

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN MOROCCO  
DURING THE REIGN OF MAWLĀY SULAYMĀN  
1792 - 1822

BY

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T H E S I S

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For my wife Fatima

A B S T R A C T

Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign (1792-1822) has so far received little attention from students of Moroccan history. The present work is designed to fill this gap in the modern history of Morocco by investigating the social, economic, political and religious aspects of this period of thirty years. It is intended to provide students of the modern history of Morocco with basic factual knowledge about the period.

Initially, the thesis describes the structures of the Moroccan State and of Moroccan society at the turn of the nineteenth century. The economic history of the period is emphasised, particularly Morocco's commercial relations with Europe and the reasons behind the weakening of these relations at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The thesis then reconstructs the political history of Morocco during Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. The discussion of political relations with the major European powers is intended to invalidate the long-held view of Morocco's isolation during the period under study.

However, the most important - and the least known - aspect of the period from 1792 to 1822 is made up by Mawlāy Sulaymān's religious ideas and policy. To what extent was he reformist in his ideas? What was the real impact of the Wahhābi doctrine on the religious debate in Morocco, and what made the confrontation between Mawlāy Sulaymān and religious groups inevitable? These are some of the questions the thesis seeks to answer before moving on to discuss the Fès rebellion (1820-1822) which was really the last serious attempt by traditionalist groups to change the course of history to their advantage.

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E R R A T A

Page 116, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following:  
"Sulaymān was unable to prevent the continuing slow".

Page 133, line 23:  
change "2,500 kilograms" to "50,000 mithqāl-s worth".

Page 219, line 23:  
add "Nāṣiri" to end of line.

Page 284, footnote 142:  
change "al-Turjumān al-mu<sup>C</sup>rib" to "al-Turjumāna al-  
kubrā".

Page 403, line 1:  
change "Essaouira" to "Safi".

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## A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

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I also received valuable help from Professor M. al-Mannūnī, particularly on the use of Moroccan archives, and from Mr. Abdelouhab Benmansour who allowed me to consult the files of the Direction des Archives Royales. I owe an equal debt to Mr. <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Karīm al-Fīlālī for having opened his private library for me.

Finally, I am grateful to Madame Latifa Harrak for the typing of the Arabic appendices.

A N O T E  
O N T R A N S L I T E R A T I O N

Consonants

|   |   |   |                                     |
|---|---|---|-------------------------------------|
| ء | د | ض | ك                                   |
| ب | ذ | ط | ل                                   |
| ت | ر | ظ | م                                   |
| ث | ز | ع | ن                                   |
| ج | س | غ | ه                                   |
| ح | ش | ف | و                                   |
| خ | ص | ق | ي                                   |
|   |   |   | ؛ -a (in<br>construct<br>state:-at) |

Vowels

|                 |           |
|-----------------|-----------|
| Short: <u>َ</u> | Long:  or |
| <u>ُ</u>        | ا         |
| <u>ِ</u>        | ي         |
| <u>ِ</u>        | ا         |
|                 | و         |
|                 | ي         |
|                 | ا         |
|                 | و         |
|                 | ي         |

It is almost impossible to devise a unified and homogeneous transliteration system. Names of places and tribes have been rendered according to the conventional French usage (Ouezzane, Tétouan, Beni Hsen, Aït Oumalou etc..). Places for which there were still no French or European names at the beginning of the nineteenth century will be rendered in the simplest Arabic transliteration while respecting their current usage during the period under study (i.e. Dār al-Bayḍā, <sup>C</sup>Arab al-widyān, etc..).

Where a word of Arabic origin is used in the plural form we have preferred to facilitate the task of non-Arabic readers by adding an (s) to the singular form (sharīf-s, muḥtasib-s, mawsim-s, etc...). However, there will be instances where the Arabic plural will be used, particularly in cases where the Arabic plural form has gained universal recognition or where the simple adding of an (s) might alter the word's meaning and render it unrecognizable to the Arabic specialist (ʿabīd instead of ʿabd-s, ʿudūl instead of ʿadl-s, wujahāʾ instead of wajīh-s, etc..). Sometimes the Arabic word might acquire a slightly different meaning when rendered into its plural form (eg. taqyīd, meaning either note or essay, its plural taqāyīd means usually notes). In such cases, every effort will be made to account for the contextual Arabic meaning.


A glossary of frequently used Arabic words will be found at the end of the thesis to which the English reader might refer in case of difficulty.

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## A B B R E V I A T I O N S

|          |  |
|----------|--|
| A.H.N.   | Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid.  |
| B.G.R.   | Bibliothèque Générale at Rabat.  |
| B.G.T.   | Bibliothèque Générale at Tétouan.  |
| B.N.     | Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.   |
| C.C.C.   | Correspondance Commerciale et Consulaire<br>(Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign<br>Affairs). |
| C.O.     | Colonial Office (Archives of the Public<br>Record Office, London).                                   |
| D.A.R.   | Direction des Archives Royales at Rabat.   |
| E.I.     | Encyclopaedia of Islam (New Edition).  |
| E.J.     | Encyclopaedia Judaica.   |
| F.O.     | Foreign Office (Archives of the Public<br>Record Office, London).                                    |
| H.P.M.D. | Hassan II Prize for Manuscripts and<br>Documents.  |
| R.L.     | Royal Library, Rabat.  |
| W.O.     | War Office (Archives of the Public Record<br>Office, London).  |

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## CHAPTER ONE

S O U R C E S

The aim of this study is to fill a gap in the modern history of Morocco. The period extending from 1792 to 1822 has remained outside the scope of historical study as far as Moroccan historiography is concerned until now. Those who have chosen to study modern and contemporary history of Morocco have either directed their attention to the beginning of the 'Alawid dynasty (1666-present) or to the period following 1830. Even if some recent attempts have been made to explore the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh (1757-1790) (1), the history of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries has remained completely ignored.

One of the reasons which has discouraged students of Moroccan history from investigating the period of Mawlāy Sulaymān has been the scarcity of material. Both European and Moroccan archival collections are remarkably poor for the pre-1830 period and the publication of archival collections relating to Moroccan history has overlooked the middle period of the 'Alawid dynasty from 1718 to 1830. The large scale work undertaken by Comte Henri de Castries (d.1927) and the Section d'Histoire du Maroc which was designed to publish European sources relating to Moroccan history did

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(1) Ramon Lourido-Diaz, Marruecos en la segunda mitad des siglo XVIII, Madrid, 1978. The two years' reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd (1790-1792) has been also extensively investigated by Mariano Arribas-Palau; cf. his Cartas Arabes de Marruecos en tiempo de Mawlāy al-Yazīd, Tétouan, 1961.

not extend beyond 1718 (2). On the other hand, El-Ouataiq, the recently created archival publication of the Direction des Archives Royales at Rabat, has been almost exclusively concerned with the publication of official documents concerning the period after 1830.

In fact, Makhzen archival sources are extremely poor for the Mawlāy Sulaymān period (3) as a cursory investigation of the files kept at the Direction des Archives Royales would show. It is no accident that the author of Ithāf a'clām al-nās, who published a considerable amount of official letters belonging to the 'Alawid sultans, was never able to produce an elaborate study of Mawlāy Sulaymān (4).

The problem is worsened by the absence of organization and indexation of Moroccan manuscript sources. Apart from private collections, most of the material deposited at the Bibliothèque Générale in Rabat or the Royal Library is not catalogued or, when it is, is so poorly done that the investigator must take potluck, especially since Arabic traditional titles do not necessarily reflect the contents of the book concerned. Thus, a tagyīd (note) on the Great Plague of 1799 was found in the midst of a biographical work relating to the eleventh century A.H. (15th-16th centuries A.D.) (5). We have also come across

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(2) Henri de Castries-Section d'Histoire du Maroc, Sources Inédites de l'Histoire du Maroc, 1905-1961, 26 volumes.

(3) This coincides with G. Ayache's observation about Makhzen archives. See his article "Archives et documentation historique au Maroc" in Les Arabes par leurs archives, CNRS, 1976, p.40.

(4) Cf. biography of Mawlāy Sulaymān in the manuscript volume of Ithāf a'clām al-nās by 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Zaydān, Ms.Z.3986, R.L.

(5) Cf. 'Abd al-Salām b. Sulaymān al-Fishtālī, Tagyīd fī al-wabā' (on the Great Plague of 1799), Ms. D 283, BGR, fol. 125-126.



important fatwā-s (legal opinions) by the ‘ālim-s of Fès concerning the deposition of Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1820 which were indexed under the title of "Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès" (6). Another example is provided by al-‘Arbī al-Mashrafī's commentary on the Shamaqmaqiya (7) in which the author reproduced several letters by Mawlāy Sulaymān as well as an extract from an important khuṭba (sermon) revealing some of his religious ideas (8).

The student of Moroccan history is further confronted with another difficulty: the nature of the Moroccan material itself. Historical works as such are very limited in number and a historian is often compelled to consult various types of sources in quest of information: biographic dictionaries, hagiographic literature, fahrasa-s (enumeration of one's teachers), religious essays (fatwā-s and jawāb-s) written by the ‘ālim-s on various issues, kunnāsha-s (note books), tagyīd-s (notes), polemic works (munāḍharāt), etc.

The last, but not the least, obstacle is the language problem which confronts European scholars in particular. Daring attempts were made during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to translate some fundamental works, such as al-Zayānī's Turjumān and al-Nāṣirī's al-Istiḡṣā which, since their publication, have been intensively used and adopted by successive generations of scholars. In spite of the inestimable value of these two works, they are far from providing a complete and accurate chronology of the ‘Alawid period. The scarcity of studies on the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān has made it

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(6) Cf. Ms.D.2795, BGR, pp.393-404.

(7) The Shamaqmaqiya is an eulogistic poem addressed by Ibn al-Wannān (d.1773) to the Sultan Sīdī Muḥammad b.‘Abd Allāh.

(8) Cf. Sharḥ al-Shamaqmaqiya by al-‘Arbī al-Mashrafī, Ms.G.629, BGR, unnumbered pages.

· necessary for this thesis to be based primarily on unpublished sources, both Moroccan and European.

## I - Arabic Sources

### A-Moroccan Manuscript Sources

#### (1) Chronologies

The basic chronologies used here come from al-Zayānī, Akansūs, al-Ḍuʿayf and the anonymous author of al-Ibtisām.

##### a) Al-Zayānī (1735-1833)

Al-Zayānī's works have constituted the major Moroccan source of reference to the history of the ʿAlawid dynasty. Plagiarized by Akansūs and adopted by al-Nāṣirī, al-Bustān has been for generations an indispensable guide.

The author of al-Bustān is certainly the first historiographer who attempted to write a history of the ʿAlawid dynasty. To his talents as a writer he had behind him a long career as a servant of the State. He had visited the Ottoman Empire and the Arab East on several occasions both on official and private business, had had the opportunity to see other political and social systems at work and, at the same time, had learnt a lot about their history, culture and traditions. As ambassador to the Sublime Porte, he met the Ottoman political elite as well as scholars who introduced him to the history of their Empire. In Egypt he met the famous historian, al-Jabartī, among many other intellectual figures (9).

His national pride as a subject of the Western Sultanate did not prevent him from developing a discreet admiration for certain aspects of Ottoman culture, and

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(9) ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Zaydān, Ithāf, p.6 of the manuscript volume, Ms. Z 3986, p. 6.

especially the care Ottoman scholars took to record their history and glorify their rulers. Al-Zayānī's chronologies are in fact full of references to the history of the Ottoman Turks. Comparisons with events from the Ottoman history often divert him from his subject and denote not only of his vast knowledge but also of his admiration for the history of this Empire.

Most, if not all, of al-Zayānī's works were written after 1224AH/1809-1810 AD, when he was dismissed by Mawlāy Sulaymān from the royal service. He first produced al-Turjumān, which was presented to Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1228 AH/1813 AD (10). This work represented a universal history in which the history of Morocco, and that of the 'Alawid dynasty in particular, only received a very brief mention. Al-Zayānī, therefore, decided to write a detailed history of the 'Alawid dynasty, a task which no historian had attempted before. Five years later (1233 AH/1817-1818 AD) he completed his basic work, al-Bustān, to which he owes his celebrity as a historian. Al-Bustān was later extended to cover the last years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. This revision of al-Bustān, which was given the title of al-Rawḍa al-sulaymāniya, was also perfected by the incorporation into the text of various notes the author had written on the margins of al-Bustān and by annexing to it the laudations that were written by eminent contemporaries in favour of this work. Strangely enough, al-Rawḍa — which will serve as our reference in this study — never gained the popularity of al-Bustān undoubtedly because it was not well-known and easily confused with the latter. For Akansūs and al-Nāṣirī al-Bustān remained the reference to the history of the 'Alawid dynasty and nowhere in their works do we find an allusion to al-Rawḍa. Al-Zayānī himself forgot that he

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(10) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa al-sulaymāniya fī mulūk al-dawla al-'alawiya wa man taqaddamahā min al-duwal al-islāmiya, Ms.D.1275, BGR, p.189.

was dealing with a different work when he concluded al-Rawḍa with the statement that "this is the end of what we could assemble in al-Bustān" (11). For Lévi-Provençal, who did not have the chance to consult a copy of al-Rawḍa, this work was nothing more than al-Bustān under a different and misleading title (12).

All the chronologies which we are concerned with —al-Turjumān, al-Bustān and al-Rawḍa— were written during the last twenty-five years of al-Zayānī's long life and were based on a vast amount of material and sources. For the history of Islam and the Ottoman Empire, al-Zayānī has access to works of well-known historians such as Ibn Khallikān, al-Ṭabarī, al-Masʿūdī, al-Baladhūrī and Kamāl al-Dīn Pāshā (13). He also had the many notes he had gathered during his travels in the Middle East and the volumes on Islamic history he brought back. As for the history of the ʿAlawid dynasty, al-Zayānī acknowledged that he had relied on unclassified notes (taqāyīd) belonging to various families for the reigns of Mawlāy Rashīd (1666-1672) and Mawlāy Ismāʿīl (1672-1727) and had depended on his personal experience for the reigns of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh and his sons Mawlāy al-Yazīd and Mawlāy Sulaymān (14). We are also told by Akansūs (15) that al-Bustān was written on the basis of notes belonging to a certain Ibn al-Ḥāj al-Miknāsī, about whom we know nothing. Even if this is true, al-Zayānī obviously had recourse to the other sources mentioned above as well as to official documents (income registers, royal letters, etc) and his memory.

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(11) Al-Rawḍa, fol.231.

(12) Lévi-Provençal, Les historiens des chorfas, Paris, 1922, p.183.

(13) Al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna al-kubrā fī akhbār al-maʿmūr barran wa baḥran, Rabat, 1967, pp.53-54, 103-104 and 208.

(14) Ibid., p.546.

(15) Muḥammad Akansūs, al-Jaysh al-ʿAramram al-khumāsī fī dawlat mawlānā ʿAlī al-Sijilmāsī, Ms. D 339, BGR,p.6.

In fact , memory constituted for him a vast source of information for the chronology of the events he witnessed. This was the reason for the brevity of information given to successive years and the numerous mistakes, especially in dating events. However, when we bear in mind that the author did not start writing until he was approaching his eighties, we can easily understand how memory can be so treacherous (16).

b) Akansūs (1796-1877)

Like al-Zayānī, the author of al-Jaysh al-‘aramram was also a kātib and minister of the ‘Alawid dynasty. His chronicle can be divided into two parts: the first covering the ‘Alawid dynasty before Akansūs was called to serve as kātib for Mawlāy Sulaymān (1235 AH/1819-1820 AD), and the second covering from the last years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign up to Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān (1859-1873). In the first part, Akansūs did nothing but plagiarize Nuzhat al-Ḥādī by al-Ifrānī and al-Bustān by al-Zayānī (17). In relating the events of the ‘Alawid dynasty up to 1819-1820, al-Jaysh hardly differs from al-Bustān. Only after that date does al-Jaysh become interesting.

- 
- (16) Al-Zayānī is very unreliable in dates. Among his errors:
- the year of introduction of the plague into Morocco (al-Zayānī gives 1212 AH instead of 1213);
  - the appointment of al-Salāwī as governor of the northern provinces (he gives 1223 instead of 1222);
  - the arrival of the Wahhābi letter and the pilgrimage of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm (he gives 1227 instead of 1226).
- Between al-Zayānī and al-Ḍu‘ayf there can be a chronological gap of two years or more. Cf. for instance the dates concerning the military expedition of Ibn Khadda to the eastern provinces which took place, according to al-Zayānī, in 1211 AH/1796-1797 AD (al-Rawḍa, fol.180), while al-Ḍu‘ayf gives the date of 1213 AH/1798-1799 AD (al-Ḍu‘ayf, pp.391-392).
- (17) Akansūs avoided, however, al-Zayānī's references to the history of the Ottoman Empire as well as his attacks on Sufi orders, and especially the Tijāniya to which the author of al-Jaysh belonged.

Akansūs who served Mawlāy Sulaymān during the last critical years of his reign (1819-1822) gives us a first hand account which is particularly valuable for, at this point, al-Zayānī's chronologies show signs of exhaustion not only because of their author's remoteness from official business, but also because of his advanced age. Akansūs, however, is to be approached very cautiously because, unlike al-Zayānī who wrote after he had abandoned palace service, the author of al-Jaysh started writing his history when he was less than forty years old and was, therefore, still tempted by dreams of returning to his old post as minister (18). Moreover, the writing of al-Jaysh, the author tells us, was undertaken to satisfy the demand of Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān. This has considerably diminished the historical importance of this work which is nothing but "un hommage servile aux princes alawites" according to Lévi-Provençal (19).

c) Al-Ḍu'ayf (1752-1818?)

Here is a totally different chronicle by an author who never served the palace (20).

All the information we have about al-Ḍu'ayf is drawn from his own work. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Salām al-Ḍu'ayf was born in 1752 and apparently spent most of his life as a student travelling from his native town, Rabat, to the major intellectual and spiritual centres of the country such as Fès, Tétouan and Ouezzane, to attend courses by eminent 'ālim-s of his time. The returns of this studious life were, however, quite meagre for, surprisingly, his chronicle is full of linguistic and grammatical mistakes. The Alfiyya (21) which he studied three times in about twenty years seems to have had little

(18) Akansūs, p.9

(19) Lévi-Provençal, Les historiens des chorfas, p.212.

(20) For his biography cf. Bujandār, al-Ightibāt bi tarājim a'ḷām al-Ribāt, Ms. D 1287, BGR, vol. I, pp. 155-156.

(21) The Alfiyya is a treatise in Arabic grammar in verse, composed by the famous Andalusian grammarian Ibn Mālik (d.672 AH/1274 AD). It used to be learnt by heart by every Moroccan student.

effect on him. This linguistic handicap certainly helped to lower his credit in the eyes of his contemporaries and explain, partly at least, why such eminent historians, such as al-Nāṣirī, have not referred to him at all (22).

The historical value of al-Ḍuʿayf's Tārīkh was discovered only recently. Unlike other Moroccan historians, al-Ḍuʿayf made no claim to write a general history of Morocco. The whole manuscript is devoted to the ʿAlawid dynasty. The author acknowledged that he relied on Nashr al-mathānī of Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib al-Qādirī (23), and particularly on the private notes of Muḥammad al-Masnāwī Murīnū (d.1207 AH/1792-1793 AD), a native of Rabat, who was in State service during the reign of Mawlāy ʿAbd Allāh (1728-1757) (24). These notes were apparently reproduced by al-Ḍuʿayf without the slightest modification, as we find the dedications to Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh and his successor Mawlāy al-Yazīd intact (25).

Al-Ḍuʿayf, however, started recording the events of his time long before the death of al-Masnāwī, since he mentions information about his private life going as far back as 1190 AH/1776-1777 AD. We are therefore indebted to al-Ḍuʿayf himself for much of the information covering the last years of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh and the reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd. As to the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān, there can be no doubt that the author was relying on his direct experience. The record of events

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(22) Al-Ḍuʿayf's manuscript was known to al-Nāṣirī's contemporaries. Ibn al-Ḥāj (d.1899) for instance made reference to it in his history of the ʿAlawid dynasty.

(23) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.76.

(24) Bujandār, al-Ightibāt bi tarājim aʿlām al-Ribāt, Ms.D.1287, BGR, vol.I, p.137.

(25) Such dedications (naṣarahu Allāh, may God assist him) are only expressed during the lifetime of a sultan.

becomes more abundant, and also more precise, after the death of Sidī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh.

Al-Ḍuʿayf's Tārīkh is in fact very similar to a diary in which the author noted down national, local and sometimes personal and private events. As a result, the manuscript takes the form of a long list of events which respects no rule but that of chronological sequence. "His writing is, at times, similar to a delirious speech", noted the author of al-Ightibāṭ (26). Sometimes the information is so abundant that we have a day by day record of happenings. Unlike al-Zayānī who goes very rapidly over the years, al-Ḍuʿayf might reserve several pages to a single year, covering the events month after month, and very often, day after day. His sense of precision goes even further and he sometimes notes down the hour when an incident occurred (27). There can be no doubt, however, that al-Ḍuʿayf intended to write a history of the ʿAlawid dynasty as he attempted to entitle his chapters according to the Khaldūnian tradition and referred to himself as "the author of this history" (28). Unfortunately, the chronicle suddenly stops as 1818 with the last sentence of the manuscript unfinished. We can only suppose that the author died shortly after he abandoned his notes. He was most probably carried away by the plague of 1818-1820 for which he must have constituted an easy prey because of his advanced age.

The importance of al-Ḍuʿayf's work needs hardly to be emphasized. The nature of the work as a record of events as they occurred, the precision of the information given, and the character of its author as an unofficial recorder of events conveying a popular perception of what had occurred, make of this work not only a useful store of

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(26) Bujandār, al-Ightibāṭ, I, p.156.

(27) For instance, the information he gives about al-Salāwī's death: 11 P.M. on the first day of Qaʿda, 1230.

(28) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p. 172.



information, but also a necessary tool to complement and correct formal chronologies such as those of al-Zayānī.

d) Al-Ibtisām

Al-Ibtisām, written by an anonymous author, was initially intended to cover the reign of Mawlāy 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Hishām (29). The author, however, by way of introduction, devoted a significant part of the book to the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān and produced an original account of events using a narrative style unusual to his Moroccan contemporaries.

The author had travelled three times to the Arab Middle East and had lived in Egypt for many years, at a time when that country was undergoing revolutionary changes under the leadership of Muḥammad 'Alī (1805-1849). He was profoundly impressed by the Egyptian experience as well as by the doctrinal tolerance of the Egyptians and the practicality of their educational system. What is important in his work is not so much the chronology, but the author's impressions and the comparisons he draws between the state of affairs in his own country and that in the Arab East. However, his observations made little impression on his Moroccan contemporaries. The manuscript is unfortunately incomplete with many folios missing from the middle and the end.

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(29) Anonymous, al-Ibtisām fī dawlat Ibn Hishām, Ms.Z.1204, R.L. The information we have about the author is drawn from his manuscript. We know that his first name was "Idrīs", that he served as kātib for Mawlāy 'Abd al-Raḥmān's minister Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-'Amrāwī (d.1847), and that he resided in Cairo for six years (al-Ibtisām p.58). This author might well be Idrīs b. al-Ṭayyib b. al-Māḥī mentioned by al-Mashraff (Nuzhat al-absār, p.455) as kātib and poet who lived at the time of Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-'Amrāwī.

(2) Biographical Literature (tarājim)

Biographical literature is an essential source for Moroccan history. For traditional writers, the history of persons, whether they were ċālim-s, Sufis, saints or temporal figures, was more important than the history of events. This was a concept which harmonized with the religious view of history according to which eternal values and qualities of eminent people were more important than temporal and transient events.

The information given about a person in such biographical dictionaries may vary from a few lines to several pages according both to the material available and the respect the individual enjoyed in the eyes of the author. Usually, such information deals with his dates of birth and death, his nasab (genealogy), his education, his virtues and qualities, sometimes his affiliation to a Sufi order, but very rarely his shortcomings or imperfections. The biographical dictionaries can be devoted to a single person or to a certain category of people (ṭabaqa), such as the Sufis of a certain religious order; they can also include many categories of Sufis, saints and ċālim-s who lived during a particular period.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's period, characterized by intensive intellectual activity, is covered by an abundant literature of biographies (30). Some of these biographies, such

- (30) Many of these biographies were written during the second half of the 19th century. Thus we have:
- Ja'far b. Idrīs al-Kattānī, al-Shurb al-muṭṭaḍḍar min ma'īn ba'ḍ ahl al-qarn al-thāliṭh ṣashar, lith., Fès, 1891-1892.
  - Ja'afar b. Idrīs al-Kattānī, Kitāb fī tarājim ba'ḍ aṣfiyā' al-qarn al-thāliṭh ṣashar, Ms.D.2744, BGR.
  - Al-'Arbī al-Mashrafi, Nuzhat al-absār li dhawī al-ma'rifā wa al-istibṣār, Ms.K.579, BGR.
  - Muḥammad b. Ja'far al-Kattānī, Salwat al-anfās wa muḥādāt al-akyās bi man uḡbira min al-'ulamā' wa al-ṣulahā' bi Fās, 3 vol., lith., Fès, 1899.
- More recent biographies include:
- 'Abd al-Kabīr al-Kattānī, Zahrat al-ās fī buyūtāt Fās; Ms.K.1281 BGR.
  - Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Ḥajwī, al-Fikr al-sāmī fī al-fiḡh al-islāmī, 4 vol., Rabat-Fès, 1921-1926.
  - 'Abd al-Ḥayy al-Kattānī, Fihris al-fahāris, 2vol., Fès, 1927-1929.

as al-Rawḍ al-munīf, dedicated to the sharīf-s of Ouezzane, or al-Faṭḥ al-wahbī, devoted to al-ʿArbī b. al-Maʿṭī (d.1819), head of the Sharqāwi zāwiya, constitute an important source of information on the history of the zāwiya-s. Al-Rawḍ al-munīf, for instance, is more than a simple collection of biographies. It often reproduces letters exchanged between the Wazzāni sharīf-s and Mawlāy Sulaymān and helps to elucidate the nature of the complex and obscure relations which existed between the Makhzen and the Wazzāniya religious order during the second decade of the nineteenth century.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Muḥammad b. Jaʿfar al-Kattānī produced a major biographical work, Salwat al-anfās (31) which he dedicated to the famous saints and ʿālim-s buried at Fès. This work served as an incentive for the emergence of a regional biographical literature. His example for soon followed by ʿālim-s from Tétouan, Rabat, Salé, Marrakech and Meknès who compiled biographies of the most eminent people of their towns (32). Rural areas remained outside the scope of this new wave of biographical literature, with the exception of the Sous to which al-Mukhtār al-Sūsī (d.1963) devoted his twenty volume al-Maʿsūl (33).

(31) Muḥammad b. Jaʿfar al-Kattānī, Salwat al-anfās, 3 vol., lith., Fès, 1899.

(32) -Aḥmad al-Ruhūnī, ʿUmdat al-rāwīn fī tārikh tiṭṭāwīn, Ms.675, BGR, 9 vol. available only.

-Muḥammad Bujandār, al-Iḡtibāt bi tarājim aʿlām al-Ribāt, D 1287, BGR.

-Al-ʿAbbās b. Ibrāhīm, al-Iʿlām bi man ḥalla Murrākush wa Aghmāt min al-aʿlām, 8 vol., Fès, 1936-1939. Vol.VI and VII on microfilm at the BGR (Mic. 167).

-ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Zaydān, Iṭḥāf aʿlām al-nās bi jamāl akhbār ḥādirat Maknās, 5 vol., Rabat, 1929-1933; unpublished parts at R.L., Ms.Z.3986.

-Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Dīnya, Majālis al-inbisāt fī sharḥ tarājim ʿulamāʾ wa ṣulahāʾ al-Ribāt, 2 vol., Ms.779, R.L.

(33) Al-Mukhtār al-Sūsī, al-Maʿsūl, 20 vol., Casablanca, 1961.

Biographical works were sometimes devoted to a single family or a single person. The authors of these works usually wanted either to glorify their own family (34) or express gratitude to a respected shaykh (35).

### (3) Al-wafayāt

This is another category of traditional literature which is mainly concerned with ascertaining the dates on which eminent people died. However, the author might very well include some information which is related to the person or to his time. Thus we find mention, often very brief, of famous calamities, such as epidemics, famines, locust invasions and droughts. At times, a brief description is given of the person concerned and, in this case, the wafayāt can be useful as a biographical reference (36). Wafayāt works might also expound on a particular event which particularly impressed the author. Thus, the author of Tadhkirat al-muḥsinīn, whose father, al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī (d.1844), played an important role in the Fès rebellion of 1820-1822, allotted many pages to relate the developments concerning the rebellion and gave detailed information about its various phases (37).

(34) For instance Muḥammad b. Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj (al-Sulāmī), Riyād al-ward ilā ma intahā ilayhi ḥadhā al jawhar al-fard, Ms.K.2313, BGR.

(35) Mawlāy Sulaymān, 'Ināyat ūlī al-majd li dhikri al-Fāsī ibn al-jadd Fès, 1928.

-Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt, al-Rawḍa al maqṣūda wa al-ḥulal al-mamdūda fī ma'āthir banī Sūda, Ms.K.2351, BGR.

Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt also wrote his autobiography entitled: Thamarat unsī fī al-ta'rif bi nafsī, Ms.K.1264, BGR.

(36) Abd al-Salām b. Sūda, Ithāf al-muṭālī' bi wafayat a'clām al-qarn al-thālith 'ashar wa al-rābi', typewritten, no. 10,651, R.L.

-Abd al-Kabīr b. al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat al-muḥsinīn fī wafayāt al-a'c'yān wa ḥawādith al-sinīn, Ms.K.270, BGR.

(37) Cf. Tadhkirat al-muḥsinīn, pp.347-358.

(4) Fahrása-s

A fahrása is a document in which the author enumerates his shaykh-s, the disciplines he studied under each of them, and his ijāza-s (recognition of competence in a certain field). Eminent ʿālim-s were usually anxious to write such fahrása-s because of their importance in confirming the sanad (chain of knowledge) which was the only way to validate the knowledge they had acquired however, the authors of such documents rarely limit themselves to the strict definition of a fahrása. They usually mention all famous ʿālim-s, Sufis or saints they met or with whom they had any spiritual affiliation. Sometimes they even give details about their lives, their karāmāt (signs of God's favour) and their virtues (38). Thus, al-Zayānī who wrote a fahrása for Mawlāy Sulaymān mentioned not only his teachers, but all those who constituted his intellectual entourage: ʿālim-s who attended his religious seminars or helped him correct and review his essays, his kātib-s and those who benefited from his learning. This fahrása also included the sciences that Mawlāy Sulaymān acquired, the ijāza-s he received from his teachers, his works and his qualities both as a ʿālim and as a sultan (39).

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- (38) -Al-Zayānī, Jawharat al-tijān, Ms.7678, R.L. and K.1220, BGR.  
 -ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Kūhin, Imdād dhawī al-istiʿdād, Ms.D.270, BGR.  
 - Al-ʿArbī al-Dammātī, Fahrása, Ms.K.1254, BGR.  
 - Aḥmad b. Ḥassūn al-Wazzānī, Fahrása, Mic.829, BGR.  
 - Aḥmad b. ʿAjība, Fahrása, Ms.D.1845, BGR.  
 - Muḥammad al-Ṭālib b. Sūda, Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb bimā lanā min al-ashyākh wa al-aṣḥāb, Mic.828, BGR.
- (39) This fahrása (Jawharat al-tijān) was abridged by al-Zayānī's pupil, Ibn Raḥmūn, under the title of ʿal-Durr wa al-ʿIqyān fī mā qayyadtuhu min Jawharat al-tijān, Ms. D 727, BGR.

(5) Tabaqāt and Manāqib

The ṭabaqāt (categories) are biographical dictionaries devoted to a specific category of people. They usually provide information about the disciples of a certain Sufi order (40). This branch of literature can easily overlap with the manāqib — works which enumerate the virtues and deeds of a saint — as the authors of such works sometimes tend to mention not only the biography of the saint or the Sufi but also the biographies of his disciples and followers as well. However, biographical information in this kind of literature tends to be very scanty as most of the manāqib works are devoted to the glorification of the individual.

(6) Genealogical literature

The importance of sharifism in Moroccan history and society is capital. Unfortunately, no attempt has been made until now to write a comprehensive history of sharifian families and their impact on the social and political development of the country. All we have at our disposal is a vast amount of genealogical literature giving the nomenclatures of the various holy lineages. The genealogies often include biographical information about eminent sharīf-s and, when written by an outstanding scholar, such as Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt, for example, can provide valuable information about the historical evolution of sharifism in Morocco and the Makhzen's policy towards the sharīf-s (41).

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- (40) - Ahmad Skirej, Rafʿ al-niqāb baʿd kashf al-ḥijāb ʿamman talāqā maʿa al-shaykh al-Tijānī min al-aṣḥāb, 3 vol., vol.I and II printed at Tétouan, no date and vol.III printed at Rabat, 1971.  
-Muḥammad b. Abū Rās al-Muʿaskarī, Kanz al-asrār fī manāqib mawlānā al-ʿArbī al-Darqāwī wa baʿd aṣḥābihi al-akhyār, Ms.D.2339, BGR.
- (41) Cf. Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn fī al-shurafāʾ al-qāṭinīn bi al-ʿuyūn, Ms.K.1480, BGR (large extracts from this work are reproduced by Ibn Zaydān in al-ʿIzz wa al-ṣawla fī maʿālim nuḍhum al-dawla, 2 vol., Rabat, 1961-1962, pp. 84-90. Al-Zayānī devoted also one of his works to the sharīf-s under the ʿAlawid dynasty; see Tuḥfat al-ḥādī al-muṭrib fī rafʿ nasab shurafāʾ al-maghrib, Ms. 2471, R.L.

(7) Riḥla-s

A great number of learned men from Morocco travelled every year to the Hijaz on pilgrimage. Some of them recorded their observations and impressions of the various countries they visited. Important riḥla-s, or travel accounts, such as the ones written by Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Salām b. Nāṣir at the end of the eighteenth century (42), include useful information about the difficulties of communication by land, the varying prices from one country to another as well as information about the tribes and territories they travelled through.

Pilgrimage was also an occasion for Moroccan scholars to meet prominent ʿālim-s from the Maghrib and the Arab East and engage in theological discussions with adepts of other madhhab-s. Thus, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Salām b. Nāṣir met Aḥmad al-Tijānī in Algeria in 1782 and became acquainted with his ideas long before their popularization in Morocco (43). Al-Zayānī who spent many years in the Arab East, both on official and private business, produced a voluminous work in which he displayed his historical and geographical knowledge (44).

(8) Kunnāsha-s and Taḡāyīd

Some scholars used to keep a kunnāsha, or note-book, in which they wrote down all kinds of information : dates of births and deaths of their contemporaries, noteworthy happenings such as epidemics and other natural calamities

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(42) Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Salām b. Nāṣir, al-Riḥla al-kubrā (1782-83), Ms. D.2651, BGR; al-Riḥla al-ṣuḡhrā (1796-97), Ms.121, R.L.

(43) Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Salām b. Nāṣir, al-Riḥla al-kubrā, p.72.

(44) Al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna al-kubrā. Other relevant riḥla-s include:  
 - Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Fāṣī, Extracts from his Riḥla (1796-1797) in Ms.G.88, BGR, pp.164-181.  
 - Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Salām al-Ḍarīr, Riḥla (1773-1774), Ms.Z.1317, R.L.

important political events, reflections on certain issues, quotations of verses composed by themselves or by their contemporaries, practical information about certain remedies, prayers to be said on special occasions, etc... The historical value of such kunnāsha-s depends on the particular interest of their authors. Thus, a kunnāsha by a sultan's kātib, such as al-ʿArbī al-Damnātī (45) contains many of the letters he wrote on behalf of Mawlāy Sulaymān, while another belonging to al-Maʿdānī (46), also a contemporary of Mawlāy Sulaymān, is totally devoted to his poetry which, with the exception of some verses extolling the benefits of tea, is of little historical importance (47).

Tagāyīd, or notes, served the same purpose of recording miscellaneous information (48). A tagyīd (when used in the singular form) is generally devoted to a certain issue which monopolized the author's attention at a given time and is then, in fact, an essay.

#### (9) Religious Essays, Fatwā-s and Khutba-s

The period of Mawlāy Sulaymān is extremely rich in controversial issues which involved not only ʿālim-s and Sufis, but also the Sultan himself. Mawlāy Sulaymān being a ʿālim himself and profoundly attached to Islamic orthodoxy, he not only encouraged religious discussion through his religious seminars and the questions he addressed to the

(45) Al-ʿArbī al-Damnātī, Kunnāsha, Ms.3718, R.L.

(46) Al-Maʿdānī, Kunnāsha, Ms.5601, R.L.

(47) Other kunnāsha-s include:

- Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Mawlāy Sulaymān, Ms.4001, R.L.

- Al-ʿArbī al-Mashrafī, Ms.K.204, BGR.

- Abū Bakr al-Manjra, Ms.K.464, BGR.

- A kunnāsha belonging to the Fāsī family, Sbiḥī Library at Salé, not catalogued.

(48) Tagyīd when used in the plural form (tagāyīd) applies to notes taken at different times and is, in this case, hardly different from a kunnāsha.



Ālim-s on various issues, but contributed himself to this cultural activity by writing on some of the important problems of his time (49).

Contemporary issues, such as the emergence of the Wahhābi doctrine, Sufi practices or relations with Christians, gave birth to an abundant literature which, on occasions, could become polemical. Political events—such as the Fès rebellion— or natural calamities — such as the plague which twice ravaged the country— were also occasions on which the Ālim-s expressed themselves (50).

(49) Religious essays and khutba-s by Mawlāy Sulaymān include:

- Khutba on the mawsim-s, printed at Fès, no date.
- Al-Samāʿ: mā huwa muttafaqun ʿalā ħimatih, Ms.652, Sbīhī Library, Salé.
- Another khutba on Sufi heterodox practices, extracts in Sharḥ al-shamaḥmaḥiya by al-Mashrafi, Ms.G.629, BGR.
- Risāla fī al-kasb (written jointly with al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān), Ms. D.1838, BGR.

Muḥammad al-Ruhūnī (d.1815) also has an important collection of khutba-s : al-Khutab al-manbariya, Cairo, 1936.

(50) Works falling under this heading include:

- Al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān, radd ʿalā madhhab al-wahhābiya, Ms.K.1325, BGR, pp.21-95.
- Mawlāy Sulaymān, letter addressed to Saʿūd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, Ms. 4624, R.L.
- Muḥammad al-Ruhūnī, al-Risāla al-wajīza al-muḥarrara fī anna al-tijāra ilā arḍ al-ḥarb wa baʿth al-māl ilayhā laysa min fiʿl al-barara, Ms.D.2438, BGR, pp. 118-127.
- Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī, Fatwā concerning the sale of horses to Spain in return for three presidios in al-Mahdī al-Wazzānī, al-Nawāzil al-jadīda, lith., Fès, 1910, III, pp.35-36.
- Al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī, Muḥammad al-Zarwālī and Aḥmad b. Sūda, Fatwā-s concerning the immunity of zāwiya-s, in Ms.Z.3772, R.L., unnumbered pages. Ibn Kīrān's reply is printed in al-Wazzānī's al-Nawāzil al-jadīda, III, pp. 80-81.
- Muḥammad ʿAshūr, an essay on blameworthy festivities celebrated at Marrakech on the occasion of the ʿĀshūrā, written on Mawlāy Sulaymān's order, Ms.Z.3772, R.L., pp.1-35.
- Anonymous, Risāla fī al-radd ʿalā ahl al-badr wa nahiyat al-mashriq, Ms.D.2594, BGR.
- Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Salām Bannānī, al-Fuyūḍāt al-wahbiya fī al-radd ʿalā al-ṭāʿifa al-wahhābiya, Ms.170, Filali Library.
- Muḥammad al-Ruhūnī, Jawāb fī al-ṭāʿūn, Ms.D.2251, BGR, pp.1-48.
- Muḥammad b. Abī al-Qāsim al-Sijilmāssi, Taqyīd fī al-ṭāʿūn, Ms. D. 2251, pp. 49-79.

(10) Polemical Works (munāḍharāt)

The growing importance of the zāwiya-s during the period under study, together with the emergence of an Islamic reformist ideology in the Arab Middle East, gave rise to a dual confrontation both between religious orders and between some of them and the defenders of orthodox Islam, the ʿālim-s. This confrontation escaped from the limited sphere of ideas when some zāwiya-s, particularly those of sharifian origin, joined the rebellion which deposed Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1820.

Two main factors lay behind this polemical literature. Firstly, there was the introduction of a new Sufi order, headed by Aḥmad al-Tijānī (1737-1815), into Morocco. It enjoyed the benevolence of the Makhzen, if not its active support. The Shādhili branches of Moroccan Sufism reacted very energetically to this intruder who claimed preeminence over all saints, dead and alive (51). The Tijāni doctrine, on the other hand quickly acquired adepts among the urban aristocracy and the educated society and did not, therefore, lack for ideological support. The second factor was the emergence in the Middle East of the Wahhābi doctrine which had a direct repercussion in the Maghrib. Mawlāy Sulaymān who inherited the Sunni orthodoxy of his father saw in the Wahhābi doctrine not only an attempt to restore the purity

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(51) Works in favour of the Tijāniya religious order include:

- Muḥammad Akansūs, al-Jawāb al-muskit, Ms.G.817, BGR.
- ʿUmar b. Saʿīd al-Fawtī, Suyūf al-Saʿīd, Ms.D.2135, BGR.
- Aḥmad b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Makkī, Bulūgh al-amānī fī manāqib al-shaykh Aḥmad al-Tijānī, Ms.D.2462, BGR.

Works hostile to the Tijāniya order include:

- Aḥmad al-Bakkāy, al-Faḥ al-quddūs fī al-radd ʿalā Abī ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad Akansūs, Ms.K.2455, BGR.
- Faḍḍul b. ʿAzzūz, Kashf al-rān ʿan fuḍād māniʿ al-ziyāra, Ms.K.644, BGR.
- ʿAlī b. Dhāhir al-Watrī, Mā abrazathu al-aqdār fī nuṣrat ahl Allāh Ms.D.1115, BGR.

of Islam, but also a political tool with which to curb the threatening influence of the zāwiya-s.

A word should be said about a particular form of polemical writing, exemplified by al-Ḥusām al-mashrafi (52) which has other qualities as well. The title of this work is a typical example of a misleading title under which the author might incorporate a useful stock of historical evidence. Intended initially as a reply to Akansūs for his defamation of the Darqāwiya religious order, the work also includes two chapters on the history of the ḤAlawid dynasty. The reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān is extensively covered and especially the Fès rebellion for which the author provides some important documents (53).

#### B - Makhzen Letters

Letters, particularly those emanating from the Makhzen, will form an essential source for this thesis. As Germain Ayache pointed out in his study of the Moroccan archives, the Makhzen collection of letters becomes poorer as we go back in time, especially for the period before 1830. (54).

A number of factors account for this. There was, for instance, the meagreness of the Makhzen's administrative apparatus greatly weakened by political instability and plague epidemics. During the short reign of Mawlāy al-

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(52) Muḥammad al-ḤArbī al-Mashrafi, al-Ḥusām al-mashrafi li-qatḤ lisān al-shāb al-jarafi, Ms.K.2276, BGR and Mic.1207, BGR. Because both of these copies lack many pages we have used both of them as they tend to complement each other.

(53) Being a Darqāwi adept, the author had access to the documents of the zāwiya branch at Fès, some of which he reproduced in al-Ḥusām. The most relevant are:  
 - Letter from the Ḥālīm-s of Fès to Mawlāy Sulaymān asking for the dismissal of the qādī (Ms.K.2276, BGR, pp.328-329)  
 - Fatwā by the Ḥālīm-s of Fès deposing Mawlāy Sulaymān (Mic. 1207, BGR, p. 474 ff.)  
 - Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès rejecting his illegal dethronement (Mic.1207, pp. 485-487).

(54) G. Ayache, in Les Arabes par leurs archives, p.40.

Yazīd, Makhzen officials who served under Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh were systematically liquidated or purged. The Great Plague of 1799-1800 also carried away a number of competent kātib-s and officials. By the turn of the nineteenth century, Mawlāy Sulaymān was to encounter great difficulty in finding experienced servants to whom he could entrust his foreign affairs. After Ibn ʿUthmān's death in 1799, the British consul general in Morocco found it extremely difficult to establish communications with the Makhzen because there were hardly any ṭālib-s around the Sultan who could handle State business. Of the numerous kātib-s who had served Sīdī Muḥammad "none remained, not one!", wrote Matra in 1802 (55). Al-Salāwī who was entrusted with the royal seal in 1799 was only twenty years old and had very rudimentary administrative experience (56). The modesty of the administrative apparatus necessarily led to a decrease in the volume of official correspondence.

Moreover, the administration was not centralized, not only because the Sultan had no fixed capital, but also because of the presence of wazīr al-baḥr at Larache where he could be in constant touch with the European consuls at Tangier. Wazīr al-baḥr himself was not responsible for foreign affairs only. Al-Salāwī, for instance, was at the same time governor of the northern provinces and we often find him campaigning in the Rif or against the Berber tribes of the Atlas. This has undoubtedly contributed to the dispersal of Makhzen correspondence.

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(55) F.O.52/12, 3 May, 1802.

(56) See F.O.52/11, Gibraltar, 6 Aug., 1799. The post of wazīr al-baḥr also remained vacant after al-Salāwī's death in 1815. This only confirms the scarcity of qualified administrative personnel during the period under study.

This, however, does not mean that there are no records for the period of Mawlāy Sulaymān. For instance, we know that al-Salāwī used to keep registers of his letters to European consuls (57). The customs houses at the main ports also used to keep registers of exports and imports (58). But, until the Makhzen archives are properly inventoried and catalogued — a process which may take several decades — it will be impossible to ascertain whether such documents still exist or not.

The files of the Direction des Archives Royales for the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān are extremely poor when compared with the abundant correspondence of the post-1830 period. They consist mainly of copies of documents kept at the Rabat Royal Library and include the correspondence of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Ash‘āsh, governor of Tétouan, and Muḥammad Bejja, a wealthy merchant who served as Moroccan consul in Gibraltar from 1815 to 1820.

Besides the collections of the Direction des Archives Royales, the Moroccan Ministry of Culture has acquired during recent years a vast amount of Makhzen letters through an annual exhibition of manuscripts and documents (59). Microfilms of such letters are kept at the Bibliothèque Générale in Rabat. Unfortunately, here again documents relating to the period of Mawlāy Sulaymān are very rare.

Copies of official letters are also to be found in various manuscript works. Many of these letters are reproduced because of their literary or doctrinal value.

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(57) F.O.52/15, letter from al-Salāwī to James Green dated 16 Feb., 1810, in which he makes reference to his previous letter dated 11 Dec., 1807.

(58) F.O.52/24, Douglas to Earl Bathurst, 23 June, 1823.

(59) Ḥassan II Prize for Manuscripts and Documents (H.P.M.D.).

Unfortunately, these copies do not always bear the date of the originals. Many important letters, for instance, occur in the midst of kunnāsha-s (60), hagiographic works or formal chronologies.

Foreign archives have also provided a number of Arabic letters relating to Morocco's relations with Europe. These documents help to undermine the long-held theory of Moroccan isolationism during Mawlāy Sulaymān's period.

## II - European Sources

European sources involve reports drawn up by European consuls and their agents, as well as observations made by various European visitors, such as ambassadors, merchants or doctors whose assistance was sometimes solicited by the Moroccan Court.

J.L. Miège, who had worked on the European archives, states that for the period under discussion (1792-1822) there was an unprecedented decline in the amount of material relating to Morocco. This, he believes, reflects a diversion of European interest from Morocco because of the Napoleonic wars (61). They placed Morocco "aux marges du conflit" (62) and the movement of people, goods and information declined as a consequence. We shall argue later on that these wars, far from relegating Morocco to the margin of the conflict, in reality aroused European rivalries and jealousies about the southern shores of the Mediterranean, particularly over Morocco. Here, however, the argument will be limited to countering Miège's suggestion concerning European archives.

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(60) A kunnāsha by a Makhzen official such as al-'Arbī al-Damnātī includes many of the letters he wrote on behalf of Mawlāy Sulaymān during the latter part of his reign. Unfortunately, they bear no date.

(61) J.L. Miège, Le Maroc et l'Europe, 1830-1894, Paris, 1961-63, vol. II, pp.19-29.

(62) Ibid., p.19.

The wars in Europe certainly slowed down the movement of people and goods between Morocco and Europe, but the few Europeans who visited Morocco during the early nineteenth century left behind some of the most detailed reports and accounts available. Observations made by travellers like Jackson, Ali Bey (Domingo Badia), John Buffa, Mathieu de Lesseps and others, have long constituted major references on Morocco (63). To these should be added embassy reports drawn up by European envoys, two of which have been published (64).

As far as consular archives are concerned, there is no evidence to suggest that they diminished during the period under study. The amount of British consular letters covering the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān outweighs by far the amount covering his father's reign (65). The same observation applies to the French consular correspondence. The volume of consular archives seems negligible only if compared with that of the post-1830 period.

European archives have long been a target of contempt and suspicion for the current generation of Moroccan

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- (63) J.G. Jackson, An Account of the Empire of Morocco, London, 1814; Ali Bey, Travels of Ali Bey in Morocco, Tripoli, Cyprus, Egypt, Arabia, Syria and Turkey between the years 1803 and 1807, 2 vol., London, 1816; J. Buffa, Travels through the Empire of Morocco, London, 1810; M. de Lesseps, "Notice sur l'Empire de Maroc" in Journal des Voyages, 45<sup>o</sup> cahier, Juillet 1822 (written in the 1790's).
- (64) J. Caillé, La mission du Capitaine Burel, Rabat, 1953; J. Caillé, Une ambassade autrichienne au Maroc en 1805, Paris, 1957. A third embassy by the Briton William A'Court (1813) remains unpublished; cf. below.
- (65) Sīdī Muḥammad's reign is covered by 9 volumes as compared with 14 volumes for Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. Cf. State Papers 71, 102 and F.O.52 series at the P.R.O.

historians (66). This attitude is based on the assumption that consular reports were written by foreign agents who not only were motivated by mercantile and colonialist designs, but were also ill-disposed towards the local population and its culture. Their reports could also not be trusted because they lived on the periphery of the country spending most of their time among themselves and taking little interest in the social and political developments of the host country. There is, undoubtedly, an element of truth in all of this. Still, the historical value of these archives cannot be denied. Ill-disposed and scornful of Moroccans as he was, Louis Chénier has left precious reports and a valuable book on the history of Morocco, which still count among the few serious sources on Morocco in the second half of the eighteenth century.

After more than two decades of national independence, European archives are being discovered not to be as useless as was once thought. They can even contribute to national history in fields rarely investigated by Moroccan historians, particularly in economic, social and demographic fields. Recent studies, both of Tunisia and Morocco, have shown the value of European records—whether they be consular, commercial or private—in describing the internal evolution of the Maghrib (67). R. Rosenberger and H. Triki pointed out in 1973 that "foreign sources are usually more useful" for the study of such aspects as plague, epidemics and famines (68). They also underlined

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(66) See Ayache, "La question des archives historiques marocaines," in Hespéris-Tamuda, vol. II, 1961, fasc. 2-3; and *idem*, G. Ayache, "L'utilisation des archives historiques marocaines," in Hespéris-Tamuda, vol. VII, 1966, fasc. unique.

(67) L. Valensi, Fellahs tunisiens, Paris, 1977; R. Rosenberger, and H. Triki, "Famines et épidémies au Maroc," in Hespéris-Tamuda, vol. XIV, 1973, pp. 109-175 and vol. XV, pp. 5-103.

(68) R. Rosenberger et H. Triki, "Famines et épidémies," Hespéris-Tamuda, XIV, 1973, p. 111.



that "les commerçants ou les diplomates qui séjournent ou passent au Maroc sont attentifs aux évènements qui peuvent affecter les affaires ou le cours de la politique" (69).

Moroccan traditional literature is strikingly silent about economic and social developments. Nowhere are to be found, for instance, population estimates in Moroccan contemporary works. Al-Zayānī, who travelled more than once to the Orient, described the major cities in Syria and Palestine not omitting to give the exact weight of the Aqsā Mosque dome or the number of prophets buried in Damascus (70) but never even considered giving a population estimate of any country he visited. The plague which swept away at least one third of the Moroccan population between 1799 and 1820, did not receive more than a few sentences from the same author. Sometimes the reader has the impression that, had not the plague carried away some important prince or minister, it would have never been mentioned (71). Even al-Ḍuʿayf, whose chronicle is more like a note-book or a diary, never gives a population estimate, not even of his native town. Only Europeans seem to have bothered about statistics of any kind.

European sources can also be very useful in revealing events which are mentioned nowhere in Moroccan sources. They also complement other information and provide the basis for a more accurate chronology for the period under study.

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(69) Ibid.

(70) Al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna al-kubrā, pp.270, 276.

(71) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.181.

## A - British Archives

The Public Record Office at London contains valuable records relating to Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. Unlike France or Spain, Great Britain maintained a closer contact with Morocco throughout the Napoleonic wars and succeeded in becoming Morocco's major commercial partner. French designs in the Mediterranean and Moroccan fears of a Franco-Spanish invasion also encouraged Moroccan rapprochement with Great Britain.

### (1) Public Record Office

F.O. 52 includes the first series of consular archives covering the period 1760-1837. Fourteen volumes (F.O.52/10-23) deal with Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. They consist of consular reports sent by three British consuls who resided at Tangier : J.M. Matra (1787-1805), James Green (1806-1817) and J.S. Douglas (1818-1829).

The first phase of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign is extensively covered by Matra's reports which are of great help in filling in the gaps of Moroccan historiography. James Green also proved to be a well-qualified consul. He was in Morocco during a crucial period when the Napoleonic threat in the Iberian Peninsula encouraged closer cooperation between Great Britain and Morocco. After 1812, however, Green's health deteriorated (72). His reports became less frequent, particularly after the end of the wars in Europe in 1814. J.S. Douglas who was appointed consul in Morocco in 1818 did not reach Tangier until 1821 after the end of the plague.

F.O. 8 - Volumes 5-10 of this series contain instructions from the British government to British consuls in North Africa and cover the period 1801-1836.

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(72) F.O. 52/16, 18 Feb., 1812.

F.O. 631 - This series contains the correspondence of the vice-consul at Essaouira. Only the first volume is of interest for the period under study. It covers the years 1813-1816.

F.O. 174 - This series consists of the archives of the British consulate at Tangier, recently transferred to the Public Record Office in London. It mainly includes registers of out-letters sent by the consul general to various authorities in Morocco and Great Britain. It also includes copies of letters sent to other residing European consuls at Tangier. Furthermore, this series contains letters received from the British authorities in London and Gibraltar, or from the vice-consul at Essaouira. It is particularly rich in Arabic letters as it includes the correspondence of Moroccan authorities.

C.O. - During the Napoleonic wars, the Colonial Office (actually responsible for war and colonies) took a particular interest in Morocco. Owing to the strategic position of the Barbary States the diplomatic affairs relating to these countries were transferred in 1804 from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office where they were to remain until 1836. The Colonial Office also followed Moroccan affairs closely because of the importance of provisions drawn from Morocco by the garrison of Gibraltar.

The material relating to Morocco in this series includes:

C.O. 2 - Volumes 3 and 4 contain the papers of William A'Court, British ambassador to the Barbary States in 1813. Volumes 6 and 10 contain documents relating to British and European efforts to suppress piracy in the Western Mediterranean during the years 1816-1818.

C.O. 91 - It contains despatches from the governors of Gibraltar. The period 1792-1822 is covered by volumes 36-80. This series includes valuable information on Anglo-Moroccan cooperation over the blockade of Ceuta (1806-1810), the plague of 1818-1820 (vol.72-76 give detailed statistics on casualties) and the Fès rebellion (R. Sillery's Report in vol.79).

W.O. - Volumes W.O.1/226, 275, 282, and W.O.6/152, 205 contain some information about the question of Ceuta and the Anglo-Moroccan efforts to invest it militarily during the years 1806-1810.

## (2) The British Museum

Additional Manuscript 41, 512 includes the papers of William A'Court concerning his mission to North African States in 1813. Among these papers are detailed statistics about the trade of Essaouira in 1812.

The correspondence of Joseph Banks (1744-1820) who took a special interest in the exploration of Africa and was the founder of the African Association. He was instrumental in the nomination of J.M. Matra as consul general in Morocco and maintained a regular correspondence with his protégé. Numerous letters by Matra are found among the correspondence of this famous British botanist, vol.33, 978 and 33, 979.

## B - French Archives

The archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Quai d'Orsay) constitute the bulk of French archives covering the period under study. The "Correspondance Consulaire et Commerciale" contains 9 volumes (vol.20-28) covering the period 1790-1824. They consist essentially of consular reports drawn up by French consuls in Morocco

( du Rocher, Antoine Guillet, Michel-Ange d'Ornano and Sourdeau). They become particularly important after the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1814 when the new royalist regime attempted to make up for the long French absence from the Moroccan scene owing to the British naval supremacy in the Straits zone between 1792 and 1814. France was the only European country to maintain a consul in Morocco during the plague epidemic of 1818-1820 in the hope of taking advantage of the epidemic to regain its lost pre-war commercial position.

At a time when British consular reports become less frequent after the departure of James Green in 1816 and the confinement of the new consul at Gibraltar between 1818 and 1821, the French consul provided useful information about the political events which destabilized the country between 1819 and 1822. This correspondence describes the changes in commercial policy carried out by Mawlāy Sulaymān after 1817 when he was compelled by internal developments to resort to maritime trade as a substitute source of income.

We have also made use of the Archives Nationales which include the valuable journal of M. de Lesseps, chancelier at the French consulate in Morocco during the 1790's(73).

Some French archival material relating to Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign has already been published by Jacques Caillé in his abundant literature (74)

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(73) A.F. IV, dossier no. 3. This journal was published in 1822 under the title of "Notice sur l'Empire du Maroc" in Journal des Voyages, 45° cahier, vol. 15, July, 1822.

(74) For example, J. Caillé, La mission du capitaine Burel au Maroc en 1808, Rabat, 1953; "le vice-consul Broussonet et ses 'mémoires' sur le Maroc," in Hespéris-Tamuda, vol. II, fasc. I, 1961, pp. 5-42.

C - Spanish Archives

The most important archival source for the study of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign is the consular archives deposited at the Archivo Historico Nacional at Madrid. As far as Morocco's internal situation is concerned, the Spanish consular correspondence tends to repeat other European archival sources. Our use of the Spanish archives has been, accordingly, very limited.

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CHAPTER IIMOROCCAN STATE AND SOCIETY  
AT THE TURN OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURYI - The Land and its People

It is impossible to determine with any certainty the population of Morocco during the period under study. The absence of population censuses and statistics leaves us with only the estimate of foreign travellers. Nor does the abundance of travel accounts during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries help us very much in working out a reliable estimate. Evaluations vary considerably from two million to about fifteen million inhabitants. The following figures given by European authors show clearly the disparity in population estimates:

Table 1      Population Estimates (1771-1825)

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|      |                |
|------|----------------|
| 1771 | 2,000,000      |
| 1779 | 6,000,000      |
| 1787 | 5 to 6,000,000 |
| 1791 | 6,000,000      |
| 1793 | 8,000,000      |
| 1805 | 5,336,000      |
| 1808 | 14,886,000     |
| 1823 | 8,500,000      |
| 1825 | 5 to 6,000,000 |

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Sources: Letters from Barbary, France, Spain, Portugal by an English officer who visited the country in 1771, Dublin, no date; D. Noin, La population

The earliest figure with any claims to accuracy goes back to the beginning of the twentieth century and lies somewhere between four and five million inhabitants. As the Moroccan population tended to be stable over time (periodic famines and epidemics erasing the gains of a high birth rate), we can assume that the estimates made at the beginning of this century were valid for most of the nineteenth century (1).

The inhabitants of Morocco formed a relatively homogeneous population. There were two main linguistic groups, Arabs and Berbers, and only two religious communities, Sunni Muslims and Jews. If we exclude the Spanish presidios on the Mediterranean coast, the number of Christians in Morocco was insignificant and consisted exclusively of European residents. By 1806, the European population of Tangier"consisted almost solely of the families of foreign consuls"(2). At Essaouira, the number of Europeans was still less important.

The Moroccan population was predominantly rural. Between 5 and 10% only lived in towns.(3). A sizable proportion of this rural population was concentrated in

... Sources for Table 1 ( continued)

rurale du Maroc, vol.I, 1970; Lemprière, Voyage dans l'Empire du Maroc et le Royaume du Fès fait pendant les années 1790 et 1791, 1801; M. de Lesseps, Letter from Taroudant, 20 Oct.n 1793 in Archives Nationales (Paris), AF IV, dossier No.3; J.Caillé Une ambassade autrichienne au Maroc en 1805, 1957; Idem, La mission du capitaine Burel au Maroc en 1808, 1953; J.G. Jackson, An Account of the Empire of Morocco, 1809; F. Charles-Roux and J. Caillé, Missions diplomatiques françaises à Fès, 1955; Graberg de Hemso, Specchio goeografico e statistico dell Imperio di Marocco, Genoa, 1834.

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- (1) D. Noin, La population rurale, I, p.30.  
 (2) J. Buffa, Travels through the Empire of Morocco, p. 22. In 1816 the French population of Tangier was made up of ten families (CC, vol.24, fol.187-188).  
 (3) In 1926 more than 90% of the population continued to live in the countryside; cf. Martin et al, Géographie du Maroc, Paris, 1964, pp. 58, 76.



mountainous areas, particularly in the Rif and the western High Atlas. The Atlantic plains, on the contrary, had a much lower population density. Louis Chénier, the French consul in Morocco under Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh, did not fail to report the emptiness of the coastal plains (4). Similar observations were made by other contemporary witnesses. ‘Abd Allāh b. al-Khayyāṭ al-Qādirī, father of the author of al-Tuḥfa al-qādiriya, reported that towards the middle of the eighteenth century most of the country between Fès and Meknès was uninhabited (5). Lemprière, a British physician who visited the country in 1790 and 1791, observed that on his seven day journey from Salé to Marrakech, he did not see a single habitation (6).

#### A- The Countryside

##### (1) The Tribal Reality

For the immense majority of the Moroccan population, the tribe constituted the basic form of social organization. The individual belonged to a tribe and used to be identified on this basis by both other tribesmen and by the Makhzen.

Few tribes really believed that they constituted the descent group of a common ancestor. The name shared by a number of people residing within a limited territory had no consanguineous connotation. The tribe was by no means a closed or permanent structure. It was always ready to receive newcomers who accepted a common destiny with other

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(4) D. Noin, La population rurale, I, p.13.

(5) ‘Abd al-Salām b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Qādirī, al-Tuḥfa al-qādiriya, Ms. K.2321, BGR, vol.II, p.103.

(6) Lemprière, Voyage, pp.84-85.

tribal members. Tribes or tribal confederations could emerge or vanish, expand or shrink, depending on their internal evolution (co-existence among various segments) or on external action of neighbouring tribes or the Makhzen.

Tribal reality in Morocco was too complex to be accounted for by a single definition. Tribal organization depended on whether the tribe was Arab or Berber, nomadic or sedentary, Jaysh (exempted from taxation in return for military service) or nāyba (paying taxes). If in zones of sedentary life the tribe was reduced to its politico-military aspect, in areas of nomadism or transhumance, on the other hand, it constituted not only a political reference and a defensive structure, but also a basic unit of economic production.

In zones of sedentary life, such as the Rif and the western High Atlas, the tribe maintained itself in spite of a number of factors which, in principle, excluded tribal organization. In these areas the tribe did not constitute a framework for social production since it was the family or the douar (village) which served as the basic economic unit. The tribe also continued to survive despite the development of private property which encouraged the emergence of familial exploitation of land. The nomadic or transhumant tribe, on the contrary, was a much more compact structure, its members being more dependent on each other for physical and economic survival. Unlike the sedentary tribe, it continued to serve not only as a defensive tool against outside danger, but also as an indispensable framework of economic production, the tribe having to move collectively from one pasture to another.

The existence of the tribe seems to have accommodated both the tribesmen and the central government. For the tribesmen, tribal structure offered the only possible

form of social organization, if not for economic reasons at least for defensive ones. In a fluid and insecure society in which the Makhzen never succeeded in establishing a durable presence, the tribe offered the only reassuring structure. The Makhzen on the other hand, could not conceive of another form of political and administrative organization within which the individual could be made accountable for taxes and military service. Far from weakening tribal structure, the Makhzen seems to have always encouraged it, not only for administrative purposes, but for politico-military considerations as well. The tribe constituted for the Makhzen an essential element for the preservation of the internal status quo and it constantly played off one tribe against another. Tribalism was maintained as a means of maintaining the Makhzen's authority over territories it would not have otherwise controlled without a reliable army and an efficient bureaucratic system. Thus the Makhzen enhanced the politico-military aspect of tribal organization which acquired more importance than other economic and social forms.

Another aspect of tribal reality was its mutability. Tribes and confederations were made and unmade for the purpose of self-preservation or in response to pressure exercised by another tribe or by the Makhzen. When during the early nineteenth century the Aït Idrassen was dismantled by the action of its neighbours and that of the Makhzen, its segments (Aït Youssi, Aït Ayache, Aït Ouafella) became autonomous or completely dispersed, becoming segments of yet another structure (7). A tribe usually remained within a confederation only as long as it needed a defensive cover or was forced to do so by a dominant tribe. Makhzen politics were also responsible for the constitution and dislocation of tribal entities.

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(7) Cf. Abd al-Rahmān al-Fāsī, al-Uqnūm, Ms.K.15, BGR, p.525; Lt.de la Chapelle, "Le sultan Moulay Ismaïl et les berbères Sanhaja du Maroc," in Archives Marocaines, XVIII, 1931, p.30.

Jaysh tribes, such as the Cheraga, Oudaya, or the Cherarda, were a pure creation of the central government. The Aït Idrassen largely owed their influence to the Alawid sultans who had encouraged some tribes (the Aït Immour and the Mejjate in particular) to join the confederation (8).

Tribes, therefore, were never closed communities or "circles which never cut across each other", to use Gellner's term (9). The rural physiognomy was subject to perpetual change. We have already seen how the Makhzen contributed to the reshaping of the tribal structure, but there were other causes as well. Natural calamities, political crises, inter-tribal and intra-tribal conflicts, the infiltration of populations from the Saharan periphery in a perpetual movement towards the north-western plains, constituted important factors behind the dynamism of the tribal reality.

## (2) Tribal Mobility

Tribal mobility was first reflected in the nomadic and transhumant mode of life. North of the Atlas mountains, seasonal tribal mobility was limited to a restricted area. Tribal movements were generally governed by a customary agreement between the various tribes inhabiting a certain region. The Beni Mguild, for instance, spent the summer in the highlands of the Middle Atlas and descended at the beginning of the autumn to the plateaux

(8) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.114; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.13,50. If the Mejjate were integrated into the Aït Idrassen, the Aït Immour, on the contrary, always remained autonomous.

