

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(134) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. LXXXVIII Aḥmad ibn <sup>c</sup>Alī ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd Allāh to Pontchartrain, Tetuan, 28/Ramadan/1125 = 18/10/1713 pp. 512-517

(135) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 18

(136) Windus p. 67

(137) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard loc. cit.

(138) de la Faye p. 91

as any Monarch whatsoever" (139). Yet dutifully, if no longer necessarily annually, these greatest of all Ismā'īl's magnates made periodic visits to Meknes, accompanying the hadāyā which guaranteed welcome and re-confirmation in office (140). It is not surprising that such magnates preferred the overlordship of the militarily inert Ismā'īl to government by any of his more martial sons. Their continued acknowledgement of Ismā'īl himself was acceptance of an established, stabilising authority which, even though palace-based, possessed in its standing army a military deterrent to which there was now added a peculiar innovation.

By the second decade of the eighteenth century, Ismā'īl's army included a new and distinct force: this was the body of abid based at the mahalla or imperial military camp that was set up in the isolated spot of Mashra<sup>c</sup> al-Raml, at the edge of the Mamora forest region, near to Sale. According to a complex indigenous tradition concerning Ismā'īl's abid, which will be examined hereafter (141), the sultan maintained troops at Mashra<sup>c</sup> al-Raml in increasing tens of thousands. This indigenous tradition is questionable at many points. But there is no doubt that the mahalla existed during Ismā'īl's latter years, and that it contained a notably sizeable body of men (142). Tradition would retroject the establishment of the mahalla into the first decade of Ismā'īl's reign. But the chronology of the camp's establishment can reliably be pinned inside a much later time-span. The mahalla did not exist in 1698, when Jean-Baptiste Estelle

(139) Windus p. 24

(140) <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Karīm of Marrakesh, during the five years he is known to have been in office, went three times to greet the sultan in Meknes (al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard pp. 18, 48 and 147)

(141) See Epilogue Part I Pp. 281-3

(142) John Ryadon to Anthony Hatfield, Tetuan, 25/3/1728 N.S., quoted by Braithwaite p. 329 cf. S.P. (71) 17 f. 162 Peter Butler to consul Russell, Tetuan, 29/7/1728 (Both letters from Titwani merchants.) The latter source wildly computed the complement of the mahalla at "sixty thousand, half horse".

stated that troops from Ismā'īl's standing army of "noirs" were all stationed within a day's muster of Meknes (143). Reliable references to the camp date only from 1714, for which a chronicle note recording the execution of four of the camp's quwwad and seventeen of its abīd (144) is illuminated by al-Zarhūnī's note that, during that year, the sultan had accidentally been wounded at the camp, during a session of la<sup>b</sup> al-bārūd (145). The foundation of the mahalla must thus be set between 1698 and 1714. It is likely to have been an experiment of the sultan's retirement from personal campaigning, following the shock of Djidioua, and may have been one aspect of an attempt by Ismā'īl carefully to cultivate a new élite corps from amid the rag-bag army of abīd that he had gathered in the 1690s.

The isolation of such an élite seems to be associated with the attachment to a proportion of Ismā'īl's abīd of the sobriquet "Bwākhir". Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft knew the slave troops of Mashra<sup>c</sup> al Raml as the abīd al-Bukhārī (146), thus giving these troops the name by which all of the Alawī abīd became later known. The sobriquet, quasi-religious in its evocation of the "Sahīh" of al-Bukhārī, may have been coined as a northern counter-blow to the overtones of Sūsī righteousness which invested the venture of Muḥammad al-<sup>c</sup>Alim against his father. For it was unknown to contemporary seventeenth century commentators, and seems to date from the period of Muḥammad al-<sup>c</sup>Alim's dissidence. Al-Zarhūnī described Muḥammad as hearing by letter that

(143) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dating from the October of 1698 p. 692

(144) "Turjuman" p. 27 of the text and 51 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43

(145) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard pp. 47-8

(146) ibid. p. 160

his father was sending a troop of "Bwākhir" against him (147). And Busnot, following a Christian slave's garbling of indigenous nomenclature, described the followers of Zaydān who took Muhammad prisoner as "noirs de l'alcayd Ablebocari, qui sont comme les Dragons du Roi, et ses plus braves Soldats" (148). However, the years of the war with Muhammad seem over-troublous to associate with the foundation of the camp at Mashra<sup>c</sup> al-Raml, which involved the concentration of manpower in placid rural isolation. It seems most likely that Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl first settled his chosen troops at the mahalla during the comparative political lull which followed 1708.

Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's purpose in setting up this isolated military camp may well have been that of creating a gross military deterrent. For Mashra<sup>c</sup> al-Raml constituted a static military reserve which counter-balanced the dynamic authority of great territorial magnates. And the "Bwākhir" were superficially impressive: in the eyes of al-Zarhūnī, a rustic clerk, the cavaliers of Mashra<sup>c</sup> al-Raml were "fine warriors" (149). Yet these warriors from Mashra<sup>c</sup> al-Raml seem only rarely to have been actively deployed by their master. As well as a deterrent, they can be seen as the "toy soldiers" of the sultan's dotage, flamboyantly trained but only parsimoniously doled out into the field. The deployment of cabīd in thousands, that had characterised the period between 1693 and the fall of Muhammad al-<sup>c</sup>Alim, was no longer the rule. Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's last two decades saw territorial magnates and other haraka generals being allotted the services of cabīd only in cautious hundreds. A consequent inexperience of real warfare may explain the poor showing

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(147) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 160

(148) Busnot p. 97

(149) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasāft ed./tr. Justinard p. 51

exhibited by the forces of Mashra<sup>c</sup> al-Raml when they were first set into battle as a body, following Isma<sup>c</sup>il's death (150).

Yet the abid of Mashra<sup>c</sup> al-Raml may not have been simply an unwieldy ornament to the makhzan. Isma<sup>c</sup>il was renowned for his policy of keeping his dependents physically employed:

"...for, says he, if I have a Bag full of Ratts, unless I keep that bag stirring, they will eat their way through." (151)

Windus, in 1721, was informed that the "large plain of Mamora", among "many other parts of the country" was "sown by the Emperor's Negroes to supply his Magazines" (152). In the light of this information, Mashra<sup>c</sup> al-Raml, set within "fine champaign country" (153), may be seen as an agricultural extension of the palace economy of Meknes, as well as a military base.

The years 1715-1717 were the height of Isma<sup>c</sup>il's "St. Martin's summer". During these years, the sultan can be seen as personally secure and aggressive at one remove, as he doled out detachments of abid to lieutenants who took the offensive. In the August of 1715, the siege of Melilla was briefly renewed, under the command of "Tekar", qa'id of its hinterland. After the customary fashion of the ihad, a "Batallon de Negros" was added to the qa'id's forces (154). During the same year, two generals, <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Karim, Bāshā of Marrakesh, and al-Sharīf, a dutifully filial full-brother to Muhammad al-<sup>c</sup>Alim, set out upon the two year haraka which was to threaten the Wādī Nafīs

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(150) S.P. 71 (17) f. 161 Peter Butler to consul Russell, Tetuan, 29/7/1728 N.S. cf. Braithwaite p. 20

(151) Windus p. 116

(152) ibid. p. 84

(153) Grey Jackson p. 14

(154) Marques de Olivart: "Relation del Sitio de la villa de MELILLA en Africa", being an edition of an anonymous eighteenth century MS, published in Madrid in 1909 (pp. 6-7).

and Glāwī regions of the High Atlas as well as the Sus, and which provides the dominant skein within al-Zarhūnī's wandering tale of "Chleuh" dissidence. In recognition of the magnitude of this proposed expedition, the commanders were granted the aid of a detachment from Mashra<sup>c</sup> al-Raml; but allegedly this detachment numbered only around two hundred men (155). 1717 was a notable year for "beating the bounds". A new and forceful governor, Maḥmūd al-Ghanjawī, was sent to Tuat, to replace its resident qā'id of twenty-four years' service. He too had the assistance of a detachment of abid in the conduct of an heavy-handed perambulation of the Tawātī oases (156). Also in 1717, the governor of Oujda took an expedition through Snassen country that was sufficiently brutal to result in the despatch to Meknes of an hundred Snassen heads (157). This successful punishment of the Snassen may have led Ismā'īl briefly to toy once again with the idea of "Chergi" expansion. It is known that, early in 1718, all communication between the Maghrib al-Aqṣā and Algiers was once again forbidden (158). This could have indicated more than a further attempt to prevent the economic assets of the region of Fes from dribbling eastwards. For it will be seen that the power of Algiers to threaten her western neighbour was on the wane.

But Ismā'īl's empire was not to enter any new period of expansion. The flourish of success at the periphery of the sultan's domains, which characterised the years 1715-1717, had a tenuous basis

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(155) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 51

(156) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin p. 82

(157) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43

(158) S.P. 71 (16) f. 549 Memo. of Anthony Hatfield, Tetuan, 24/5/1718



within the potentially breakaway regions of the south. Here, grimmer years for imperial authority would follow. A crucial turning point for Ismā'īl's fortunes in the south of his empire came with the death of one man.

In the summer of 1718, <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Karīm of Marrakesh died, upon haraka, near Demnat (159). Allegedly "the Emperor...seemed so concerned that none durst speak further about it" (160). The concern is understandable. Unlike the Hammāmī of Tetuan, this bāshā of Marrakesh had not been in a position of localised authority long enough for the establishment of a sub-dynasty. His death led to the collapse of the network of allegiance he had built up within "greater Sus": the evaporation of a political power "as if it had never existed" (161).

Immediately, in 1718, Ismā'īl sent out to Marrakesh Ghāzī Abū Ḥafra (162), an officer noted for his loyalty, and for his court proximity to the sultan (163). The intervention of this officer did not prevent fission in the administration of the south, in developments which indicate that southern affairs were once more slipping beyond the grasp of Meknes. The new bāshā never matched up to his political predecessor in Marrakesh. He made a bad start by failing to take control of <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Karīm's armed following. The core of the forces who had been at Demnat fell to an <sup>c</sup>abd general, the Bāshā Musāhil (164). Acting independently of Ghāzī Abū Ḥafra, this general made for "inner Sus", apparently with the intention of taking command of the troops of that

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(159) S.P. 71 (16) f. 563 Memo. of Anthony Hatfield, Tetuan, 11/8/1718; and al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 153  
The chronology of the former is to be preferred to that of the latter, who gives a seasonally equivalent date for the previous year,

(160) S.P. 71 (16) f. 563 Memo. of Anthony Hatfield, Tetuan, 11/8/1718

(161) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 155

(162) S.P. 71 (16) f. 563 Memo. of Anthony Hatfield, Tetuan, 11/8/1718

(163) S.P. 71 (16) f. 539 Memo of Anthony Hatfield, Tetuan, 23/4/1718  
cf. Busnot p. 133

(164) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 154

region. There he was forestalled by a third party, the qā'id of Tarudant, an ally and subordinate of the dead <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Karīm. This qā'id had foiled a local military coup by depriving <sup>C</sup>abīd stationed in "Chleuh" country of arms, horses and even shoes. He kept these troops in the south, and kept his own governorship independent (165).

It may have been this southern crisis that drove Ismā'īl back upon an embittered Fes, with a new round of demands. In 1718, the citizens received two open imperial letters. The first promised remission of taxation, but the second was an hectoring demand for mass citizen military service (166). Theoretically the demand was not extraordinary. The citizens were offered a choice between two traditional patterns of military service: enrolment as ever-ready, tax-exempt jaysh troops, or conscription into nā'iba service, which was less onerous, but which made demands of the tax-payer (167). But this offer must be seen in the context of the long tussle over the harātīn fās. It aroused violent opposition that was presumably based upon a widespread fear that, in practise, conscription would be carried out upon harsh terms. The leader of this opposition was one Walad al-Ṣaḥrāwī, whose nisba would seem to indicate that he was a man of oasean immigrant origin, and thus highly at risk in terms of the policy of impressment by way of the dīwān al-harātīn, as established in 1708. Al-Ṣaḥrāwī was put to death by the city governor, Abū <sup>C</sup>Alī al-Rūsī, for voicing the civic demand that there should be face-to-face negotiations with the sultan before any Fāsī

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(165) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 154

(166) "Turjumān" pp. 27-8 of the text and 51-2 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43

(167) See Chapter II P. 110

took up arms on his behalf (168). A period of disorder, studded with further murders, followed within the city; and there was a turnabout of city governors (169).

The central authority faltered. Ismā'īl seems at this point to have been incapable of deparching ḥarakāt to the far reaches of his dominions. In Tuat, 1719 was a year noted for exemptions from taxation (170). And the hard governor, Maḥmūd al-Ghanjāwī, was replaced in Tuat, as makhzan representative, by a son of his predecessor Muḥammad al-Ṣafar; a governor so innocuously acceptable to the distant oases for it to be possible to send him out to his posting with an escort of only twenty horse (171).

Wheedling as well as bullying entered into the sultan's attempts to gain Fāsī co-operation. In 1720, Ismā'īl issued a command for the total architectural restoration of the shrine of Idrīs the Younger, the building that was the city's spiritual heart. He also arranged for the re-ordering of the shrine's Friday ritual (172). But, in attempting to win the Fāsī by adorning their city as al-Rashīd had adorned it fifty years previously, Ismā'īl was making a gesture that came too late, and was cancelled out by a punitive demand for a civic financial contribution (173) which indirectly forced the city itself to foot the bill for the restoration of its shrine. The demand provoked

(168) "Turjuman" pp. 27-8 of the text and 52 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43

(169) "Turjuman" p. 28 of the text and 52 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

(170) Martin: documents noted p. 82

(171) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin loc. cit.

(172) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." quoted al-Nāsirī: "Kitāb al-Istiqsā..." Casablanca text Vol. VII p. 98 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 134. ( This note is missing from the Fes lithograph edition of the "Nashr al-Mathānī...")

(173) "Turjuman" p. 28 of the text and 53 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 44

a new spur to emigration among the wealthier Fāsī (174).

Meanwhile, events within the south of Ismā'īl's empire proceeded steadily in the sultan's disfavour. Ghāzī Abū Hafra, the bāshā of Marrakesh, and Abū <sup>C</sup>Aziz ibn Ṣadduq, governor of Tarudant, died within two months of each other (175), most probably in the autumn of 1720 (176). In the aftermath of these deaths, inner Sus entered its third period of dissidence under an <sup>C</sup>Alawī prince. The prince was <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Malik, who had recently been resident in Marrakesh, acting dutifully in tandem with the Bāshā Ghāzī. The power vacuum induced by the deaths of the two southern governors presented <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Malik with his opportunity. He shifted his base from Marrakesh to the strategically more sheltered Tarudant (177), where he is known to have been established, in command of an army, in 1721 (178). His move can probably be equated with the setting up of an independent military administration. Braithwaite recorded, for 1727, that "Muley Abdelmeleck had for several Years past lived in a state of Independency, and...refused to pay his Father the customary Taxes", being "then looked upon to be in a state of rebellion" (179). The authority he built up within the Sus lacks the memory of cultural grace that is

(174) "wa khallat al-madīna. wa lam yubqa ahad min ahl al-yasar"

("And the city was stabbed to the heart. There did not remain there a single member of the prosperous class of its citizenry.")

("Turjuman" p. 28 of the text cf. 53 of the translation.)

(175) "Turjuman" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43

(176) The dates given within al-Zayyānī's texts, as cited above, correspond with dates from the autumn of the following year, 1721. However, they are associated here with information concerning mujahid events known from external sources to have taken place in the autumn of 1720. And, by the time of the Stewart embassy of 1721, the "Basha Gauzi" was noted as "deceased" (Windus p. 155)

(177) "Turjuman" pp. 28 of the text and 53-4 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43

(178) Windus p. 94

(179) Braithwaite p. 2

associated with the government of Muhammad al-<sup>C</sup>Alim, and may be thought of as distinctively martial: for "Abdelmeleck" was, among Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's sons:

"...reckoned the best Soldier, but cruel in his Temper and brutal in his actions, and...only esteemed by his Army." (180)

This third and final loss of the Sus marked the end of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's "St. Martin's summer". The sultan was now in his seventies, and in his old age would seem to have learned a certain resignation. For he maintained diplomatic relations with <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Malik (181), despite his loss of Sūsī revenue. But he would not risk his "Bwākhir" of Mashra<sup>C</sup> al-Raml in a Sūsī war. To Marrakesh, he sent an <sup>C</sup>abd general, Hammu ibn Ṭarīfa (182) "who was remarkable for Stratagems" (183), and might deter <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Malik from venturing within the Atlas arc. But, for his part, <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Malik made no move to cross the mountains. He was rumoured to be patiently awaiting a duel, at his father's death, with his brother Ahmad al-Dhahabī (184).

Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's latter-day government suffered a northern disgrace which was contemporaneous with the southern amputation of the Sus. In the autumn of 1720, the regenerated Spain of Felipe V and Alberoni injected an angry spasm of life into the calcified confrontation around Ceuta. Spanish troops, under the command of the Marques de Lede were sent massively to re-inforce the presidio. They made successful raids upon "the camp before Ceuta", and upon a fort along the route from Ceuta to Tangier. The mujāhidun suffered notable losses in men

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(180) Windus p. 94

(181) Braithwaite p. 2

(182) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 167

(183) Braithwaite p. 20

(184) ibid. p. 3

and in equipment, and the quarters of the Bāshā Ahmad himself were destroyed (185). For the Spaniards, the episode was a fire-cracker. It failed permanently to raise the siege of Ceuta, whose stylised ritual was to be resumed during the years preceding the sultan's death (186). But the attack was of lasting significance for Isma<sup>c</sup>il's relations with Christendom. It drove the sultan into making a pact with a Christian power: an ironic coda to his pose as a patron of the jihād.

Since the Moroccan embassy to London in 1700, there had been a series of intermittently bruised maritime truces between Morocco and Great Britain. But these had not involved the betrayal of the local religious ban upon the supply of provisions to the infidel (187). Thus, in 1709, the request of an envoy of Queen Anne that British ships should be allowed to revictual in Moroccan ports had been refused (188). Subsequent peace negotiations, backing and filling between Gibraltar and Tetuan, had been dilatory for many years. A British mission to Meknes in 1718 had resulted only in the envoy's loss of temper (189). But the Spanish sortie of 1720 ended vacillation. 1721 saw the Stewart embassy from Gibraltar to Meknes. This embassy succeeded in drawing up a treaty allowing for complete freedom of trade

- (185) "Turjuman" p. 28 of the text and 53 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43 cf. C.O. 91 (1) Memo from Col. Kane C.-in-C. of the Gibraltar garrison, to Charles Delafaye, 8/11/1720 (ff. 49-55)
- (186) Braithwaite p. 10
- (187) According to Braithwaite's understanding: "The Law of Mahomet forbids the Exporting of Corn, which they strictly observe here, tho the Turks and Moors of Tunis, Tripoli and Algier, dispense with it, for the sake of the great Profit it brings them in..." (p. 342)
- (188) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI No. LXXXIII Declaration of the former captive François Fily, on board ship out of Sale, 20/11/1711 p. 485
- (189) S.P. 71(16) ff. 571-3 Translation of a letter from Mūsā ibn Hattār, court Jew, and Isma<sup>c</sup>il's master of customs, to Admiral Byng, "the camp before Ceuta", 13/11/1718.

between Morocco and Britain, and for the duty-free provisioning of British ships in Moroccan ports (190).