(9) E. Gellner, "Tribalism and Social Change in North Africa," in W.H. Lewis, ed., French Speaking Africa, New York, 1965, p.108. The segmentary model proposed by E.Gellner would at best provide a framework for the understanding of the tribal reality in what the author calls "the outer circle". Segmentarity weakens as we draw near to the centers of authority and urban civilization. Actually, universalist elements (Islam, religious orders, Makhzen politics) were always present even among the most remote tribes. Far from providing a dynamic explanation of the North African social reality, the segmentary theory disregards the historical dimension by presenting a static model for tribalism.

of the western Middle Atlas which, during the summer, were occupied by the Zemmour, Guerouane and Beni Mtir (10). These contracted to fill lands situated further to the north or to the west, thus entering into contact with the transhumant Arab tribes of the Beni Hsen and Zaer. The whole process was reversed during the summer season when there was a general retreat towards the more favourable pastures of the highlands.

This seasonal mobility in quest for more favourable grazing lands was but one aspect of a long term tribal movement which concerned the whole area extending between the Ziz and upper Moulouya valleys and the Azghār—the north-western Atlantic plains. Indeed, one of the basic trends of Moroccan history has been the perpetual movement of populations from the desertic fringes to the more inviting lands north of the Atlas mountains. The low altitude of the Middle Atlas and the absence of sedentary populations there facilitated a constant flow of Saharan or pre-Saharan tribes to the other side of the Atlas watershed.

Behind this northward movement there were many factors. The most important was certainly the under-population of the Atlantic plains. The demographic losses occasioned by famines and epidemics created a vacuum which was filled by outsiders. The phenomenon seems to have been accelerated during the latter part of the Merinid dynasty (1258-1465) as a result of the ravages of the Black Death which carried away nearly two thirds of the Moroccan population (11). This epidemic caused, according to Moroccan sources, the depopulation of the coastal plains and facilitated the Iberian assault on the coastal towns (12). The implantation of the Zenata tribes

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(10) W.B.Harris, "The Nomadic Berbers of Central Morocco," in The Geographic Journal, 6, vol.IX, June 1897, p.639.

(11) Brignon et al., Histoire du Maroc, p.153.

(12) Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh al-Qādirī, al-Tuḥfa al-qādiriya, II, pp.415-416.

(Chaouia) in the Atlantic plains dated, according to 'Abd al-Salām b. al-Khayyāṭ al-Qādirī, from this period (13). During the same period, and most probably as a result of the same epidemic, the Saharan Arabs of the Beni Hsen who used to reside in the Sijilmasa and the Dra valley, made their first appearance in the Tadla (14). From the fifteenth century on, the Beni Hsen pursued their slow progress to the north until they reached the Atlantic coast.

Severe famines led to important changes in the tribal map of the country. The famines of 1661-1662, on which we are well informed owing to 'Abd Allāh al-'Ayyāshī (d.c.1724 AD) (15), led to the northward migration of many 'Saharan tribes. The Guerouane and Aīt Immour made their first crossing to the depopulated Tadla in 1661, while the Aīt Haddidou, another Saharan tribe, moved to the Moulouya valley (16). This famine also seems to have greatly weakened the northern part of the country and paved the way for the 'Alawid takeover of the Azghār.

Another factor which contributed to the emigration of Saharan tribes may have been the progressive desertification of the Saharan fringes. Studies made by A.G.P. Martin on the Saharan oases of the Touat suggest that the volume of subterranean waters declined considerably after the fourteenth century (17). During the eighteenth century alone the taxable volume of water decreased from 200,000 fingers in 1708 to less than 20,000 fingers in 1796 (18). The steady drying up of the Sahara must be therefore, taken into account when considering the migrations by Saharan tribes.

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(13) Ibid.

(14) Ibn al-'A'raj al-Sulaymānī, Zubdat al-tārikh wa zahrāt al-shamārikh, Ms. D 3657, BGR, vol. I, pp. 451-452.

(15) 'Abd Allāh al-'Ayyāshī, al-Iḥyā' wa al-inticāsh, Ms. D.1433, BGR.

(16) Ibid, pp.251-252.

(17) A.G.P. Martin, Quatre siècles d'histoire marocaine, Paris, 1923, p. 107.

(18) Ibid.

Political factors were at least as important as the climatic ones in determining the tribal map of Morocco. Various dynasties proceeded to the transfer of tribes from one place to another for various political reasons. The Almoḥad Yaḥyā al-Manṣūr (d.1199) transferred a number of Maḥqil Arab tribes from the Eastern Maghrib to the Atlantic plains. The sparsity of population in the western coastal plains of Morocco allowed easy resettlement of the Sefiane, Khlott and Riyah tribes there (19). The Merinids carried out other tribal transfers. The most important of these was the transfer of Sefiane from the Tamesna to the Gharb (20). They also encouraged the Beni Hsen to leave their Saharan abodes in the Ziz valley when they entrusted them with a peace keeping task among the Atlas Berbers in return for the right to collect taxes over a wide region extending from Sijilmassa to the Tadla (21). The Saḥadian and ḤAlawid dynasties, both of Saharan origin, relied on the Saharan Arab Maḥqil to subdue the northern provinces and, subsequently, to build their Jaysh. The Jaysh tribes stationed around Marrakech and Fès were transferred from the Sahara by the Saḥadian Aḥmad al-Manṣūr and later on by Mawlāy Ismāḥīl (22).

The ḤAlawid sultans were particularly instrumental in facilitating the descent of the Fazāz Berbers (23) to the lowlands adjacent to the north western slopes of the Middle Atlas. Even if Mawlāy Ismāḥīl succeeded in containing the northward flow of the Fazāz Berbers by building numerous forts around the Atlas mountains, his successors proved to be unable to prevent their irresistible advance. The death of Mawlāy Ismāḥīl and the ensuing political instability led to the breakdown of the status quo in the

(19) Muḥammad al-ḤAyyāshī, Zahr al-bustān, Ms.D.2152, BGR, p.42.

(20) Ibid., p.20.

(21) Ibn al-ḤAraḥ al-Sulaymānī, Zubdat, I, pp.451-452.

(22) Aḥmad b. Khālīd al-Nāṣirī, al-Istiḡṣā li akhbār duwal al-Maghrib al-aḡṣā, Casablanca, vol. VII, pp. 50-51.

(23) The term "Fazāz" used to be applied to the north-western part of the Middle Atlas or the territory lying south of Meknès and Fès extending between the upper courses of the Sebou and Oum er-Rbia rivers.

Fazāz and the acceleration of the northward trend of migration. The Guerouane who were residing in the Ziz valley at the end of the seventeenth century (24) made their appearance north of the Atlas mountains only ten years after Mawlāy Ismā'īl died (25). The Aīt Immour who were maintained by Mawlāy Ismā'īl in the Moulouya valley burst into the Tadla after they were driven out by the Aīt Oumalou (26). Being unable to control the advance of the Berber tribes into the Azghār, Mawlāy Ismā'īl's successors increasingly made use of their military potential. Indeed, without the decisive backing of the Aīt Idrassen, Mawlāy 'Abd Allāh (1729-1757) would have been unable to maintain himself in power (27). Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh continued to rely on the Aīt Idrassen, his father's allies (28). Upon his accession to the throne in 1757 he invited them to settle near Meknès. In 1765 he transferred the Aīt Immour to the Gharb and induced them to join the Aīt Idrassen confederation which he hoped to use as a buffer against the troublesome Aīt Oumalou. During the early 1780's he carried out further tribal adjustments. Thus, he transferred the Tekna, Mejjate and Dou Blal from the Haouz of Marrakech to the vicinity of Fès (29). He also brought back the Guerouane to the Fazaz and a fraction of the Aīt Immour to the Tadla (30).

By the end of the eighteenth century, the lowland Berbers (31) on the northwestern slopes of the Middle Atlas formed an important strategic ally of the Makhzen.

(24) Al-Nāṣirī, VII, p.87.

(25) Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib al-Qādirī, Ḥawliyat nashr al-mathānī, N. Cigar, ed., Rabat, 1978, p.46.

(26) Ahmad b. al-Ḥāj (al-Salmī), al-Durr al-muntakhab, Ms.Z.1875, R.L. VIII, pp.197-198.

(27) Al-Nāṣirī, VII, pp.136, 163.

(28) Al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.13.

(29) Akansūs, al-Jaysh, Ms.D.339, BGR, p.239; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.50.

(30) Al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.50.

(31) Lowland Berbers (barābir lūṭā) included: Aīt Idrassen, Zemmour, Guerouane and Aīt Hakem. In Makhzen terminology, they were also referred to as Barābir al-dawla (State berbers) or Barābir al-ṭā'a (loyal Berbers).



"The Beni Mtir, Aīt Idrassen, Guerouane, Zemmour, Aīt Immour and Aīt Hakem", wrote al-Zayānī, "are State Berbers falling under the Makhzen's might. These Berbers have been subjected for a long time to the oppression of the Aīt Oumalou. Every year these used to invade their lands during seasonal migrations and progressively drove them away until they occupied almost all their territories" (32).

### B- The Urban World

French colonial literature has long upheld the view that there was a complete rupture between the countryside and the towns (33). Towns were seen as isolated fortresses premanently besieged by hostile tribesmen. However, recent studies tend to invalidate this view (34).

Despite the recurrent upheavals by tribesmen, the towns and the countryside never ceased to depend on each other. The prosperity of townspeople was intimately linked to that of the peasant. Towns constituted a permanent market where the peasant sold his agricultural produce and procured all kinds of commodities, whether locally made or imported. In the coastal towns export trade consisted mainly of the produce of the land. Any crop failures in the countryside led not only to a rise of food prices within the towns, but threatened to paralyse all economic activity. Since the peasant was an important customer of the urban artisan and merchant, a fall in his purchasing power was immediately felt by the urban economy.

Towns were also the seat of government. Many provincial qā'id-s or governors resided in towns from which

(32) Al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna al-kubrā, Rabat, 1967, p.75.

(33) Cf. for instance E. Michaux-Bellaire in Villes et Tribus du Maroc, II, p.57.

(34) K. Brown, People of Salé, Manchester, 1976; M. Mezzine, Fès and its hinterland from 1549 to 1637, thesis for the Diplôme d'Études Supérieures, Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, Rabat. 1979.

they ran the affairs of the neighbouring tribes. Thus Mawlāy Sulaymān's governor for Rabat and Salé also had under his command the neighbouring tribes of Zaer, Beni Hsen and ḤArab al-Widyān (35). Other examples included the governor of Essaouira who also commanded the neighbouring Chiadma, and the governor of Tétouan whose administrative prerogatives extended to the northern Jbala tribes. From the judicial point of view tribesmen often fell under the jurisdiction of the town's qāḍī. The legal opinion of urban Ḥālim-s was constantly solicited by tribesmen who contested the verdict of local judicial authorities.

The cultural influence of towns usually extended to areas far beyond the city walls. Fès, Tétouan and Marrakech were the seats of an intensive learning and sheltered an important proportion of rural students (āfāqiyūn). Even minor towns such as Ouezzane, Boujad and Ksar el-Kebir used to serve as important centers of learning whose fruits were reaped mainly by the adjacent countryside. These towns were also the seat of religious orders which recruited their adepts among the rural population. On the other hand, rural zāwiya-s and religious orders (the Darqāwiya, for instance) had many disciples among the urban population and possessed important sites within the city walls.

Town and country were finally bound together by property relationships. Wealthy townsmen owned estates in the neighbouring country and entrusted their exploitation to peasant sharecroppers. Reciprocally, many influential tribal notables owned houses in towns. Mawlāy Sulaymān's qāʿid for the Chaouia, al-Ghāzī, possessed important property in Rabat (36), while the qāʿid of Beni Hsen, Abū Ḥazza al-Qustālī, had a house in Salé (37).

(35) ḤArab al-Widyān included the tribes of the Rabat-Salé hinterland, namely Ṣabbaḥ Arabs, the Duḡma, the Sehoul and Hossain.

(36) Al-ḌuḤayf, p. 514.

(37) Ibid., p. 327.

Towns were traditionally distinguished as ḥaḍariya (seats of Islamic culture and civilization) and Makhzen towns (seats of government and garrisons). The first category included Fès, Tétouan, Rabat and Salé—towns which contained an important Andalusian colony as a result of the Christian reconquista of Spain. Within their walls they sheltered wealthy and refined merchants and scholars, as well as ingenious craftsmen. Makhzen towns, on the other hand, provided residence for the sultan and his military governors and contained garrisons and storehouses. Sometimes, as used to be the case for some coastal towns (Tangier, Larache and Essaouira), most of the inhabitants were attached to the Makhzen.

The prosperity of a coastal town was intimately linked to the expansion or decline of commerce. The decline of export trade to Europe after 1800 greatly affected the coastal towns. "These ports", noted Jackson in 1809, "had but a limited commerce with foreign nations and were consequently neither very extensive nor populous" (38). They served mainly as garrison towns after Mawlāy Sulaymān closed many ports to trade following the country's pacification in 1798. Some coastal towns, such as Tangier and Larache, were mainly inhabited by soldiers and seamen (39). Others, such as Salé, Rabat and Essaouira, had important 'Abīd garrisons and, with the exception of the latter, maintained negligible trade relations with the outside world.

Some inland towns were also on the decline at the turn of the nineteenth century. Marrakech was particularly affected by the diversion of southern trade to the port of Essaouira during the second half of the eighteenth century. Already in 1790-1791 Lemprière noted

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(38) J.G. Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.29.

(39) J. Buffa, Travels, pp.48-50.

that many of its houses were in ruin (40). Many years later, Jackson gave a similar description, stating that the town was "mostly filled with ruins of houses which had gone to decay" (41). At about the same time, al-Ḍuʿayf noted that trade was stagnating and many merchants from Marrakech had become bankrupt (42). The demographic losses of the Great Plague (1799-1800) were partly responsible for this decline. Further to the north, Meknès seems to have shared the fate of Marrakech. To the British ambassador William A'Court "it had the appearance of a heap of ruins rather than of an inhabited city" (43).

Fès and Tétouan, on the other hand, seem to have enjoyed an unprecedented period of economic prosperity. Mathieu de Lesseps reported in 1794 that "Fès was the most populous, industrious, and enlightened as well as the wealthiest and the most civilized city in Morocco" (44). Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Fès was undergoing considerable extension. A letter by Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès makes it clear that by 1797 building activity in the city had spread to hitherto uninhabited zones (45). The Great Plague must have affected this expansion but economic activity seems to have quickly recovered owing to the fiscal advantages granted by Mawlāy Sulaymān (46). According to the author of *al-Ibtisām*, never were the Fāsi merchants more prosperous than during the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān (47).

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(40) W.Lemprière, *Voyage*, p.85; J.Caillé, Mathieu de Lesseps au Maroc, in *Hespéris-Tamuda*, vol.II, 1961, p.287.

(41) J.G. Jackson, *An Account of the Empire*, p.63.

(42) Al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.439-440.

(43) C.O.2/4, Meknès, 20 Aug., 1813.

(44) J.Caillé, "Mathieu de Lesseps au Maroc", *Hespéris-Tamuda*, vol.II, 1961, p.288.

(45) Cf.letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès, dated 16 Ḥijja 1211/12 June, 1797 in Ms.D.194, BGR, p.56.

(46) Among these advantages were the abolition of non-Quranic taxes, the reduction of import duties for Muslim merchants and the reduction of the military burden of maintaining the *rumāt* (urban militia)

(47) *Al-Ibtisām*, p.67.

Tétouan had common interests with Fès. It was the latter's outlet to the sea through which passed a major proportion of its trade with Europe. Tétouan had many merchants who maintained commercial relations with European and Mediterranean countries (48). Both Fès and Tétouan seem to have benefited from the decline of the Atlantic trade. Indeed, Fès had become "the greatest emporium of commerce with the interior parts of Africa" (49) and Tétouan tended to serve as the northern outlet for that commerce as well.

### C- Social Categories

In broad terms, the Moroccan society was divided into two main categories : the khāṣṣa, or élite, and the ʿāmma, or the common people. The khāṣṣa included the sharīf-s, or those who claim descent from the Prophet, ṣālim-s, or religious scholars, notables, Makhzen officials and wealthy merchants. The ʿāmma, on the other hand, included the mass of the people: peasants, artisans, shopkeepers, itinerant traders and urban workers— all those whose opinion was never consulted in political matters and who, according to Mawlāy Sulaymān, "should rather count among the dead than among the living" (50).

#### (1) The Khāṣṣa

Texts of the bayʿa (declaration of allegiance to the newly appointed sultan) generally enumerated the main components of the khāṣṣa, or elite. In such documents, they

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(48) A Tétouani merchant, such as ʿAbd al-Karīm b. al-Ṭālib, maintained commercial relations with the Turkish regencies; cf. CCC, vol. 25, 1 Sept., 1817. Other Tétouani merchants who had commercial relations with Europe included ʿAlī al-Bāhy, Muḥammad al-Brūbī and al-ʿAttār brothers.

(49) A. Brooks, Sketches in Spain and Morocco, London, 1931, vol. I, p. 212.

(50) Cf. extracts from a khutba by Mawlāy Sulaymān in al-Mashraffī, Sharḥ al-shamaʿmaqiyya, MS. G 629, BGR, unpaginated.

were referred to as ahl al-ḥall wa al-ʿaḍ, that is "the people of tying and untying". Their presence and opinion was required every time that the Islamic community was confronted with an important political decision. There is no doubt that the ḥaḍariya towns, being the seats of Islamic civilization, harboured a greater proportion of this elite and were, therefore, entitled to play a much more important role in the shaping of the country's destiny.

In a traditional Islamic society, religion played a major role in determining the nature of social differentiation. Sharīf-s claimed prominence over all other segments in society because they belonged to the holy lineage of the Prophet.

Sharīf-s were respected and venerated by virtue of their nobility of blood and their —real or supposed— possession of a particular power of blessing (baraka). They were often called upon by lay people to settle disputes and act as mediators in conflicts. The sultan, although a sharīf himself, did not hesitate to appeal to them for mediation.

The ʿālim-s also derived their influence from religion since they were considered to be the guardians of the holy law (sharīʿa) and the spiritual inheritors of the Prophet. The acquisition of the holy sciences (al-ʿilm al-sharīf) was a substitute for the holy lineage and ensured for its holder a prominent position in society. The ʿālim-s were the main referees in all important issues. Among "the people of tying and untying" they held a key position, and no bayʿa could ever take place without their participation.

Their social importance was further increased by the exercise of a wide range of judicial, educational and religious functions (judges, notaries, market provosts,

administrators of pious endowments, preachers, prayer leaders, etc). However, ʿālim-s did not constitute a social class nor did they represent specific interests. Their loyalty could very well be a function of their sharifian origin or their belonging to a particular religious order.

Religious groups and zāwiya-s represented another socio-religious group the leader of which acquired a considerable influence in society. The importance of these religious orders was based on the moral authority of their shaykh-s (leaders) and the thousands of adepts that were to be found in every part of the country and at every level of the social organization. Their influence was not limited to the religious field. Sufi shaykh-s acted as arbiters in settling conflicts and their zāwiya-s (lodges) served as shelters for the persecuted. They also extended their protection to travelers and trade caravans which otherwise would be exposed to plunder, particularly in zones of weak Makhzen authority. By the turn of the nineteenth century, some religious orders had become so influential that their shaykh-s intervened openly in dynastic conflicts.

Besides religion, hereditary leadership provided an important means of social prominence. Some families, both rural and urban, acquired high social status by virtue of their service to the Makhzen or their military and political prowess within their own group. This often became hereditary. Thus, the Ibn ʿAbd al-Sādaq of northern Morocco provided qāʿid-s for the Jbala region for many generations under the ʿAlawid dynasty. The ʿAsh ʿash family of Tétouan, though less prestigious than the former, provides another example. In Fès, such a hereditary nobility was mainly monopolized by the Andalusian families which supplied the greatest proportion of military and political leaders there.

The social standing of this nobility (aḥyān) was largely based on its military achievement. A group such as the Fāsi Andalusians was distinguished less by its wealth or learning than by its ability to provide military leadership during periods of political uncertainty. This role was best illustrated in the Fès rebellion of 1820-1822 during which these influential families provided the leadership of the urban militia (rumāt) (51).

Makhzen officials constituted another element of the khāṣṣa. Their social standing depended above all on the power conferred upon them by the sultan. Among them we find the sultan's ministers and kātib-s, governors, qā'id-s, and army officers. They were not always chosen from among people of wealth or noble descent. They were merely individuals who had proved their proficiency in their field and manifested enough literary skill or administrative know-how to attract the attention of the sultan (52). These individuals were highly influential and were often used as channels to reach the sultan's ear.

Finally, wealth was another means which allowed its holder to figure among the khāṣṣa. However, even if people of wealth counted among the wujahā' (notables), they were not necessarily politically influential. Wealth conferred a high social standing but did not confer power which was the apanage of the Makhzen and its officials. Indeed, recent studies on the social history of Fès (53) show that merchants as a social group never played any outstanding political role in society because political power tended to be concentrated in the elite of the various "natural groupings" (sharīf-s, Bildiyyīn, Andalusians, etc...).

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(51) Cf. chapter VII below, pp. 385-390.

(52) Cf. the case of Aḥmad al-Qusṭālī, Mawlāy Sulaymān's secretary, in Bujandār, al-Ightibāt, I, pp.42-49.

(53) N. Cigar, Socio-economic Structures and the Development of an Urban Bourgeoisie in Pre-colonial Morocco, 1980, typescript, (forthcoming in The Maghreb Review), pp. 9-10.



Two reasons might explain the political insignificance of merchants in Moroccan society prior to 1830. First, there was the predominance of vertical loyalties according to which merchants tended to identify primarily with their ethnic community and only secondarily with their interest groups. Secondly, there was the absence of an effective internal organization among merchants designed to further their commercial and political interests. This induced them to seek individual ways of promotion rather than collective ones. The most common way was to look for Makhzen protection either by accepting governmental responsibilities (amīn-s, customs collectors, qā'id-s), or by entering into commercial association with the sultan and thus, serve as his commercial agents. The most outstanding merchants of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries had all, in one way or another, served the Makhzen (54). Mawlāy Sulaymān himself underlined this reality when he noted that merchants were above all faithful to their commercial interests and would readily accept government responsibility since it allowed them to further these interests (55).

## (2) The ʿĀmma

The ʿĀmma, or commoners, included all those who did not belong to the elite of the community: peasants, craftsmen, shopkeepers and workers.

In the countryside, the social map was to a large extent simplified by the predominance of the agricultural mode of production. With the exception of a minority of

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(54) Among these we find al-Ṭālib b. Jallūn, ʿAbd al-Karīm b. al-Ṭālib, Muḥammad Bejja, Muḥammad al-Ṣaffār and the Ṣfīra brothers of Fès.  
 (55) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès (1820), in Akansūs, pp.320-322.

of tribal notables, the overwhelming majority of peasants were small landowners, who owned just enough land to sustain their families. Most of the time these peasants found it more, or at least equally, profitable to hire their labour out as khammās (a sharecropper for the fifth of the crop) rather than to cultivate their own parcels of land. In an agriculturally based economy, the peasant endured the main burden of taxation, particularly under the Quranic taxation system adopted by Mawlāy Sulaymān. They also provided armed contingents to fight alongside the Makhzen army. The rural ḥamma, however, had no place on the political scene and lived on the margin of society.

The urban ḥamma was more diversified. Some segments of it could also play a more important role. It included petty officials, craftsmen, shopkeepers, peddlers and labourers. The first three categories constituted what can be called the middle rank which separated the khāṣṣa from the lower rank consisting of peddlers and labourers. While the middle strata enjoyed an urban style of life, the rabble on the other hand lived on the margin of urban civilization and represented, by virtue of their predominantly rural origin, an extension of the countryside into the town.

Craftsmen were, numerically, the most important segment of urban society. Artisanry is supposed to have provided the livelihood of more than half of all townspeople (56). Not all crafts were equally valued however.

The other important urban category of the ḥamma was formed by shopkeepers (ahl al-ḥawānīt) and the itinerant traders (al-suwwāqa). Because of the modest sources of capital at their disposal, the material condition of these

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(56) K. Brown, People of Salé, p.129.

merchants did not differ much from that of artisans. Many of them specialized in the sale of artisanal products such as shoes and cloth. Some of them chose to move about the weekly country markets instead of waiting for the peasant customer to visit town.

Of all urban social categories, craftsmen and retail traders were the most inclined towards some form of social organization. The fact that artisans and traders belonging to the same occupation were usually located in the same place induced them to a certain type of corporative organization which was illustrated by the existence of ḥanṭa-s (guilds).

The urban ṣāmma of the ḥaḍariya towns supplied the main body of the urban militia (rumāt). Together with the city's ṭubjiya (artillerymen), this militia played an important role in the defence of the town in time of political instability. However, the military leadership of this urban force belonged to the local notables. Prestigious urban families, such as the Fāsi Andalusians, usually provided leaders to officer the military force constituted by the ṣāmma.

### (3) The Jewish Community

The Jewish minority constituted in many ways a society apart. Jews enjoyed freedom of worship but were tied down to a special dhimma status. According to this status they were compelled to wear a distinctive costume and pay the capitation tax (al-jizya) which was intended to serve as a constant reminder of their degraded situation as long as they refused to embrace the Islamic religion.

The fact that Jews were forbidden to own land obliged most of them to live in towns where they were employed in artisanry and trade. However, some Jewish rural communities continued to live in the most remote places such as

Wādī Noun, the Dra valley and Tafilelt (57). Their total number was estimated in 1806 at more than 100,000 (58).

If the great majority were employed as artisans, small shopkeepers and itinerant traders, many were big merchants who resided in the ports and conducted large-scale trade with European countries. While they found it difficult to engage in the eastern or southern caravan trade, they could always act as bankers by lending money to Muslim merchants who traded with the Sudan (59). They also engaged in commercial associations with wealthy Muslim merchants and served as commercial agents for the sultan himself.

During the second half of the eighteenth century, Jewish merchants acquired a great importance by virtue of the encouragement given to maritime trade by Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh. Many Jewish families emigrated from all parts of the country to settle in the newly founded port of Essaouira. Sīdī Muḥammad entrusted Jewish merchants with Makhzen monopolies over some products (60) and used them on political missions abroad (61). "The condition of the Jews improved throughout the country" (62).

Under his successor, however, the Jewish community was exposed to the most severe hardships it had experienced for many centuries. Mawlāy al-Yazīd (1790-1792) allowed many Jewish quarters to be plundered and persecuted many of those who had served his father. In fact, the persecution of Jews by Mawlāy al-Yazīd should be seen as a violent reaction against the Jewish ascendancy

(57) R. Caillé, Journal d'un voyage à Timbuctoo et à Jenné dans l'Afrique centrale, Paris, 1965, vol. III, p.88.

(58) J. Buffa, Travels, p.183.

(59) R. Caillé, Journal d'un voyage, III, pp.88-89.

(60) Al-Ḍu'ayf mentioned that Sīdī Muḥammad entrusted the monopoly of cochineal at Fès to Jewish merchants; cf. p.168.

(61) Encyclopaedia Judaica, XII, art. "Morocco", column 338.

(62) Ibid.

which resulted from Sidī Muḥammad's commercial policy(63).

The advent of Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1792 came as "a certain delivrance" for the Jewish community (64). He resumed his father's policy by entrusting his commercial transactions to some wealthy Jews of Essaouira such as the Macnin-s and the Guidalla-s. He was even accused of partiality towards his Jewish subjects by European merchants((65). Indeed, during the early nineteenth century most of the Essaouira trade tended to be concentrated in Jewish hands after many European merchants left the country as a result of the two epidemics of the plague and Mawlāy Sulaymān's restrictions on maritime trade(66).

However, relations between the Muslim and Jewish communities of Morocco at the beginning of the nineteenth century did not always run smoothly. The fact that many Jews travelled to Europe meant that many of them adopted European dress, European names and even European nationalities. Many Gibraltar Jews were in fact Moroccans who changed their nationality while maintaining commercial links with their country of origin. For the Muslim community this represented a violation of the dhimma status and exacerbated tension between the two sides. The rising fears of European intervention in Morocco by the turn of the nineteenth century only worsened the relations between the two communities. In the eyes of the Muslim population the Jews came to represent the agents of European interests and were, therefore, looked upon with much suspicion. Did not they serve as commercial associates of Christians in

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(63) Mawlāy al-Yazīd's persecution of the Jews was not an isolated case. In 1792 a certain adventurer in the Sous, Abū Iḥlās, was particularly resentful to the Jews whom he killed and burnt in the Sous and Wādī Noun. Cf. al-Samlālī, Nuzhat al-jullās, Ms.46,25, R.L., p.15; al-Mukhtār al-Sūsī, al-Ma'sūl, 1961, vol.V, pp.142-144. Cf. also F.O. 52/10, 4 Feb., 1792.

(64) Encyclopaedia Judaica, XII, art. "Morocco", column 338.

(65) F.O. 174/124 April, 1805; F.O.52/29, Report on the trade of Essaouira, dated 3 June, 1828.

(64) Encyclopaedia Judaica, XII, art. "Morocco", column 338.

(65) F.O.174/12, 4 April, 1805 and F.O.52/29, Report on the Trade of Essaouira, dated 3 June, 1828.

(66) Cf. below chapter III, p. 162.

the ports and as the medium through which European consuls and travellers discovered the hidden weaknesses (ḥawra) of the Muslim community? The author of al-Ibtisām did not fail to underline their damaging role during the French occupation of Egypt when they assisted Napoleon in the translation of the Quran and other Islamic works (67).

As a result of the increased resentment against Jews isolated incidents between individuals from the two communities became more frequent. In 1804 the Jews of Essaouira asked Mawlāy Sulaymān to take some measures of protection on their behalf and he ordered the building of the first millāḥ (Jewish quarter) of the town (68). In 1806 Mawlāy Sulaymān prohibited the wearing of European dress by his Jewish subjects (69) and ordered the 2,000 Jews of Larache to leave the town (70). There was also the pressure exerted upon the Sultan by religious groups which in 1807 made him issue an order to build millāḥ-s for Rabat, Salé, and Tétouan (71). At the end of 1815 Mawlāy Sulaymān renewed his order to Jews to wear the traditional Moroccan dress and pay the capitation tax. Those who refused under the pretext that they fell under the protection of European countries were asked to leave the country (72). Mawlāy Sulaymān's attitude should not be seen, however, as a manifestation of religious intolerance. Jewish merchants continued to serve as "the king's merchants" (tujjār al-sultān) and customs receivers (73). Mawlāy Sulaymān also proved to be an energetic

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(67) Al-Ibtisām, p.27.

(68) D. Corcos, Studies in the History of the Jews of Morocco, Jerusalem, 1976, p.121.

(69) Cf. petition by Jewish merchants of Gibraltar in F.O.174/10, 13 Nov., 1806.

(70) In 1806 Mawlāy Sulaymān ordered the Jews of Larache to leave the town after some Jewish merchants had been involved in the sale of wine to local sailors; cf. J. Buffa, Travels, p.44, and F.O.174/284, letter from al-Salāwī to J.Green, 4 Rajab, 1221/17 Sept., 1806, (appendix 24).

(71) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.448; al-Ibtisām, p.12.

(72) F.O.52/17, 6 Jan., 1816; CCC, vol.24, 1 Feb., 1816.

(73) D. Corcos, Studies, p.117.

defender of the Jewish community. When Fāsi merchants attempted to prevent Jews from selling slippers in the markets of Old Fès he opposed this arbitrary action (74). After the Zaīan defeat, Mawlāy Sulaymān entrusted Jewish merchants with the task of buying arms for his disorganized army (75) and in 1820, when the Oudaya attacked the millāh of Fès, he condemned their action and summoned them to return the Jewish property they had plundered (76). Jewish merchants were still entrusted with Makhzen commercial transactions and in 1822 they were solicited to assist in the reopening of El-Jadida to European trade (77). By confining Jews within special quarters and preventing them from wearing the European dress Mawlāy Sulaymān was just making clear that the Muslim community was not prepared to accept any alteration in the traditional status of the ahl al-dhimma (the protected people).

## II - The Moroccan State (Makhzen)

The Moroccan State, known as the Makhzen, was similar in its structure to the great Muslim empires of the Middle East. It was headed by a sultan who was assisted by an army and a bureaucratic apparatus.

The sphere of the sultan's authority expanded or shrank depending on the strength or the weakness of the Makhzen's military forces. Many tribes acknowledged the sultan's authority and agreed to pay taxes. These were usually those contiguous to the urban centers of the western plains and constituted what came to be known as

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(74) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès, no date, in al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, Ms.K.224, BGR, p.210.

(75) CCC, vol.26, 18 July, 1819; and CCC., vol.27, 31 May, 1820.

(76) CCC, vol.27, letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès dated 2 Shawwāl, 1235/13 July, 1820, asking the Oudaya to return Jewish property.

(77) D.A.R., letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Beloniel, 3 Şafar, 1238/ 20 Oct., 1822.

bilād al-makhzen, or the land of government. Others, while still recognizing the religious authority of the sultan, refused to pay taxes when they felt secure enough from the Makhzen's military reprisals. They constituted "the land of dissidence", or bilād al-sība. However, between full-fledged acceptance of Makhzen rule and open dissidence there was a wide range of intermediate relations between the tribes and the sultan. Many distant tribes over which the Makhzen could never hope to establish lasting control kept a regular exchange of letters with the sultan, sent periodic delegations to renew their allegiance and even requested the appointment of Makhzen qā'id-s. Thus, the Touat population in 1800 agreed to pay their legal taxes to the bayt al-māl (treasury) at a time when Mawlāy Sulaymān granted them local autonomy, preferring to entrust the administration of their territory to a local council of notables (78).

#### A- The Sultan

The sultan's powers extended to almost every aspect of the religious and political life of the country. His religious influence was derived from the fact that he was both the commander of the faithful (amīr al-mūminīn) and a descendant of the Prophet. At the same time, he commanded the army, ran the administrative apparatus, regulated the country's finance and supervised relations with foreign nations. The sultan's prerogatives tended to be even more extensive in Mawlāy Sulaymān's case because of the modesty of the administrative apparatus.

#### (1) Religious and Temporal Duties

The sultan filled many functions within the Moroccan State. First of all, he was the head of the Islamic community. His main duty in this respect lay in guarding

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(78) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Touat, 28 Şafar, 1215/ 21 July, 1800, in El-Ouataïq, I, 1976, pp.446-447.



and enforcing the sharīʿa, or Islamic law, and the defence of his subjects' faith against heterodox deviations.

This role of the sultan as the guardian of the sharīʿa is best illustrated by the case of Mawlāy Sulaymān. Indeed, one of his major concerns was the defense of the faith and his constant endeavours to rid the religion from culpable alteration.

The enforcement of the sharīʿa represented another aspect of the sultan's religious duties. The sultan filled the function of the highest judicial authority by appointing judges (qāḍī-s) and chief-judges. At the same time, he acted as the supreme court of appeal. His role of guardian of the sharīʿa was also reflected in his endeavours to ensure its supremacy over customary law (ʿurf) Makhzen attempts to subdue tribal areas of dissidence, particularly in the Berber zones, was partly motivated by the sultan's eagerness to ensure the supremacy of Islamic law over the "law of barbarousness" (al-jāhiliya). Subduing zones of dissidence was regarded by the sultan as a religious duty which differed in no way from the jihād against the enemies of Islam (79).

The defense of Islam against outside threats figured among the most sacred duties of the sultan. This was best illustrated by the necessity to keep alive the tradition of jihād against Christian nations which did not have peace treaties with Morocco. By 1800, this obligation tended to become merely theoretical because of the naval superiority of European countries. Nevertheless, when Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to liquidate the Moroccan navy in 1817, the religious groups did not fail to see in this measure

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(79) In 1819, following the Zaian defeat, Mawlāy Sulaymān called on his subjects to take part in a holy war against the rebellious Berbers who were considered to be "more worthy of jihād than the infidel enemy". Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAshʿāsh, dated 2 Muḥarran, 1235/ 21 Oct., 1819, in D.A.R.

an abandonment by the sultan of one of his essential duties. The sultan refused also to endorse peace treaties the clauses of which were in contradiction with the sharīʿa. This was particularly made clear by the insistence by sultans upon the fact that the judgement of cases involving Muslim subjects and Christians should always be in conformity with the Islamic law (80).

However, the most important of all sultan's duties was the maintenance of internal peace and security. Internal peace was not only a worldly requirement, but a religious one as well. By ensuring internal security the sultan made it possible for the Muslim community to exercise its religious duties. At the same time, the sultan had to see to it that his subjects were secure both in their lives and their property. In return for this, he was given absolute power. As long as he was able to maintain order the sultan could not be questioned even if he proved to be arbitrary and unjust. Under the terms of the sharīʿa, as in the Hobbesian concept of the social contract, priority was given to order and security rather than justice. The worst of situations for an Islamic State was not an unjust political system but a situation of sedition (fitna) which rendered the exercise of religious duties impossible.

The sultan was also the head of the army and the Makhzen administration. He supervised the recruitment, the equipment and the training of the army and led all major expeditions in person. He appointed ministers, governors, and qāʿid-s and kept a regular correspondence with each of them. In addition to this, he controlled the economic activity by appointing amīn-s (tax collectors) and muhtasib-s, by striking the currency and fixing its value, and finally by regulating the flow of foreign trade. In fact, there was hardly any field that was free from sultanian intervention.

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(80) Cf. for instance article VII of the Anglo-Moroccan treaty signed in 1801, in F.O.52/27.

This does not mean that the powers of the sultan were unlimited. The bayʿa was already a limitation in itself. Its conditions could be particularly restrictive if the sultan was in a weak position at the time of his investiture. The bayʿa of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm b. al-Yazīd in 1820 and that of his brother Mawlāy Saʿīd in 1821, both proclaimed during the Fès rebellion, are evidence of this fact (81). The powers of the sultan were also restricted by the sharīʿa and those who represented it, namely the ʿālim-s. The sultan had to refer to the guardians of the Islamic law especially when he was confronted with important decisions. Mawlāy Sulaymān, being a religious scholar himself, was more inclined than any of his ʿAlawid predecessors to abide by the sharīʿa. On crucial issues such as the sale of victuals and strategic materials to Christians or the attitude to be adopted towards the Wahhābi doctrine, the opinion of the ʿālim-s was always sought (82). These could also ask the sultan to implement a legal opinion (fatwā) they had pronounced independently of any request by the sultan. In 1799 for instance, the ʿālim-s were of opinion that the country was in danger of a European invasion and that the Makhzen had to allow the sale of military equipment to his subjects who were to be put in a state of readiness to defend the land of Islam. Mawlāy Sulaymān could not oppose this fatwā despite the regrettable consequences that such a decision was bound to have on internal order. In practice, therefore, the powers of the sultan were not as absolute and unlimited as they were usually depicted by European observers.

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(81) Cf. texts of the two bayʿa-s in Dāwūd, III, pp. 250 and 264.

(82) In 1794 Mawlāy Sulaymān requested the religious opinion of al-Tawdī b. Sūda regarding the sale of wheat to the Christians; cf. his letter in Mic. 3/HPMD, Fès, 1978. Later on, he consulted the ʿālim-s concerning the sale of horses to Spain; cf. al-Mahdī al-Wazzānī, al-Nawāzil al-jadīda, III, pp. 35-36. For his consultation on the Wahhābi doctrine cf. chapter V below.

(2) Mawlāy Sulaymān (1766-1822)

The text of the bayʿa drafted at Fès in March 1792 depicted the basic traits of Mawlāy Sulaymān's character: nobility, devotion, gentleness and clemency. The bayʿa also stressed his piety and his "assiduous study of the noble science" (83). Foreign observers underlined the same features of his character. Matra described him in 1792 as "a respectable young man (...) but timid and unambitious, totally in the hands of the priests (ʿālim-s)" (84). Other contemporary European officials were unanimous about his "mild and humane character" (85).

Mawlāy Sulaymān was born in the Tafilelt in 1766. His father Sīdī Muḥammad took a special interest in the religious education of his young sons after he had been disappointed with the behaviour of the elder ones, and particularly Mawlāy al-Yazīd. After he had memorized the Quran in a zāwiya in Ahmar near Safi and studied the Prophet's biography at Ksar el-Kebir (86), Mawlāy Sulaymān was sent to the Tafilelt in 1783, together with two of his brothers. There, each one of them was placed in a separate fortress and given a private tutor. Abū al-Qāsim al-Zayānī, one of the highly trusted servants of Sīdī Muḥammad, was purposely appointed governor of the Tafilelt in order to supervise the education of Mawlāy Sulaymān and his brothers. During his stay in the Tafilelt, Mawlāy Sulaymān had some of the most outstanding ʿālim-s of Fès for teachers: ʿAbd al-Qādir b. Shaqrūn, Muḥammad a. al-Ṭāhar al-Hawwārī, Muḥammad al-Ṭrunbāṭī and Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj. Mawlāy Sulaymān only resided in Fès for two years (1790-1792) (87).

(83) Cf. Mawlāy Sulaymān's bayʿa in al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.87-90.

(84) F.O.52/10, 27 March, 1792.

(85) See observations made by the French vice-consul, L. Mure in CCC, vol.20, 10 April, 1792, the British vice-consul at Tétouan during 1820's, W. Price, reproduced in Brooke, Sketches, I, p.359, and the British consul J.S.Douglas in F.O.52/23, 26 April, 1822.

(86) Al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, pp.166-167.

(87) Al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.87.

Mawlāy Sulaymān had a bent towards the study of religious sciences and manifested little interest in the country's political affairs before 1792. When Mawlāy al-Yazīd was proclaimed in 1790 he asked him to reside at Marrakech as vice-regent, but after a short time Mawlāy Sulaymān deserted his post and returned to Fès to resume his studies (88). In March 1792 he was very reluctant to accept the throne offered to him by the head of the Aīt Idrassen confederation and the people of Fès. According to al-Ḍuʿayf, he accepted only upon the condition that he would not take part in the fighting against his brothers (89).

Indeed, Mawlāy Sulaymān was little prepared to govern a country. He was above all a religious scholar whose education deeply marked his political behaviour. His great respect for the sharīʿa explains the fact that he sometimes placed God's prescriptions before the interest of the State. His rigid observance of the sharīʿa, together with his opinionated character, was responsible in part at least, for the inflexibility which characterized his policy, and put him often in collision with groups such as the sharīf-s and the religious brotherhoods whose inherited privileges were not always in conformity with the Holy Law.

#### B- Makhzen Administration

The nature and extent of the administrative system differed widely from one sultan to another. With Mawlāy Sulaymān the administrative apparatus tended to be very modest. Apart from some objective factors which contributed to the weakening of the administrative apparatus left by Sīdf Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh, there was also the authoritarian character of Mawlāy Sulaymān who followed a rigid policy of centralization.

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(88) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.247.

(89) Ibid., p.281.

(1) The Administrative Apparatus

Among the responsibilities of the Moroccan State were the political and administrative posts over which the Makhzen exercised a direct control. Others, on the contrary, were semi-autonomous being mainly religious in character. In traditional Morocco, the so-called "Makhzen service" was basically the palace domestic organization, the administrative hierarchy and the army.

Immediately surrounding the sultan were a number of palace servants who carried out a wide range of daily tasks. They included tent pitchers, water-bringers, the kitchen master, the tea master, the pistol bearer, etc. By 1790, they covered more than twenty different fields (90). These palace servants constituted the permanent company of the sultan and moved with him wherever he went. Although forming part of the Makhzen, the above officers had no stake in the political or administrative affairs of the State. The sultan ran the country through his ministers, kātib-s, qā'id-s and amīn-s, or tax collectors.

At the central level, the Makhzen administration was very rudimentary and in running the affairs of the State the sultan was assisted by a limited number of officials. Louis Chénier, French consul in Morocco from 1767 to 1782, noted that Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh had no real government in which responsibilities were divided among ministers (91). This continued to be the case until the second half of the nineteenth century when Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (1859-1873) and Mawlāy al-Ḥasan (1873-1894) attempted to introduce some administrative reforms. The sultan used to be surrounded by men of confidence rather than ministers. The most important individual among these trusted men usually acquired the title of "chief minister" (al-wazīr al-aḥḍam). He directed, among other things,

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(90) Cf. list of palace officers in 1791 given by the British consul Matra ub Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.

(91) L. Chénier, Recherches historiques, III, p.164.

foreign affairs, and acted as the intermediary between the sultan and European consuls.

This responsibility of "chief minister" was entrusted between 1800 and 1815 to Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Salām al-Salāwī (d.1815), and afterwards to Aḥmad b. M'bārak (d.1819). In practice, government responsibilities were never clearly defined. Al-Salāwī who signed his letters to European consuls as wazīr al-baḥr wa shu'ūn al-ajnās (minister of foreign affairs), performed many other duties at the same time. Thus, while still running foreign affairs, he was entrusted on various occasions with the local government of Fès, Salé and the neighbouring tribes, Larache and the northern provinces. He was also entrusted with the leadership of military expeditions not only within territories under his jurisdiction, but also in the Tadla, the Rif and the Fazāz. The scarcity of competent officials must have partly accounted for this concentration of responsibilities in few hands.

Indeed, never was the central administration so reduced as during the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān. Whereas Sīdī Muḥammad used to be surrounded by more than thirty kātib-s at any one time (92), the total number of secretaries who served Mawlāy Sulaymān during his reign did not exceed twenty according to al-Zayānī (93). This fact cannot just be ascribed to Mawlāy Sulaymān's excessive tendency for centralization or to his authoritarian character. Other objective factors account for the modesty of the administrative apparatus at the beginning of the nineteenth century. One of these factors was the persecution undertaken by his predecessor, Mawlāy al-Yazīd, against his father's servants. When he came to the throne in 1790, Mawlāy al-Yazīd resolved that he would not rely on his father's "dogs" as he used to call them (94). Between 1790 and 1792, he launched a systematic search

(92) F.O.52/12, 3 May, 1802.

(93) Al-Zayānī, Jawharat al-tījān, Ms.6778, R.L., pp.67-68.

(94) Al-Ḍu'ayf, p.228.

for all those who had gained the confidence of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh. Many were executed while others were imprisoned or left the country to save their heads. "As many of the Talbs he could catch were cut to pieces", wrote Matra in 1802, "the same fate attended the old alcaïds or generals..." (95).

There was also the Great Plague of 1799-1800 which was responsible for the death of many competent officials of the old administration. Mawlāy al-Ṭayyib, the Sultan's brother, and Muḥammad b. ʿUthmān who were entrusted with foreign affairs, perished in the epidemic. In 1800 Mawlāy Sulaymān found himself compelled to entrust a twenty year old waṣīf (sultan's slave) with the running of foreign affairs (96). In 1801, the Anglo-Moroccan treaty was negotiated on the Moroccan side by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAshʿāsh, "a common muleteer" who could neither read nor write. "The man who negotiated the treaty", wrote Matra in 1802, "was ignorant; the plague had carried off all talbs used to foreign business" (97).

Finally, the conditions of Mawlāy Sulaymān's accession to the throne and the dynastic struggle which opposed him to many of his brothers made him very distrustful of the court princes. The rebellion of his cousin Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Mālik b. Idrīs in 1796 while governor of the Chaouia, and the attempt made by Mawlāy al-Ṭayyib to get himself proclaimed at Marrakech in 1799 (98) confirmed him in his suspicions. Among all princes, only Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Salām, the Sultan's brother, had some influence in the court of Mawlāy Sulaymān because, "being blind, he was less dangerous" (99). Mawlāy Sulaymān tended to rely above all on black slaves such as al-Salāwī and Aḥmad b. M'bārak.

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(95) F.O.52/12, 3 May, 1802.

(96) F.O.52/10, 6 Aug., 1799.

(97) F.O.52/12, 12 April, 1802. The same ʿAshʿāsh negotiated the treaty of 1803 between Morocco and Sweden; cf. Muḥammad al-Ḥajwī, al-ʿAlāʾiq al-siyāsiya li al-dawla al-ʿalawiya, n.p., n.d., p.15.

(98) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.394.

(99) F.O.52/12, 3 May, 1802.



Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Salām al-Salāwī represented the most outstanding figure of Mawlāy Sulaymān's Makhzen. He served as chief minister in charge of foreign affairs for about fifteen years (1800-1815). When he was first entrusted with the royal seal in 1799, al-Salāwī had behind him little administrative experience. He was a black slave brought up in the court and had previously served as secretary to Mawlāy al-Ṭayyib while this one was governor of the northern ports (1794-1797). After the removal of Mawlāy al-Ṭayyib to Dār al-Bayḍā in 1797 al-Salāwī acted as qāʿid of Tangier and had the occasion to deal with European consuls. Following the death of Ibn ʿUthmān in 1799 he was entrusted with the royal seal and from 1800 onwards he directed most of the correspondence with European consuls (100). In 1802 he was appointed governor of Fès, and less than one year later he joined the sultan as kātib. At the beginning of 1804, he was made qāʿid of Rabat, Salé and the neighbouring Beni Hsen and ʿArab al-Widyān (101). In May 1805 he was entrusted with the government of Larache and the north-western Jbala tribes (102). Following the destitution of ʿAshʿāsh in 1807, al-Salāwī's prerogatives were extended to include the governorship of both Tétouan and Tangier. At one time the whole of northern Morocco, including the Rif, came under his authority, in addition to foreign relations which he exercised until his death in 1815. The passing away of al-Salāwī came as a great loss for Mawlāy Sulaymān at a time when the country was entering a difficult period. "When the āmīr al-mūminīn learned about his death", wrote al-Zayānī, "he regretted his loss as he was the pillar of his State" (103).

On the local level, the Makhzen exercised its control

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(100) F.O.52/11, 6 June, 1797; F.O.52/12, 12 Aug., 1802; al-Ḍuʿayf, p.307.

(101) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.428.

(102) Ibid., p.442.

(103) Al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, p.182.

over the population through governors and qā'id-s. These were generally chosen on the basis of their administrative competence. A qā'id did not need to be a scholar but had to be an ṣāqil (wise man) with a sense of the practical. Qā'id-s were chosen either from among tribal notables or among Makhzen servants, such as army officers. In the first case the sultan did nothing more than confirm the tribal leader in his position. The effective control of the Makhzen over such qā'id-s depended to a large extent on the strength of the central authority, on the location of the tribe and on its military potential. The most efficient qā'id was the one who succeeded in gaining the trust of both his tribesmen and the sultan. The least efficient, on the other hand, was usually the qā'id appointed by the sultan from outside the tribe and who lacked the necessary coercive power to impose the Makhzen's will. Mawlāy Sulaymān, in particular, tended to disregard the realities of tribal politics and often appointed his own qā'id-s, chosen from among his slaves or from army officers. His attempts at imposing outsiders as qā'id-s on the Berber tribes of the Middle Atlas were constantly rejected and constituted an important factor in the deterioration of Makhzen-Berber relations (104).

Besides ministers, kātib-s and qā'id-s, there were the amīn-s, or tax collectors, who played an important role in the running of the Makhzen administrative machinery. Amīn-s were often described as the bankers of the Makhzen. They ensured the collection of taxes and supervised the farming of State monopolies. They served also as State accountants by keeping Makhzenian funds and executing the sultan's orders relating to the payment of officials and various other expenditures.

Finally, there were public sectors—the judicial system and the administration of pious endowments (aḥbās)—which, though autonomous, were not completely free from

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(104) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.183.

Makhzen intervention. Under judicial posts (al-manāṣib al-sharʿiyya) we find the muftī, the qāḍī-s (judges), the ʿudūl (pl. of ʿadl, or notaries) and the muḥtasib-s (market provosts and supervisors of public morality). The judiciary also included the abū al-mawārīth (the master of probate and administrator of government property) and the kāfil al-aytām wa al-ghāʾibīn (advocate for orphans and missing persons). Posts depending on the aḥbās were also semi-autonomous. They included the nādhir (administrator of pious endowments), the mosque imām-s and khaṭīb-s (prayer leaders) as well as mosque and madrāsa teachers.

## (2) Mawlāy Sulaymān's Administrative Policy

The meagreness of the administrative apparatus at the beginning of the nineteenth century was not only a result of objective factors such as Mawlāy al-Yazīd's persecution of his father's collaborators and the effects of the Great Plague. It was also a result of Mawlāy Sulaymān's centralizing and authoritarian character. Those who served as his kātib-s, such as al-Zayānī or Akansūs, did not fail to remark on his authoritarian attitude and his obstinacy in running the affairs of the country. Mawlāy Sulaymān's greatest weakness according to al-Zayānī, was "his obstinacy and reliance on inexperienced people" (105). He was so opinionated that he used to draft his own letters before he handed them over to his secretaries, without allowing the least alteration to the text. According to al-Ibtisām, Mawlāy Sulaymān forbade his secretaries even to correct grammatical or linguistic errors they might notice in the draft (106). Little chance was given to his entourage to participate in decision making and "no minister was offered opportunity to leave his mark on the country's policy" (107).

His inflexible tendency towards centralization was apparent in more than one aspect of his policy. In ap-

(105) Ibid., fol.186.

(106) Al-Ibtisām, p.5.

(107) Muḥammad Gharrīṭ, Fawāṣil al-jumān fī anbāʾ wuzarāʾ wa kuttāb al-zamān, Fès, 1921, p. 8.

pointing qā'id-s, for instance, he gave little chance to local notables and religious dignitaries to express their opinion about such appointments. This discontended both traditional notables and local zāwiya-s (108) and led to a continuous friction between the Makhzen and the loci of local power.

We touch here on the heart of Mawlāy Sulaymān's administrative policy. Indeed, Mawlāy Sulaymān showed little respect for traditional and tribal considerations in the appointment of local officials. In the Tadla, the appointment of alien qā'id-s was at the root of persistent tension with the Sharqāwiya religious order. The local government of Fès was often entrusted to outsiders which greatly discontended the Fāsi traditional leadership and partly accounted for the deterioration of relations between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the influential notables of Fès (109). Mawlāy Sulaymān was also prone to disregard tribal antagonisms when extending the authority of a single governor over an explosive combination of tribes. Thus, the governor of the Chaouia, Ibn al-Ghāzī al-Madanī, who commanded a territory extending from the banks of the Bouregreg river to those of the Oum er-Rbia, found his authority contested by the Tadla tribes on many occasions. The Sultan's attempt to impose a single qā'id for both highland and lowland Berbers was, according to al-Zayānī, the reason behind the hostile attitude of the Aīt Oumalou who disliked the governorship of Muḥammad Wa'zīz of the Beni Mtir (110) and later on that of Ibn al-Ghāzī of the Zemmour (111).

Mawlāy Sulaymān wanted above all to entrust government responsibilities to individuals who could be easily controlled by the Makhzen. This explains why he resorted more often to black slaves and non-committed merchants.

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(108) Cf. relations between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the zāwiya-s of Ouezzane and Boujad in chapter VI below.

(109) Cf. chapter VI<sub>1</sub> below.

(110) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.183.

(111) Al-Zayānī, Tārīkh al-wilāya, Ms.13,009, R.L., p.3.

John Buffa noted in 1806 that many black qā'id-s "reckoned to be very loyal to the Emperor (were) at the head of the most important provinces and districts"(112). Al-Salāwī and Aḥmad b. M'bārak, the only two ministers that Mawlāy Sulaymān had between 1799 and 1819, were both palace slaves (waṣīf-s). Merchants also enjoyed Mawlāy Sulaymān's favours and were sometimes entrusted with government responsibilities (113).

However, Mawlāy Sulaymān lacked the necessary means to carry out his policy of centralization. He lacked both a reliable army and a flexible tribal policy. Unlike his father who was able to tolerate tribal dissidence as long as it did not threaten his authority, Mawlāy Sulaymān showed a firm determination to extend his control to tribes and territories which the Makhzen had never been able to control since the death of Mawlāy Ismā'īl. Sīdī Muḥammad avoided open confrontation with inaccessible tribes as much as possible. He preferred to spare his energies in order to tackle more important problems instead of being constantly at the head of his meḥalla. Peaceful arrangements with dissident tribes were far more valued than costly and risky military campaigns which, even when successful, had but a limited effect. On the contrary, Mawlāy Sulaymān not only attempted to force the inaccessible mountain Berbers to submit, but also showed a political inflexibility which often made him reject peaceful solutions. The humiliating Zaian defeat in May 1819 was ascribed by Akansūs to the rejection by Mawlāy Sulaymān of the peace proposals made by the Aīt Oumalou (114). Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh, noted Akansūs, had never rejected the enemy's appeal for forgiveness. He even induced a third party to intercede on behalf of the enemy so as to arrange an honourable outcome for the conflict without risking a humiliating setback (115).

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(112) J. Buffa, Travels, pp.108, 184.

(113) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès in Akansūs, pp. 320-322.

(114) Ibid., p.317.

(115) Ibid., pp.317-318.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's religious concept of the imamate might explain his administrative policy and his subsequent difficulties. The Quranic system of taxation adopted by Mawlāy Sulaymān implied a permanent control of the countryside and a direct supervision by the central government of tax collecting. On the other hand, Mawlāy Sulaymān's sense of justice led him to revoke local governors on the least accusation made against them by their subjects. The author of al-Ibtisām reported that on one occasion the governor of Doukkala was arrested because he offered the Sultan a large sum of money, only a short time after his nomination (116). The author of al-Ightibāṭ mentioned that it was customary for Mawlāy Sulaymān to leave officials in their posts only for a short period of time (117). Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Dukkālī also confirmed that by following such a policy the Sultan intended to provide guarantees against the risks of corruption (118). These frequent changes in local government paved the way, however, for the eruption of conflicts among the local notables and considerably weakened the administrative apparatus at a time when Mawlāy Sulaymān had failed to build up a reliable coercive military force.

### C- The Army

At the end of the eighteenth century, the Moroccan army consisted of a relatively small corps of professional soldiers of ʿAbīd and Oudaya, both of which had originally been formed by Mawlāy Ismāʿīl, and the jaysh tribes which formed a sort of reserve army to be called upon for special expeditions.

(116) Muḥammad al-Ḥajwī, Ikhtisār al-ibtisām, Ms.H 114, BGR, p.360.

(117) Bujandār, al-Ightibāṭ, II, pp.122-127.

(118) Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Dukkālī, Ithāf ashraf al-malā, Ms.D.11, BGR, p. 101.

يولي ويعزل دوام عصره  
بالعود والعلم والالتفات  
من جورهم لقصر الأزمان

” . إذ كان مولانا أمير دهره  
وذلك من مصلحة القضاء  
عسى يدوم الناس في أمان

Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh had reduced the power of both the ʿAbīd and the Oudaya who had been largely responsible for the civil strife that followed Mawlāy Ismāʿīl's death. He reduced the size of the ʿAbīd corps to about 15,000 men and dispersed them among the various sea ports. The Oudaya consisting mainly of cavalry, were reduced to only about 1,000 men and transferred from Fès, where they had been causing a great deal of trouble, to Meknès (119). On the other hand, the reserves furnished by the tribes, both Arab and Berber, became more important. The Arab tribes of the coastal plains alone could contribute, according to al-Zayānī, about 150,000 men (120). The ḥaḍariya towns also contributed to the Makhzen's military effort by providing contingents of rumāt (urban militia) and ṭubjiya (artillerymen) for major expeditions.

The essence of Sīdī Muḥammad's military reform was to curtail the power of the professional army and to rely on the military potential of the tribes with the aim of alleviating the financial burden on the Makhzen. The logical consequence of this policy with regard to the army was to favour the unorganized strength of the tribes over the standing army of the Makhzen. In other words, tribal ʿaṣabiyya acquired the upper hand over the janisary type of organization sought by Mawlāy Ismāʿīl. During his brief reign, Mawlāy al-Yazīd attempted to revive and revitalize the ʿAbīd army by assembling them in the garrison of Meknès (121). The Oudaya were also brought back to Fès after thirty years of absence.

When Mawlāy Sulaymān came to power, the size of the professional army was negligible. Just before Mawlāy al-Yazīd died, it consisted of about 400 Oudaya and less than 2,000 ʿAbīd (122). The political difficulties of Mawlāy al-

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(119) Al-Zayānī, ʿIqd al-jumān, Ms.G.40, BGR, p.15; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.115.

(120) Al-Zayānī, ʿIqd al-jumān, p.15.

(121) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.228.

(122) Ibid., p.273.

Yazīd and the dynastic crisis which followed his death led to the dispersal of the professional army as many soldiers deserted Makhzen service under the pressures of survival. In these circumstances, Mawlāy Sulaymān had to rely on the Berber confederation of Aīt Idrassen and the tribe of Beni Mtir in particular, in order to subdue the country and impose his rule. The pacification of the northern provinces of Jbala, the Gharb and Tamesna was essentially an achievement of Aīt Idrassen contingents commanded by Muḥammad Waʿzīz and Ibn Nāṣir al-Mṭīrī. As for the professional army, it hardly totalled 4,000 men in 1793, according to the estimates of the British consul in Morocco (123).

The task of providing the State with a reliable army was, therefore, one of Mawlāy Sulaymān's most urgent responsibilities. He could not remain for ever dependent on Berber contingents. In 1796 he decided to incorporate among the auxiliary jaysh the tribes of Cheraga and Oulad Jama and equipped at the same time 3,000 men from the Oudaya with horses (124). Mawlāy Sulaymān aimed in the first place at strengthening the Oudaya, greatly weakened by his father, so as to allow them to counter-balance the arrogant power of the ʿAbīd. In 1798 he decided to reinforce the tribal jaysh with the recruitment of the Beni Hsen who were among the most powerful Arab tribes of the Azghār (125). In 1807 the jaysh organization was extended to the Guerouane who, after an unfortunate battle with their Beni Mtir rivals, asked Mawlāy Sulaymān to accept them into his army (126). According to Captain Burel who visited Morocco in 1808, the Guerouane supplied the Makhzen with 2,000 fighters (127). This tribe remained, however, only a short while within the Makhzen army since, in 1811, we find it among the allies of Abū Bakr Amhāwish at the Battle of Azrou.

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(123) F.O.52/10, 7 May, 1793.

(124) Al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.318-319.

(125) Ibid., p.387.

(126) Ibid., p.448.

(127) J. Caillé, La mission, p.59.



By the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century Mawlāy Sulaymān realized how modest the result of his organizational efforts really had been. His major failure had been his inability to organize the various jaysh tribes into an efficient army endowed with the necessary discipline and capable of checking the military potential of the tribes. The Cheraga, Oulad Jama and the Beni Hsen tribes never rose to the organizational level of the Oudaya, as Mawlāy Sulaymān had hoped. They constituted nothing more than an auxiliary tribal force to which the Makhzen resorted every time there was a major military confrontation. Even in quantitative terms, Mawlāy Sulaymān was unable to recruit enough troops to balance the military strength of some of the powerful tribal confederations. In 1808 the army was evaluated at 36,000 men (128) at a time when a single tribal confederation, such as the Beni Hsen or the Chaouia, could mobilize as much as 30,000 or 40,000 men (129).

Conscious of these deficiencies, in 1810-1811, Mawlāy Sulaymān attempted a solution along the lines of the janisary model. On the one hand, he ordered the recruitment of the harrāṭīn (descendants of black slaves) to reinforce the 'Abīd army (130); but this decision was apparently never carried out as a result of the controversy which it raised over the definition of a hartānī (131). On the other hand, Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to recruit 2,000 men of the Beni Hsen—already made into a jaysh tribe—into the regular army (132). These measures, however, were no more successful than the earlier ones. The fall in Makhzen revenue during the second decade of the nineteenth century and growing tribal agitation among the coastal plains after 1811 compromised all efforts designed to strengthen the army. More alarming was the spread of insubordination in the army itself as a result of the Makhzen's inability

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(128) Ibid.

(129) Al-Du'ayf, p.388.

(130) Ibid., p.460.

(131) Ibid.

(132) Ibid., p.483.

to curb tribal agitation. In 1815 the 'Abīd army showed signs of dissatisfaction (133) and in 1816 the Oudaya openly defied Mawlāy Sulaymān's orders by refusing to be transferred from Fès to Meknès (134). The plague epidemic of 1818-1820 and the military setback of Zaïan dealt a final blow to the Makhzen army. Disorganized by the plague, routed by the Berber contingents of Abū Bakr Amhāwish, the army became more restless and undisciplined than ever.

After the Zaïan defeat, a reorganization of the army became necessary. In 1818-1819 Mawlāy Sulaymān ordered the recruiting of what had been saved from the epidemic and the military defeat (135). He particularly wanted to raise two Arab tribes in the vicinity of Fès, Oulad al-Haj and Himyan, to the jaysh status and incorporate them into the Oudaya (136). However, the political instability which characterized the latter part of his reign, in addition to financial problems experienced by the Makhzen, rendered any efficient reorganization futile.

What was the nature of this army? The Makhzen army consisted, as mentioned earlier, of two main groups: the standing army of 'Abīd and Oudaya, and the auxiliary force provided by the jaysh tribes. The Oudaya were stationed at Fès while the 'Abīd were garrisoned at Meknès as well as in the various ports. Men in the standing army were provided with accommodation, a fixed monthly salary (one mithqāl), two garments per year, a fixed amount of cereals for the maintenance of their families and horses, in addition to their military equipment. They also received a

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(133) F.O.174/20, 6 Sept., 1814.

(134) Al-Ḍu'ayf, p.531.

(135) Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to 'Ayyād, commander of the Oudaya, ordering him to replace all soldiers who died in the plague epidemic, dated 7 Muḥarram, 1234/ 6 Nov., 1818, in D.A.R. See also another letter to 'Ayyād concerning the reorganization of the army, 1 Shawwāl, 1234/ 13 Aug., 1819 in D.A.R.

(136) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to 'Ayyād, 21 Shawwāl, 1234/ 13 Aug. 1819, concerning the recruitment of Oulad al-Haj and Himyan into the Oudaya, in D.A.R.

rātib (allowance) for every military expedition (137). The jaysh contingents, on the other hand, did not receive a salary as they represented the contribution from tribes which, in return for their military service, were exempted from taxes. For their livelihood, the tribal contingents depended on agriculture but received arms, equipment and clothing from the Makhzen.

While the 'Abīd consisted of infantry and cavalrymen, the Oudaya formed an exclusively mounted force. From both of these Mawlāy Sulaymān appointed 1,400 men to serve as his tabā'a, or royal guard (138). The Makhzen army was particularly deficient in the field of artillery. Indeed, the best artillerymen of the country belonged to the ḥaḍariya towns such as Tétouan, Salé, Rabat or Fès. They were often called upon to assist the army during its major expeditions.

The structure of the Moroccan army was rudimentary. The troops were officered by qā'id-s and muqaddam-s. Every hundred men were placed under the command of a qā'id, and every twenty five under a muqaddam (139). In their appearance, there was hardly any distinction between a soldier and a common tribesman as far as mount, dress, or military equipment were concerned. Within the army itself, there was only a slight difference in dress between soldiers and officers (140).

Once on the battlefield, Makhzen troops formed nothing but an incoherent multitude lacking both order and discipline. Al-Zayānī ascribed Mawlāy Sulaymān's military defeats to the great number of troops that he led to the

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(137) AHN, Estado, Leg.4327, Observations on Lemprière's A Tour from Gibraltar to Tangier, p. 16.

(138) Al-Ḍu'ayf, p.318.

(139) Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to 'Ayyād concerning the re-organization of the army, dated 1 Shawwāl, 1234/ 13 Aug., 1819, in D.A.R.

(140) Soldiers used to wear a red cap while officers added a white turban around; cf. J. Buffa, Travels, p.108.

battlefield and which became impossible to control. "Every sultan who fights with all his troops", he wrote, "is condemned to ruin, and every prince who entrusts the command of more than one thousand men to a single person is certainly leading his army to defeat"(141). Indeed, Mawlāy Sulaymān's troops at the time of confrontation presented themselves like "a disorganized multitude and reckless hordes lacking order, discipline and restraining officers who should be strictly obeyed by their subordinates"(142). This description of the Moroccan army by a Makhzen official was confirmed by a British surgeon who visited the country in 1820 when he wrote: "A Moorish army is nothing better than a collection of people brought together and possessing neither order nor discipline"(143).

Mawlāy Sulaymān must have been aware of his army's weaknesses for the assistance of Christian renegades was often sought and artillerymen sent for training at Gibraltar. European instructors were also invited to Morocco for training purposes (144). Such attempts were, however, sporadic and isolated. They were intended to meet circumstantial needs rather than longterm programs of training. The Sultan had even proposed to send a group of Moroccan students to London to be trained in the art of gunnery and medicine (145). The British government was willing to receive these students, but the untimely death of al-Salāwī together with the deterioration of the domestic situation in Morocco relegated this project to a secondary plan (146). Turkish and Egyptian military

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(141) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.184.

(142) The remark was made by Mawlāy 'Abd al-Raḥmān's minister, Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-'Amrāwī (d.1847); cf. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Salām al-Sā'ih, al-Muntakhabāt al-'abqariya, Rabat, 1920, p.108.

(143) C.O.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.

(144) F.O.174/124, letter from al-Salāwī to Matra, dated 21 Ḥijja, 1210/29 June, 1796; F.O.174/285, from al-Salāwī to J. Green, dated 23 Ṣafar, 1227/8 March, 1812; F.O.174/286, from Aḥmad b. M'Bārak to J. Green, dated 29 Jumāda I, 1231/28 April, 1816.

(145) Letter from al-Salāwī to W. A'Court, 26 Sha'bān, 1228/24 Aug., 1813. in C.O.2/4 (appendix 67).

(146) Ibid.

reforms were well known in Morocco but did not seem to have made any impression (147). The application of Western-style discipline (qānūn) was simply discarded as being impossible (148).

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- (147) At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Moroccans were well acquainted with Middle Eastern military reforms. The author of al-Ibtisām, for instance, gave a detailed description of Muḥammad 'Alī's reforms in Egypt. Cf. al-Ibtisām, pp.31-35.
- (148) Al-Ibtisām, p.209.

CHAPTER III

## ECONOMY, FINANCE AND TRADE

1792 - 1822

I - Bases of Moroccan Economy

The economic structures of Morocco at the end of the eighteenth century had undergone little or no change for centuries. Agriculture, which provided the overwhelming majority of the population with its livelihood, continued to be practised according to the most rudimentary technological methods. Much the same could be said for crafts and commercial techniques. Moroccans contented themselves with the heritage and ignored the technological changes that were taking place around them. Their proximity to Europe and their uninterrupted contact with Europeans left them indifferent to the growing efficiency of Western civilization. The peasant, the artisan and the merchant continued to provide their goods and services to satisfy the immutable needs of a predominantly rural population. Morocco's acceptance of European trade during the second half of the eighteenth century no doubt placed the population in contact with new products and tended to develop new tastes, particularly among the urban khāṣṣa, but that was just the start of a process the full development of which remained for the distant future.

### A- Agriculture

Moroccan traditional agriculture remained heavily dependent on climatic variations and the hazards of natural calamities to which all Mediterranean countries were subject. Drought and locust invasions were the most dreadful enemies against which the peasant could do nothing but lament and pray. When one or the other occurred, economic life was in jeopardy. Yet, in the absence of such calamities, the country produced enough not only to cover the needs of its inhabitants, but to permit exports as well. "The inhabitants", reported the British consul general in 1824, "have an abundance of food, except after long droughts or when the vegetation is destroyed by locusts" (1).

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Morocco still seemed to be an undercultivated country. Many foreign observers were struck by the immensity of the uncultivated lands (2). Despite the fertility of the soil, M. de Lesseps remarked, little land was ploughed (3). Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, Beaumier could still claim that cultivated lands hardly represented one third of the arable territory (4).

The rudimentary state of agricultural techniques did not fail to attract the attention of European travellers. "Despite the beneficent climatic influences", noted Beaumier, "agriculture made no progress for centuries" (5). The wooden plough and the sickle were the only tilling and harvesting instruments adopted by both sedentary and transhumant peasants. "They make use of

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(1) F.O. 174/156, 4 Feb., 1824.

(2) Lemprière, *Voyage*, p. 73, M. de Lesseps, "Notice", p.17, F.O. 174/156, 4 Feb., 1824.

(3) De Lesseps, "Notice", p. 17.

(4) A. Beaumier, *Le Maroc*, Paris, 1867, p. 54.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 52.

small harrow and a pair of oxen for turning up the soil, which they instantly sow, and with another harrow of a finer construction they level the mould, and leave the rest of the operations to Nature" (6). Given the availability of fertile land and the relative underpopulation of the coastal plains, such a rudimentary technology seems to have been well suited for the country's requirements. The Moroccan peasant saw no need for a more advanced technology to satisfy his basic wants (7).

However, agricultural techniques and cultures varied greatly from one region to another, depending on the nature of the soil and the degree of sedentarization. In hilly or mountainous country, such as the Rif, the Jbala, the Sous and the western High Atlas where sedentary life predominated, agriculture was based on an intensive utilization of the soil (8). The relative density of the population and the low fertility of the soil led to a fragmentation of family property and the adoption of terraced cultures, particularly in the Sous. In these regions cereal farming acquired a secondary importance as it was intended primarily to cover the needs of the local population. The country between Tétouan and Fès produced large quantities of olives, figs, and citrus fruits. In the Haha and the Sous the same produce could be found, in addition to almonds. "The Sus", wrote J.G. Jackson in 1808, "produces more almonds and olives than all other provinces together" (9). Sugar cane was also planted around Taroudant, but the sugar industry had been on

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(6) J. Curtis, A Journal of Travels in Barbary, London, 1803, p.51.

(7) Observations made by A.G.Hopkins about west African pre-colonial societies apply to the Moroccan case as well. "A more advanced technology", wrote Hopkins, "will be used only if it is more profitable than existing methods, or if it is essential to ensure survival". Cf. A.G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, London, 1973, p.37.

(8) Saugnier, Relations, p. 154.

(9) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.20.



the decline for a long time and Morocco depended increasingly on European imports (10). On the other hand, the coastal plains laying between the Jbala and the western High Atlas constituted a land of cereals par excellence. The Gharb appeared to be in 1813 "perhaps the finest cornland in the world" (11). The Chaouia, the Doukkala and the Abda had long been known as the granaries of the Empire. Some industrial cultures were also practiced. Before its prohibition in 1800 by Mawlāy Sulaymān, tobacco used to be planted around Meknès and in the Doukkala. Enough was produced to allow exports to the western Sudan (12). Cotton of "a superior quality" was also cultivated in the environs of Rabat and Salé (13) and was used by the workshops of these towns in the manufacture of a local cotton cloth known as al-kittān al-bildī (14).

In Morocco, as in other pre-colonial societies, agriculture was the matrix of all economic activities. Of all products from the land, cereals were by far the most important. A good harvest of cereals was not only a barrier against famine, but a motor for the whole economic system. With the exception of the famine years of 1817-1818, the period under study witnessed no major agricultural crisis. The early period of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign (1792-1797) was a period of abundance during which agriculture did not suffer from either natural calamities or from the political instability. In fact, Mawlāy Sulaymān avoided as much as possible major military confrontations with the "coastal republics" of Safi, Tīṭ and Dār al-Bayḍā, preferring to consolidate his rule in the

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(10) In a letter to the Earl of Liverpool dated 20 Sept., 1797, Jackson mentioned sugar and cotton as produces of the Sous; cf. Liverpool papers, Ms.38,231, British Museum. Cf. also Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp.18-20.

(11) C.O.2/4, A'Court Mission to Morocco, 20 Aug., 1813.

(12) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.16.

(13) Ibid., p.15. Cf. also Ibn'Alī al-Dukkālī, Ithāf, Ms.Z.13009, R.L., p.16.

(14) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Ash'āsh, 24 Jumādā II, 1233/1 May, 1818, in D.A.R.

northern provinces. Wheat was so abundant and cheap during these years that it constituted the main item of export from both the northern and southern ports (15).

In 1798 the joint effects of a drought and a locust invasion put an end to this agricultural prosperity. In August 1798 the British consul reported that "the crops in Morocco had entirely failed" (16). The price of wheat became exorbitant reaching 60 mithqāl-s the wisq, or 12 ūqiya-s per mudd (17). The way was paved for the most disastrous plague since the Middle Ages. During the spring of 1799 locusts invaded the country reaching as far north as Tangier and "leaving not the least appearance of verdure on the face of the country" (18). Curiously enough, this locust invasion does not seem to have occasioned any significant damage to the crop of 1799 which, according to both Moroccan and European sources, was abundant (19).

Agricultural activity suffered heavily from the plague of 1799-1800. This was mainly due to the decrease in population and the lack of manpower. "The crop (of 1799) was abundant", noted 'Abd al-Salām b. Sulaymān al-Fishtālī, "but impossible to gather in" (20). European observers who travelled through the coastal plains shortly after the plague ended reported that wheat was left uncut in many places and herds of cattle were wandering in the countryside (21). Labour became so scarce and expensive that husbandmen preferred to abandon their crops, the value of which would be "insufficient to pay the expenses of reaping them" (22). Contrary to what

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(15) Al-Du'ayf, pp.324, 334.

(16) F.O.52/11, 15 Aug., 1798.

(17) Al-Fishtālī, fol.125. The wisq makes 5 mudd-s, or 62.5 kilograms.

(18) F.O.52/11, 21 May, 1799.

(19) Al-Fishtālī, fol.125; Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.105.

(20) Al-Fishtālī, fol.125.

(21) F.O.52/11, 28 Nov., 1799; Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.175.

(22) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.42.

would have been expected, the period immediately after the plague was not one of abundance, but rather of scarcity. The dissemination of the rural population and the heavy rains of the winter of 1799-1800 did not allow the survivors to cultivate the soil (23). Accordingly, little ground was tilled in 1800. At the end of the year the British consul reported that the price of wheat was "three times dearer than it ought to have been at that time" (24). It was precisely this scarcity which induced Mawlāy Sulaymān to impose restrictions on the export of victuals. "The plague made every kind of provision scarce", argued Makhzen officials, "and he (Mawlāy Sulaymān) must consult the interests of his own people" (25).

Once the immediate effects of the Great Plague were over, the country experienced an exceptional agricultural abundance. Neither the demographic losses nor the prohibition imposed on the export of grain seem to have resulted in a drastic fall of cultivated surfaces as alleged by Jackson (26). In fact, all those who visited the country between 1801 and 1813 conveyed a different picture of Moroccan agriculture. James Curtis who travelled to Fès in the spring of 1801 observed that "the country seemed better cultivated than might have been expected from the fatal effects of the plague" (27). While travelling through the Gharb, Curtis also noted that "every part evinced a high state of cultivation" (28).

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(23) F.O.52/11, 19 March, 1800.

(24) F.O.52/11, 2 Dec., 1800.

(25) F.O.52/11, 30 Jan., 1801.

(26) Jackson affirmed that after the prohibition of the export of wheat "the soil here (in the Chaouia) and elsewhere has lain fallow" (An Account of the Empire, p.42). In 1818 Jackson affirmed again that "many millions of acres of the finest and most productive land lies fallow for want of a market for its produce" (An Account of Timbuctoo, and Housa territories in the Interior of Africa, London, 1820, p.211). The fact that the southern coastal plains were usually less extensively cultivated than the northern ones might explain the above assertions.

(27) J. Curtis, A Journal, p.32.

(28) Ibid., p.26.

Even "portions of the mountains were cultivated" (29). These observations were confirmed five years later by another British visitor. In 1806 John Buffa noted that the country between Tangier and Meknès was covered with "fine corn fields ... many mountains cultivated to the very summit" (30). In 1813 the British ambassador A'Court was also impressed by the agricultural abundance of the Gharb. "The whole country is one continued plain of perhaps the finest cornland in the world", he wrote (31).

The period extending between 1800 and 1812 was, indeed, one of agricultural prosperity. Cereal prices were extremely low. In 1808, the mudd of wheat cost less than 2 ūqiya-s (32). Famines such as those experienced by Algeria and Tunisia in 1804-1805 were unknown to Morocco (33). At a time when eastern neighbours were having serious agricultural difficulties Morocco could afford to relieve their sufferings by sending cargoes of wheat to Tunis and Tripoli (34). Mawlāy Sulaymān also allowed the free export of 50,000 quintals of cereals "in assistance to the British army fighting the French in Lisbon and Cadiz" (35).

In 1812 locusts invaded the southern provinces causing "considerable damage in corn" (36). Rainfall was also

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(29) Ibid., p.53.

(30) J. Buffa, Travels, p.30.

(31) C.O.2/4, Meknès, 20 Aug., 1813.

(32) J. Caillé, La mission, p.107.

(33) L. Valensi, Le Maghreb, p.24.

(34) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.182; F.O.52/12, 25 Aug., 1804 and 23 June, 1802.

(35) F.O.52/16, letter from Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Sādaq, governor of Essaouira, to the British government, dated 6 Šafar, 1228/8 Feb., 1813. The Spanish junta of Seville was also allowed in 1809 to export 20,000 fanega-s of wheat (cf. CCC, vol.23, 26 Nov., 1809).

(36) F.O.174/20, 21 April, 1812; F.O.174/153, 9 March, 1812. The crops in the Doukkala and Tamesna were not affected by this locust invasion.

insufficient. Towards the end of 1812 and early 1813 wheat prices in the south suddenly rose to 20 ūqiya-s for the mudd (37). "People have been in a great measure starving", wrote the British vice-consul at Essaouira in May 1813 (38). That was the end of agricultural prosperity and a precursory sign of the economic and political difficulties that lay ahead.

Nevertheless, the 1812 scarcity seems to have been mainly limited to the southern part of the country. Until 1815 Moroccan wheat continued to be illegally drained off to European countries. From 1813 Mawlāy Sulaymān mounted numerous military campaigns against the tribes of the Rif to stop illicit trade of wheat (39). Evidently, the country continued to produce enough to cover the essential needs of the population before the major famine of 1817-1818.

Table 2 Evolution of Wheat Prices 1796-1822

| Year    | Price | Unit   | Location    |
|---------|-------|--|-------------|
| 1796    | 4     | <u>ūqiya-s</u> / the <u>mudd</u> (12.5 kgs.) |             |
| 1798-99 | 12    | " " " "                                      |             |
| 1808    | 1.5   | " " " "                                      |             |
| 1812    | 20    | " " " "                                      | (Essaouira) |
| 1817    | 26    | " " " "                                      | (Rabat)     |
| 1818    | 23    | " " " "                                      | (Rabat)     |
| 1819    | 4     | " " " "                                      | (Rabat)     |
| 1820    | 4     | " " " "                                      | (Rabat)     |
| 1821    | 6     | " " " "                                      | (Rabat)     |
| 1822    | 3     | " " " "                                      |             |

Sources: Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.321; al-Fishtālī, fol.125; J. Caillé, La mission p.107; F.O.531/1; CCC, vol.27-28.

(37) F.O.631/1, 16 May, 1813.

(38) Ibid. In 1813 the Moroccan government found itself in the impossibility of acceding to the request of the British ambassador who demanded, among other things, the authorization to export wheat. Cf. letter from al-Salāwī to W. A'Court, 8 Shaʿbān, 1228/6 Aug., 1813 in Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.

(39) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.190; al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.508, 512; F.O.52/16, 7 Aug., 1814.

B - Crafts

The prosperity of the artisan was intimately linked to that of the peasant. Years of drought or bad harvest had direct repercussion on both industry and trade. During such years town dwellers would have to spend more of their income on victuals, and particularly on cereals. Crop failures also reduced the peasant's spendings on town-made products. The urban artisan supplied the tribesman with armament, saddlery, leather articles, part of his clothing and various tools and utensils (40). In the village there were blacksmiths, weavers and potters who satisfied the basic needs of the rural population. Nevertheless, it was in the urban market that the peasant could find more complex articles and a wider choice too.

Craftsmen were mainly concentrated in the ḥaḍariya towns such as Fès, Tétouan, Rabat and Salé. In the south, Marrakech and Taroudant tended to play a role similar to that of the ḥaḍariya towns in the north. It is impossible to determine exactly the proportion of artisans in the urban population but information about Fès at the beginning of the twentieth century (41) suggests that at least half the population of the major towns gained their living from crafts even in the early nineteenth century. They undoubtedly formed the majority of the urban labour force (42).

Within the urban social body artisans counted rather among the common people. However, the value attached to manual work differed greatly from one craft

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(40) For some artisans, such as saddlers and gunsmiths, the tribesman was, undoubtedly, the most important customer. Cf. R. Le Tourneau, La vie quotidienne à Fès en 1900, Paris, 1965, p. 98.

(41) Ibid, p. 99.

(42) Kenneth Brown, People of Salé, p.132.

to another. Between "noble" crafts, such as shoemaking or the work of precious metals, and "dirty" crafts, such as rope making or horseshoeing there was an unbridgeable gap. Crafts of the latter kind tended to be left to outsiders (barrānī-s) while "noble" professions were in general the appanage of "the sons of the town". Very few artisans acquired enough wealth to join the khāṣṣa. Accordingly, they played no significant role in politics, except in times of instability when physical power became more important. Their esprit de corps allowed them to acquire a sudden importance at times when central authority was weak (43).

The list of the various activities involved was vast, but the most important were the leather industry (tanning, shoemaking and saddlery), the weaving of wool and cotton, pottery, the copper industry and the manufacture of light armament. The results of these activities covered not only the local needs but also used to be exported to the western Sudan and the Arab Middle East. Leather goods, woollens and copper utensils were the most well-known articles of Moroccan industry.

While the arrival of Andalusian families from Spain during the fifteenth and early seventeenth centuries gave Moroccan crafts a new impetus through the introduction of new skills, working underwent little change. The basic unit of production remained the workshop which included, in addition to the master worker (m<sup>c</sup>allem), one or a few apprentices. Material conditions for the

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(43) In 1873, for instance, the tanners of Fès rebelled against the tax collector (amīn) as he attempted to raise the maks on leather, a few weeks only after the proclamation of Mawlāy al-Ḥasan (1873-1894). Cf. details of the tanners' rising in El-Outaiq, III, 1977, pp.280-296.

(44) A list of traditional Moroccan crafts is given by 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Zaydān, Ms.Z.3986, R.L., p.11.

master worker differed only slightly from that of his journeymen(45). The use of machinery was unknown and even tools were rudimentary.

Outside the workshop the artisans belonging to the same profession were bound by the ḥanta, or corporation. The ḥanta was a loose organization with no civil personality and was governed more by ʿurf , or custom, than by a recognized set of rules. In their daily activities artisans manifested no real evidence of organization. It was only on the occasion of certain ceremonies or when a fellow artisan was placed in a difficult situation that mutual action came into play. Artisans of the same corporation usually collected money to make a joint present to the sultan, to the sharīf-s or to the shrine of the patron saint of the town. The same happened when an artisan was faced with an unexpected expense, such as funerals or in the case of serious damage to health or property. At the head of every corporation there was an amīn (46) who acted as the representative of the profession before the Makhzen authorities and other corporations. In practice, his main task consisted in settling disputes which arose among the members of the corporation. The amīn was chosen by artisans under the supervision of the muhtasib (market provost) (47).

Every corporation placed itself under the spiritual protection of a saint. The members of the corporation participated every year in the religious festivities organized in honour of the patron saint and contributed generously to collections for the sharīf-s.

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(45) K. Brown, People of Salé, p.132.

(46) The amīn, head of the corporation, is not to be confused with the makhzen's amīn, who is a customs officer or a tax collector.

(47) The muhtasib regulated most economic affairs (fixing of prices, checking weights and measures, repression of industrial fraud) and supervised public morality.



In times of economic hardship artisans usually appealed to the city's patron saint (Mawlāy Idrīs of Fès, Sīdī 'Abd Allāh b. Ḥassūn of Salé and Abū al-‘Abbās al-Sabtī of Marrakech) imploring him to intercede in their favour before God (48). Of all the urban groups artisans were the most inclined to join popular ṭarīqa-s such as the ‘Aysāwiya, the Ḥamadsha and the Darqāwiya (49).

Like all other economic sectors crafts suffered heavily from famines and plague epidemics experienced under the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān. The Great Plague of 1799-1800 was the most disastrous of all. The epidemic carried away many artisans in the major towns of the country. Members of the British embassy who were in Fès in 1801 noted the great loss in human lives among artisans (50). Some crafts suffered more than others. Matra reported the perishing of more than seventy stationers and embellishers that were in the city. Mawlāy Sulaymān's ceremonial letter to the king of Great Britain was ornamented by the only apprentice who was spared by the plague (51). The expense of labour rose considerably as a result of the demographic losses (52) and prices of manufactured goods necessarily followed suit. James Curtis noted in 1801 that the prices of locally manufactured articles had considerably increased as a result of the plague (53).

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(48) Al-Ḍu‘ayf mentions, for instance, that in 1804 craftsmen and traders of Marrakech appealed twice to Sīdī Abu al-‘Abbās al-Sabtī because of the economic difficulties experienced by the town at that time. Cf. pp.239-240.

(49) In his Enquête sur les corporations, Massignon noted that popular ṭarīqa-s, such as the Ḥamadsha and the ‘Aysāwiya, recruited their adepts mainly among bakers, porters, bath workers, tanners and blacksmiths. Cf. L. Massignon, "Enquête," in Revue du Monde Musulman, LVIII, 1924, p.140.

(50) Curtis, A Journal, pp.83-84; cf. also al-Fishtālī, fol.125.

(51) F.O.52/12, 12 April, 1802.

(52) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.175.

(53) Curtis, A Journal, pp.83-84.

However, like other economic sectors, crafts certainly benefited from the agricultural abundance which characterized the middle part of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. Artisans were also favoured by the fiscal policy adopted by the Sultan. The abolition of non-Quranic taxes (maks) and State monopolies over a number of raw materials (leather, cochineal, raw silk, sulphur) provided unusual advantages for artisanry. The restrictions imposed on the export of wool after the Great Plague made that article abundant (54) and must have constituted a strong incentive for the woollen industry. High tariffs levied on the export of other raw materials, such as goat skins and cow hides, served also as a protection for the local leather industry. The supply of such articles seems to have been so abundant that despite a considerable increase in the volume exported between 1806 and 1812 (55), local markets remained well provided with all kinds of raw materials(56). This certainly allowed the industrial activity to recover from the harmful effects of the Great Plague.

The opening of Morocco to European imports during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries does not seem to have seriously undermined local crafts (57). Although the country received increasing quantities of European manufactured goods (linens, copper utensils, knives, razors, etc) the Moroccan artisan continued to produce not only to cover the needs of the overwhelming majority of consumers, but also to allow for exports to the Sudan and the Arab East. It is true that imported quantities of brass pans, razors and sewing thread, for

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(54) F.O.174/13, 30 June , 1802.

(55) Cf. Table 12 below.

(56) J. Buffa, Travels, pp.25, 53.

(57) While Mawlāy Sulaymān attempted to limit exports he made no effort to obstruct imports.

instance, considerably increased between 1804 and 1812 (58), but such imports were to some extent destined for reexportation in the caravan trade and what remained in the country went mainly to an insignificant wealthy minority.

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Moroccan artisans succeeded in withstanding European competition without much difficulty (59). Many products, particularly leather articles and woollens, continued to find their way to Middle Eastern and west African markets. In Timbuctoo slippers from Fès and ḥāyk-s from Tafilelt could be found side by side with Manchester cloth (60). Indeed, despite a rudimentary technology, the Moroccan artisan produced superior quality articles. The woollen cloth of Tafilelt (al-ḥāyk al-filālī) was "as thin as muslin" (61). A British visitor noticed in 1826 that "some of the woollen manufactures were of superior strength and closeness" even to English woollens (62). Jackson also noted that gold thread manufactured at Fès was "much superior to that which was imported into Barbary from Marseilles" (63) and which was solely used to "make belts sold in the Sudan" (64). In the cutting and polishing of precious stones the Moroccan artisan also displayed an "equal sagacity" (65).

However, by the early nineteenth century the Moroccan artisan was already beginning to lose ground in many fields before the competition of European products. European firearms, for instance, constituted a serious

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(58) Between 1804 and 1812 imported brass pans, for instance, increased by as much as 47 times, and razors by more than four times. Cf. Table 15 below.

(59) K. Brown, People of Salé, pp.120-121.

(60) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp.289-290; Barth, Travels and discoveries in North and Central Africa, London, 1857, vol.V, pp.32-34.

(61) Jackson, An Account of Timbuctoo, p. 217.

(62) G. Beauclerk, A Journey to Morocco in 1826, London, 1828, p.239.

(63) Jackson, An Account of Timbuctoo, p.126.

(64) Ibid., p.215.

(65) Ibid., p.216.

competitor for the traditional musket. "Locally made firearms", wrote Jacques Caillé in 1827 about the Fāsi industry, "are far from European perfection"(66). By that time the Moroccan gunsmith had not only lost his traditional west African customer but was also threatened on the local market itself. European copper utensils, particularly copper kettles and tea boards, were progressively imposing themselves upon the taste of a wealthy minority for which tea had become by 1800 "a constant beverage at all hours"(67).

Moroccan cotton industry also showed the first signs of inferiority before European imports. According to Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Dukkālī, it was during the latter part of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign that European manufacturers began imitating local cloth with the aim of gaining over the Moroccan clientele. "Europeans began to imitate Moroccan cloth", wrote the author of Ithāf ashraf al-malā, "and succeeded in offering a better product at a lower price"(68). Apparently, the cotton industry of Salé and Rabat was the first to suffer. The Makhzen itself preferred European cloth to provide for the needs of the army "because", wrote Mawlāy Sulaymān, "it was of a better quality than the local cotton cloth (al-kittān al-bildī)"(69). Velvet also became an important article in the clothing of the Moroccan army. The artisan's outlets became more and more restricted as Morocco opened its doors to European trade.

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(66) J. Caillé, Journal, III, p.115.

(67) Curtis, A Journal, p.16.

(68) Ibn ʿAlī al-Dukkālī, Ithāf, p.27.

(69) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAsh ʿāsh, 12 Jumādā II, 1233 / 19 April, 1818, in D.A.R.

C - Trade

In traditional Moroccan economy there was no clear cut distinction between crafts and trade. The artisan was usually the seller of his own produce. The dividing line ran, in fact, not between artisans and merchants, but rather between artisans and small merchants on one hand, and big merchants on the other. The material condition of the shop-keeper or the itinerant trader who moved from one rural market to another hardly differed from that of the artisan who relied on his manual work to earn his living. The tājir, or big merchant, on the contrary, indulged in wholesale trade and had often commercial interests outside the national borders.

Numerically, these tājir-s represented a negligible minority and were concentrated in the ḥaḍariya towns such as Fès and Tétouan. Marrakech once considered as the emporium of Saharan trade, was on the decline during the latter part of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (70). The maritime orientation of Moroccan trade by Sīdī Muḥammad b.ʿAbd Allāh had diverted trade routes to the Atlantic coast and incited many merchants, particularly Jews, to emigrate from inland towns to the sea ports.

This opening to Europe had far reaching consequences on big trade. It gave rise to a new type of cosmopolitan merchants who, instead of contenting themselves with the role of intermediaries for European interests, now travelled all over Europe. Another important development was the

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(70) Lemprière who visited the town in 1790-1791 reported that many houses were in ruin (Voyage, p.85). Jackson made similar remarks noting that "streets are mostly filled with ruins of houses which have gone to decay" (An Account of the Empire, p.63). On the economic difficulties of Marrakech at the beginning of the nineteenth century, cf. al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.439-440.

adaption of merchants who had specialized in the caravan trade to maritime commerce. This was the case of al-Ṭālib b. Jallūn (d.1844), the undisputed tājir of Fès who "acquired an immense wealth in the Nigrita trade" and who extended afterwards his activity to maritime commerce (71). He gained "an unlimited number of estates in Fès and its vicinity consisting in orchards, irrigated lands and other properties" (72). The fact that Ibn Jallūn was entrusted with Makhzen money being Mawlāy Sulaymān's amīn (73) did not prevent him from taking part in the Fès rebellion of 1820-1822. However, neither Mawlāy Sulaymān nor his successor reproached him for this involvement. For the Makhzen he represented the appearance of a new class the cooperation of which was necessary to check the influence of the conservative religious forces. Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, instead of liquidating him— as he did other rebellion leaders (74)— appointed him chief minister when he came to the throne (75).

Another typical example of the cosmopolitan merchant of the early nineteenth century was provided by ʿAbd al-Karīm b. al-Ṭālib. After many years of trade with western Africa, Ibn al-Ṭālib specialized in the export of wheat. In 1804, he was described by the British consul as "a correct trader ... whose papers are as current as those of any banker of Europe" (76). He spent more than fifteen

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- (71) F.O.52/29, report on the trade of Essaouira drawn by the British consul in 1828. On the biography of al-Ṭālib b. Jallūn cf. ʿAbd al-Kabīr b. Hāshim al-Kattānī, Zahrāt al-ās, pp.546-547.
- (72) ʿAbd al-Kabīr al-Kattānī, Zahrāt al-ās, p.547.
- (73) Al-Ṭālib b. Jallūn supervised, for instance, the construction of great works such as bridges; cf. Anon., Dhikr khilāfat mawlānā Sulaymān b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Ismāʿīl al-ʿAlawī, Ms. 1892, fonds arabe, B.N., fol. 67.
- (74) Upon his accession to the throne Mawlay ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ordered the execution of Muḥammad b. Sulaymān and Ibn al-Ghāzī, two notables who had played an important role in the Fès rebellion. Cf. al-Nāṣirī IX, pp.10-11; Muḥammad Gharrīṭ, Fawāṣil, pp.92-93.
- (75) F.O.52/24, 11 Feb., 1823.
- (76) F.O.52/12, 21 Oct., 1804

years abroad during which he travelled all over Europe. J.M. Matra reported that he could speak many European languages including English (77). In 1804 he was dispatched by Mawlāy Sulaymān to London, together with ʿAbd al-Khālaq ʿAshʿāsh to arrange for the purchase of naval armaments (78). Following the British attack on Algiers in 1816 he was dispatched by the Sultan in 1817 on a political mission which led him to Algiers, Tunis and Constantinople (79). During the last years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign he was appointed by the Regency of Algiers as its consul in Morocco. This allowed him to orient his commercial activities eastward to the Ottoman regencies (80).

Muḥammad Bejja (d.1820) was another example of these new enterprising merchants of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He left his native town, Larache, towards the middle of Sīdī Muḥammad's reign to settle in Cadiz. Later on, he moved to Gibraltar where he carried on his business for about twenty years. Bejja succeeded in gaining the confidence of Mawlāy Sulaymān for whom he concluded many commercial transactions abroad (81). In 1815 he was appointed consul of Morocco at Gibraltar where he died five years later, leaving behind him a fortune of 25,000 pounds sterling which Mawlāy Sulaymān found most useful in the midst of the Fès rebellion (82).

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(77) Ibid.

(78) Ibid.

(79) CCC, vol.25, 1st Sept., 1817.

(80) Like al-Ṭālib b. Jallūn, he readily accepted to oppose his signature to the bayʿa proclaiming a rebel prince in 1821; cf. text of the bayʿa of Mawlāy Saʿīd in Dāwūd, III, p.261.

(81) AHN, Estado, Leg.6232(2), letter from al-Salāwī to the Spanish junta at Cadiz, recommending Muḥammad Bejja, dated 12 Rabīʿ II, 1228/14 April, 1813.

(82) C.O.91/79, memorial addressed by al-Ḥāj al-ʿArbi Maʿnīnū and al-Ḥāj Ṭāhar al-Ḥayāt to the governor of Gibraltar concerning the property of Muḥammad Bejja. This sum was used by Mawlāy Sulaymān for the purchase of military equipment.

There were many other merchants who traded directly with European countries. Among these we find 'Alī Barrāda, al-Ḥāj Idrīs Laḥlū, al-Ḥāj Aḥmad Ḥarḍān, 'Abd Allāh al-Salmānī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-'Aṭṭār, 'Abd al-Karīm al-'Aṭṭār and the Buhlāl brothers whose names have been conserved in the European archives (83). However, few of these merchants travelled abroad to carry<sup>on</sup> their private business. They were more like commissioners who transacted various affairs either on behalf of the Makhzen or on account of fellow merchants who remained in the country. Thus, Muḥammad Bejja provided a commercial antenna for Tétouani merchants while he resided at Gibraltar. The two sides exchanged commercial information on the availability of articles of trade, on their prices, as well as on the economic situation in general (84). Among themselves, Moroccan merchants created their own commercial circuit in order to avoid resorting to European or Jewish intermediaries as much as possible. This cooperation was made necessary by the modesty of the capital at their disposal. The fact that some of them travelled as far as Hamburg or Amsterdam should not create illusions about the extensiveness of their fortunes. "These merchants", wrote the French consul in 1814, "do not have enough capital to carry this trade with their own means. To their own funds they often add capital belonging to their parents or friends. Sometimes they attend also to money belonging to a widow or an orphan which they fructify according to what they consider as the most advantageous way. After one year or two years of absence ... they return home in order to deliver to everyone the merchandise he ordered or the profit made during the voyage ... contenting themselves with a small

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(83) Cf. numerous petitions by Moroccan merchants in F.O.52/14, and CCC, vol.21-22. Some names of prominent contemporary merchants can be found in Beauclerk, *A Journey*, p.27.

(84) Cf. correspondence of Muḥammad Bejja in D.A.R.



commission" (85). Other obstacles impeded the development of commercial capitalism. Religious scruples prevented Muslim merchants from adopting modern commercial techniques. Banking services remained unknown in Morocco as well as the use of bills of exchange in the negotiation of commercial deals. Commerce was done by barter and when a Moroccan merchant travelled abroad he had to carry with him hard cash consisting generally in Spanish dollars (86). Nor was the Moroccan merchant guaranteed against the risks of piracy, war danger or natural calamities, the taking of an insurance being contrary to religion.

Maritime trade was not the only source of wealth. Caravan trade, in spite of its obvious decline during the period under study, continued to play an important role in the activation of internal exchanges. The eastern pilgrimage caravan was not motivated solely by religious considerations. Besides devout believers who sought to accomplish their religious duties, there were a number of trading pilgrims (al-hujjāj al-mutasabbibūn) who, once in Egypt and the Hijaz, exchanged articles of Moroccan artisanry (leather goods, woollens) or African slaves for Asian spices, Indian muslins and silk. The most prominent pilgrim trader was the head of the caravan (shaykh al-rakb) appointed by the sultan among the wealthiest merchants of Fès (87). The caravan gathered at Fès and remained there for about two months before it departed for Egypt. It was also at Fès that the caravan disbanded upon its return. Its stay at this city for a number of months every year was the occasion for important commercial activity of benefit both to artisans

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(85) CCC, vol.24, "Mémoire sur le commerce des européens au Maroc," presented by L. Mure en 1814, fol.120-126.

(86) F.O.52/15, 26 May, 1810.

(87) Some of the prominent merchants of Fès who owed their wealth to pilgrimage caravan trade: the Šfīra brothers, Muḥammad Mezwār, al-ʿArbī al-Shraybī and ʿAbd al-Salām Buhlāl. Mawlāy Sulaymān attempted to appoint as head of the pilgrimage caravan a merchant from another town but met with the opposition of the people of Fès. Cf. al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.384-385, 387.

and merchants of Fès. The cessation of this caravan in 1830 with the French occupation of Algiers constituted a severe blow to the Fāsi economy and necessarily oriented Moroccan trade towards the Atlantic ports.

The commercial ascendance of Jewish merchants was another important development of the late eighteenth century. This ascendance was a direct result of Sīdī Muḥammad's interest in the Atlantic. Many Jewish families moved to the Atlantic ports, particularly to Essaouira, where they specialized in the export-import trade. Under the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān they continued to hold the greatest share of the maritime trade. Although affected by Mawlay Sulayman's restrictive commercial policy, they tended to suffer less than their European competitors. Indeed, they seem to have consolidated their position at a time when European merchants found it impossible to maintain themselves in the Moroccan trade. Thus, in 1812 there were six Jewish trading houses in Essaouira as compared to two only in 1805. The number of European trading houses in this port decreased from six to four during the same period (88). European consuls and merchants were constantly complaining about Jewish competition, accusing Mawlāy Sulaymān of partiality towards "Jews who trade with his money" (89).

In fact, Mawlāy Sulaymān chose his tājir-s not only among his Muslim subjects but among Jews as well. While his father decided in 1789 to withdraw his money from Jewish hands and place it in the hands of European merchants, Mawlāy Sulaymān, on the contrary, restored the privileges of his Jewish subjects by entrusting them with

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(88) F.O.174/12, 4 April, 1805; Inventory of the trade of Essaouira in Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.

(89) F.O.174/12, 4 April, 1805; F.O.52/29, Report on the trade of Essaouira drawn in 1828 by the British consul.

his business (90). The most trusted Jewish merchants belonged to the Macnin and Guidalla families of Essaouira, who had commercial interests in England (91). Meir Macnin's business was essentially run with funds borrowed from the Makhzen treasury of Essaouira (92). In 1795 he headed an important firm at Essaouira with agencies at Marseille and London. From 1799 onwards, this agency was entrusted to his nephew, Salomon Sebag, the father of Sir Joseph Sebag Montefiore (93). Meir Macnin himself resided for many years in London where, in addition to running his private business, he negotiated Makhzen transactions and acted as a de facto consul of Morocco in Great Britain (94). On Mawlāy 'Abd al-Rahmān's accession to the throne in 1822, Macnin was granted large export monopolies and dispatched afterwards as ambassador to some European capitals (95).

Despite adverse economic and political conditions of the latter part of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign, the period under study can be considered as a prosperous one as far as domestic trade is concerned. Agriculture, the basis of all economic activities, witnessed no major setback if we except the crop failures of 1798, 1812 and 1817-1818. Politically, the country enjoyed a long period of

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(90) Corcos, Studies in the History of the Jews of Morocco, p.117.

(91) F.O.174/29, 1st March, 1811.

(92) Letter from al-Salāwī to Francis Nadler (merchant), 26 Muḥarram, 1217 / 29 May, 1802.

(93) E.J., vol. XI, column 675.

(94) Thus, Meir Macnin negotiated the purchase of military equipment for the Makhzen and intervened on behalf of Moroccan nationals who were met with difficulties while in Great Britain. Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the governor of Essaouira concerning the purchase by Macnin of a warship in England in F.O.52/14, 28 Ḥijja, 1222 / 22 Dec., 1813; F.O.52/14, letters from Macnin to British authorities concerning some Moroccan nationals.

(95) F.O.52/24, 29 Nov., 1823; E.J., vol. XI, column 675.

peace. Even during the pacification period (1792-1798) economic activity went on unimpaired due to the strategy adopted by Mawlāy Sulaymān and which consisted in avoiding military confrontation as much as possible. It was precisely during this early period that wheat export on a large scale permitted the enrichment of the coastal towns and provinces through the acquisition of large amounts of foreign gold and silver (96).

Mawlāy Sulaymān's fiscal and commercial policy also tended to favour internal trade. By the abolition of the maks the taxation burden of the Moroccan merchant was reduced by more than 75%. Thus, the merchants of Fès who used to pay 22,000 mithqāl-s under the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad b. <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh paid only 5,000 mithqāl-s during the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān (97). State monopolies over a number of products were also abolished. Moroccan Muslim merchants enjoyed, moreover, a reduced import taxation on sea trade (2.5% against 10% for Christian and Jewish merchants) (98). At one time imports through the eastern borders paid a 1% tax only (99).

Mawlāy Sulaymān's restrictions on exports during the middle part of his reign must have also favoured Moroccan merchants. Limitations on the export of agricultural products led to abundance on the internal market and consequently improved the purchasing power of the population. This benefited both merchants and artisans.

Merchants were also favoured by Mawlāy Sulaymān's administrative policy. Government responsibilities were

(96) Al-Ḍuḥayf mentions that the merchants of Rabat accumulated great fortunes from the wheat trade during this period; cf. p.337.

(97) Al-Ḍuḥayf, pp.168, 387; al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.116; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.16.

(98) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Muḥammad al-Salāwī, no date, concerning port duties for Moroccan merchants, in Alfiyat al-sulūk by al-Zayānī, p.209.

(99) F.O.174/13, from Jackson to Matra, 18 May, 1802.

often entrusted to merchants in preference to other social groups. For Mawlāy Sulaymān, wealth meant a minimum of greed and temptation to take over other people's property (100). "The merchant", he wrote to the people of Fès in 1820, "does not envy others' money and contents himself with his privileged social position in order to fructify his capital" (101). This attitude led him to entrust the local government of Fès to a number of wealthy merchants, such as <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Qādir Ṣfīra, Muḥammad Mezwār and Muḥammad al-Ṣaffār. The same principle led him to favour the Bildiyyīn (102) who were not only people of scholarship but of wealth as well (103).

It was only after 1815 that Moroccan merchants suffered from a series of distressing political and economic developments. During the second decade of the nineteenth century Makhzen authority became increasingly weak. Lacking enough funds and a reliable army Mawlāy down of commercial activity. Merchants, both Muslim and Jewish, were also subject to some restrictive measures in 1815-1816. In 1815 many Jewish merchants left the country after Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to impose on Jews the wearing of Moroccan dress and the payment of the capitation tax. Muslim merchants were also partly affected by the Sultan's decision in 1815 to raise import duties on maritime trade from 2.5% to 10%. Moreover, the travel abroad of

(100) Al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, p.214.

(101) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès (1919) in Akansūs pp.320-322; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.139-141.

(102) The term Bildiyyīn (pl. of Bildi) designates Fāsi converts from Judaism into Islam and their descendants. Since the thirteenth century, when many Jewish families were forced to embrace Islam, the Bildiyyīn formed a distinct social group within the Fāsi society. Despite their indefectible attachment to Islam, their integration was constantly resisted by the other components of the Fāsi society, particularly the sharīf-s. This resistance was to a large extent motivated by economic reasons as the Bildiyyīn proved to be unbeatable in the fields of crafts and trade; they also excelled in the field of learning. Cf. Anonymous, Dhikr qiṣṣat al-muhājirīn, Ms.D.1115, BGR; N. Cigar, "Conflict and Community in an Urban Milieu under the Alawis (ca.1666-1830", in The Maghreb Review, Nov.-Dec., 1978, pp.3-13.

(103) On Mawlāy Sulaymān's relations with the Bildiyyīn cf. chapter VII below.

Moroccan nationals, whether for commercial or other purposes, was subject in 1816 to tight control. More dramatic, however, were the severe famine of 1817-1818 and the dynastic crisis which dominated the last years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign.

#### D - A Certain Prosperity

European literature, generally based on impressions formulated by European consuls and merchants, tends to often convey a gloomy picture of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. Two erroneous concepts contribute to this unrealistic picture. The first one tends to depict this reign as a long chain of civil wars and military confrontations between the Makhzen and Berber tribes. The second concept over-emphasizes the regression of European trade and the adverse effects this had on European interests. The implicit inference behind both these mythical concepts is an unstable reign, a disorganized economy and stifled commerce.

A closer view at the political and economic developments of the period under study shows, on the contrary, that Morocco under Mawlāy Sulaymān enjoyed not only a long period of peace but of prosperity as well. Politically, the country was not exposed to any serious danger of internal destabilization before 1819. During the dynastic crisis of 1792-1798, the country remained divided, but there were no devastating wars. The country continued to produce and export large quantities of agricultural products. During the middle part of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign (1800-1811) the country was economically prosperous and politically peaceful. The second decade of the nineteenth century was undoubtedly disturbed by increasing

tribal agitation but economic activity was not seriously affected until the catastrophic famine of 1817-1818. It was only after the financial means of the Makhzen were greatly reduced as a consequence of this famine that tribal dissidence acquired a threatening character.

Nor was the decline of Moroccan exports to Europe an indication of a degraded internal economy. In fact, Mawlāy Sulaymān's restrictions on the export trade were an important factor behind the prosperity during most of his reign, since it allowed lower prices of agricultural products and sustained the activity of all economic sectors.

The most evident indication of internal prosperity was the low price of victuals. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the price of bread reached its lowest level since the reign of Mawlāy Ismā'īl (104). Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the mudd of Moroccan wheat cost between 2 and 4 ūqiya-s, whereas it cost 16 ūqiya-s in Algeria (105). In 1805 the Austrian ambassador to Morocco wrote that "cereals in this country are of a very low price" (106). Three years later Captain Burel reported that a quintal (118 English pounds) of wheat cost 2.50 francs, viz. 1.5 ūqiya-s the mudd (107). During years of abundance the mudd of wheat which had cost 5 to 6 ūqiya-s under the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad

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(104) J. Brignon et al, Histoire du Maroc, p. 273.

(105) Compare wheat prices in Morocco given by al-ḥu'ayf, p.321 with prices in effect in Algeria for the same period given by Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Fāsī in his Riḥla; cf. extracts of this Riḥla Ms.G.88 BGR, p.164.

(106) J. Caillé, Une ambassade, p.108.

(107) Idem., La mission, p.107.

was available at only 2 and 3 ūqiya-s (108). Much the same could be said of meat prices. The Gibraltar authorities noted that Moroccan cattle were far cheaper than either Algerian or Spanish livestock. Even when communications between Gibraltar and Spain were open, the pound of Moroccan meat still cost only one third of the price of its Spanish counterpart (109).

During the last decade of the eighteenth century the political divisions in the country and agricultural abundance made unrestricted export of cereals possible. This gave rise to a class of intermediaries in the Atlantic ports who accumulated enormous wealth. In Rabat and Salé, for instance, some wealthy individuals, such as ʿAbd Allāh Bargāsh and his son al-Makkī, bought a number of vessels in Europe for mercantile purposes (110). "The people of Rabat", wrote al-Ḍuʿayf, "used to buy ships from Christians. Some of them bought an entire ship, others bought half, one third or one fourth of it. They gained a lot of money and began building houses with arched doors on the Western model" (111). The coastal tribes also benefited from this prosperity. Al-Ḍuʿayf was impressed in 1800 by the affluence of coastal tribesmen, particularly by their admirable horses, their colourful velvet garments, their delicate saddles and golden stirrups (112).

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(108) During the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh the mudd of wheat cost between 5 to 6 ūqiya-s in time of abundance (cf. AHN, Estado, Leg. 2327, Observations sur un livre anglais intitulé A Tour from Gibraltar to Tanġier, by Lemprière p.44). During the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān the mudd of wheat cost between 2 and 3 ūqiya-s according to the French consul; cf. CCC, vol. 26, 19 Feb., 1818.

(109) F.O.52/21, 21 Nov., 1820.

(110) F.O.52/10, 2 Aug., 1792; AHN, Estado, Leg., 4331(1), copy of a notarial act concerning the purchase of a vessel by ʿAbd Allāh Bargāsh, dated 6 Shawwāl, 1207/17 May, 1793.

(111) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.337.

(112) Ibid., p.409.



The most prosperous period of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign was undoubtedly from 1800 to 1815. With the exception of the bad harvest of 1812, this period was free from any serious drought or natural calamity. "The tribes", wrote al-Zayānī, "grew richer and their flocks became more extensive" (113). The plague, by reducing the population, had certainly contributed to the enrichment of those who were left. According to the testimony of Jackson, the period after the plague saw a beneficent "alteration of fortunes" (114). "When the epidemic ended in the Gharb (...), Fès, Meknès and their surroundings", wrote Akansūs, "life became more pleasant and goods more plentiful as a result of the inheritance left by the dead" (115). J. Buffa who travelled through the northern Atlantic plains in 1806 reported that the countryside was prosperous and "covered with immense flocks of sheep and herds of cattle" (116). He also noted the availability in the markets of large quantities of agricultural products (117). Moroccan sources tend to confirm the observations made by European travellers. "During these years", wrote al-Nāṣirī, "the population experienced the utmost tranquillity, peace, low prices and happiness" (118). This was particularly true of the middle period of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. "We have had the occasion to meet many people who lived during the middle period of his reign", added al-Nāṣirī, "and all are unanimous in their praise of it" (119)

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(113) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol. 204.

(114) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p. 174.

(115) Akansūs, p. 288.

(116) J. Buffa, Travels,

(117) Ibid., p. 53.

(118) Al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p. 114.

(119) Ibid., p. 112.

This prosperity also benefited to the urban population. "Trade expanded", wrote the author of al-Ibtisām, "and money became abundant with the abolition of the maks and the extension of security to both the individual and his property" (120). A similar impression is conveyed by al-Zayānī. "During his (Mawlāy Sulaymān's) days", he wrote, "people competed in the building of houses and palaces such as were never seen before" (121). An indication of this urban prosperity was the impressive expansion of Fès towards the end of the eighteenth century. In a letter to the people of this city in 1797, Mawlāy Sulaymān referred to the fact that urbanization had spread to the periphery of the town and to hitherto uninhabited zones (122).

## II - Makhzen Finance

### A - The Taxation System

The origin of the taxation system in Morocco goes back to the establishment of Islam there. For the Islamic State the sharīCa devised an ingenious system of taxation based on both capital and income. It consists of the ushūr and the zakāt. The first one was a tax of one tenth levied on the produce of the land. In principle,

(120) Al-Ḥajwī, Ikhtišār al-Ibtisām, p. 359.

(121) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol. 202.

(122) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès, 16 Ḥijja, 1211/12 June, 1797 in Ms. D 194, BGR, p. 50.

"... فالعمارة التي تهيأت في هذا الوقت السعيد إن شاء الله بحاضرة فاس... فأنتم  
تروا الناس يعمرون أطراف المدينة و البقع التي كانت غير مسكونة..."

it was paid at once at the harvest. The zakāt, on the other hand, was a tax of 2.5% paid on precious metals (money included), merchandise, as well as on livestock after one year's uninterrupted possession of a certain minimum (niṣāb). These Quranic taxes fell mainly on the countryside and their efficient recovery depended therefore on the Makhzen's ability to control the tribes.

Experience proved that these taxes were far below the necessities of the Islamic State. Various dynasties therefore attempted to supplement their revenue by arbitrary taxes, generally known as maghārim (pl. of maghram) and mukūs (pl. of maks).

The maks, being a non-Quranic tax, is outlawed by the sharīʿa. It can be authorized only in extreme cases when the bayt al-māl is suffering an exceptional shortage of funds or when the imām needs urgent assistance to thwart a danger which threatens the Muslim community. Only in such cases can the Ḍālim-s authorize the imām to levy non-Quranic taxes (123). Sultans were usually able to convince the Ḍālim-s of their urgent need for funds and only rarely was there any open refusal to a sultan's request (124).

Upon his accession to the throne in 1757, Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh deemed the legal taxes insufficient for the task of the reconstruction of the State after thirty years of devastating civil wars. The opinion of the Ḍālim-s was solicited and Sīdī Muḥammad was able to obtain a fatwā which, without giving an unqualified approval, limited itself to the reiteration of the legal

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(123) ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Fāsī, Ṭaḡyīd fī al-mukūs, Ms. D 283, BGR, fol. 27; al-Mahdī al-Wazzānī, al-Nawāzil al-jadīda, I, pp. 348-349.

(124) The most famous instance on which a sultan's request to levy non-Quranic taxes was refused is when the qādī of Almeria, Ibn al-Barrā<sup>3</sup>, rejected Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn's (1108-1143) demand for the maʿūna (assistance). Cf. Akansūs, al-Jaysh, p. 218.

limitations and conditions of the sharīʿa regarding the maks (125). That was all that Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh needed to start his fiscal plans. After him, Mawlāy al-Yazīd decided to abolish the maks, most probably to satisfy the religious forces which were behind his proclamation (126). Mawlāy Sulaymān chose to rely exclusively on Quranic taxes. In the light of available evidence, it is impossible to determine whether the decision of Mawlāy Sulaymān was motivated by his religious convictions or by the conditions imposed on him by the people of Fès in 1792 (127).

What exactly does the maks cover? For the Cālim-s it includes all arbitrary obligations which are not provided for in the Quran or the Prophet's tradition (128). The maks, known sometimes as "the sultan's tax", covers a wide range of illegal taxes which differ with space and time. These taxes are generally levied on commercial transactions, and include gate duties, and a special tax paid on scales (129). The maks covers also monopolies held by the Makhzen over the exploitation of a number of products such as hides, tobacco, silk, cochineal and sulphur (130). This tax was not collected by the Makhzen but tendered out to a number of merchants who ensured its farming. Thus, Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh conceded in 1174/1760-1761 the maks of Fès to Muḥammad al-Ṣaffar for 12,000 mithqāl-s (131).

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(125) Al-Nāṣirī, VII, pp.7-9.

(126) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.226.

(127) Akansūs, p.219. Akansūs wrote in particular: "None of the preceding dynasties since the Almoravids until now respected the the opinion given by Ibn al-Barrā' including this Sharifian ʿAlawīd dynasty, with the exception of Mawlāy Sulaymān, May God's mercy be upon him. Some people say that the people of Fès insisted upon the abolition of the maks at the time of his bayʿa, others say he abolished it by personal motives of virtue and piety. Only God knows better".

(128) ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Fāsī, Fī al-mukūs, fol.27.

(129) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.168.

(130) Ibid.

(131) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.116.

The maks fell essentially on the urban population and was particularly resented by craftsmen and traders. Its abolition by Mawlāy Sulaymān must have come as a great relief to these social categories. With the abolition of the maks the taxation burden was mainly borne by the peasantry. Under Mawlāy Sulaymān, the zakāt and the Ḥushūr levied on agriculture provided the greatest share of Makhzen income. The most important implication of this return to the Islamic model of taxation was the increase in the proportion of the bill paid by the countryside. "The tribe which paid ten thousand mithqāl-s by contract in the time of his father", wrote al-Zayānī, "paid (under Mawlāy Sulaymān) twenty or thirty thousand mithqāl-s according to the ratio fixed by the sharīʿa" (132). The burden was, therefore, increased twice or threefold. There is no doubt that the agricultural abundance and the absence of severe droughts before 1817 contributed to the prosperity of the tribes the taxable wealth of which consequently increased. Al-Zayānī's statement, however, leaves no doubt that the augmentation of the tribal contribution to the bayt al-māl was intimately linked to the application of the religious ratio of taxation (al-niṣāb al-sharīʿī) and that the contract system (muqāṭaʿa) adopted by Sīdī Muḥammad imposed a lighter fiscal burden (133).

The contract system applied to taxes on both crops and livestock. Under this system an understanding was reached between the central government and each tribe, or confederation of tribes, over the contribution which

(132) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.204.

(133) Ibid. On the muqāṭaʿa system al-Zayānī wrote:

"... لأن القبائل في أيامه تمولت ونمت مواشيتها وكثرت الخيرات عليها من عدله  
وحسن سيرته، فصارت القبيلة التي تُعطي عشرة آلاف مثقال مقاطعة أيام والسده  
يخرج منها على النصاب الشرعي عشرين وثلاثين ألفاً..."

should go to bayt al-māl. This amount was fixed by contract most probably after the evaluation of the tribe's agricultural potential, and was not liable to rise and fall from one year to another. Although it used to be called ʿushūr, the contribution hardly constituted a Quranic tax since it was not subject to a regular annual revision. The advantages of such a system were numerous. First, it reduced the chances of conflict with the tribes since there was a prior understanding between the two parties and an engagement by the qāʿid-s the tribe to secure the amount agreed upon. In other words, the sultan held his qāʿid-s responsible for the farming of rural taxes without having to interfere directly with the tribes. Secondly, it considerably alleviated the military burden of the State. The collection of taxes alone necessitated an army under constant mobilization and consumed a sizable share of Makhzen income. By adopting the contract system, Sīdī Muḥammad avoided being constantly on horseback seeking taxes. Thirdly, the muqāṭaʿa system guaranteed the Makhzen a regular income which was liable to be affected only if there was an exceptionally long drought, such as the one experienced between 1776 and 1782. The amount agreed upon was certainly below the legal quota, but it had the advantage of being regular and easily recoverable.

This system was abandoned by Mawlāy Sulaymān, together with non-Quranic taxes and State monopolies. In its place he imposed the Quranic ʿushūr and zakāt on crops and livestock, relying almost exclusively on these agrarian taxes and thus shifting the burden of the fiscal system to the countryside. By doing so, he increased the chances of confrontation with the tribes. This fiscal choice was partly responsible for Mawlāy Sulaymān's political and military difficulties. A traditional taxation system necessitated not only a reliable army under constant mobilization, but also an efficient administrative apparatus to ensure regular

and adequate collection. John Buffa reported that "detachments of troops were constantly employed in collecting taxes" (134). The Quranic taxation system implied the curbing of tribal dissidence and imposed on Mawlāy Sulaymān the need to be constantly at the head of his meḥalla.

The merit of Sīdī Muḥammad's taxation policy was to lessen Makhzen dependence on a countryside the control of which was never guaranteed and to rely on the urban based sectors of the economy (trade, crafts) as an important source of revenue. Mawlāy Sulaymān did just the opposite. By freeing the urban population from the maks, he placed his destiny in the hands of the tribes. His dependence on the countryside was further increased after the fiscal concessions made to the merchants, particularly by the reduction of import duties (135). The bayt al-māl was also deprived of the zakāt on land trade which Mawlāy Sulaymān conceded to the sharīf-s (136). When during the latter part of his reign crops failed and tribes refused to pay taxes, Mawlāy Sulaymān was placed in an untenable situation. It was only then that he realised the disadvantages of the traditional system of taxation and began, progressively, to restore some non-Quranic taxes (137). He also turned his attention to other sources of revenue, particularly the export trade which he attempted to encourage after 1817.

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(134) J. Buffa, Travels, p. 185.

(135) Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to al-Salāwī fixing import duties for Moroccan Muslim merchants, no date, in al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, p. 209.

(136) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès, no date (1821), in al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahāʾ, K 241, pp. 181-185, appendix 88.

(137) Cf. below evolution of Mawlāy Sulaymān's commercial policy.

B- Sources of Income

The zakāt and the Cushūr constituted the most important source of Makhzen revenue under Mawlāy Sulaymān. The fact that these taxes were mainly levied on agricultural produce made this source of revenue most irregular and uncertain.

The zakāt and the Cushūr were essentially levied in kind. Cereals constituted the principal produce which supplied the Makhzen treasury. After its collection by Makhzen officials, the produce was conceded to merchants in return for cash. Sometimes, as had been the case with Mawlāy Sulaymān, the sultan permitted the export of this produce (138). The zakāt levied in towns was generally farmed by merchants. A large portion of these taxes never reached the sultan's treasury as they were used to pay local government officials and garrison troops. Sometimes Makhzen officials were directly entrusted to merchants who paid their salaries (139).

Trade was another source of Makhzen revenue, both directly through the employment of Makhzen money in commercial transactions, and indirectly through the collection of import and export duties. The sultan was himself an important merchant. Makhzen money, drawn from taxation and foreign trade, was handed over to a number of trusted merchants known as tūjjar al-sultān (king's merchants) in order to be fructified in trade. Many of them were Jewish. We have already mentioned the case of Meir Macnin who used the

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(138) For instance, Mawlāy Sulaymān allowed in 1802 Portuguese merchants to export wheat collected as zakāt. Cf. F.O.52/12, 2 May, 1802.

(139) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Abd al-Rahmān Ash'āsh dated 6 Qa'ḍa, 1233/7 Sept., 1818, in D.A.R.



customs income of Essaouira (140). 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Ash'āsh also used the income of Tétouan's port to carry on commercial transactions on behalf of Mawlāy Sulaymān. 'Ash'āsh invested public money in the eastern caravan trade. He exported wheat, wax, saltpetre, fullers earth and received in return Indian goods which, being sold duty free, could undersell all other imports (141).

If duties on land trade were conceded to the sharīf-s (142), maritime trade duties continued to pass to Mawlāy Sulaymān. On imports from Europe he introduced no innovation. Christian and Jewish merchants continued to pay a uniform tax of 10% ad valorem. For Muslim merchants the import duty was revised in the light of the sharī'a and reduced to 2.5% (143). Import duties were often levied in kind, particularly on linen and woollen cloth which was used for the clothing of the army. Export duties, on the contrary, varied considerably and were subject to no rule except the Makhzen's immediate interest (144). After the pacification period during which Mawlāy Sulaymān depended to a large extent on duties drawn from the export of cereals, the Makhzen fixed high tariffs for many articles. The export of many products was also prohibited. Owing to agricultural abundance, Mawlāy Sulaymān disposed of enough income between 1800 and 1815 to be able to dispense with foreign trade as an important source of revenue. It was only after 1815, when the economic and political situation

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(140) In 1802, al-Salāwī wrote to a European merchant about Meir Macnin in these words: "Meir Macnin is our Jew and all the funds with which he traded were money belonging to the public treasury of Essaouira". Cf. F.O.52/12, letter dated 26 Muḥarram, 1217/29 May, 1802.

(141) F.O.52/13, 10 March, 1805.

(142) Cf. Mawlāy Sulaymān's letter referenced in note 136 above.

(143) Cf. Mawlāy Sulaymān's letter mentioned in note 135 above. Moroccan Muslim merchants continued to pay 2.5% on imports until 1815.

(144) The only regular export duty was the one levied on the annual contingent of 2,000 head of cattle exported under contract to the British garrison of Gibraltar. This continued at 5 Spanish dollars per head.

deteriorated, that Mawlāy Sulaymān carried out a number of reductions in export duties to procure additional income. There is no doubt that Mawlāy Sulaymān's commercial policy, in addition to the effects of natural calamities, contributed to a decline in the volume of exchanges with the outside world and, as a result, reduced the customs income.

A further source of Makhzen income was provided by the inheritances of people who died without heirs. According to the sharīʿa, the bayt al-māl is the heir of all estates and properties to which there is no legal claimant. ʿAlawid sultans usually conceded part of this right to sharīf-s or zāwiya-s. Sīdī Muḥammad granted, for instance, the inheritance of Fès (māl irāthat Fās) to the sharīf-s and Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Raḥmān granted later on a similar privilege to the Wazzāni zāwiya in Touat (145). Mawlāy al-Yazīd and Mawlāy Sulaymān decided, however, to take over all of inheritances of the munqaṭiʿūn, thus depriving the sharīf-s of a privilege bestowed on them by Sīdī Muḥammad. The succession of Mawlāy Sulaymān to the inheritances of heirless people after the end of the Great Plague procured "important revenues" for the Makhzen (146).

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Mawlāy Sulaymān continued to receive two taxes which seemed increasingly anachronistic to those who paid them, namely the capitation tax (al-jizya) levied on Moroccan Jewish subjects and the tribute traditionally paid by some Christian powers. Both of these taxes were originally

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(145) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-ḥādī, p. 13; Villes et Tribus du Maroc, vol. IV, p. 247.

(146) F.O.52/12., 4 May, 1803.

justified by the superiority of Islam. The first one was paid by the ahlal-dhimma (Jews) as a symbol of their special status and was intended to serve as a permanent reminder to the Jews of their lowliness as long as they remained attached to their religion. With the opening of Morocco to European trade, this dhimma status began to be increasingly challenged, particularly by wealthy Jewish merchants who travelled abroad and sometimes chose to reside on the other side of the Straits. Many of them adopted the European dress, changed their names once in Europe and refused to pay the capitation tax even if they maintained commercial interests in their mother country. In 1815 Mawlāy Sulaymān decided that all Moroccan Jews should pay the capitation tax and wear the customary Moroccan dress. As a result, many Jews chose to leave the country for Europe (147).

The Makhzen continued to receive an annual tribute from some European countries, such as Sweden, Denmark, Holland and the Republic of Venice. This tribute was initially intended as a guarantee against piracy. With Mawlāy Sulaymān, however, Morocco ceased to represent any significant threat for European trading vessels. Some of these States simply ceased to pay their tribute. Holland, for instance, never paid any tribute to Mawlāy Sulaymān. Venice continued to pay its dues until the abolition of the Venetian Republic by Napoleon in 1797. Only Denmark and Sweden maintained their annual contribution of 25,000 and 20,000 Spanish dollars respectively (148).

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(147) CCC, vol.24, 1 Feb., 1816; F.O.52/17, 6 June, 1816.

(148) C.O.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.

Finally, Mawlāy Sulaymān received various types of conventional contributions known as hadiyya-s, presents offered by the country's notables and tribes on the occasion of religious feasts, the ma<sup>c</sup>ūna and sukhra, contributions for revictualling the sultan's troops and emoluments given to Makhzen officials for various services. The sharīf-s and the murabiṭūn were exempt from these contributions.

Undoubtedly, sources of revenue under Mawlāy Sulaymān were less diversified than they used to be under his predecessors. The abolition of non-religious taxes made him too dependent on the countryside at a time when the fiscal burden of the urban sectors of the economy was greatly alleviated. Any crop failure or inability of the Makhzen to control the countryside could have disastrous effects on the Sultan's finance. Urban arbitrary taxes— which during the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad equalled the revenue drawn from legal taxation (149)— could have constituted an important substitute, in times of difficulty, for the uncertain agricultural taxes.

#### C - The Monetary System

At the end of the eighteenth century the Moroccan monetary system retained the basic characteristics it had acquired during the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh. The system

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(149) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol. 204.

was based on a bi-metallism of silver and bronze, in which the bronze coins possessed an intrinsic value of their own and served as the most current medium of everyday transactions among Moroccans (150). Gold coins became very rare during the latter part of the eighteenth century. The standard coin was the silver mithqāl, weighing 29 grms. In the mithqāl there were 10 silver dirham-s, equalling in value 10 copper ūqiya-s (ounces). The dirham was subdivided into 4 mūzūna-s (or blanquils for Europeans), each being the equivalent of 24 copper files.

Table 3            The Moroccan Monetary System Under Sidī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh

| Silver Coins                              | Bronze Coins                          |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| <u>Mithqāl</u> (29 grams)                 |                                       |
| <u>Dirham</u> (1/10 of a <u>mithqāl</u> ) | = One <u>ūqiya</u> (96 <u>files</u> ) |
| <u>Mūzūna</u> (1/4 of a <u>dirham</u> )   | = 24 <u>files</u>                     |

The traditional system based on bimetallism operated properly as long as European influence remained limited. In an isolated Morocco bronze remained a relatively precious alloy, not far behind silver. Its relation to silver was very much like the relation that existed between silver and gold. The whole system began to

(150) G. Ayache, "Aspects de la crise financière au Maroc après l'expédition espagnole de 1860", in Études d'histoire marocaine, Rabat, 1979, pp. 97-138. Although it deals with the late nineteenth century developments, this study remains, nevertheless, the only attempt made until now to explore the mechanisms of a most difficult monetary system and gives useful insights into the situation which prevailed during the early nineteenth century.

crumble under the effect of European penetration. Bronze coins continuously lost value to the advantage of silver. The correlation that existed between copper and silver was disrupted for two main reasons. First, there was a progressive decrease in the volume of coined silver. Both Moroccan purchases abroad and uncontrollable smuggling (151) drained off large quantities of silver. Secondly, the value of Moroccan bronze necessarily decreased under the effect of foreign market prices (152). In order to compensate for the disappearance of silver currency, the Makhzen was induced to put a greater amount of bronze coins into circulation. This inflation in bronze values formed the main feature of the Moroccan monetary system during the nineteenth century.