The disgraced mujaḥid, Aḥmad of Tetuan, travelled to Meknes in company with the embassy party. He was accompanied by all sixteen of the kinsmen who held administrative posts within his sphere of influence (191). Despite his defeat in battle, and a previous three years of absence from Meknes, the bāshā was subjected to no more than a display of verbal violence, and a demand from the sultan for an increase in the size of his hadīya (192). However, while the pact with the Christians was being ratified, Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl picked out the bāshā's favourite kātib for exemplary execution (193). The charges were ideological: that the kātib, when about his master's business in Gibraltar, had indulged in riotous living in Christian company. This execution had a dual significance. As a ritual of displacement, it diverted attention and guilt from the agreement into which the sultan was currently entering, which set aside religious principle, in favour of diplomatic nostalgia for the old Sa<sup>c</sup>dī alliance with England (194). More narrowly, the execution was an indirect and, it might be hoped, prophylactic punishment of the Bāshā Aḥmad for his defeat at Spanish hands.

In the shadow of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's recent loss of the Sus, the bāshā of Tetuan himself, as the sultan's principal northern lieutenant, was personally indispensable and inviolate. He was swiftly restored

(190) Treaty of 7/8/1721, reproduced by Windus pp. 230-231 and 236

(191) Windus p. 81

(192) ibid. pp. 90-91 and 200

(193) ibid. pp. 156-8

(194) "We are upon the same foot of friendship with your Majesty that your ancestors were with our kinsmen the Sherifs of Morocco, and Kings of the West in their times." (S.P. 71 (16) f. 624 Translation of a letter from Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl to George I, accompanying the peace treaty of 7/8/1721).

to formal favour. In the spring of 1722, he was granted extensions to his government, and the additional "douceur" of an <sup>C</sup>Alawī wife attended by forty slaves (195). During Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's final years, the bāshā of Tetuan lived in high style (196), and to aliens epitomised active Moroccan government. In his gaudy and bellicose public state, as described by an eyewitness from the winter of 1724-5 (197), he now outshone his master. For by this date Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl, who, even in his sixties, had been able to leap into the saddle (198), was physically become a Tithonus: he was brought into public audience in a small open carriage (199).

But it would be unwise to conclude from this physical decrepitude that Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl, during his last quinquennium, was become negligible. This little-known period is likely to have been characterised by the anticipation of political opportunity, as princes and magnates awaited the sultan's death. But, while he lived, the sultan remained the linchpin of government. He was not simply a figurehead. His heir-presumptive Aḥmad al-Dhahabī remained a political untouchable (200).

During these last years, Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl ruled a contracted domain which did not include the Sus. In the year 1724, it was a domain ravaged by famine (201), and by southern rebellion (202). Yet there

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(195) S.P. 71 (16) f. 635 Anthony Hatfield to Cartaret, Tetuan, 13/5/1722

(196) Windus pp. 7-25 passim

(197) de la Faye pp. 90-91 and 240-241

(198) Busnot p. 37

(199) de la Faye p. 150

(200) Consul Hatfield, who had put forward a plea by way of Miknāsī courtiers, recorded that he had "proposed to them to interest Muley Hamet in it and do it by his hand and they say it is not feazable, for the Emperor would not take it from him, as too much interposing in his government" (S.P. 71 (16) f. 652 Hatfield to Cartaret, Tetuan, 26/8/1722)

(201) Chronicle of Samuel ibn Saḥl ibn Danān ed./tr. Vaida Text no. XXVI from "Un recueil de textes..." in "Hespéris" Vol. XXXVI (Paris, 1949) pp. 160-162

(202) S.P. 71 (17) f. 16 Hatfield to Newcastle, Tetuan, 18/5/1724



was no deliquescence of the central authority. Revenue was still clawed into Meknes by the sultan's lieutenants. Ahmad of Tetuan continued to be a loyal visitor to the capital (203). So did Hammu ibn Tarīfa, the bāshā of Marrakesh (204), whose tax raids are known to have penetrated High Atlas reaches (205). Revenue even came in from distant Tuat, funnelled to the capital by way of Tafilelt, where the <sup>C</sup>Alawī vice-roy Yūsuf remained a loyal son to his father (206). Further, the sultan retained his hold over major economic assets. The empire's only concentrated and large-scale armaments industry was attached to the Miknāsī palace (207). And the imperial Fāsī "estancar" continued to flourish, and to infiltrate high governmental circles. A magnate as considerable as Hammu ibn Tarīfa was willing, when in Meknes, to run a debt-collecting errand for the favoured <sup>C</sup>Adayyil (208).

In external affairs, the sultan enjoyed a latter-day piece of good fortune. Wilting Ottoman power enabled him to recover his balance in dealings with the Turks. Early in 1724 there was a Porte embassy to Meknes. Hatfield, the British consul in Tetuan was told that its aim was to request safe harbourage for any Ottoman vessels that might be driven back upon Moroccan ports during a proposed Ottoman expedition towards Malta (209). Isma<sup>C</sup>il, who had been obsequious towards the Ottoman embassy of 1697 (210), could afford to

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(203) de la Faye p. 240

(204) ibid. p. 196

(205) Mzouda MS ed./tr. J. Berque, and quoted in Morsy: "Moulay Isma'il et l'armée de métier" p. 105

(206) Letters from Isma<sup>C</sup>il to Yūsuf (7/Dhū 'l-Qa<sup>C</sup>da/1137 = 18/ 7/1725) and from Yūsuf to Isma<sup>C</sup>il (6/Rabi<sup>C</sup> II/1138 = 12/12/1725) quoted Martin pp. 85-6

(207) Windus p. 105 and Braithwaite p. 196

(208) de la Faye p. 196

(209) S.P. 71 (17) f. 7 Anthony Hatfield to Cartaret, Tetuan, 12/2/1723 O.S.

(210) See Chapter V Pp. 223-4

be off-hand in his dealings with this later envoy, whom he kept waiting in Tetuan (211). The closer Turkish authority in Algiers seems no longer to have posed any threat to the Maghrib al-Aqṣā, either by sea or by land. By 1726 it had become customary for Algerine vessels driven into Moroccan ports to be subjected to fines (212). Diplomatic protest from Algiers was doomed to failure. For it could no longer be backed by the naval power deployed so efficiently against Ismā'īl in 1692; and the Algerines were loth to invade <sup>c</sup>Alawī territory without the support of their fleet (213). This Algerine debility dissipated the shadow of Djidioua, Ismā'īl's greatest military disgrace.

In the March of 1727, after a reign of fifty-five years, "The Old Emperor died of a Mortification in the lower part of his Belly, in extreme old Age" (214). His length of days invited an immediate maximisation of his achievements. Thus the contemporary "Chleuh" author, al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft, was delighted to trace out the geographical limits to which, to the best of his knowledge, the suzerainty and coinage of this sultan of the "Gharb" had run (215).

(211) S.P. 71 (17) f. 1 Hatfield to Cartaret, Tetuan, 25/1/1723 O.S.

(212) S.P. 71 (17) f. 68 Hatfield to Charles Delafaye, Tetuan, 20/7/1726

(213) "The Algerines talk very bold, yet something reasonable, for they say that their soldiery must be supported, and now that they have lost their marine force, they must seek to succour them by other methods" (S.P. 71 (17) ff. 68-9 Hatfield to Delafaye, Tetuan, 20/7/1726)

(214) Braithwaite pp. 5 and 4

(215) "Il s'étendit jusqu'au pays du Sahara, au côté du Sud, jusqu'au pays des Almoravides Lemtouna; et jusqu'aux Ghozlan et à leurs voisins Arabes de l'Oued Dra', et jusqu'au Touat et à Sijilmassa et jusqu'au pays de Figuig, dans l'est...et jusqu'au pays de Bou Semghoun, au pays des dattes, à cinq étapes duquel est la limite où sa monnaie avait cours..."  
(Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard pp. 167-8)

It was convenient thus to maximise Ismā'il's government in terms of quantity rather than quality. Delineation of the major events of Ismā'il's reign has shown that "Cherg" and Sus, the spheres of the sultan's chief territorial ambitions, were also the spheres of his most notable ill-success. Further, this delineation has failed to show that Ismā'il was anything of a political strategist as distinct from tactician. His government had histrionic style rather than vision. He built a palace at Meknes, not a sophisticated state. And he built up bodies of troops, rather than any "New Model Army". But, in his dealings with Fes, he "tamed the shrew", tying an enervated city to his own economic advantage. And his long life established the <sup>C</sup>Alawī as a dynasty. During the decades of strife that followed Ismā'il's death, only Ismā'il's sons were, in practise, eligible for the position of sultan. And Ismā'il's line continued.

Consequently, much of the mythopoeia that came to work upon the life and times of this long-lived ruler was dynastic mythopoeia. As such, it was tailored to suit the sensibilities of his descendents.

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AN EPILOGUE: THE MYTHOLOGY OF ISMA<sup>C</sup>IL'S REIGN

Many dubious traditions concerning Isma<sup>C</sup>il's reign can be traced to the writings of al-Zayyānī. It has been indicated, in the Prologue to this work, that the early <sup>C</sup>Alawī period is marginal to the main content of al-Zayyānī's history (1). The matter of al-Zayyānī's major historical texts is essentially a tale of turbulence followed by calm. It is hinged at 1757, the date of the accession of Sayyidī Muḥammad III which, in the historian's eyes, marked the end of the political disorder consequent upon the death of Isma<sup>C</sup>il, and the inauguration of a new period of orderly government. <sup>C</sup>Alawī history for the years before 1727 stands uneasily at the head of this matter, as introductory material. It is told comparatively briefly, and its skeleton of Fes-oriented chronicle material is hung about with a cluster of ill-assorted traditions.

Part I: The "Black Army" and "tamhīd"

Two important and related traditions associated specifically with the reign of Isma<sup>C</sup>il concern, firstly, his fostering of an army of <sup>C</sup>abīd or black slaves, and, secondly, the pacification of his empire: a tamhīd supposedly underpinned by the construction of a network of forts which <sup>C</sup>abīd were customarily set to garrison. Together, <sup>C</sup>abīd and tamhīd have been seen as aspects of a successful pattern of heavy handed provincial government peculiar to the reign of Isma<sup>C</sup>il (2).

It has been customary to treat of "the black army" almost by analogy with "the buildings of Meknes", as a curiosity to be discussed in isolation from the political and military history of Isma<sup>C</sup>il's reign.

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(1) See Prologue Pp. 21 and 25-6

(2) For examples of this viewpoint, see Terrasse Vol. II pp. 256-7 and 258, and the recent article by Morsy: "Moulay Isma'il et l'armée de métier".

This approach was determined by al-Zayyānī, who was concerned only to tell a tale of Ismā'īl's recruitment of an abīd force as an entertainment and as a necessary precursor to his main matter. The author regarded the abīd equivocally. He saw abīd as the prime agents of disorder during the interregnum which followed Ismā'īl's death. More than once he explicitly compared Ismā'īl's abīd with the Turkish slave troops of al-Mu'tasim ibn al-Rashīd al-Abbāsī (3). And he constructed a quaint criticism of Ismā'īl's own internal use of his abīd forces: the wish that Ismā'īl's fortresses had all been ships which could have transported their slave garrisons across the sea, to a glorious reconquest of Spain (4). But al-Zayyānī seems to have realised that the abīd of Ismā'īl's day were a force bound up with the good name of the dynasty, and that it was proper for him to provide a counter-weight to his own chronicle notes upon the disputes concerning the imperial right to the proprietorship of abīd and harātīn (5). For he included within his texts a "received version" of Ismā'īl's acquisition of his slave army. Both the "Bustān al-Zarīf...." and the "Turjumān" contain a variation of this "received version" (6). In each case, the material falls into two parts. The first part outlines the gathering of a foundation corps of raw recruits;

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(3) "Bustān al-Zarīf...." MS pp. 32-3 and 37

(4) "wa hadhā 'l-<sup>c</sup>adad alladhī jama<sup>c</sup>a al-sultān ismā'īl min al-<sup>c</sup>abīd law khāda fī 'l-bahr li-'l-andalus wa tilka al-<sup>c</sup>gal<sup>c</sup> kānat marākib bi-hawz al-<sup>c</sup>asākir la-malaka bihi al-andalus kullihā."

("This being the number of black slaves which the sultan Ismā'īl collected, had he plunged across the sea to Spain, and had these forts been ships for transporting his armies, certainly he would have conquered all of Spain with it (the number of slaves).") ("Bustān al-Zarīf...." MS p. 37)

(5) See Chapter V Pp. 211-221 and Chapter VI Pp. 257-259

(6) "Bustān al-Zarīf...." MS pp. 31-2 and 37 cf. "Turjumān" pp. 15-16 of the text and 29-31 of the translation.

the second part describes the training from childhood of the slave army proper, the offspring of the foundation corps.

It was claimed that Isma<sup>C</sup>īl began his reign with an army composed of free men (7). However, when in Marrakesh, following its capture from Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz in 1677, the sultan is said to have been approached by a Murrākushī tālib surnamed <sup>C</sup>Alīlish, whose father had been a kātib in Sa<sup>C</sup>dī service. <sup>C</sup>Alīlish showed the sultan a register (daftar) of <sup>C</sup>abīd who had formed part of al-Mansūr's army, and assured him that there were many such slaves still to be found within the city, and among the tribes of its surrounds. He was promptly charged with rounding up this remnant of al-Mansūr's following, for Isma<sup>C</sup>īl's benefit. Imperial letters were sent to regional quwwād requesting co-operation. And the following year saw the gathering in of every aswad within the region (8). The recruits were registered. If bachelors, they were provided with wives, bought slave-girls (imā') or co-opted serf-women (hartāniyāt). They were then despatched to Meknes, provided with arms, and grouped under commanders. Further companies were subsequently rounded up from other regions; governors of the major towns were ordered to buy up men and women slaves; and recruits were brought in from named provinces of the northern and central Maghrib al-Aqṣā, according to the pattern set within the environs of Marrakesh. With two exceptions (9), each regional contingent was in turn sent off from Meknes to the rural camp of Mashra<sup>C</sup> al-Raml near to Sale. There

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- (7) "wa kāna yuktabu al-<sup>C</sup>askar min al-ahrār" ("And the army was recruited from among free men") ("Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 31)
- (8) "...hattā lam yatrūk bi-tilka al-qabā'il kullihā aswad sawā' kāna mamlūk aw hurr aswad aw hartānī" ("...until he left not a single black, slave, free or serf, within any of those tribes") ("Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 32)
- (9) "Bustān al-Zarīf...." version only. loc cit.

they were said to have been joined by an haratīn force gathered by the sultan upon an expedition he supposedly made to Chinguetti in 1678 (10). According to the figures scattered through the version of this material set out in the "Bustān al-Zarīf...", the number of recruits first sent to Mashra<sup>C</sup> al-Raml totalled ten thousand, including the haratīn. These, the majority, were set to build their own homes, till the earth and beget children (11). A minority, the four thousand recruits from Tamesna and Dukkala, were said to have been retained for immediate military service (12).

The second section of the narrative concentrates upon the children born in the mahalla at Mashra<sup>C</sup> al-Raml. At the end of a ten-year interval, and thereafter annually, successive groups of these children are said to have been brought to Meknes for a six-year period of training which comprised, for the boys, three years at work on the palace buildings (khidma), followed by three years training in the use of arms and in horsemanship. Meanwhile, the girls were educated in domestic service. At the end of this period came formal mass-weddings and registration. There was then renewal of the cycle. The young abīd were grouped in companies under older officers, and despatched straight back to Mashra<sup>C</sup> al-Raml (13). According to the terms of the narrative, many must be supposed to have remained there. For, by the end of Ismā'īl's reign, when the number of registered abīd was said to have risen to 150,000, half this quota was allegedly stationed at the

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(10) "Turjumān" pp. 16-17 of the text and 31-2 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf...." MS p. 32

(11) "Turjumān" version, p. 16 of the text and 30 of the translation

(12) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." version, MS p. 32

(13) ibid. p. 37

mahalla. Of the remainder, twenty-five thousand were in Wajh <sup>C</sup>Arūs, the garrison suburb of Meknes; the others were distributed in forts throughout the country.

Al-Zayyānī claimed to have taken his information upon Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's abid from two sources: a tārikh or kunnash, attributed to a certain "al-Hamīdī" (14); and a daftar which had been in the possession of the kātib Sulaymān ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Zarhūnī (15). Nothing seems known of al-Hamīdī. In the "Kitāb al-Istiḡṣā..." his name does not appear, being supplanted by that of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's wazīr al-Yahmādī (16). This substitution should probably be dismissed as a late attempt further to authenticate the material. The "Bustān al-Zarīf..." does contain biographical notes on the kātib al-Zarhūnī. These state that he worked for the administrations (dawlatayn) of both al-Rashīd and of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl, and that he died in Tarudant in 1138 A.H. /1725-6 A.D., in possession of a roster of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's entire army, including those troops who were centrally based, and those who were dispersed among the forts (17). These details are open to question. The "Nashr al-Mathānī...", an earlier work than the "Bustān al-Zarīf...", contains an obituary notice for a kātib Abū 'l-Rabī<sup>C</sup> Sulaymān ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Zarhūnī, also said to have served both al-Rashīd and Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl. This obituary notice is for the year 1098 A.H./1686-7 A.D. (18). As it

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(14) "tārikh": "Turjumān" p. 16 of the text and 31 of the translation of. "kunnash": "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 37

(15) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

(16) Al-Nāsirī: "Kitāb al-Istiḡṣā...", Casablanca text, Vol. VII p. 56 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 74

(17) "wa kāna <sup>C</sup>indahu daftar al-<sup>C</sup>asākīr kullamā 'l-sawād al-<sup>C</sup>zam wa'l-mutafarriqūn fī gal<sup>C</sup> al-maghrīb"

("... and he possessed a register of all military forces, the majority in the central cantonment, and the detachments dispersed among the forts of the Maghrib") "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

(18) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 385-6



is unlikely that there were two kātibān of the same name who had served both <sup>C</sup>Alawī brother sultans, al-Zayyānī's attribution of late military source material to the kātib al-Zarhūnī is thus rendered highly suspect. It is likely that al-Zayyānī had two pieces of written material to hand, when he composed his matter upon the abīd. But both sources are best regarded as of unknown origin. They will be referred to hereafter as "al-Ḥamīdī" and "pseudo al-Zarhūnī".

The mass of al-Zayyānī's general information upon the gathering and training of abīd is likely to have been "al-Ḥamīdī" material. But the daftar of the "pseudo al-Zarhūnī" was specifically claimed as the source for certain statistics associated with this material (19). This daftar is likely also to have been the source for a separate skein of data within al-Zayyānī's texts: a series of notes purporting to record, in rounded hundreds or thousands, the military complement allotted to forts allegedly built in association with Ismā'īl's programme of tamhīd or rural pacification. The two bodies of information are linked by a common reference to the stocking of two forts at Adekhsan and Dilā' with the four thousand abīd from Dukkala and Tamesna (20). All this statistical information is open to query. Garrison figures of two thousand for individual rural forts such as Adekhsan and Dilā' seem astonishingly inflated when compared with contemporary European notes upon the size of Moroccan garrisons. For around 1680, Mouëtte estimated the palace guard of Fās al-Jadīd at three hundred (21). And in 1699, the abīd garrison of the citadel in New Sale, the present day "Casbah des Oudaias", and one of the country's most notable fortresses, was said by a French naval reporter to number around two hundred, to the exclusion of its teeming women and children (22).