No doubt, the disappearance of precious metals cannot be solely blamed on European factors. The mining of gold and silver seems to have declined during the second half of the eighteenth century (153). Mines were either abandoned or located in mountainous areas which the Makhzen was not always able to penetrate. Gold arrivals from West Africa also diminished. In 1797 Mawlāy Sulaymān's qā'id in the Tafilelt, the main terminal of Saharan trade, was able to collect 2,500 kilograms of gold dust as part of the zakāt (154). However, gold and silver coins became very rare during the early nineteenth century. The diversion to Tripoli of most of the Sudanic trade after 1795 (155) must have reduced the flow of gold dust into

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(151) In 1809-1810 Jewish merchants, in particular, were suspected of exporting foreign specie; cf. F.O.174/17, letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green, 26 Rabī' II, 1224/10 June, 1809, appendix 46.

(152) Ayache, "Aspects de la crise financière," p.125.

(153) Brignon, p.283.

(154) Al-Du'ayf, p.344.

(155) A.A. Boahen, Britain, the Sahara and the Western Sudan 1788-1881, Oxford, 1964, p. 45.

Morocco. Gold and silver mines did exist in the Sous and the Atlas mountains, but, apparently were neither regularly nor adequately worked (156). An indication of the disappearance of silver coins was the conversion by the Makhzen of European silver currencies into Moroccan dirham-s (157). As to the silver mithqāl, it ceased to circulate and became a mere unit of account.

Behind this rarefaction of hard currency there were two possible reasons. First, there was Mawlāy Sulaymān's commercial policy which, by limiting exports and encouraging imports, led to a decline of Moroccan reserves in European specie. Even purchases arriving through Morocco's eastern borders were paid for in Spanish dollars (158). Secondly, there was the uncontestable outflow of precious coins to both Europe and the Middle East. Apart from the smuggling alluded to above, there was the flow of Moroccan coins to the Arab East through the annual pilgrimage caravan. In his study on the economic history of Cairo in the eighteenth century, André Raymond noted that every year Moroccan pilgrims used to sell large quantities of both precious and non-precious coins on the basis of their weight (159).

Copper also became rare. In fact, Mawlāy Sulaymān was the first 'Alawid sultan to have allowed the incorporation of lead into bronze coins and put into

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(156) Jackson reported that Moroccans were unacquainted with "the proper method of refining" precious metals and that, in consequence, mines were often abandoned. Cf. Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.127.

(157) F.O.52/12, 3 Feb., 1804.

(158) Jackson mentioned that in 1802 about 4/5 of Moroccan imports through Algeria (evaluated at one million dollars annually) were paid for in the Spanish hard currency; cf. F.O.174/13, Jackson to Matra, 18 May, 1802.

(159) A. Raymond, Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, Damascus, 1973-1974, vol. I, pp. 37-38. The author affirmed that among all Arab coins that ended in Egypt, the Moroccan ones were the most abundant.

circulation a lead coin (160).

If daily domestic transactions continued to be negotiated in terms of the bronze currency (ūqiya-s and fiḥs) foreign trade, on the contrary, was essentially carried out through the medium of the Spanish dollar (161). With the disappearance of the silver mithqāl from circulation, the Spanish dollar, which weighed a little less than the mithqāl (25 grams), became the reference currency for the Moroccan monetary system. Since the chief money of account, the ūqiya, was bronze, the Spanish dollar constantly gained in value while the ūqiya depreciated.

Mawlāy Sulaymān attempted to restore the value of the bronze currency by an arbitrary measure. Upon his accession to the throne in 1792, he decided that the silver mūzūna should equal 4 fiḥs only instead of 24 fiḥs (162). Thus, the dirham (or the ūqiya) now consisted of only 24 fiḥs instead of 96. After this reevaluation of the bronze currency, the fiḥs was worth four times as much as formerly. However, Mawlāy Sulaymān was unable to maintain this situation. Less than two years later, he devalued the bronze currency by one third of its value. The mūzūna became equivalent to 6 fiḥs instead of 4 (163).

The Sultan's attempted reform in 1792 received a further blow at the beginning of the nineteenth century. With the restrictions imposed on exports after 1800 and the decline in the entry of foreign money, people preferred

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- (160) Brethes, Contribution à l'histoire du Maroc par les recherches numismatiques, pp. 238-239; letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAshʿāsh, dated 11 Ḥijja, 1227/16 Dec., 1810 in D.A.R. (appendix 64).
- (161) The Spanish dollar (piaster) was known in Morocco as al-riyāl al-rūmī.
- (162) Aḥmad al-Ruhūnī, ʿUmdat al-rāwīn, II, p.179; Dāwūd, III, p.198.
- (163) "The currency", wrote Matra, "has been debased by 33% during his short reign" (F.O.52/10, 26 June, 1794). When Ali Bey visited Morocco in 1803, the mūzūna was still worth 6 fiḥs; cf. Ali Bey, Travels, I, p.35.



to bury their precious Spanish coins leaving only bronze coins in circulation (164). By 1802, gold and silver coins had become so rare that Mawlāy Sulaymān ordered his customs officers to accept nothing but silver in payment for import duties (165). The bronze currency was further depreciated when Mawlāy Sulaymān decided that the silver dirham should equal 6 mūzūna-s instead of 4 (166). By taking this decision he was, in fact, indirectly undermining the value of the bronze currency. On the basis of this new ratio the dirham (or the ūqiya) could only be exchanged against 36 fiḥs. The monetary system was progressively returning to its former state which prevailed before 1792. The shortage of Moroccan silver coins at the beginning of the nineteenth century was such that Mawlāy Sulaymān was left with the only solution of minting dirham-s from the Spanish dollar (167). By doing so, the Sultan contributed to the increased depreciation of the Moroccan currency since the Spanish silver coin was used to make 13.5 dirham-s. The result was that people buried their old dirham-s, preferring to pay their taxes to the Makhzen in the new debased dirham. Mawlāy Sulaymān soon found himself overloaded with this currency and was, therefore, obliged to order the coining of the Spanish dollar into 10 parts only. Still, the dirham obtained weighed less than the standard dirham (2.5 grams instead of 2.9 grams). In reality, it usually weighed even less than the tenth part of a Spanish dollar because of the loss resulting from clipping. "Money being hammered and not melted", noted the British consul, "the loss would be considerable by clipping" (168). As the Spanish

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(164) F.O.52/12, 25 May, 1802.

(165) F.O.52/12, 22 Nov., 1802.

(166) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p. 424. "On the first of Muḥarram, 1218 (23 April, 1803) arrived in Rabat the Sultan's order making the dirham into 6 awjuh (pl. of wajh, lit. face)".

(167) F.O.52/12, 3 Feb., 1804.

(168) Ibid.

dollar which weighed 25 grams replaced the mithqāl (29 grams) as the monetary reference, the way was opened for a rapid devaluation of the Moroccan currency.

Table 4            The Monetary System at the Beginning of the nineteenth century (1803)

| Silver Coins                         | Bronze coins                      |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <u>Mithqāl</u> (10 <u>dirham-s</u> ) | = 10 <u>ūqiya-s</u> *             |
| <u>Dirham</u> (6 <u>mūzūna-s</u> )   | = 1 <u>ūqiya</u> = 36 <u>fils</u> |
| <u>Mūzūna</u>                        | = 6 <u>fils</u>                   |
| 1/2 <u>mūzūna</u> **                 | = 3 <u>fils</u>                   |

\* The ūqiya, unlike the dirham, did not exist as a coin. As a unit of account it stood at 36 fils.

\*\* The half mūzūna was put into circulation, according to al-Ḍu<sup>c</sup>ayf, in 1797 (cf.p.348).

If the devaluation of the bronze currency was essentially an internal affair affecting only transactions among Moroccans, the devaluation of the dirham had a direct effect on the value of the Moroccan money in foreign dealings. The relationship between the Moroccan dirham and the European currencies constantly shifted to the disadvantage of the former. From 8.5 ūqiya-s in 1782, the Spanish dollar rose to 12 ūqiya-s around 1800 (169). In 1820, however, it was worth 13.5 ūqiya-s (170). Over a period of twenty years the Moroccan currency suffered only slightly. This was partly due to the decline of commercial contact with Europe during the first two decades of the nineteenth century (171).

(169) F.O.174/6, 23 April, 1800.

(170) Graberg de Hemso, Specchio, p. 163; OCC, vol. 27, 8 Oct., 1820.

(171) From 1792 to 1800 the Spanish dollar changed from 8.5 to 12.5 ūqiya-s and from 1820 it changed from 13.5 to 18 ūqiya-s. The Moroccan mithqāl was worth 3 shillings and 8 pence in 1808. Ten years later (1818), it was worth 3 shillings and 6 pence.

III - Foreign TradeA - Motives and Attitudes(1) Moroccan 'Ālim-s

The question of trading with non-Muslim countries was an eternal issue of debate for Moroccan Cālim-s ever since the extension of Islam northward to Spain and southward to western Africa. Trade with non-Islamic lands and residence among non-Muslims were either prohibited or subject to a number of restrictions under the sharī'ca. This applied not only to Christian countries, but also to the pagan peoples of Africa. A contemporary Cālim of Mawlāy Sulaymān, al-Mukhtār al-Kuntī (d.1811), called upon believers not to visit the western Sudan because its princes were still attached to pagan practices (172). Since the fall of Muslim Spain and the beginning of European expansionism, Moroccan Cālim-s became increasingly preoccupied with the lawfulness of maintaining commercial relations with Christian nations.

Māliki 'Ālim-s (173) considered the travel and residence of Muslims among non-believers as a great sin (174). The religious justification is based on the superiority of Islam which might be impaired by the presence of Muslims in non-Islamic lands. Residence among infidels puts the believer in a dangerous position for he is not only subject to non-Islamic jurisdiction, but might also be present at prohibited practices such as the drinking of alcohol and the eating of pork.

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(172) Muḥammad b. 'Uthmān b. Fūdī, Infāq al-maysūr fī tārikh bilād al-takrūr, Ms K 2384, BGR, p.9.

(173) The school of Mālik b. Anas (d.795 AD) is dominant in the Maghrib and is reputed to be the most formalist madhhab.

(174) Al-Wansharīsī, Al-Mi'yar in Archives Marocaines, XII, 1908, pp. 196-198.

Believers are supposed to avoid the company of non-Muslims even on board of Christian ships. "Under such conditions", wrote al-Ruhūnī, "travel even to the holiest places with the intention of accomplishing a religious duty is unanimously disapproved of by the Ālim-s, let alone travel which is motivated by worldly interests" (175). In a Christian country, a Muslim would be also tempted by non-Islamic practices such as usury or the taking of insurance, both prohibited by the sharīʿa. The sending of money to non-Islamic countries is also prohibited under Muslim law (176).

Commercial dealings with Christians are particularly disapproved of when they consist of supplying the enemies of Islam with strategic articles. The selling of every article which is liable to strengthen the military potential of the enemy is prohibited. This applies in particular to horses, metals and military equipment (178). "The imām, may God bless him, assist him and make him victorious", wrote al-Ruhūnī, "is under the obligation of reminding his subjects of these prescriptions and then of punishing whoever transgresses his orders without any leniency in this respect" (179).

## (2) Mawlāy Sulaymān and European Trade

Religious considerations were the main motivations of Mawlāy Sulaymān's attitude towards European trade. The restrictions he imposed on travels to Europe by his

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(175) Muḥammad al-Ruhūnī, al-Risāla al-muḥarrara al-wajīza, p.120.

(176) Ibid.

(177) Cf. fatwā by Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī concerning Mawlāy Sulaymān's proposal for the selling of horses to Spain in return for three Spanish occupied enclaves on the Moroccan Mediterranean coast, in al-Nawāzil al-jadīda, III, pp.35-36 (appendix 47).

(178) Ibid., p.35.

(179) Al-Ruhūnī, al-Risāla, p.127.

Muslim subjects were essentially designed to limit the prejudicial effects on religion (180). The measures taken by Mawlāy Sulaymān to reduce contact with "the land of the enemy" (arḍ al-ḥarb) were considered by Moroccan Ālim-s as a great achievement of his reign (181). "Merchants who travel to the land of the enemy", he wrote to al-Salāwī, "indulge in business according to the law of the infidels, while this is prohibited by religion" (182).

The danger to which the faith of believers was exposed as a result of their contact with non-Muslims was another factor in Mawlāy Sulaymān's aversion to European trade. The contiguity of Moroccans and Europeans in some coastal towns led to the introduction of many reprehensible practices such as the consumption of alcohol and the use of tobacco. Ali Bey noted in 1803 that the taking of tobacco, despite its prohibition by Mawlāy Sulaymān, was more common among the people of the ports because of their contact with the Europeans (183). The presence of Europeans in the ports also led to the employment of Muslims as servants, a practice particularly injurious to the dignity of the Muslim community as a whole (184). "This very principle", wrote Ali Bey, "is the cause of his being so averse to trade with Christians, as he is afraid that traffic with the infidels should vitiate or impair the true believers' faith" (185).

Fear of scarcity was another argument that was constantly evoked. Experience demonstrated that unlimited

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(180) Muḥammad b. Jaʿfar al-Kattānī, Salwat al-anfās, I, p.231.

(181) Ibid.

(182) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Muḥammad al-Salāwī, no date, fixing import duties for Moroccan Muslim merchants, in al-Zayānī, Alfiyat, p.209 (appendix 91).

(183) Ali Bey, Travels, I, p.173.

(184) F.O.174/20, 6 Dec., 1815.

(185) Ali Bey, Travels, I, p.173; cf. also Brooks, Sketches in Spain and Morocco, I, pp.361-362.

exports usually led to a rise in prices and scarcity of agricultural products on the local market (186). European consuls tried in vain to convince Moroccan authorities of the benefits of liberalized commerce. The opening of the ports to all nations, explained Matra to Ibn ʿUthmān in 1796, would make commodities cheaper and, by giving an impulse to production, would consequently increase the Sultan's revenue (187). Makhzen officials were unable to perceive the benefits of such an approach. The practical effects of free exporting convinced them, on the contrary, that such a policy led only to scarcity and a rise in food prices.

Unrestricted exports also led to the disaffection of the population. Inland regions suffered not only from the consequent rise of food prices, but also from the diversion of economic activity to the coastal towns. In 1793 the people of Fès protested against the export of large quantities of wheat and Mawlāy Sulaymān was "obliged to yield to their clamours" (188). The following year, another violent protest against the ex-

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- (186) Al-Ḍuʿayf, reported that in 1796, when there were more than 50 ships at Rabat to export wheat and other products, the price of a single bullock reached as much as 30 mithqāl-s (three times the usual price) and dried fruits were not to be found on the occasion of the ʿĀshūrā, cf. pp. 333-334. Al-Ḍuʿayf also noted the effect of unlimited export on the price of wheat: "the price of wheat reached seven ūqiya-s and half, but the Christians still found nothing to export", p. 333.
- (187) F.O.174/124, 6 Feb., 1796. Cf. a similar advice by J.S. Douglas, British consul in Morocco (1818-1829) to al-Ṭālib b. Jallūn, chief minister of Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Rahmān, in F.O.52/24, 15 Oct., 1823: "The more of every article is exported the more of that article will be produced in the country(...) the more that is exported, the greater will be the revenue of the State".
- (188) F.O.52/10, 30 Sept., 1793.

port of wheat occurred near Tétouan. To show their discontent against the export of 15,000 loaves of bread daily to the Spanish garrison of Ceuta, the Jbala tribesmen attacked the port of Martil, killing a number of Makhzen troops and Spanish seamen and destroying five ships (189). The export of wheat created discontent even among the population of the coastal towns. At Rabat, where the export of wheat during the early period of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign only profited a minority of intermediaries, "most people were opposed to the sale of wheat to the Christians" (190). In 1795 the people of Rabat attacked a European merchant and destroyed his weights (191). It is true that during the pacification period Mawlāy Sulaymān allowed the export of wheat despite popular protests because he urgently needed funds to consolidate his rule; but his attitude changed after 1800 when he had unified the country and disposed of enough resources to dispense with the income from exports.

To insistent European demands for the export of wheat Mawlāy Sulaymān replied that "kings who are entrusted by God with the affairs of their subjects and the defense of their interests must not overlook this duty" (192). The argument was not merely a subterfuge to put off Christian demands. Mawlāy Sulaymān resorted to the same justification when solicited by Yūsuf Karamanlī to allow wheat exports to Tripoli (193).

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(189) AHN, Estado, Leg.4331(1), letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Salmon, dated 3 Sha'abān, 1208/6 March, 1794; F.O.52/10, 5 March, 25 May, 26 June, 1794. This attack was, apparently, made at the instigation of the people of Tétouan (appendix 7).

(190) Al-Ḍu'ayf, p.316.

(191) Ibid.

(192) F.O.174/285, letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to J. Green, dated 6 Rabī' II, 1222/13 June, 1807 (appendix 28).

(193) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Yūsuf Pasha Karamanlī, no date, in al-Damnātī, Kunnāshā, Ms.3718, R.L., unnumbered pages, where the Sultan apologizes for the impossibility of allowing wheat exports. It was written during the latter part of the Sulaymāni reign.

Another factor which contributed to Mawlāy Sulaymān's aversion for trade with Europe was the damaging role played by European interests in perpetuating the political division of the country from 1792 to 1798. During this period many European merchants moved to Safi and Ṭīṭ where they were offered every encouragement by the rebels. In these ports, European merchants were exempt from any restrictions on exports and customs duties were very low. Without income from trade, the rebellious qā'id-s of Abda and Doukkala would have been unable to continue their rebellion for so long. "If these people were to remain without income from trade", wrote Ibn ʿUthmān in 1796, "their supporters would soon desert them and their submission would necessarily follow" (194). Immediately after the pacification of the southern coastal provinces, Mawlāy Sulaymān moved to close down European commercial interests there. The ports of Safi, Ṭīṭ, Agadir and Dār al-Bayḍā were closed to commerce and European merchants ordered to move to Essaouira (195). The Venetian Chiappe brothers, who were suspected of involvement in ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Nāṣir's rebellion, were ordered to leave the country in 1800 (196). Nor could Mawlāy Sulaymān easily forget the active role played by Spain in the supporting of the rebellion. After he had secured control of the country, he cancelled all concessions he had made to the Spanish government. He particularly denounced the 1799 treaty which granted Spain important commercial privileges and refused to open Moroccan ports for the export of wheat as had been stipulated in the treaty (197).

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- (194) AHN, Estado, Leg.4345, letter from Ibn ʿUthmān to the Spanish Prime Minister Godoy, dated 16 Muḥarram, 1211/22 July, 1796 (appendix 13)
- (195) CCC, vol.22, letter from al-Salāwī to the French consul dated 2 Rabīʿ II, 1216/13 July, 1801 informing him of the closure of a number of ports. Cf. also letter from Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj to the French consul Guillet dated 7 Jumādā I, 1214/7 Oct., 1799 in E. Fumey, Choix de correspondances marocaines, Paris, 1903, p. 17.
- (196) F.O.52/11, 17 April, 1800.
- (197) F.O.52/11, 21 Nov., 1801. Cf. article 30 of the treaty in J.C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, New Haven and London, 1975, vol. I (European Expansion 1535-1914), p. 139.



Finally, the European political situation convinced Mawlāy Sulaymān that trade with Europe was usually a source of trouble. Moroccan merchants trading with Europe were shown little respect at sea despite Morocco's neutrality during the Napoleonic wars. Vessels and cargoes belonging to Moroccan merchants were frequently seized and confiscated by both warring parties (198). Mawlāy Sulaymān intervened personally on behalf of these merchants, sometimes to no avail. In 1799, after numerous cases of disrespect shown to Moroccan colours at sea, he decided to call home all Moroccan vessels (199). During the first decade of the nineteenth century, he sent two embassies to Napoleon to request the return of Moroccan property, but without success (200). All this, together with a growing suspicion of European designs in the Islamic world and the fear that European hostilities would be extended to Morocco itself, encouraged Mawlāy Sulaymān to prefer an isolationist attitude.

#### B - The Decline of Caravan Trade

For many centuries Morocco had served as the main outlet for Saharan and west African products. The implantation of European settlements on the west African coast, together with the increasing weakness of the Makhzen, necessarily led to the decline of commercial relations between Morocco and Western Sudan. Since the collapse of the Sa'adian dynasty (mid-seventeenth century), the Moroccan political presence in the Sahara had become very intermittent. The

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(198) Cf. numerous petitions by Moroccan merchants asking for redress in F.O.52/14, and CCC, vol. 21 and 22.

(199) F.O.174/6, 9 Dec., 1799.

(200) On the double embassy of Ḥāj al-Rāmī to France (1803 and 1807) cf. below chapter IV.

Alawid Mawlāy Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl was partially successful in restoring Moroccan sovereignty over the western Sahara and the Touat, thus diverting a sizable part of the Sudan trade northward. His efforts were, however, vitiated by the political instability which followed his death. Later sultans were unable to extend their authority beyond the Sous, although the Friday prayer continued to be said in the name of the Moroccan Sovereign over most of the western Sahara. During the second half of the eighteenth century, Sīdī Muḥammad b. <sup>c</sup>Abd Allāh showed complete disinterest in the Saharan provinces, preferring to orient the country towards maritime trade and the north.

Mawlāy Sulaymān succeeded in pacifying the southern Saharan provinces and extended his authority to territories which, since the time of Mawlāy Ismā<sup>c</sup>īl, had remained virtually independent. In 1796 he pacified the Tafilelt, the main outlet for Saharan trade (201), and in 1800 the people of the Touat recognized his authority and agreed to pay legal taxes (202). By 1801-1802, the Dra valley and trade routes, noted al-Zayānī, were opened to traders "who were able to move freely from one province to another" (203). Two years later, Mawlāy Sulayman's governor, al-Ṣarīdī, pacified the Saharan routes again and appointed Makhzen qā'id-s for the Dra and Ziz valleys (204). Mawlāy Sulaymān even succeeded in extending his rule to Figuig where Makhzen authority had been non-existent for most of the eighteenth century (205). In 1807 he led a southward tour in person which took him

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(201) Al-Ḍu<sup>c</sup>ayf, p.339.

(202) Two letters from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Touat, dated respectively 23 Ṣafar, 1215/16 July, 1800 and 28 Ṣafar, 1215/21 July, 1800, in El-Ouataiq, I, 1976, pp.444-447.

(203) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.181.

(204) Ibid.

(205) Ibid., fol.182-183.

as far south as Goulimine, another outlet of Saharan caravans (206). However, these efforts to control Saharan provinces proved to be of no avail. The frequent campaigns that Mawlāy Sulaymān had to undertake showed how fragile the result of these attempts at pacification were.

The land trade consisted of two annual caravans. The first one linked Fès to Timbuctoo and took place between September and April of each year (207). The second caravan departed from Fès for the Arab East on the occasion of the pilgrimage. Both were exposed to the risks of attacks by roving bedouins and were sometimes interrupted because of the insecurity of roads.

Traditional Moroccan exports were largely based on artisan products such as leather articles, woollens, copper utensils, and tobacco. In return, the caravans brought back gold dust, slaves, elephant teeth, ostrich feathers and gum. Pilgrim merchants transported wheat, slaves received from the Sudan, saltpetre and articles of Moroccan artisanry to the Arab East. On their way back to Morocco, these pilgrims carried Indian muslins, silk, spices and perfumes with them. During the second half of the eighteenth century, Morocco's acceptance of European commerce led to the introduction of many European products among the commodities exported southward or eastward. Besides the slippers of Fès and the ḥāyk-s of the Tafilelt, Moroccan merchants exported linens, muslins, sugar and tea (208).

The volume of caravan trade with western Sudan decreased considerably since the sixteenth century. This was due both to the inability of Moroccan sultans to

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(206) Al-Du'ayf, pp.445-446.

(207) Jackson, An Account of Timbuctoo, p.282.

(208) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.289.

control the west Saharan tribes and to the political instability that prevailed in the Niger bend area following the fall of the Songhai Empire (209). Moreover, the European settlements on the west African coast became the poles of attraction for an important share of Sudanic trade. By 1793, the whole Saharan trade did not exceed 1 million pounds sterling according to the estimates of the African Association (210). By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Atlantic traffic had already succeeded in gaining the upper hand over the caravan trade (211).

Among all trans-Saharan routes, the one linking Morocco to Timbuctoo seems to have suffered the most. Indeed, the most important share of Sudanic trade was directed to the North African regencies, and particularly to Tripoli. This was mainly due to the political stability enjoyed by Tripoli under the long reign of Yūsuf Karamanlī who ruled unchallenged from 1795 to 1830. The Pasha of Tripoli succeeded in gaining control of the hinterland tribes and in 1811 conquered the Fezzan. By 1818, more than half the route linking Tripoli to Bornu came under his control (212). Furthermore, Yūsuf Karamanlī entertained excellent relations with the rulers of Bornu and the Sokoto Empire. In 1825, the Tripoli route to Bornu was described by Laing as "a regular trading route ... along which a child might travel" (213). The security of this route necessarily

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(209) A.A. Boahen, Britain, the Sahara and the Western Sudan, pp.104-105.

(210) C.W. Newbury, "North African and Western Saharan Trade in the Nineteenth century : a Reevaluation", Journal of African History, VII, 2 (1966), p.234.

(211) J.B. Webster and A.A.Boahen, The Growth of African Civilization. The Revolutionary Years. West Africa since 1800, London, 1967, p. 61.

(212) A.A. Boahen, Britian, the Sahara and the Western Sudan, p.45.

(213) Ibid., p.107.

diverted the greatest share of Sudanic exports to Tripoli and undermined at the same time Morocco's role as a commercial intermediary between the Arab East and West African peoples.

All indications point to the decline of the caravan trade along the Morocco-Timbuctoo route. By 1788, James Matra reported that "the caravans to the south have decreased considerably for many years. Their decay originated in the great diminution in the number of slaves imported" (214). Indeed, the arrivals of slaves—an important item of Sudanic trade—decreased considerably. Half of the 10,000 exported slaves were directed to Tripoli from which they were reexported to Turkey and the Balkans (215). The number of slaves arriving in Morocco declined as the possibilities of reexport to the eastern regencies were reduced. In 1798 the Timbuctoo caravan returned to Morocco with only 700 slaves (216). By 1817, the flow of black slaves in Morocco had become so scarce that Moroccan merchants sought an attractive source of supply from Algiers (217).

Gold dust arrivals from western Africa seem also to have declined during the early nineteenth century. In 1797 Mawlāy Sulaymān's governor to the Tafilelt returned to Fès with 50,000 mithqāl-s of gold dust only (218) but four years later, the Sultan's governor to the Sous was able to collect "a great deal of gold dust" (219). However, the rarefaction of precious coins after 1800 and the absence

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(214) Ibid., p.106.

(215) Webster and Boahen, The Growth of African Civilization, p.67.

(216) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.287.

(217) CCC, vol.25, 16 Dec., 1817.

(218) Al-Ḍuḥayf, p.344.

(219) Anonymous, Dhikr khilāfat, Fonds Arabe, Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris, fol.68. The governor was dispatched to the Sous in 1800; cf. Akansūs, p.288).

of gold dust among Moroccan exports between 1804 and 1812 (220) indicate that arrivals of African gold diminished in the same proportion as other Sudanic products.

Among these let us mention some of the most important. The volumes of ivory, ostrich feathers and gum Senegal that were re-exported from Essaouira diminished steadily during the first decades of the nineteenth century. By 1814 ostrich feathers could not be found at Essaouira. The British vice-consul at that port spent many months trying to procure a small amount to satisfy a personal request (221). He finally wrote to James Green: "I am sorry I have not been able to procure for Madame de Charmilly the remaining feathers which from their present scarcity cannot be procured suitable on any terms" (222).

Table 5                    The Export of Sudanic Products from  
Essaouira: Evolution in volume (1804-1812)

|                  | 1804         | 1805         | 1812         |
|------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Gum Senegal      | !95,956 lbs. | !23,509 lbs. | !16,234 lbs. |
| Elephant teeth   | ! 800 "      | ! 1,709 "    | ! 35 "       |
| Ostrich feathers | ! 555 "      | ! 1,120 "    | ! 1,217 "    |
|                  | !            | !            | !            |

Sources: Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp.241-251;  
Add. Ms.41,512, British Museum.

Another indicator of the decline of the Timbuctoo trade was the number of camels employed in the trans-Saharan traffic. Figures provided by European observers

(220) Cf. Table 5 below.

(221) F.O.631/1, 17 Jan., 1814 and 8 April, 1814.

(222) Ibid., 17 Jan., 1814.

show a steady decline in the size of the Timbuctoo caravan.

Table 6      Size of the Morocco-Timbuctoo Caravan :  
Number of camels employed (1798-1827)

|      |              |
|------|--------------|
| 1798 | 2,000 camels |
| 1799 | 1,700 "      |
| 1805 | 1,800 "      |
| 1827 | 1,400 "      |

Sources: Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp.285, 287; Idem., An Account of Timbuctoo, p.156; R. Caillé, Journal, II, p.384.

The other caravan which annually linked Morocco to the Arab East was also seriously undermined during the period under study. The restlessness of Angad Arabs in eastern Morocco and the political instability of western Algeria exposed the eastern caravan to frequent attacks (223). Political events of Egypt and the Hijaz also led to the interruption of the caravan (224). The French invasion of Egypt in 1798 resulted in the suspension of the pilgrimage caravan for several years. The emergence of the Wahhābi-s in the Hijaz also contributed to the disruption of this caravan during the early nineteenth century (225). After pilgrimage was officially resumed in 1811, Mawlāy Sulaymān decided again on its inter-

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- (223) Anon., Dhikr khilāfat, fol.68; al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna al-kubrā, p.140. In 1805 an eastern caravan proceeding to Fēs was captured and plundered by the Darqāwi rebels in western Algeria (cf. F.O. 52/13, 10 March, 1805).
- (224) In 1799 the Moroccan pilgrimage caravan turned back at Tripoli on the news of the French invasion of Egypt (cf. al-Fishtālī, fol.125). It was not resumed until 1802 (F.O.52/12, 3 Nov., 1802).
- (225) Al-Ibtisām, p.31.

ruption in 1815 for two years (226).

The development of maritime communications also helped to weaken the pilgrimage caravan by diverting the transport of people and goods from land to sea. Sea transport had the advantage of saving time (30 to 40 days from Morocco to Egypt by sea as compared to 4 to 5 months by land). It also reduced costs and, above all, offered a more secure medium of transport. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, an increasing number of Moroccan pilgrims chose to travel by sea. In 1798 there were nine ships at Essaouira for the transport of pilgrims to Alexandria (227). Muḥammad b. <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Salām b. Nāṣir described the various dangers to which the traveller by land was exposed and regretted not having chosen sea transport (228). He admitted that travel by land was more arduous, more insecure because of the frequent attacks by highwaymen, and more onerous, the pilgrim having to pay various transit taxes, pay for his food, and ensure the maintenance of his mount at prices which varied from one country to another (229). In 1805 wealthy merchants from Salé were able to arrange for the transport of pilgrims on hired European vessels at only 18 Spanish dollars (21.6 mithqāl-s) per person (230).

By the end of the eighteenth century, the caravan trade seems to have lost its traditional lucrative appeal. Trade with Europe attracted instead an increasing number of merchants, including inland merchants such as the Fāsi-s (231). Some outstanding tājir-s, such as <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Karīm b.

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(226) A.G.P. Martin, Quatre siècles d'histoire marocaine, p.127. The reasons behind this stoppage of the eastern caravan are not known. By that time Muḥammad <sup>C</sup>Alī of Egypt was involved in a decisive military confrontation with the Wahhābi-s whom he defeated in 1818.

(227) J. Caillé, Une ambassade, p.111.

(228) Ibn Nāṣir, al-Riḥla al-ṣuḡhrā, p.59.

(229) Ibid., pp.59, 127.

(230) Al-Ḍuḡayf, p.532.

(231) In 1798 Mawlāy Sulaymān experienced a great difficulty in overcoming the laxity manifested by Fāsi merchants and their uncooperativeness in setting off the pilgrimage caravan. According to



al-Ṭālib, al-Ṭālib b. Jallūn, and the Buhlāl brothers who made their initial fortunes in land trade, progressively diverted their capital to maritime commerce. A Fāsi merchant, Muḥammad Mezwār who accumulated much of his wealth as shaykh of the eastern caravan, had by 1816 important stakes at sea (232). James Grey Jackson mentions another example, al-Ḥāj Shbānī, who shifted his commercial interests from land to sea (233). Despite unfavourable international circumstances maritime trade was still more profitable, particularly with the advantages conceded by Mawlāy Sulaymān to Moroccan merchants.

#### C - Maritime Trade : An Era of Uncertainty and Hesitations

The fact that most of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign coincided with the Napoleonic wars determined to a large extent the fate of Morocco's commercial relations with Europe.

Until 1814 sea communications, particularly near the strategic Straits of Gibraltar, became extremely hazardous. The activity of European privateers, the frequent harassment of trading vessels and the seizure of property belonging to the enemy by the contending navies rendered any maritime commercial enterprise very risky. Even a neutral country like Morocco suffered from these damaging war risks and was accused of partiality by both belligerent parties (234).

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al-Duḥayf. Mawlāy Sulaymān addressed the merchants of Fès in the following terms: "I appealed to you to go on pilgrimage but you refused(...)preferring to it the land of the Christians. I leave you, therefore, to the land of the Christians until you become Christians yourselves!", p.385.

(232) *Ibid.*, p.532. Cf. note 216 in chapter IV below.

(233) Jackson, *An Account of Timbuctoo*, pp.V-VII.

(234) On French accusations against Morocco cf. CCC, vol.21, fol.54. For Great Britain, cf. F.O.174/3, 24 Dec., 1797 and F.O.52/11, 1st Oct., 1797.

The Napoleonic wars deprived Morocco of some important customers in Europe. The commercial interests of Marseille in Morocco were irremediably damaged by British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean and the Straits zone. The French invasion or annexation of some European countries made them enemies of Great Britain. Their merchant vessels, being exposed to reprisals from the British navy, could no longer venture on the seas, particularly in the Straits zone.

The isolationist orientation of Mawlāy Sulaymān is to be explained by the rising aggressiveness of Europe. Makhzen fears of a European invasion led to frequent stoppages of exports while the war was raging in the Iberian Peninsula (235).

Acute rivalry between France and Great Britain over export privileges also led to the same negative attitude from the Makhzen. When confronted by pressing demands for supplies from contending parties, the most convenient attitude was often a general refusal. "If we accede to your request, or even grant you a proportion of what you are demanding", wrote Mawlāy Sulaymān to James Green in 1811, "they (the French) will certainly renew their application as it cannot be kept secret from them. Therefore, we cannot accede to both" (236). Mawlāy Sulaymān wanted, in fact, to avoid falling into an interminable chain of concessions which would lead to scarcity on the local market.

Nor can we appraise the full extent of the decline of commercial relations with Europe without taking into

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(235) On Moroccan fears of a European invasion cf. below chapter IV. On stoppages of exports following alarming rumours cf. F.O.52/13, 12 May, 1807 and 18 Jan., 1808; cf. also F.O.52/15, 22 Feb., 1810 and 20 Sept., 1811.

(236) F.O.52/15, letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to James Green, dated 16 Sha'bān, 1226 / 4 Sept., 1811.

account the natural calamities that Morocco experienced during Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. The Great Plague of 1799-1800, the famine of 1817-1818, and the plague of 1818-1820 deeply affected the Moroccan economy and contributed to the slow down of commercial exchanges with the outside world. Many European and Jewish merchants left the country to escape the plague and never returned afterwards. Isolation measures taken by European countries whenever epidemics occurred also led to the interruption of normal commercial exchange. From 1818 to 1821, for instance, Great Britain, Morocco's first commercial partner, suspended all contacts with the North African States. Natural calamities also weakened the economic potential of the country, dispersed the population and disrupted traditional economic relations (237).

(1) Nature and Extent of European Trade

Moroccan trade with Europe can be divided into two main categories: an official trade negotiated between the Makhzen and the representatives of the European powers, and a general trade conducted by merchants on a private basis. The first dealt with the export of provisions the returns of which served to cover the costs of government purchases, mainly military equipment. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, this provision trade essentially concerned the British garrison of Gibraltar and the neighbouring Cadiz and Lisbon. General trade, however, tended to be long distance trade and was carried on mainly with the British Isles. This distinction was reflected at the geographic level as well. The northern ports of Tangier and Tétouan specialized in the export of provisions (238), while the southern port of Essaouira

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(237) On the departure of European and Jewish merchants from Essaouira following the Great Plague cf. F.O.52/11, 26 Sept., 1799.

(238) "Tout le commerce de Tanger consiste à envoyer des comestibles à Gibraltar et Cadiz", CCC, vol.20, fol.179.

where the major trading houses were located, was exclusively restricted to private transactions. Indeed, Mawlāy Sulaymān never allowed provisions to be exported from Essaouira, arguing that "the country roundabout is poor and not cultivated and many times the inhabitants themselves do not find sufficient to eat, much less can they supply others"(239).

The export of provisions included, among other things, livestock, vegetables, poultry and fruits. After the signing of the Anglo-Moroccan treaty of 1801, Mawlāy Sulaymān had allowed a regular annual contingent of 2,000 head of cattle to the British garrison of Gibraltar. This contingent was exported at a low duty of five Spanish dollars instead of the usual 26 dollars per head. Other European nations, such as Spain and Portugal, obtained the same concession when they asked for it, but Great Britain was the only country to benefit regularly. Above this fixed contingent, the Sultan usually granted additional exports when he was in need of funds to finance the purchase of arms and military equipment(240). Being negotiated on a governmental level, this type of trade was not subject to any significant alteration during Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. The duty on cattle exports was never increased and continued to be in force even after Mawlāy Sulaymān's death.

General trade, on the other hand, was subject to great fluctuations, especially after 1800. Having unified the country under his authority and disposing of enough income to dispense with foreign trade, Mawlāy Sulaymān prohibited the export of many articles while he subjected others to prohibitive tariffs.

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(239) F.O.52/13, letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green, 2 Rabī<sup>c</sup> I, 1222/9 May, 1807.

(240) C.O.91/79, Robert Siller's Report.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the make up of Morocco's exports and imports had undergone little change. In 1808, Jackson wrote that "nearly the whole of the exports to Morocco consists of manufactured goods and that the returns for these are entirely raw materials" (241). Morocco exported hides, wax, almonds, gum and some African imported commodities, such as ostrich feathers and ivory. In return, the country received a wide range of cloth, glassware (the manufacture of glass being unknown in Morocco), firearms, iron bars, copper sheets, paper and increasing quantities of sugar and green tea (242).

The trade was carried out according to the most rudimentary methods. Bills of exchange were not negotiable and commerce was accordingly carried out by barter, the excess being paid for in Spanish dollars (243). Control on credit facilities were also tightened by Mawlāy Sulaymān and this greatly curtailed the merchants' freedom of action (244).

The volume of the European trade had always been modest. After the open door period (1792-1800), Mawlāy Sulaymān's restrictions on exports, together with the effects of European hostilities and the departure of many European merchants during the 1799-1800 plague, led to a decrease in the volume of trade. Despite the lack

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(241) J.G.Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.256.

(242) The use of tea by Moroccans is quite recent. According to the author of Tadhkirat al-muhsinīn, it was under Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh that the consumption of tea became popular. After his death, tradition of tea was firmly established. Both Mawlāy al-Yazīd and Mawlāy Sulaymān had "masters of tea" (mūl atāy) in their courts. In 1802, Ali Bey reported that "there is no Musulman in any tolerable circumstances who has not at all hours of the day tea ready to offer to everyone who may visit him"; cf. his Travels, I, p.22. In reality, this was the case of wealthy townsmen and an insignificant rural minority. Figures of imports at Essaouira show that in 1812 Moroccans still drank more coffee than tea. Cf. table 15 below.

(243) F.O.52/15, 26 May, 1810.

(244) F.O.174/13, Jackson to Matra, 18 May, 1802.

of detailed statistics, the number of trading vessels which called at Essaouira still gives an approximate idea of its size (245).

Table 7 Number of European Vessels at the Port of Essaouira (1798-1822)

|      |                    |
|------|--------------------|
| 1798 | 60 trading vessels |
| 1804 | 23 " "             |
| 1805 | 21 " "             |
| 1812 | 24 " "             |
| 1822 | 25 " "             |

Sources: CCC, vol. 21; F.O.52/13; F.O.52/24; Add. Ms. 41,512, British Museum.

The same decline is illustrated by the fall in the number of European trading houses at Essaouira.

Table 8 Trading Houses at Essaouira (1790-1828)

|      |                   |
|------|-------------------|
| 1790 | 12 trading houses |
| 1800 | 8 " "             |
| 1805 | 6 " "             |
| 1812 | 4 " "             |
| 1822 | 2 " "             |
| 1828 | 1 " "             |

Sources: Lemprière, *Voyage*, p.66; F.O.52/11, 1st Dec. 1800; F.O.52/13, 4 April, 1805; Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum; F.O.52/23, 23 Nov., 1822; F.O. 52/29.

(245) Unfortunately, there are no trade statistics for the port of Tétouan, the use of which was exclusively limited to Moroccan merchants. Tétouan served as an important outlet for Fāsi merchants trading with Europe.

The port of Tangier which specialized in the export of provisions to Gibraltar, was less affected by the decline of European trade. In 1812, Tangier received 122 vessels from Gibraltar (246). By 1822, the number of vessels employed in the provision trade had only slightly increased to about 156 voyages per year (247).

## (2) Trading Interests

The Napoleonic wars brought about a complete change in the commercial roles of Morocco's European partners. British supremacy on the seas led to the interruption of trade with France and her allies, while Great Britain consolidated her position and became Morocco's first commercial partner.

During the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad b. <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh, Moroccan trade with Europe was carried with Holland, Hamburg and Genoa. The most important trading partner by far, however, was Marseille. Before the French revolution, Marseille alone controlled more trade than all other competitors put together (248). The war changed the situation. "Depuis le commencement de notre malheureuse révolution", wrote in 1814 the French vice-consul Mure, "notre commerce a dû se ressentir de l'abandon que nos troubles et nos guerres perpetuelles apportaient à toutes nos relations commerciales. La perte totale de notre navigation a laissé ce commerce entre les mains des anglais"(249). At the beginning of 1805 there was a single French commercial establishment at Essaouira (250). After the battle of Trafalgar, French commercial presence in Morocco simply ceased to exist. The little trade with France between 1805 and 1814 that remained was carried by Moroccan merchants,

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(246) Cf. list of arrivals and departures of vessels at Tangier in 1812 in Add. Ms. 41,512, British Museum.

(247) F.O.52/23, 26 April, 1822.

(248) De Lesseps, Notice, p.53.

(249) CCC, vol.24, "Mémoire sur le commerce des européens au Maroc" (1814), by L. Mure, fol. 120-126.

(250) F.O.52/13, 4 April, 1805.

mainly from Tétouan, who hoped to take advantage of the exemption granted by Great Britain to the subjects of neutral countries in trading with her enemies (251).

Progressively, almost all foreign trade began to be carried on with England and Gibraltar. In fact, it was during the Napoleonic wars that the British commercial supremacy in Morocco was confirmed. Until 1912, the French were unable to regain the privileged position they had acquired during the second half of the eighteenth century. The identity of the trading vessels that visited the port of Essaouira between 1804 and 1822 makes British dominance clear.

Table 9 Trading Vessels at Essaouira According to Nationality (1804-1822)

|      | Great Britain | Denmark | Portugal | Others | Total |
|------|---------------|---------|----------|--------|-------|
| 1804 | 7             | 6       | 4        | 6      | 23    |
| 1805 | 7             | 6       | -        | 8      | 21    |
| 1812 | 17            | -       | -        | 3      | 20    |
| 1822 | 23            | -       | -        | 2      | 25    |

Sources: F.O.52/13; F.O.52/24; Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.

Whether British or not, the commercial establishments of Essaouira traded almost exclusively with the British Isles. Almost all European houses belonged to British nationals. In 1812 the four European trading houses which carried out some significant trade with England were all British (252).

Once the war was over, French commercial interests found it extremely difficult to regain the position they had lost to the English. "Le goût que les habitants du

(251) C.O.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.

(252) Cf. trade statistics for the port of Essaouira in Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.



Maroc auront contracté depuis plus de vingt ans pour les objets d'Angleterre", wrote Mure in his report, "les empêchera de reprendre celui des marchandises que nous leur fournissions autrefois" (253). So attached had Moroccans become to English products, that after 1814 even French merchants ordered their supplies of cloth at Gibraltar instead of Marseille. By doing so, the French merchants disobeyed an ordinance by the king of France (1815) under which French nationals should only sell French products (254). In Morocco the French consul Sourdeau was unable to enforce this royal decree (255).

The interruption of communications between Morocco and Great Britain during the plague epidemic of 1818-1820 seemed to offer a golden occasion for French traders to penetrate the Moroccan market anew. Sourdeau who was the only European consul to remain in the country during the epidemic, attempted to divert Moroccan trade to Marseille. "Point de doute, Monseigneur", he wrote to Richelieu in 1818, "que le mal qui inflige les maures en ce moment ne tourne au profit de notre commerce" (256). The refusal of British authorities to establish any contact with the Barbary States during the epidemic confirmed Sourdeau's hopes. Since it became impossible to gain admittance to Gibraltar, many British vessels began to load Moroccan products for delivery to Marseille. This revival of French trade was, however, only temporary and was based solely on the momentary absence of British competition. With the end of the epidemic, Sourdeau's hopes proved to be an illusion. In 1822 the port of Essaouira was not visited by a single French vessel, against 18 from England and 5 from Gibraltar (257).

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(253) CCC, vol.24, "Mémoire sur le commerce des européens au Maroc," fol.120-126.

(254) CCC, vol.26, 29 Dec., 1819.

(255) Ibid.

(256) CCC, vol.26, 6 Oct., 1818.

(257) F.O.52/24, 23 June, 1823.

Trade with other powers was generally reduced. Spain, being mainly interested in Moroccan wheat, was prevented by Mawlāy Sulaymān from carrying on any extensive trade with Morocco. The treaty of 1799 was never implemented (258). Mawlāy Sulaymān refused to ratify the treaty, maintaining that his minister, Ibn 'Uthmān, had gone beyond his prerogative in granting Spain important concessions, including that of exporting wheat from Dār al-Bayḍā (259). Having failed to persuade Mawlāy Sulaymān to respect the treaty, in 1805 the Spanish government decided to freeze all its commercial interests in Morocco.

Portugal, Denmark and Holland continued to figure among Morocco's commercial partners until 1806-1807 when the Continental System, the Danish alliance with France and the French invasion of Portugal put a complete stop to their relations with Morocco.

Besides the preponderance of British commercial interests in Morocco, the other major feature of maritime trade during the period under study was the progressive replacement of departing European merchants by Moroccan Jewish nationals. At the death of Sīdī Muḥammad in 1790, this trade was concentrated in the hands of 12 European houses and about ten Jewish merchants (260). Under Mawlāy Sulaymān, the decline of European presence seems to have benefited Moroccan merchants. Indeed, Mawlāy Sulaymān was often accused by European merchants and consuls of partiality towards his Jewish subjects. In 1805, the British consul affirmed that "the Emperor was determined to have all the commerce in the hands of

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(258) Cf. treaty in Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa, I, in World Politics, New Haven and London, 1975, vol. I, pp.134-140.

(259) C.O.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.

(260) Lemprière, Voyage, p.86; M.Abitbol, Les Corcos et l'histoire du Maroc contemporain, Jerusalem, 1977, p. 22.

his Jews who trade with his money" (261). The British consul at Essaouira, in a report on trade there in 1828 (262), also noted Mawlāy Sulaymān's abolition of the privileges conceded by his father to the European merchants which meant that Jews could trade with the outside world (263). This policy, noted the report, led to the progressive concentration of foreign trade in the hands of Moroccan Jews at the expense of Europeans.

There is no doubt that the departure of European merchants as a result of the plague and the French revolutionary wars left the way open for a take over by Moroccan Jews of foreign trade. The number of Jewish commercial houses at Essaouira increased in inverse proportion to the decline of their European counterparts. On the other hand, Moroccan Muslim merchants were granted enough fiscal privileges to be able to handle a significant share of the import trade.

Table 10 Evolution of Jewish Trading Interests at  
Essaouira (1806 - 1828) (264)

|      | European Trading<br>Houses | Jewish Trading<br>Houses |
|------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1805 | 6                          | 2                        |
| 1812 | 4                          | 6                        |
| 1828 | 1                          | 9                        |

Sources: F.O.52/13; F.O.52/29 and Add.Ms. 41,512, British Museum.

(261) F.O.174/4, 4 April, 1805.

(262) Report on the trade of Essaouira drawn by the British vice-consul there in 1828, F.O.52/29.

(263) According to the above mentioned report, neither Jewish nor Muslim merchants were allowed to trade with the outside world during the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad. Only Europeans had this privilege. The author of the report noted that Guidalla was the only exception in this respect.

(264) The Jewish commercial houses of Essaouira were in the hands of: David Macnin, Solomon Macnin, Salem Abitbol, Abraham Cohen, Haim Guidalla and Mordecay Lagury.

(3) Evolution of Mawlāy Sulaymān's  
Commercial Policy

Under Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh, trade with Europe occupied a key position in the global policy of the State. Maritime commerce was encouraged by the Makhzen as an important source of revenue which Sīdī Muḥammad used to fulfil the goals of his internal policy. Commerce with Europe was therefore promoted by all possible means and religious considerations were often overlooked to further this trade. Unlike his father, Mawlāy Sulaymān did not conceive of maritime trade as a tool which might serve his domestic policy. Contact with the Christians was looked upon as "an unavoidable evil" the injurious effects of which should be kept at a minimum. Up to 1817 at least, recourse to trade with Europe was only circumstantial and dictated by contingent difficulties.

a) The Export Trade

Upon his accession to the throne Mawlāy Sulaymān manifested his intention to curtail the export trade, particularly by prohibiting the sale of wheat, wool and oil to Christians (265). However, during the early period of his reign (1792-1798) Mawlāy Sulaymān was in no position to lead a restrictive policy for a number of reasons. In the first place, there was the political division of the country and the need of the Makzen for funds to achieve the pacification of the southern provinces. At a time when many tribes remained independent, the Sultan found in exports a most valuable source of income. Secondly, a restrictive policy at this stage would have only diverted maritime trade to his southern opponents, particularly the rebellious qā'id-s of Abda and Doukkala, who were ready to give all encouragement to European traders. This would have necessarily

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(265) F.O.52/10, 27 March, 1792; CCC, vol.25, 29 Sept., 1817.

strengthened the southern rebels and made their submission even more difficult to achieve. Thirdly, Mawlāy Sulaymān needed to convince Spain, whose role in sustaining the southern rebellion was crucial, that her commercial interests would not be affected in a country united under his authority.

A liberal policy was, therefore, tactically necessary. Mawlāy Sulaymān soon repudiated the promises he had made to the people of Fès in 1792 and allowed wheat to be exported on a large scale. Internal opposition did not prevent him from opening his ports to Christian merchants. "Vessels exported wheat from Tétouan, Tangier, Larache, Rabat, Dār al-Bayḍā and Essaouira with the approval of Mawlāy Sulaymān" (266). On such exports, he received a modest duty of one Spanish dollar, or even eight ūqiya-s per fanega (267). Commercial rivalry between Mawlāy Sulaymān and his southern opponents led to an unprecedented rush for the export of cereals. In 1796 there used to be between 50 and 60 ships at Rabat all loading wheat (268). During the month of January 1796 alone, Essaouira received 24 English vessels —more than the yearly average for the first two decades of the nineteenth century — to load wheat for Europe (269).

Since this open door commercial policy was only tactical, it was doomed to evaporate once the country had been unified. After the independent "coastal republics" of Abda, Doukkala and the Chaouia were subdued in 1797, Mawlāy Sulaymān changed to a completely different attitude.

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(266) Al-Ḍuḥayf, p.334.

(267) The Spanish fanega is the equivalent of 1.58 bushels or 4 mudd-s. Cf. AHN, Estado, Leg.4331(1), letter from al-Ṭāhar Fannīsh to A. Salmon, 20 Jumādā I, 1208/23 Jan., 1794; letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to A. Salmon dated 3 Shaḥbān, 1208/6 March, 1794.

(268) Al-Ḍuḥayf, p.334.

(269) Cf. above table 7.

Export duties were raised twice or fivefold (270) and the ports of Dār al-Bayḍā, Ṭīṭ, Safi and Agadir closed to European trade. This tendency towards a restrictive policy was enhanced by the repercussions of the Napoleonic wars. Vessels navigating under Moroccan colours were seized by both belligerent parties. In 1799, Mawlāy Sulaymān decided that, because of "the little respect paid to his subjects and colours on sea", Moroccan vessels were to return home (271). They could no longer sail abroad "on any consideration" unless entrusted with a particular business by the Sultan (272). The plague epidemic of 1799-1800 which greatly reduced contact with the outside world seemed to offer a golden opportunity for the inauguration of a restrictive policy.

There is no doubt that the European political context was not favourable to the development of normal trade relations. The few Moroccan merchants who ventured on sea were often subject to harassment by warring navies and their property confiscated (273).

However, a restrictive policy would not have been possible if the Makhzen had not disposed of enough income to dispense with the revenue from maritime trade. The early years of the nineteenth century witnessed a number of restrictions which complemented those adopted since the end of 1797. In 1801, al-Salāwī notified the European consuls of the Makhzen's decision to close to trade the ports of Mehdia and Asila (274). The export of some traditional articles of trade was prohibited. Wheat, in particular, was no longer regarded as an article of common trade. The export of wool was suspended in 1802 because, argued Mawlāy Sulaymān, "it made clothing too dear for his own people" (275). The duty on cattle was increased threefold, a

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(270) F.O.52/11, 20 Dec., 1797.

(271) F.O.174/6, 6 Dec., 1799; F.O.52/11, 15 Dec., 1799.

(272) *Ibid.*

(273) *CCC*, vol.21 and 22; F.O.52/14.

(274) *CCC*, vol.22, letter from al-Salāwī to A. Guillet, 2 Rabī<sup>c</sup> I, 1216/13 July, 1801.

(275) F.O.52/12, 22 July, 1802.

decision which persuaded Spain to ban all imports from Morocco (276).

For Mawlāy Sulaymān general trade with Europe was no longer considered a vital source of revenue. Nor did he consider the presence of European merchants in his ports a commercial necessity. "All are welcome to leave the country", he declared in 1801, "as one of my Jews can import whatever commission I order" (277).

The evolution of tariffs between 1801 and 1806 shows clearly Mawlāy Sulaymān's determination to suffocate European trade.

Table 11 Evolution of Export Duties 1801-1806  
(in Spanish dollars)

|  | ! 1801             | ! 1806 |
|--|--------------------|--------|
| Figs, almonds, raisins,<br>oil, olives and honey | ! 2 per quintal(*) | ! 12   |
| Bees wax   | ! 14 " "           | ! 26   |
| Ivory, copper and gum<br>Arabic                  | ! 5 " "            | ! 15   |
| Goat skins                                       | ! 4 " "            | ! 8    |
| Common tanned leather                            | ! 1 " "            | ! 5    |
| Ostrich feathers                                 | ! 2 per pound      | ! 16   |
| Slippers   | ! 4 per 1,000      | ! 10   |
| Ḥāyk-s   | ! 1 each           | ! 3    |

Source: J. Buffa, Travels, pp.89-90.

(\*) Moroccan quintal = 118 English lbs.

(276) F.O.52/11, 30 Jan., 1801 and 22 Feb., 1801.

(277) Ibid., 23 Jan., 1801.

In 1807, Mawlāy Sulaymān added new articles to his list of prohibitions. The export of almonds, raisins, slippers, hāyk-s and carpets was banned (278). In 1812 duties on goat skins and calf hides were further increased (279). By 1815, such duties had increased almost four times since 1801. The prohibitive taxes imposed on exports led to the decline of this trade and convinced many European merchants to close down and leave the country (280).

Table 12 Evolution in the Volume of some Articles of Export at Essaouira ( 1804-1812 )

|                  | 1804         | 1805         | 1812        |
|------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| Bitter almonds   | 362,606 lbs. | 488,260 lbs. | 73,093 lbs. |
| Sweet almonds    | 321,717 "    | 505,458 "    | 39,337 "    |
| Pomegranate peel | 46,281 "     | 65,040 "     | 16,219 "    |
| Bees wax         | 194,859 "    | 52,348 "     | 79,270 "    |
| Wool             | 97,896 "     | 29,731 "     | prohibited  |
| Olive oil        | 57,236 "     | 45,489 "     | prohibited  |
| Gum Arabic       | 335,436 "    | 492,350 "    | 12,266 lbs. |
| Gum Senegal      | 95,956 "     | 31,556 "     | 16,234 "    |
| Cow hides        | 120,483 "    | 259,961 "    | 1,036,562 " |
| Goat skins       | 12,726 döz.  | 10,037 döz.  | 27,999 doz. |

Sources: F.O.52/13; Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp. 236-254; Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.

The end of the wars in Europe could have led to a re-activation of maritime trade but the high duties imposed

(278) F.O.52/13, 20 Nov., 1807.

(279) F.O.174/153, 3 March, 1812.

(280) However, such high tariffs did not prevent an increase in the exported volumes of some articles such as goat skins and calf hides. Cf. Table 12.



by Mawlāy Sulaymān and the decline of provision sales to the armies of Great Britain and her Peninsular allies as a result of the peace rendered such a prospect illusory. Moreover, Mawlāy Sulaymān adopted a number of measures which gave the impression that the country was heading towards complete isolation. In 1815, he abolished the privilege enjoyed by Moroccan Muslim merchants trading with Europe until then and which consisted in the payment of a reduced duty of 2.5% on imports instead of the 10% paid by Christian and Jewish merchants (281). At the end of the same year, a Makhzen decision imposing the wearing of the traditional Jewish costume on Jews and the payment of the capitation tax by them, led to the departure of many Jewish merchants (282). In 1816, a sultanian decree forbade the travelling of Moroccans to Europe (283). Even pilgrimage to the Holy Places needed special permission from the Sultan (284). For a time, Mawlāy Sulaymān believed that he could dispense with the outside world. "I have no need for trade and would rather not receive a single blanquil from my customs", he declared in 1816 (285).

Never was the outlook for maritime trade so desperate. The French consul expressed his despair in the following terms : "La France ne doit songer à entretenir aucun

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(281) CCC, vol.24, 26 Oct., 1815. Contrary to what is ascertained by J.L. Miège in Le Maroc et l'Europe, II, pp.21-22, and Brigon et al. in Histoire du Maroc, p.281, Mawlāy Sulaymān did not impose a tax of 50% on imports in 1815. What he did was to raise the contribution paid by Muslim merchants from 2.5% to 10%. In 1819 the import tax was still fixed at 10% (CCC, vol.26, fol.234-235).

(282) F.O.52/17, 6 Jan., 1816; CCC, vol.24, 1st Feb., 1816.

(283) R. Thomassy, Des relations politiques et commerciales de la France avec le Maroc, Paris, 1842, p. 294; al-Ḍuḡayf, pp; 531-532.

(284) Cf. an example of this special permission in D.A.R., 15 Shawwāl, 1232/ 28 Aug., 1817. According to A.G.P. Martin (Quatre siècles d'histoire, p. 127) pilgrimage to the Holy Places was suspended between 1815 and 1817.

(285) CCC, vol. 24, 26 March, 1816.

commerce avec cette puissance : droits énormes, prohibitions presque générales, tout s'y oppose" (286). Yet, in February 1817, the whole prohibition system began to crumble.

The decrease in Makhzen revenue following the scarcity of 1816 and the prospects of a disastrous crop for 1817 induced Mawlāy Sulaymān to look for a new source of revenue. Thus in February 1817 he agreed to allow the export of 10,000 quintals of wheat to France despite the scarcity of cereals on the local market. By taking this decision, Mawlāy Sulaymān wanted to respond favourably to the first request made by the new royalist regime in France. Nevertheless, it was clear that the Sultan was desperately looking for sources of income. This was confirmed when during the same month he consented to important reductions in the duties of some basic export articles.

Table 13      Tariff Reductions of February 1817

|                | Old Duty<br>(in Sp. §) | New Duty<br>(in Sp. §) |
|----------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Wax            | 14 per ql.             | 10 per ql.             |
| Gum            | 5 "                    | 3 "                    |
| Sweet almonds  | 8 "                    | 5 "                    |
| Bitter almonds | - -                    | 3 "                    |
| Goat skins     | 15 per 100             | 10 per 100             |

Source: CCC, vol.27, fol.100.

The political difficulties of Mawlāy Sulaymān, especially after the unfortunate Battle of Zaïan (May 1819) and the subsequent spread of tribal agitation, were further inducements for him to encourage exports. Thus, on the eve of the Fès rebellion, Mawlāy Sulaymān allowed the export of cereals (September 1820) and lifted the prohibition imposed on wool and olive oil (287). Duties on other products, such as almonds, goat skins, leather

(286) CCC, vol.25, 27 Jan., 1817.

(287) CCC, vol.27, 1 Oct., 1820.

and gum, were subject to further reductions. These measures gave a real hope for a commercial opening.

Table 14      Export Duties Between 1817 and 1820  
(in Spanish dollars)

|                | ! Before 1817 | ! | 1817       | ! | 1820      |
|----------------|---------------|---|------------|---|-----------|
| Sweet almonds  | ! 8 per ql.   | ! | 5 per ql.  | ! | 2 per ql. |
| Bitter almonds | ! - -         | ! | 3 "        | ! | 2 "       |
| Gum            | ! 5 "         | ! | 3 "        | ! | 2 "       |
| Wax            | ! 14 "        | ! | 10 "       | ! | - -       |
| Leather        | ! - -         | ! | 5 "        | ! | 3 "       |
| Wool           | ! prohibited  | ! | prohibited | ! | 3 "       |
| Oil            | ! prohibited  | ! | prohibited | ! | 4 "       |
| Goat skins     | ! 15 per 100  | ! | 10 per 100 | ! | 8 per 100 |

Source: CCC, vol.27, fol.100.

Indeed, without trade revenues Mawlāy Sulaymān would have been unable to meet the expenses of the war he was engaging against internal dissidents at a time when he lacked the coercive power to collect tribal taxes. Progressively, maritime trade emerged as a useful alternative source of income which allowed the Makhzen to reduce its dependence on the ever uncertain countryside. It enabled Mawlāy Sulaymān to resist effectively the conservative coalition of the zāwiya-s, the sharīf-s and the Berber tribes.

#### b) The Import Trade

Mawlāy Sulaymān's restrictive policy did not affect imports. He continued to receive a uniform import duty of 10% . He even encouraged traders to bring more goods into the country. Consequently, far from regressing, the volume of many imported articles increased during his reign.

Imports, though they resulted in the draining of valuable specie, were not regarded by the Makhzen as being as impoverishing as exports. On the contrary, they were always welcome in so far as they satisfied the needs of the population. Mawlāy Sulaymān, by principle opposed to the travel of Muslim merchants to Christian countries, took no coercive measures before 1816 to prevent them from trading with Europe (288). Nor did the Makhzen take into consideration the long term effects such imports could have on local industry and crafts.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's encouragement to Moroccan Muslim merchants led to the concentration of a sizable portion of the import trade into the hands of the latter. Indeed, the privileges granted by the Sultan to these merchants made it extremely difficult for European traders to impose themselves on the local market. While Europeans had to pay 10% in kind or ad valorem on all imported goods, Moroccan Muslim merchants paid only the zakāt or 2.5%. According to Jackson, merchandise entering Morocco by land was subject to an even lower duty: 1% ad valorem (289). Thus, goods arriving at Fès from Algiers were far more competitive than those offered by European traders at the sea ports (290). Moroccan merchants were further encouraged in 1803 when they were allowed to travel to Europe and purchase goods within the limits of 2,000 Spanish dollars without having to pay any duty at all (291). European merchants at Essaouira were greatly alarmed by this measure. Matra saw in it a blow to European interests and "a resolution to oblige them to leave the country and confirm his foreign commerce to his own subjects" (292).

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(288) Thomassy, Des relations, p. 294.

(289) F.O.174/13, from Jackson to Matra, 18 May, 1802.

(290) Ibid. Jackson affirmed that "the Fez traders are enabled to undersell the European merchants established at this port (Essaouira) and the other ports of the Empire".

(291) F.O.52/12, 31 Jan., 1803.

(292) Ibid., 27 Feb., 1803.

This trade tended to be carried on through the port of Tétouan for which we, unfortunately, do not have any statistics as it was exclusively used by Moroccan merchants. Available figures about the Essaouira trade show a steady increase in the volume of imports during the two first decades of the nineteenth century.

Table 15 Import Trade Through Essaouira 1804 - 1812

|                       | 1804        | 1805        | 1812         |
|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| Sugar                 | 65,419 lbs. | 32,532 lbs. | 118,131 lbs. |
| Coffee                | -           | 3,600 "     | 2,480 "      |
| Tea                   | 1,510 "     | 1,770 "     | 2,031 "      |
| Cloves                | 7,504 "     | 13,576 "    | 15,850 "     |
| Brass pans            | 550 "       | 1,000 "     | 26,114 "     |
| Steel                 | 2,500 "     | 7,000 "     | 93,725 "     |
| Razors                | -           | 500 doz.    | 2,400 doz.   |
| Knives                | 13,738 doz. | 12,874 "    | 9,893 "      |
| Sewing thread         | 1,000 lbs.  | 1,480 lbs.  | 2,842 lbs.   |
| Cotton                | 2,400 "     | 5,400 "     | 21,220 "     |
| Copperas (for dyeing) | 91,061 "    | 147,882 "   | 118,317 "    |
| Copper tea kettles    | 119 p.      | 255 p.      | 150 p.       |

Sources: Inventories of exports and imports at Essaouira for the years 1804, 1805, and 1812 in F.O.52/13, Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp.236-254, Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.

## CHAPTER IV

## MAJOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1792-1822

At the death of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh in 1790, Morocco seemed ready for a repeat of the long period of instability it had experienced after the death of Mawlāy Ismāʿīl. The two years-long reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd (1790-1792) were enough to undo the achievements of thirty years of stability and throw the country back into a state of civil war which endangered all the organizational efforts of his father.

In the official version as presented by al-Zayānī and Akansūs, Mawlāy al-Yazīd appears as an adventurer or an insane fanatic who led the country into disorder and chaos. Yet, in reality, despite his impulsive and adventurous temper, Mawlāy al-Yazīd did reflect the aspirations of large sectors of the population (1). The support he enjoyed from the sharīf-s, the Berber tribes and the army, together with his unanimous proclamation on the morrow of his father's death—despite this latter's public disavowal of his son—showed to what extent the country had become hostile to Sīdī Muḥammad's policies and ready for a change. Mawlāy al-Yazīd's declaration of war on Spain, his persecution of the Jews, expulsion of Christian missionaries, liquidation of his father's

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(1) Compare al-Zayānī's attitude with that of al-Ḍuʿayf who did not conceal his sympathy with Mawlāy al-Yazīd, seen as the hero of the jihād (al-Ḍuʿayf, p.269).

collaborators and the changes he proposed for the organization of the army and the taxation system (2) constituted a reaction against every aspect of the previous reign. The endorsement given to his candidature for the throne by all the major groups in the country proved that Mawlāy al-Yazīd was more than just an isolated adventurer.

However, the coalition of these groups around Mawlāy al-Yazīd was based on a negative attitude of rejection rather than on a clear and concrete vision of an alternative; his popularity was then bound to evaporate. First of all, the coalition which brought him to power was not homogeneous. The new sultan could not possibly satisfy the army, the Berber tribes, the sharīf-s and the zāwiya-s simultaneously. Secondly, Mawlāy al-Yazīd very quickly succeeded in making enemies. His brutality alienated the administrative apparatus left by his father. By abolishing the maks (non-Quranic taxes) and granting considerable fiscal privileges to the sharīf-s (3), he deprived himself of the revenue necessary to finance his war effort against Spain and ensure the support and fidelity of the army and the tribal contingents.

Indeed, the support of the sharīf-s, the army and the Berbers dissipated as fast as it had emerged. His original supporters—the Idrisid sharīf-s of northern Morocco—became less enthusiastic for his cause and gave refuge to his brother Mawlāy Maslama who promised to be a less adventurous and more malleable prince. The passionate theme of jihād lost its mobilizing effect when the siege of Ceuta was abandoned at the end of 1791. The Berber contingents became less reliable because of irregularities in pay (4). The 'Abīd army refused to obey Mawlāy al-

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(2) On these changes, see al-Ḍu'ayf, pp.226, 232 and 233.

(3) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-ḥādī, Ms.2471, R.L., p.13.

(4) Al-Ḍu'ayf, p.243.

Yazīd's orders for the same reason (5). With these increasing difficulties, the reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd became one of terror. To obtain the necessary funds to run the country, he had to have recourse to extortion and plunder. Extremely impulsive and authoritarian, he did not hesitate to persecute and physically liquidate important officials and notables on the least suspicion. This created an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty among his entourage and led to the defection of many qā'id-s and members of the royal family (6). Most important of all, however, was the active intervention of Spain in Moroccan internal politics to hasten his downfall.

## I - Internal Developments

### A - The Struggle for Power (1792-1798)

The evolution of Moroccan internal politics during the early 1790's was greatly influenced by the Spanish hostility to Mawlāy al-Yazīd. To divert his attention from the siege of Ceuta, the Spanish government attempted to encourage rebellion in the southern part of the country by all means available. In the execution of these plans, the governor of Safi and the Abda, 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Nāṣir al-Mkhīznī, played an important role. Owing to the financial assistance received from Spain (7), Ibn Nāṣir was able to rouse the Abda, the Doukkala and the Haouz tribes against Mawlāy al-Yazīd and, on 10 December 1791, proclaim another son of Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh: Mawlāy Hishām. This proclamation occurred at a time when

(5) Ibid., pp.258-259.

(6) Ibid., pp.250-251, 260.

(7) Cf. Arribas-Palau, Cartas Arabes de Marruecos, and idem, Arabic letters about Morocco during the reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd in Majallat Titwān, 3-4, 1958, pp.109-151. On Spanish assistance to the southern rebels cf. also al-Du'ayf, p.257.



Mawlāy al-Yazīd was the uncontested Sultan of Morocco and can, therefore, only be seen as an attempt by the southern provinces to maintain their independence under the fictive sultanate of Mawlāy Hishām.

When Mawlāy al-Yazīd died at Marrākech on 17 February 1792, the power contest between the sons of Sīdī Muḥammad had already begun. Besides Mawlāy Hishām who ruled over the country extending from Marrakech to the Atlantic coast, there was another prince, Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, who succeeded in setting up an independent principality in the Sous. The latter prince, however, had no ambition of claiming the imamate and his position was really the consequence of political vacuum in the extreme south of Morocco. By February 1792, only Mawlāy Hishām and Mawlāy Maslama appeared to be viable candidates for the Moroccan throne.

(1) The Initial Phase of Mawlāy Sulaymān's  
Pacification Efforts (1792-1793)

This phase was characterized by the contest between Mawlāy Sulaymān and his brother Mawlāy Maslama for the control of northern Morocco.

Mawlāy Maslama, who had taken refuge in the sanctuary of Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Salām b. Mashīsh in 1791, was proclaimed on 28 February 1792 with the active support of the Raysūni sharīf-s (8). Within a short time, he succeeded in rallying most of the Jbala tribes as well as the towns of Tétouan, Tangier, Chaouen and Ksar el-Kebir (9). Having secured the northern ports, he moved to Ouezzane where the head of the Wazzāniya religious order, Sīdī ʿAlī b. Aḥmad, promised him every assistance. Sīdī ʿAlī b. Aḥmad

(8) To cement this alliance with the Raysūni sharīf-s Mawlāy Maslama married a Raysūni sharīfa shortly after his proclamation. Cf. al-Duʿayf, p.277.

(9) Ibid.

whose influence in the country was far more important than that of the Raysūni zāwiya took upon himself Mawlāy Maslama's cause and became his main advisor. He repeated the proclamation at Ouezzane on 23 March 1792 and wrote to his adepts everywhere in the country to secure their backing for Mawlāy Maslama (10).

Owing to the support of the Wazzāni sharīf-s, Mawlāy Maslama rapidly extended his influence over most of the country north of the Sebou river. During his short reign, he chose to reside at Ouezzane where, according to the observation of the British consul, "he depended entirely on the advice and guidance of the sheriff" (11). SĪDĪ al-Tuhāmī b. al-Ḥasanī, another Wazzāni sharīf, served as de facto minister for Mawlāy Maslama (12). Never before had the Wazzāniya religious order participated so openly in the political struggle. However, Mawlāy Maslama's chances of success slackened by the middle of March 1792 when an unexpected candidate emerged—Mawlāy Sulaymān.

Mawlāy Maslama and his Wazzāni protectors had underestimated the importance of two major groups, the 'Abīd army and, particularly, the lowland Berbers (barābir lūṭā), whose military intervention in the dynastic contest proved to be decisive. By attempting to physically liquidate Sa'īd b. al-'Ayyāshī, head of the 'Abīd army, and Muḥammad Wa'zīz, leader of the Aīt Idrassen confederation, Mawlāy Maslama alienated both these groups (13). The refusal of the 'Abīd to join Mawlāy Maslama was also motivated by the latter's determination to transfer them back from Meknès to the various coastal garrisons, as used to be the case before the reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd (14). The

(10) F.O.52/10, 22 April, 1792.

(11) F.O. 52/10, 5 April, 1792.

(12) Al-Ḍu'ayf, p.278.

(13) Ibid., p.277.

(14) D.A.R., letter from Mawlāy Maslama to the Spanish governor of Ceuta dated 21 Sha'bān, 1206 AH/14 April, 1794 (photostatic copy from an original kept at the A.H.N., Madrid).

ʿAbīd naturally wanted to remain together in a single place, preferably in their traditional residence at Meknès. Mawlāy Maslama's intention to scatter them apparently encouraged their chiefs to seek the alliance of the Aīt Idrassen and start looking for their own candidate to the throne. Despite their differences, the ʿAbīd and the Aīt Idrassen were both determined to avoid falling under the tutelage of the Wazzāni sharīf-s. Neither could they accept the proclamation of Mawlāy Hishām who was equally dependent on the qāʾid-s of Abda and Doukkala. Whether they proclaimed Mawlāy Maslama in the north or Mawlāy Hishām in the south, they risked being left with very little say in the country's political affairs.

The fact that the ʿAbīd and the Aīt Idrassen controlled the middle regions of the country, and particularly Fès, the seat of legitimacy, gave them an undeniable advantage over both their northern and southern adversaries. Indeed, without the ʿālim-s of Fès, no prince could claim nationwide recognition. A bayʿa was binding for the whole Moroccan community only if it received the approval of the principal holders of religious legitimacy—the ʿālim-s of Fès.

The first move of Muḥammad Waʿzīz and Saʿīd b. al-ʿAyyāshī was, therefore, to approach al-Tāwdī b. Sūda (d.1795), the dean of the Fāsi ʿālim-s (shaykh ʿal-jamāʿa). This latter acted not only as a spokesman for the scholarly elite but was also empowered by the people of Fès to decide on the choice of a sultan on their behalf (15).

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(15) Cf. notarial act dated 10 Rajab, 1206 AH / 4 March, 1792 AD whereby the people of Fès delegated power to al-Tāwdī b. Sūda to be their spokesman in the choice of a new sultan, in Mic. 2/70, H.P.M.D., Fès, 1978.

Muḥammad Waʿzīz and al-Tāwdī b. Sūda agreed not to proclaim any of the contesting princes. Instead, al-Tāwdī proposed to the leader of the Aīt Idrassen to convene a general congress of "the people of tying and untying" (ahl al-ḥall wa al-ʿaḡd) to look into the dynastic issue. This congress would include the ʿālim-s, the army chiefs, the heads of the Wazzāniya and Sharqāwiya religious orders, and the main tribal notables (16). Otherwise, al-Tāwdī b. Sūda insisted, the imamate should go to Mawlāy Hishām because he was proclaimed in the land where the previous imām had died (17). Apparently, this last argument was little appreciated by Muḥammad Waʿzīz. Nor did he appreciate the idea of a congress of notables who, by deciding between Mawlāy Maslama and Mawlāy Hishām, would leave the Aīt Idrassen out of the power game. He therefore resolved to act quickly and present the ʿālim-s of Fès with a fait accompli. Together with Saʿīd b. al-ʿAyyāshī and the chiefs of the ʿAbīd army, he proclaimed Mawlāy Sulaymān at Meknès on 10 March 1792. Two days later, the newly proclaimed prince was conducted to Fès in order to receive the formal bayʿa from the ʿālim-s.

The people of Fès, who had already expressed their opinion through al-Tāwdī b. Sūda, were placed in an embarrassing situation. They could not possibly reject the candidature proposed by the army and the Aīt Idrassen without risking aggravating the dynastic crisis. The approval of Mawlāy Sulaymān's candidature by the ʿālim-s of Fès on 12 March 1792 was actually nothing more than the result of a carefully prepared coup de force. The only consolation of the ʿālim-s was the fact that the new sultan was a man of learning and devotion and, above all, a prince who promised to be of a mild character.

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(16) Al-Duʿayf, p.277.

(17) Ibid., p.278.

However, the proclamation of Mawlāy Sulaymān at Fès did not succeed in putting an end to the dynastic crisis. On the contrary, it seemed to have complicated it by adding another prince to the list of pretenders. In the north, Sīdī 'Alī b. Aḥmad was more determined than ever to defend the candidature of Mawlāy Maslama. He rejected the bay'ā of Fès and refused Mawlāy Sulaymān's proposal of submitting the matter to the sharī'ā (18). To refute the bay'ā of Fès, Sīdī 'Alī b. Aḥmad brought out an old fatwā going back to the post-Ismā'īli dynastic crisis. According to this fatwā, the imamate is the right of the first proclaimed imām, or, in case of a deadlock, to the most valorous one. Both arguments, were, of course, in favour of Mawlāy Maslama. Moreover, this fatwā gave priority to the prince who was proclaimed by the mujāhidīn and the people of the thughūr (places of confrontation with the enemy), whence the importance of the northern provinces which had always constituted the stronghold of the jihād (19).

It was military force rather than the confrontation of legal opinions which determined the outcome of the succession contest. The support of the army, and particularly that of the powerful Aīt Idrassen confederation, was to be decisive. Indeed, in the coalition which brought Mawlāy Sulaymān to power, the 'Abīd tended to be the weaker partner. The 'Abīd chiefs realized very soon that real power belonged to Muḥammad Wa'zīz and his tribesmen. Only a few days after the formal proclamation of Mawlāy Sulaymān at Fès, the 'Abīd attempted to shift the balance to their advantage by seeking an alliance with the Guerouane, the Aīt Idrassen's rivals, some of whom had already proclaimed Mawlāy Maslama (20). Relations between Sa'īd b. al-'Ayyāshī and Muḥammad Wa'zīz

(18) Ibid., pp.282, 291.

(19) Cf. text of the bay'ā invoked by Sīdī 'Alī b. Aḥmad in al-Du'ayf, pp.292-294.

(20) Ibid., pp.281-283.

deteriorated rapidly, reaching a point at which the latter was forced to transfer his family from Meknès to Fès (21). The dissatisfaction of the 'Abīd army became such that in early April 1792, they threatened to join Mawlāy Maslama at Ouezzane (22) and, had they abandoned Mawlāy Sulaymān, Mawlāy Maslama's chances of success would have certainly improved.

However, lacking an organized military force, Mawlāy Maslama depended essentially on disparate tribal contingents whose number and enthusiasm necessarily decreased with time. He also lacked the necessary funds to sustain his military effort. In April 1792 he was so desperately short of money that he wrote to European consuls at Tangier requesting their financial assistance (23). Apparently, Sīdī 'Alī b. Aḥmad—whose coffers contained more gold and silver than was to be found in the Makhzen treasury (24)—was not ready to pursue his backing for a cause which had little chance of success after the central regions of Morocco lent their support to Mawlāy Sulaymān. On 22 April, Mawlāy Maslama decided to abandon the struggle momentarily after he suffered two military defeats which ended with the desertion of his two most reliable supporters, the Aīt Immour and the Hayaina tribes (25). In all, his reign lasted a little less than two months. He retreated to the Rif, and later on to Algeria, but never ceased to nourish hopes of taking revenge upon Mawlāy Sulaymān.

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(21) *Ibid.*, p.282.

(22) D.A.R., letter from Mawlāy Maslama to the governor of Ceuta, ref. in note 14 above.

(23) F.O. 52/10, 22 April, 1792.

(24) 'Abd Allāh b. al-Ṭayyib al-Wazzānī, *al-Rawḍ al-munīf*, II, Ms.K. 2304, BGR, fol.77.

(25) Al-Zayānī, *al-Rawḍa*, fol.166.

The withdrawal of Mawlāy Maslama from the northern provinces in April 1792 was an important political success for Mawlāy Sulaymān and represented a crucial step in the pacification of the country. Henceforth, Mawlāy Sulaymān became the uncontested ruler of northern Morocco. He appointed governors to the various tribes and towns falling under his control and inaugurated a policy of rapprochement with the Raysūni sharīf-s (26) who assisted him in consolidating his rule over the Jbala. On the other hand, Sīdī 'Alī b. Aḥmad ceased his opposition to Mawlāy Sulaymān. To atone for his past support for Mawlāy Maslama, he offered his mediation for bringing about the submission of the southern rebels.

The most recalcitrant zone was the Tamesna where the Chaouia tribes were not completely subdued until 1797. In May 1793, Mawlāy Sulaymān, whose rule was by that time firmly established north of the Bouregreg river, made his first move against the Chaouia. He succeeded in reaching Dār al-Bayḍā without much difficulty but the Chaouia, who had withdrawn their forces southward, inflicted a heavy defeat on the Sultan's troops in June 1793 (27). The royal army, composed of 7,000 men from the 'Abīd, Oudaya and Aīt Idrassen, was forced to retreat. The 'Abīd were particularly affected as many of them were killed or captured (28). Deeply upset, Sa'īd b. al-'Ayyāshī threatened, once again, to abandon Mawlāy Sulaymān (29).

This major military setback in the Chaouia helped to delay Mawlāy Sulaymān's pacification program and gave a respite to Mawlay Hishām and his military backers, 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Nāṣir and Muḥammad b. al-'Arūsī, qā'id-s of

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(26) In 1793 Mawlāy Sulaymān granted the Raysūni-s a funduq (caravan-serae) in Tétouan where they established a branch of their zāwiya. Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī 'Alī b. Raysūn dated early Sha'bān, 1207 AH/ March, 1793 AD in Muḥammad al-Amīn al-Raysūnī, Ḥaḳā'iq tārikhiya 'an zāwiyat Tazrūt, 1966, p.26.

(27) F.O. 52/10, 1 Aug., 1793.

(28) Ibid.

(29) F.O. 52/10, 19 Oct., 1793.

the Abda and Doukkala tribes respectively. The disobedience of the Chaouia tribes acquired an even more threatening character when, in October 1793, they called on Mawlāy Maslama to serve as their prince (30).

Since he left Ouezzane in April 1792, Mawlāy Maslama had made several attempts to destabilize Mawlāy Sulaymān's government. In September 1792, he attempted, in vain, to rouse the Hayaina tribe north of Fès. After a short stay in Algeria, he returned to the Tafilēl and from there crossed to the Middle Atlas mountains to seek the help of the Amhāwish maraboutic family. According to contemporary Jewish sources, Mawlāy Maslama succeeded in rallying to his cause Abū Bakr Amhāwish who proclaimed him in the summer of 1793 and provided him with 4,000 men to attack Meknès (31). This attempt also failed and Mawlāy Maslama was desperately looking for assistance in the Tadla when he was invited by the Chaouia to join them (32).

By proclaiming Mawlāy Maslama, the Chaouia were only seeking a cover of legitimacy to maintain their independence. A handful of wealthy notables, among them a cousin of Sīdī 'Alī b. Aḥmad (33), were particularly interested in ensuring for themselves the control of wheat exports from Dār al-Bayḍā. The Chaouia notables made it clear to Mawlāy Maslama that, in return for his services, he was to receive half the export duties (34).

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(30) *Ibid.*

(31) G. Vajda, "Recueil de textes historiques judéo-marocains," in *Hespéris*, 36, 1949, p.184.

(32) F.O. 52/10, 10 Oct., 1793.

(33) *Al-Ḥuṣayf*, p.297.

(34) F.O. 52/10, 19 Oct., 1793.



(2) The Second Phase of Pacification :  
Mawlāy Sulaymān's New Strategy (1793-1795)

By the end of 1793, the whole of the coast south of Rabat was in the hands of autonomous qā'id-s or princes. Mawlāy Sulaymān lacked the necessary military and financial means to embark upon a large scale confrontation with the rebellious provinces. The unfortunate campaign of May-June 1793 against the Chaouia showed how harmful such military failures could be to the army's morale and discipline.

Moreover, the army was neither well organized nor trustworthy. The 'Abīd officers, in particular, accused Mawlāy Sulaymān of being partial to the Oudaya and the Aīt Idrassen Berbers (35). The 'Abīd looked unfavourably upon the Sultan's attempts to strengthen the Oudaya army greatly weakened by Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh and which Mawlāy Sulaymān wanted to strengthen to keep the arrogance of the 'Abīd in check (36). In October 1793, when Mawlāy Sulaymān had decided to march against the Chaouia, the 'Abīd troops refused to move and Sa'īd b. al-'Ayyāshī openly threatened to proclaim Mawlāy Maslama (37).

Confronted with these difficulties, Mawlāy Sulaymān adopted a new strategy of pacification based on three principles : a greater recourse to efforts at mediation, the weakening of the rebellious coastal provinces by intercepting their maritime trade, and the courting of Spain in an attempt to bring about a change in her attitude towards the political division of Morocco.

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(35) F.O. 52/10, 1 Aug., 1793.

(36) On the strengthening of the Oudaya cf. al-Ḍu'ayf, pp. 318, 335. In 1796 Mawlāy Sulaymān raised the cavalry force of the Oudaya from 400 men that were in 1792 to 3,000 men.

(37) F.O. 52/10, 19 Oct., 1793.

After 1793, Mawlāy Sulaymān resorted increasingly to the good offices of important religious figures, such as Sīdī 'Alī b. Aḥmad and al-'Arbī b. al-Ma'ṭī, heads of the Wazzāniya and Sharqāwiya religious orders respectively. In 1794, he called upon Sīdī 'Alī b. Aḥmad to exert pressure on his cousin Sīdī 'Abd Allāh b. 'Abd al-Qādir to put an end to his commercial activities at Dār al-Bayḍā (38). The Wazzāni sharīf finally left the Chaouia in October 1794 following the repeated intervention of Sīdī 'Alī b. Aḥmad (39). The mediation efforts of the latter as well as those of the ʿālim-s of Fès were also used by Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1795 in an attempt to obtain the submission of 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Nāṣir (40).

Mawlāy Sulayman's strategy also involved avoiding destructive warfare as much as possible directing his efforts instead to a blockade of the rebellious ports. The Sultan had realized that the basis of the whole crisis was commercial. Since the death of Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh, coastal tribes had established direct trade relations with European merchants and embarked upon unrestricted export of wheat. In and around the ports of Dār al-Bayḍā, Ṭīṭ and Safi, a minority of wealthy intermediaries emerged whose interests depended closely on maritime trade. Mawlāy Sulaymān decided, therefore, to strike at these interests by setting up a naval blockade around these ports.

In October 1793, just after Mawlāy Maslama established himself at Dār al-Bayḍā, Mawlāy Sulaymān intimated to the European consuls his determination to blockade all ports which did not recognize one of the two ruling sultans, himself and Mawlāy Hishām (41). Consequently, European countries were notified that all vessels trading with Dār al-Bayḍā would be seized. Spain, whose merchants

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(38) Al-Ḍu'ayf, p.297.

(39) Ibid., p.299.

(40) Ibid., p.311.

(41) F.O. 52/10, 28 Oct., 1793.

had important trading interests at Dār al-Bayḍā, could not raise any objection to this decision since it had recognized that the country north of the Oum er-Rbia river fell within the dominions of Mawlāy Sulaymān (42). In 1794, some vessels were refitted and ordered to cruise off the Chaouia coast. Many boats loaded with wheat were seized. The naval blockade proved to be so effective that in July 1794 the Chaouia notables asked Mawlāy Maslama to leave their territory (43).

At the beginning of 1795, Mawlāy Sulaymān was presented with an unexpected pretext to extend the naval blockade to Safi and Ṭīṭ—the abdication of Mawlāy Hishām at Marrakech. Having realized that he was nothing more than a political tool in the hands of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Nāṣir, Mawlāy Hishām abandoned the throne in January 1795 (44). The fact that the tribes of Abda and Doukkala were left without a prince induced Mawlāy Sulaymān to intercept the trade of Ṭīṭ and Safi, on the grounds that these ports were refusing allegiance to both courts—Fès and Marrakech—and were, therefore, to be reduced to the obedience of one prince or another (45).

Furthermore, Spain could no longer uphold its argument according to which the territory south of Oum er-Rbia lay outside the sovereignty of Mawlāy Sulaymān. Three important developments undermined this argument. First, there was the proclamation of Mawlāy Sulaymān by Essaouira in April 1794 because of the influence of the important ‘Abīd garrison stationed in that port (46). Secondly,

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(42) The Spanish government recognized Mawlāy Sulaymān's right to intercept the trade of Dār al-Bayḍā but made it clear that it would not allow its trade with Ṭīṭ and Safi to be disturbed. Cf. F.O. 52/10, 29 Aug., 1794.

(43) *Ibid.*

(44) F.O. 52/11, 16 Feb., 1795.

(45) F.O. 52/11, in a letter to European consuls dated 29 Sha‘bān, 1209 AH/21 March, 1795, Mawlāy Sulaymān expressed his intention to forbid the trade of the Abda and Doukkala following the abdication of Mawlāy Hishām.

(46) Al-Du‘ayf, p. 308.

there was the political division of the Doukkala between Muḥammad b. al-‘Arūsī and his brother al-Hāshmi at the end of 1794 and the decision taken by the latter to proclaim Mawlāy Sulaymān (47). Although al-Hāshmi b. al-‘Arūsī threw off his allegiance to Mawlāy Sulaymān in the summer of 1795 (48), the Sultan was nevertheless able to make use of this temporary submission to present himself as the legitimate sultan of the whole country. The third development was the proclamation of Mawlāy Sulaymān in June 1795 by the notables of Marrakech and Rehamna (49).

All these gains, though precarious and temporary, greatly improved Mawlāy Sulaymān's political position vis-à-vis his opponents. The renewed proclamation to Mawlāy Hishām at Marrakech in October 1795 by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Nāṣir and al-Hāshmi al-‘Arūsī—by then the uncontested leader of Doukkala—did not prevent Mawlāy Sulaymān from proceeding with the blockade of Safi and Ṭīṭ. In June 1796, he had five vessels cruising off the coast of Abda (50) and during the summer of 1796, many ships loaded with wheat were seized and sold at Rabat (51).

Parallel to the blockade of the rebellious ports, Mawlāy Sulaymān attempted to influence Spain's attitude towards the dynastic crisis by granting her important commercial privileges. Indeed, the policy of rapprochement with Spain constituted one of the major principles of Mawlāy Sulaymān's policy during this phase of pacification. The first step in this respect had been the appointment in November 1792 of Muḥammad b. ‘Uthmān, well known to be the man of Spain, as minister for foreign

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(47) *Ibid.* , p.306.

(48) *Ibid.*, p.310.

(49) *Ibid.*, p.311; F.O.52/10, 30 July , 1795.

(50) F.O.52/11, 16 June, 1796.

(51) Al-Ḍu‘ayf, p.334.

affairs (52) . . . In May 1793, immediately after his first entry to Dār al-Bayḍā, he notified the Spanish government that it could send its nationals to exercise their trade at that port from which they were allowed to export wheat on the same conditions granted to them by his father (53). A further concession to Spain was made in 1795 when Mawlāy Sulaymān conferred upon her the exclusive right of using the port of Larache (54).

The commercial liberalism which characterized Mawlāy Sulaymān's policy in the 1790's was, to a large extent, motivated by his Spanish policy. By encouraging wheat exports during the pacification phase, he not only sought to strengthen the Makhzen finances, but also anticipated the advantages that were to be expected from a change in Spanish attitudes. Spain, being mainly interested in the purchase of wheat, realized that it could export from the northern ports on almost the same conditions as those offered by the rebels (55). Ultimately, Mawlāy Sulaymān succeeded in convincing Spain that her interests could be better served by a united and peaceful Morocco.

(3) The Third Phase of Pacification:  
the Reunification (1796 - 1798)

The abdication of Mawlāy Hishām in January 1795 and the voluntary submission of the Chaouia to Mawlāy Sulaymān two months later gave real hopes for a rapid reunification of the country. The arrival in northern Morocco of a delegation from Marrakech to present its bayʿa to Mawlāy Sulaymān in June 1795 confirmed these hopes.

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(52) AHN, Estado, Leg.4328, letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the European consuls dated 6 Rabīʿ I, 1207/1st Nov., 1792, notifying them of Ibn ʿUthmān's appointment.

(53) AHN, Estado, Leg.4330(2), letter from al-Ghāzī b. Salāma to A. Salmon dated 2 Shawwāl, 1207/13 May, 1793, reproduced in appendix 6.

(54) F.O.52/11, 31 Oct., 1795.

(55) Cf. Mawlāy Sulaymān's commercial policy in chapter III pp. I63-I64.

The political situation, however, progressively turned against Mawlāy Sulaymān during the second half of the year.

In July 1795, al-Hāshimī b. al-ʿArūsī disavowed his bayʿa and joined ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Nāṣir. In the Jbala, Mawlāy Maslama threatened to destabilize Mawlāy Sulaymān's control when he laid a siege to Tétouan during most of the summer (56). In October 1795, Mawlāy Hishām was proclaimed again at Marrakech by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Nāṣir and al-Hāshimī b. al-ʿArūsī. With the exception of Essaouira, the whole country south of Oum er-Rbia rose again in rebellion. Even Spain, which had suspended her commercial relations with Safi and Ṭīṭ on account of Mawlāy Sulaymān's naval blockade of these ports, made it known that after the renewed proclamation of Mawlāy Hishām in October 1795 she had the intention of resuming her normal relations with the qāʿid-s of Abda and Doukkala (57). "Cet empire", wrote the French deputy consul, L. Mure, "paraît devoir rester longtemps divisé en deux royaumes" (58).

During the year 1796, no progress could be made to solve the dynastic crisis. For Mawlāy Sulaymān, new difficulties arose. In the Tadla, the head of the Sharqāwiya religious order turned to Mawlāy Hishām after he suspected Mawlāy Sulaymān of ordering the killing of his affine, Abū ʿAzza al-Qusṭālī, qāʿid of the Beni Hsen (59). In the Sous, Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Mālik al-Zayzūn, Mawlāy Sulaymān's nephew and governor of Agadir and Taroudant, became virtually independent. Further to the south, Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, another son of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd

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(56) Al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.312-315. Mawlāy Maslama was compelled to abandon the siege of Tétouan in Oct. 1795 owing to the intervention of Ibn Nāsir al-Mṭīrī. This was his last attempt after which he retreated to Algeria.

(57) AHN, Estado, Leg.4345, letter from Ibn ʿUthmān to the Spanish prime minister Godoy, 16 Muḥarram, 1211/22 July, 1796; cf. appendix 13.

(58) Archives Nationales (Paris), A.F. IV, from L. Mure to the Comité du Salut Public, Salé, 16 Vendémiaire, year IV (7 October, 1795)

(59) Al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.328-329, 341.

Allāh, set up an independent principality in Wādī Noun. More serious, however, was the renewed rebellion of the Chaouia.

Upon the submission of the Chaouia in March 1795, Mawlāy Sulaymān had appointed his cousin 'Abd al-Mālik b. Idrīs governor for this province. Mawlāy 'Abd al-Mālik took over a large share of the trade returns of Dār al-Bayḍā and, by November 1796, had succeeded in rallying local notables to his autonomist plan. On 21 January 1797, he was formally proclaimed by the Chaouia tribes. This rebellion took a more threatening character when, in March 1797, 'Abd al-Mālik declared his allegiance to Mawlāy Hishām (60), thus giving the southern prince a pretext whereby he could claim sovereignty over a territory which, until then, had remained an uncontested part of the northern kingdom. Only internal dissensions among the southern rebels allowed Mawlāy Sulaymān to neutralize the serious implications of such a development.


In March 1797, just after Mawlāy 'Abd al-Mālik b. Idrīs proclaimed his allegiance to the court of Marrakech, Mawlāy Hishām abdicated for the second time in protest against the control of all political power by the qā'id-s of Abda and Doukkala (61). 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Nāṣir and al-Hāshimī b. al-'Arūsī could not afford a new dynastic vacuum which would impair the legitimacy of their pretensions and give Mawlāy Sulaymān a valuable opportunity to resume his naval blockade against their ports. This second abdication by Mawlāy Hishām was, therefore, immediately followed by the proclamation of his brother Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn on 30 March, 1797 (62). The new sultan was supported by the Abda, Doukkala, Chaouia and the Charrādi zāwiya (63). Marrakech

(60) Ibid., p.348.

(61) Ibid.

(62) Ibid., p.349.

(63) The zāwiya used to be located about one day's journey west of Marrakech. It was founded by Abū al-'Abbās al-Charrādī, disciple of Aḥmad al-Khalīfa (d. 1717), second shaykh of the Nāṣiriya religious order. Its influence, however, was limited to the Cherarda tribes including the Zirara, Chébanat, Tekna, Oulad Dlim and Dou Blal. Cf. Drague, Esquisse d'histoire religieuse du Maroc, Paris, 1951, pp. 91-92.





and the adjacent Rehamna, on the other hand, remained attached to Mawlāy Hishām (64) who engaged in a fierce fight with his brother for the control of the southern capital. Finally, Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn entered Marrakech in May, while Mawlāy Hishām took refuge in the mountains.

It was precisely at the moment when the two princes were battling for the control of Marrakech that Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to march against the rebellious Chaouia. Mawlāy 'Abd al-Mālik b. Idrīs succeeded in raising 11,000 fighters amongst the Chaouia tribes but Mawlāy Sulaymān had with him 60,000 men the great majority of them belonging to the Aīt Idrassen and other lowland Berbers (65). The rebellious prince was driven back to the Oum er-Rbia river and defeated on 20 May, 1797 (66). The following day, not only the Chaouia but also a number of Doukkala notables submitted to the rule of Mawlāy Sulaymān. The Chaouia, the key to the reduction of the southern provinces, was now definitely pacified and placed under the command of Mawlāy al-Ṭayyib. The port of Dār al-Bayḍā was immediately closed to maritime trade and European merchants transferred to Rabat (67). Henceforth, the southern rebels already divided and weakened could no longer hope to maintain their independence.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's victory over the Chaouia in May 1797 and the struggle between Mawlāy Hishām and Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn induced many southern tribes to proclaim Mawlāy Sulaymān. The mawlid (the Prophet's birthday) of 1797 which coincided with 4 September, was the occasion for the Doukkala and Rehamna tribes to present their allegiance to Mawlāy Sulaymān (68). At about the same time, the head of the Wazzāniya religious order was dispatched to Safi in an attempt to obtain the peaceful submission of 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Nāṣir. This latter already abandoned

(64) Al-Ḍu'ayf, pp. 350, 353.

(65) C.C.C., vol. 21, fol.117.

(66) Al-Ḍu'ayf, pp.358-359.

(67) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol. 171.

(68) Al-Ḍu'ayf, p.366.

by al-Hāshimī b. al-‘Arūsī, could not resist any longer. On 23 September, Sīdī ‘Alī b. Aḥmad succeeded in inducing him to recognize Mawlāy Sulaymān as the legitimate and only ruler of the country (69). At Marrakech, the news of the bay‘a of Ibn Nāṣir spread and was immediately followed by the expulsion of Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn and the proclamation of Mawlāy Sulaymān. The reunification of Morocco was formally achieved with the triumphal entry of Mawlāy Sulaymān to Marrakech on 26 November 1797(70).

The Sultan remained at Marrakech for the winter in order to consolidate his rule in the southern provinces. He still had to overcome the desperate resistance offered by Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn and Muḥammad al-Charrādī who refused to hand in the artillery left in his zāwiya by Mawlāy Hishām (71). In December 1797 ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Nāṣir could no longer conceal his sympathy for al-Charrādī in his conflict with Mawlāy Sulaymān and offered to assist him militarily. He even threatened to proclaim Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn (72). However, the submission of this prince to Mawlāy Sulaymān and his transfer to Rabat at the beginning of 1798 foiled any secessionist attempt. In February 1798, Mawlāy Sulaymān received the allegiance of his nephew ‘Abd al-Mālik al-Zayzūn who ruled independently at Agadir (73), and in March of the same year, a deputation from the Dra populations came to present its bay‘a and request the appointment of a Makhzen governor (74). Thus, on 19 March 1798, Mawlāy Sulaymān celebrated the end of the holy month of Ramaḍān in the presence of delegations from most tribes of Morocco. He was the uncontested ruler of Morocco.

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(69) Ibid., p.367; F.O. 52/11, 1 Oct., 1797.

(70) Al-Du‘ayf, p.372.

(71) Ibid., p.373.

(72) Ibid.

(73) Ibid., pp.378-379.

(74) Ibid., p.379.

B - The Great Plague of 1799-1800

No sooner was Mawlāy Sulaymān generally accepted as sultan than the country suffered the first of two major outbreaks of plague. The epidemic which ravaged the country in 1799-1800 had important social and political consequences.

(1) Evolution of the Epidemic

Morocco seems to have been spared the recurrent outbreaks of plague which afflicted North African countries during the second half of the eighteenth century. From 1750 to 1799 the country enjoyed almost half a century without the disease (75). The plague invasions of 1784-1789 witnessed by Tunisia and Algeria did not apparently reach beyond Tlemcen and Mascara (76). Yet, by the end of the century, the country experienced the most devastating epidemic since 1350.

Those who survived the epidemic called it "the big plague" (al-ṭā'ūn al-kabīr) in order to distinguish it from other less important disorders (77). The extent of ravages was far greater than that of the last plague of 1750. A simple indication of its effect is that the number of dead at Fès reached a maximum of 300 per day during the 1750 outbreak whereas in 1799 the number was eight times as much— 2,500 according to Moroccan contemporary estimates (78).

What was the nature of the epidemic? Was it really the plague or another disorder among the frequent calamities which ravaged societies at that time? Contemporary witnesses, both Moroccan and foreign, leave no doubt that the disease in question was the bubonic plague. The

(75) Al-Qādirī, Hawliyāt, p.74.

(76) L. Valensi, Le Maghreb avant la prise d'Alger, Paris, 1969, p.21.

(77) Al-Ibtisām, p.7; 'Abd al-Kabīr b. al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat al-muḥsinīn, p.343.

(78) Al-Ibtisām, p.7; al-Qādirī, Hawliyāt, p.74; al-Du'ayf, p.144.

description given by al-Ruhūnī (d.1815), one of the most eminent ‘ālim-s of the Sulaymāni period, was most explicit. It was "a very painful tumor accompanied by high temperature, shivering and vomiting" (79). These symptoms coincide perfectly with the definition of the bubonic plague given by Encyclopaedia Britannica (80). Contemporary Moroccan sources are also specific about the terminology used. We are dealing with ṭā‘ūn and not just wabā’ (81).

The plague, already present in Algeria in 1798, penetrated the country from the east. Mawlāy Sulaymān refused to comply with quarantine regulations set by the European consuls at Tangier (82) and considered any preventive measures to be a great sin (83). The bad harvests of 1798 had prepared the way for the epidemic. In August 1798 the British consul general noted that "the crops had entirely failed" (84). The crops in 1799 were more promising but were partly destroyed by locusts. "In the course of twenty four hours", noted Matra, "they left not the least appearance of verdure on the face of the country" (85). It was precisely in the spring of 1799, during the bridging months of the agricultural year, when the individual is at his most vulnerable to epidemics, that the plague took hold on the country.

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(79) Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Ruhūnī, Jawāb fī al-ṭā‘ūn, Ms.D.2251, BGR, p.4.

(80) Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1958, pp. 992-996.

(81) Cf. al-Ibtisām, p.7; ‘Abd al-Salām b. Sulaymān al-Fishtālī, Ṭaqyīd, Ms.D.283, BGR, fol.125. The term wabā’ is general and used to cover a wide range of ill-defined diseases (cholera, malignant fever, etc) which attacked populations on a large scale.

(82) European consuls constituted from 1792 a kind of health council to supervise quarantine regulations which, for religious considerations, the Makhzen was never ready to carry out by itself.

(83) F.O.52/11, 26 April, 1799.

(84) F.O.52/11, Tangier, 15 Aug., 1798.

(85) F.O.52/11, Gibraltar, 21 May, 1799.

Before it appeared in the vicinity of Fès, the plague had already been reported in the Rif; but it was at Fès and its surroundings that the epidemic firmly entrenched itself during the month of April 1799 (86). The movement of royal troops under Mawlāy Sulaymān towards Rabat and the southward hastened the spread of the disease. After having completed the pacification of the country, the Sultan decided to visit Safi and Abda in April 1799. He wanted, in particular, to receive the allegiance of 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Nāṣir whose submission still remained uncertain (87). In this southward tour, Mawlāy Sulaymān was accompanied by a large corps of 'Abīd and Oudaya who were already affected by the plague. "Everyday a certain number among the army died from the plague" (88). In this southward expedition Mawlāy Sulaymān "was dragging behind him two armies : the troops and the epidemic", wrote al-Ḍu'ayf (89). The British consul also noted that Mawlāy Sulaymān had carried the disease with him from Fès to Rabat and the coastal plains (90).

There is no doubt that the Sultan's movement across the southern Atlantic plains was responsible for the quick spread of the plague during a season which was particularly favourable to the extension of the malady. "There was no sign of the epidemic in the Doukkala, Abda, Ahmar and elsewhere until the royal army entered these places", added

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(86) For both al-Zayānī and the author of *al-Ibtisām*, the plague made its appearance in 1212 AH/1797-1798 AD. All the evidence drawn from British and French archives as well as from Moroccan contemporary sources proves that the epidemic reached Fès in the spring of 1799. Cf. al-Ḍu'ayf, p.399; 'Abd al-Salām b. Sulaymān al-Fishtālī, *Ṭaḡyīd*, fol.125; al-Zayānī, *al-Rawḍa*, fol.181; *al-Ibtisām*, p.7; F.O.52/11, 15 March, 1799; CCC, vol.22, fol.54-55.

(87) Al-Ḍu'ayf, p.403.

(88) Al-Ḍu'ayf, p.402.

(89) *Ibid.*

(90) F.O.52/11, 6 Aug., 1799. On the responsibility of the sultanian expedition in carrying the disease southward, cf. also F.O. 52/11, 21 May, 1799.

al-Ḍuʿayf (91). Commenting on Mawlāy Sulaymān's untimely expedition, al-Fishtālī noted that "his movement had no reason or justification whatsoever" (92).

The plague made its major ravages between April and July, reaching its apex at Fès and Marrakech during the spring of 1799. According to Moroccan contemporary sources, the number of victims at Fès reached as much as 1,000 per day. "At one time", wrote al-Fishtālī, "people used to bury more than one thousand a day" (93). The author of al-Ibtisām mentioned the figure of 2,500 per day (94). Whatever the exact figure is, it is clear that the losses were considerable. At Marrakech, daily losses reached as much as 1,800 according to French consular sources (95). By September, the British consul general reported that "not one human creature ... is left in Morocco (Marrakech) and the whole face of the country to the summits of the Atlas mountains is covered with dead bodies" (96).

During the months of August and September 1799, the epidemic witnessed a general regression. At the end of the summer, it was even believed to have ended. However, it was "just a temporary calm occasioned by the decrease in population and the heat" (97). By October, the malady reappeared again in the central and southern provinces but the mortality rate was very low.

The northern part of the country was not seriously affected until the spring of 1800. In Tétouan, the plague did not appear before February 1800 (Ramaḍān 1214 AH) according to local sources (98). In March, the number

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(91) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.402.

(92) Al-Fishtālī, fol.125.

(93) Ibid.

(94) Al-Ibtisām, p.7.

(95) J. Caillé, "Le vice-consul Broussonet et ses mémoires sur le Maroc", in Hesperis-Tamuda, II, 1961, p.16.

(96) F.O.52/11, 13 Sept., 1799.

(97) F.O.52/11, Safi, 25 Aug., 1799.

(98) Dāwūd, III, p.234.

of victims rose to 20 per day, reaching the record figure of 130-150 per day in April (99). In two months, the town lost, according to contemporary Tétouani sources, 8,000 souls (100). At Tangier where the population was less important, the maximum number of dead does not seem to have exceeded 30 per day (101). The number of victims diminished steadily during the summer of 1800 and, by the end of the year, the country was entirely free from the disease.

## (2) Social and Political Consequences

The Great Plague of 1799-1800 had important social , economic and political consequences. The first major consequence was obviously demographic. Between one fourth and one half of the population perished during this epidemic according to British and French consular estimates (102). Moroccan sources, usually silent about such estimations, convey the impression of a sweeping calamity which "almost led to annihilation" (103). Among the indicators of the heavy losses that had been incurred during the plague was the inability of the rural population to ensure the gathering of the 1799 harvest or to attend to agricultural activities in 1800. "The crop was abundant", noted al-Fishtālī in 1799, "but impossible to gather in, so few were the survivors" (104).

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(99) F.O.52/11, 29 July, 1800.

(100) Dāwūd, III, p.234.

(101) F.O.52/11, 29 July, 1800.

(102) British consular services estimated the loss at half the population (C.O.91/41, Gibraltar, 14 Dec., 1800). Jackson believed the epidemic to have carried away between one third and half the population (An Account of the Empire, p. 171). The French vice-consul at Essaouira assessed the losses at one fourth or one third (Thomassy, Des relations, p. 262).

(103) Al-Fishtālī, fols.125-126.

(104) Ibid.

Losses among the urban population were generally more important. Towns lost between half and two thirds of their population (105). In Fès, the most populous city of Morocco, many houses were emptied (106). James Curtis who visited the city in 1801 reported that 15,000 people perished in one single street in which only thirty individuals were left (107). Among the victims were thousands of artisans, merchants and men of learning.

However, the demographic losses of the Great Plague seem to have been compensated by a rapid population growth after 1800. The agricultural prosperity which characterized the first decade of the nineteenth century, aided by the absence of epidemics and a high birth rate, tended to attenuate these losses (108).

The Great Plague was also responsible—partly at least—in determining the Makhzen's fate during the early decades of the nineteenth century. Politically, the Great Plague favoured Mawlāy Sulaymān's efforts at pacification by weakening the remaining rebellious tribes of Abda and Doukkala. Heavily depopulated and deprived of their maritime trade after the departure of many European merchants and the interruption of communications imposed by the epidemic, these coastal provinces could no longer hope to maintain their independence (109).

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(105) Rabat lost, according to Broussonet, about 20 of its 30,000 inhabitants. Cf. H.P.J. Renaud, "La peste de 1799" - *Hespéris*, T.1, 1921, p.162. Ksar el-Kebir lost 10 out of its 20,000 inhabitants. Cf. Curtis, *A Journal*, p.36. Jackson gives the following figures for the main towns: Fès, 65,000; Marrakech, 50,000; Essaouira, 4,500 and Safi, 5,000 (*An Account of the Empire*, p.174). Tétouan lost in two months only about 8,000 souls according to Tétouani sources quoted by Dāwūd, III, p.234.

(106) Al-Fishtālī, fol.125.

(107) Curtis, *A Journal*, p.83.

(108) Cf. above chapter III, pp. 98-99.

(109) F.O.52/11, 13 Sept., 1799.



By weakening the southern coastal provinces, it rendered any significant tribal upheaval impossible. The plague also took away most of his former opponents. His two brothers, Mawlāy Hishām and Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn, who, for six years had contested his power south of the Oum er-Rbia river, died in the epidemic. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Nāṣir and al-Hāshimī b. al-‘Arūsī, qā’id-s of Abda and Doukkala, also perished from the plague. "Mawlāy Sulaymān is now in perfect control of the country", wrote Matra after the plague ended, "the coastal provinces are so depopulated that no insurrection of consequence is possible" (110).

The Great Plague also helped to solve the Makhzen's immediate financial problems. The succession of Mawlāy Sulaymān to the inheritances of deceased persons (munqati‘ūn) assured him of important revenues and allowed him, according to Jackson, to gain "an incalculable accession to wealth" (111). From the province of Sous alone, the inheritance was so considerable that Makhzen officials were incapable of collecting all of it (112). This unexpected source of revenue allowed Mawlāy Sulaymān to dispense with the returns of maritime trade and encouraged him to put restrictions on commercial relations with Europe.

On the other hand, the plague helped to weaken the Makhzen. The administrative apparatus, in particular, was greatly eroded by the death of many competent officials and princes who had acquired previously an administrative experience under the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad. After the death of Ibn ‘Uthmān and Mawlāy al-Ṭayyib in 1799, Mawlāy Sulaymān could hardly find a person to take charge of foreign affairs.

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(110) F.O. 52/11, 23 Jan., 1801.

(111) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.169; under Islamic law the property of persons who die without heirs passes to the bayt al-māl (State treasury).

(112) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.181.

Mawlāy Sulaymān also lost in the Great Plague some of his best supporters among the ‘ālim-s. Eminent scholars such as Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām al-Fāsī, ‘Alī b. Awīs al-Ḥuṣaynī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Bannīs, Muḥammad b. Mas‘ūd al-Ṭrunbāṭī and others who supported his bay‘a in 1792 and had served as his teachers died in the epidemic (113). Al-Du‘ayf, who was a student at Fès in 1799, noted the the devastating effects of the plague on the world of learning. "Most ‘ālim-s from Fès and Mēknēs died" he wrote (114). The passing away of many scholars of the old generation paved the way for important changes among the ‘ālim-s during the first two decades of the nineteenth century (115).

#### C - A Precarious Truce (1800-1811)

Natural calamities played an important role in furthering tribal instability. This is particularly true of epidemics which, by affecting coastal areas more than Saharan or mountainous regions, created favourable conditions for the movement of tribes (116). Indeed, Saharan and mountainous regions in Morocco always tended to constitute an eternal "réservoir humain" from which the western Atlantic plains were constantly supplied with population reinforcements. For Saharan tribes, the plague was referred to as "al-khayr" (the good), most probably because it allowed them to move to more fertile

(113) Cf. the names of some of these in Ja‘far b. Idrīs al-Kattānī, al-Shurb al-muḥtaḍar, lith., Fès, 1891, part I, pp. 4-6.

(114) Al-Du‘ayf, p. 401.

(115) Cf. evolution of the corps of the ‘ālim-s under Mawlāy Sulaymān in chapter VI below.

(116) J.N. Biraben and Le Goff, "La peste du haut Moyen Age", in Annales Economie Sociétés, Civilisations, 6, Nov.-Dec., 1969, p. 1488; B. Rosenberger and H. Triki, "Famines et épidémies", Hespéris-Tamuda, XV, pp. 40-41.

Saharan regions are less affected by plague epidemics because of dry and hot weather which impedes the survival of the flea, the main transmission agent. The plague bacillus itself is not very resistant to heat. The extreme cold and the low degree of humidity in mountainous areas also stop the reproduction of the flea. Moreover, the inhabitants of desertic and mountainous regions are less exposed to contagion because of the relative isolation and inaccessibility of human agglomerations.

lands (117). Jackson reported that after the Great Plague of 1799-1800 many tribes from the Saharan fringes emigrated and "took possession of the country contiguous to the river Draha, as well as many districts in Suse" (118).

Epidemics should be regarded, therefore, as a crucial factor in the perpetuation of nomadic life and the disruption of the tribal status quo. In fact, one of the major aspects of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign was the growing pressure by the mountain Berbers of the Middle Atlas on their lowland neighbours (119).

#### (1) The End of the Makhzen-Berber Alliance

Under the 'Alawid dynasty, the Makhzen's Berber policy has always been based on a distinction between the unruly mountain Berbers (Barābir al-jabal) and the lowland Berbers (Barābir lūṭā) who tended to serve as strategic allies of the central government.

The predominant group among the mountain Berbers was the powerful Aīt Oumalou confederation. These "people of the shade" included Berber dwellers of the northern slopes of the Middle Atlas as compared to "the people of the sun", such as the Saharan Aīt Atta. Geographically, they covered the territory extending from Azrou to the Assif Melloul river south of Wādī el Abid (120).

(117) Al-Mashrafī, Kunnāsha, p.103; Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p. 106.

(118) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp. 175-176.

(119) Early in 1800, when the plague was coming to an end in the central and southern regions, "people began talking about Amhāwish who wanted to lead a Berber rising" (al-Ḍu'ayf, p.407). In May 1800 Mawlāy Sulaymān suffered a major defeat in his first confrontation with the mountain Berbers.

(120) The composition of the Aīt Oumalou, like that of other tribal groupings, has always been subject to change. By the end of the seventeenth century they included the Beni Mguild, Ichkern, Aīt Haddidou, Aīt Isehak and Aīt Lahsen (cf. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Fāsī, al-Uqnūm, p.526). At the beginning of the nineteenth century al-

Owing to the inaccessibility of their territory and their pastoral mode of life which induced them to make incursions on the more inviting grazing lands of the "Makhzen Berbers", relations between the Aīt Oumalou and the central government were usually tense. Mountain Berbers often rejected the jurisdiction of Makhzen qā'id-s chosen most of the time among lowland Berbers—and proved to be very reluctant in the paying of taxes to the bayt-al-māl.

The weakness of Makhzen authority among mountain Berbers opened the way for the rise of maraboutic figures whose religious charisma ensured them a wide popularity. Since the eighteenth century this role was filled by the Amhāwish family from the Aīt Sokhman.

The ascendancy of this family was initially based on a religious affiliation to the Nāširi ṭarīqa. 'Alī U-Ḥsāyin Amhāwish was a disciple of Aḥmad al-Khalīfa (d.1717), second shaykh of the Nāširiya religious order. His son, Muḥammad Ū-Nāšir—thus surnamed in glorification of the founder of the ṭarīqa—gained a reputation of sainthood, whence his immense prestige among mountain Berbers(121). Abū Bakr, the elder son of Muḥammad Ū-Nāšir, inherited the charismatic qualities of the Amhāwish and continued to lead Berber opposition to the Makhzen. In 1800, he led mountain Berbers in his first encounter with Mawlāy

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... Zayānī mentioned as components of the Aīt Oumalou the following groups: Zaiān , Ichkern, Beni Mguild, Aīt Isehak, Aīt Ihannd and Aīt Lahsen (al-Rawḍa, fol.207). By early twentieth century, the Beni Mguild had broken away from the Aīt Oumalou (Drague, Esquisse, pp.147-148, note 15). On the other hand, the Aīt Seri and the Aīt Sokhman—who according to al-Zayānī belonged to another confederation— seem to have joined the Aīt Oumalou during the nineteenth century.

(121) According to al-Zayānī this prestige was based on his prophetic inspiration in which "he might have been assisted by some demon" (al-Rawḍa, fol.208).

Sulaymān's armies. Despite a two front attack (Tafilelt and Tadla), Abū Bakr Amhāwish gained a crushing victory over Makhzen forces. Later military successes (1811 and 1819) added to his prestige and made of him the most irreducible enemy of the 'Alawid dynasty.

To bring mountain Berbers to submission or to keep off their incursions, the Makhzen found it necessary to rely on their lowland consanguineous brothers. Indeed, ever since the death of Mawlāy Ismā'īl in 1727, lowland Berbers had increasingly intervened in the political life of the country. For the 'Alawid sultans who succeeded to Mawlāy Ismā'īl, the Aīt Idrassen, Guerouane and Zemmour represented a useful support which not only balanced the power of an often insubordinate professional army, but also served as an important tool in containing the unruly mountain Berbers. These Berber groupings of the lowlands were also used by the Makhzen to control each other, this tactic being a general principle of Makhzen tribal policy.

Among the lowland Berbers the Aīt Idrassen were by the end of the eighteenth century the most important military force of central Morocco. According to al-Ḍu'ayf, "they owned more money, cattle, horses and equipment than any other tribe, being the most powerful and the most numerous" (122). This enabled them to become the incontestable leaders among the lowland Berbers.

When the succession contest between the various sons of Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh began in 1792, the Aīt Idrassen were in a position to play a leading role in this dynastic crisis. The Oudaya army had been greatly

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(122) Al-Ḍu'ayf, p. 421. Originally the Aīt Idrassen were located in the upper Moulouya valley. With time, they changed both in their emplacement and their components. At the end of the seventeenth century the confederation included according to 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Fāsi: Aīt Youssi, Beni Mtir, Beni Hammad, Aīt Sadden, Aīt Ouallan and Aīt Ayache (al-Uḡnūm, p. 525). At the beginning of the nineteenth century it started to disintegrate. Apart from its nucleus, the Beni Mtir, it included Aīt Ouallan, Aīt Sadden and Mejjate (al-Ḍu'ayf, p. 448).

weakened by Sīdī Muḥammad and the 'Abīd had, to a large extent, disintegrated as a result of Mawlāy al-Yazīd's financial difficulties. At the latter's death, the Oudaya consisted of no more than a few hundred men, while the 'Abīd amounted to less than two thousand men (123). Under these circumstances, the Aīt Idrassen, led by Muḥammad Wa'zīz of the Beni Mtir, served as the main military support of Mawlāy Sulaymān.

We have already seen how instrumental Muḥammad Wa'zīz had been in the bay'ā of Mawlāy Sulaymān in March 1792. Later on, when the 'Abīd threatened to join Mawlāy Maslama, the Aīt Idrassen proved to be an essential deterrent force which frustrated destabilization attempts by 'Abīd officers. More important was the role played by the Aīt Idrassen in the pacification of the country from 1792 to 1798. The submission of provinces north of the Oum er-Rbia river was mainly their achievement. During the pacification period, Berber contingents headed by Muḥammad Wa'zīz and Ibn Nāṣir al-Mṭīrī, were to be found among all major military expeditions. Ibn Nāṣir al-Mṭīrī who assumed the leadership of his tribesmen after 1794, was the effective commander-in-chief of Mawlāy Sulaymān's forces whether in the Jbala or in the coastal plains (124). The Sultan himself had a great respect for Ibn Nāṣir al-Mṭīrī and made of him one of his closest advisors. He was not only entrusted with the military operations, but also with the task of reorganizing the army (125). The Berber leader became so essential that he supervised even the appointment of Makhzen qā'id-s (126).

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(123) Al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.15; al-Ḍu'ayf, p.273.

(124) Al-Ḍu'ayf, pp.313,316,333, 338-339. In 1795 Ibn Nāṣir al-Mṭīrī succeeded in ending the siege of Tétouan by Mawlāy Maslama and in May 1797 he participated actively in the military operations against the Chaouia which led to the submission of this province.

(125) In 1796 Ibn Nāṣir al-Mṭīrī supervised the recruitment of Cheraga and Oulad Jama tribes and their incorporation into the Makhzen jaysh (al-Ḍu'ayf, p.319) as well as the purchase of horses for their equipment (al-Ḍu'ayf, p.335).

(126) Al-Ḍu'ayf, p.322.

Ibn Nāṣir al-Mṭīrī succeeded in becoming—to use al-Ḍuʿayf's terms—"the pillar of Mawlāy Sulaymān's State" (127).

However, with the end of the pacification, a number of factors contributed to undermine the entente which existed between Mawlāy Sulaymān and his Berber allies. First, there was the completion of the pacification itself which lessened the Makhzen dependence on Berber military support. Secondly, Mawlāy Sulaymān succeeded by 1798 in diversifying his military force. During the first six years of his reign he reorganized the ʿAbīd army and, to check its arrogance, reinforced the Oudaya cavalry with new recruits (128). He also strengthened his military potential with the incorporation into his jaysh of new tribes, namely the Cheraga, Oulad Jama and Beni Hsen (129). The extension of military organization to these tribes greatly enhanced the Arab character of Mawlāy Sulaymān's army and, above all, tended to involve him in the tribal antagonism which opposed some of the Arab tribes to lowland Berbers.

Indeed, by 1798 Mawlāy Sulaymān inaugurated a new tribal policy which openly favoured the Beni Hsen. Following his decision to incorporate them into his jaysh, they tended to become the Makhzen's main military support outside the regular army (130). This development was not to be viewed favourably by the Zemmour who were locked up in a long standing struggle with the Beni Hsen over the coastal plains of the Azghār. Mawlāy Sulaymān further contributed to the deterioration of his relations with the lowland Berbers when in September 1798 he incited his new Arab allies to drive away the Zemmour from lands

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(127) Ibid., p.316.

(128) Cf. army organization in Chapter II, pp. 85-92.

(129) Al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.318-319, 387.

(130) Ibid., p.387.

that he considered as belonging to the former (131). By doing so, the Sultan stirred up tribal antagonisms and favoured the crystallization of Arab and Berber loyalties (132). Voluntarily or not, Mawlāy Sulaymān had placed himself in an intricate and delicate situation.

Finally, relations between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the lowland Berbers deteriorated because of internal developments inherent to the Aīt Idrassen themselves. The transfer of Aīt Idrassen leadership to a new generation of young leaders following the death of Ibn Nāṣir al-Mṭīrī (1798-1799) was full of implications for the future of these relations. The fact that the sons of Muḥammad Waʿzīz and their cousins, the sons of Ibn Nāṣir, competed for the leadership of the confederation greatly weakened the credibility of the traditional leadership of the Beni Mtir among other segments of lowland Berbers. Mawlāy Sulaymān found it increasingly difficult to control the young Aīt Idrassen leadership which was disputed between Muḥammad b. Muḥammad Waʿzīz and Abū ʿAzza b. Nāṣir (133). Muḥammad Waʿzīz junior was more inclined to cooperate with the Makhzen while Abū ʿAzza tended to represent a hard line trend within the Beni Mtir (134). These internal cleavages within the Aīt Idrassen after 1800 turned the confederation towards open confrontation with both the Makhzen and its lowland neighbours.

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(131) *Ibid.*, p.393.

(132) *Ibid.* Al-Ḍuʿayf mentioned that in 1798 all Arab tribes of the Azghār sided with the Beni Hsen, while all Berbers manifested their sympathy for the Zemmour.

(133) Muḥammad Waʿzīz who died in 1794 left three sons among whom Muḥammad who served as Mawlāy Sulaymān's *qā'id* for Fès from 1807 to 1810. For the sake of simplicity, we shall refer to the son as Muḥammad Waʿzīz. The reader will know that we are dealing with the father for events preceding 1794, and with the son for those after this date.

(134) Mawlāy Sulaymān was on bad terms with Abū ʿAzza b. Nāṣir whom he held under surveillance at Fès until he escaped in 1802. Cf. al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.378-379; F.O.52/12, 15 April, 1802.



The most important consequence of these changes was the rapid disintegration of the lowland Berber front and the increased pressure of the Aīt Oumalou on the Makhzen and its traditional allies. This became particularly true after the major defeat suffered by Makhzenian troops in May 1800 in their first encounter with the Aīt Oumalou since Mawlāy Sulaymān's accession to the throne. The military incapacity of the Makhzen and the absence of a united lowland Berber front induced some segments of the latter to seek the more reassuring alliance of the mountain Berbers. This was the case of the Aīt Youssi who traditionally belonged to the Aīt Idrassen confederation and, to a lesser extent, of the Guerouane.

During the first decade of the nineteenth century the military potential of the lowland Berbers was progressively eroded under the joint action of the Makhzen and the Aīt Oumalou. In April 1802, Mawlāy Sulaymān inflicted a major defeat on the Beni Mtir and allowed the Guerouane, their rival neighbours, to take possession of their lands (135). In October 1807, the Guerouane were assaulted by both lowland and highland Berbers at the instigation of Mawlāy Sulaymān, after which they were transferred to the country between Meknès and Sefrou (136).

Nevertheless, Mawlāy Sulaymān did not sever all relations with the traditional Berber allies of the Makhzen. Muḥammad Waʿzīz continued to be Makhzen qāʿid over his tribesmen and, from 1807 to 1810, he also filled the functions of governor of Fès (137). The Guerouane were also—though for a brief period—incorporated into the Makhzen army after their defeat in 1807.

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(135) Al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.419-421.

(136) Ibid., p.448.

(137) Al-Zayānī, Jamharat man ḥakama bi Fās, Ms.2348, R.L., p.7.

However, Mawlāy Sulaymān lacked a coherent Berber policy which would have strengthened his lowland allies and guaranteed their support for the Makhzen. His playing off of lowland Berber tribes against each other proved to be harmful to his strategic interests in the long run. By 1810, the Aīt Oumalou renewed their pressure on lowland Berbers and succeeded in rallying the Guerouane and the Aīt Youssi who became the docile allies of Abū Bakr Amhāwish. Relations between Mawlāy Sulaymān and Muḥammad Waʿzīz further deteriorated in 1810 when this latter was accused of intriguing with mountain Berbers. The Sultan revoked him in April 1810 and shortly afterwards put him in irons (138). When Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to lead a military expedition against the Aīt Oumalou in April 1811, the lowland Berbers had never been so divided in their loyalties.

The Battle of Azrou was hardly a military success for Mawlāy Sulaymān. The Sultan's armies were thrown into confusion during the first day of the battle (28 April, 1811) but the intervention of the Aīt Immour and the Aīt Idrassen the following day saved them from complete destruction (139). Despite their differences with Mawlāy Sulaymān, the Aīt Idrassen were not ready to accept a victory of the Aīt Oumalou. Thereafter, their support to Mawlāy Sulaymān was dictated more by an instinct of preservation than by their sympathy for the Makhzen.

## (2) The Pacification of the Peripheral Zones

Despite the steady deterioration of Makhzen-Berber relations during this intermediary period, the country was prosperous and peaceful. The inheritances of the plague victims and agricultural abundance allowed Mawlāy Sulaymān

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(138) Al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.456, 462.

(139) Akansūs, p.296; al-Ḍuʿayf, p.465; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.117.

to easily overcome most of his political difficulties. With the unsubmitive Ait Oumalou there was no direct military confrontation between 1800 and 1811. The recurrent embroilments with lowland Berbers fitted into the traditional pattern of tribal unrest and were neutralized without much difficulty. Moreover, the restlessness of the lowland Berber zones remained essentially an intra-Berber affair and at no time was the Makhzen directly endangered. Mawlāy Sulaymān therefore directed his efforts to consolidate his rule and extend his authority to peripheral zones which, during the dynastic crisis, had either fallen under foreign rule or simply lost contact with centralized authority and remained autonomous.

In 1798, immediately after the submission of the southern rebel princes, Mawlāy Sulaymān organized a military expedition into the eastern Rif and Oujda on the Algerian border. Since 1792, these territories had been under the control of the Algerian Turks. Upon the proclamation of Mawlāy Sulaymān, the Bey of Mascara who, in 1792, succeeded in liberating Oran from Spanish occupation, crossed into Moroccan territory under the pretext of preparing the siege of Melilla. Later developments proved, however, that the siege of this fortress was but a cover for the territorial ambitions of the Bey of Mascara who withdrew to Algeria as soon as he had appointed his qā'id-s for the eastern provinces (140). Mawlāy Sulaymān's mehalla headed by the Oudaya chief, 'Ayyād, and by Ibn Khadda al-Sharqī, encountered no difficulty in recovering the eastern provinces from the Turks in May 1798 (141).

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(140) This eastern expedition was dispatched in Shawwāl, 1212 AH/March-April, 1798 AD and not in 1211 as mentioned by al-Zayānī. Cf. al-Du'ayf, p.380; al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.180.

(141) Al-Du'ayf, pp.380, 383.

Between 1800 and 1802, Mawlāy Sulaymān directed his attention to the southern and south-eastern provinces. The Touat oases in particular had been completely autonomous since Mawlāy Ismā'īl's death. A military presence in a distant territory such as the Touat was certainly out of the Makhzen's reach. All that Mawlāy Sulaymān could hope to establish there was a relationship of allegiance based on the granting of autonomy to the local populations (142). In 1800, the Sultan resumed contact with the districts of Touat. The populations agreed to pay their legal taxes to the bayt al-māl and obtained in return the right to appoint their own local officials (143). This measure guaranteed the extension of Makhzen authority southward and allowed the Sultan to increase his revenue at the same time.

In 1801-1802, Mawlāy Sulaymān organized two military expeditions with the view of pacifying the southern and south-eastern fringes. The first one was headed by the Sultan's kātib, Aḥmad Ashaghrās, and succeeded in pacifying the Dra valley between the Sous and the Tafielt. Following this tour, noted al-Zayānī, trade routes on the Saharan fringes were again open to caravans (144).

The second expedition was entrusted to the governor of Tafielt, Muḥammad al-Ṣarīdī, who pacified the Moulouya valley, the Ziz and Gheriss country and the upper Dra valley. Makhzen governors were appointed to all these places (145).

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(142) Cf. two letters from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Touat dated 23 Ṣafar, 1215 AH/ 16 July, 1800 and 28 Ṣafar, 1215 AH/21 July, 1800 n El-Outaiq, I, 1976, pp.443-449.

(143) Ibid.

(144) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.181.

(145) Ibid. For this expedition, al-Rawḍa gives the date of 1218 AH (1803-1804). Al-Zayānī committed the same error regarding the defeat of the Beni Mtir by Mawlāy Sulaymān and the cession of their lands to Guerouane and which took place in 1802 and not in 1803-1804 as mentioned in al-Rawḍa. Cf. al-Ḍu'ayf, p.421, al-Rawḍa, fol.181.