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(19) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 37

(20) ibid. pp. 32 and 36

(21) Mouëtte: "Histoire..." p. 186

(22) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. V No. LXXX Study of Sale, addressed from de la Maisonfort to de Combes, Rouen, 28/12/1699 pp. 551-2

Nor can credit be given to the dates al-Zayyānī attached to the garrisoning of individual forts. The tales of Ismā'īl's pacification of the Maghrib al-Aqsā, to which these garrison notes are attached, will be shown to be highly dubious in themselves. And the garrison notes would appear arbitrarily to have been spliced with these tales, as part of a literary construction that was not carried out with overall care. For these notes clash with the chronology attributed to the "al-Hamīdī" tale which concentrates upon the build-up of the force at Mashra<sup>c</sup> al-Raml. According to the "Bustān al-Zarīf..." version of this material, fifteen named forts were stocked with abīd over the period 1680-1688 (23); and the implication covers other forts. The most conservative calculation, based here upon the "Bustān al-Zarīf..." figures, suggests that the number of abīd thus detailed for garrison duty approached ten thousand; and the text implies that a far greater number of men were actually involved. However, according to the "al-Hamīdī" chronology, the only recruits then available for garrison duty were the abīd of "Tamesna" and Dukkala, destined for two forts only. For in "al-Hamīdī" terms, the main force of abīd was still located placidly at the mahalla at Mashra<sup>c</sup> al-Raml, from which the first recruitment of ten-year old children was allegedly made only in 1100 A.H./ 1688-9 A.D. In terms of this chronology, the first body of trained abīd could not have become operational until around 1694.

The schemata of "al-Hamīdī" and of "pseudo al-Zarhūnī" are both questionable in the light of external evidence. The "pseudo al-Zarhūnī" notes concerning the numbers and deployment of abīd all waver in the light of evidence that one such note is false. Al-Zayyānī would date the building of Qasba Tadla, and its garrisoning with a thousand abīd to 1688 (24). But Mouette's "Histoire...", published in 1683, recorded the

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(23) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 34, 35 and 36

(24) "Turjumān" p. 22 of the text and 41 of the translation.

building of this fort, and its garrisoning with renegade troops, as taking place in 1679, as an incidental to the return lap of the long haraka of the plague years (25).

Similarly, the more generalised "al-Ḥamīdī" material upon the primal ingathering and training of ʿabīd is demonstrably weak: a medley of traditions in which the memory of genuine circumstances seems to have been distorted and interwoven with decorous fiction. The suggestion that Ismāʿīl's ʿabīd were in any way inherited from Ahmad al-Mansūr al-Saʿdī is false. The obvious point that, in 1677, genuine survivors from al-Mansūr's period were likely to be few and antique, is relatively unimportant. The major error lies in the suggestion that al-Mansūr or his Saʿdī successors had ever employed black slave troops in any quantity. The suggestion would seem to have been carelessly extrapolated from memories of the trans-Saharan expeditions of al-Mansūr's day. These had indeed led to the import of slaves. But the slaves would seem to have been seen as luxury commodities, rather than as potential military recruits. An account of the tribute caravan with which Jawdar Pasha, the "conquistador" of Songhai, returned to Marrakesh in 1599, set at the end of its exotic catalogue:

"great quantitye of eanuches, duarfes and weomen and men slaves, besydes fifteen virgins, the Kinges daughters of Gago" (26)

The composition of al-Mansūr's army, at the end of his reign, is well known from both European and indigenous material. An English eyewitness who attempted to outline, for the benefit of James I, the opposition to be expected were he to undertake a "godly and christianlike"

(25) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 124-5

(26) S.I. 1<sup>re</sup> Angleterre Vol. II No. XLIX Jasper Tomson, Barbary merchant, to his brother Richard Tomson, Marrakesh, 24/6/1599 p. 146

bid for the subjection of Morocco, listed among the paid imperial

"Maganisies" (makhazīniya):

"Of Ellches, being runnegades, the best solduares, 4000.  
Of Andaloustes, being runnegade Moores out of the mountains  
of Granado, 4000. Of Swagostes, that are Moores of the  
Mountaines, 1500. And of Turkes and others, to make up  
them above fortie thowsand..." (27)

In ethnic range, this summary aligns with al-Ifrānī's version of al-Fishtālī's account of al-Mansūr's army on parade (28). This describes an harlequin array, including the indigenous juyūsh al-sūs, the sharāqa or "easterners", the renegades, the Andalusians and the Turks. There is no mention here of any force of black troops. And in such a context, an example of a literary theme delighting in variety (29), it is difficult to believe that any major force could have been overlooked.

Al-Mansūr may have had black slaves close to his person. There survives a trace-reference to one Mas'ūd ibn Mubarak, the "sahib al saqif" or "master of the personal guard", whom al-Mansūr once designated to be commander of the Murrākushī citadel in the eventuality of plague (30). He was described as a "wasif" (31), and his name is redolent of Islamic black slavery. But the saqif he commanded is likely to have been a small personal bodyguard (32). It did not develop into a larger

(27) S.I. 1<sup>re</sup> Anqleterre Vol. II No. LXXXIII Henry Roberts, Barbary merchant, to James I, Marrakech N.D. pp. 224-5

(28) "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." ed./tr. Houdas pp. 115-118 of the text and 195-201 of the translation

(29) See, for example, the account of the polychrome Fatimid army of the mid eleventh century, on parade at the ceremony of the opening of the Nile sluices, as described by the Persian traveller Nasir-i Khusraw: quoted R. Levy, in "The Social Structure of Islam" (London, 1957) pp. 445-6

(30) "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." ed./tr. Houdas p. 184 of the text and 298 of the translation

(31) The term wasif may indicate close personal association with a master. Sources for the period frequently note a wasif individually, by his personal name, and in the execution of a particular duty.

(32) Dozy's "Supplément..." (Vol. I p. 663) defines "saqif" as an intimate guard, in derivation from its original sense of "portico".

Sa<sup>C</sup>dī "black army". Europeans dominated the forces associated with the rump of the Sa<sup>C</sup>dī state. An anonymous English eyewitness of the late 1630s described the Murrākushī sultan's "magazeene" as a "pretorian band, not unlike they Janizaries of the Grand Seignior", that was disciplined by "elshes", renegades whose commander was a Frenchman (33).

On the other hand, it has been seen that <sup>C</sup>abīd were with the <sup>C</sup>Alawī from the outset. The "al-Hamīdī" material is incorrect in suggesting that Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl began his reign with a military backing limited to free men. Besides his own renegades, he had a black slave force inherited from his brother al-Rashīd, and led by the commander "Bousta" (34). Even during the first decade of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's reign, MouÛtte could insist upon the military prominence of the sultan's black guards:

"...ses meilleurs soldats...qui combattent toujours proche de sa personne avec des armes à feu; ceux qui rendent de meilleurs combats obtiennent les principales charges de l'armée ou le gouvernement de quelque place." (35)

But this author gave no evidence that the force of "Noirs" had been dramatically enlarged during his period of residence within Morocco. His "Histoire..." is devoid of any reference to a country-wide round-up of negro slaves following Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's 1677 capture of Marrakesh, or to the establishment of an experimental mahalla at Mashra<sup>C</sup> al-Raml. Indeed, MouÛtte's detailed record of the sultan's activities during the plague years 1678-80, has been seen to point up Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's pre-occupation with self-preservation. Here MouÛtte is borne out by material from the "al-Fāsī" chronicle. Both sources suggest that, amid

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(33) S.I. 1<sup>re</sup> Vol. III No. XCIII Anon. Leconfield MS No. 73 pp. 466-7

(34) See Chapter II Pp. 213-214

(35) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 176

the havoc of the plague, neither the administration nor the society of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā was in any fit state for the elaborate experiment in social surgery that a widespread levy of slaves would have involved. It has been seen that Ismā'īl's employment of <sup>c</sup>abīd during this crisis was not experimental but brutally pragmatic; that they were posted with orders to slaughter travellers on the routes leading into Safs from the pestilence-ridden north (36).

The obvious foundation for the first part of the "al-Hamīdī" material is quite distinct: a memory of the wide-ranging but rough-handed quest for new <sup>c</sup>abīd recruits that was thrust into operation during the mid-1690s, in the aftermath of the disastrous Algerine invasion of 1692 (37). This was the period for which a southern clerk named <sup>c</sup>Alīlish was a known governmental figure (38).

The quest for <sup>c</sup>abīd had required jurist justification in the 1690s. And governmental white-washing of the affair continued. Thus, de Chénier was told, in the mid eighteenth century, that Ismā'īl had, chiefly by gift or purchase, collected an army of slaves who were sun-worshippers whom he converted to Islam, and set beneath the auspices of al-Bukhārī (39). Al-Zayyānī's "al-Hamīdī" material constitutes a variation in <sup>c</sup>Alawī governmental justification of the great quest. It is comparatively robust, acknowledging the rounding up of free negroes and negresses (40)

(36) See Chapter III Pp. 117-118

(37) See Chapter V Pp. 193-197

(38) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 6 Ismā'īl to Muhammad ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsi, 28/Dhū 'l-Qa'da/1104 = 31/7/1693, includes the name of "our servant (khadīmna) Muhammad <sup>c</sup>Alīlish" p. 45. The southern origin of this clerk is vouched for by later, embittered references to the man, as a Murrākushī "Quisling", in the text of al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard pp. 16-17 and 149

(39) L-S. de Chénier English translation of 1788 Vol. II pp. 188-190.

(40) "fa jama<sup>c</sup>ū kull mā wajadū hattā lam yubqa aswad bi 'l-maghrib fī hādira wa lā badiya. wa law kāna hurr aswad aw hurra sawdā'"

("And they gathered in every one they found until there was not a single black remaining in the city or countryside of the Maghrib. There was not even a free negro or a free negress") "Turjumān" p. 15 of the text cf. 29 of the translation.

into an imperial service that was de facto slavery. But al-Zayyānī, who was himself associated with the training of pressed recruits in the days of Muḥammad III (41), is unlikely to have been abashed at the material he was using. In the mid nineteenth century, his material would be refined further by the scandalised Akansūs, who worked out a loyal and logic-chopping defence of the sultan Ismāʿīl. This defence ended with an admission of the facts of co-optation, but nevertheless stressed that the makhzan had kept within the bounds of the law. The defence was based partly upon silence: the silence of the moral voice of the shaykh al-Yūsī, the most renowned literary sage of Ismāʿīl's day. But Akansūs claimed also that he had personally examined the military records of Ismāʿīl's day, and could vouch for the existence of different categories of "personnel" within the muster-rolls of the ʿabīd forces: those in a state of slavery ("raqqīya"), those in the free state ("hurriya"), and "those in the middle category" ("wāsita baynahumā"). On the basis of the "al-Ḥamīdī" material, he accounted for these distinctions with the suggestion that the "slaves of al-Mansūr", although gathered together after scrupulous investigations as to their identity, had yet been recognised as a group distinct from those bought on the open market for cash; and that consequently, any argument concerning the legitimacy of the sultan's actions should turn upon the impressment of free men into the army, rather than upon their enslavement, to which, strictly, the sultan had never pretended.

It has been suggested that there were possibly recognised distinctions between men from Ismāʿīl's primal and palace educated guard of ʿabīd,

(41) "Turjuman" pp. 85-6 of the text and 157 of the translation

(42) Akansūs quoted al-Nāgiri: "Kitāb al-Istiqsā...", Casablanca text, Vol. VII pp. 88-9 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX pp. 120-121

and the men taken, under various circumstances, into the swollen army of the 1690s (43): that <sup>C</sup>abīd who had been trained as court pages ranked higher than pressed adults. The "al-Ḥamīdī" material would disguise such a distinction by suggesting that the majority of the first, pressed generation of <sup>C</sup>abīd was never militarily employed, and that the creation of a corps of court pages, and of a standing guard in Meknes, were clean and secondary developments within Ismā'īl's military policy. But there was no such two-tier development. In Mouëtte's day, the sultan's "Noirs" already fulfilled all the standard military roles of <sup>C</sup>Alawī service. There were <sup>C</sup>abīd in the standing guard. There was a corps of adolescent black pages. And there were negro troops set to garrison forts "hors la veue de leur maistre" (44).

Other details from the "al-Ḥamīdī" material have piecemeal external corroboration, suggesting that many aspects of Ismā'īl's deployment and training of <sup>C</sup>abīd were standard. Throughout Ismā'īl's reign, the sultan's conduct of mass-weddings on behalf of his military slaves was a topic for the prurient delight of alien commentators, especially as it frequently entailed compulsory miscegenation for renegade soldiers (45). This was a matter of common policy, with a view to breeding new generations of imperial troops. It had no necessary connection with Mashra<sup>C</sup> al-Raml, which no known contemporary commentator mentions in such a context. Similarly, it seems to have been customary throughout Ismā'īl's reign for the sultan casually to turn his <sup>C</sup>abīd on to the palace building site as masons. Mouette commented that:

(43) See Chapter V Pp. 197-199

(44) Mouëtte: "Histoire..." p. 176

(45) See, for example, Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 128 cf. "Ockley" pp. 80-81 cf. Windus p. 138



"Les travaux et les ateliers en sont remplis, et on les y voit chargés de fers et de blessures." (46)

These periods of khidma would seem to have been entirely arbitrary. According to Windus, the page-boys who had been toiling one day with "Earth, Stones or Wood" might the next day appear "gay and under Arms" (47). The suggestion within the "al-Hamīdī" material that the three years of formalised building labour constituted some rugged aspect of military training, seems to have been put forward as a pathetic attempt to align Ismā'īl's force of abīd with those major Islamic armies whose recruits had been selected in youth for a period of orderly instruction. However, comparison with the education of the embryonic Almohade "hāfiz" (48), the embryonic Egyptian "mamlūk" (49), or the embryonic Ottoman janissary (50), all of whom were educated in religion and polite literature as well as the arts of war, serves only to underline the rough nature of the handling with which the young abīd were "broken in".

The abīd were undoubtedly held in great indigenous regard during Ismā'īl's own day. The sight of the sultan at the head of his ten thousand blacks was held out in promise to the embassy party of Pidou de St. Olon, as a finer panoply than France could offer (51). But it has been seen that abīd were no match for Turkish-trained troops either at al-Mashāri<sup>c</sup> or at Djidioua. And, internally, the significance of abīd to the maintenance of Miknāsī authority must be

(46) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 176

(47) Windus p. 141

(48) Anon: "Al-hulal al-mawshīya..." tr. Huici. Quoted J.F.P. Hopkins: "Mediaeval Muslim Government in Barbary" (London, 1958) p. 107

(49) al-Maqrīzī: "Khitat..." Vol. II (Cairo, 1906) p. 213, quoted R. Levy: "The Social Structure of Islam" p. 450

(50) H. Dernschwam: "Tagebuch einer Reise nach Konstantinopel und Kleinasien" ed. F. Babinger (Munich and Leipzig, 1923) p. 60

(51) S.I. 2<sup>B</sup> France Vol. IV No. XIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Tetuan, 11/8/1693 p.74

evaluated within a wide and evolving general context. There was no necessary correlation between the effective might of the central power, and the number of abid in the sultan's askar or standing army. It has been seen that the sultan Ismā'il's years of escalating internal authority were the years preceding 1690: years during which the imperial corps of abid was compact by comparison with the swollen horde gathered in by the great military quest of the mid-1690s. Ismā'il could not take the loyalty of this enlarged abid army for granted. During the war between Muḥammad al-Alim and Zaydān, and its aftermath, imperial abid showed themselves as capable of following a sultan's son as of following the sultan himself (54). It was within this early eighteenth century political context that the mahalla of Mashra<sup>c</sup> al-Raml came into being. The creation of this mahalla was not, as the "al-Ḥamīdī" material would suggest, a foundation stone to the creation of a centralised Alawī standing guard. It was its coping-stone: a latter-day experiment by which the sultan Ismā'il built up a massive reserve force which counter-balanced the active power of his sons and magnates (55). Among the forces which these sons and magnates could command were, as during decades past, their own miniature forces of personal abid (56).

A set focus upon the massed troops of Mashra<sup>c</sup> al-Raml and Meknes, such as characterises the "al-Ḥamīdī" material, is ill-assorted with the view that the key to Ismā'il's mastery of his empire was the scattered deployment of his abid. Yet this view, set alongside the "al-Ḥamīdī" material, is also traceable to al-Zayyānī, within whose stylised schema of Ismā'il's reign the sultan's "tamhīd", or "setting

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(54) Busnot Chapters III and IV passim (\*)

(55) See Chapter VI P. 263

(56) S.I. 2<sup>b</sup> France Vol. IV No. XIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Tetuan 11/8/1693 p. 84 cf. Busnot p. 69 cf. Windus pp. 189-90

(\*) An error in transcription resulted in (52) and (53) being omitted from the numerical series of footnotes.

in order" of his kingdoms is recounted as having been completed after twenty-four years of energetic campaigning (57). The associated tactics were summed up in the assertion that Ismā'īl had built forts at all the way-stations and garrisoned them with abīd (58). Bold claims have been made for the consequences of these tactics: that the forts and garrisons were a mechanism for the elimination of a "bilād al-sība" or "country of dissidence" (59), a concept alien to the vocabulary of indigenous authors of the period.

It is true that, stylistically, al-Zayyānī built up the concept of "tamhīd" as a goal which Ismā'īl achieved, as distinct from an incidental chore of military government. Each of the author's major historical texts contains five related passages (60) which provide a bloc of evidence upon Ismā'īl's pacification of his kingdoms. They are set within the narrative of the period 1680-1692, and describe punitive expeditions undertaken against rural groupings. Judged in isolation, these episodes would read unremarkably, as evidence of a fairly commonplace bludgeoning of countryfolk. Yet within the context of the short account of

(57) "Turjumān" p. 25 of the text and 46 of the translation.

(58) ".... tamahhada mulk al-maghrib wa'l-sūs wa'l-sahrā' al-sultān ismā'īl. wa banā jamī' qal'ihī bi 'l-manāzil kullihā. wa shahanahā bi 'abīdihī."

("...the sultan Ismā'īl set the kingdoms of the Maghrib and the Sus and the desert to order. And he built the sum total of his forts at every one of its way-stations. And he stocked them with his black slave troops.")  
 ("Turjumān" p. 23 of the text cf. 43 of the translation)

(59) The concept of the "bilād al-sība", or territory beyond effective government, is built into the French historiography of Morocco. But it has almost universally been waived for the latter part of Ismā'īl's reign. Terrasse considered it controversial to credit Ismā'īl with the abolition of "offensive dissidence" only (op. cit. Vol. II p. 264). More recent work, including "A history of the Maghrib" by J. M. Abun-Nasr (London, 1971) p. 231, has returned to the old theme of rigour and sweeping success. And Magali Morsy in her "Moulay Isma'il et l'armée de métier" concluded that the sultan's deployment of abīd throughout the Maghrib al-Aqṣā, in an "infrastructure politico-militaire", effectively abolished sība.