The political events which took place in Western Algeria in 1805 drew Mawlāy Sulaymān's attention to the necessity of consolidating Makhzen authority and rule on the eastern borders of his kingdom. During that year, an adept of the Darqāwiya religious order, 'Abd al-Qādir b. al-Sharīf, rebelled against the Bey of Oran and called upon the people of Tlemcen to proclaim the Sultan of Morocco. Mawlāy Sulaymān refused the bay'at presented to him by the people of Tlemcen and sent a Makhzen meħalla to assist the Turks in the re-establishment of their authority over the Tlemcen area (146). These events seem to have provided Mawlāy Sulaymān with the opportunity to strengthen his military presence in the eastern marches of the country with the aim of preventing any possible spread of Darqāwi agitation. Taking advantage of Algerian internal difficulties, the Sultan sent in 1806 his qā'id Aba'qīl al-Sūsī to inspect the eastern provinces and recover the oasis of Figuig which, since 1727, had remained virtually independent (147). However, Mawlāy Sulaymān proved his self-restraint when he chose not to aggrandize his eastern provinces at a time when his Turkish neighbours were in no state to oppose any resistance. Indeed, Mawlāy Sulaymān, who personally believed that Morocco extended eastward as far as the Tafna river, did nothing to alter the eastern borders of his kingdom (148).

Having secured his eastern provinces, the Sultan turned his attention to the south-western zones. In 1807, he headed an expedition which led him to Taroudant, Agadir, the zāwiya of Tazeroualt and Goulimine. During this tour

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(146) F.O.154/284, letter from al-Salāwī to Matra, 13 Jumādā I, 1220 AH/ 9 Aug., 1805. Mawlāy Sulaymān sent at the same time his brother Mawlāy Mūsā to Oujda to prevent the spread of Darqāwi agitation to Morocco (Ibid.).

(147) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fols.182-183.

(148) Muḥammad Abū Rās al-Mu'askarī, Fath al-Ilāh wa minnatuh, Ms.K.2332, BGR, p.103. The author reported that, while he was in Morocco, Mawlāy Sulaymān asked him about the eastern limits of Morocco. Abū Rās answered that, according to Ibn Khaldūn and the agreement concluded between the Turks and Mawlāy Ismā'īl, Oujda was Morocco's eastern boundary post. Mawlāy Sulaymān did not agree and remarked that Moroccan territory extended as far as the Tafna river between Oujda and Tlemcen.

in the far Sous, he appointed qā'id-s and qāḍī-s and arrested the autonomous ruler of Goulimine, 'Abd Allāh U-Sālim who owned a private black army of 1,500 men and commanded Saharan territories as far as al-Saqiya al-Ḥamra (149). On the same occasion, Mawlāy Sulaymān arrested his brother Mawlāy 'Abd al-Raḥmān who, ever since his father's death, had ruled independently over the Wādī Noun (150).

During the following year, Mawlāy Sulaymān led another tour through the Rif and penetrated deep into the mountains where no 'Alawid sultan had ever ventured before. Thus, he reduced the Nāṣiri zāwiya of Beni Touzine and subdued the tribes of Beni Ouriaquel, Beni Saïd and Temsaman (151).

At about the same time, he entered into diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain and Spain with a view to recovering the Spanish holdings on the Moroccan Mediterranean coast. However, the vicissitudes of European politics frustrated Mawlāy Sulaymān's hopes in this respect.

Nevertheless, during the first decade of the nineteenth century, Mawlāy Sulaymān succeeded in extending Makhzen authority to territories which had lost all contact with the central government. By recovering the Touat, Figuig, the far Sous and the Rif, he achieved what had proved to be unrealizable for many of his predecessors. However, these pacification efforts remained without lasting effect. In 1810, Makhzen rule in the Sous was again challenged by the zāwiya of Tazeroualt (152) and the Rif necessitated many other military campaigns. Following the

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(149) Al-Du'ayf, p.446.

(150) Ibid., p.447.

(151) Ibid., p.450.

(152) Ibid., p.459.

Battle of Azrou, Mawlāy Sulaymān's efforts were mainly directed to the pacification of the coastal plains which became the principal hotbed of agitation.

D - The Collapse of Makhzen Authority (1811-1822)

(1) The Unrest of the Coastal Plains

One of the consequences of the Battle of Azrou was the spread of tribal agitation to the coastal plains. After the military shortcomings of the Makhzen were unveiled, it became extremely difficult for Mawlāy Sulaymān's governors to impose respect for Makhzen authority.

Attempts by Mawlāy Sulaymān to introduce some administrative adjustments on the morrow of the battle only made things worse. Deeply disappointed by the military performance of his qā'id-s at Azrou (153), Mawlāy Sulaymān proceeded with the replacement of some of them, while he curtailed the administrative prerogatives of the others (154). At the end of 1811, he did the same in the coastal zones where a number of officials were replaced (155). The newly appointed governors, however, were unable to impose respect for order at a time when they lacked the necessary military backing.

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(153) Al-Ḍuʿayf reported that following the battle, Mawlāy Sulaymān "lost faith in all his governors" and insulted them publicly at Fès. Cf. p. 446.

(154) The governor for the Chaouia, for instance, was deprived of the governorship of Rabat, Salé and ʿArab al-Widyān. This must have been regarded by his tribesmen as a sultan's condemnation and encouraged therefore latent opposition among the various factions of the Chaouia to well up to the surface. Cf. al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.463-464.

(155) Ibid., p.480.

The economic situation also encouraged the spread of tribal unrest. In 1812 the southern provinces, in particular were seriously affected by a locust invasion and an insufficient rainfall. It was the first agricultural crisis since 1798. In the spring of 1813, wheat prices reached as much as 20 ūqiya-s at Essaouira (156). This not only affected the Makhzen's income based on agricultural revenues, but led also to the dissatisfaction of coastal tribesmen who found it difficult to honour their taxation obligations (157).

The destabilization which affected the Chaouia, the Doukkala and Abda became Mawlāy Sulaymān's main internal preoccupation between 1811 and 1815. The recall in July 1811 of the Chaouia governor, al-Ghāzī, who had been in office since the pacification of the Tamesna in 1797, was followed by an upsurge of tribal feuds which Mawlāy Sulaymān found hard to repress. Al-Ghāzī's successor failed in rallying the notables of the various segments of the Chaouia confederation to him and, in October 1811, the old governor was called back to his office. Owing to the backing of the Makhzen, al-Ghāzī succeeded in quelling tribal agitation in the Chaouia until he was finally recalled in 1815.

Further to the south, the Doukkala attacked their governor 'Umar Abū Sitta in February 1815 and freed all prisoners that were in his jails. The Abda and the

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(156) F.O.631/1, 16 May, 1813. In years of abundance, wheat cost between 2 and 3 ūqiya-s for the mudd.

(157) In 1812 Mawlāy Sulaymān acknowledged his financial difficulties which prevented him from ensuring a regular pay to the army. Cf. his letter to 'Abd al-Rahmān Ash'āsh, 2 Jumādā II, 1227/13 June, 1812 in DAR. Cf. also FO 174/20, 19 July, 1815.



neighbouring Chiadma also rebelled in 1815 against their governor, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Ṣādaq, and forced his resignation (158). "All the tribes of Morocco were in peace with the Sultan", wrote al-Ḍuʿayf in 1815, "excepting the Chaouia, Doukkala and Abda" (159).

Actually, by that time, insubordination had spread to other parts of the country, and even to the army. In the Rif, tribes engaged in the illicit export of wheat. In the Tafilelt, the Aīt Atta Berbers resumed their expansionist drive in the Ziz valley (160). The ʿAbīd army showed signs of disaffection and the Oudaya refused to obey the Sultan's orders (161).

Towns were no exception to this generalized insubordination. In the summer of 1815 the artisans of Rabat threatened to kill their qāʾid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAshʿāsh (162) and in December of the same year the people of Tétouan rejected the nomination of ʿAshʿāsh as governor of their town (163). On the eve of the catastrophic Zaīan defeat, Mawlāy Sulaymān was assailed from all sides.

## (2) The Mountain Berber Threat

Between 1811 and 1819, Makhzen-Berber relations were characterized by three main developments. First, there was the accentuated weakening of lowland Berbers and particularly the Aīt Idrassen confederation which was, until the beginning of the nineteenth century, the most powerful component among lowland Berbers.

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(158) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.190; F.O.631/1, 2 June, 1815; cf. also letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to ʿUmar Abū Sitta dated 23 Rajab, 1230/1st July, 1815 in Mic.4, H.P.M.D., 1978. (appendix 69).

(159) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.525.

(160) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.70; al-Ḍuʿayf, p.527.

(161) F.O.174/1, 6 Sept., 1815; al-Ḍuʿayf, p.531.

(162) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.522.

(163) *Ibid.*, p.528.

Secondly, the leadership of lowland Berbers was no longer controlled by Aīt Idrassen after 1814, but passed into the hands of the Zemmour leader, Muḥammad b. āl-Ghāzī.

The third development was the implantation of the Darqāwi ṭarīqa among the Fazāz Berbers and its role in widening the gap between these and the Makhzen.

On the morrow of the Battle of Azrou Mawlāy Sulaymān adopted an openly hostile policy to all Berbers whom he held collectively responsible for his military disappointment. The policy he adopted after April 1811 was clearly one of revenge. It was particularly manifested in his political alignment with the Beni Hsen whom he attempted to set up against their Berber neighbours. In October 1813 he renewed his appeal to the Beni Hsen to expel the Zemmour from what he considered as the former's lands (164). At the beginning of 1814 he called again on the Beni Hsen to attack the Zaīan Berbers (165). Such a policy necessarily gave a racial dimension to the Makhzen-Berber conflict and encouraged Fazāz Berbers to make common cause.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's policy during the second decade of the nineteenth century was also based on weakening the lowland Berbers by refusing to assist the traditional allies of the Makhzen in resisting Aīt Oumalou military pressure. The Aīt Idrassen were the first to suffer from this policy of abandonment. Without Makhzen support they proved to be unable to resist the Aīt Oumalou and their Guerouane and Aīt Youssi allies.

The most significant event in this respect was the major confrontation of April 1814 between Abū Bakr Amhāwish and Muḥammad Waʿzīz to which official historiography makes

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(164) Ibid., pp.501-502.

(165) Ibid., pp.502-503.

no reference. During an attempt to prevent Abū Bakr Amhāwish from attacking Meknès, Muḥammad Waʿzīz was overwhelmed by the military might of the Aīt Oumalou (166). In this confrontation, the Beni Mtir leader was assisted by Aīt Immour and part of the Zemmour whose loyalties were divided between their Idrassen neighbours and the menacing Aīt Oumalou (167). The Makhzen, though directly concerned with the outcome of this battle, preferred not to intervene. Muḥammad al-Sālāwī, who was then at Meknès, contented himself with dispatching an 'Abīd patrol to follow the developments in the struggle (168). The Zemmour abandoned the battlefield and Aīt Idrassen were left on their own. The battle ended with a crushing victory of the Aīt Oumalou and the death of Muḥammad Waʿzīz.

The consequences of this decisive battle were far-reaching for Makhzen-Berber relations. With the weakening of the Aīt Idrassen, lowland Berbers could no longer resist Aīt Oumalou pressure and, consequently, the way was open for a direct confrontation between the Makhzen and the mountain Berbers.

The defeat of the Aīt Idrassen had other repercussions on Berber politics. It dangerously upset the balance in favour of the mountain Berbers whose influence among their lowland neighbours became increasingly important at a time when the Makhzen had chosen to abandon its strategic allies.

Relations among lowland Berbers were also upset by this defeat. The Zemmour emerged as the most powerful confederation, a position which they were to hold for the rest of the nineteenth century. Muḥammad b. al-Ghāzī became the

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(166) Ibid., p.506.

(167) Ibid., p.507.

(168) Ibid.

uncontested leader of the lowland Berbers. After the death of Muḥammad Waʿzīz, Ibn al-Ghāzī was appointed qāʿid not only for his tribesmen but for all Fazāz Berbers (169). He was to play a leading role in the Fès rebellion of 1820 and even hoped to serve as the main advisor of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm when this one was proclaimed in November 1820 (170). The special treatment reserved by Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (1822-1859) upon his accession to the throne for the Zemmour leader attested to Ibn al-Ghāzī's importance among lowland Berbers (171).

However, the importance acquired by the Zemmour during the second decade of the nineteenth century cannot be explained solely in terms of military superiority. The implantation of the Darqāwi ṭarīqa among the Fazāz Berbers (172) was another factor which contributed to Berber politics during this period. The Darqāwi ṭarīqa, which was based on austerity and rejection of all forms of luxury, adapted to the rural mode of life more than any other Sufi doctrine. The new ṭarīqa rapidly succeeded in extending its influence to the countryside and particularly to Berber zones. Muḥammad b. al-Ghāzī was "one of the most intimate adepts of Mawlāy al-ʿArbī al-Darqāwī" (173). Abū Bakr Amhāwish, though never formally a member of the ṭarīqa, nevertheless sympathized with the teachings of Mawlāy al-ʿArbī. The sharifdom and ascetism of the Darqāwi shaykh made him highly respectable in the eyes of Amhāwish who claimed Idrisid sharifdom himself (174).

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(169) Al-Zayānī, Tārīkh al-wilāya, p.3.

(170) Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahāʿ, pp.194-196. According to Akansūs, Ibn al-Ghāzī was by then "the most influential among Berbers" (al-Jaysh, p.315).

(171) Al-Nāṣirī, IX, p.7.

(172) Cf. below chapter VI, p. 338.

(173) Akansūs, p.330.

(174) Apparently, Abū Bakr Amhāwish did not abandon the Nāṣiri ṭarīqa to become a Darqāwi. His successors, however, joined the Darqāwi ṭarīqa cf. Drague, pp. 152-153.

Undoubtedly, the implantation of the Darqāwi religious order among Fazāz Berbers contributed to ease friction between lowland and highland Berbers and paved the way for the crystallization of a united Berber front under the leadership of Abū Bakr Amhāwish. This was particularly the case following the Battle of Zaīan (May 1819) which greatly enhanced the prestige of the Amhāwish among all Berbers (175). In 1820 Abū Bakr Amhāwish joined his efforts to those of religious and traditionalist forces to hasten the downfall of Mawlāy Sulaymān.

## II - Foreign Preoccupations

Morocco's relations with the international environment between 1792 and 1822 were largely determined by the tension which characterized the political situation in Europe. Mawlāy Sulaymān acceded to the throne just at a time when the French Revolution was leading Europe towards generalized war. By virtue of its position on the southern shores of the Straits of Gibraltar, Morocco acquired an additional importance during the Napoleonic wars. Throughout the long series of wars, Mawlāy Sulaymān attempted by all means to keep the country out of the European conflict. He progressively dismantled the Moroccan navy to reduce the risks of confrontation with the Christian powers and avoided taking sides in the war which opposed the two European blocks. His endeavours to observe a strict neutrality were, however, made arduous by the fact that Morocco itself was, for a time, threatened by Napoleonic expansionism.

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(175) The Battle of Zaīan and its consequences will be discussed in chapter VII below.

### A- An Impossible Jihād

The peaceful relations Mawlāy Sulaymān entertained with Europe from 1792 to 1822 would not have been possible without the curtailing of the corsair activity on the part of Morocco. Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh had already succeeded in controlling it by making the fleet State property. Mawlāy Sulaymān liquidated the Moroccan navy altogether when it became apparent that the country lacked both the necessary means to match the technological superiority of Christian countries and the concerted expansionism which Europe embarked upon after 1815.

#### (1) The Technological Gap

Despite efforts made by Sīdī Muḥammad to build up a strong navy during the second half of the eighteenth century, the superiority of European navies remained unchallenged. This had been particularly evident during the siege of Melilla in 1771 when Sīdī Muḥammad declined to fight the Spanish at sea (176). Conscious of the deficiency, he made the navy one of his major preoccupations. Before he died, his naval force consisted of about sixty vessels and 4,000 seamen (177).

His successors were too busy with internal difficulties to pay attention to the maintenance of the navy. The seamen, one fourth of whom were recruited in the Ottoman regencies, were disbanded after 1790 (178) while the vessels were abandoned to the inclemency of weather. During the first two years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign, noted Matra in 1794, vessels had been exposed to rain and sun without maintenance (179).

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(176) Al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.40-41.

(177) Al-Zayānī, ʿIqd al-jumān, Ms.G.40, BGR, p.15; Lemprière, Voyage, p.210.

(178) Al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna al-kubrā, p.165.

(179) F.O.52/10, 26 June, 1794.

It was only at the end of 1793 when he realized the importance of the navy in subduing the coastal provinces that Mawlāy Sulaymān directed his efforts to the refitting of his naval vessels. In October 1793 he intimated to the European consuls his intention of blockading the port of Dār al-Bayḍā and all ports which did not recognize one or other of the two sultans (180).

The interception of vessels dealing with the rebellious port of Dār al-Bayḍā played a major role in hastening its submission. This decided Mawlāy Sulaymān to extend the naval blockade to Safi and Ṭīṭ in 1795. In the summer of 1796 Mawlāy Sulaymān had five cruisers off the coast of Safi (181).

The Moroccan navy remained, nevertheless, very modest. By the end of the eighteenth century it consisted, according to an official of the French legation, of three or four corvettes and a small number of xebecs, galleys and galliots, all very poorly equipped (182). Many of these were lost in February 1800 as a result of a storm which destroyed all vessels that were in the port of Larache (183).

The feeling of insecurity which resulted from Napoleonic expansionism encouraged Mawlāy Sulaymān to pay a greater attention to his fleet. In 1800, he ordered the reactivation of the Rabat-Salé shipyards (184) and in 1804 he decided to buy two war vessels in England (185). The Austrian ambassador, visiting the country in 1805, reported that the Moroccan fleet consisted then of about twenty units but "all of a very bad construction" (186). In 1807-

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(180) F.O.52/10, 28 Oct., 1793 and 16 Aug., 1794.

(181) F.O.52/11, 16 June, 1796.

(182) De Lesseps, "Notice", pp. 20-21.

(183) F.O.52/11, 6 March, 1800. Cf. also letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Matra dated 23 Ramaḍān, 1214 AH/18 Feb., 1800, asking for the replacement of lost ships (same FO series).

(184) Al-Duʿayf, p.407.

(185) F.O.52/12, 16 Sept., 1804 and 27 Sept., 1804.

(186) J. Caillé, Une ambassade, p.111.

1808 Mawlāy Sulaymān ordered two new war vessels in England and sent two old frigates to be repaired and armed at Gibraltar(187). Other ships were sent to Lisbon to be refitted (188). Captain Burel evaluated the Moroccan fleet in 1808 at about a dozen units manned with about 850 seamen and harboured mainly in Larache and Salé (189).

With the end of the Napoleonic wars, the Moroccan naval force rapidly disintegrated. Many vessels were given as presents to the Deys of Algiers and Tripoli. By 1816, the Moroccan fleet was reduced to four vessels, among which two only were armed (190). In 1818, the French consul reported that there was only one vessel left at Rabat (191). Two years later, the Moroccan navy ceased to exist when the last vessel was given as present to the Dey of Algiers (192).

Quite apart from its size, the Moroccan navy under Mawlāy Sulaymān hardly deserved the name. It possessed neither the equipment nor the organization enjoyed by contemporary European navies. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the docks of Rabat, Salé and Martil only built small ships which could not venture safely on the high seas outside of the spring and summer seasons. Vessels bought in Europe or received as presents were

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(187) F.O.174/17, letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green, Qa'ḍa, 1222/Jan., 1808; F.O.52/13, 7 Octo., 1808.

(188) F.O.52/13, 7 Oct., 1808.

(189) J. Caillé, La mission, p;105. Local inventories of the naval force at the beginning of the nineteenth century gave the following figures concerning the number of seamen at Salé:-

1804.....400 men

1806.....378 men

1812.....352 men

Cf. Kunnāsha fī umūr al-baḥr, Ms.D.1409, BGR, and a list of seamen at Salé, Mic.43, BGR.

(190) CCC, vol.24, 3 Oct., 1816; F.O.52/17, 25 Dec., 1816.

(191) CCC, vol.25, 19 Feb., 1818.

(192) CCC, vol.27, 18 March, 1820.



generally old (193). Once acquired, they were inadequately used and negligently maintained. Moroccan vessels, noted Matra, are "so crowded on the quarter deck and fore-castles that they are rendered useless" (194). Moreover, these vessels were equipped with heavy guns which were suitable only for land use. In 1795, Matra found it hard to convince Moroccan authorities that 14 and 16 pounder guns could not be mounted on vessels. Mawlāy Sulaymān finally realized the mistake over the size of the guns ordered by the Makhzen (195) and Matra could write to Ibn ʿUthmān: "I am very glad the mistake about the size was discovered. I have always thought that the naval system in this country rested on wrong principles. The Moors in my opinion do not sufficiently attend to the navy of their country and the state of their harbours" (196). Other foreign observers, such as de Pouilly, John Buffa and Captain Burel, all underlined the decayed state of the Moroccan fleet (197). "All is rotten and out of order", noted Burel in 1808 (198).

The same attitude of neglect characterized the recruitment of seamen and their organization. Sailors were not full-time professionals. They really constituted a naval reserve force among which the raʿīs (commander) of a ship chose his crew when he was sent on a special mission (199). Most often, sailors joined the raʿīs on a voluntary basis in the hope of some material gain. The salary allocated to the seamen was very modest and irregular (200). Judging by

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(193) In 1800 the governor of Gibraltar proposed to his government the sale to Morocco of two sloops of war requested by the Sultan to be "of the most inferior in H.M.'s arsenals"; cf.C.O.91/40, 18 Dec., 1800.

(194) F.O.52/11, 6 March, 1800.

(195) F.O.174/124,6 Ramaḍān, 1209 AH/28 March, 1795.

(196) F.O.174/124, 22 April, 1795.

(197) J.Caillé, Une ambassade, p.111; J.Buffa, Travels, p.51; J.Caillé, La mission, p.105. The vessel which was destined to carry back Captain Burel in 1809 broke into two halves as it was leaving the port of Larache. Cf.OCC, vol.23, 26 Nov., 1809; F.O.52/15, 27 Jan., 1810.

(198) J. Caillé, La mission, p.105.

(199) J. Caillé, Une ambassade, p.111.

(200) De Lesseps, "Notice", p.21.

the general state of the navy, de Pouilly estimated in 1805 that five or six European vessels would be more than enough to reduce the Moroccan naval force (201).

(2) The Anachronism of the Jihād at Sea

The technological inferiority of Muslim countries made it increasingly difficult for them to maintain the traditional principles which governed their relations with Christian nations. The jihād at sea became more and more a source of trouble and continuous conflict with Christian nations.

Mawlāy Sulaymān attempted to remove all possible issues of confrontation with European countries. He abolished enslavement of European seamen (202) and ransomed all crews whose ships were wrecked on the Moroccan coast so that they were immediately delivered to their consuls (203). More important was his determination to abandon the jihād at sea.

Mawlāy Sulaymān had realized very early that it had become impossible to enter into a confrontation with European countries without exposing the country to heavy reprisals. The superiority of European navies rendered illusory any hope of maintaining the privateering activities of Moroccan corsairs. Appeals to Muslim solidarity addressed to Mawlāy Sulaymān by the Ottoman Sultan in 1798 following the invasion of Egypt had no chance of being answered (204).

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(201) J. Caillé, Une ambassade, p.112.

(202) L. Godard, Description et Histoire du Maroc, Paris, 1860, II, p. 583.

(203) F.O.52/16, 6 April, 1815; CCC, vol.26, 19 April, 1819; Thomassy, Des relations, p.298.

(204) Cf. letter from Selim III to Mawlāy Sulaymān, 3 Rabī' I, 1213 AH/ 15 Aug., 1798, in F.O.174/2 and F.O.174/124, asking for the use of Moroccan fleet against French vessels (appendix 14). Although profoundly concerned about the French invasion of Egypt, Mawlāy Sulaymān was not in a position to intercept French vessels in the Straits zone. "The letter of the Grand Signor", wrote Maṭra in 1799, "seems to have made no impression on the Emperor's mind" F.O.52/11, 13 Sept., 1799).

All attempts by Mawlāy Sulaymān to reactivate privateering were energetically countered by Christian nations. The major incident in this respect was one with the United States of America at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1803, Mawlāy Sulaymān issued orders to the Raʿīs Ibrāhīm Lubarīs to seize vessels belonging to the United States of America, Venice, Holland, the northern German States and all countries which had no peace treaties with Morocco (205). The capture of an American vessel in June 1803 brought about an immediate reaction on the part of the United States of America. Lubarīs and about a hundred sailors from Salé were intercepted before they could reach the coast and made prisoners (206).

The incident created great embarrassment for Mawlāy Sulaymān. The Americans refused to liberate Lubarīs and his crew unless there was a formal engagement by Mawlāy Sulaymān not to harass their vessels in the future. They even threatened to blockade Moroccan ports until such an engagement was obtained (207). Lubarīs and his crew remained in detention for about three months during which negotiations went on between the two sides with the active mediation of British authorities at Tangier and Gibraltar. Finally, in September 1803, Mawlāy Sulaymān arrived in Tangier to sign a peace treaty with the United States of America and to obtain the release of his imprisoned men in return.

The 1803 crisis with the United States showed clearly that the Moroccan navy could not match the superiority of the Christian nations. The American show of force proved to be so successful that many European countries thought of using the same means should a conflict with Morocco occur (208).

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(205) Cf. order of Mawlāy Sulaymān in F.O.52/12, no date (1803).

(206) Cf. story in al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.424-426.

(207) J. Caillé, *Une ambassade*, p.113.

(208) *Ibid.* Cf. also F.O.174/285, 23 Ramaḍān, 1222/24 Nov., 1807 about a similar incident with Sardinia.

Open confrontation being impossible, Mawlāy Sulaymān sought other forms of jihād, particularly the redemption of Muslim captives detained in Europe. Immediately following the incident with the United States, the Sultan requested the British consul, Matra, to assist him in redeeming ten Muslim captives held at Malta (209). In 1806 another initiative was taken by the Makhzen to free Muslim captives at Leghorn (210). Mawlāy Sulaymān's endeavours to recover the Spanish presidios can also be seen as being intended to compensate for the impossibility of carrying on the jihād at sea (211).

The end of the Napoleonic wars inaugurated a new era of relations between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. If during these wars European countries had not been in a position to adopt a common strategy towards the Barbary corsairs, this was no longer the case after the Congress of Vienna in 1815. European countries began intensive consultations with the aim of uniting their efforts to repress privateering in the Mediterranean (212). Though unable to agree on a common formula, European countries were, nevertheless, determined to put an end to what they regarded as a humiliating and anachronistic practice. In 1816, the Spanish ambassador in London presented a formal protest to the British government against the delivery of military equipment to Morocco despite its non-offensive character (213). The British

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(209) F.O.174/284, from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Matra, 23 Sha'abān, 1218/8 Dec. 1803.

(210) F.O.174/284, from al-Salāwī to J. Green, 14 Shawwāl, 1221/25 Dec. 1806.

(211) Cf. El Mansour, "Mawlāy Sulaymān's endeavours to recover Ceuta," in Majallat Kulliyat al-Ādāb, Rabat, No.5-6, 1979, pp.29-44, and idem "Ceuta in Anglo-Moroccan Relations," The Maghreb Review, July-Dec. 1979, pp.129-133.

(212) C.O.2/6, "Projet d'alliance contre les pirateries barbaresques".

(213) The military equipment consisted of gun carriages, gunpowder and cannon balls. Cf. P.G. Rogers, A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations, London, no date, p. 133.

action was judged by the Spanish government as "displeasing to the powers of Europe and at variance with the efforts actually made by them for reducing those of Barbary to the usages established among civilized nations" (214).

The most worrying incident for Mawlāy Sulaymān was the joint Anglo-Dutch attack on Algiers in August 1816 (215). The destruction of the Algerian fleet on 27 August 1816 by Lord Exmouth had a profound psychological impact on Moroccans (216). Mawlāy Sulaymān who was preparing a punitive expedition against the Aīt Atta delayed his departure preferring to remain in the north until more was known about the outcome of the Anglo-Dutch action. Lord Exmouth did not fail to acquaint the Sultan of Morocco with the motives that lay behind the naval expedition against Algiers.

In his reply, Mawlāy Sulaymān seemed to agree with Lord Exmouth about the erroneous attitude of the Algerian people. "The people of Algiers", he wrote, "were unable to foresee the injurious consequences of their conceptions" (217). In fact, the Algiers expedition was intended as a warning to all those who had not yet been reduced to "the usages of civilized nations". Mawlāy Sulaymān fully understood the lesson to be drawn from it.

To express his solidarity with his suffering Algerian neighbours Mawlāy Sulaymān decided in June 1817 to make a present of three vessels to the Dey of Algiers (218). At

(214) FO.52/17, letter of protest from the Spanish ambassador Fernan Minez to Viscount Castlereagh, 21 Sept., 1816.

(215) Cf. C.O.2/6, "Lord Exmouth's expedition to the Barbary Powers".

(216) Al-Du'ayf, p.532. Among those who suffered in Lord Exmouth's attack on Algiers was a Fāsi merchant, Muḥammad Mezwār, a former qā'id of Fès. He lost a vessel in the port of Algiers carrying 100,000 mithqāl-s worth of merchandise.

(217) F.O.174/286, letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Lord Exmouth, 26 Shawwāl, 1231/19 Sept., 1816.

(218) CCC, vol.25, 4 July, 1817.

the same time, he made it clear that by giving what vessels remained in his ports he intended to avoid being constantly tormented by his own people about the necessity of privateering in the Straits zone (219). By ceding the last vessel he had to the Algerian Regency in 1820, Mawlāy Sulaymān completely abandoned the jihād at sea.

#### B- Moroccan Fears

Morocco's isolationist tendencies during the period under study were determined, to a large extent, by the menace of European expansionism. During Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign Moroccans, both on the official and popular levels, were constantly obsessed with the spectre of a Christian invasion.

The invasion of Egypt by Napoleon's armies in August 1798 was seen in Morocco as a great calamity for all Muslims (220). Its effects on Moroccans was intensified because Egypt was not only part of dār al-Islām (the land of Islam) but also the bridge leading to the Holy Places of the Hijaz. The image of mounted French soldiers desecrating the Azhar Mosque was humiliating and revolting at the same time (221). If on the official level Mawlāy Sulaymān proved to be unresponsive to appeals from the Sublime Porte for the interception of French vessels in the Straits zone (222), on the popular level, the reaction was immediate and spontaneous. Indeed, the Moroccan colony in Egypt and in the Holy Places, as well as Moroccan pilgrims passing through Egypt, played an active role in organizing resistance to the French occupation of the country (223). In 1800, a Moroccan ascetic, Sīdī al-Jilālī al-Sibā<sup>c</sup>ī, who had been residing in Mecca since 1787-1788, raised an army of volunteers and led the jihād

(219) Ibid.

(220) Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Salām b. Nāṣir, al-Riḥla al-ṣuḡhrā, P.107.

(221) Al-Ibtisām, p.24.

(222) Cf. letter from Selim III to Mawlāy Sulaymān referenced in note 204 above.

(223) A. al-Jabartī, ʿAjāʾib al-āthār fī al-tarājim wa al-akhbār, Cairo, 1880, vol. III, p. 94.

against the French invaders (224). He succeeded in assembling many of his compatriots and particularly distinguished himself by opposing the truce concluded with Napoleon and insulting the Egyptian Ālim-s who gave their consent to it (225).

In Morocco itself the invasion of Egypt was seen not as an isolated happening, but as part of a plan which aimed at the subjugation of the whole Islamic world. Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt warned his Moroccan contemporaries of the Christian danger by drawing a parallel between the loss of Muslim Spain and the conquest of Egypt (226). Al-Ḥawwāt called upon Mawlāy Sulaymān to fortify the ports and put his people in a state of readiness to confront the Christian danger (227). He attacked sceptics who regarded a similar assault on the western part of the Muslim world as impossible because of the alleged invincibility of Moroccan armies. "Did you forget the recent invasion by the infidels of the land of Egypt whose people were so ruthlessly oppressed, plundered and killed that most of them were threatened by apostasy, were it not for God's Mercy and favour? How can a wise man, therefore, be misled by those who say that the Christians would not dare attack Morocco (al-Gharb) because they know it is well defended and that

(224) Al-Duʿayf, p.519; al-Jabartī, III, p.94.

(225) Al-Jabartī, III, pp.99-100.

(226) Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt, Asʿila wa ajwiba, Ms.2710, R.L., fol.94.

(227) S. al-Ḥawwāt, Diwān, fol.23. The author addressed Mawlāy Sulaymān in the following verses:

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| <p>وَحَدَّ بِالْعِزْمِ فِي سِدِّ الشُّغُورِ<br/>فَقَدْ نَامُوا بِدِرَاقَةِ النَّهَارِ<br/>وَبَعْضًا فِي عِوَابِ الْأُمُورِ</p> | <p>فَسَدِّ رَأْيِ سَعِيكَ مُسْتَعْدًّا<br/>وَحُضِّ الْمُسْلِمِينَ عَلَى جِهَادِ<br/>وَكَنْ حَذْرًا مِنَ الْكُفَّارِ كَلَّا</p> |
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He also warned the Sultan against the French danger:

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| <p>دَنَا مِنَّا وَنَحْنُ عَنْهُ كَالنُّوَامِ<br/>كَمْ زَلَّ فِيهَا ثَابِتُ الْأَقْدَامِ<br/>لِيُصَحَّ بِأَعْيُنِهِمْ عَلَى الْأَقْدَامِ<br/>أَوْلَى بِهَا مِنْ سَائِرِ الْأَقْدَامِ<br/>عِزْمًا لَتُرْهَبَ عَابِدُ الْأَصْنَامِ</p> | <p>هَذَا الْفَرَنْسِيِّسِ اللَّعِينِ لَقَدْ<br/>وَمَكِيدَةُ الْكُفَّارِ أَخْفَى حِيلَةَ<br/>فَلْتَتَوَقَّظَنَّ النَّاسُ مِنْ غَفْلَتِهِمْ<br/>وَإِخْصَصْ وَلَا تَكْ فِي السُّوَاهِلِ أَنَّهُمْ<br/>وَأَعِدْ مَا اسْتَطَعْتَهُ مِنْ قُوَّةِ</p> |
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Islam is always victorious ? This saying can only emanate from those who take their wishes for an object of worship and stop just short of polytheism "(228).

Muḥammad al-Ruhūnī, another outstanding ḥālim of the Sulaymāni period, also called for vigilance, affirming that "the great outrage experienced by Egypt could very well take place anywhere" in the lands of Islam(229).

The evolution of the political situation in neighbouring Spain and the feverish movements of European navies in the Straits zone made the Christian danger a real one. Indeed, after 1795, Spain became the most docile continental ally of Napoleon and a tool for the execution of the latter's ambitions in the Peninsula. The attack made by Spain in 1796 on Portugal, already at war with France, came as clear evidence of this docility. By 1799-1800, rumours were circulating about the existence of a secret arrangement between France and Spain by virtue of which the former would receive the Spanish fortress of Ceuta (230).

The incessant movements of European fleets near the Moroccan coast became a subject of great concern for the populations of the northern ports during the last years of the eighteenth century. In 1799, the ḥālim-s of the northern ports expressed their worries about the fact "that the sea was full of Christian vessels" at a time when the coastal populations lacked all means of defense as a result of Mawlāy Sulaymān's prohibition of the private carrying of firearms (231). These concerns were brought

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(228) Al-Ḥawwāt, As'ila wa ajwiba, fol.94.

(229) Al-Ruhūnī, al-Khuṭab al-manbariya, Cairo, 1936, vol. I, p. 11.

(230) C.O.91/40, 8 April, 1799; C.O.91/41, 30 Aug., 1800. The governor of Gibraltar, O'Hara, and the British consul at Tangier, Matra, were in favour of a British take over of Ceuta as early as 1799.

(231) Al-Ḍu'ayf, pp.398-399. According to al-Ḍu'ayf, Mawlāy Sulaymān had limited the carrying of firearms, as well as the purchase of gunpowder, to Makhzen officials.



to the attention of the Sultan who found himself compelled to lift the ban on the sale of firearms and amunitions despite the injurious consequences that such a decision was to have on internal security (232).

By 1800, Mawlāy Sulaymān became extremely uneasy about rumours of a probable Christian invasion from Ceuta (233). At the same time, his brother Mawlāy Maslama, who met Napoleon in Egypt (234), was reported to be in western Algeria preparing his entry to Morocco (235). By the end of the year, the simple appearance of a British fleet near Tangier created a great panic among the population and the Makhzen officials. Mawlāy Sulaymān immediately issued an order for a general mobilization of the army and requested Sīdī 'Alī b. Aḥmad, head of the Wazzāniya religious order, to lead the mujāhidīn to Tangier (236). Nor did assurances given by Spain to Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1801 about the non-existence of a secret treaty ceding Ceuta to the French dissipate his apprehensions (237). The arrival in Cadiz of French troops and armaments was seen as a serious threat to Morocco's security (238).

James Matra reported the general alarm of Moroccan officials about a possible French invasion of their country when he was at Fès to sign the Anglo-Moroccan treaty in 1801. The French danger, he noted, was daily debated in government circles (239). Moroccan officials, he added, did not hide their fears and told the British consul that in case of a French attack, Morocco would look to Great Britian "as the only nation who could protect them from

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(232) Ibid., p.400.

(233) Ibid., p.412.

(234) Ibn Zaydān, Ithāf, VI, p.354.

(235) Al-Ḍu'ayf, pp.409, 412-413.

(236) F.O.174/8, 1st Dec., 1800.

(237) F.O.52/11, 1st July, 1801.

(238) F.O.52/11, 1st July, 1801; F.O.174/284, letter from al-Salāwī to Matra dated 8 Sha'bān, 1216/14 Dec., 1801.

(239) F.O.52/11, 16 Sept., 1801.

such a disaster" (240). British authorities played an important role in arousing Moroccan fears. To ensure the flow of supplies to the garrison of Gibraltar, the British government missed no opportunity to stress the gravity of French designs. Matra received instructions from London to "apprize the Emperor of Morocco of the danger to be justly apprehended from these designs . . . and to represent to him the treachery and insidious policy of the French in the strongest terms" (241).

In 1801 Matra wrote to Muḥammad al-Salāwī warning him that the Franco-Spanish coalition would direct its armies to Morocco as soon as they had completed the conquest of Portugal (242). The British consul was also ordered to make considerable use of the Egyptian example and the role played by Great Britain in "freeing Egypt and restoring it to its lawful sovereigns" (243). James Green who succeeded Matra in 1806 followed the same policy in order to convince the Makhzen that Napoleon was "the enemy of all crowned heads" (244).

The evacuation of Egypt and the reestablishment of peace in 1802 temporarily thrust aside the danger of a French invasion. However, the Peace of Amiens (1802), by mentioning the Barbary States (245), caused some anxiety to the Makhzen. On reading the translation of the treaty Moroccan officials tended to believe that the settlement reached between the belligerent parties could

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(240) Ibid.

(241) F.O.8/5, Whitehall, 18 July, 1801, Secret and Confidential.

(242) F.O.174/284, letter from Matra to al-Salāwī, 15 Aug., 1801.

(243) F.O.8/5, 18 July, 1801.

(244) F.O.174/151, letter from Green to his agent at Tétouan, no date.

(245) Cf. article X of the Peace of Amiens in Bulletin des Lois de la République Française, 3eme série, vol.VI, 1802, pp.336-344.

only lead to the division of the Ottoman Empire and the rest of the Islamic world (246).

The Moroccan government felt much more secure after British naval domination was achieved in the Mediterranean, particularly after the decisive Battle of Trafalgar (October 1805). The destruction of the combined fleets of France and Spain and the emergence of Great Britain as the uncontested master of the seas greatly reduced the risks of an invasion of Morocco. Mawlāy Sulaymān felt secure enough to begin contemplating plans for the recovering of the Spanish fortress of Ceuta and other presidios which his predecessors had been unable to liberate (247).

However, the French danger reappeared again by November 1807 when Portugal was invaded by the Napoleonic armies. Rumours about an eventual occupation of Ceuta by France circulated again (248). The invasion of Portugal was taken by the Moroccan government as a prelude to a French attack on Morocco itself. Mawlāy Sulaymān realised that the best way to thwart the possibility of a Franco-Spanish invasion was to take over Ceuta, the only place from which a major attack could be launched.

Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808 and the enthronement of his brother Joseph in the place of the destituted Ferdinand VII was even more alarming. Al-Ḍuʿayf reported that after taking hold of Spain, Napoleon was determined to invade Morocco (249). According to rumour, Napoleon had even succeeded in building a wooden bridge to be used in crossing the Straits and that the only obstacle which

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(246) F.O.52/12, 6 June, 1802 and 13 June, 1802.

(247) Cf. note 211 above.

(248) F.O.52/13, 20 Nov., 1807.

(249) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.446.

prevented him from executing his plan was the British threat to obstruct the return of French forces to the Peninsula (250).

False reports about French landing on the Moroccan coast enhanced popular excitement. In the spring of 1808 imaginary Christian landings were reported near Agadir and even at Rabat and Salé (251). Mawlāy Sulaymān who was by then on a tour in the far Sous hastened his return to the northern provinces and in April 1808 issued a general order for mass mobilization. Governors of the coastal towns were to remain alert and tribes were asked to send contingents to the nearest ports. In May 1808, there were about 40,000 men from the Chaouia and 'Arab al-Widyān ready for any contingency at Rabat (252).

Never in modern times had Morocco's fate been so closely dependent on that of the Iberian Peninsula. The general retreat of French armies in Spain and Portugal during the summer of 1808 and the establishment at Seville of a "Junta Central" to organize resistance against French occupation brought a certain psychological relief to Moroccans who were closely following military developments on the other side of the Straits. The military success of Sir Arthur Wellesley in the Peninsula during the years 1808-1813 reduced Moroccan fears to a large extent and nullified Napoleon's threat to Mawlāy Sulaymān that he intended to invade Morocco with 200,000 French and Spanish soldiers (253). Even the French siege of Cadiz at the beginning of 1810 does not seem to have aroused Moroccan apprehensions after it became clear that Napoleon could never overcome the fierce resistance of the Spanish

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(250) Ibid.

(251) Ibid., p.450.

(252) Ibid., p.449. On Moroccan fears of a French invasion in 1808 see also F.O.52/13, 26 April, 1808.

(253) F. Charles-Roux, La France et l'Afrique du Nord avant 1830, Paris, 1932, p. 455.

people who, moreover, enjoyed the military and naval support of Great Britain (254).

The expulsion of French forces from Spain in 1813 came as a great relief to Mawlāy Sulaymān who sent a message congratulating Ferdinand VII for having been saved from the hands of the "arrogant traitor" (255). The restoration of the monarchy in France in 1814 was warmly received by the Moroccan government. "His Majesty", wrote al-Salāwī to Fournet, the French acting consul, "was greatly pleased with this change. I think that at present, your nation can live in peace as well as the whole world" (256).

#### C - A Difficult Neutrality

Morocco's relations with Europe during the Napoleonic wars were characterized by two major developments. There was an unprecedented rapprochement with Great Britain as a result of French expansionist policy in the Mediterranean and, by the same token, relations with France and her Spanish ally steadily deteriorated.

##### (1) The Anglo-Moroccan Rapprochement (1800-1814)

After 1800 Mawlāy Sulaymān and his minister for foreign affairs, Muḥammad al-Salāwī, moved Morocco towards closer cooperation with Great Britain. The death in 1799 of

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(254) The news of the French siege of Cadiz was mentioned by al-Ḍuʿayf in a calm and passive manner. Apparently, there was no sign of panic on the part of the Makhzen or the populations as there had been in 1808. Cf. al-Ḍuʿayf, p. 456.

(255) AHN, Estado, Leg.4348, letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Ferdinand VII in which the former expressed his satisfaction at the restoration of the monarchy in Spain and the downfall of "the perturber of world peace"; cf. CCC, vol.25, 17 Feb., 1817.

(256) CCC, vol.24, 3 Jumādā II, 1229/25 May, 1814. Cf. also letter of congratulations from al-Salāwī to the British consul dated 15 Jumādā I, 1229/5 May, 1814 in F.O.174/286.

Muḥammad b. ʿUthmān, widely known to be Spain's advocate in the Moroccan Court, the decisive British role in thwarting Napoleon's occupation of Egypt, and the threat of French expansionist designs in the Mediterranean offered a favourable background for a closer cooperation between Morocco and Great Britain.

The resumption in 1800 of Anglo-Moroccan negotiations concerning a British establishment at Ksar el-Seghir, east of Tangier, was in indication of improving relations between the two sides. Ever since 1790, Matra had been striving to obtain from Morocco the exclusive use of this port. As it was nearly opposite to Gibraltar, it would have allowed the British to supply their garrison there without the risk of being intercepted by enemy war vessels (257). Mawlāy al-Yazīd was, apparently, the first to have promised Ksar el-Seghir to Matra, a place, he said, whence the British "might take milk warm from the cow to Gibraltar" (258). Mawlāy al-Ṭayyib, while governor of Tangier (1794-1797) made the same promise to the British consul (259). In 1800, Matra raised the issue again with the Moroccan authorities who showed their readiness to concede the place to the British but asked Matra to exercise patience until the end of European hostilities (260). In 1802, al-Salāwī promised the British consul the said port or the port of Beliounech, near Ceuta, but his promise never materialized, most probably because such a concession on the southern shore of the Straits was no longer necessary after 1805 when the supremacy of the British fleet in the region became uncontested (261).

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(257) Add.Ms.33,978, British Museum, letter from Matra to J.Banks, 27 Sept., 1801.

(258) F.O.174/12, 27 Feb., 1801.

(259) *Ibid.*

(260) F.O.174/8, letter from al-Makkī al-Ghāzī to Matra, 5 Muḥarram, 1215/29 May, 1800.

(261) The secret negotiations that were going on between Morocco and Great Britain about Ksar el-Seghir were well known to the French and Spanish governments. Cf.AHN, Estado, Leg.4341, 12 July, 1799.

Undoubtedly, the British naval supremacy was in itself an important factor in the preponderance of British influence in Morocco at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Great Britain was, in fact, the only European country which was able to maintain a continuous contact with Morocco and, until the end of the war in 1814, British commercial supremacy in Morocco was unrivalled. France and her European allies were not in a position to ensure the continuity of their interests in Morocco. Following the Battle of Trafalgar, the French consul in Morocco could do nothing but observe, report and formulate vain protests against Mawlāy Sulaymān's "complaisance" with the British (262). In a sense, Morocco was condemned to cooperate with Great Britain which was able to impose her presence in the region.

Yet, Great Britain also depended on Moroccan supplies for her troops in Gibraltar and the Iberian Peninsula. Following the signing of the 1801 treaty between the two countries, Mawlāy Sulaymān consented to allow the export of an annual contingent of 2,000 head of cattle to the garrison of Gibraltar at a reduced rate of duty. Great Britain was also able to obtain additional supplies when the Moroccan government needed to pay for military equipment ordered in Gibraltar or England. Moreover, Mawlāy Sulaymān granted the British government the authorization to export wheat destined for the use of British troops fighting in Spain and Portugal (263).

Military cooperation was another aspect which illustrated the prevalence of British influence in Morocco during this period. Morocco received most of its armament from Great Britain and British authorities also agreed to train

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(262) R. Thomassy, *Des relations*, p. 289.

(263) In 1810-1811 Mawlāy Sulaymān allowed Great Britain to export 75,000 quintals of cereals. F.O.52/16, 29 July, 1812.

Moroccan artillerymen either in Gibraltar or in Morocco itself. This military cooperation reached its apex when both countries joined forces in 1807 over the possible siege of Ceuta. During that year, the Moroccan government allowed the British army to use the islet of Tāwra and proposed the landing of British troops on the Moroccan mainland to organize the siege of Ceuta (264). The end of European hostilities reduced the importance of Morocco for Great Britain, but preponderance of British influence in Morocco was firmly established for the rest of the nineteenth century.

(2) Franco-Moroccan Tensions (1800-1814)

Relations with France and her allies deteriorated continuously during the same period. Napoleon not only never thought of renewing the Franco-Moroccan treaty of 1767, but showed little courtesy to the Sultan of Morocco. In 1803 Mawlāy Sulaymān was deeply offended by the behavior of the French government towards his ambassador, Hāj Idrīs al-Rāmī. The Moroccan envoy who was dispatched to claim property belonging to Moroccan merchants whose ships or cargoes were confiscated by the French navy, was shown little consideration and returned empty-handed (265). On the return of al-Rāmī, the French commissioner in Morocco notified al-Salāwī that all correspondence with the French government was to be conveyed through him and that "failing to this formality, such correspondence would receive no consideration" (266). In 1804, when Napoleon was proclaimed Emperor, Mawlāy Sulaymān refused to congratulate him. In reply to Fournet, the French consul in Morocco, the Sultan made it clear that it had

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(264) Cf. letters from al-Salāwī to British authorities concerning Anglo-Moroccan efforts at blockading Ceuta in appendices 33, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 48.

(265) CCC, vol. 22, fol. 100, letter from al-Rāmī to the French government, no date, concerning the property of Moroccan merchants.

(266) CCC, vol. 22, from the French commissioner to al-Salāwī, 14 Nivose, year XII of the Revolution calendar (4 Jan., 1804).



never been customary for a Muslim Sultan to be first in addressing a Christian ruler and that Bonaparte had not until then sent any letter or present to the sultan of Morocco. Fournet was reminded that he himself needed a letter of accreditation (267).

Mawlāy Sulaymān refused also to accept the French conquest of Italy. In 1806 he prevented the French consul in Morocco from hoisting the Italian flag affirming that he would only permit the colours that were hoisted during his father's lifetime (268), and by 1807 d'Ornano was to acknowledge his failure in inducing the Moroccan government to recognize French conquests in Italy. Moreover, Mawlāy Sulaymān refused to comply with Napoleon's Continental System and continued to allow traditional exports to Gibraltar (269).

In 1807, Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to send al-Rāmī on a second embassy to France in an attempt to obtain redress for the Moroccan merchants. This mission to the Napoleonic court was no more successful than the first one. Al-Rāmī's demands for compensation received no attention. Napoleon's letter of reply to Mawlāy Sulaymān made no mention of the issue al-Rāmī was sent to resolve (270).

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(267) CCC, vol.22, letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Fournet, 14 Ḥijja, 1219/ 16 March, 1805.

(268) F.O.52/13, 10 Dec., 1806.

(269) J. Caillé, "Le consul de l'Empereur au Maroc," Revue de l'Institut Napoléon, 93, Octobre 1964, p.175.

(270) CCC, vol.23, two letters from al-Rāmī to the French minister for foreign affairs, the first bearing no date, and the second dated 27 Oct. , 1807. Cf. also Napoleon's reply dated 11 Nov., 1807 in J. Caillé, "Deux lettres de Napoléon 1er au Sultan du Maroc," in Revue de l'Institut Napoléon, 90, January 1964, pp.13-14.

The Franco-Moroccan tension reached its height in 1807 when Mawlāy Sulaymān allowed British forces to occupy the islet of Tāwra so as to blockade Ceuta. D'Ornano protested vehemently against this occupation and requested al-Salāwī to expel British troops from the islet, to which the latter replied that the Moroccan government had not experienced any injury from the British presence in Tāwra and did not, therefore, deem it necessary to take any action against them (271).

Napoleon took this event so seriously that he decided to dispatch a special envoy to Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1808. Captain Burel was chosen for this embassy and was entrusted with a double mission. On one hand, he was to protest against Mawlāy Sulaymān's "complicity" with the English, and on the other, to draw a reconnaissance of the country's defenses in view of an eventual invasion (272). Napoleon's letter delivered by Burel to Mawlāy Sulaymān was by no means friendly. The French Emperor summoned Mawlāy Sulaymān to stop supplies to the British garrison of Gibraltar and demanded the immediate withdrawal of British troops from the Tāwra islet. He also warned against any eventual landing of British troops on the Moroccan mainland which would threaten Ceuta. "If you favour their (the British) views against us, we will be under the obligation of considering you among our enemies", wrote Napoleon, "because we cannot tolerate for ever a situation in which we are neither enemies nor friends ... The Spanish forces are now united to those of France and, relying on these, we will be able to check any offense and avenge any injury done to us either openly or under the cover of a treacherous neutrality" (273).

Mawlāy Sulaymān was greatly offended by this letter. Captain Burel had no hope of success in the mission he was

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(271) CCC, vol.23, from al-Salāwī to d'Ornano, 9 Rabī' I, 1223/6 May, 1808.

(272) J. Caillé, La mission, p. 28.

(273) Letter from Napoleon to Mawlāy Sulaymān, 16 May, 1808 in CCC, vol. 23.

entrusted with, especially since he only delivered the letter in August 1808, at a time when the news of the French débâcle at Baylen in Spain and the emergence of a junta government at Seville had turned the situation completely to the disadvantage of Napoleon. The difficulties of the French army in Spain after 1808 had rendered Burel's mission to Morocco useless.

Between 1808 and 1814, d'Ornano lacked all means of exerting any significant pressure on Moroccan authorities. In 1808 Mawlāy Sulaymān accepted the accreditation of a consul sent by the Seville Junta against which the French consul protested energetically. Al-Salāwī explained to d'Ornano that European quarrels did not concern Morocco and that if King Joseph Napoleon sent his consul he would be received with the same honours (274). In 1809, d'Ornano protested again, but in vain, against the arrival in Morocco of Count de Tilly as ambassador of the Seville Junta. "We are neutral", answered al-Salāwī, "and we are free to receive whoever comes to us" (275). D'Ornano also protested against the authorization granted to the Spanish junta government to export cattle and wheat (276). "You Frenchmen are always complaining about the fact that we do nothing for you", replied al-Salāwī, "but you never ask for anything. Request something and you will be served in the same way as others" (277).

The end of hostilities in 1814 came as a relief not only to Europe but also to the Moroccan government. The post-war period was characterized by a clear European disinterest in Morocco, particularly on the part of Great Britain whose dependence on Moroccan provisions was

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(274) J. Caillé, La mission, p.54.

(275) CCC, vol.23, from al-Salāwī to d'Ornano, 8 Muḥarram, 1224/23 Feb., 1809.

(276) CCC, vol.23, 26 Nov., 1809.

(277) Ibid.

greatly reduced. Only France attempted to restore her commercial interests almost completely destroyed by the British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean (278).

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(278) Cf. evolution of Morocco's commercial relations with Europe after 1814 in chapter III .

CHAPTER V

MAWLĀY SULAYMĀN AND RELIGIOUS REFORMISM  
 AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

One of the most obscure aspects of the period under study is constituted by the religious ideas of Mawlāy Sulaymān and the impact on Morocco of the contemporary Wahhābi reformist doctrine. Indeed, this period is characterized on one hand by the ascendance of religious forces and their open intervention in the political sphere, and on the other, by the insistent appeal of Mawlāy Sulaymān for a return to the sources of Islam and his obstinate militancy to eradicate detestable religious innovations. The Wahhābi doctrine, which appeared in the Arab East at the turn of the nineteenth century, seems to have gained the sympathy of Mawlāy Sulaymān and contributed to worsen his relations with the Sufi orders and the sharīf-s. Although differing with the Wahhābi-s on some important ideological issues, Mawlāy Sulaymān appreciated, nevertheless, the reformist character of the doctrine. Only the quasi-unanimous hostility of the Moroccan religious forces to Wahhābism can explain why Mawlāy Sulaymān refrained from openly adopting the doctrine. Religious forces, however, were not unconscious of his hidden sympathies and did not fail to accuse him of Wahhābism. To what extent, then, was Mawlāy Sulaymān reformist in his religious ideas and what was his real attitude towards the Wahhābi doctrine?

## I- The Reformist Tradition in Morocco

In the Islamic world, reformism was always identified with an attempt to restore the primitive purity of Islam. It did not mean the rejection of the old and its replacement by the new. Reformism was intimately linked to the Islamic conception according to which the best of times was the time of the Prophet and his immediate successors. The more remote we are from the pious ancestors (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ) the more corrupt we become. The ideal, therefore, is behind and not ahead and no modern reformist movement ever attempted to challenge this truism.

If in the Arab East the profusion of religious doctrines was at the origin of numerous reformist theories, the monopoly of the Māliki rite in Morocco seems to have crippled, to a certain extent, the religious speculative activity. Indeed, the salient feature of Maghribi Islam has been the predominance of one school of jurisprudence — Mālikism — and the absence of all others. Since the ninth century, Malikism progressively imposed itself as the undisputed madhhab (rite) all over North Africa, mainly as a result of the work of the highly esteemed scholar of Kairouan, ʿAbd al-Salām b. Saʿīd Saḥnūn (d. 854 A.D.). His Mudawwana became the fundamental reference for legislation (1).

The only Moroccan dynasty which ever attempted to challenge Mālikism was that of the Almoḥads (1130-1276). During this period attempts were made to introduce the doctrine of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (2) through the works of his disciple Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī (1058-1112) who happened to be the teacher of the dynasty's founder,

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(1) Later on an Egyptian ʿālim, Khalīl b. Ishāq (d.1374) produced an abridgement (mukhtaṣar) which acquired the character of a code for Māliki rite and used to be memorized by every Moroccan student who had passed elementary education.

(2) The Ashʿari school was founded by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī. (d.935 AD) who tried to use rational arguments to defend orthodox Islam. This school became identified with the theory of al-kasb according to

Ibn Tumart (d.1128). The hostility of the Almoḥads to Mālikism was best illustrated by their burning of Saḥnūn's Mudawwana, while al-Ghazzālī's Iḥyā' was widely distributed.

The Almoḥad ideological rebellion against Mālikism produced, however, no lasting effect. Mālikism proved to be deeply rooted in the country. Almoḥad Ash'ari ideas had no alternative but to cohabit with the doctrine of Mālik b. Anas. After the Almoḥads, Mālikism was restored as the official madhhab but Moroccan ʿālim-s could no longer dispense with the Ash'ari dogma. Māliki jurisprudence and Ash'ari dogma became two indissoluble aspects of the Moroccan religious tradition (3).

The early ʿAlawid sultans were concerned more with the military and political consolidation of their power than with ideological problems. Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh was the first ʿAlawid sultan to deal with such doctrinal issues.

Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh was a great admirer of the Saʿāadian Aḥmad al-Manṣūr not so much for his religious ideas as for the pompous etiquette of his court. Indeed, Sīdī Muḥammad attempted to copy many of al-Manṣūr's political military and even religious institutions. Following the example of this illustrious predecessor, Sīdī Muḥammad made ḥadīth reading and commentary an established

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...which man creates his deeds in conformity with God's will. Cf. E.I., 1960, vol. I, pp.694-696.

- (3) The best illustration of this successful symbiosis is the urjūza (poem) of ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. ʿĀshir (d.1631) in which the author brings together the fiqh (jurisprudence) of Mālik, the dogma of al-Ash'arī and the sufism of al-Junayd (d.910 AD). This urjūza summarized the basic tenets of religion and used to be memorized by every Moroccan student. It was abundantly commented during Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign, particularly by al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān (d.1812), Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥammūmī (d.1849) and Muḥammad al-Murābiṭ al-Samlālī (d.1806).

custom of his court (4). He brought in from the Arab East many ḥadīth collections, particularly the musnad-s of al-Shāfi'ī, Abū Hanīfa and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, which he was the first to introduce to Morocco (5). The study by Sīdī Muḥammad of these three musnad-s led him to adopt a more conciliatory and open attitude towards the madhhab-s of their authors. In his seminars Sīdī Muḥammad gave equal importance to the ḥadīth collections of the four imām-s whom he considered to be equal in orthodoxy (6).

However, Sīdī Muḥammad was attracted above all by Ḥanbalism (7) because of the simplicity of its dogmatic views which he judged as "most conformable to the belief of the four imām-s and the pious ancestors" (8). In fact Sīdī Muḥammad was no man of erudition. He abhorred complex speculative controversy and for this reason found the Ḥanbali madhhab suitable to his simple thinking. Along the lines of Ibn Ḥanbal's doctrine, Sīdī Muḥammad advocated reliance on the self-evident meaning of the Quran and the ḥadīth, rather than complex theological interpretations. Dogmatic theology (ʿilm al-kalām) and philosophical

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(4) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.125-126; al-Nāṣirī, V, p.153, VIII, p.67. Al-Zayānī mentioned that upon his accession to the throne, Sīdī Muḥammad abandoned the reading of history and literature books and devoted all his time to the reading of ḥadīth to which he appointed fixed hours in imitation of Aḥmad al-Manṣūr. Sīdī Muḥammad never missed the occasion to declare that "al-Manṣūr is our teacher and example". Cf. al-Rawḍa, fol.125-126.

(5) Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh, al-Futūḥāt al-ilāhiya fī aḥādīth khayr al-bariya, Rabat, 1980, p. 1.

(6) Ibid., p.459.

(7) Ḥanbalism is the doctrine founded by the celebrated theologian, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (780-855) which claimed to restore the Quran, the Prophet's tradition and the consulta (fatwā) of the rightly guided ancestors as the main sources of Islamic jurisprudence. Ibn Ḥanbal advocated a strict adherence to the text of the Quran and the Sunna without any allegorical exegesis. In case of disagreement, reliance on the Quran was preferred to personal effort of opinion; cf. "Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal" in E.I., vol. I, 1960, pp. 272-277.

(8) Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh, al-Futūḥāt, p.458.



speculation were unknown to the Prophet and his companions and were therefore considered as "detestable innovations" (9).

For this reason the teachings of al-Ash'arī and al-Ghazzālī were discarded because both engaged in the refutation of erroneous ideas, thus preserving these injurious concepts in their books (10). As far as ideological attacks against Islamic orthodoxy were concerned, the best approach consisted, according to Sīdī Muḥammad, in abstaining from all debate about dogma (11).

Dogmatic inflexibility was, indeed, the main grievance Sīdī Muḥammad had against the Māliki ʿālim-s of Morocco. For him, the search for truth should not be confined to one single madhhab, since all the four imām-s — al-Shāfi'ī, Abū Ḥanīfa, Mālik and Ibn Ḥanbal — were worthy of respect and glorification (12). Everyone who adheres to one of the four doctrines", he wrote, "is sure to be on the right path, because they all relied on God's Book and his Prophet's tradition" (13). To show his independence vis-à-vis all doctrines, Sīdī Muḥammad declared to his contemporaries that he was Māliki in rite but Ḥanbali in dogma (14).

Sīdī Muḥammad's open challenge to the Māliki-Ash'ari tradition led him to adopt some original ideas on the teaching of religious disciplines. For him, the Islamic religion

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(9) Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh, Taʿlīf fī ihyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn, Ms.9593, R.L., pp.130-131; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.68.

(10) Ibid., pp.112-113.

(11) Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh, al-Futūḥāt, p.457; Cf. also his Taʿlīf, p.129.

(12) Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh, al-Futūḥāt, p.459.

(13) Ibid.

(14) Ibid., pp.457-458. Sīdī Muḥammad often repeated this statement. Cf. notice entitled "On the clarification of my saying 'Māliki in rite and Ḥanbali in dogma' "in al-Futūḥāt, pp.457-458.

was very simple and was to be sought in its primary sources. He advocated, therefore, the return to the source of the sharīʿa, the Quran and the Prophet's tradition, and the abandonment of fossilized manuals, such as the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl b. Ishāq (15), which, by their complexity, often hid the simplicity of the religion. These abstracts, argues Sīdī Muḥammad, often conceal the true nature of Islam and complicate what, in fact, is clear and intelligible (16). During his reign the study of Khalīl's Mukhtaṣar was to be largely abandoned by many ʿālim-s who did not want to antagonize the Sultan (17).

Sīdī Muḥammad's reformist attempts were obstinately resisted by the Moroccan ʿālim-s. Those who complied with his instructions regarding the teaching of certain Māliki manuals did so more from fear than from conviction (18). After his death, his Ḥanbali ideas were completely forgotten.

Mawlāy Sulaymān was a fervent adept of the Māliki school. Owing to his religious education, however, he remained faithful to the reformist spirit of his father. His loyalty to the Māliki-Ashʿari school did not prevent him from advocating the return to the sources of Islam in order to restore the original purity of the religion.

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(15) Cf. note 1 above.

(16) Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh, al-Futūḥāt, cf. introduction by Muḥammad Rashīd Mulīn, p. ط ; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.67.

(17) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.235.

(18) Cf. case of Muḥammad b. Abū al-Qāsim al-Sijilmāsī who resumed the teaching of Khalīl's Mukhtaṣar and its commentaries immediately after the death of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh, in al-Ḍuʿayf, p.235. Moroccan ʿālim-s remained unanimously hostile to the Ḥanbalist tendencies of Sīdī Muḥammad. They expressed their attachment to the Mukhtaṣar in the following terms:

”نحن خليليون، إن ظلّ ظللنا وإن اهتدى اهتدى اهتدينا“

Cf. al-Futūḥāt, introduction , p. ٤.

## II - The Religious Reformism of Mawlāy Sulaymān

It would be impossible to appraise in its full extent the nature of the conflict which opposed the Makhzen to the religious forces within Morocco at the beginning of the nineteenth century without, first, shedding some light on the religious ideas of Mawlāy Sulaymān.

### A- His Education and Religious Scholarship

Mawlāy Sulaymān was deeply influenced by his religious education. This education was mainly accomplished outside the big centres of learning. His father, being eager to isolate his young sons from the political turmoil of the major urban centres, preferred to send Mawlāy Sulaymān first to a small zāwiya near Safi. When he memorized the Quran, he pursued his religious education at Ksar El-Kebir. In 1783, Sīdī Muḥammad sent him to Tafilelt at the age of seventeen (19). It was in the latter place that he acquired his basic education and was introduced to the main religious sciences, such as the ḥadīth, the exegesis of the Quran and Sufism. It was also in the Tafilelt that he was acquainted with the fundamental work of al-Ghazzālī, Iḥyā' ʿulūm al-dīn, the study of which he encouraged later on, as well as some works of the Ḥanbali theologian Ibn Taymiyya (20). His stay in Fès was apparently very brief but allowed him, nevertheless, to meet some of the most prominent ʿālim-s of his time, namely al-Tawdī b. Sūda, his son Aḥmad b. Sūda, al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān, ʿAbd al-Qādir b. Shaqrūn and Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj (21).

(19) Al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, Ms.K.224, BGR, pp.166-168.

(20) ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Filālī, al-Tārīkh al-muftarā ʿlayh fī al-Maghrib, Rabat, 1969, pp. 119-120.

(21) Al-Zayānī, Alfiyat, p.168.

Until he assumed the responsibility of the sultanate in 1792 Mawlāy Sulaymān gave himself completely to the acquisition of the religious sciences showing little interest in worldly attractions (22). Nor did he have any political motivation. During the short reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd he refused the post of vice-regent for Marrakech and preferred, instead, to devote himself to learning (23). According to the author of Tadhkirat al-muḥsinīn, Mawlāy Sulaymān "was never a candidate to the throne, nor did he have any such ambition. His interest was so oriented towards religious studies that people used to believe he could not even ride a horse" (24). Indeed, when sultan, Mawlāy Sulaymān governed more like a ḥālim than a statesman, referring constantly to the sharīʿa and the ḥālim-s before taking any important decision. "He never concluded any business which related to his kingdom without first consulting them (the ḥālim-s)", wrote Muḥammad b. al-Ḥāj, "nor did he accept from them anything but an explicit reference to the text (of the Quran and the Sunna)" (25). The abolition of non-religious taxes or the prohibition of tobacco plantation — which both used to secure important revenues for the treasury — are typical examples of the supremacy of faith over State interest.

Nothing illustrates the religious orientation of Mawlāy Sulaymān better than his cultural activity and his numerous writings. His court used to be a meeting place for the outstanding ḥālim-s of his time, particularly during the holy month of Ramaḍān. He supervised religious seminars in person and recommended the study of some works, such as

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(22) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol. 157.

(23) Al-Zayānī, Alfiyat, p.159; al-Ḍuʿayf, p.247.

(24) ʿAbd al-Kabīr b. al-Majdhūb al-Fāsi, Tadhkirat al-Muḥsinīn, Ms.K.270 BGR, p.342.

(25) Muḥammad al-Ṭālib b. Ḥamdūn b. a-Ḥāj, al-Ishrāf ʿalā baʿd man bi Fās min al-ashrāf, Ms. D 653, BGR, p. 80.

the Iḥyā' of al-Ghazzālī or the Musnad of Ibn Ḥanbal (26). His political responsibilities never prevented him from contributing actively to the theological debate of his time. In this respect he wrote numerous works which bear the marks of a distinguished scholarly talent (27). Mawlāy Sulaymān was also known to be an active promoter of religious learning. He provided for students who memorized the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl and attended lectures given by the ʿālim-s at the Qarawiyin in person (28).

### B- His Religious Ideas

Mawlāy Sulaymān inherited his father's religious reformism but without its Ḥanbalist orientation. Like his father, Mawlāy Sulaymān was in favour of a return to the tradition of the Prophet and his companions by extricating all "detestable innovations" and restoring the primitive purity of Islam. This, however, he wanted to achieve within the well-established tradition of the Māliki-Ashʿari school.

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- (26) Al-Zayānī, Jawharat, Ms.6778, R.L., p.84; al-Ḍuʿayf, p.390; Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt, al-Rawḍa al-maḡṣūda, Ms.K.2351, BGR, p.43; al-Ḥawwāt's Dīwān, Ms.D.753, BGR, pp.17-20; Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj, Dīwān, Ms.222, R.L., p.39.; Muḥammad al-Ḥajwī, Ikhtīṣār al-ibtisām, Ms. H.114, BGR, p.359.
- (27) The works of Mawlāy Sulaymān include in particular:-
- Commentary of Khalīl's Mukhtaṣar, the first volume is available at the Royal Library, No. 1323;
  - Commentary of the Muwatta' of Mālik b. Anas;
  - ʿInāyat ʿulī al-majd li dhikr al-Fāsī ibn al-jadd, written in gratitude to his shaykh (teacher) Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Salām al-Fāsī, printed at Fès in 1928;
  - Annotations (ḥāshiya) on al-Zarqānī's commentary of al-Mawāhib al-ludniya;
  - Essay on pilgrimage, Ms.K.963, BGR, pp.237-264;
  - Essay on the kasb (Jawāb fī masʿalat al-kasb) Ms.D.1838, BGR, pp. 253-270. This essay was revized by al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān;
  - Two essays on the use of music by Sufi brotherhoods:
    - \* al-Samāʿ: mā huwa muttafaqun ʿalā ḥirmatih, Ms.652, Sbiḥī library (Salé), pp. 1-59.
    - \* Imtāʿ al asmāʿ bi tahrīr ma iltabasa min ḥukm al samāʿ, mentioned by Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj in his Dīwān, p.241;
  - Risāla fī al-radd ʿalā man qāla bi afḍaliyyat banī isrāʾīl ʿalā al-ʿarab, Ms.D.2600, BGR, pp.34-42;

His essay on the acquisition of human actions (al-kasb) (29) sheds some light on his dogmatic convictions. Mawlāy Sulaymān adopted the basic principles of the Ashʿari school, particularly with regard to man's freedom of action and the problem of al-takfīr (excommunication). Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī had devised the notion of kasb in order to avoid the extremism of two theological schools, the Qadariya and the Muʿtazila which maintained that man is totally free and capable of inventing his actions, and the Jabriya for which man is nothing but a tool in the execution of the divine will (30). According to the theory of al-kasb, which characterized the Ashʿari school, man has the power to create his actions but in conformity with God's will. This interpretation was adopted by the Moroccan ʿālim-s (31) and by Mawlāy Sulaymān to avoid the abuses of both the Qādariya and the Jabriya, and also because it fits perfectly well the position of Mālik b. Anas on this particular issue (32).

The second point of convergence between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Ashʿari school relates to the problem of al-takfīr. For Ashʿari theologians such as al-Ghazzālī, a grave sin (kabīra) does not justify

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- Taqyīd fī al-tabkhīr zaman al-ṣawm, Ms.653, Sbīḥī Library, 9 pages;

- Numerous khutba-s attacking popular detestable innovations relating to the cult of saints. Cf. in particular his khutba on the mawsim-s printed at Fès, without date; cf. also extracts from other khutba-s in al-Mashrafī, Sharḥ al-shamaʿmaqiyya, Ms. G.629, BGR, unpaginated; and al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p. 123.

(28) Al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.364-391.

(29) Jawāb fī masʾalat al-kasb, Ms. D 1838, BGR, pp. 253-270.

(30) Ibid., p.254.

(31) Cf. al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān, Sharḥ tawḥīd al-murshid al-muʿīn, lith. 1889, p.6.

(32) Ibid.

excommunication as long as its author does not contest the oneness of God and accepts his Prophet's message . A person does not incur infidelity as long as he recognizes some basic tenets of the religion (ḍarūriyat, pl. of ḍarūra). Both Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī and al-Ghazzālī called for the greatest prudence in excommunicating "the people of the qibla" (Muslims). Mawlāy Sulaymān defended the same principle. "Excommunication", he wrote, "should be pronounced only against an infidel about whom there can be no ambiguity because it means the condemnation of a Muslim to perpetual hell when the Day of the last judgement comes" (33). It was on this particular point that Mawlāy Sulaymān expressed his greatest reticence on the Wahhābi doctrine which was highly predisposed to excommunicate ideological opponents.

The mere fact of participating in such dogmatic debate would have been considered inadmissible by Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh. Mawlāy Sulaymān, on the contrary, did not share his father's Ḥanbali convictions as far as speculative theology was concerned. His reign was characterized, in fact, by the restoration of Māliki supremacy and the return to Ashʿari dogmatics. Mawlāy Sulaymān rehabilitated the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl and encouraged the study of al-Ghazzālī's works. He remained, however, deeply convinced of the necessity to restore the original purity of Islam.

The reformist ideas of Mawlāy Sulaymān reflected a deep personal conviction and were not dictated solely by political considerations. They also reflected his pious character and his natural hostility to heterodox practices.

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(33) Mawlāy Sulaymān and al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān, Jawāb fī masʾalat al-kasb, p. 264.

Mawlāy Sulaymān wrote numerous essays to discredit popular customs which are contrary to the sharīʿa (34). He incited at the same time the ʿālim-s to imitate his efforts. Thus, on Mawlāy Sulaymān's demand, the qāḍī of Rabat, Muḥammad b. ʿĀshūr (d.1844-45) wrote a pamphlet reproving some festive amusements celebrated at Marrakech on the occasion of the ʿĀshūrā (tenth day of Muḥarram) (35). Another ʿālim, ʿAbd al-Salām Ḥarakāt of Salé criticized, in an essay written by order of the Sultan, twenty five "detestable popular practices" (36).

Mawlāy Sulaymān hardly missed an occasion to reaffirm his reprobation of such practices. Religious fairs (mawsim-s) were declared illegal not only because they constituted blameworthy innovations in themselves but also because of their allowing a number of indecent practices, such as chanting, dancing, the mingling of men and women, extravagant celebrations and illegal spendings (37).

Another manifestation of Mawlāy Sulaymān's salafism (38) was his hostility to the ornamentation of holy places and the erection of sumptuous buildings over tombs and shrines. In 1805, for example, he ordered the removal of a dome built on his father's shrine and placed it instead on a mosque (39). Four years later he removed the tombstone (naqīr) placed on his father's tomb because

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(34) Cf. works of Mawlāy Sulaymān above, footnote 27.

(35) Muḥammad ʿĀshūr (known as al-Rashshāy), essay reproving festive amusements celebrated at Marrakech on the occasion of ʿĀshūrā, in Ms.Z.3772, R.L., pp.1-35. Cf. also Bujandār, al-Ightibāt bi tarājīm aʿlām al-Ribāt, Ms.D.1287, BGR, vol.I, pp.196-197.

(36) Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Dukkālī, Ithāf, Ms.D.11, BGR, p.75.

(37) Mawlāy Sulaymān, Khutba on the mawsim-s, pp.5-6.

(38) Salafism advocates the return to the pious men of old (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ), that is the Prophet's companions, as a means to restore the original purity of the religion.

(39) Al-Duʿayf, p.442.



he argued, it was a bidʿa contrary to the Sunna (40). Among the ʿAlawid sultans Mawlāy Sulaymān was in fact the one who devoted the least effort to the building and restoration of shrines (41).

### C- Mawlāy Sulaymān and Sufism

Those who approached Mawlāy Sulaymān, whether Moroccan or foreign contemporaries, were impressed by his piety and ascetism. He disdained luxury and contented himself with the strict minimum. "His court", wrote Ali Bey, "had no splendor and his dress was very simple, not to say plain" (42). A Moroccan contemporary, quoted by al-Nāṣirī, was reported to have seen the Sultan wearing patched trousers and in possession of a watch on a cord of wool (43).

His austere nature, his ascetism and his religious education made him very inclined to contemplative life. Mawlāy Sulaymān was not hostile to Sufism as it is often assumed. His hostility was not directed against Sufism as such but against Sufism as it came to be practised by common people and certain zāwiya-s. After all, Mawlāy Sulaymān himself was an adept of the Nāṣiriya religious order (44).

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- (40) Al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.441-445. The word bidʿa (detestable innovation) is used to mean any alteration or addition to the religion which contradicts the tradition of the Prophet and his companions.
- (41) Among the architectural achievements of Mawlāy Sulaymān al-Zayānī mentioned 16 mosques but only 2 shrines. One of these shrines was renovated because the Sultan wanted to erect a separation wall between men and women visitors. Cf. al-Rawḍa, fol.204; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.172-173; al-Ḍuʿayf, p.173.
- (42) Ali Bey, Travels, I, pp.51, 173.
- (43) Al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.171. Another mark of Mawlāy Sulaymān's ascetism was his refusal to use articles which contained gold. In 1803 he declined an umbrella presented to him by the French consul because it was decorated with gold threads. Such articles were usually sold and their value distributed to ʿālim-s and sharīf-s. Cf. letter from al-Salāwī to A. Guillet, 10 Rajab 1218/23 Oct. 1803 in Eugène Fumey, Choix de correspondances marocaines, p.19.
- (44) ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Zaydān, Ithāf, II, p.21; ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Kattānī, Fihris al-fahāris, II, p.331. Cf. also text of an ijāza delivered

The most outstanding feature of Moroccan Sufism has always been its popular orientation. This popular dimension is to be seen in both its historical and social context. Since the fifteenth century, indeed, the local zāwiya-s have played a determinant role in the military resistance against frequent attempts of Iberian expansionism and needed for this purpose a constant popular mobilization. Being essentially a rural movement operating within an overwhelmingly illiterate population, the simplification of Sufi principles became a necessity. This was also made imperative by the missionary function of the zāwiya in a milieu where islamization remained rudimentary and superficial. The popular success of the zāwiya-s in the countryside was, in a sense, the result of the spiritual vacuum which in the town was filled by ‘ālim-s.

This popularization of Sufism led to the emergence of numerous heterodox practices which tainted the true nature of Islam. Among these practices there were the gathering of adepts in exciting dhikr sessions, the cult of saints and the annual celebration of mawsim-s. Another by-product of this popularization was the degradation of Sufism as a science. Moroccan Sufis tended, according to Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt, to neglect the original works on Sufism and concentrate instead on a number of popularizing books and stereotyped formulas such as the maxims of Ibn ‘Atā’ Allāh(45)

... by Mawlāy Sulaymān to Aḥmad b. al-Nādī al-Ḥamdūnī, dated 1 Shawwāl 1236/2 July, 1821 in D.Ā.R., year 1236 AH.

- (45) Ibn ‘Atā’ Allāh (d.1308 AD) belonged to the mystic school founded by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī (d.1258 AD). His most important work, al-Ḥikam al-‘atā’iyya, was abundantly commented by Moroccan mystics. E.I., III, 1971, pp.722-723. On the degraded state of Moroccan Sufism at the beginning of the 19th century Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt wrote in al-Rawḍa al-maḡṣūda, p.43:

” . . . إلا أن هم أهل المغرب تقاعست عن التعلق بموضوعاته سوى ما كان من مسائل اقتطفها ابن عطاء الله من الكتاب والسنة وكلام القوم ونسخها في قوالب الحكم وعدت من جملة كتب الفن، وان كانت انما هي كلمات ملتقطة بلا ترتيب ولا تبويب . . . ولم تبرح هذه الحكم تتناولها الأيدي وتلعثم بها الألسن من طلبية المدرسين في الوقت ويلهج بحفظها المستظهرون بالانحياش للقوم . . . أما الكتب المتضمنة لموضوع الفن على سنن أهله ووفق مصطلحهم فقد طارت به عنقا مغرب في جميع أقطار المغرب . . . ”

For similar Sufi works Mawlāy Sulaymān had little sympathy. He even remonstrated against their being read (46).

The ambition of Mawlāy Sulaymān was, according to al-Ḥawwāt, to renovate mysticism by going back to the sources of Sufism, and particularly to the doctrine of al-Ghazzālī (47). Mawlāy Sulaymān had clearly a great admiration for al-Ghazzālī. Upon his accession to the throne he prescribed the teaching of his Iḥyā' and recommended its reading for his own sons (48). He also supervised its discussion within the religious seminars that he held frequently and which included the most eminent ʿālim-s of the country (49).

Al-Iḥyā' is al-Ghazzālī's greatest work in size and in importance. It is a comprehensive guide for the devout Muslim covering almost every aspect of religious life : worship, conduct in the daily life, purification of the heart and advance along the mystic way (50). Al-Ghazzālī had the advantage of being an outstanding theologian and a great mystic at the same time. Without departing from Sunnism or orthodox Islam, his Iḥyā' provided an answer to all mystic preoccupations of the devout believer.

(46) A. al-Filālī, al-Tārīkh, pp. 122-124.

(47) Al-Ḥawwāt, Dīwān, pp. 17-20; al-Rawḍa al-maḥṣūda, p. 43.

(48) Al-Ibtisām, p. 6. Cf. also letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to his son Mawlāy Ibrāhīm recommending the reading of al-Iḥyā', no date, in al-Mashrafī's Sharḥ al-shamaḥmaḥiyya, unnumbered pages.

(49) Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt, al-Rawḍa al-maḥṣūda, p. 43; cf. also his Dīwān, pp. 17-20. Al-Ḥawwāt praised Mawlāy Sulaymān's efforts to revive the "science of Sufism by encouraging the study of al-Ghazzālī's Iḥyā'". In this respect he wrote in al-Rawḍa .., p. 43:

"لما أطلع الله على المغرب شمس خلافة في أفق العلم والعدل . . . أمر صرف  
 همته لأحياء هذا الدين بأحياء كتاب الإحياء للغزالي ، فصار يُقرأ على مر الأيام  
 والليالي ، وذلك بعدما تعهده بالقراءة في بساطه السعيد ، وتناول له بالمباحثة  
 في تفاصيل مشكله بالنظر السديد ."

(50) Cf. E.I., 1965, II, pp. 1038-1041.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's preference for the mysticism of al-Ghazzālī was in fact a preference for a "Sunni mysticism" or a "mysticism of the legalists" (taṣawwuf al-fuḡahā) as defined by a fifteenth century Maghribi mystic, Aḥmad Zarrūq (d.1493 AD) (51). The objective of Sunni mysticism is to place the believer on the mystic way and provide him with the necessary tools to ensure his salvation without the need for a spiritual intermediary. In other words, it is a mysticism in which the shaykh, or spiritual guide, occupies a secondary role (52).

This kind of mysticism is elitist by definition and therefore less open to popular deviations. Mawlāy Sulaymān advocated a mysticism for the enlightened few to the exclusion of the ʿāmma, or common people, "this group of people which", in his own terms, "should count rather among the dead than among the living" (53). This is because the common people were unable to lead a contemplative life in conformity with the tradition of the Prophet and his companions. Orthodox mysticism supposed the ability to recite the Quran and invoke God in a discreet manner, instead of resorting to ecstatic dhikr sessions as was the case with some popular religious orders (54).

Mawlāy Sulaymān was fully conscious that the replacement of popular mysticism as advocated by the zāwiya-s

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(51) S. Trimmingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam, Oxford, 1971, p. 242.

(52) The adoption of a shaykh was essential to all Sufi orders and particularly to the Shādhiliṭarīqa-s. "He who pretends to be able to dispense with the shaykh", wrote Mawlāy al-ʿArbī al-Darqāwī, "has missed the gate and faced the wall. Had we remained faithful to the Prophet's message we would have certainly been able to content ourselves with God and the Prophet without the need for a shaykh; but after all the alterations we have introduced to the religion, until our hearts and senses have become soiled, how can we do without a shaykh?" . Cf. Mawlāy al-ʿArbī al-Darqāwī, Rasāʿil, Ms.K.3095, BGR, p.30; personal translation.

(53) Al-ʿArbī al-Mashraffī, Sharḥ al-shamaḡmaḡiyya, unpaginated.

(54) Mawlāy Sulaymān, Khuṭba on the mawsim-s, pp.5-6.

with a "Sunni mysticism" according to the doctrine of al-Ghazzālī, would only be achieved if the prevailing Sufi practices were discredited and eradicated. He applied himself therefore to the task of combatting innovations with an untiring perseverance. His essays and khutba-s were mainly directed against popular religious brotherhoods which recruited heavily among the lower strata of the ʿamma, such as the ʿAysāwiya and the Ḥamadsha orders. They were also directed against the new Darqāwiya order which succeeded within a relatively short time in becoming the most popular religious order in the country and whose practices —such as the dhikr sessions and the wearing of patched garments— were often repugnant to orthodox ʿālim-s.

Among the unorthodox practices of the zāwiya-s, the samāʿ (the use of musical instruments for worship purposes) was an eternal subject of controversy between the ʿālim-s and the Sufis. In two essays devoted to this question, Mawlāy Sulaymān elucidated religious attitudes with this respect (55). To cut short the controversy on the samāʿ he proposed to go back to "the mother of sources" —the Quran and the Prophet's tradition. He also supported his arguments condemning the samāʿ by extensive quotations from the works of famous Māliki theologians. Mawlāy Sulaymān wanted to prove in particular that:-

1. the worship of God is incompatible with any form of amusement;
2. Sufism as practiced by the ʿamma is a fallacy and an innovation which does more harm to their belief than any other sin they might commit;
3. the adepts of Sufi ṭarīqa-s are superfluous and an unproductive element in society. By their retreat from active life they necessarily constitute a burden for the rest of the social body from which

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(55) Cf. note 27 above.

they should be discarded (56).

Mawlāy Sulaymān's attack on Sufi heterodox practices found its expression also in his numerous khutba-s (57) in which he denounced the celebration of mawsim-s. These annual gatherings of adepts and sympathizers of a religious order gave rise to a number of illegal practices. The mawsim-s, argued Mawlāy Sulaymān, constituted an innovation because they were unknown to the pious ancestors (58). Moreover, these annual fairs were usually the occasion for the immolation of animals and their dedication to dead saints in order to implore their power of intercession. This practice, Mawlāy Sulaymān claimed, could be perilous for the belief of the common people who, by imploring the saints, often tended to ascribe to them divine attributions (59). Mawlāy Sulaymān decided, therefore, to ban these annual celebrations and maintained this interdiction even during the most critical periods of his reign (60).

By discrediting these practices Mawlāy Sulaymān was in fact launching a direct attack on the zāwiya-s for whom the mawsim-s represented not only an important religious manifestation but also a vital source of income (61). The decision to prohibit such fairs affected directly the moral and material privileges of both the zāwiya-s and the sharīf-s. No wonder that these forces adopted an openly hostile attitude towards Mawlāy Sulaymān and accused him of Wahhābism.

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(56) This is a clear attack on the Darqāwi-s who preached al-khumūl, or the neglect of means of livelihood. Cf. Mawlāy Sulaymān, al-Samāʿ, pp.44-46.

(57) Cf. Note 27 above.

(58) Mawlāy Sulaymān, Khutba on the mawsim-s, p.5.

(59) Al-ʿArbī al-Mashrafi, Sharḥ al-shamaḡnaqiya, unpaginated.

(60) In 1235 AH/1819-1820 AD, on the morrow of the Zaian defeat and in the midst of a critical political crisis, Mawlāy Sulaymān still maintained a firm position on religious fairs and opposed the celebration by the ʿAysāwa of their mawsim. Cf. Ibn Zaydān, Ithāf, I, p.351 and al-Mashrafi's Sharḥ..., unpaginated.

(61) The mawsim-s took place usually during the summer or the autumn seasons after the end of harvests. The adepts of the Wazzāniya

II - The Winds of Eastern Reformism : the Moroccan  
Response to Wahhābism

The Wahhābi doctrine was almost unanimously rejected by the Islamic world. In the Ottoman Empire hostility to Wahhābism was motivated, to a large extent, by political reasons since the movement represented not only a religious but also a political threat. This was not the case in Morocco whose Sultan was one of the rare rulers if not the only one, who not only refrained from attacking the doctrine, but sympathized with many of its ideas. However, the conservatism of the religious forces and the predominance of the Sufi-sharifian ideology in Morocco made impossible its implantation in this country.

A- The Wahhābi Doctrine

Wahhābism is a modern form of Ḥanbalism. The founder of the doctrine, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (1703-1792), received a religious education in conformity with the Ḥanbalist rite and was particularly impressed with the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya (d.1328 AD) who was one of the most eminent theologians of the Ḥanbali school (62). In 1744 Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb concluded an alliance with the prince of Najd in the Hijāz, Muḥammad b. Saʿūd, for whom the new ideas of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb presented a precious occasion to shake off the Ottoman rule. Thereafter, the movement acquired a political character, gained new followers and extended progressively to most of the Hijāz. In 1805-1806 the Wahhābis took over the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina. It was indeed under the reign of Saʿūd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (1803-1814) that the movement reached its culmination.

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... religious order , for instance, brought all kinds of offerings to Sīdī ʿAlī b. Aḥmad: agricultural products, slaves, gold and silver. Cf. A. al-Wazzānī, al-Rawḍ al-munīf, II, pp. 76-77.

(62) On Ibn Taymiyya, cf. E.I., III, 1971, pp. 951-955.

Being unable to stop the progress of the Wahhābi threat the Ottoman sultan, Maḥmūd II, called on the Pasha of Egypt, Muḥammad ʿAlī, to check the spread of this politico-religious danger. The successor of Saʿūd , ʿAbd Allāh, suffered a decisive defeat in 1815 and was finally taken prisoner and executed at Istanbul in 1818.

As a doctrine, Wahhābism attempts, along the lines drawn by Ibn Ḥanbal and Ibn Taymiyya, to restore the original purity and simplicity of the religion by combatting all suspect innovations. The Wahhābi doctrine is based on a strict adherence to the unicity of God (al-tawḥīd). The cult of saints is energetically opposed as well as the visitation of shrines and tombs of saints, considered to be forms of idolatry. Even the ritual visitation of the Prophet's tomb was placed under heavy restrictions and prohibited to the common people in order to prevent idolatrous practices, such as asking for the Prophet's intercession. Books of prayers dedicated to the Prophet, such as the Dalāʾil al-khayrāt by the renovator of Maghribi Sufism, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jazūlī (d. 1460), were forbidden (63). Prayers, argued the Wahhābi theologians, should be directed to God alone to the exclusion of all creatures, be they prophets or saints, alive or dead (64). All those who did not conform to this view were considered as idolatrous (mushrikūn, pl. of mushrik) and therefore liable for jihād as infidels.

The Wahhābi fight against innovations and idolatrous practices also manifested itself in intransigent opposition to all deviations which had corrupted religion. Among these there were the ornamentation of tombs of saints and mosques, the consecration of sacrifices to the awliyāʾ<sup>3</sup>

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(63) Al-Ibtisām, p.28.

(64) ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, An Account of the Tenets of the Wahhabis of Arabia, Ms.Or.6631, British Museum, fol.20.



(pl. of wali, or saint) and all forms of saint cult. Upon their entering Mecca and Medina, the Wahnābi-s destroyed the domes erected on the tombs of the Prophet and his companions and all ornamental edifices they considered as detestable innovations. In so doing, their aim was to restore the primitive purity and simplicity of Islam as lived under the Prophet and the Right-guided califs.

The Wahnābi-s distinguished themselves in particular by their hostility to Sufism and the Sufi ṭarīqa-s. Although they were not opposed to mysticism in principle, the Wahnābi-s were, nevertheless, suspicious of Sufi practices which they condemned as being contrary to religion (65). This attitude provoked the hostility of most of the Islamic world because of the spread of Sufi ideology, particularly among the common people. The condemnation of Sufi heterodox practices by the Wahnābi-s was accompanied by a very austere and ascetic way of life. They forbade the use of tobacco, the wearing of silk and abstained from all forms of luxury (66). Their attachment to the primitive purity of Islam and the tradition of the Prophet's companions also reflected itself in their stress on equality among all believers. They abolished distinctive titles and forbade prostration before princes or other dignitaries. "They addressed their prince by his name", noted the author of al-Ibtisām, "and greeted him in the same way they used to greet each other" (67).

#### B- The Moroccan Response

A number of factors militated against the success of the Wahnābi reformist doctrine in Morocco. If, on one hand the popular attitude was mainly motivated by the

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(65) Ibid., pp.7-8.

(66) Al-Ibtisām, p.28; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.120.

(67) Al-Ibtisām, p.28; Anon. Histoire des Wahhabis depuis leur origine jusqu'à la fin de 1809, Paris, 1810, p. 21.

predominance of the Sufi-sharifian ideology, that of the Ṣālim-s, on the other hand, is to be explained by the deep-seated Māliki-Ashʿari tradition which proved to be incompatible with Ḥanbali dogma. However, Mawlāy Sulaymān while remaining faithful to Ashʿari dogma, did not make secret his sympathy with the reformist character of Wahhābism.

### (1) The Popular Response

The Ḥanbali doctrine was well known in Morocco but remained confined to the speculative field since Mālikism had always been the official and undisputed rite, and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal was respected more for his contribution to the study of the ḥadīth than for his theological ideas (68). It was only during the second half of the eighteenth century that Ḥanbali ideas were openly adopted by the ruling sultan, Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh. This coincided with the emergence of Wahhābism in the Arabian peninsula, but there is nothing to show that Sīdī Muḥammad's sympathy with Ḥanbalism was a result of foreign influence. The existence of the Wahhābi movement passed apparently unnoticed until the beginning of the nineteenth century when it had spread to the Holy Places. Moroccan travel accounts (riḥla-s) written by returning pilgrims during the latter part of the eighteenth century make, in fact, no reference to this emerging religious movement. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Salām b. Nāṣir who went twice on pilgrimage—in 1782 (1196 AH) and 1797 (1211 AH)—wrote two detailed riḥla-s neither of which mentioned the Wahhābi-s (69). Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Fāsī who accompanied him during the second pilgrimage did not refer either to the Wahhābi movement in his riḥla (70).

(68) E. Micheaux-Bellaire, Le Wahhabisme, Casablanca, 1928, p.9.

(69) Cf. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Salām b. Nāṣir, al-Riḥla al-kubrā, Ms.D. 2651, BGR, and al-Riḥla al-ṣuḡhrā, Ms.121, R.L.

(70) Cf. extracts from his riḥla in Ms.G.88, BGR, pp.164-181.

The first reference to the Wahhābi movement by al-Duʿayf goes back to 1803 (71). The information provided by Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Salām Bannānī (d.1819) also confirms that it was at the beginning of the nineteenth century that Moroccans became acquainted with the existence of Wahhābism (72). Bannānī affirmed that before 1803 there had never been any mention of the Wahhābi-s in Morocco (73). This was no doubt due to the interruption of contact with the Arab East for a number of years. From 1798 to 1802 the Moroccan pilgrimage caravan was suspended because of the French invasion of Egypt (74). This suspension, apparently, left Moroccans unacquainted with the events that were taking place in the Arabian peninsula. Moreover, the attention of the Islamic world was directed to the Christian threat which hung over Egypt, until the evacuation of French troops in 1802.

Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Salām Bannānī was among the pilgrims who left the city of Fès in October 1802. "We had never heard of the Wahhābi or his followers", he wrote (75). It was only upon their arrival in Egypt in February 1803 that Moroccan pilgrims became acquainted with the existence of the Wahhābi movement (76).

(71) Al-Duʿayf, p.423.

(72) Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Salām Bannānī, al-Fuyūḍāt al-wahbiya fī al-radd ʿalā al-ṭāʿifa al-wahbiya, Ms.170, private library of ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Fīlālī.

(73) Ibid., pp.10-11.

(74) The Moroccan pilgrimage caravan was temporarily interrupted following the French invasion of Egypt. It was in 1802 that Mawlāy Sulaymān authorized this caravan upon the assurances given to him by the British consul on the security of the land routes through Egypt. Cf. FO.52/12, 3 November, 1802.

(75) Bannānī, al-Fuyūḍāt, pp.10-11:

" . . . خرجتُ مع الركب النبي من محروسة فاس أمنها الله تعالى من كل بأس في أول يوم من العشر الاواخر من جمادى الثانية عام سبعة عشر بموحدة و مائتين و ألف، و الجفر من ألم الفراق و كثرة الشوق في نشر و لف، و ليس في أذ هاننا و لا أسمعنا ذكر للوهبي و لا أشباعه ( . . . ) الى أن وصلنا الى قاهرة مصر المحروسة أواخر شوال من العام المذكور فوجدنا وجوه أهلها من أجله قمطيرة عبوسة و ألفينا خبره فيها شائعاً و على لسان كل غاد و رائح مستفيضاً ذائعاً " .

(76) Ibid., p.11.

The news about the existence of the Wahhābi-s in the Hijaz and the prohibition they imposed on the visitation of the Prophet's tomb spread fear and confusion among Moroccan pilgrims, but the pilgrimage caravan succeeded in reaching Medina without being disturbed. After the pilgrims had fulfilled their religious duties there, however, they were attacked by the followers of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. Some of them were plundered and some even lost their lives (77).

The returning pilgrims were the first to popularize the news about the Wahhābi movement. The information conveyed by these pilgrims, many of whom had suffered or witnessed Wahhābi brutality, was in general biased, inaccurate and distorted. In Morocco, the Wahhābi doctrine was thus judged on the basis of false rumours or in terms of excesses committed by Wahhābi followers. For the common people, the doctrine came to be identified with the desecration of the Holy Places, the hostility to the visitation of saints, and the prohibition of the Dalāʾil al-khayrāt (78), a highly venerated book of prayers in Morocco. Al-Ḍuʿayf, who reflected popular opinion better than any other contemporary author, claimed that "the Wahhābi" was seeking to found a new religion (79).

The attitude of the Moroccan people to this eastern reformist doctrine was overwhelmingly hostile. The predominance of the Sufi-sharifian ideology represented the main obstacle to the spread of Wahhābism in Morocco.

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(77) Ibid., pp.16 and 19.

(78) Al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.424 and 500; al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna, p.389; al-Ibtisām, p.28.

(79) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.500.

The Wahhābi doctrine is in its essence opposed to the cult of saints which is the very basis of Moroccan popular religion. It is also hostile to the adoption of spiritual intermediaries between the believer and God. This was in open contradiction with the whole sufi ideology according to which mystic shaykh-s, or spiritual guides are supposed to lead the believer on the path of God. The Shādhili school of Sufism, from which derived most of the Maghribi ṭarīqa-s, maintained in fact that it was impossible to restore the original purity of Islam as lived under the Prophet and his companions because of the corruption of the age, whence the necessity for spiritual guidance for the devout Muslim (80). The adoption of a "spiritual way" (ṭarīqa) becomes, therefore, a necessity. The Wahhābi doctrine upheld, on the contrary, that religion was accessible by its sources to all believers without distinction.

The Wahhābi doctrine could not just antagonize Ṣufi brotherhoods without, at the same time, coming into collision with sharifism. Indeed, Moroccan Sufism had been interwoven with sharifism ever since the revival of the Shādhili mystic school in the fifteenth century under the influence of the celebrated Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jazūlī. The worship of saints, the veneration of the Prophet and his descendants and the advocacy of social and religious differentiation which places the awliyāʾ and the sharīf-s at the top of the socio-religious pyramid, were as dear to the sharīf-s as they were to the Sufi shaykh-s. The Wahhābi doctrine, however, rejected the intercession of saints and the necessity of intermediaries between man and God, thus attacking the foundation of both popular Sufism and sharifism at the same time.

(80) Mawlāy al-ʿArbī al-Darqāwī, Rasāʾil, Ms K 3095, BGR, p. 30; ʿAbd al-Hafīdh al-Fāsī, al-Turjumān al-muʿrib ʿan ashhar furūʿ al-shādhiliya bi al-Maghrib, Mic. I4, HPMD, Rabat, 1976, no pagination.

Anti-Wahhābi propaganda found in Morocco most favourable ground. The common people readily adopted a hostile attitude to this reformist movement. Many thousands of Moroccans volunteered to fight the Wahhābi-s under the banner of Muḥammad ʿAlī (81). The spirit of the jihād remained by no means confined to the common people. As eminent an ʿālim as Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Salām Bannānī thought in fact that it was also the duty of amīr al-mūminīn to send the mujāhidīn, money and military equipment to suppress the Wahhābi threat (82).

(2) The Official Response: ʿĀlim-s and Makhzen

Apparently, the Wahhābi leaders never attempted to recruit the Moroccan sultan or the Moroccan ʿālim-s to their religious cause. Their preaching effort remained confined to the Ottoman Empire, most probably for political reasons, as they needed to overcome first of all resistance within the Empire itself. There is, in fact, no evidence of any direct correspondence from the Wahhābi-s to the Moroccan ʿālim-s or to Mawlāy Sulaymān. Indeed, among the written documents through which Moroccans became acquainted with the Wahhābi doctrine there is none addressed to them directly.

Contrary to what is asserted by al-Zayānī and al-Nāṣirī, Moroccan ʿālim-s did not first come into contact with the Wahhābi doctrine in 1811-1812 (83) when they received a copy of the letter addressed by Saʿūd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz to the Tunisian ʿālim-s. The information provided by the author of al-Fuyūḍāt al-wahbiya leaves no doubt that the introduction into the country of the first Wahhābi documents goes back to 1803.

(81) Al-Ḍuʿayf mentioned that Muḥammad ʿAlī had with him a Maghribi contingent of 8,000 men. Cf. al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.477, 500. The Egyptian historian al-Jabartī noted the existence of Maghribi fighters among the Egyptian army; cf. ʿAjāʾib al-āthār fī al-tarājīm wa al-akhbār, Cairo, 1880, vol.IV, p.305.

(82) A. Bannānī, al-Fuyūḍāt, p.151.

(83) Cf. al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.185; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.117-120.

Indeed, Aḥmad Bannānī affirmed that upon his return from the Hijaz he brought with him two letters exposing the tenets of the Wahhābi doctrine (84). The first letter was a long one, while the second which fell into the author's hands at Constantine during the return journey amounted to a few pages only (85). After having circulated among the ʿālim-s of Fès, these two documents finally reached Mawlāy Sulaymān.

This version of events is confirmed by al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān. In his essay in the refutation of Wahhābism, Ibn Kīrān affirmed that he was entrusted by Mawlāy Sulaymān with the examination of two letters which "fell into his hands" (86). They consisted in a long one of about forty pages, and a short one of four pages, neither of which, he claimed, was addressed to the Moroccan ʿālim-s or to Mawlāy Sulaymān (87).

(84) A. Bannānī, al-Fuyūḍāt, p. 176.

(85) Ibid. Bannānī wrote in particular:

"وذلك ان رسالة الوهبي المذكور أتيت بها معي من بلاد المشرق مع رسالة أخرى صغرى ألفيتها بمدينة قسطنطينة. ثم لما وصلنا الى مدينة فاس أمنها الله تعالى من كل باس وقعتا معا بيد مولانا الإمام الأوحده عالم السلاطين وسُلطان العلماء النقد أمير المؤمنين سيدنا سليمان بن محمد أبقاه الله ذاباً عن دينه وملاذا لاهل الحق في حينه فأمر نصره الله شيخنا المذكور (الطيب بن كيران) أن يعجن النظر فيما انتحاه صاحب الرسالتين واعتمده وحمل عليه العامة وتقلده".

(86) Al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān, Radd ʿalā madhhab al-wahhābiya, Ms. K 1325, BGR, p. 21.

"ووقع من ذلك في يد مولانا الإمام (...). رسالتان منسويتان لسعود بن عبد العزيز إحداهما صغرى نحو وقتين والأخرى كبرى نحو كراسة، أمرني أن أمعن النظر فيما انتحاه واعتمده...".

(87) Ibid.

The ideological content of the two documents seemed so important that Mawlāy Sulaymān deemed it necessary to submit the issue to the ʿālim-s for examination. Ibn Kīrān, being the shaykh al-jamāʿa, was more qualified than any other to draft an answer. The need for the formulation of a reply was dictated essentially by the necessity of ideological clarification.

In his response, which extended to about fifty pages (88), al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān took it upon himself to refute the main theological arguments of the Wahhābi doctrine. He relied on both logic and the sayings of famous theologians to define the nature of belief and heresy and to clarify the attitude of Islam towards the veneration of saints and recourse to their power of intercession. The veneration due to the Prophet and the awliyāʾ, argued Ibn Kīrān, is conformable with the precepts of religion and should in no way be considered as idolatrous worship. Ibn Kīrān recognized, however, that some people among the ʿāmma did in fact exaggerate their reverence towards the awliyāʾ but in such cases, he maintained, we should be very cautious in deciding whether this veneration had reached the point of becoming a heresy or not. The punishment of heretical practices, underlined Ibn Kīrān, must remain limited to their specific authors and should in no way be generalized to a whole community (89).

On the Makhzen's side, there was no reaction until 1811. Between 1803 and 1811 Mawlāy Sulaymān refrained from either condemning the Wahhābi doctrine or expressing openly his sympathy with its principles. Was it the hostility of the ʿālim-s to this doctrine which prevented

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(88) Ibid. Ibn Kīrān's personal attitude towards the Wahhābi doctrine is reflected in his essay (Ms.K.1325, BGR). It should not be confused with the letter that he wrote to Saʿūd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz on behalf of Mawlāy Sulaymān (Ms.4624, R.L.) and which reflects the Sultan's views. Cf. appendix 55.

(89) Ibid., p.75.



him from manifesting his favourable disposition ? Some indications allow us to conclude that Mawlāy Sulaymān's hostility to innovations and heterodox practices was enhanced during this period. In 1804, al-Ḍuʿayf reported that the Sultan's governor, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Salām al-Salāwī, prevented the ʿArab al-Widyān tribes from celebrating the mawsim of Sīdī Yaḥya b. Manṣūr (90). The next year Mawlāy Sulaymān removed the dome off his father's shrine in Rabat (91). In 1806, the Sultan wrote an important essay in which he attacked Sufi heterodox practices (92). Three years later, in 1809, he ordered the removal of the tombstone placed on his father's tomb claiming that "it was against the Sunna" (93).

Meanwhile, the regular movement of Moroccan pilgrims to the Hijaz was hindered by the alleged insecurity of the holy places (94). The arrival in Fès of a third Wahhābi document in 1811 raised the problem again and made an official reply inevitable. The new document consisted in a letter addressed by Saʿūd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz to the ʿālim-s of Tunis. A copy of this letter had then been dispatched to Fès (95). Mawlāy Sulaymān thought that the time had come for the resumption of the pilgrimage to Mecca and the despatch of an official delegation which would both transmit the Moroccan position vis-à-vis the Wahhābi doctrine and also sound out the real intentions and motives of the Wahhābi leaders.

(90) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.411. For al-Ḍuʿayf the event seemed so important that he wrote: "From the day of Mawlāy Sulaymān's proclamation to the day in which he removed the tombstone there had elapsed 17 years and 11 months less than 7 days".

(91) *Ibid.*, p.442.

(92) Mawlāy Sulaymān, al-Samāʿ, Ms. 652, Sbīḥī library, pp. 1-59.

(93) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.454.

(94) Propaganda by conservative forces played an important role in diverting devout believers from fulfilling their religious duties. Cf. the case of an Idrisid sharīf, al-Faḍīl al-ʿAmrānī, who dissuaded many Moroccan pilgrims from proceeding to the Hijaz on the pretence that Wahhābi-s had forbidden the visitation of the Holy Places. Cf. al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahāʿ, p.20. Later on, this ascetic sharīf played an active role in the Fès rebellion against Mawlāy Sulaymān.

(95) Cf. copy of the letter in al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna al-kubrā, pp.394-396.

Mawlāy Sulaymān found no difficulty in convincing the ḥālim-s that it was necessary to issue a fatwā authorizing the resumption of pilgrimage. The question addressed to the ḥālim-s was formulated in such a way that they were left with little freedom of manoeuvre. "Our Lord", wrote the ḥālim-s, "has already answered the query and left little room for contestation". Relying on the information communicated to them in two royal letters about the security of the Holy Places, the ḥālim-s wrote that "the people of the Maghrib were subject, in the same way as other Muslims, to the obligation of pilgrimage, especially after it became clear that they were not exposed during their journey to any threat from 'Abd al-Wahhāb(sic). Nobody who travelled through the Wahhābi State of the Hijaz ever claimed that he had been invited to adopt Wahhābi views or had been endangered in his life or property, or prevented from accomplishing his wishes. On the contrary, he ('Abd al-Wahhāb) was the agent of security and tranquillity in every part of the Hijaz, and might very well be a support for this Religion"(96).

Never were the Moroccan ḥālim-s more unanimous in praising the action of the Wahhābi-s. Mawlāy Sulaymān seemed to have achieved a preliminary success in overcoming the resistance of the religious scholars. He was so encouraged that he decided to send an official reply to Sa'ūd b. 'Abd al-'Azīz. The task of formulating such a reply was entrusted to three ḥālim-s: al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān (d.1812), author of the essay referenced above, Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt (d.1816), the naqīb (dean) of the sharīf-s, and Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj, the uncontested poet of the Sulaymāni Court (97).

(96) Cf. fatwā by the ḥālim-s authorizing Mawlāy Sulaymān to dispatch the pilgrimage caravan in 1811 after he had received favourable reports on the security of the Hijaz, in Ms.D.2753, BGR, pp.95-98. The signatories of the fatwā were: Aḥmad b. Sūda, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī, Muḥammad al-Zarwālī, Idrīs al-'Irāqī, Muḥammad b. Manṣūr, Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj, al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān and 'Abd al-Salām al-Azamī. Cf. appendix 53.

(97) Cf. Ibn Kīrān's letter to Sa'ūd b. 'Abd al-'Azīz in the name of Mawlāy Sulaymān in Ms.4624, R.L.; al-Ḥawwāt's letter in Ms.2710, R.L., fol.82-86; Ḥamdūn's versified reply in his Dīwān, Ms.K.963, pp.202-215.

Ibn Kīrān had already made clear his rejection of the Wahhābi doctrine. Like Mawlāy Sulaymān, he remained profoundly attached to Māliki-Ash‘ari theological thought. He was highly respectful of the sharīf-s to whom he devoted two of his major works (98) and was by no means hostile to the zāwiya-s. Among his works there figure, in particular, a commentary on the maxims of Ibn‘Atā‘Allāh (99) and another on the Mashīshi prayer (al-ṣalāt al-mashīshiya by the Sufi Pole Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Salām b. Mashīsh). He was not, therefore, disposed to offer a welcome to Wahhābi ideas.

Nor was Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt--whose consultation by the Sultan on this issue seemed rather to be a measure of courtesy towards the spokesman of the sharīf-s--any more receptive to Wahhābi views. Although well grounded in the religious sciences, al-Ḥawwāt did not count among the senior ‘ālim-s whose opinion was sought on important doctrinal issues (100). He distinguished himself not so much by his religious scholarship as by his talents as the genealogist of the sharifian families of Morocco (101). He was also profoundly imbued with sufi ideas. His sympathy with the sufi brotherhoods manifested itself especially in his condemnation of the persecution to which the Darqāwi-s were exposed in the years 1794-1795 (102). Towards Wahhābism al-Ḥawwāt adopted an openly hostile attitude (103). In spite of this, he maintained good relations with the Sultan to whom he devoted many of his eulogistic poems (104).

(98) They consisted in two poems devoted to the exaltation of the Qādiri and Wazzāni sharīf-s. Cf. Hāshiyat Muhammad b. Qāsim al-Qādirī on Ibn Kīrān's commentary on Ibn ‘Ashir's tawhīd, lith. Fēs, no date, vol. I, part I, pp. 4-5.

(99) Cf. footnote 45 above.

(100) His name does not figure, for instance, among the ‘ālim-s who were consulted in 1811 on the resumption of pilgrimage to the Holy Places. Cf. footnote 96 above.

(101) Cf. al-‘Arbī al-Mashrafī, Nuzhat al-abṣār, p.451.

(102) Ibid.

(103) Al-Ḥawwāt, Dīwān, Ms.2941, R.L., p.57.

(104) Cf. his Dīwān in the eulogy of Mawlāy Sulaymān, Ms.D.753, BGR;cf. also collection of his poems in Ms.Z.3091, R.L.

The third ʿālim, Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj, was both a religious scholar and an unrivalled poet. The excellent relations he maintained with the court made of him a typical "palace ʿālim". During Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj was often called upon to fill governmental posts. He served in particular as Muḥtasib of Fès and governor of the Gharb province. His strict adherence to the sharīʿa made him, sometimes, very unpopular, especially with the Wazzāniya religious order whose influence extended to the Gharb (105). His dispute with Sīdī ʿAlī b. Aḥmad in 1804 (106) was most probably the reason why he abandoned the Wazzāni ṭarīqa (107). Aḥmad al-Tijānī attempted later on to attract him to his ṭarīqa but without success (108). Undoubtedly, Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj was the most enthusiastic ʿālim for the Wahhābi reformist ideas. Al-Zayānī went so far as to claim that Ḥamdūn confessed his Wahhābism to his son before he died (109).

Among the three answers drafted at Mawlāy Sulaymān's demand, only Ḥamdūn's qaṣīda is mentioned by Moroccan historiographers. There is no trace in the works of al-Zayānī or Akansūs of Ibn Kīrān's reply which constituted, nevertheless, the basic document carried by the official delegation to the Wahhābi leaders. Both al-Zayānī and Akansūs mentioned Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj as the only ʿālim entrusted with the drafting of the Moroccan reply (110). Ḥamdūn's qaṣīda certainly reflected Mawlāy Sulaymān's attitude, but was rather intended as an eulogistic supplement to Ibn Kīrān's solidly argued letter. The fact that not only Ibn Kīrān's letter and Ḥamdūn's qaṣīda

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(105) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.436; al-Kattānī, Salwat, III, pp.4-5; al-Mashraffī, Nuzhat al-abṣār, pp.431-433.

(106) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.436.

(107) Skiredj, Rafʿ al-ḥijāb, II, p.143.

(108) Cf. Tijānī Letters, Ms.K.644, BGR, letter from Aḥmad al-Tijānī to Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj, pp.158-159.

(109) Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahāʿ, p.271.

(110) Al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna, p.396; al-Rawḍa, fol.185; Akansūs, pp.298-299.

but also a third document by Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt (111) are now available enables us to have a clearer idea about the whole issue.

The examination of the three documents shows, indeed, that they all express the same convictions and rely on same arguments. The instructions of Mawlāy Sulaymān to the three ‘ālim-s were faithfully respected. Contrary to what is claimed by al-Zayānī, therefore, Ḥamdūn's qaṣīda did not reflect the convictions of its author alone (112). Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj had done no more than to render in verse the ideas developed in prose by Ibn Kīrān and Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt.

Both Ibn Kīrān and al-Ḥawwāt had the opportunity to express their personal opinion about the Wahhābi doctrine (113). They both were unequivocally hostile to the said doctrine. In his essay on the refutation of the Wahhābi ideas, Ibn Kīrān attacked "the Wahhābi" as a "blameworthy innovator" who "perturbed the belief of the common Muslims" (114). Al-Ḥawwāt, on the other hand, qualified the Wahhābi-s as "rebels" who threatened with the sword all those who did not adopt their views (115). An examination of Mawlāy Sulaymān's message to Sa‘ūd b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz makes the great difference between these ‘ālim-s personal

(111) Al-Ḥawwāt drafted a letter to Ibn Sa‘ūd on behalf of Mawlāy Sulaymān but this latter preferred Ibn Kīrān's project which was more solidly argued. Cf. al-Ḥawwāt's letter in Ms. Z.2710, R.L., fol.82-86 (appendix 56). Cf. Ibn Kīrān's draft in Ms.4624, R.L. (appendix 55).

(112) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.185.

(113) Cf. Ms. K.1325, BGR, for Ibn Kīrān's personal opinion and Ms.2941, R.L. for al-Ḥawwāt's personal views.

(114) Ibn Kīrān, Radd ‘alā madhhab al-wahhābiya, pp. 21, 46.

(115) Al-Ḥawwāt, Dīwān, pp.32,57.

On the return of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm from the Hijaz in 1812 al-Ḥawwāt wrote :  
 ولا سِيما و سَعود يَمْنَعُ أَرْضَهُ \* بالسيف من كان لا يتوَهَّب  
 وهو الأمير على الحجاز وغيره \* والثائر التمرد المُغلب

This accusation is completely contradictory to the eulogistic statements made in the letter he was asked to draft to Sa‘ūd b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and in which he praised in particular the pacification of the Hijaz by the Wahhābi-s ; cf. Ms. Z.2710, R.L., fol.85.

views and the position of the Sultan quite evident (116).

(3) Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Wahhābi Doctrine

The fact that Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to send an official delegation in 1811 to deliver his reply to the Wahhābi leaders shows the importance he attached to the issue. This delegation was headed by his elder son and heir presumptive, Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, as well as the qādī of Marrakech, Muḥammad al-Zaddāghī, and a distinguished ʿālim from Fès, al-ʿAbbās b. Kīrān (117).

Mawlāy Sulaymān took the initiative of sending an official reply in order to express his good disposition towards the Wahhābi ideas. "The aim of this letter", he wrote to Saʿūd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, "is to dissipate any possible suspicion on your part according to which we would be opposed to your ideas" (118). In spite of some criticism, Mawlāy Sulaymān remained, on the whole, favourable to the reformist spirit of the Wahhābi doctrine. He exalted the asceticism of the Wahhābi-s, their hostility to all forms of luxury and their endeavours to purify the religion from all sorts of detestable innovations. "We were pleased", Mawlāy Sulaymān wrote, "to hear about your conduct, your qualities, your ascetism, your revivification of the tenets of religion according to the path traced by the pious ancestors (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ), your care about a sincere unitarian worship of God and your eradication of innovations and deviations which are usually at the origin of doctrinal errors and heresies. What we learned about you is in perfect harmony with the books of the

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(116) Since al-Ḥawwāt's letter was never sent to Saʿūd, it will be, therefore, disregarded in our analysis of Mawlāy Sulaymān's attitude vis-à-vis the Wahhābi doctrine.

(117) Akansūs, p.299.

(118) Cf. letter drafted by Ibn Kīrān, Ms.4624, R.L., fol.5.

Ālim-s and the doctrines instituted by the salaf and the Prophet's companions" (119). Mawlāy Sulaymān also praised the action of the Wahnābi-s in pacifying the Hijaz and ensuring the protection of pilgrims (120).

He had, nevertheless, some reservations about the Wahnābi doctrine regarding, in particular, the doctrinal problem of al-takfīr (excommunication) and the recourse to the intercession of prophets and saints.

The major issue of theological disagreement between the Wahnābi-s and their opponents was, undoubtedly, the question of excommunication. The doctrine of Wahnābism was initially founded on the basis of a strict adherence to the unicity of God. The followers of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahnāb were, indeed, so attached to the principle of God's unicity that they preferred to call themselves al-muwahhidūn, or unitarians (121). Their zeal about this principle made them very prone to consider the popular veneration given to the Prophet and the awliyāʾ as a form of idolatrous worship which contradicted the basis foundation of faith. Ideological intolerance, which usually characterizes every new movement, led them to abuse of the use of excommunication against their opponents. These were thus declared to be mushrikūn (pl. of mushrik) or heretics and whose blood may be let under the terms of the sharīʿa.

(119) Letter to Saʿūd, Ibid., fol.1 (personal translation). The letter

read: "وبعد فإننا نحمد إلیکم الله الذي هدانا لهذا وما كنا لنهتدي لولا أن هدانا الله. فلقد سرنا ما بلغنا عنكم من سيرتكم وشيئكم وأحوالكم في الزهد في الدنيا وإحيا رسوم الدين، والحض على طريق السلف الصالح وسنن المهتدين، والحمل على إخلاص التوحيد لرب العالمين وقطع البدع والضلالات التي هي منشأ زيغ العقائد وكثرة الجهالات. وما برحنا نسمع عنكم ما قد أصبتم فيه كل الإصابة ووافقت فيه كتب العلماء ومذاهب السلف والصحابة...".

(120) Ibid., fol.5.

(121) The appellation of "Wahnābis-s" was applied to them by their enemies.

Given his strong attachment to the Māliki-Ashʿari school (122), Mawlāy Sulaymān rejected the Wahhābi view on this particular issue. He maintained that the exaggerated veneration of saints and their entreatment are to be considered at most as bidʿa or as a serious sin (kabīra) which should in no way result in excluding from the Muslim community persons who still believed in God and his Prophet (123). We have already referred to Mawlāy Sulaymān's doctrinal position on the takfīr issue. "Excommunication", he wrote in his essay on al-kasb, "is a most alarming issue, since it implies the condemnation of a person to perpetual hell when the day of the Last Judgement comes. The takfīr can only be pronounced against an infidel about whom there can be no ambiguity" (124). According to Mawlāy Sulaymān, the dividing line between a believer and an infidel is the profession of faith, or the shahāda, which is enough in itself to ensure the individual against perpetual hell. "It is far safer to spare the lives of a thousand infidels", Mawlāy Sulaymān wrote to Saʿūd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, "than to shed unjustly the blood of a single believer" (125).

The second objection made by Mawlāy Sulaymān to the Wahhābi doctrine related to the place occupied by saints in Islam. The Wahhābi-s did not deny sainthood or the saints' miracles (karāmāt). They maintained, nevertheless, that only God was worthy of worship and rejected

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(122) His Ashʿari convictions are clearly expressed in an essay on al-kasb written initially by Mawlāy Sulaymān but completed by Ibn Kīrān. Cf. Ms.D.1838, BGR, pp.253-270.

(123) Mawlāy Sulaymān and Ibn Kīrān, Jawāb fī masʾalat al-kasb, Ms.D. 1838, BGR, p.269.

(124) Ibid.

(125) Mawlāy Sulaymān, letter to Saʿūd, fol.2.



therefore all forms of saint cult. They particularly disapproved the visitation of the saints' tombs by the common people. The supplication of saints, whether dead or alive, was considered as a form of heresy (shirk) since only God can fulfill man's wishes (126).

For Mawlāy Sulaymān, a distinction had to be made between a person who resorted to the intercession of saints being aware that only God could fulfill his demand and a person who addressed himself to a saint believing that the saint alone could ensure him good or evil. In other words, all depended on the real intention of the individual, something which only God knows.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's letter quoted numerous ḥadīth-s and verses of the Quran which supported the ability of prophets and saints to act as intermediaries between man and his Creator. The recourse to the intercession of saints, argued Mawlāy Sulaymān, could not be therefore considered as a form of heresy. The visitation of the Prophet's tomb and the request of his shafā'a (intercession) was even recommended by the sharī'a and remained perfectly advisable as long as the prescribed rules of visitation were respected (127).

Mawlāy Sulaymān recognized, however, that these rules were usually unknown to the ʿāmma who resorted to numerous

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(126) On this particular issue the Wahhābi-s are most ambiguous. The supplication of saints and the recourse to their power of intercession is considered indiscriminately both as shirk and as bid'a. Cf. letter of Sa'ūd to the ʿālim-s of Tunis in al-Zayānī's Turjumāna al-kubrā, pp.394-395 and Ibn'Abd al-Wahhāb, An Account, fol. 4.

(127) Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sa'ūd, fol.4.

detestable innovations, such as the embracing of the saints' tombs and the circumambulation of their shrines. He agreed, therefore, with the attitude adopted by the Wahhābi-s of preventing the common people from visiting the tombs of saints. "The visitation by the common people of the tombs of saints is usually the occasion for unsuitable sayings and heresies", he wrote. "It is perfectly legitimate to prevent them from such visitations until they are fully aware of what they say"(128). This position is in harmony with Mawlāy Sulaymān's ideas on the visitation of saints (129) and the celebration of the mawsim-s which he prohibited for his people on more than one occasion, as we have seen earlier.

Between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Wahhābi-s there was another point of accord: it concerned the ornamentation of tombs and the erection around them of sumptuous buildings. Mawlāy Sulaymān always abhorred extravagant practices which run contrary to the Sunna. The building usually raised over a tomb, argued Mawlāy Sulaymān in his letter to Sa'ūd, should be kept to a minimum "whether the dead is a proprietor, a ḥālim, a sharīf or a sultan"(130). Slight constructions could be tolerated for the purpose of distinction and preservation but should exclude any engravings or excessive ornamentation. He also condemned other similar heterodox practices such as the burning of candles or the sacrifice of animals on the saints' tombs (131).

Mawlāy Sulaymān's adherence to the Ash'ari theory of al-kasb was certainly a major obstacle which prevented

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(128) Mawlāy Sulaymān believed that the visitation of saints should be allowed only to those who are acquainted with the rules prescribed by the sharī'a in this respect. Cf. Ibn Murīda, al-kawākib al-sayyāra fī al-baḥṭh wa al-ḥaṭh ḥalā al-ziyāra, Ms. K 479, BGR, p.113.

(129) Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sa'ūd, Ms 4624, RL, fol. 4.

(130) Ibid.

(131) Ibid.

him from adopting the Wahhābi doctrine. However, the disagreement on the issue of excommunication was only partial since, in principle at least, the Wahhābi-s did not consider the author of a grave sin (kabīra) to be an infidel (kāfir) but merely a sinner (132). The discord point between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Wahhābi-s was not constituted by the latter's doctrinal tenets but by their proneness to excommunicate without allowing for enough prudence to discern the real kāfir from the false one. Mawlāy Sulaymān's criticism of the Wahhābi-s was rather directed against their practical abuses. In his message to Sa'ūd he called on the Wahhābi-s to adopt a more lenient attitude in dealing with theological differences. He recalled the rules of debate as formulated by al-Ghazzālī and practiced by Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, warning against the dangers of ideological obstinacy and intolerance (133). Indeed, the confrontation of ideas between the ʿālim-s members of the Moroccan delegation to the Hijaz and Sa'ūd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz showed an identity of views on major theological issues (134).

Mawlāy Ibrāhīm and the members of the delegation were given a warm welcome by Sa'ūd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz and were allowed to visit all Holy Places, including the Prophet's tomb (135). According to Akansūs, the Moroccans were impressed by the ascetism of the Wahhābi prince whose "state did not differ from that of any of his subjects" (136). Contrary to what they expected, they observed no-

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(132) ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, An Account, p. 16.

(133) Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sa'ūd, fol.3.

(134) Akansūs, pp.299-300. During the audience accorded to Mawlāy Ibrāhīm by Sa'ūd, it was made clear to the Moroccan delegation that the Wahhābi-s upheld the Māliki interpretation of God's metaphorical "sitting on the throne" (al-istiwāʿ). Sa'ūd explained that the visitation of the Prophet's tomb was only prohibited for ordinary people who were unacquainted with the prescribed rules of visitation.

(135) Al-Jabartī reported that the Moroccan pilgrimage caravan was given an unusual welcome and allowed to travel freely in the Hijaz. Cf. al-Jabartī, ʿAjaʿib al āthār, IV, p.143.

(136) Akansūs, p.299.

thing from him or from his followers which contradicted the sharīʿa. During the audience accorded to the Moroccan delegation, the opportunity was given to the gāḍī of Marrakech, Muḥammad al-Zaddāghī, and to al-ʿAbbās b. Kīrān to seek more clarification of the Wahhābi doctrine, particularly on the question of intercession of the Prophet and the awliyāʾ, and the visitation of tombs and shrines (137). Saʿūd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz explained to the Moroccan ʿālim-s that the Wahhābi-s were not opposed by principle to the visitation of the Prophet's tomb, nor did they deny the sainthood of the awliyāʾ. This visitation, however, had to be performed according to certain rules, well established by the sharīʿa, and which were usually ignored by the common people. It was in order to prevent the visitation of venerated persons from becoming a cult in itself, he explained, that the Wahhābi-s prohibited ordinary people from entering the Prophet's sanctuary (138).

Upon their return in September 1812 the members of the delegation reported their impressions and expounded the doctrine of Wahhābism. Akansūs, who conferred with many of them, affirmed that none had seen or heard from the Wahhābi-s anything contrary to the sharīʿa (139). The return of the delegation gave birth, nevertheless, to an acute controversy about Wahhābism. The opponents of the doctrine, such as al-Zayānī and Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt, claimed that the Holy Places in the Hijaz were as insecure as ever and, were it not for the presence of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm among the Moroccan delegation, pilgrims would have never been allowed to perform their religious duties (140).

(137) Ibid., pp.299-300.

(138) Ibid.

(139) Ibid., p.300.

(140) Following the return of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm from the Hijaz, al-Ḥawwāt wrote:-

و لولاه لم تأمن لهم سبل الهدى \* ولا أتموا نحو الحجاز وأنجدوا  
ولكن به حلوا مقام سميه \* وحجوا وزاروا والزيارة نحمد

Cf. his Dīwān, Ms.2941, R.L., P.57.

Another point of discord concerned the eulogistic qaṣīda of Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj. Al-Zayānī claimed that it reflected in no way the ideas of Mawlāy Sulaymān and that it was composed on the private initiative of Ḥamdūn (141). "How is it possible", al-Zayānī wrote, "to praise this erring innovator who should be, in fact, repudiated especially after he had spread insecurity in the Holy Places, prohibited the visitation and the intercession of prophets and saints, and banned the reading of Dalā'il al-khayrāt and the invocation of saints?" (142).

On the other hand, Akansūs who counted among the Tijāni adepts, affirmed that Ḥamdūn composed his poem "by order of the Sultan and in his name" (143) to be delivered officially by his son to the head of the Wahhābi State.

Ḥamdūn's qaṣīda was generally attacked by Mawlāy Sulaymān's contemporaries who, instead of attacking openly the Sultan's sympathy with Wahhābism, blamed its author as the sole person responsible (144). In this respect, Aḥmad b. 'Abd al-Salām Bannānī was more outspoken in his criticism of Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj and, indirectly, of Mawlāy

(141) Al-Zayānī was strongly opposed to the Wahhābi movement. This hostility is to be explained, in part at least, by his sympathy with the Ottomans. Like al-Ḥawwāt, he maintained that without the presence of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm the Moroccan pilgrims would have been unable to fulfill their religious duties. Cf. al-Rawḍa, fol.187.

(142) Al-Zayānī, al-Turjumān al-mu'rib, p.389 (personal translation).

" فكيف يمدح المبتدع الضال ويشكر؟ بل يهجر. أم كيف يتقرب إلى من يخيف أهل الحرمين ويمنع زيارة الأنبياء والتوسل بهم إلى رب السماوات وينهى عن قراءة دلائل الخيرات والدعاء بمقامات الأولياء أهل الكرامات؟ "

(143) Akansūs, p.299.

(144) This is the case of an anonymous essay refuting the Wahhābi doctrine, entitled: Risāla fī al-radd 'alā muḥtadī'at ahl al-badr wa nāhiyat al-mashriq, Ms.D.2594, BGR, pp.251-264. The author of this essay attacked those who praise the Wahhābi-s in the following terms:

" وما دروا أن أهل الحق من الأمة الحمدية لا يألون في طلب الحق جهدهم، وأن مديحه وإن أظن فيه ماح ليهو ولفوعندهم. وأن مثل مولانا المنصور بالله (... ) لا يتبع في مدح ماحيه هواهم ولا يبيع أعزه الله آخرته بدنياهم، فليس لمولانا أعزه الله مع رسوخه في العلوم ممن يستغزه أحد بقوله... "

Sulaymān . Bannānī argued that Ḥamdūn's eulogy was worthy only of legally proclaimed princes, which was not the case with the Wahhābi leader (145). Instead of praising Saʿūd, Ḥamdūn "should have appealed to Moroccans, and particularly to the amīr al-mūminīn may God glorify him in order to organize the jihād against this usurpator and in order to free the Holy Places from his grasp and assist the mujāhidīn by supplying them with military equipment such as gunpowder, guns, artillery and other material. As to this kind of speech, it will only encourage him in his tyranny" (146).

Contrary to what Mawlāy Sulaymān had hoped, the sending of the official reply to the Wahhābi leaders, instead of easing the internal resistance of religious forces in Morocco, had only exacerbated their hostility. Mawlāy Sulaymān's initiative succeeded neither in convincing the ʿālim-s of the religious soundness of the Wahhābi doctrine nor in dissipating the malevolent propaganda of conservative groups about the alleged insecurity of the Holy Places. This initiative had, in reality, only served to unchain their hostility.

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(145) Bannānī, al-Fuyūḍāt, pp.124-125.

(146) Ibid., p.151.

CHAPTER VI

THE ASCENDANCE OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS:  
THE RELIGIOUS POLICY OF MAWLĀY SULAYMĀN

During the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān religious groups acquired an unprecedented importance in the political affairs of the country. This was due, no doubt, to the weakness of the Makhzen, but also to the growing prestige of these groups, especially the sharīf-s. Indeed, among the three religious groups, the Ālim-s, the zāwiya-s and the sharīf-s, these last were, by virtue of their Caṣabiyya, the most active social element which succeeded in extending its hegemony over all others.

I - The Ālim-s

A- Role and Function in Society

In an Islamic society, religious nobility could be attained either through sharifian descent or through the acquisition of the "holy knowledge" (al-Āilm al-sharīf) For those who lacked a sharifian lineage (sharaf al-nasab) religious scholarship offered the alternative for a privileged position in society.

The importance of the Ālim-s, or religious scholars, in an Islamic society needs hardly to be underlined. They did not only constitute the guardians of the religious

sciences, but also represented the only body which could interpret religious law (al-sharī<sup>c</sup>a) and therefore, the only force which could act as a check on the sultan's powers. After all, the Ālim-s are the successors of the Prophet, the guardians of the sharī<sup>c</sup>a and consequently the source of all religious and political legitimacy.