(60) "Turjumān" pp. 18-19, 20, 20-21, 21-22 and 23-25 of the text cf. 34-35, 37-38, 38-39, 41-42 and 43-46 of the translation cf.

"Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 34, 35, 36 and 40-41

Isma<sup>c</sup>īl's reign, the space and detail allotted to these five expeditions has implied that they were of peculiar significance to the sultan in themselves, and even that they marked stages in a systematic policy of disarming the entire rural populace.

The first of these episodes was a campaign into the "Cherg", allegedly undertaken by the sultan as a measure for the support of those Ma<sup>c</sup>qil groupings whom he had ordered to migrate thither from the Hawz of Marrakesh (61). The four remaining episodes were expeditions which allegedly led to the sultan's mastery of various Beraber groupings from the Central Atlas region. Certain motifs are common to all five episodes: the punishment of hill-folk by the confiscation of their arms and horses, and, as noted previously, the building and garrisoning of forts.

The episodes are related in an increasingly discursive manner, and given increasing moment. Their culmination was the final Central Atlas campaign, dated to 1104 A.H./1692 A.D. The tale of this expedition is sonorous, and related with a wealth of military, geographical and anecdotal detail which gives to the campaign the appearance of a major politico-military undertaking. Isma<sup>c</sup>īl was said, erroneously, to have prefaced the expedition by appointing three sons as vice-roys in Fes Marrakesh and Meknes (62). Thereafter he supposedly led a great and heavily armed haraka towards the Central Atlas. With him there was allegedly a bevy of commanders including, with some chronological improbability, the Bāshā Musāhil, a noted <sup>c</sup>abd general of the last decade of his reign (63). The haraka was said successfully

(61) See Chapter II P. 106

(62) The three sons' names were attached to appropriate vice-regalities. But Muhriz had been appointed vice-roy of Fes in 1678, Ma'mūn vice-roy of Marrakesh in 1677, and Zaydān vice-roy of Meknes in 1685 (Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 108 and 112 and Chapter III P. 140 Note (101))

(63) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard pp. 153-4 cf. Braithwaite p. 7 and passim

to have penetrated high mountain defiles. The vaunted consequence was defeat for a triple dissident confederation from the "Jabal Fāzzāz", and the lateral crushing of a fourth grouping, the Garwān, at the hands of loyalist Beraber. In trophy, the makhzan forces were said to have won ten thousand guns, thirty thousand horses and innumerable heads (64).

This tale of measured brutality has a particular stylistic significance which goes beyond its narration as a major military undertaking. It would seem to have been written up, most notably within the "Bustān al-Zarīf...", as a literary "set-piece", central to al-Zayyānī's account of Ismā'īl's reign. And it was explicitly elevated to climacteric status, dividing the sultan's years of energetic campaigning from his years of relaxation (65). The implication of triumph was hammered home by the trenchant assertion that, after 1692, weapons and horses remained in the possession of only four groupings within Ismā'īl's empire: the Ayt Yimmūr, loyalist Beraber set to guard the "Fāzzāz"; the ahl al-rīf, designated mujāhidūn; the abīd; and the Udāya (66).

The entire body of material to do with pacificatory campaigning seems to have fused several of al-Zayyānī's more dubious sources of information: court tradition; the notes of "pseudo al-Zarhūnī" upon the garrisoning of rural forts; and the folk-memory of the "Jabal Fāzzāz",

(64) "Turjūmān" pp. 23-25 of the text and 43-45 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 40-41. A close reproduction of the latter version of this tale is to be found within al-Naṣirī's "Kitāb al-Istiqsā...", Casablanca text, Vol. VII pp.79-81 and 86-7 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX pp 105-9 and 119

(65) The "Bustān al-Zarīf..." version of the tale concludes thus:  
"wa bi 'l-istīlā' <sup>C</sup>alayhim kamala lihi fath al-maghrib. wa lam yubqa bihi man yanbidu lihi <sup>C</sup>irq."

("And with their conquest his triumph over the Maghrib was brought to fulfilment. There remained within the region no race that strove against him.") "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 41

(66) "Turjūmān" p. 24 of the text and 46 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

the Central Atlas region of the author's ancestry. The result has been firstly to suggest that the Central Atlas was of particular significance to Ismā'īl; secondly to imply that it was internal victory rather than external defeat which brought about the sultan's switch from campaigning to palace retirement; and thirdly to insist that rural pacification and the disarmament of rural peoples were viable goals to whose consummation a date could be set.

The association of four out of the five of the recorded campaigns with the Central Atlas is likely to reflect simply the personal interest of the author in memories of campaigning carried out within the region associated with his own language group. The Central Atlas can have had little intrinsic attraction for the makhzan. As a region of transhumant pastoralism (67) it is likely to have been sparsely populated by comparison with territory such as the inner Sus valley, where intensive agriculture prevailed. The northern fringes of the Middle Atlas were important to the cities of Saïs, as a near and vital source of timber (68); but this trade seems not to have involved the more southerly "Fāzzāz". For a sultan based within Saïs, the greatest significance of the Central Atlas is likely to have been strategic. Its northern sector contains the upland way from Saïs to Tefilelt; and the "Jabal Fāzzāz" overlooks the direct route from Saïs to Marrakesh, passing by way of the Tadla. Both routeways were particularly danger-prone. For they cut across the lines of transhumance along which

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(67) Studies of Central Atlas transhumance include the pre-Protectorate essay of W.B. Harris: "The nomadic Berbers of Central Morocco"; and the twentieth century articles by J. Celerier: "La transhumance dans le Moyen Atlas" in "Hespéris" Vol. VII (Paris, 1927) pp. 53-76 and "L'économie montagnarde dans le Moyen Atlas" in "Revue de géographie marocaine" Vol. I Jan. 1939 (pp. 58-67). (Paris)

Many of al-Zayyānī's campaign stories, and in particular an account from Muḥammad III's day, in which the author displayed his knowledge of local movements in the "Fāzzāz" region, suggest the long establishment within the southern Central Atlas, of a transhumant cycle to rural behaviour (See, in particular, the "Turjuman" pp. 79-80 of the text and 145-6 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS pp. 109-111)

(68) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 56

cf. Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 190

groupings of herdsmen would move back and forth, from altitude to altitude according to the season.

There seems no need to assume that any specific ethnically-based hostility lay at the root of attacks made against Beraber groupings (69), or that the series of Central Atlas campaigns was major and comprehensive, as distinct from minor and typical. Under close examination, much of al-Zayyānī's pacificatory campaign material withers. The skein of notes pertaining to forts supposedly built in conjunction with these campaigns has already been suggested to be "pseudo al-Zarhūnī" material, and unreliable. Further, it seems suspicious that no single one of the five pacificatory campaigns has any firm place within the "al-Fāsī" chronicle material as reproduced within later texts. Al-Nāsiri attempted neatly to align the preliminary campaign into Snassen and Angad country with a well-

(69) The theory that the pacification of the peoples of the Central Atlas region was one of Isma'il's military priorities has, by way of a straightforward reading of al-Zayyānī, become an established theme within French writing upon his period. The most developed expression of this theory is that set out by F. de la Chapelle in his article "Le Sultan Moulay Isma'il et les Berberes Sanhaja du Maroc Central" (A.M. Vol. XXVIII Paris, 1931). This sets the Central Atlas campaigns of Isma'il's reign within a highly questionable historical framework, derived in its current form from G. Marçais ("Les Arabes en Berbérie du XI<sup>e</sup> au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle", Constantine and Paris, 1914). This framework delineated an age-old pattern of conflict between grand, ill-knit, yet ethnically identifiable conglomerations of peoples, acting out their racial destiny within the Maghrib upon a vast historical and geographical scale. According to this schema, there was an ethnically based enmity between the Beraber of the Central Atlas, part of the wider "Sanhaja" grouping, and Isma'il, a Filālī sharīf of quintessentially Arab stock. Their tussle could be interpreted as one episode in the struggle between the Sanhaja and a series of ethnic rivals for control of the Western Maghrib (See also F. de la Chapelle's "Esquisse de l'Histoire du Sahara Occidental" in "Hesperis" Vol. XI Paris, 1930 pp. 35-95)

This viewpoint ignores the evidence that Isma'il and all his successors had the support of certain Beraber groupings. Its development seems attributable in part to the interpretation in seventeenth century terms of certain factors important at the time of the establishment of the Protectorate: the weakness of the sultan's forces in the face of the Zimmūr, a people claiming Beraber origin, who had come to dominate the routeway linking Sals with Rabat; and the difficulties encountered by Lyautey's troops in subduing the peoples of the Central Atlas itself. (See, for the situation in 1903, R. Mauduit: "Le Makhzen Marocain..." p. 295; and, for the difficulties faced by the Protectorate troops, A. Guillaume: "Les Berbères marocains et la pacification de l'Atlas Central 1912-1933" (Paris, 1946) passim)

known expedition into the further "Cherg" (70). But the identification is far from obvious, as the details of the two "Chergi" campaigns are vastly different. As for the dates allotted to the four Central Atlas campaigns, these are best explained in terms of tortuous interpolation into an overall framework of "al-Fāsī" annal material. For al-Zayyānī seems here to have attempted to knit together, as strands of equal weight, two conflicting series of annals, the one metropolitan and the other regional. It is possible that the latter series was a record kept within al-Zayyānī's family. As an appendix to an account dated to 1688, the author included the note that a forefather of his had been co-opted into the sultan's train (71).

Comparison of the Hegiran dating of the Central Atlas campaigns with its Gregorian equivalent, points up weaknesses within the "regional" strand to al-Zayyānī's chronology which would not have been immediately apparent to a Muslim historian writing years after the event. Thus, after recording Ismā'īl's return to Meknes in 1683, following his first Sūsī campaign against Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz, al-Zayyānī's narrative improbably suggests that, almost immediately, the sultan set out for the Middle Atlas, with the aim of subjecting a Beraber grouping, the Idrāsīn. As the return from the Sus was dated, within Fāsī material, to Dhū 'l-Qa<sup>c</sup>da 1094 (72), the author, who apparently wished to have both events stand in the same year, was forced to set the beginning of the Idrāsīn campaign into Dhū 'l-

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(70) See Chapter III Pp. 127-8 as compared with al-Nāṣirī in the "Kitāb al-Istiqsā...", Casablanca text Vol. VII pp. 62-3 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX pp. 82-3. Here the author aligns a campaign account taken from the "Bustān al-Zarīf..." (MS p. 34) with a date taken from the "Nashr al-Mathānī..." (See the French edition of Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 338)

(71) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 36

(72) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above p. 357 cf. "Turjumān" p. 20 of the text and 37 of the translation.



Hijja 1094. This month, which covered late November to late December 1683, was at an unlikely point in the seasonal year for the opening of a campaign against hill-folk. And the dating is clearly belied by the narrative of the Idrāsin campaign itself. This describes an expedition begun in summer and maintained until winter by the blockading of the Idrāsin within high pasture country until famine and the decimation of their herds forced them to descend and sue for peace (73).

A similar problem besets the narrative of the second Central Atlas campaign, dated by al-Zayyānī to 1096 A.H./1685 A.D. The sultan is described as, on this occasion having spent almost a year by the upper Moulouya, supervising fort-building and blockading peoples of the north-eastern Atlas into submission (74). Yet the English slave Phelps recorded that on January 1st. 1685, Ismā'īl set out for the Sus (75) where, even upon al-Zayyānī's own reckoning, he must have been situated in the following autumn. For he is known to have been outside Tarudant when Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz was found murdered (76).

When grooming his "set-piece" upon the grand final campaign into the "Jabal Fāzzāz", al-Zayyānī seems to have been forced to defer the dating he would have preferred. He asserted that the campaign was planned in the year 1103 A.H., but postponed until the beginning of the following year by the sultan's sudden deflection of military purpose into a "Chergi" campaign against the Turks, in the company of his son Zaydān (77). This suggestion of a postponement was probably

(73) "Turjuman" p. 20 of the text and 37-8 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 35

(74) "Turjuman" p. 20-1 of the text and 38-9 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

(75) T. Phelps: "A true account of the captivity..." pp. 8 and 12

(76) "Turjuman" p. 21 of the text and 39 of the translation cf. Chapter III P. 143

(77) "Turjuman" p. 23 of the text and 44 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 40

based upon the author's knowledge of "al-Fāsī" material. In this material it was admitted that, during the latter months of 1103 A.H., which correspond to the high summer of 1692 A.D., Ismā'īl's concerns were dominated by a threat from the Algerine Regency that was only dissipated finally with the return of an embassy from Algiers at the beginning of the following Muslim year (78). The threat was one of the major crises of the reign. As has been seen, it included a Turkish invasion, and the battle of al-Mashārī<sup>c</sup>, a disastrous defeat for <sup>c</sup>Alawī forces upon home territory (79). Al-Zayyānī glided over the memory of this disgrace. But he made it one quiet concession: a forward shift to his tale of the last victory in the "Fāzzāz", a victory which, according to his own logic, was crucial to Ismā'īl's mastering of his own empire. In so doing, he destroyed the credibility of his "Fāzzāz" campaign narrative. For the early months of 1104 A.H. correspond with the autumn of 1692. And it is highly improbable that any major campaign into a mountain region would have been undertaken so late in the year. Further deferral into the following summer campaigning season is unsatisfactory. During the summer of 1693, Ismā'īl is known to have been occupied with the conduct of a major campaign into the "Cherg" (80).

The most straightforward solution to this problematic chronology of pacification is to suggest that al-Zayyānī's record of Ismā'īl's punitive expeditions vastly distorts and inflates events that were of relatively minor significance to the makhzan. It seems likely that it was only within Beraber folk-memory that the sultan could be thought,

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(78) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Fes lithograph Vol. II p. 157 of the first notation.

(79) See Chapter V Pp. 188-190

(80) See Chapter V Pp. 199-201

in person, and upon successive occasions, to have devoted entire years to the subjection of mountain groupings. It is possible that most of the pacificatory action which al-Zayyānī recorded in isolation was actually incidental to expeditions that were geographically and politically of a wider scope: "mopping up" campaigns conducted laterally while the sultan's haraka was on the main routeway. Al-Rashīd apparently conducted such an expedition from the Tadla, while first on the road to Marrakesh (81). And Isma<sup>c</sup>īl directed similar forays during the leisurely return lap of his expedition of the plague years. While he himself organised the rebuilding of a bridge over the Dum er-Rbia, "Serhony, son bacha, qui avoit un camp volant, faisoit souvent les escarmouches avec les Barbares" (82). Al-Nāsiri's alignment of nearer and further "Chergi" campaigns in 1680 is thus made credible; for the attacks upon Snassen and Angad peoples recorded by al-Zayyānī can be seen as examples of a routine punishment of rural peoples, undertaken on the sultan's homeward march from an ill-fated Tilimsānī expedition. Similarly, the three campaigns into the Central Atlas which al-Zayyānī dated to the 1680s can all be seen as ancillary to the sultan's two major Sūsī expeditions of the decade. In this light they present no chronological problems. And their raids for arms and horses may be seen in context, as the snatching of supplementary military equipment.

The final "Fāzzāz" campaign of 1692 is less easy to dovetail with imperial harakāt of wider range. But it is possible that the campaign was minuscule as seen from Meknes. Isma<sup>c</sup>īl himself need not have been involved. The cut, and even perhaps the memory of the affair may be

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(81) See Chapter II P. 84

(82) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 124

discerned within contemporary European notes upon a genuine Central Atlas campaign. In the June of 1691, the qā'id Ahmad ibn Ḥaddu al-Attār, who was briefly in court disgrace, was sent, for his own punishment, upon a mountain expedition. Two months later, his haraka returned, trailing plunder and a party of rustic heretics (83). His campaign would seem to have been of the diminutive cast later noted as commonplace in the report of Napoleon's envoy Burel:

"...petites expéditions contre les Berabères qui occupent les gorges de l'Atlas du côté de l'Est:...ces expéditions sont-elles courtes et peu lointaines; les armées sont formées avec célérité dans les provinces voisines des lieux où il faut opérer, et composées en grand partie de la population du lieu jointe à une portion de troupes de l'empereur." (84)

The note upon the significance of rural auxiliaries to these "petites expéditions" recalls al-Zayyānī's racy details upon the activities of loyalist Beraber during Ismā'īl's campaigns into the "Fāzzāz".

It must be allowed that, even if minor or lateral, "Chergi" and Central Atlas campaigns were pacificatory in a certain ephemeral sense. Pro-dynastic sentiment would see "tamhīd" in any expedition that involved the sultan or his men in scorching a path along a major rural thoroughfare. And it has been seen that, to contemporary eyes, the protection of wayfarers was the duty of a sharīf and a good sultan (85). Eighteenth century legend credited al-Rashīd in person with fulfilling the obligations of his birth by the protection of a caravan (86).

This theme of the protection of travellers infiltrated al-Zayyānī's own tales of "tamhīd". Thus, in 1680, Ismā'īl was said to have

(83) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. III Nos. CXXXIII and CLI Memoranda of J-B. Estelle, completed Sale, 24/7/1691 and 2/2/1692 respectively. (pp. 385 and 448-9)

(84) Burel: "Mémoire Militaire..." p. 58

(85) See Chapter IV: Pp. 176-7 and 179

(86) See Chapter I P. 55

ordered the construction of forts at intervals of a day's journey along the pilgrimage route between Saïs and Dujda, and to have set up shelters for caravanners in association with these forts (87). The tale of the 1683 campaign against the Idrāsin, whose grazing-grounds verged upon Azrou, where the routes from Tafilelt and Marrakesh into Saïs meet, was clinched by the assertion that the region was freed from brigandage along the Saïs routeway (88). Similarly, the massacre of the Garwān by their loyalist Zimmūr neighbours, which is set into the "Fāzzāz" tale of 1692, was supposedly permitted as retribution for the Garwān having endangered a section of "the road to the desert" (89).

These last Central Atlas notes of al-Zayyānī's may be taken as the sententiousness of a "law-and-order" man who believed that, even in his own rough country, tough campaigning could have lasting results (90). It is indeed true that Ismā'īl's reign was considered by contemporaries to be remarkable for its high degree of routeway security. But this was, for the most part, security locally maintained (91). And, in the rugged Central Atlas region, this security was only intermittent. For the key Tadla route between Fes and Marrakesh, it is impossible to trace any makhzan-induced mid-reign climacteric separating routeway lawlessness from routeway orderliness. In 1683, ten years before the supposed climacteric of

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(87) "wa bi-kull qal<sup>c</sup>a funduq limā bayt al-qufu<sup>l</sup>" ("And in each fort a shelter to house caravans") "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 34

(88) "fa-istarāha min <sup>c</sup>aythihim bi-tarīq sa'īs" ("And he was freed from their deprivations along the Saïs routeway") "Turjumān" p. 20 of the text cf. 37 of the translation

(89) "Turjumān" p. 24 of the text and 45 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 40-41

(90) See Prologue P. 26 Note (41)

(91) See Chapter IV : Pp. 177-178

pacification, the party of the French ambassador St. Amans travelled peaceably through the Tadla, upon its return journey from the Sus (92). Yet, after 1692, this passage was at times difficult. Thus, in 1696, it was planned that Zaydān, as vice-roy designate of Marrakesh, should travel from Meknes to his post by way of Sale (93). His route implies that the Tadla path was considered dangerous. And in 1707, Zaydān's own funeral cortege, which numbered several thousand men, was only permitted to pass beneath the "Fāzzāz" upon the payment of a bribe to local peoples (94).

There is thus reason to doubt the validity of al-Zayyānī's claim that, by 1692, Ismā'īl had achieved massive and lasting success in pacifying the rural populace of his empire. It is particularly unlikely that he had deprived the mass of his people of their arms and mounts. There is a contemporary reference to a disarmed body of Ismā'īl's subjects. This refers to the civic population of Sale. With the exception of the governor, and of a few favoured possessors of hunting licences, the men of this town were said, in 1699, to be armed only with knives (95). But the rural scene is likely to have been very different. A passage in Braithwaite's narrative, from less than a year after Ismā'īl's death, tells of a rural warrior array as seen a few days' journey to the north of Fes (96). The sight was very similar to the display made by Berber mujaḥidūn outside Tangier in the days of al-Rashīd (97). In both cases, the tribesmen were a mob of

(92) "Journal du Voyage de St. Amans" pp. 337-8

(93) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. IV No. LXVII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed Sale, 2/4/1696 p. 401

(94) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. VI Pere Busnot to Pontchartrain, Cadiz, 29/10/1707 p. 389

(95) S.I. 2<sup>e</sup> France Vol. V. Maisonfort to de Combes, Rouen, 28/12/1699 p. 526

(96) Braithwaite pp. 135-6

(97) Anon: "The Interest of Tangier" appendix to "A Discourse Concerning Tangier" (London, 1680) pp. 37-8. Internal evidence suggests that the appendix was written in 1664, the year of the death of the Earl of Teviot.

dexterous horsemen, of whom a proportion toted fire-arms. The intervening reign of Ismā'īl would here seem to have made little difference to rustic possession of the requisites of battle.

Over the period, Sūsī men would probably have been better armed than men of the "greater Gharb". In the High Atlas, which was rich in the appropriate minerals, the possession of locally manufactured muskets and ammunition seems to have been widespread throughout Ismā'īl's reign. The party which, in 1709, skirted the outer reaches of the Atlas, in the company of the pilgrim Ahmad al-Nāṣirī of Tamgrout was armed (98). And the text of al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft is riddled with references to home-made fire-arms and ammunition.

A letter of rebuke, directed at the sultan Ismā'īl, and attributed to the shaykh al-Yūsī, has been called in defence of the theory that Ismā'īl systematically disarmed his subjects. The letter is quoted in full in the "Kitāb al-Istiḡṣā...", in the context of comments made upon it by Akansūs (99). Akansūs seems to have been arrested by its single reference to a population deprived of horses and arms. Al-Zayyānī had supplied his master-text for Ismā'īl's period. And, on this point, the letter aligned with al-Zayyānī's re-iterated motif of "tamhīd" : "al-khayl wa'l-silāh", the mounts and weapons surrendered to Ismā'īl by subject peoples. Some literary connection between this letter and al-Zayyānī's writing seems possible. But the direction of the derivation is not obvious. The letter is anonymous. None of its surviving MSS possesses a date (100). The work therefore cannot be said for certain to antedate the period of Akansūs himself. Its pre-occupation with the related themes of the jihād, coastal defences and Tetuan may be considered suspicious.

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(98) "Voyage de Moula Ahmad..." ed./tr. Berbrugger p. 176

(99) Al-Nāṣirī: "Kitāb al-Istiḡṣā..." Casablanca text, Vol. VII pp. 81-86 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX pp. 109-119

(100) Berque: "Al-Yousi..." p. 139

Within the letter they are linked with the period of al-Rashīd and of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl. But these sultans' names could have been employed as filters for the secure expression of alarm aroused by the Spanish Moroccan conflict of 1859-60, which had taken place while Akansūs was writing (101). And, even if genuine, the letter would add little to al-Zayyānī's evidence. It is generalised, floridly polite and decidedly hectoring (102). Amid a full-scale condemnation of oppression and heavy taxation, it suggests that, instead of depriving Muslims of their arms and horses, Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl, as sultan, should leave these in the possession of the people, or even donate them as an aid to the waging of the jihād. The parallels between this text and the more detailed notes on disarmament given by al-Zayyānī are limited to the simple theme of the sultan's confiscation of arms and horses. The Ayt Yūsī were among the Beraber confederations who had supposedly submitted to the sultan in the aftermath of the campaign dated by al-Zayyānī to 1685 (103). Berque concluded that the letter was written in the aftermath of this campaign, which the sage al-Yūsī had seen as the epitome of unjust government (104). For this there is no proof. The letter makes no mention of the Ayt Yūsī, and is geographically precise only in insisting that the entire Maghribī coastline from

(101) The "Jaysh al-<sup>c</sup>aramram..." terminates with the year 1282 A.H./  
1865 A.D.

(102) In itself the angry tone of the letter need not indicate that the document is spurious, although it may suggest that the work was intended for discreet literary perusal only. Berque noted the survival of a further letter, allegedly written by al-Yūsī to the sultan Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl, and dated to 1675 ("Al-Yousi..." pp. 58 and 139). This second letter was similarly irate in tone, and declared the saint's desire to counter the sultan's wishes by leaving Fes for the peace of the countryside. Its theme, an invective against city life, is typically literary, and likely to have been intended simply for circulation within a literary "milieu".

(103) "Turjuman" p. 20 of the text and 38 of the translation of "Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS p. 35

(104) Berque: "Al-Yousi..." pp. 91-2



Qal'iyā to Massa should be set on a war footing. Further, it has been seen that al-Zayyānī's details concerning the pacificatory campaign dated to 1685 are far from reliable (105). Equally uncertain is the seventeenth century alignment of the Ayt Yūsī. One tradition suggests that this population was counted among the loyalist groupings of Ismā'īl's day, and was employed by the sultan to guard the Sefrou section of the Fes-Tafilelt routeway against attacks from neighbours (106).

According to al-Zayyānī's view of "tamhīd", disarmament was one wing to rural pacification, and fort-building the other. Al-Zayyānī believed Ismā'īl to have built seventy-six forts spanning his empire (107). And undoubtedly, many forts were built or restored during Ismā'īl's long reign. Indeed, al-Zayyānī's boast that the forts spanned the region between Oujda and Wādī Nūn (108) was an under-estimation. At the end of Ismā'īl's reign, he had a "small Castle" at Cape Blanco (109), somewhat nearer to the Senegal than to Wādī Nūn. However, the role of this castle in relationship to Meknes is impossible to estimate. It is difficult to believe that its garrison had close ties with the capital. And it has been suggested already that it is impossible to equate the construction of a fort with local pacification, or with effective government from Meknes (110).

It is unnecessary to associate fort-building with the sultan's superintendence, or with the years prior to 1692. Thus, <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Karīm, the great bāshā of Marrakesh, is recorded as having overseen the construction of an High Atlas piedmont fort at Amizmiz, on the Wādī

(105) See the present chapter Pp. 299-301

(106) Reisser and Bachelot: "Notice sur le cercle de Sefrou" in "Bulletin de la Société de Géographie du Maroc" (Paris, Feb. 1918) p. 38

(107) "Turjuman" p. 16 of the text and 31 of the translation

(108) ibid. loc. cit.

(109) Braithwaite p. 335

(110) See Chapter IV: Pp. 181-185

Nafīs, in the autumn of 1713 (111). Nor was fort-building peculiar to Ismā'īl's reign. It is probable that, as "fort-builder extraordinary" this sultan was conveniently accredited with a number of constructions for which his predecessors and successors were responsible. A modern attempt by de la Chapelle to identify, with the aid of both written and oral tradition, the entire array of forts at Ismā'īl's command, racked up a total of fifty-seven (112). Of these, a number were admitted to be of Sa<sup>c</sup>dī or Dilā'ī origin. Others post-dated Ismā'īl's reign. Thus, de Chénier, who in 1781 visited one listed construction, the beetling fortress of Boulaouane, noted that its major recent restoration had been the work of Ismā'īl's son, <sup>c</sup>Abd Allāh (113). Similarly, certain of the listed Tadla forts could have been of nineteenth century origin. For their names were culled from the chronicle of "Si Brahim Nasiri", attributed to a contemporary of Ismā'īl, but extant only in a twentieth century manuscript in which, as its editor admitted, traditions from Ismā'īl's day were confounded with others from the time of the nineteenth century sultan <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Rahmān (114).

A deeper understanding of Ismā'īl's precise contribution to fort-building in the Maghrib al-Aqṣā awaits planned archaeological investigation. However, for the purpose of understanding Ismā'īl's government, it may always be necessary to rate Ismā'īl as the architect of the Miknāsī palace and its grasping economy, as of greater significance than Ismā'īl as the master of a chain of rural forts. For fort-garrisons were, as MouÛtte put it, "hors la veue de leur maistre" (115).

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(111) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard pp. 45-6

(112) F. de la Chapelle: "Le Sultan Moulay Isma'il et les Bereberes..."  
(Footnotes to pp. 25-8)

(113) de Chénier English translation of 1788 Vol. I pp. 87-9

(114) A translation of the chronicle of "Si Brahim Nasiri" by Lt. Reyniers, was set as an appendix to de la Chapelle's article (A.M. Vol. XXVIII, Paris, 1931) pp. 37-42, and referred to within the article's text by de la Chapelle as editor (pp. 8 and 37-41)

(115) MouÛtte: "Histoire..." p. 176

Part II: The shadow of Sayyidī Muhammad III

At the heart of al-Zayyānī's <sup>C</sup>Alawī history lay the figure of his master Sayyidī Muḥammad III, a sultan who delighted in seeing himself as political heir to the towering figure of Aḥmad al-Mansūr al-Sa<sup>C</sup>dī. The comparison probably sprang from Muḥammad III's capture in 1769 of the Portuguese enclave of Mazagan, an echo of the battle of Alcazarquivir which, in 1578, had destroyed a king of Portugal, and given al-Mansūr his sobriquet. Muḥammad III made a conscious attempt to imitate al-Mansūr in the incidentals of his court behaviour, ferreting for details in the "Manāhil al-Safā'..." of al-Fishtāli, al-Mansūr's court historian. On pilgrimage near Aghmat in 1784, the sultan attempted to draw his bemused entourage into literary exchanges based upon the impromptu versification credited to al-Mansūr and his courtiers on a journey in the same region. Finding his own following at a loss to understand the references, Muḥammad is said to have had the relevant passages of the "Manāhil al-Safā'..." read out to them, in order that they should be learned by heart (116).

Al-Zayyānī bowed to his master's predilection. His discussion of Sayyidī Muḥammad III opened symbolically with an account of his being sent to Marrakesh as vice-roy to his father <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh. There he pitched his tent amid the ruins of Sa<sup>C</sup>dī palaces. Later he restored Marrakesh as an imperial city and, within it, the mosque which al-Mansūr had built (117). The erection of Aḥmad al-Mansūr and Muḥammad III into twin pinnacles was bound to diminish intervening rulers. The latter

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(116) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 117 ff.

(117) "Turjumān" pp. 67 and 69 of the text, and 123 and 126 of the translation of. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 82 and 83

Sa<sup>c</sup>dī were swiftly disposed of (118). And disorderly government was made a backdrop to the rise of the <sup>c</sup>Alawī political founding father, al-Sharīf, who was said to have gained power in Sijilmasa while the Sa<sup>c</sup>dī sultan <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Malik ibn Zaydān led, within Marrakesh, a life abandoned to pleasure (119). However, early <sup>c</sup>Alawī history was less easy for al-Zayyānī, as an historian of the <sup>c</sup>Alawī dynasty, to subordinate to his own main matter, to which Muḥammad III stood as focus. Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl was a figure whose longevity and achievements made him peculiarly difficult to set aside. But the author took care that the grandfather did not overshadow the grandson.

Al-Zayyānī glorified the reign of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl with an antiquary's superficiality, as a period of "curiosities". Notes relating to the sultan's vast numbers of children and of captives (120) were set forth upon the same level as notes upon the massive palace complex of Meknes, upon the abīd and upon the rural forts (121). The repetitious stress was upon quantity and bulk. Taken all together, the details endorsed the view that Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl had been, in his day, a fascinating and remarkable figure. But they invoked criteria quite separate from those by which Muḥammad III would be judged, and so could not diminish him. In the matter of the jihād, al-Zayyānī may have sensed the possibility of competition. In this sphere, Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl could well have been portrayed as exemplary. In al-Zayyānī's day, his

(118) Lévi-Provençal, who had access to a MS of the "Turjuman" containing a chapter on the Sa<sup>c</sup>dī, noted that it was heavily dominated by an account of the reign of Aḥmad al-Mansūr. Only cursory treatment was granted to that sultan's successors. ("Les Historiens des Chorfa" p. 176)

(119) "Turjuman" p. 1 of the text and 2 of the translation

(120) "Turjuman" pp. 28-9 of the text and 54-5 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 44-5

(121) "Turjuman" pp. 13 and 14-15 of the text cf. 25-6 and 28-31 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 30 and 31-2

reign was credited with having seen the capture of four coastal enclaves from the Christians: Mamora, Tangier, Larache and, inaccurately, Arzilla (122). This run of success could have enshadowed Muhammad III's single victory over Mazagan, and his policy of commercial alliance with Christian powers, among whom Spain, the ancient enemy, was the chief (123). Significantly, al-Zayyānī recorded the victories of the mujāhidun during Ismā'īl's reign in curiously brief and prosaic terms. Al-Nāsiri seems later to have gone to some effort towards padding this material out in Ismā'īl's honour: his account of the capture of Larache contains information taken from five indigenous prose-writers, together with further notes from the Spanish historian Castellanos; and he crowned the affair by quoting a lengthy praise-poem (124).

In al-Zayyānī's summing up of Ismā'īl's reign, the period was allowed to represent that standard item of folk-memory, the "good old days": an idyllic period of peace and order, plenty and low prices, during which the peoples of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā had supposedly become as dutiful as the Egyptian fallāhūn (125). But this collapse into nostalgia was spliced with darker Fāsī material giving laconic notes upon disasters dating from Ismā'īl's final decade: the Spanish victory outside Ceuta, and the fiscal belabouring of Fes (126). Further, the author carefully delimited certain achievements which redounded to Ismā'īl's fame, by pointing out that the idyll germinated its own

- (122) "Turjumān" pp. 19, 20 and 22-3 of the text cf. 35-6, 38 and 42-3 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 34, 35 and 39-40
- (123) For a contemporary summary of Muhammad III's commercial relations with European states see: de Chenier English translation of 1788 Vol. II pp. 294-301 and 357-372
- (124) Al-Nāsiri: "Kitāb al-Istiqṣā..." Casablanca text, Vol. VII pp. 73-7 cf. Fumey translation, A.M. Vol. IX pp. 97-103
- (125) "wa sāra ahl al-maghrib ka-fallāhīn ahl misr" ("And the people of the Maghrib took on the demeanour of the peasant populace of Egypt") ("Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 44)
- (126) "Turjumān" p. 28 of the text and 53 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." loc. cit.

destruction, and that order was only re-born in the time of Muhammad III. It was stressed that, following Isma<sup>C</sup>il's death, his <sup>C</sup>abid became sultan-making masters of the country, amid disorders that brought about their own ruin. It was the achievement of Muhammad III effectively to re-found this force, and to restore the <sup>C</sup>Alawī <sup>C</sup>abid to prosperity and order (127). Similarly, it was his achievement to put an end to the rural disorder which had burst forth in 1727, producing brigand-infested routeways. Among insubordinate local peoples, the Beraber in particular were said to have lost no time in re-equipping themselves with arms and horses (128). And, according to al-Zayyānī's final historical notes:

"Because of them (the Beraber) these circumstances afflicted the people of the Maghrib, until God had the mercy to send them the reign of Sayyidī Muḥammad ibn <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh...He governed them with discernment and firmness." (129)

The focusing of al-Zayyānī's <sup>C</sup>Alawī history upon the figure of Muhammad III produced a curious retrospective twist to the purely dynastic history of Isma<sup>C</sup>il's reign. This was imposed by the author's desire to enhance the court status, during Isma<sup>C</sup>il's lifetime, of Khunātha bint Bakkār, daughter to a shaykh of the M<sup>C</sup>āfra, a "Qiblan" grouping, and mother to Isma<sup>C</sup>il's son <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh, through whom the

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(127) "wa lam yudarrīk minhum al-sultān sayyidī muḥammad lammā buyi<sup>C</sup>a illā al-qalīl. wa huwa alladhī jama<sup>C</sup>ahum wa ahyāhum bi<sup>C</sup> add."

("And very few of them (the <sup>C</sup>abid) remained with the sultan Sayyidī Muḥammad when he received the oath. It was he who gathered them together and revitalised their numbers.") "Bustān al-Zarīf" MS P. 87

(128) "Turjumān" p. 30 of the text and 65-7 of the translation of. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 47

*Sā'at* (129) "wa sā'at aḥwāl ahl maghrib ma<sup>C</sup>ahum ilā an rahimahum allāh bi-wilāyat al-sultān sayyidī muḥammad ibn <sup>C</sup>abd allāh... fa-sāsahum bi-hilmihī wa ḥazmihī"

("Turjumānat al-Kubrā...") ed. al-Filālī p. 71

direct line of authority continued. Khunātha was linked with Muḥammad III by more than the simple association of grandmother with grandson. During <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh's first period of government, she made a dynastically famed pilgrimage to Mecca, in the company of Muḥammad, who was then as small boy (130). And when <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh suffered the first of several oustings from power, both he and Muḥammad his son were granted asylum, for more than two years, by the M<sup>C</sup>āfra who, as Khunātha's people, were <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh's akhwāl (131)

Khunātha is known to have figured in palace politics during Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's declining years as a "Concubine...of great Interest" (132). But she was not counted among the sultan's wives (133). It was for later dynastic tradition, as set forth by al-Zayyānī, to grant to her union with Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl an unparalleled significance and fanfaronade. It was claimed that, in 1678, Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl had taken an expedition into the deep south. On the route, and apparently with ease and brevity, he pacified the Sus. He then continued, by way of the Dar<sup>C</sup>a, as far as Chinguetti. In the course of this expedition, Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl was said to have collected a force of two thousand harātīn to be joined to his new force, supposedly clustering at this date at Mashra<sup>C</sup> al-Raml. It was also claimed that the sultan received the voluntary submission of eight named Arab-speaking groupings

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(130) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." quoted al-Nāsirī: "Kitāb al-Istiḡsā..." Casablanca text Vol. VII p. 131 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 181 cf. Anon. "Relation de ce qui s'est passé dans le Royaume de Maroc depuis 1727 jusqu'en 1737" pp. 215-216

It would seem to be upon this pilgrimage that dynastic sycophants have based their insistence upon Khunātha's reputation for piety and learning. For a recent example of such commentary, see Lakhdar: "La vie littéraire..." pp. 190-192

(131) "Turjūmān" p. 40 of the text and 74 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 57

(132) Braithwaite p. 6

(133) An account of the "Disposition of Presents to the Court of Macquines by the Hon. Chas Stewart Esq." linked with the 1721 embassy, lists the names of four queens and "Lala Chineta" as recipients of gifts (S.P. 71 (16) ff. 613-617 Memo., dated Meknes, 24/7/1721)

from the "Qibla" and desert fringe or "Sāhil", including the M<sup>c</sup>āfra, the Shabbānāt, the Jirār and the Mtā<sup>c</sup>. Associated with this mass declaration of allegiance was the sultan's marriage with Khunātha (134).

This account of a "Qiblan" royal progress is likely to be fictional. It has been seen that the penetration of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's authority south of the Anti-Atlas is unlikely long to have pre-dated 1690 (135). And it is doubtful whether Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl at any point in his reign personally led an expedition into the "Qibla". There seems no evidence of such a venture outside of al-Zayyānī's record. And there was certainly no expedition along the southern route described by al-Zayyānī during 1678, a plague year for which the skulking and prophylactic track of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's movements is known in detail from Mouëtte's "Histoire". In this year, Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl went no further south-westwards than the head of the Dar<sup>c</sup>a. He was far from any "pacification" of the Sus, which was then under the suzerainty of Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz. Indeed he would seem, at this date, to have been at pains to avoid a southern confrontation with his nephew. For, rather than enter his rival's "sphere of influence", he made his disastrous decision to attempt an High Atlas crossing in winter (136).

The dating of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's union with Khunātha to 1678 is in itself suspiciously early. Windus recorded that, in 1721, the "mother of Muley Abdallah"'s own mother was alive and well able to carry messages for her daughter (137). It is possible that the chronology here adopted by al-Zayyānī was of complimentary significance, designed to link Khunātha with the foundation of the corps of <sup>c</sup>abīd, which in the terms

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(134) "Turjumān" pp. 16-17 of the text and 31-32 of the translation of. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 32

(135) See Chapter III Pp. 135-155

(136) See Chapter III Pp. 119-120

(137) Windus p. 128



of al-Zayyānī's "al-Ḥamīdī" material was the re-foundation of the army of al-Mansūr. It has been seen that Khunātha's marriage was given literary juxtaposition with a trawl for harātīn recruits for Mashra<sup>c</sup> al-Raml. These two thousand harātīn, allegedly brought back from the "Qibla" in 1678, may thus be seen symbolically as a contribution from Khunātha: a "dowry" presented to al-Mansūr's restored army. Similarly, the setting of Khunātha's name and people at the heart of a mass rallying to Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl by desert groupings was dynastically complimentary at a level other than the obvious. Three of these groupings, the Shabbānāt, Jirār and Mṭā<sup>c</sup> may be assumed to have been regarded by al-Zayyānī as the cognate kin of peoples he had noted as military followers of Sa<sup>c</sup>dī kings (138). The tradition thus provides yet another grace-note to the implied association between Muḥammad III and al-Mansūr, the greatest of Sa<sup>c</sup>dī rulers.

As ancestress to the continuing line of <sup>c</sup>Alawī sultans, Khunātha seems comparable to the surface text of a palimpsest. Her memory, within indigenous tradition, all but obliterates the memory of another and previously significant Saharan woman. For all but the last decade of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's reign, contemporary evidence seems devoid of reference to Khunātha or to <sup>c</sup>Abd Allāh her son. By contrast, there is a mass of evidence that, from the 1690s until her death in 1715, unrivalled prominence as mistress of the palace belonged to <sup>c</sup>Ayisha Mubārka, mother to the successive heirs presumptive Zaydān and Ahmad al-Dhahabī. This was a woman whom al-Zayyānī's texts acknowledged only within the discreet obituary notice of an "umm al-shurafā'" (139).

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(138) In the "Bustān al-Zarīf..." these three names, together with the name of the Zirara, were listed together with the note: "kānū 'l-jundiya ma<sup>c</sup> a al-mulūk al-sa<sup>c</sup>dīya" ("They were the troops of the Sa<sup>c</sup>dī kings") MS p. 30

(139) "Turjumān" p. 27 of the text and 51 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43

This displacement of <sup>c</sup>Ayisha Mubārka by Khunātha, in dynastic tradition, is chiefly significant as an explanation for al-Zayyānī's glancing and "folklorique" treatment of the origins of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's corps of Udāya; the "parientes" of his "Reyna Negra" <sup>c</sup>Ayisha (140). Within the narrative allotted to Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's period, the "Turjumān" contains only a single reference to the Udāya. And this is set within the highly suspect text which states that, from 1692 onwards, horses and weapons were retained by only four military groupings, of which the Udāya formed one (141). To this fleeting note, the "Bustān al-Zarīf..." adds a bloc of roughly composited information on the entry of the Udāya into Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's service: an introductory "just-so" story of pleasant naivete, which expands into a corpus of inchoate and dateless detail.

According to this account, it was after the fall of Marrakesh to Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl, in 1677, that the sultan went hunting one day in the Bahīra plain to the north of that city. There he met an herdsman foraging for his beasts by cutting away at the lotus trees: a man with a knife, "Abū 'l-Shafra". The sultan's interrogation of this herdsman led to the joyous discovery that the man and his "brothers" were the sultan's own personal akhwāl. They were of Udāya descent (142) but had been driven northwards by drought (jadb) from the "Qibla" by way of the Sus, and were currently associated with peoples of the "Ḥawz". The herdsman's own particular grouping dwelt with the "Ḥawz" Shabbānāt. After a kindly chiding for not having come previously to greet the sultan, the herdsman was urged to bring his chattels into Marrakesh. There he was set at the head of a body of cavalry, with

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(140) See Chapter IV: P. 171 Note (64)

(141) "Turjumān" p. 24 of the text and 46 of the translation of.  
 "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 41

(142) See Appendix B Pp. 338-9

orders to gather in his scattered kinsmen and conduct them to Meknes, where they were registered as the sultan's troops and domiciled next to the palace at al-Riyād. Subsequently a new body of recruits from the "Qibla" proper came into Meknes to join their "brothers". One detachment from this total force was later set into Fās al-Jadīd, to replace a body of Zirāra and Shabbānāt troops who had been there under the command of al-Duraydī. At the head of these Fāsī Udāya there was placed one Muḥammad ibn <sup>C</sup>Attā. He was said to be the son of <sup>C</sup>Alī Abū Shafra, by whom al-Zayyānī may be presumed to have meant the original Bahīra herdsman, now become the Udāya commander in al-Riyād. After a period of regular alternation, the two generals permanently exchanged posts (143).

This bloc of material, as summarised above, hastily foreshortens information that can be teased out over the history of much of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's reign. Its style is quite alien to the treatment which al-Zayyānī awarded to the Udāya in the course of his narrative of <sup>C</sup>Alawī history for the years following 1727. Into this later narrative, the activities of the Udāya as a military and political pressure group are tightly knit. The author's sketchy account of Udāya origins arouses suspicion. It is known that the Udāya formed a notable force at the time when al-Zayyānī was writing. For the year 1808, when Sulaymān was sultan, Burel noted the influence and favour at court enjoyed by the "alcaides" of the "Loudaya". He estimated the corps at eight thousand "établissements autours de Fes et servant près de l'Empereur qui les aime beaucoup" (144). It seems unlikely that al-Zayyānī would have slid through the early history of such a force, merely by oversight.

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(143) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 29-30

(144) Burel: "Mémoire Militaire..." pp. 59 and 61

The clue to the author's reticence lies within the suggestion that the Udāya were constituted as the akhwāl or maternal kin of Ismā'īl himself (145). It is true that, in the days of Ahmad al-Dhahabī, Ismā'īl's immediate successor, the Udāya were accustomed to call themselves "uncles" of the sultan. Braithwaite explained, with reference to <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Malik Abū Shafra, the Udāya commander he knew, that his "Stile and Title" of "Uncle" was "a common form, old Muley calling all the Lydyres his Relations" (146). But, for Ismā'īl himself, a formal relationship with the Udāya as akhwāl is unlikely. Even as a courteous fiction, it is improbable that the Udāya were constituted as the kinfolk of Ismā'īl's mother. All that is recorded of this woman is that she was a slave girl: according to al-Zayyānī, a "jāriya" born among the M<sup>C</sup>āfra (147). In the light of the author's interest in stressing the M<sup>C</sup>āfran connections of the <sup>C</sup>Alawī dynasty, the ethnic element within this tradition may well be seen as dubious. It is certainly irrelevant. As al-Nāsirī later pointed out, servile status would have rendered null any of the woman's associations by birth or upbringing (148). Further, it has been seen that there is strong European evidence that, in Ismā'īl's own day, the Udāya were regarded collectively as kin, not to the sultan's mother, but to <sup>C</sup>Ayisha Mubārka, the sultan's wife, and the mother to the heirs presumptive of his lifetime (149).

But there was purpose behind al-Zayyānī's suggestion that the

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(145) "antum akhwāl" ("You are maternal uncles") are the very words with which Ismā'īl was said to have greeted his first Udāya recruits ("Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 29)

(146) Braithwaite p. 24

(147) "jāriya min mawlūdāt al-m<sup>C</sup>āfra" ("A slave-girl of M<sup>C</sup>āfran birth") "Turjumān" p. 3 of the text cf. 5 of the translation.

(148) Al-Nāsirī: "Kitāb al-Istiqsā...", Casablanca text Vol. VII p. 14 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 19

(149) See Chapter IV: Pp. 170-171

corps of Udāya originated in the chance meeting between Ismā'īl and a lost kinsman of his own. It deftly removed any implication of illegitimacy from the association current in the author's own times between the Udāya, and sultans from the line of <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh ibn Ismā'īl, the prince who emerged from internecine warfare as his father's effective successor. Hints at further links between Ismā'īl's Udāya and the Shabbānāt, or the Māfra, may be construed as weak attempts to attach to the Udāya traditions which al-Zayyānī associated with Khunātha, <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh's mother, and Muḥammad III's ancestress.

Al-Zayyānī's bloc of notes upon the Udāya resembles his evidence concerning the foundation of the corps of <sup>C</sup>abīd. It contains a number of details open to an individual external verification. But, as a composite whole, the developed tradition is misleading, and can be seen to have been warped to provide a dynastically appealing "received version" of events. Thus the surnames "Abū Shafra" and "ibn <sup>C</sup>Attā" were each associated with Udāya generals known to European reporters (150). But it is likely that simple word-play upon the first name suggested the legend-like motif of the "man-with-a-knife" as the first Udāya commander. Similarly, the dating of the foundation of the corps of Udāya to 1677 seems uncannily accurate. It has been seen that there was an ingathering of troops from Marrakesh and its surrounds, following the city's capture from Ahmad ibn Muhriz (151). But this ingathering was not the serendipitous consequence of a placid hunting expedition. It was thrust into operation in the face of a last flicker of political menace from Dilā'. And it only began the metamorphosis of the Udāya from rabble into crack corps. As has been suggested,

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(150) Busnot Chapter III passim cf. Braithwaite pp. 23 and 95

(151) See Chapter II Pp. 103 and Mouštte: "Histoire..." p. 108

the Udāya are likely to have reached political maturity along with their "nephew-by-courtesy", Zaydān, the Udāya queen's eldest son (152).

Pre-occupation with the priorities of Muḥammad III brought more than a narrowly dynastic warp to al-Zayyānī's early <sup>C</sup>Alawī history. The imperial master's interests would seem to have underlain another and quite distinct strand to the story: al-Zayyānī's intricately tailored account of confrontation in the "Cherg" between early <sup>C</sup>Alawī princes and the forces of Algiers.

The Algerine administration acknowledged the suzerainty of distant Constantinople. And rapprochement with the Porte was an highlight of Muḥammad III's foreign policy. During his reign, large sums in aid were despatched to the Ottoman sultan. Formally this aid had pious motivation: support for the Ottoman jihād against the forces of Catherine the Great's Russia. At another level, the gifts constituted an attempt to buy a "free hand" in dealings with Algiers. Perhaps, also, the gifts may be seen as a covert bid by Muḥammad, as the wealthy ruler of a louche domain, at buying enhanced dignity in his dealings with the "Grand Signior", the most prestigious of Muslim princes (153).

In 1786, al-Zayyānī travelled to Constantinople as Muhammad III's ambassador (154). He seems to have been infected with admiration for the Ottoman state. Later, in a summary of <sup>C</sup>abīd history, he was to insert a reference to a proportion of these <sup>C</sup>Alawī troops as "janissaries" ("inkisha'iriya") (155). He visited Constantinople a

(152) See Chapter IV: Pp. 169-70 and ff.

(153) For a recent account of Muhammad III's relations with the Ottoman empire, see R. Lourido Diaz: "El sultanato de Sidi Muhammad b. <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh (1757-1790)" (Granada, 1970) pp. 127-138. See also Terrasse Vol. II pp. 295 and 297

(154) "Turjumānat al-Kubrā..." ed. Al-Fīlālī pp. 96-126

(155) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 87

second time, in a private capacity. There he spent a period studying the Ottoman history to which he gave a significant place within the pre-<sup>C</sup>Alawī chapters of his "Turjumān al-Mu<sup>C</sup>rib..." (156). The Ottoman empire was set into this work as the state which crowned the history of the Muslim east, parallel, by the author's implication, to <sup>C</sup>Alawī Morocco, whose story culminated his survey of the Muslim west.

This sense of honourable demarcation had not always governed <sup>C</sup>Alawī relations with the Turkish power immediately to their east, the Algerine Regency. It has been seen that, over the years 1680-1701, march peoples had suffered a series of raids designed to give the sultan Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's wavering taxation frontier an eastward thrust, and that these raids had precipitated two massive defeats for <sup>C</sup>Alawī armies by Algerine forces. Within al-Zayyānī's texts, this border confrontation is given only skinny acknowledgement, in notes that are quite overshadowed by a lengthy preliminary section of narrative. This tale purports to recount an episode in <sup>C</sup>Alawī relations with the Regency, dating from the pristine days of Muḥammad ibn al-Sharīf, elder brother to al-Rashīd and to Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl.

According to this tale, Muḥammad, around the year 1640, went voluntarily from his base in Tafilelt into the "Cherg". There, with the aid of "Chergi" Arabs from the Angad plain, he took the town of Ujda. Subsequently he used Ujda as a base for operations of a remarkable sweep, which ranged from Snassen country, out as far as the Saharan posts of Ain Madi, Laghouat and el-Ghasoul, lying two hundred miles to the south of Algiers. His deprivations provoked a "Bey of Mascara" into demanding reinforcements from the capital. The Day, <sup>C</sup>Uthmān Pasha, sent an heavily armed expedition westwards through

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(156) Lévi-Provençal: "Les Historiens des Chorfa" pp. 169-170

country which Muhammad had lain waste. In face of this threat, Muhammad withdrew to Sijilmasa without joining battle. Later, he received a four-man embassy from Algiers, bearing a lengthy letter of protest. Muhammad's first response was fury. But, after counter-changes in which the envoys explained that their opponent's conduct had been unworthy of a sharīf, the prince's fury turned to profound repentance. Claiming that he had been duped by the "Arab devils" ("shayātīn <sup>C</sup>arab"), his allies, into serving their nefarious ends, he solemnly swore never again to cross the river Tafna into the Regency, on an unlawful errand (157).

It is possible to see this tale of Muhammad's "Chergi" raiding as entirely fictitious. It has no place in the earlier writings of al-Ifrānī, who was well able to detail Muhammad ibn al-Sharīf's oasean exploits, his bid for Fes, and his final assault upon his brother al-Rashīd (158). Nor was the episode mentioned in the notes upon Muhammad given by the early dynastic historian al-<sup>C</sup>Alawī (159). The tale involves the suggestion of conflict with a "Bey of Mascara" at a time when Mascara was not yet the seat of a beylicate, and of counter-moves by an "<sup>C</sup>Uthmān Dey", unknown to Algerine history, in which the office of Dey did not figure before 1671. In itself the tale is bizarre. It echoes the better documented "Chergi" exploits of other <sup>C</sup>Alawī princes, al-Rashīd and Zaydān ibn Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl, but is ill-assorted with what is known of the career of Muhammad ibn al-Sharīf. It implies that, for a period, Muhammad was willing and able

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(157) "Turjumān" pp. 3-5 of the text and 5-9 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 10-13

(158) "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." ed./tr. Houdas pp. 299-302 of the text and 495-499 of the translation cf. "Zill al-Warīf..." pp. 33-4 and 37

(159) Al-<sup>C</sup>Alawī: "Al-Anwār al-Husniya..." pp. 76-77



to abandon Tafilelt for a "Chergi" base, and to adopt an alien following of shirāqa, only to return afterwards, peaceably to his former political base at Sijilmasa upon the Ziz. This delineation of Muḥammad's career would seem to have puzzled al-Nāsiri. In his "Kitāb al-Istiqsā..." he transferred the tale of Muḥammad's move upon Oujda into the aftermath of that sharīf's 1650 assault upon Fes (160). This re-alignment is unsatisfactory. By 1652, Muḥammad ibn al-Sharīf is known to have been back in Tafilelt, from which he led an haraka out to Tuat (161).

The inspiration for the entire narrative of Muḥammad's "Chergi" raiding is likely to have been the long letter of florid rebuke which al-Zayyānī associated with Muḥammad, and quoted in full within his "Bustān al-Zarīf..." (162). The letter includes a plethora of proper names, detailing peoples and places supposedly associated with the marauding of the man to whom it was addressed. A number of well-known "Chergi" groupings figure within this context, including the Banū Amir. There also figure the toponyms Ain Madi, Laghouat and al-Ghasoul. The high degree of correlation between this body of nomenclature and the names set into the saga of Muḥammad ibn al-Sharīf's "Chergi" adventuring, renders it highly unlikely that the letter and its associated narrative were written independently. The letter may be seen as the primary document, providing notes from which the skeleton of the raiding story was constructed. For the letter is less anachronistic than the narrative. It lacks any reference to a "Bey of Mascara". And its note that the Banū Amir

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(160) Al-Nāsiri: "Kitāb al-Istiqsā...", Casablanca text Vol. VII pp. 20-21 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX pp. 26-8

(161) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahai" quoted Martin pp. 52-3

(162) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 10-12

were currently acknowledging infidel suzerainty (163) records circumstances true for the seventeenth century, when Oran, at the edge of Banū<sup>C</sup> Amir country, was a Spanish "presidio". It is written in the name of one Muḥammad ibn<sup>C</sup> Abd Allāh, otherwise unknown. And it contains no trace of reference to the mysterious "<sup>C</sup>Uthmān Dey", who may perhaps be dismissed as an eponymous "Ottoman".

However, the letter raises its own problems. It is not a diplomatic missive, but a literary creation, written throughout in rhymed prose. Its text within the "Bustān al-Zarīf..." lacks the date with which al-Nāsirī later provided it (164). And it is addressed, informally, to an unnamed sharīf, son of "al-Sharīf". This "sharīf" is likely to have been Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl, as the letter implies that he was third of his house (165). It is improbable that he was ever intended to receive the letter. It is equally improbable that the letter, in its extant form, was written in Algiers. For it contains no invective of the type which characterised the "Daftar al-Tashrifāt" (166), and no trace of the contempt with which the <sup>C</sup>Alawī sovereign to the west, an "Arab" chieftain of "miserable black-faced Moors" (167)

(163) "wa zayyanat sawlatuka li-banū<sup>C</sup> amir: li-qādat al-nuffar li-kanaf al-kawāfir"

("And your attack has provoked the leaders of the Banū<sup>C</sup> Amir into flocking to the protection of the infidel")

("Bustān al-Zarīf.... MS p. 11)

(164) Al-Nāsirī: "Kitāb al-Istiqsā... Casablanca text Vol. VII p. 27 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 36. The date given is the 15/Rajab/1064 = 1/6/1654

(165) "awwal al-dawlat thā'ir: wa 'l-thānī muqtaf lihi sā'ir: wa 'l-thālith li-kamāl miyar nā'ir"

("A rebel the first of the house; the second a follower in his path; and the third brings the kindling of war to its fulfilment.")

("Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 12)

(166) See Chapter V P. 188

(167) Al-Hājj Sha<sup>C</sup>bān Dey to Pontchartrain, Algiers, 25/Muharram/1102 = 29/10/1691, quoted in translation in E. Plantet: "Correspondance des Deys..." Vol. I p. 380

was customarily regarded in higher Algerine circles. For, while criticising the "sharīf", the letter serves also to glorify his martial capacity, by suggesting that his exploits had sent a tremor through the lives of peoples of the Maghrib al-Awsat, living as far to the east as Constantine and the Djerid. And its overall tone is sternly moralising rather than strictly hostile. It refers to the sharīf's ill-directed courage (shajā'a), and to the machinations of the "ahl-sibta", presumably the Spanish Ceuta garrison. The obvious implication is that the sharīf would have been better occupied in waging the jihād than in raising dust among "Chergi" peoples. A possible source for the expression of such opinions would have been the Qadiriya community of Tlemsen: pro-Ottoman, but equivocally placed in the march (168). The letter ends with a demand that the sharīf leave the environs of Tlemsen (169), and cease from interfering in the squabbles of its neighbouring migrant peoples (170).

It is conceivable that the letter was picked up by al-Zayyānī during his eighteen months exile spent in Tlemsen over the years 1792-3. It is known that at this period he took a close interest in history, and read widely (171). He may have associated the document with the early days of Muhammad ibn al-Sharīf, on the grounds that

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(168) See Chapter III P. 126

(169) "ahī tajannab quwāh tilimsān. wa lā tazāhumahā bi-miḥan jumū<sup>c</sup> rumat wa lā fursān"

("O turn aside from the approaches to Tlemsen. Do not press it to ordeal with your cohorts of musketeers and cavaliers.")

("Bustān al-Zarīf...") MS p. 12

(170) "inna ishtahat al-a<sup>c</sup>rāb qhāra<sup>c</sup> alā ba<sup>c</sup>dihim ba<sup>c</sup>dā ...wa ya<sup>c</sup>imuhum<sup>c</sup> inda al-duwal mā ya<sup>c</sup>imu al-makhānā al-kuffār"

("For the nomad groupings desire to skirmish amongst themselves... and a responsible member of any government treats with them as he would treat with the treacheries of the infidel.")

("Bustān al-Zarīf...") MS loc. cit.

(171) "Turjumānat al-Kubrā...." ed. Al-Fīlālī p. 144

it was addressed to a "sharīf" and not to an acknowledged sultan, and afterwards proceeded to utilise it as raw material for the construction of a scene-setting prologue to the "Chergi" content of his current work. As finally wrought, the tale of Muḥammad ibn al-Sharīf's eastern adventure usefully involved a retrojection of the period of most significant conflict between the <sup>c</sup>Alawī and the forces of the Algerine Turks into the days of a shadowy "ur-sultan". It credited an <sup>c</sup>Alawī prince with far flung raiding that enhanced the military honour of the dynasty. But it carefully absolved the dynasty from the guilt of aggression by stressing that Muḥammad had been duped into trespassing within the Regency. The blame for his actions was squarely laid with march groupings of "Arabs". Upon this point, the author's personal bitterness may be discerned. Surprise attack by "Chergi" peoples near Ujda in 1792 had led to his own disgrace and enforced Tilmisānī exile (172).

The most important aspect of the tale of Muḥammad ibn al-Sharīf's "Chergi" adventuring, is that it was clinched with the establishment of a political maxim governing <sup>c</sup>Alawī relations with the Regency of Algiers: peace with honour, based upon the mutual acceptance of a frontier at the Tafna, the river flowing between Ujda and Tlemsen. This aligned with circumstances accepted for most of Muḥammad III's reign, but left al-Zayyānī with the task of explaining away the trespasses of the early <sup>c</sup>Alawī period. For this reason the author's notes upon the Tafna frontier form a particularly distorted vein within his general narrative. Evidence of eastward transgressions by <sup>c</sup>Alawī armies was customarily slurred over, or treated as, in some sense, a pardonable aberration from the norm.

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(172) "Turjumānat al-Kubrā..." ed. Al-Fīlālī p. 140

Al-Rashīd's career was easily contained within the schema. It was implied that his early "Chergi" adventuring took him only as far as Oujda (173), and that he repeated his brother's written guarantee of acceptance of a Tafna frontier (174). But the "Chergi" campaigning of Ismā'īl gave rise to a tradition of greater convulsion, with its individual prologue. Late in the 1670s (175), Ismā'īl was said to have invaded the "Cherg". He moved to the south of Tlemsen, where he received the massed allegiance of nine named Arab groupings. With their support, and the particular encouragement of the Banū <sup>C</sup>Amir, Ismā'īl went on as far as the upper Chéliff, where he was confronted by an heavily armed expeditionary force from Algiers. A night of Turkish cannon and mortar fire terrified the sultan's Arab following. Headed by the Banū <sup>C</sup>Amir, they fled, leaving the sultan with the support only of the <sup>C</sup>askar with which he had set out. Subsequently he received a letter from the Turks, bidding him keep within traditional boundaries. It was accompanied by written evidence that his brothers Muḥammad and al-Rashīd had accepted the Tafna frontier. Battle was thus rendered dishonourable as well as militarily indiscreet. Ismā'īl made peace and retired. But never again would he trust the Arabs (176).

Elements within this tale recall the earlier narrative of Muḥammad's adventures. Here again are the motifs of unwitting trespass, Arab

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(173) "Turjuman" p. 7 of the text and 14 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 22

(174) "Turjuman" p. 17 of the text and 32 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 33

(175) The "Bustān al-Zarīf..." (loc. cit.) would date this campaign to 1089 A.H. and the "Turjuman" (loc. cit.) to 1090 A.H. These years include the campaigning summers of 1678 and 1679 respectively.

(176) "wa min yauma'idhin lam ya'mun fī al-<sup>C</sup>arab wa lam yathiq bihim" ("And from that day forth, he had neither faith nor confidence in the Arabs.") ("Turjuman" p. 17 of the text cf. 33 of the translation)

duplicity, and the halting of an eastward march by a Turkish letter. However, this tradition concerning Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl seems in part to be rooted in the memory of a genuine campaign: Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's first major "Chergi" haraka of 1680. As has been seen, MouÛtte's account of this expedition includes notes upon a peaceable meeting between Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl and Arabic-speaking groupings, confrontation with a powerful Turkish force, and the cessation of hostilities upon the receipt of a brusque letter from Algiers adjuring Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl to remain within the boundaries traditionally accepted by the "roys de Fes" (177). But within al-Zayyānī's narrative, the vapour of plague and famine which surrounded the 1680 campaign has been dissipated, and the geographical scope of the actual feeble Tilimsānī expedition, nobly increased. There has also been added to the tale a refrain upon the fickle loyalties of "Chergi" peoples.

The result is a narrative developed to suit the internal logic of dynastic tradition. It recapitulates the theme of <sup>c</sup>Alawī acceptance of a Tafna frontier. It functions as a pointer towards subsequent campaign stories. And, as, within al-Zayyānī's texts, it follows upon the tale of Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl's supposed expedition into the "Qibla" (178), it balances this earlier episode, while stressing the contrast between the two ventures. Both harakāt were allegedly distinguished by the ingathering of a following. But the allegiance of "Qiblan" groupings entailed loyal service; a similar declaration of loyalty by shirāqa from the east was followed by treachery.

It seems that al-Zayyānī wished to imply that "Chergi" expeditions aimed at the belabouring of eastern traitors were amply justifiable. He could thus use the theme of punitive campaigning within the eastern march as a sleight for containing the memory of incursions beyond the

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(177) See Chapter III Pp. 127-128

(178) See the present section P. 314-315

beyond the Tafna. One relevant episode was set into the author's narrative at the year 1680. It is the first of the corpus of five campaign narratives associated with Ismā'īl's "tamhīd" or "setting to order" of his domains, and it lists rural groupings compelled to accept disarmament (179). According to the nomenclature of the "Bustān al-Zarīf...", three out of the four Arabic-speaking groupings involved were peoples who had supposedly abandoned Ismā'īl by the Chéiff in his hour of need, during the previous campaign. Within the narrative structure, these were peoples receiving their just deserts for an act of treachery in the field. One of these groupings, the Ḥamiyān, was from beyond the Tafna (180). This circumstance was left unremarked. Similarly, for the year 1682, a year for which contemporary European sources rumoured a confrontation in the Tilimsānī march, between the forces of Ismā'īl and an army from Algiers (181), al-Zayyānī's narrative suggested that Ismā'īl's eastward move had been directed solely against the Banū 'Amir (182), the arch-traitors of the first "Chergi" campaign. The Banū 'Amir were inhabitants of "Oranie", well beyond the Tafna. But the author avoided any implication that Ismā'īl's supposed attack upon their territory had precipitated any Turkish counter-move. His tale of a subsequent Turkish invasion of Snassen country was linked solely with the machinations of Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz (183).

Traditions concerning the confrontation between the forces of Ismā'īl and the forces of the Regency over the decade 1691-1701, were

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- (179) "Turjumān" pp. 18 of the text and 34-5 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 34
- (180) Al-Nāḡirī: "Kitāb al-Istiḡsā..." Casablanca text Vol. VII p. 21 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 27
- (181) See Chapter III Pp. 135-6
- (182) "Turjumān" p. 19 of the text and 36 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf...." MS loc. cit.
- (183) "Turjumān" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

too strong for al-Zayyānī to ignore. The period was marked off by events associated with the two major <sup>C</sup>Alawī defeats at al-Mashāri<sup>C</sup> and at Djidioua. And the entire decade was scarred by <sup>C</sup>Alawī raids upon Algerine territory (184). The author was compelled to present both aggression and defeat in an acceptable fashion. To this end, his major narrative device was carefully to set the figure of Zaydān rather than the figure of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl at the centre of the "Chergi" disorders. Within al-Zayyānī's writings, in which memory of Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's design for an "Udāya succession" was obliterated, Zaydān was dynastically a marginal figure, without the pre-eminence that is vouched for by European sources contemporary with Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's middle years. He was said to have been the boldest cavalier among Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl's sons ("afraṣ awlādihi") (185). But there is no record of his ever having been heir presumptive. Tradition reserved the distinction of "waliy <sup>C</sup>aḥd" in his father's lifetime for Aḥmad al-Dhahabī (186). Zaydān was therefore conveniently well-suited to the role of unruly son, a maverick for whose deeds his father could not necessarily be held responsible.

The foundation for this line of approach is likely to have been a genuine tradition concerning Zaydān's leadership of his father's troops within the "Cherg" over the years 1691-2: a leadership which had culminated in the debacle at al-Mashāri<sup>C</sup>. It has been seen that al-Zayyānī discreetly left this first defeat unspoken of. A blurred précis of the entire encounter survives, limpet-like at the edge of the author's great set-piece of internal pacification: the final

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(184) See Chapter V passim.

(185) "Turjumān" p. 23 of the text and 44 of the translation

(186) ibid. p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation



campaign into the "Jabal Fāzzāz" (187). The precis simply records Zaydān's leadership of the campaign, and Ismā'īl's supposedly short-term swerve aside from his campaign against Beraber groupings, into joining his son in making peace with the Turks. Any literary trace of the invasion by Algerine forces was neatly erased by the suggestion that peace had been made at the frontier town of Oujda (188).

Within al-Zayyānī's texts, subsequent <sup>C</sup>Alawī ravaging of the "Cherg" survives only within a record which shaped events into a narrow but acceptable drama. The role of Zaydān was made crucial and vigorous. In 1694, when it was probable that the troops under Zaydān's command went no further than Taza (189), the prince was said to have raided the Turks of Tlemsen, and to have brought back booty (190). On this occasion, his father's fundamental goodwill towards Algiers and Constantinople was vouched for by an immediately subsequent note within the narrative. This described Ismā'īl's reception of an embassy from the Porte, and his swift compliance with its demands that he should make peace with Algiers (191). It has been seen that the embassy was a genuine occurrence, but that Ismā'īl's regard for the peace it had brought was short lived. Grim raiding of Tilimsānī march peoples was soon resumed from the west. But within al-Zayyānī's texts the tedious pattern of this raiding was transmuted. Zaydān was made entirely to blame for the renewed rupture of relations with the Algerine Regency. In 1699-1700, as the sultan doled out vice-regalities, Zaydān was said to have been allotted the "Cherg". Thereafter, in what

(187) See the present section, Part I Pp. 295-6

(188) "Turjuman" p. 24 of the text and 44 of the translation

(189) See Chapter V P. 203

(190) "Turjuman" p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 41

(191) "Turjuman" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

seems to have been a colourful misremembering of his raid of 1691 (192), Zaydān was alleged to have cut a swathe through Algerine territory. The incursion was put forward as the crime of a bold young warrior: successful, and carrying a touch of bravura. It was claimed that the prince had expelled the Turkish garrison from Tlemsen, and had raided the palace of the Bey of Mascara (193): both achievements are apparently unknown to contemporary comment, and may be assumed to be fiction. Within this context, no trace survives of Ismā'īl's personal involvement, at this date, in raiding beyond the Tafna. Al-Zayyānī carefully dissociated the sultan from the raiding, by insisting that Ismā'īl respected the peace he had made with the Turks, and disapproved of his son's actions, to the point of depriving him of command (194).

Nevertheless, in terms of this narrative, the transgression of the son was to be visited upon the father. The encounter of 1701 was made the outcome of the previous year's raiding. The plundered Bey was said to be with the army that came from Algiers to punish Ismā'īl. Battle, and, by implication, defeat, were upon this occasion admitted (195). Either, however, the author was unaware of the battle site or he suppressed it. The simple insertion of the toponym Djidioua would have shattered his carefully moulded version of relations between Ismā'īl and the Turks, with the bald demonstration that Ismā'īl had

(192) See Chapter V P. 188 and the "Daftar al-Tashrifāt" p. 502 of the text and 506 of the modern French translation.

(193) "Turjuman" p. 25 of the text and 48 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 41-2

(194) "falammā balaḡha dhalika al-sultān ikhtāza ʿalayhi wa ʿazalahu li-ʿl-sulh alladhī kāna baynahu wa bayna al-turk"

("And when this reached the sultan he was furious with him (Zaydān), and deprived him of command, because of the peace that there was between him and the Turks")

("Turjuman" pp. 25-6 cf. 48 of the translation.)

(195) "Turjuman" p. 26 of the text and 48 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 42  
See also Chapter V P. 236

provoked his own undoing by an undisguisable invasion of the Regency.  
For Djidioua lies half way along the road between the Tafna and  
Algiers.

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## APPENDIX A

THE TERM HARTĀNĪ/HARĀTĪN

It is impossible to use the term hartānī (pl. harātīn) with sociological precision, as its connotations are part racial and part economic. It is a term particularly characteristic of oasean society in the western Sahara and its fringes. Here it denotes the sedentary serf-cultivator who tends the palm grove of a migratory master. To date, there has been no serious full-scale study of the hartānī in this context.

Oasean serf-cultivators are known to have existed as early as the time of Leo Africanus (1). For centuries they have been regularly distinguished both from free men and from slaves. Thus, according to a chronicle edited by A-G-P. Martin, the death-roll of a seventeenth century Tawātī famine affecting the settlement of Makhra was enumerated in categories of "harratines" and "negres" (2). Such serfs remained "harātīn" even if they left the land. In the context of a 1719 civic "brouhaha" in Timbuktu, the dependents of oasean shurafā' who had settled within this city were carefully referred to as harātīn, as distinct from abīd proper (3).

Outside of the oases, harātīn seem best regarded as the "coloureds" of north-west Africa. They are today frequently of a bronzed or mulatto appearance, and have been seen by the ethnologically romantic as the remnant of an ancient and

(1) Leo ed. Ramusio ff. 73-4

(2) al-Tawātī quoted Martin p. 54

(3) "Tadhkirat al-Nisyan..." pp. 29-30 of the text and 47-8 of the translation.

aboriginal bronze race. Such speculation has been passed on, with qualified approval, within certain of the passing notices to which discussion of the harātīn has been so far confined (4). However, these people are more likely to represent a stock resulting from centuries of miscegenation within settlements strung along the major slave-trading routes. In the nineteenth century they were noted as being particularly typical of the Dar<sup>c</sup>a valley (5) where, in the early sixteenth century, Leo had noted that slaves were a particularly prominent section of the population (6).

Within the Atlas arc, the term hartānī may, in certain contexts, have been used to denote "freedman". In his annotated reproduction of al-Zayyānī's account of the setting up of the abīd army, al-Nāsirī, as part of his defence of Ismā'īl's recruitment policy, defined hartānī as "atīq", or "emancipated slave" (7). As root of the term, he gave the etymologically impossible "al-hurr al-thānī", or "second class freeman". But this was a prim and blinkered interpretation of the total connotation of the word. De Foucauld, an author who was al-Nāsirī's contemporary, passed on a significant if grubby little gibe:

"Parle-t-on mariage?" dit un proverbe, "l'Arabe demande: 'est-elle de bonne maison?'; le Chleuh, 'est-elle riche?'; le Hartani, 'est-elle blanche?'" (8)

For the period covered by the thesis, the weakness of a lawyer's

(4) See, for example, the relevant passages within R. Mauny's "Tableau Géographique de l'Ouest Africain au Moyen Age" pp. 444-5, and within "Le Sahara Français" Vol. II of R. Capot-Rey's "L'Afrique Blanche Française" (Paris, 1953) pp. 169-72

(5) de Foucauld p. 88

(6) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 73

(7) Al-Nāsirī: "Kitab al-Istiqsā..." Casablanca text Vol. VII p. 58 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 77

(8) de Foucauld loc. cit.

limitation of the term to the meaning "freedman" is illuminated by the contemptuous term "red-hide" ("ahmar al-jild") employed, as a synonym for hartānī within the sultan Isma<sup>c</sup>īl's own chancery (9). The connotation "freedman" may also be undermined by the fragment of a register possessed by M. G-S. Colin (10). This document, which covers a section of rural "Jabalī" society, regularly employs haratīn as a synonym for wusfān: "slaves". There is no clarification here of the precise meaning of haratīn. But the meaning "freedmen" would seem to be eliminated.

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(9) See Chapter V Pp. 216-217

(10) See Chapter V P. 196 (Note (51))

## APPENDIX B:

THE GEOGRAPHICAL CONNOTATIONS OF 'UDĀYA'

The name "Udāya" is distinctively Saharan, but, for the period covered by the thesis, cannot be attached with precision to any narrow ethnic grouping or limited region.

In the sixteenth century "Udāya" seems to have had "Qiblan", that is, western Saharan connotations. The name was employed by Portuguese authorities of the early sixteenth century to denote both the desert hinterland of the stretch of coast facing Arguin island (1), and the Arabic-speaking section of the inhabitants of this region (2). Leo, from the same period, listed the "Vodei" as a sub-fraction of the "Mahchil" Arabs, a grouping "di numero quasi infinito" inhabiting the desert between Wadan and Walata (3). These were peoples who could be reached by way of the Dar<sup>c</sup>a valley. A rebellious nephew of Ahmad al-Mansūr al-Sa<sup>c</sup>dī, Dāwūd ibn <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Mu'min, is said to have fled southwards along this route "to lead a nomadic life among the Udāya Arabs of the south" (4).

However, by the early nineteenth century, the name seems to have been subjected to a shift inland. On a map drawn at this date by Grey Jackson, once British consul in Mogador, to illustrate trading connections between Morocco and Timbuktu, the term "Ludaya Arabs" was set sprawling across a region sited between "Tuat Encampment", and the similarly vast region of the "Mograffra Arabs" (M<sup>c</sup>āfra?), set to the west of the "Ludaya", and within the

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(1) "Lodea": Valentim Fernandes Alema: "Descripçam..." ed./tr. P. de Cenival and Th. Monod (Paris, 1938 pp. 68-72)

(2) "Ludea": D. Pacheco Pereira: "Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis" ed. A.E. da Silva Dias (Lisbon, 1905) p. 77

(3) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 4

(4) "wa istaqarra bihi al-rahl fī <sup>c</sup>arab al-udāya min <sup>c</sup>arab al-janūb" Al-Ifrānī: "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." ed./tr. Houdas p. 85 of the text cf. 150-151 of the translation.

hinterland of Cape Bojador. This map must be admitted to contain gross errors. Grey Jackson belonged to the school which believed the Niger to be the Upper White Nile, and all his information for regions beyond the Atlas came at second hand. But for Saharan, as distinct from West African geography, the draftsman's major points of reference seem to align relatively well with points along the coastline, which here provides an approximately accurate frame to the whole (5).

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(5) Grey Jackson Map facing page 283.



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Included within this category are primary works from the entire pre-Protectorate period. The list is limited to works referred to within the text of the thesis. Certain of the major items printed or reprinted in whole or part within the series inaugurated by de Castries: "Les Sources Inédites de l'Histoire du Maroc" (S.I.) are listed separately, with a cross-reference to the relevant volume of that series. In determining the order of reference, anonymous works have been listed chronologically. "Al-", "Ibn" and the Arabic letter <sup>c</sup>ayn (ع) have been alphabetically ignored. Compendia have been listed under the names of their editors.

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- |   |                   |                 |
|---|-------------------|-----------------|
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|   | <u>Angleterre</u> | Vol. II (1925)  |
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Files footnoted within the text of the thesis:-

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(13) to (17) inclusive: Consular and miscellaneous correspondence referring to Morocco, 1637-1733

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(1) Miscellany of eighteenth century Gibraltar papers

B. Secondary Sources

These have been subdivided. The aim has been to keep the list brief. However, to those sources footnoted within the text of the thesis, there have been added certain general works which helped to mould the background against which the thesis took shape. These additional works include two gaudy "lives" of Mawlay Isma<sup>C</sup>il, the works of Blunt and of "Maxange-Defontin". Their content is ripe with "copy" suitable for exclusion from any considered study of their hero's period.

Published Books

- I.S. Allouche and A. Regragui: "Catalogue des MSS Arabes de Rabat"  
Two volumes, (Paris 1954, and Rabat, 1958). This catalogue notes additions to the library from the year 1921 onwards, and was designed to supplement the earlier catalogue of E. Lévi-Provençal (q.v.)
- I. Bauer y Landauer: "Apuntes para una bibliografía de Marruecos"  
(Madrid, N.D.)
- J. Berque: "Al-Yousi: problèmes de la culture marocaine au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle" (Paris, 1958)
- P. Berthier: "Les anciennes sucreries du Maroc et leurs réseaux hydrauliques: un épisode de l'histoire de la canne à sucre" (Rabat, 1966) Two volumes.
- W. Blunt: "Black Sunrise: the life and times of Mulai Ismail, Emperor of Morocco 1646-1727" (London, 1951)
- E.W. Bovill: "The Golden Trade of the Moors" (London, 1958)
- J. Brignon, A. Amine, B. Boutaleb, G. Martinet, B. Rosenberger and M. Terrasse: "Histoire du Maroc" (Casablanca, 1967)
- R. Capot-Rey: "Le Sahara Français" being Vol. II of "L'Afrique Blanche Française" (Paris, 1953)



- M.P. Castellanos: "Apostolado Serafico en Marruecos" Vol. I  
(Madrid and Santiago, 1896) (Vol. II was never written.)
- M.P. Castellanos: "Historia de Marruecos" Third edition (Tangier, 1898)
- G.N. Clarke: "War and Society in the Seventeenth Century" (London, 1958)
- A. Cour: "L'établissement des dynasties des Chérifs au Maroc et leur rivalité avec les Turcs de la Régence d'Alger 1509-1830."  
(Paris, 1904) Volume XXIX in the series "Publications de l'École des Lettres d'Alger."
- The tone of Cour's work is redolent of a period when an independent Morocco was formally to be considered a threat to French Algeria. And the work itself is riddled with errors. Nevertheless, it is a piece of some interest. It provides the sole attempt, to date, at a study of relations between the Maghrib al-Aqṣā and the Maghrib al-Awsat over its chosen period. And, for the reign of Ismā'īl, it has the strength of an appreciation of this sultan's interest and involvement in the "Cherg", an interest which standard histories, concentrating upon Morocco in isolation, have virtually obliterated. L/
- O. Dapper: see Ogilby
- M. Dāwūd: "Tārīkh Titwān" Volumes I-II (Tetuan, 1959)  
These volumes preface the author's major interest, the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-1860
- M. Delafosse: "Haut-Sénégal-Niger (Soudan français)" Vol. I  
(Paris, 1912)
- A. Delcourt: "La France et les établissements français au Sénégal entre 1713 et 1763" (Dakar, 1952)
- J. Despois and R. Raynal: "Géographie de l'Afrique du Nord-Ouest"  
(Paris, 1967)
- G. Fisher: "Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa 1415-1830" (London, 1957)  
The title of this work is over-comprehensive. The book is, in affections and content, heavily biased towards the Ottoman Regencies, and Algiers in particular. It is virtually devoid of information upon Morocco during the period.
- L. Galindo y de Vera: "Historia, vicisitudes y política tradicional de España respecto de sus posesiones en las costas de Africa" (Madrid, 1884)
- E. Gellner: "Saints of the Atlas" (London, 1969)
- E. Gellner and C. Micaud (editors): "Arabs and Berbers" (London, 1972)
- H-D. de Grammont: "Histoire d'Alger sous la domination turque (1515-1830)" (Paris, 1887)

- A. Guillaume: "Les Berbères marocaines et la pacification de l'Atlas Central (1912-1933)" (Paris, 1946)
- M. Hājji: "Al-zāwiya al-dilā'iya wa dawruhā al-dīnī wa 'l-ilmī wa 'l-siyāsī" (Rabat, 1964) Short title within the thesis: "Al-Zāwiya al-Dilā'iya..."
- J.F. P. Hopkins: "Mediaeval Muslim Government in Barbary until the sixth century of the Hijra" (London, 1958)
- Ch.-A. Julien: "Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord, Tunisie-Algerie-Maroc, de la conquête arabe à 1830" (Paris, 1952) Second edition of Vol. II of the author's earlier "Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord", as revised by R. Le Tourneau.
- H. Kamen: "The War of Succession in Spain" (London, 1969)
- H. Koehler: "L'église chrétienne du Maroc et la Mission Franciscaine 1221-1790" (Paris, 1934)
- M. Lakhdar: "La vie littéraire au Maroc sous la dynastie <sup>c</sup>Alawide (1075-1311 = 1664-1894)" (Rabat, 1971)
- E. Laoust: "Mots et choses berbères" (Paris, 1920)
- A. Laroui: "L'histoire du Maghreb: un essai de synthèse" (Paris, 1970)
- R. Lebel: "Le Maroc et les écrivains anglais aux XVI<sup>e</sup>, XVII<sup>e</sup>, et XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècles" (Paris, 1927)
- R. Le Tourneau: "Fès avant le Protectorat: étude économique et sociale d'une ville de l'Occident Musulman" (Casablanca, 1948)
- E. Lévi-Provençal: "Les manuscrits arabes de Rabat" (Paris, 1921)  
It is to this work that the catalogue of Allouche and Regragui (q.v.) was designed to form a supplement.
- E. Lévi-Provençal: "Les historiens des Chorfa: essai sur la littérature historique et biographique au Maroc du XVI<sup>e</sup> au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle" (Paris, 1922) Short title within the thesis: "Les historiens des Chorfa".
- R. Levy: "The Social Structure of Islam" (London, 1957)
- R. Lourido Diaz: "Ensayo historico-grafico sobre el sultanato de Sidi Muhammad b. <sup>c</sup>Abd Allah" (Granada, 1957)
- R. Lourido Diaz: "El sultanato de Sidi Muhammad b. <sup>c</sup>Abd Allāh (1757-1790)" (Granada, 1970)
- V. Magalhães-Godinho: "L'économie de l'empire Portugais aux XV<sup>e</sup> et XVI<sup>e</sup> siècles" (Paris, 1969)

- G. Marçais: "Les Arabes en Berbérie du XI<sup>e</sup> au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle"  
(Constantine and Paris, 1913)
- A-G-P. Martin: "Quatre siècles d'histoire marocaine (1504-1912);  
au Sahara de 1504-1902 - au Maroc de 1894-1912"  
(Paris, 1924) See the Prologue to the thesis (P. 30 Note 50)  
for the relationship of this work to the author's  
earlier book "Les Oasis Sahariennes" (Paris, 1908),  
and for the particular significance of Martin's  
references to the chronicle of one "Sidi Bahaia"  
(Mawlay Hashim ibn Ahmad).  
Documents cited within the text of the thesis as  
quoted by Martin have been culled from the "Quatre  
siècles d'histoire marocaine (1504-1912)".
- J. Martin, H. Jover, J. le Coz, G. Maurer and D. Noin: "Géographie  
du Maroc" (Paris and Casablanca, 1964).
- J.M.J.L. Mas Latrie: "Relations et commerce de l'Afrique septentrionale  
ou Maghreb avec les nations chrétiennes du  
moyen age" (Paris, 1886)
- R. Mauny: "Tableau Géographique de l'Ouest Africain au Moyen Age  
d'après les Sources Ecrites, la Tradition et l'  
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- "Maxange-Defontin" (pseud.): "Le Grand Ismail, empereur du Maroc"  
(Paris, 1929)
- F.W.B. Meakin: "The Moorish Empire" (London, 1899)  
An old-fashioned work, but useful for its annotated  
bibliography.
- J-L. Miège: "Le Maroc et l'Europe (1830-1894)" Three volumes,  
(Paris, 1961). Fourth volume, (Paris, 1963)
- R. Montagne: "Les Berbères et le Makhzen dans le Sud du Maroc"  
(Paris, 1930)
- J. Ogilby: "Africa: being an accurate description of the regions of  
Aegypt, Barbary, Lybia and Billedulgerid...with all the  
adjacent islands...belonging thereunto...Collected and  
translated from most authentick authors, and augmented  
with later observations...." (London, 1670).  
This work is an adapted translation from the "Naukeurige  
Beschrijvinge der Afrikaensche Gewesten van Eoypten" of  
the Dutch compiler Olfert Dapper, published in  
Amsterdam in 1668.  
Short title within the thesis: "Africa"
- J. W. Parkes: "The Jew in the Mediaeval Community" (London, 1938)
- R.L. Playfair and R. Brown: "A bibliography of Morocco" (London, 1892)  
being part IV of the "Bibliography of  
Barbary States" in "Supplementary Papers of  
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- E.M.G. Routh: "Tanqier: England's Lost Atlantic Outpost 1661-1684"  
(London, 1912) Short title within the thesis: "Tanqier"
- Seran de la Tour: "Histoire de Mouley Mahamet, fils de Mouley Ismael, Roy de Maroc" (Geneva, 1749)
- H. Terrasse: "Histoire du Maroc, des origines à l'établissement du Protectorat Français." Vol. II (Casablanca, 1950)  
Although open to challenge on many points, this standard work still gives the best short general summary of the period covered by the thesis.
- R. Thomassy: "Le Maroc et ses caravanes ou Relations de la France avec cet empire" (Paris, 1845)
- E. Westermarck: "Ritual and Belief in Morocco" Two volumes, (London, 1926)

#### Published Articles

- J. Alemany: "Milicias Cristianas al Servicio de los Sultanes del Almagreb" in "Homenaje a D. Francisco Codera" edited by E. Saavedra (Saragossa, 1904) pp. 133-169
- M. Arribas Palau: "Documentos sobre Marruecos en el Archivo Historico Nacional de Madrid" in "Hespéris-Tamuda" Vol. IX (Rabat, 1968) pp. 65-72
- G. Ayache: "La question des archives historiques marocaines" in "Hespéris-Tamuda" Vol. II (Rabat, 1961) pp. 311-326
- N.R. Bennet: "Christian and negro slavery in eighteenth century North Africa" in "The Journal of African History" Vol. I (London, 1960) pp. 64-82
- M. Bodin: "La Zaouia de Tamegrout" in "Les Archives Berbères" (Paris, 1918) pp. 259-296
- M. Brett: "Ifriqiya as a Market for Saharan Trade from the tenth to the twelfth century A.D." in "The Journal of African History" Vol. X (London, 1969) pp. 347-364
- M. Brett: "Problems in the interpretation of the history of the Maghrib in the light of some recent publications" in "The Journal of African History" Vol. XIII (London, 1972) pp. 489-506
- R. Brunschvig: article headed <sup>c</sup>Abd in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, Vol. I (London and Leyden, 1954) pp. 31-36
- H. de Castries: "La Conquête du Soudan par el-Mansour (1591)" in "Hespéris" Vol. III (Paris, 1923) pp. 433-458
- J. Célérier: "La transhumance dans le Moyen Atlas" in "Hespéris" Vol. VII (Paris, 1927) pp. 53-76

- J. Célérier: "L'économie montagnarde dans le Moyen Atlas" in "Revue de géographie marocaine" Vol. I (Paris, 1939) pp. 58-67
- P. de Cénival: "La légende du Juif ibn Mech<sup>c</sup>al et la fête du Sultan des Tolba a Fès" in "Hespéris" Vol. V (Paris, 1925) pp. 137-218
- M. Delafosse: "Les débuts des troupes noires au Maroc" in "Hespéris" Vol. III (Paris, 1923) pp. 1-12
- R.E. Dunn: "Berber Imperialism: the At-Atta expansion in South-East Morocco" in "Arabs and Berbers" edited by Gellner and Micaud (q.v.)
- M. El-Fasi: "Biographie de Moulay Ismael" in "Hespéris-Tamuda" Special Edition, (Rabat, 1962) pp. 9-29
- A. Graulle: "Le Boustân adh-dharîf d'az-Ziyânî." in "Revue du Monde Musulmane" Vol. XXIV (Paris, Sep. 1913) pp. 311-317
- G. Hardy: "La légende et l'histoire. Les relations de la France et du Maroc sous Louis XIV" in "Revue de l'histoire des colonies françaises." Vol. VI (Paris, 1927) pp. 489-508
- R. Henry: "Où se trouvait la Zaouâa de Dilâ ?" in "Hespéris" Vol. XXXI (Paris, 1944) pp. 49-54
- H. Koehler: "Quelques points d'histoire sur les captifs chrétiens au Maroc" in "Hespéris" Vol. VIII (Paris, 1928) pp. 177-187
- F. de la Chapelle: "Esquisse de l'Histoire du Sahara Occidental" in "Hespéris" Vol. XI (Paris, 1930) pp. 35-95
- F. de la Chapelle: "Le Sultan Moulay Isma'il et les Berbères Sanhaja du Maroc Central" in A.M. Vol. XXVIII (Paris, 1931) pp. 7-64
- J.D. Latham: "The Reconstruction and Expansion of Tetuan: the period of Andalusian Immigration" in "Arabic and Islamic Studies in honour of Hamilton Gibb" edited by G. Makdisi (Leyden, 1965) pp. 387-408
- J. le Coz: "Les tribus guiches au Maroc: essai de géographie agraire" in "Revue de Géographie du Maroc" Vol. VII (Rabat, 1965) pp. 3-52
- Capitaine Lô: "Les Foggaras du Tidikelt" in "Travaux de l'Institut de Recherches Sahariennes" Vol. X (Algiers, 1953) pp. 139-159 and Vol. XI (Algiers, 1954) pp. 49-77
- P. Marty: "L'Emirat des Trarzas" in "Revue du Monde Musulmane" Vol. XXXVI (Paris, 1917-18).
- E. Michaux-Bellaire: article headed "Makhzen" in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, first edition Vol. III (London and Leyden, 1936) pp. 166-171

- E. Michaux-Bellaire: "La maison d'Quezzane" in "Revue du Monde Musulmane" Vol. V. (Paris, May 1908) pp. 23-89
- E. Michaux-Bellaire: "Les Confréries Religieuses au Maroc" in A.M. Vol. XXVII (Paris, 1927) pp. 1-86
- R. Montagne: "Un épisode de la 'siba' Berbère au 18<sup>e</sup> siècle", in "Hespéris" Vol. XXVIII (Paris, 1941) pp. 85-97
- M. Morsy-Patchett: "La longue captivité et les aventures de Thomas Pellow" in "Hespéris-Tamuda" Vol. IV (Rabat, 1963) pp. 289-311
- M. Morsy (simple): "Moulay Isma'il et l'armée de métier" in "Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine" (Paris, Vol. XIV May-June, 1967) pp. 97-122
- A. Péretié: "Le Raïs El-Khadir Ghailan" in A.M. Vol. XVIII (Paris, 1912) pp 1-186
- Reisser and Bachelet: "Notice sur le cercle de Sefrou" in "Bulletin de la Société de Géographie du Maroc" (Paris, Feb. 1918) pp. 30-42
- P. Rosende: "Los Franciscanos y los cautivos en Marruecos" in "Archivo-Ibéro-Américano" Vol. I (Madrid, Jan-Feb 1914)
- G. Salmon: "Les Chorfa Idrisides de Fès" in A.M. Vol. I (Paris, 1904) pp. 425-end of volume.
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### Thesis

- B.A. Mojuetan: "The rise of the <sup>c</sup>Alawi dynasty in Morocco, 1631-1672"  
Ph. D. (London) (1969)

### Personal informants noted in the text of the thesis:

- M. G. Ayache  
M. G-S. Colin  
Dr. A. Zebadia



# THE MAGHRIB AL-AQṢĀ



Land over 500 metres

100 km

oasean country



MEDITERRANEAN SEA

ATLANTIC OCEAN

SAHARA DESERT

Cadiz

Gibraltar

Ceuta  
Tetuan

Tangier

Larache

Alcazarquivir

Sebu

SAIS

Meknes

Fes

Taza

Melilla

Oujda

Tlemcen

SEBKRA  
Oran

TADLA

ATLAS

HIGH

ATLAS

Marrakesh

HAWZ

INNER

SUS

Agadir

Tarudant

Sus

Marrakesh

Mazagan

Safi

Sale

TAMESNA

TAFILELT

Rheris

Ziz

Da'ra

oasean country symbols