This importance was underlined every time the Muslim community was confronted with an important decision, and especially when it was faced with the choice of a new sultan. Among all the components of the ahl al-ḥall wa al-<sup>c</sup>aqd, the Ālim-s represented the crucial element in any bay<sup>c</sup>a procedure. Once "elected", the sultan was not responsible to the Ālim-s, but often felt obliged to consult them and justify his decisions to them. Sometimes, the Ālim-s took the initiative of issuing a judicial opinion without a request from the sultan and expected its implementation by the Makhzen (1).

Behind this important role was the relative independence enjoyed by the Ālim-s vis-à-vis the Makhzen on which they depended neither organizationally nor financially. On the organizational level, the Ālim-s never had a clear code to define obligations and internal rules of mobility. This ambiguity worked against any attempt by the Makhzen to domesticate them. The sultan could appoint Ālim-s to judicial posts, but was unable to control the internal mobility of Ālim-s from one grade to another. Only the Ālim-s themselves had the overriding say in the distribution of religious scholars

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(1) In 1799, for instance, following the French invasion of Egypt and the unusual movement of European fleets near the Moroccan coast, the Ālim-s of Tétouan wrote to the Ālim-s of Fès in order to obtain a fatwā which would allow the inhabitants of the thughūr (ports) to buy and carry arms. The desired fatwā was issued and Mawlāy Sulaymān had no alternative but to lift the ban of the private use of arms, despite the gravity of such a decision. Cf. al-Ḍu<sup>c</sup>ayf, pp.398-400.



among the various categories of learning (ṭabaqāt, pl. of ṭabaqa) (2). The appointment of the chief Ḳālim (shaykh al-jamā<sup>c</sup>a) also remained beyond the sultan's control. This was usually decided by the corps of Ḳālim-s according to a well established tradition which took into consideration the Ḳālim's competence, age and experience.

The Ḳālim-s had also a relative financial autonomy. Whether he was to fill a judicial or an educational post the Ḳālim would not be dependent on the Makhzen for his emoluments, for these he received from the aḥbās. Even the qāḍī, who was appointed by royal decree, was not considered a Makhzen official. The distinction between a Makhzenian post (manṣib makhzanī) and a legal post (manṣib shar<sup>c</sup>ī) left no room for confusion. The Ḳālim-s did receive occasional presents from the sultan but this manifestation of sultanian generosity had no significant effect on the Ḳālim's freedom of thought. A Ḳālim could be even more independent and feared by the Makhzen if he refused the sultan's favours and declined public responsibilities. Nothing irritated Sīdī Muḥammad b. Ḳālim more than the refusal of a Ḳālim, such as Aḥmad al-Warzīzī, to accept his donation (3). Such a negative attitude on the Ḳālim's part was also a cause for respect by his fellow Ḳālim-s. The greatest eulogy that could be reserved for a Ḳālim was to mention that he never stained his honour with the acceptance of a Makhzenian post (4).

The Ḳālim-s filled a number of important functions in society, in a least three fields: religious observance, teaching and judicature. The first evident function of religious scholars was to provide places of worship—mosques, sanctuaries and zāwiya-s— with imām-s and khaṭīb-s (preachers) to lead the five daily prayers as

(2) Under Mawlāy Sulaymān the Ḳālim-s were classified into three categories. Cf. Ibn Zaydān, al-Ḳizz wa al-ṣawla, pp.167-175.

(3) Al-Ḍu'ayf, p.170. Cf. also Ibid., pp.194 and 198.

(4) Cf. introduction to al-Ḥawwāt's al-Sirr al-ḡāhīr, lith., Fès, 1932, pp.3-4; cf. also Muḥammad b. Ja'far al-Kattānī, Salwat, III, p.118.

well as the Friday prayer. Jointly with his duties as prayer leader, the imām assumed a teaching task. It was at the mosque, in fact, that the learning process began, first by the memorization of the Quran, then by the acquisition of the basic disciplines.

Higher education could be acquired in the countryside especially in rural areas with an old sedentary tradition, such as the Jbala and the Sous; but it was mainly in the ḥaḍariya towns that the student had the opportunity to meet the most eminent ʿālim-s of the country. After the acquisition of the preliminary education, the ṭālib, or student, moved to the town where he could deepen his knowledge and learn new disciplines. Fès was the uncontested centre of higher education, not only because of the number of outstanding ʿālim-s it embraced within its walls, but also by the numerous schools (madrasa-s) in the city. Students repaired to Fès from all over the country, including from other ḥaḍariya towns, to perfect their learning.

Curriculum and teaching methods underwent little or no change through centuries. Fiqh (jurisprudence) was at the basis of all learning and continued to be considered as "the king of sciences". Other disciplines included the exegesis of the Quran (al-tafsīr), the ḥadīth, or the Prophet's traditions, the uṣūl, or sources of jurisprudence, theological dogma (ʿilm al-kalām), logic (al-mantiq), mysticism (al-taṣawwuf) in addition to grammar, Arabic linguistics and some scientific subjects such as arithmetic, algebra, and astronomy(5). The emphasis on the study of certain disciplines could vary with time. Thus, the study of Khalīl's Mukhtaṣar was almost abandoned under the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad because of this latter's hostility to abridged works as a method

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(5) Cf. al-Ḥawwāt, al-Rawḍa al-maḡṣūda, pp.34-57 for a complete list of disciplines taught at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

of teaching. Sīdī Muḥammad also reproved the study of theological dogma (6). Mawlāy Sulaymān, on the contrary, allocated special prizes for those who memorized Khalīl's Mukhtaṣar and did not refrain from venturing into dogmatic discussions himself.

Education was mainly based on learning by rote and the use of archaic manuals. Many of these were rendered in verse in order to facilitate their acquisition. The most common teaching method consisted in reading and explaining the text to the students. In practice, the teacher never limited himself to the text. He attempted most of the time to expound on the subject by referring to the opinions of the famous theologians. The study of a single manual, such as the Mukhtaṣar for example, could last as much as ten years and even longer (7). For the Ālim, the length of his course was a sign of his scholarly competence. Attempts by Sīdī Muḥammad to introduce some reforms to the educational system, namely by repressing the use of secondary manuals, ended in failure. Moroccan Ālim-s were not disposed to relinquish their centuries-old teaching traditions. Different educational methods witnessed by Moroccan Ālim-s in the Arab East, such as Egypt, where the acquisition of the Mukhtaṣar took no more than two years and where "the student became capable of teaching in three years" (8) seem to have had no effect on teaching methods at the Qarawīyyīn (9).

The other function of the Ālim-s was judicial. From among the Ālim-s were recruited the muftī, the qāḍī and the Ādūl, or notaries. At the top of the judicial system there was the sultan himself who appointed the qāḍī-s and acted as the highest court of appeal. He appointed the

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(6) Cf. chapter V above. pp. 247-248.

(7) A. al-Tāzī, Jāmi' al-Qarawīyyīn, Beirut, 1972, vol. II, p. 727.

(8) Al-Ibtisām, pp. 58-59.

(9) It was only in 1845 that Mawlāy 'Abd al-Rahmān attempted to introduce some reforms to the educational system of the Qarawīyyīn; cf. al-Tāzī, Jāmi' al-Qarawīyyīn, III, pp. 727-728.

chief judge (qāḍī al-quḍāt) and the judges of the different towns and tribes. In theory, the chief judge, who acted at the same time as the qāḍī of Fès, was entitled to appoint and supervise all other judges of the country (10). In practice, however, his prerogatives were much more limited, since the judges were appointed by royal decree and grievances against them were generally addressed directly to the sultan. Moreover, there were a number of regional chief judges at the major towns such as Tétouan, Marrakech and Taroudant, who used to supervise the qāḍī-s of their immediate regions. Thus, the qāḍī of Ouezzane was usually entrusted with the supervision of the rural qāḍī-s of the Jbala (11).

The main duty of a qāḍī was to render justice according to the sharī<sup>C</sup>a. His prerogatives also extended to many judicial, religious and educational fields. Thus, he appointed or dismissed the ḥudūl and supervised the functions of the nāḍhir, the muḥtasib, as well as those of the mosque imām-s and the teachers at the various mosques and madrasa-s(12). Owing to these prerogatives, the qāḍī held a privileged position not only within the body of learned men, but in society as a whole. His effective power depended, nevertheless, on both the official backing of the sultan and the respect he enjoyed from his fellow ḥālim-s. This respect was generally based on both the qāḍī's scholarship and his age.

Beside the qāḍī, there was the muftī who acted as a court of appeal. The muftī (the person who issues a fatwā) was a regular function of every ḥālim whose scholarly competence was widely recognized. This function enabled the citizen to by-pass the qāḍī, if necessary, when a

(10) Al-Zayānī, Takmil quḍāt Fās Calā mā fī Jadhwat al-iqtibās, Ms. 4792, RL, p. 2.

(11) Letter from Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh to Sīdī ʿAlī b. Aḥmad, Muḥarram, 1200/Nov.-Dec., 1785, in al-Ḍuḥayf, pp.198-199.

(12) Al-Zayānī, Takmil quḍāt Fās, p.2.

fatwā was requested independently of a prior consultation of the latter (13). The muftī acted more often as a court of appeal when a contender, being dissatisfied with the qāḍī's judgement, brought his case before him. Unlike the qāḍī, however, the muftī lacked the necessary authority to enforce his sentence and, in case of irreconcilable contradiction between the qāḍī's judgement and the muftī's opinion, the contending parties were left with the only ultimate alternative of appealing to the sultan.

As an institutionalized function, it was not established in Morocco before the sixteenth century. While the same institution was in force in the Eastern Maghrib ever since the fourteenth century, in Morocco it was apparently introduced for the first time by the Sa'adian Muḥammad al-Shaykh (d.1557) in imitation of the Ottoman Turks (14). Nevertheless, the post of muftī in Morocco was never as important as it was in the Ottoman Empire. This institution was in fact so fragile that it simply vanished when the qāḍī al-quḍāt enjoyed enough moral authority and respectability to impose himself as the uncontested judicial reference. This was the case of al-Tāwdī b. Sūda under Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh. Other sultans, such as Mawlāy Sulaymān and his successor Mawlāy 'Abd al-Raḥmān, were even convinced that the existence of qāḍī and muftī side by side created more problems than it solved (15). Among these problems was the traditional professional rivalry which opposed qāḍī and muftī and which led during the last years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's rule to the most distressing consequences.

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(13) According to al-Zayānī, the post of muftī comes third in the administrative hierarchy of the Islamic State after the sultan and the wazīr-s (ministers). Cf. Takmīl quḍāt Fās, p.1.

(14) A. Benabdallah, al-Qaḍā' al-maghribī, paper presented to the Fès Seminar on Mālik b. Anas (1980), p.6. On the origin of the institution in the Eastern Maghrib, cf. R. Brunschwig, La Berbérie orientale sous les Hafside des origines à la fin du XVe siècle, Paris, 1940, vol. II, p. 139.

(15) In 1820 following the different between the qāḍī and the muftī of Fès, Mawlāy Sulaymān abolished the institution of muftī (al-Zayānī, Takmīl quḍāt Fās, p.12)

B- The Corps of <sup>C</sup>ālim-s Under Mawlāy Sulaymān.

The <sup>C</sup>ālim-s did not constitute an effective group with a clear structure and recognized rules of accession. All those who established themselves in the religious sciences and gained the reputation of belonging to the learned elite of the country were <sup>C</sup>ālim-s. It was only on the occasion of important events, such as the proclamation of a sultan, the holding of a consultation on an important political or religious issue, or the distribution of a Makhzen donation, that the question of "who is <sup>C</sup>ālim?" imposed itself.

Under Mawlāy Sulaymān, the <sup>C</sup>ālim-s were classified into three categories (ṭabaqāt) according to their competence and scholarly reputation (16). The first and second ṭabaqa-s included senior <sup>C</sup>ālim-s whose "learning piety and insight" enabled them to act as "the people of tying and untying" as far as important matters of religion were concerned. The third category, on the other hand, was made up of ṭālib-s, or students who, after having acquired the basic religious science, took up a number of low clerical offices: imām-s, khaṭīb-s, teachers at the Quranic schools, notaries, etc.

At the top of the learned pyramid there was the shaykh at-jamā<sup>C</sup> who, by virtue of his scholarship, piety and age, acted as the spokesman for his fellow <sup>C</sup>ālim-s. He was consulted by the sultan on important matters and served as an intermediary between him and the rest of the <sup>C</sup>ālim-s. Shaykh al-jamā<sup>C</sup> acted sometimes as the spokesman for the whole Fāsi society as was the case in 1792 when al-Tāwdī b. Sūda was delegated to act on

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(16) Cf. Mawlāy Sulaymān's dhahir giving the list of <sup>C</sup>ālim-s in Fès according to their category, issued around 1233/1817-1818, in Ibn Zaydān, al-Izz wa al-ṣawla, II, pp.167-175. The number of <sup>C</sup>ālim-s under Mawlāy Sulaymān was 428 (in 1818) compared to 266 in 1906. Compare dhahir of Mawlāy Sulaymān referenced above to the dhahir of Mawlāy Abd al-<sup>C</sup>Azīz (1894-1908) in Ibn Zaydān, al-Izz wa al-ṣawla, II, pp.167-188.

behalf of the population of Fès in the choice of a new sultan (17). The moral authority enjoyed by the shaykh al-jamā<sup>C</sup>a enabled him to play a role of arbiter and give the corps of ālīm-s a certain appearance of unity and homogeneity by keeping in the shade internal cleavages.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's relations with the ālīm-s can be divided into two periods. During the first two decades of his reign Mawlāy Sulaymān maintained privileged relations with the ālīm-s. This was partly due to the presence of scholars with whom he had built up close ties of cooperation. It is also to be explained by the existence until 1812 of a shaykh al-jamā<sup>C</sup>a in the person of al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān whose moral authority among the religious scholars served as a safeguard against possible inter-ālīm-s dissensions. The uncontested judicial authority of Aḥmad b. Sūda and the abolition of the institution of muftī during his term also helped to avoid the traditional qāḍī-muftī opposition (18). However, the passing away of many ālīm-s of the old generation opened the way after 1812 for the emergence of a new generation of scholars with whom Mawlāy Sulaymān had little contact. Moreover, the re-establishment of the post of muftī after 1816, together with the appointment of a young qāḍī from the Ibn Sūda family, contributed to the deterioration of Makhzen-ālīm-s relations.

The fact that Mawlāy Sulaymān was himself a ālīm taking an active part in the religious and cultural life greatly improved his image among the scholarly elite of the country. His doctrinal views also contributed to ease his relations with this religious group. His attachment to the Māliki-Ash<sup>C</sup>ari tradition as manifested in the re-

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(17) Cf. notarial act established on 10 Rajab, 1206/ 4 March, 1792, Mic. 2/70, HPMD, Fès, 1978.

(18) These dissensions were best illustrated by the animosity which opposed al-ʿAbbās b. Sūda and Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī after 1816. Cf. below.

establishment of the teaching of Khalīl's Mukhtaṣar and al-Ghazzālī's Iḥyā', was well received by Moroccan Ḍālim-s.

Mawlāy Sulaymān had for teachers the most outstanding Ḍālim-s of the late eighteenth century. Some of these, such as al-Tāwdī b. Sūda, Aḥmad b. Sūda, Muḥammad al-Hawwārī and ʿAbd al-Qādir b. Shaqrūn, had been called by Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh to assume judicial responsibilities and look after the education of his sons. For these Ḍālim-s, who dominated the scholarly elite at the death of Sīdī Muḥammad, Mawlāy Sulaymān had a great respect. He regularly consulted them on important religious and political issues and continued to attend their lectures even after he assumed power. A close contact with Mawlāy Sulaymān's shaykh-s was maintained through the Sultan's learned council which served as a seminar for the debate of religious questions.

Some of Mawlāy Sulaymān's most respected teachers were of Bildi origin. Moroccan historiographers did not fail to point out that in 1804, Mawlāy Sulaymān attended Ibn Shaqrūn's funeral in person to mark his great affection for his shaykh (19). He then ordered the burial of Ibn Shaqrūn within the walls of the holy shrine of Mawlāy Idrīs, despite the opposition of the sharīf-s (20). Al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān, another Bildi Ḍālim, and shaykh al-jamāʿa after al-Tāwdī b. Sūda, also enjoyed Mawlāy Sulaymān's admiration. Even while sultan, Mawlāy Sulaymān continued to attend Ibn Kīrān's lectures at the Qarawiyyīn preferring to sit among the students as a sign of respect for his teacher (21). He also constantly referred to him

(19) Jaʿfar b. Idrīs al-Kattānī, al-Shurb, part I, p.7; Muḥammad b. Jaʿfar al-Kattānī, Salwat, I, pp. 95-96. "The Sultan attended his funeral and mourned him", noted al-Ḍuʿayf, p. 441.

(20) A. Ibn al-Muwāz, al-Maqāla al murḍiya fī al-dawla al-ʿAlawiya, Ms. 493, RL, p. 21; M. Balmūnū, Taqyīd fī baʿd asrār al-ṭarīqa al-tijāniya, Ms. K 461, BGR, pp. 144-145.

(21) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p. 364.



in the clarification of religious and doctrinal issues. This sympathy for Bildi ʿālim-s was often interpreted by cotemporaries as a sign of Mawlāy Sulaymān's preference of the Bildiyīn to other social groups and was particularly resented by sharīf-s (22).

Mawlāy Sulaymān had also a great esteem for the Ibn Sūda family which produced many outstanding ʿālim-s. Al-Tāwdī b. Sūda served as his teacher as well as his shaykh from whom he received the Nāṣiri wird. His advice on important issues was regularly solicited by Mawlāy Sulaymān. Aḥmad b. Sūda and his son al-ʿAbbās were entrusted with the qadirate of Fès during most of his reign (23).

However, the good understanding which existed between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the ʿālim-s was seriously compromised during the latter part of his reign. This was essentially due to the internal changes undergone by the ʿālim-s between 1792 and 1822. During this period most ʿālim-s who served as Mawlāy Sulaymān's teachers and closest advisors progressively passed away to be replaced by a younger generation of ʿālim-s. The most important loss for Mawlāy Sulaymān consisted in the death of al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān in 1812 and the disability of Aḥmad b. Sūda in 1816. The result was the absence among the ʿālim-s of a moral authority able to fill the vacant post of shaykh al-jamāʿa or to exercise effectively the duties of chief judge. Under such conditions latent inter-ʿālim-s rivalries were bound to emerge to the surface.

The list of ʿālim-s established by Mawlāy Sulaymān around 1817 shows a complete renewal of the scholarly elite (24). The examination of the fatwā-s and the bayʿa which brought Mawlāy Ibrāhīm b. al-Yazīd to power in 1820 also confirmed this change. By comparing the

(22) al-Ḍuʿayf, p.364.

(23) On Mawlāy Sulaymān's relations with the Ibn Sūda family, cf. chapter VII below.

(24) Cf. dhahir referenced in not 16 above.

list of Ḳālim-s who proclaimed Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1792 to that of Ḳālim-s who dethroned him in 1820 (25) we notice that among the fifteen scholars who signed the 1792 bayḲa only one was still alive twenty nine years later — Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī. Consequently, most of the Ḳālim-s who took part in the Fès rebellion belonged to the younger generation of scholars, or "aḥdāth al-Ḳulamā", as referred to by al-Zayānī (26).

A further observation should be made here. At a time when the sharīf-s enhanced their presence among the scholarly elite, the Bildiyyīn who traditionally provided "a disproportionate number of scholars" (27) seem to have lost their privileged position. No Bildi name figured in fact in the bayḲa proclaiming Mawlāy Ibrāhīm (28).

List "A" - The Ḳālim-s who proclaimed Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1792

- Muḥammad al-Tāwdī b. Sūda (d.1795)  
 Aḥmad b. al-Tāwdī b. Sūda (d.1820)  
 Muḥammad b. Ḳabd al-Salām al-Fāsī (d.1799)  
 Ḳabd al-Qādir b. Shaqrūn (d.1804)  
 Muḥammad Bannīs (d.1799)  
 Muḥammad b. Ḳabd al-Majīd al-Fāsī (d.1799)  
 Yaḥyā b. al-Mahdī al-Shafashāwnī (d.1813)  
 ḲAlī b. Awīs (d.1799)  
 Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī (d.1826)

(25) Compare lists "A" and "B" below.

(26) al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahā, Ms.6180, R.L., p.12.

(27) N. Cigar, "Conflict and Community in an Urban Milieu Under the ḲAlawi-s (1660-1830)", The Maghreb Review, Nov.-Dec., 1978, p.9.

(28) Cf. text of the bayḲa in Dāwūd, III, pp.250-257.

Muḥammad b. Mas<sup>C</sup>ūd al-Ṭrunbāṭī (d.1799)  
 Muḥammad al-Hādī b. Ziyān al-<sup>C</sup>Irāqī (d.1799)  
 Sulaymān al-Fishtālī (d.1794)  
 Muḥammad al-Tuhāmī Ṭāhar -  
<sup>C</sup>Abd al-Mālik b. al-Ḥasan al-Faḍīlī  
 Idrīs b. Hāshim al-Jūṭī

List "B" - The <sup>C</sup>ālim-s who supported the dethronement  
 of Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1821

Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī  
<sup>C</sup>Abd al-Salām al-Azamī (d.1826)  
 Abū Bakr al-Manjra (d.1824-1825)  
 Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr al-Yāzghī (d.1823-1824)  
<sup>C</sup>Abd al-Mālik al-Murrī  
 Abū Bakr al-Idrīsī  
 Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥammūmī (d.1849-1850)  
 Al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī al-Zarhūnī  
 Al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī  
 Muḥammad b. Sulaymān  
<sup>C</sup>Abd al-Salām al-Masnāwī  
 Muḥammad b. <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Raḥmān al-Dilāḥī

During the second decade of the nineteenth century relations between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the <sup>C</sup>ālim-s became increasingly tense, essentially because of the Sultan's intransigence and refusal to recognize the changes that had occurred within the learned elite of the country. His decision in 1816 to appoint a new qāḍī from the Ibn Sūda family was bound to create friction between the newly named official and Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī, the muftī, not only because this latter belonged to a prestigious family which produced many <sup>C</sup>ālim-s in the past, but also because he considered himself, by virtue of his scholarship and his

age, as the most qualified person for the office of chief judge (29). The young age of the new qāḍī, al-<sup>C</sup>Abbās b. Sūda, his inexperience and his inability to impose himself to his fellow scholars further aggravated inter-<sup>C</sup>ālim rivalries.

## II - The Sharīf-s

The sharīf-s constituted a kind of "blood nobility" within the Moroccan society. To be a sharīf one had to be able to trace one's descent back to the Prophet through his daughter Fāṭima. The Idrisids, whose ancestor Idrīs b. <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh founded in Morocco the first Islamic dynasty (788-1016 AD), are the most venerated and the most widespread. Between the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries, other sharifian families arrived in Morocco. Among these were the <sup>C</sup>Alawids, the Qādiri-s, the Siqilli-s, the <sup>C</sup>Irāqi-s and the Manjriyyīn. Many of these families resided at Fès, the cradle of the Idrisid dynasty, but the Idrisid sharīf-s were to be found everywhere, particularly in the northern part of the country. The <sup>C</sup>Alawids who belong to a different branch of sharīf-s remained in the Tafilelt until the middle of the seventeenth century when they founded their own dynasty.

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(29) al-Zayānī, Takmil quḍāt Fās, p.12

وعزم المفتي ومن له تبع      من فقها الوقت وفي القضا طمع

The fact that the muftī, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī, had ambitions for the post of qāḍī shows that al-Zayānī's classification placing the office of muftī above that of chief judge (cf. note 13 above) did not always reflect the reality, especially under Mawlāy Sulaymān who insisted on curtailing the powers of the muftī.

Sharifdom is based on the possession of the baraka, a kind of "beneficent effluvium" or supernatural power inherited from the Prophet. Not all sharifian groups possessed the same amount of this baraka. The Idrisids were considered to be the most prestigious by far, and among the Idrisids themselves, some families claimed pre-eminence over others. Thus, the Kattāniyyīn considered themselves to be the purest and the most authentic of all (30).

The Idrisid sharīf-s lived in concealment for many centuries after the fall of their dynasty (10th century AD) in order to avoid persecution. With the encouragement of the Merinid dynasty (1258-1465), however, they began to emerge to the surface. The Merinids hoped to exploit the religious prestige of the sharīf-s to their advantage to counter the influence of the zāwiya-s. This hope was enhanced by the concentration of the sharīf-s at Fès, which seemed to offer greater possibilities for Makhzen control. The benevolent Merinid policy towards the sharīf-s encouraged many sharifian families to return to Fès (31). It was during the Merinid period that, by a mysterious coincidence, the relics of Mawlāy Idrīs II were discovered in Fès (32).

The spread of Sufism was another factor which favoured the resurgence of sharifism. The emphasis placed by the Shādhili school on the veneration of the Prophet and his descendents contributed to the consolidation of sharifism as a fundamental principle of both religious and political legitimacy. The prestige of the sharīf-s further increased after the fifteenth century because of their active role in the military resistance to Spanish and

(30) <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Ḥayy al-Kattānī, Kitāb fī al-<sup>C</sup>āḍila al-Kattāniya, Ms.K. 3249, BGR, p.120.

(31) Al-Nāṣirī, VII, p.6; Ibn Zaydān, al-<sup>C</sup>Izz wa la-ṣawla, II, pp.85,108; Ibn al-Ḥāj, al-Durr al-muntakhab, IX, pp.292-293; <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Salām b. al-Ṭayyib al-Qādirī, al-Durr al-saniy, lith., Fès, 1891, pp.17,38.

(32) G. Drague, Esquisse, p.47.

Portuguese attacks on Morocco (33).

Being a sharīf in the Moroccan society entitled one not only to the respect and veneration due to the descent of the Prophet but also to a number of material privileges. A sharīf was, first of all, exempt from military service, from non-religious taxes and from all arbitrary Makhzen impositions (al-wadhāʿif pl. of wadhīf). Thus, the sharīf-s were freed from participating in the presents offered to the sultan on the occasion of religious celebrations (hadiyya), as well as from the contributions paid to Makhzen officials on various occasions (34). They were also guaranteed justice by their peers and placed under the authority of a sharīf shaykh to whom they delivered their taxes (35).

In many ways, the sharīf-s constituted a State within the State. They were immune from a number of contributions, enjoyed a private jurisdiction and were not subject to any lay authority. Between them and the sultan, the naqīb of the sharīf-s (the dean) acted as an intermediary. The naqīb was appointed by the sultan to look after the moral interests of the sharīf-s. His main duty resided in ascertaining sharifian genealogies and preventing false pretenders from staining the Prophet's posterity. He kept an inventory of all births and deaths among the sharīf-s and saw to it that no misalliances took place between sharīf-s and non-sharīf-s. The naqīb also attempted to divert the sharīf-s from the exercise of degrading professions which were incompatible with the dignity of the holy lineage (36). The donations they received from the sultan were

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(33) In 1578 the Idrisid sharīf-s of northern Morocco participated actively in the battle of Wād al-Makhāzin. To reward them, Aḥmad al-Manṣūr declared inviolable the shrine of Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Salām b. Mashīsh and allowed them a share in the income of the sanctuary of Mawlāy Idrīs.

(34) Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-ḥādī, p. 12.

(35) Ibid.

(36) Ibn Zaydān, al-ʿIzz wa al-ṣawla, II, pp. 74, 79.

intended essentially to guarantee a decent livelihood to the sharīf-s without which they would necessarily resort to such professions. The naqīb acted, finally, as an arbitrator in intra-sharifian conflicts so as to avoid any outside interference from laymen.

The privileges enjoyed by sharīf-s naturally encouraged many people to falsify their genealogies and claim descent from the Prophet. Such forgeries could very well pass unnoticed, particularly during long intervals of civil strife, such as the chaotic period which followed the death of Mawlāy Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl. Sultans attempted therefore at different times to ascertain sharifian genealogies and establish inventories of authentic sharīf-s.

The first attempt in this respect was made by the Sa<sup>C</sup>adian Aḥmad al-Manṣūr (d.1603). His inventory (dīwān al-ashrāf) served later on as a basis for Mawlāy Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl to produce his own register (kunnāsh al-ashrāf) (37). When Sīdī Muḥammad b. <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh acceded to the Moroccan throne in 1757, the number of false sharīf-s (al-mutasharrifūn, pl. of mutasharrif) had considerably increased. To quell the clamours of the powerful sharifian families (ahl al-<sup>C</sup>aşabiyya), Sīdī Muḥammad decided to limit sharifdom to twelve distinguished branches, or sixteen families (38). As a measure of solicitude towards the sharīf-s he granted these branches the privilege of dividing among themselves the inheritance fund of Fès (39). This measure created a great deal of discontent among the rest of the sharīf-s, or the "common sharīf-s" (<sup>C</sup>āmmat al-ashrāf), who did not belong to the twelve influential branches but still remained fully convinced of their sharifdom. Their insistent complaints persuaded Sīdī Muḥammad to abrogate in 1201 AH (1786-1787) the concessions he had made to the

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(37) Ibid., p.108.

(38) Cf. list of the twelve branches in Taqyīd al-ashrāf, Z.3122, R.L.

(39) The inheritance fund of Fès (māl irāthat Fās) included all properties left by heirless persons who died in the city.

twelve branches and declare that the inheritance fund of Fès should be equally divided among all sharifian families with the exception of the Idrisids who monopolized the revenue of the sanctuary of Mawlāy Idrīs instead (40).

The short and unstable reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd was another occasion for false sharīf-s to forge genealogies. Mawlāy al-Yazīd, we are told by al-Zayānī, granted ḡhahīr-s of sharifdom to all pretenders without the least check on the authenticity of their claims (41). Nevertheless, he followed a pro-sharifian policy motivated to a large extent by the support he received from the sharīf-s of northern Morocco before and after his proclamation. This policy was largely responsible for the growing interference by the sharīf-s and the zāwiya-s in the political life of the country, especially during the dynastic crisis which followed his death in 1792.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's relations with the sharīf-s were governed by two considerations: first, there was his centralizing temperament which made him hostile to all forms of particularism; secondly, there were his personal religious convictions which placed the sharīf<sup>c</sup>a above particular interests. These considerations led Mawlāy Sulaymān to progressively curtail the privileges enjoyed by the sharīf-s and embittered relations between the two sides.

The sharīf-s' material privileges were particularly affected. Mawlāy Sulaymān, like his father, failed to solve the traditional dilemma of "who was sharīf?"

(40) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-ḡādī, p.13; Ibn Zaydān, al-<sup>c</sup>Izz wa al-ṣawla, II, p.86.

(41) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-ḡādī, p.13; ʿAbd al-Salām al-Qādirī, Ṭaqyīd fī al-dawla al-ʿalawiya, Ms.248, R.L., p.20.



During the early disturbed years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign, the Makhzen was too busy pacifying the country to devote any attention to this thorny problem. When it finally did, it found that the number of false pretenders to sharifian status reached such proportions that it was impossible to discern an authentic from a false sharīf. Mawlāy Sulaymān decided, therefore, to place sharīf-s and non-sharīf-s on the same footing to cut short all polemic on the issue. He wrote to his governors ordering them to collect taxes (zakāt) and <sup>C</sup>ushūr) from all his subjects, without distinction (42). By this measure, he undermined the administrative autonomy of the sharīf-s.

Sharifian families upon whom Sīdī Muḥammad had conferred the right to divide among themselves the inheritance fund of Fès (43) were deprived from this privilege by Mawlāy Sulaymān (44). To compensate them he decided to grant them a regular allowance (ṣila) taken from bayt al-māl. In order to satisfy other categories of sharīf-s who felt especially injured, Mawlāy Sulaymān decided in 1795 to extend this allowance to forty-four new families who, though not belonging to ahl al-<sup>C</sup>aṣabiyya (prestigious sharifian families), possessed nevertheless sufficient written evidence of the authenticity of their lineages. In addition to these two categories of sharīf-s—ahl al-<sup>C</sup>aṣabiyya and those who had written evidence—Mawlāy Sulaymān identified a third category which included thirty families whose sharifdom was disputed by prestigious sharīf-s, but against whom there was no decisive evidence. To these thirty families, Mawlāy

(42) Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-ḥādī, p.13 : "He wrote to the governors ordering them not to consider any of his ḍahir-s and to collect their zakāt and <sup>C</sup>ushūr without distinction between sharīf and mutasharrīf".

(43) Ibn Zaydān, al-<sup>C</sup>izz wa al-ṣawla, II, p.86. The list of the sixteen families (or twelve branches—a branch, shuḥba, being more general than "a family", ḥāḍila) is given in Ms.Z.3122, R.L.

(44) Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-ḥādī, p.13.

Sulaymān decided to grant one fifth of the allowance given to the two categories above (45) until such time as they produced substantial proof of their sharifdom. By 1801, only three out of these thirty contested families were unable to produce Ismā<sup>C</sup>īli dhahīr-s authenticating their sharifian lineages. To the great grief of ahl al-<sup>C</sup>aṣabiyya, the corps of sharīf-s was expanded once more to include twenty seven additional families (46).

These measures which were intended to quell the clamours of dissatisfied sharīf-s only discontented all categories. They failed to satisfy the prestigious families who did not want to be placed on the same footing with those whom they considered doubtful sharīf-s. Ahl al-<sup>C</sup>aṣabiyya were also affected in their material interests because the number of beneficiaries from the royal concessions had increased considerably. Instead of the sixteen families chosen by Sīdī Muḥammad b. <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh there were now eighty-seven to compete for the inheritance fund of Fès. The "common sharīf-s" (<sup>C</sup>āmmat al-ashrāf) were not satisfied either. Mawlāy Sulaymān's measures did not succeed in completely abolishing the discrimination they were subjected to by powerful sharīf-s. On the occasion of the distribution of a sultanian ṣila, reported al-Zayānī, it used to be said "this is for the sharīf-s and this is for the muta-sharrifūn" (47).

Mawlāy Sulaymān devised another measure intended to compensate sharīf-s for the Makhzen's take over of the inheritance fund of Fès. It consisted of granting the sharīf-s the zakāt levied on overland trade (48)—2.5%

(45) Dhahīr of Mawlāy Sulaymān to the sharīf-s, dated 7 Rabī<sup>C</sup> I, 1210/21 Sept., 1795 in Ibn Zaydān, al-<sup>C</sup>Izz wa al-ṣawla, II, pp. 111-113.

(46) Cf. Sulaymānī dhahīr dated Jumādā II, 1216/Oct.-Nov., 1801, D.A.R.

(47) al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-ḥādī, p. 14.

(48) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the sharīf-s of Fès, no date, in al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahā<sup>2</sup>, pp. 181-185 (appendix 88).

tax on capital, paid by merchants returning from the Arab East or from Timbuctoo. This decision, however, disadvantaged the sharīf-s of northern Morocco since a large part of the zakāt exacted on the caravan trade would go to the <sup>ʿ</sup>Alawid sharīf-s of Tafilelt. The northern sharīf-s were left with the zakāt of the eastern pilgrimage caravan only. The frequent interruption of this caravan during the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān must have certainly affected the interests of the sharīf-s of Fès and the northern part of the country.

The sharīf-s were not only affected materially. Their social and moral status was at stake as well. On the judicial level, Mawlāy Sulaymān decreed that the sharīf-s<sup>C</sup> should stand supreme. A sharīf was no longer to be immune from punishment by Makhzen officials, although traditionally the naqīb or the shaykh of the sharīf-s looked into offences committed by the descendants of the Prophet, and a layman could never punish a sharīf. All he could do was to persuade him in the same way "a slave would persuade his master's son" (49) because his sins were the concern of "a prior Divine Providence" (50).

Mawlāy Sulaymān's most daring action against the sharīf-s was his abolition of the immunity traditionally enjoyed by the venerated descendants of the Prophēt and the murabiṭūn (zāwiya members). To give his action a solid legal foundation, Mawlāy Sulaymān asked the ʿālim-s to issue a fatwā concerning the immunity of zāwiya-s in which some governors had deposited illegally acquired funds. In their reply to the Sultan's query, the ʿālim-s

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(49) Al-Tijānī, Nuṣrat al-shurafā fī al radd ʿalā ahl al-jafā, Ms K 1574, BGR, pp. 551-552.

(50) Ibid., p. 552.

were unanimous in authorizing the Makhzen to invest such zāwiya-s and recover funds which legally belonged to bayt al-māl (51). In other words, the zāwiya-s and other venerated places could not serve as a refuge from the judgement of the sharī<sup>C</sup>a.

Mawlāy Sulaymān pursued convicted sharīf-s even inside such traditionally inviolable places as the shrine of Mawlāy Idrīs in Fès. For the Sultan, there could be no sanctity above that of the sharī<sup>C</sup>a. Al-Ḍu<sup>C</sup>ayf reported an incident according to which an Idrisid sharīf was taken out of the shrine of "his ancestor" on the Sultan's order and administered five hundred strokes (52). Makhzen qā<sup>ḍ</sup>id-s did not hesitate either to invest holy shrines to expel offenders even if these happened to be sharīf-s. In 1796, the qā<sup>ḍ</sup>id of the Gharb, Ibn al-Jilānī, ordered his men to invade the shrine of Mawlāy Bushtā al-Khammār in order to arrest a sharīf who was then taken to Mawlāy Sulaymān and maimed in application of the precepts of the sharī<sup>C</sup>a (53). The sheltering of offenders and political dissidents was clearly the major issue between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Wazzāni and Sharqāwi zāwiya-s. In Fès, some of Mawlāy Sulaymān's governors, such as Muḥammad Wa<sup>C</sup>zīz (1807-1810) and Aḥmad al-Qusṭālī (1817-1818), were most unpopular among the sharīf-s (54). This

(51) Cf. text of the fatwā by Ibn Kīrān, al-Dukkālī, Muḥammad al-Zarwālī and Aḥmad b. Sūda in al-Mahdī al-Wazzānī, al-Nawāzil al-kubrā, lith., Fès, 1901, vol.III, pp.80-81. The same fatwā can be consulted in Ms.K.1072, BGR, pp.100-115.

(52) Al-Ḍu<sup>C</sup>ayf, p.319, "On Tuesday, 15 Rajab, 1210 (25 Jan., 1796) the Sultan arrested the sharīf Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. al-Faḍīl al-Idrīsī after he was taken out of the shrine of his ancestor. When he reached the Sultan he was undressed and administered about five hundred strokes ... He was liberated afterwards on the intervention of al-faqīh al-Ḥāj Muḥammad Bannīs and given a compensation of one hundred mithqāl-s, but the sharīf refused to take it". The fact that a sharīf was liberated on the intervention of a Bildi is significant enough. Cf. another case of punishment inflicted on a sharīf, p.333.

(53) Ibid., p.329.

(54) Al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, pp.213-214; and idem, Jamharat man ḥakama bi Fās, p. 7.

latter, in particular, came to be known as mu<sup>2</sup>addib al-ashrāf (the person who punishes the sharīf-s) (55).

In his attitude towards the sharīf-s Mawlāy Sulaymān was certainly motivated by a deep sense of justice refusing to allow people of his own blood to transgress the sharī<sup>c</sup> merely because they were the Prophet's descendants. It is reported that he once beat his son to death for having unjustly killed a slave (56). This does not, however, completely explain his policy towards the sharīf-s. What he sought in the first place was a curb on the power of a social group upon which tradition and society had conferred too much consideration. In this respect, his confrontation with the sharīf-s cannot be detached from his struggle against the growing power of religious groups in general. Mawlāy Sulaymān attempted by various means to diminish the influence of the sharīf-s. His privileged relations with the ālim-s which contrasted with his avoidance of the sharīf-s, were intended, according to Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt, as a check on the arrogance of the latter (57). Even a foreign traveller, such as John Buffa, who was on a short visit to the country, observed that "the princes of blood and Xeriff-s were not allowed to interfere in any political or public business, and were never consulted in State affairs" (58).

The conflict with the sharīf-s had also an ideological dimension. The sharīf-s, whose interests were intimately linked with those of the zāwiya-s, could not but be

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(55) Ibid.

(56) Āl-Ḥajwī, Ikhtisār al-Ibtisām, p.359. The British consul also reported in 1802 that Mawlāy Sulaymān beat to death a prince of the ruling family for having arbitrarily killed a Berber notable; cf. F.O.52/12, 12 Aug., 1802.

(57) Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt wrote: "After Mawlāy al-Yazīd, Mawlāy Sulaymān followed a wise policy which favoured the people of learning and religiousness and discarded the rest, elevating some and discrediting others with the hope of checking their abuses and reducing their power"; quoted in Ibn Zaydān, al-<sup>c</sup>Izz, II, pp.86-87.

(58) John Buffa, Travels, p. 184.

concerned over Mawlāy Sulaymān's reformist ideas. His sympathy with the Wahhābi doctrine and his public and repeated attacks on popular religious practices irritated the sharīf-s and the zāwiya-s. Mawlāy Sulaymān's prohibition of the mawsim-s held annually by the zāwiya-s and the sharīf-s constituted not only an injury for the material interests of these groups, but also an unpardonable outrage against their religious traditions. The sharīf-s were to play an important role in the Fès rebellion during which they openly accused Mawlāy Sulaymān of Wahhābism.

### III - Religious Orders

The proliferation of religious brotherhoods has certainly been the salient feature of Moroccan history during the last four centuries. Sufi ideas, which were introduced into the Maghrib in the eleventh century received vigorous encouragement by the doctrines of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī (1175-1258 AD) and Muḥammad b. <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jazūlī (d.1465). These two mystics did not found any particular order or zāwiya of their own, but served nevertheless as the spiritual reference for most ṭarīqa-s of the Maghrib.

The Shādhili-Jazūli school was based on an intensive veneration of the Prophet which was quickly extended to the latter's descendants. Thus, Moroccan Sufism progressively fell under the influence of the sharīf-s. Al-Jazūlī from whom most ṭarīqa-s claim spiritual descent, was a sharīf himself and manifested a great pride in declaring that he had the privilege of possessing, at the same time, the nobility of belief and that of blood (al-sharaf al-dīnī wa al-sharaf al-ṭīnī) (59). "Man's power", he wrote, "springs not from the esteem he enjoys or the tribe to which he belongs, but from the nobility

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(59) Muḥammad al-Mahdī al-Fāsī, Mumtī<sup>C</sup> al-asmā<sup>C</sup> fī dhikr al-Jazūlī wa al-Tabbā<sup>C</sup> wa mā lahumā min al-aṣḥāb, lith., Fès, 1895, p.3.

of his origin. I am a sharīf, my origin is noble, my ancestor is the Prophet of God (may peace be upon him) to whom I am closer than any other creature" (60). In fact, al-Jazūlī did nothing more than underline the sharifian orientation of Moroccan Sufism whose Poles (61), Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī and his shaykh Mawlāy<sup>c</sup> Abd al-Salām b. Mashīsh, were themselves descendants of the Prophet (62).

After al-Jazūlī, most ṭarīqa-s in Morocco came under the control of sharifian lineages. With the exception of the Qādiriya and the Tijāniya, all claim spiritual attachment to the Shādhili-Jazūli tradition. By the early nineteenth century, the most influential zāwiya-s (Wazzāniya, and Darqāwiya) were led by sharīf-s. Indeed, sharifian opposition to Mawlāy Sulaymān was usually associated to that of the zāwiya-s. The distinction made here between zāwiya-s and sharīf-s is purely dictated by methodological considerations. In practice, these two groups often represented the same reality.

Before reviewing the main ṭarīqa-s which dominated the religious life at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the difference between ṭarīqa, ṭāʿifa and zāwiya must be clarified. A ṭarīqa is a religious path which is supposed to lead the murīd (aspirant) towards a more intimate knowledge of God and, through an intensive religious life, put him closer to the Divine presence.

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(60) Ibid., p.5.

(61) A Pole (quṭb) means in Sufi terminology the highest spiritual authority among the saints during a given period of time. Aḥmad al-Tijānī, the founder of the Tijāni ṭarīqa, claimed that he was the Pole of his time.

(62) Muḥammad al-Mahdī al-Fāsī, Mumtiʿ al-asmāc, p.8.

Each ṭarīqa is distinguished by its particular wird (initiation prayer) and dhikr (litany) which is recited either individually or preferably in collective dhikr sessions. The adepts of a ṭarīqa form a religious order (ṭāʿifa) which is headed by a shaykh. Within this religious association, the murīd is directed towards salvation by following the ṭarīqa prescriptions. The zāwiya finally, is a kind of a convent or meeting house where the adepts of a particular religious order assemble to lead an intensive religious life. Zāwiya-s, therefore, belong most of the time to a large religious order.

A local zāwiya, however, could very well develop its own ṭarīqa and evolve into a wider religious order extending over vast regions and sometimes over many countries. The great religious orders of Morocco, the Nāṣiriya, the Sharqāwiya and the Wazzāniya, all started as local zāwiya-s. Indeed, in the Moroccan context, this evolution was rather the rule. With time, the term "zāwiya" imposed itself as a substitute for "religious order".

#### A - The Nāṣiriya

The zāwiya of Tamegrout was founded in 783 AH (1575-1576) by <sup>C</sup>Umar b. Aḥmad al-Anṣārī (d.1602). It was only after his death that the zāwiya, under the leadership of Muḥammad b. Nāṣir, began to evolve as a brotherhood with its own Sufi path (63). Muḥammad b. Nāṣir, who assumed the responsibility of the zāwiya in 1630, was in fact the spiritual founder of the Nāṣiriya religious order. His scrupulous observance of Islamic orthodoxy profoundly marked the evolution of the zāwiya.

The Nāṣiri ṭarīqa had no distinctive doctrine. "The path of the Nāṣiriya", wrote Aḥmad b. Khālīd al-Nāṣirī, "is actually nothing but the path of the Prophet of God

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(63) M. Ḥajjī, al-Ḥaraka al-fikriya bi al-Maghrib fī ʿahd al-saʿdiyīn, Rabat, 1976, vol. II, p. 551.



and his Sunna .... The shaykh Muḥammad b. Nāṣir simply gave it a new life and served as the agent who strived for its triumph" (64). Muḥammad b. Nāṣir who was an outstanding Ālim and Sufi at the same time, reduced the litanies (wird-s) of the Shādhiliya to a single litany leaving more room for the recitation of the Quran (65). Heterodox Sufi practices, such as the use of musical instruments or the recourse to liturgic dances, were severely condemned and discarded as detestable innovations (66). The Nāṣiri-s also considered as innovations the immolation of animals on the shrine of saints, the use of tobacco and, indeed, all practices which find no justification in the Quran or in the Prophet's traditions. This orthodox orientation attracted many Ālim-s to the order. Al-Tāwdī b. Sūda (d.1795) adhered to the Nāṣiri ṭarīqa and his son Aḥmad (d.1820) was entrusted with the leadership of the Fāsi branch of the zāwiya (67). Mawlāy Sulaymān, following his father's example, also adhered to the Nāṣiri ṭarīqa whose rigorous orthodoxy was closest to his reformist ideals.

Owing to its geographical location, the Nāṣiri zāwiya played an important role in the cultural and social life of the Dra valley. Tamegrout constituted, indeed, an active centre for the propagation of the Arabo-Islamic culture on the fringes of the Sahara. Nothing illustrates this fact better than the famous library of the zāwiya which still contains many thousands of manuscripts. The weakness of central authority in such a distant region furthermore impelled the zāwiya to serve as mediator in tribal conflicts and extend its beneficent protection to local economic activity. This social role made Tamegrout into an important staging point for the caravan trade and allowed the zāwiya to acquire considerable wealth.

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(64) G. Druce, Esquisse, p.203.

(65) al-Ruhūnī, Umdat al-rāwīn, VII, pp.603-604.

(66) Muḥammad b. Ābd al-Salām b. Nāṣir, al-Mazāyā fī mā ḥadatha min al-bida' bi ummi al-zawāyā, Ms Z 3099, RL, pp. 47-49.

(67) Al-Ḥawwāt, al-Rawḍa al-maqṣūda, p. 322.

The distant location of the zāwiya on the outskirts of the Sahara was never an incentive for the Nāṣiri shaykh-s to develop political ambitions. These always manifested great self-restraint in this respect, even refusing to take part in the jihād efforts in order to avoid being suspected of political designs (68). As a result, their relations with the Makhzen were generally peaceful and cordial. The refusal of the Nāṣiri-s to mention the sultan's name in the Friday prayer created a certain tension between the zāwiya and Mawlāy Rashīd, but the 'Alawid sultans were soon convinced that this omission was not a sign of hostility to the ruling dynasty. According to the argument put forward by the Nāṣiri shaykh-s, it was a measure dictated by a strict observance of the Sunna (69). To show his good will towards the zāwiya, Mawlay Ismā<sup>C</sup>īl allowed Aḥmad b. Nāṣir to extend his influence to the northern provinces of the country, apparently with the aim of exercising a closer control over the activities of the zāwiya.

During the first half of the eighteenth century, the zāwiya succeeded in gaining numerous adepts all over the country. Its implantation was particularly important amongst Atlas Berbers. The adoption of the Nāṣiri ṭarīqa by the Amhāwish and Aḥanṣāl families was at the basis of their politico-religious leadership in the Atlas during most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

This northward expansion imposed on the zāwiya the adoption of a policy of cooperation with the Makhzen. The fifth shaykh of the zāwiya, Ja<sup>C</sup>far b. Mūsā, entertained cordial relations with Sīdī Muḥammad b. <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh (70).

(68) G. Drague, Esquisse, p.208, note 28.

(69) Ibid., p.189. Muḥammad b. <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Salām b. Nāṣir gave a different interpretation to this practice of the early Nāṣiri-s. Sīdī Muḥammad b. Nāṣir, argued the author of al-Mazāyā, lived at a time when the dynastic struggle between the 'Alawids and the Dilā'i-s was not yet settled. To avoid any complications, he chose therefore not to mention any name in the Friday khutba; cf., al-Mazāyā, p.69.

(70) G. Drague, Esquisse, p.191.

As a result, the Nāṣiri-s implanted branches of their zāwiya everywhere and succeeded in becoming one of the most influential religious orders in the country. However, under the sixth shaykh, <sup>C</sup>Alī b. Yūsuf (term from 1783 to 1818-1819), relations deteriorated and Sīdī Muḥammad b. <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh not only destroyed a branch of the zāwiya in the Rif (71) but threatened to invest Tamegrout itself (72).

During the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān, the Nāṣiri-s entertained excellent relations with the Makhzen. Indeed, Mawlāy Sulaymān succeeded in dissipating the tension which had reigned on the eve of Sīdī Muḥammad's death replacing it by cooperation and good understanding. Many factors contributed towards this improvement. During the term of <sup>C</sup>Alī b. Yūsuf the zāwiya progressively lost its influence among the Fazāz Berbers whose sympathies went instead to the new Darqāwi religious order. This development reduced the chances of **confrontation** between the Makhzen and the Nāṣiri zāwiya whose Amhāwish and Aḥanṣāl adepts had been at the origin of numerous conflicts with the <sup>C</sup>Alawid dynasty (73). At the beginning of the nineteenth century Abū Bakr Amhāwish maintained very distant relations with his Nāṣiri shaykh-s. He seemed to have more admiration for the shaykh of the Darqāwi ṭarīqa whose ascetic character and sharifian origin were particularly appealing to his austere nature and sharifian pretensions (74). The Nāṣiri-s, on the other hand, were not very enthusiastic about the bellicose attitude of the Aīt Oumalou towards their neighbours (75).

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(71) Al-Ḍu<sup>ʿ</sup>ayf, p. 203.

(72) Ibid., pp. 210-211.

(73) The Ḥanṣālī zāwiya followed the Nāṣiri doctrine and intervened actively in the troubles which followed the death of Mawlāy Ismā<sup>ʿ</sup>īl in 1727. Cf. Magali Morsy, Les Ahansala, Paris-The Hague, 1972. Under the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad the Amhāwish maraboutic family gave refuge to Mawlāy al-Yazīd in 1770, after this one rebelled against his father. Cf. al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.163-164.

(74) G. Drague, pp. 141-143.

(75) Ibn Nāṣir, al-Riḥla al-ṣuḡhrā, p. 215.

Another factor which contributed to the rapprochement between the Nāṣiriya and the Makhzen during the period under study was the need for the zāwiya of Tamegrout to resist the expansionism of the Aīt Atta Berbers. The southward expansionist drive of the Aīt Atta constituted a serious threat for the Arab tribes of the Dra valley. By the end of the eighteenth century, according to Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Salām b. Nāṣir (76), the Aīt Atta had occupied most of the country stretching between the Tafielt and the Dra river. This expansion compelled the Nāṣiri-s to seek the support of the Makhzen (77).

The orthodoxy of the Nāṣiri ṭarīqa and its well-known disapproval of blamable innovations must certainly have favoured a better understanding between the two sides. The doctrine of the Nāṣiriya, which is "actually nothing but the path of God's Prophet" (78), matched perfectly Mawlāy Sulaymān's hostility to heterodox practices. Mawlāy Sulaymān was himself an adept of the Nāṣiri ṭarīqa, the wird of which he received from his father, as well as from the shaykh-s of the zāwiya (79). This adherence to the Nāṣiri ṭarīqa he also shared with his respected teachers, al-Tāwdī b. Sūda and Aḥmad b. Sūda (80).

The Nāṣiri shaykh-s themselves had great esteem for Mawlāy Sulaymān's orthodoxy and religiousness. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Salām b. Nāṣir who met Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1796

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(76) Ibn Nāṣir, al-Riḥla al-Kubrā, p. 23.

(77) G. Drague, p. 213.

(78) Aḥmad b. Khālid al-Nāṣirī, Ṭalʿat al-mushtārī, quoted by G. Drague, p. 203.

(79) Ibn Raḥmūn, al-Durr wa al-ʿiqyān, D 724, p. 45; A. al-Kattānī, Fihris al-fahāris, II, p. 329.; al-Ḍuʿayf, p. 394.

(80) S. al-Ḥawwāt, al-Rawḍa, pp. 316, 322. Aḥmad b. Sūda received the Nāṣiri wird from his father and from ʿAlī b. Yūsuf who entrusted him with the leadership of the Fāsi branch of the zāwiya.

was impressed with the latter's scholarship and respect for the ʿālim-s (81). Moreover, he maintained excellent relations with Mawlāy Sulaymān's court and called upon the shaykh of the zāwiya, ʿAlī b. Yūsuf, to mention the Sultan's name in the Friday khuṭba, thus advocating the break with an old tradition whereby the Nāṣiri-s omitted the prince's name in their Friday prayers (82). ʿAlī b. Yūsuf himself paid frequent visits to the royal court and enjoyed Mawlāy Sulaymān's respect (83). Indeed, never before had relations between the Nāṣiri shaykh-s and the ʿAlawid sultans been so intimate.

#### B - The Sharqāwiya

The Sharqāwi zāwiya is an offshoot of the Nāṣiri ṭarīqa. Its founder, Muḥammad al-Sharqī (d. 1601) claimed descent from the Prophet's companion ʿUmar b. al-Khattāb (84). Muḥammad al-Sharqī was a disciple of al-Jazūlī through his pupil ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Tabbāʿ. Around 1660, the grandson of the founder, Muḥammad al-Maʿṭī joined the Nāṣiri ṭarīqa. However, the shaykh-s of the Sharqāwiya religious order did not always manifest the same degree of orthodoxy as the Nāṣiri-s. Liturgic dances, for instance, were perfectly acceptable to Mawlāy Sulaymān's contemporary, al-ʿArbī b. al-Maʿṭī (85).

The Sharqāwiya never succeeded in extending its influence to distant regions as did the Nāṣiriya or the Wazzāniya. The Sharqāwi-s had neither the missionary drive of the Nāṣiri-s nor the advantage of sharifdom enjoyed by the Wazzāni-s. The influence of the zāwiya remained therefore limited to the Tadla and the central plains of Morocco.

(81) Ibn Nāṣir, al-Riḥla al-ṣuḡhrā, p. 29.

(82) Ibn Nāṣir, al-Mazāyā, p. 69.

(83) Al-Ḍuʿayf, pp. 381, 394. The respect Mawlāy Sulaymān had for the Nāṣiri-s did not prevent him from launching a punitive attack on the zāwiya's branch of Beni Touzine (Rif) in 1808. Cf. al-Ḍuʿayf, p. 450.

(84) ʿAbd al-Salām al-Qādiri refuted this claim. Cf. his al-Tuḥfa al-qādiriya, II, p. 8.

(85) al-Ḍuʿayf, p. 387.

The geographical location of the zāwiya at Boujad, at the foot of the Atlas mountains, determined to a large extent, the nature of its relations with the Makhzen. By virtue of its position, it served as a buffer zone between the dissident Berber tribes and the lowland Makhzen country. The <sup>C</sup>Alawid sultans had, therefore, a particular interest in strengthening the zāwiya. The Sharqāwi-s were granted large concessions over the Tadla and neighbouring tribes in the form of <sup>C</sup>azīb-s (86). The farming of agricultural taxes in these territories, together with the regular ziyāra-s (offerings) by the faithful (87), ensured a considerable revenue for the zāwiya.

The destruction of the zāwiya of Dilā<sup>2</sup> by Mawlāy Rashīd in 1668 certainly contributed to the emergence of the Sharqāwiya order as the uncontested religious power of central Morocco (88). The long period of political instability witnessed between 1727 and 1757 served also to consolidate the prestige of the zāwiya, by virtue of its role as mediator in local conflicts. During the second half of the eighteenth century, the politico-religious influence of the zāwiya reached such proportion that Sīdī Muḥammad b. <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh found it necessary to direct a military attack against Boujad and evacuate its inhabitants (88).

Apparently, Sīdī Muḥammad's repressive action against the zāwiya of Boujad caused little harm to the prestige and influence of the Sharqāwi-s. The political instability

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(86) A <sup>C</sup>azīb is a territory the inhabitants of which pay their legal taxes to a zāwiya by virtue of a concession from the Makhzen. Wazzāni sharīf-s were granted control not only over taxation but over land and its occupants as well.

(87) The Sharqāwi zāwiya received two annual ziyāra-s, one during the spring and the other after the end of harvests. They consisted of both money and agricultural produce (Information communicated to the author of this thesis by Muḥammad al-Sharqāwī).

(88) al-Nāṣirī, VII, p.53.

(89) Al-Ḍu<sup>C</sup>ayf, p.197. Al-Zayānī dated this campaign in 1119AH/1784-1785 (al-Rawḍa, fol.144). The date given by al-Ḍu<sup>C</sup>ayf, being more precise (Feb., 1786), seems more probable.

after his death allowed the zāwiya to regain its strength and enhance its autonomy by assuming a more pronounced role in the 1790's dynastic crisis.

The attitude of the Sharqāwi zāwiya in the political contest between Mawlāy Sulaymān to his brothers from 1792 to 1797 was by no means neutral. Al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī lent his support to Mawlāy Hishām with whom he had a deep and intimate friendship (90). Until 1794 the name of Mawlāy Hishām was still mentioned in the mosques of Boujad during Friday prayers (91). Despite al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī's loyalty to Mawlāy Hishām, some influential members of the Sharqāwi family, such as Qaddūr b. <sup>C</sup>Alī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī, had close relations with Mawlāy Sulaymān and were in favour of his being proclaimed. Towards the end of 1794, al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī had become so embarrassed by the growing sympathy of his own family for Mawlāy Sulaymān that he sought refuge in the mountains (92). Soon afterwards, however, the head of the Sharqāwiya realized that the moment of truth had come and that he could no longer ignore the consensus which was building up around Mawlāy Sulaymān. He was even willing to offer his good offices in 1796 to bring about the submission of the rebellious Chaouia (93).

A fortuitous incident in 1796 compromised this new and fragile reconciliation. Abū <sup>C</sup>Azza al-Qustālī, qāḍid of the Beni Hsen and affine of al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī, was assassinated in obscure circumstances, most probably at Mawlāy Sulaymān's instigation (94). This incident "deeply afflicted" al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī (95) and reduced his enthusiasm for Mawlāy Sulaymān's cause at a time when the southern provinces were still in rebellion. Once again,

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(90) Al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī Bendāwūd, al-Fath al-wahbī fī manāqib al-shaykh abī al-mawāhib mawlānā al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī, Ms K 23I2, BGR, p. 529.

(91) Al-Du<sup>C</sup>ayf, p.300.

(92) Ibid.

(93) Ibid., p.317.

(94) Ibid., pp.327-328.

(95) Ibid., p.328.

al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī turned to Mawlāy Hishām (96). It was only after the mediation of Fāsi Cālim-s that the shaykh of the Sharqāwi zāwiya agreed to meet Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1797 (97). The rupture between the two sides had lasted for about a year.

With the submission of the last strongholds of rebellion in 1798 Mawlāy Sulaymān directed his attention to the consolidation of his rule in the Tadla where Makhzen authority had been almost inexistent since the death of Sīdī Muḥammad b. <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh. Attempts by Mawlāy Sulaymān to impose qāḍid-s over the Tadla were constantly thwarted by al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī. Despite a certain Makhzen tradition there, Mawlāy Sulaymān appointed neither a local man as qāḍid nor did he take the opinion of the zāwiya over this appointment into consideration. None of the numerous qāḍid-s appointed after 1798 met with the approval of the Tadla tribes. At the end of 1799 these rose in rebellion against al-Ghāzī b. al-Madanī, qāḍid of the Chaouia and whose prerogatives were extended to include the Tadla as well (98). In 1801, al-Zayānī, who was appointed governor of this province, met the same fate (99).

To gain over al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī and neutralize the opposition of the Tadla tribes, Mawlāy Sulaymān nominated members of his own family as governors for this province: his brothers Mawlāy al-Ṭayyib and Mawlāy Mūsā, his son Muḥammad and his son-in-law al-Ḥabīb al-Balghītī (100).

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- (96) According to al-Ḍu<sup>C</sup>cayf, the Friday prayer at Boujad was still said in the name of Mawlāy Hishām at the end of 1796, cf.p.341.
- (97) The delegation sent by Mawlāy Sulaymān to al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī in 1797 included al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān, <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Qādir b. Shaqrūn, Muḥammad Bannīs, in addition to Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, the Sultan's son who was ordered to stay at Boujad in order to acquire the religious sciences there; cf. al-Ḍu<sup>C</sup>cayf, pp.356-358, 363.
- (98) Ibid., p.405. From February 1799 to November 1799, the governorship of the Tadla had been assumed by Mawlāy al-Ṭayyib (d.Nov.1799).
- (99) Ibid., p.413.
- (100) Ibid., pp.399, 404, 405, 429, 434, 435; see also letter of rebuke from Mawlāy Sulaymān to al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī, no date, in Ms.K.1264, BGR, pp.361-365 (appendix 54).



This did not prevent the Beni Mousa and Ourdigha tribes from attacking and plundering Makhzen troops at Boujad in 1801 (101). In 1804 the governorship of the Tadla was entrusted to Sulaymān Ludiyyī (of the Oudaya) and in 1805 to Muḥammad al-Jilālī al-Sarghīnī, both strangers to the area and devoted servants of the Makhzen (102). Both of these qā'id-s were particularly unpopular in the Tadla and, according to the literature of the zāwiya (103), were at the origin of all the misunderstanding and the tension that existed between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Sharqāwi zāwiya.

In 1808 the tribes of the Tadla, namely Ouardigha and Smala, rose again in rebellion against al-Ghāzī b. al-Madanī. This latter succeeded apparently in convincing Mawlāy Sulaymān of the fact that al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī was the instigator of this rebellion (104). The Sultan decided thereafter to put an end, once and for all, to the arrogance of the Sharqāwi zāwiya which he considered as responsible for the persistent agitation among the Tadla tribes (105). On 26 November 1808, a summons by the Sultan was read at the great mosque of Boujad: anybody who remained at Boujad after a lapse of fifteen days would face capital punishment (106). Al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī was placed under surveillance at Fès (107) and the zāwiya threatened with punishment similar to the one suffered by the Dilā'i-s in 1668 (108). At the same time the Sultan organized a punitive expedition against the Tadla tribes and against the mountain Berbers of Aīt Seri (109).

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(101) Ibid., pp.417-418.

(102) A. Bendāwūd, al-Faṭḥ al-wahbī, .530; al-Ḍu<sup>C</sup>cayf, pp.435, 440.

(103) A. Bendāwūd, al-Faṭḥ al-wahbī, pp.528-530.

(104) Al-Ḍu<sup>C</sup>cayf, pp.451-452.

(105) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī, referenced in note 100 above.

(106) Al-Ḍu<sup>C</sup>cayf, p.451.

(107) Al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī remained in exile from December 1808 to Aug. 1809; cf. al-Ḍu<sup>C</sup>cayf, pp.452-453.

(108) Cf. letter mentioned in notes 100 and 105 above.

(109) Al-Ḍu<sup>C</sup>cayf, pp.452-453.

The Berber policy of Mawlāy Sulaymān was, in fact, an important area of disagreement with the Sharqawi zāwiya. Traditionally, the zāwiya extended its spiritual influence over the mountain Berbers, thus drawing into its orbit refractory tribes which the military power of the Makhzen was incapable of subduing (110). The shaykh-s of the zāwiya preferred to see these tribes remain outside Makhzen authority. The extension of Makhzen rule to mountainous areas would not only compromise the position of the zāwiya as a useful buffer between Makhzen regions and areas of dissidence, but would also deprive the Sharqāwi-s of a possible refuge in case of conflict with the Makhzen (111). It was to conserve this rearguard that the Sharqāwi-s used to discourage the Makhzen from taking any action against the Atlas Berbers. Al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī often dissuaded Mawlāy Sulaymān from risking a perilous military confrontation with "these monkeys" as long as they remained entrenched in their mountains and were not endangering his communication routes through the coastal plains (112). Mawlāy Sulaymān's qā'id-s in the Tadla saw the advice as nothing more than a cover for the Sharqāwi-s to maintain their influence in the Atlas which they intended to use as a refuge for offenders from the Tadla (113).

Following Mawlāy Sulaymān's action against the zāwiya in 1808-1808 and the eight months exile of al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī (114), the Sharqāwi-s began to avoid involvement in

(110) The Sharqāwi-s had, for instance, khādim-s (servants) in the Aīt Attab tribe; cf. Bendāwūd, al-Fatḥ al-wahbī, p. 570.

(111) In 1794, for instance, al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī took refuge in the mountains after he refused to proclaim Mawlāy Sulaymān; cf. al-Ḍuḥayf, p. 300.

(112) A. Bendāwūd, al-Fatḥ al-wahbī, p. 530.

"ما لك حاجة في قتال قروود علي قنن الجبال لم يجعلهم الله في طريق الرباط ولا في طريق طنجة ولا تطوان، فلا تلعب القمار معهم بالملكنة"

(113) Ibid.

(114) Al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī was allowed by Mawlāy Sulaymān to return to Boujad in Aug. 1809; cf. al-Ḍuḥayf, p. 453. On 22 Jumādā II, 1224/4 Aug. 1809, according to al-Ḍuḥayf, al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>ṭī left Fès where he was kept "like a prisoner" and was given 81 mules by the Sultan to carry the numerous presents he received.

Makhzen affairs. The head of the zāwiya disassociated himself from the insubordination of the Tadla tribes and spent the last years of his life exhorting his followers to respect Makhzen authority (115). The punitive military campaign had certainly neutralized the power of the Sharqāwi zāwiya, but the weakening of its position as a buffer between the Makhzen and the dissident Berber tribes exposed the former to even greater dangers. The "final pacification" of the Tadla in 1808-1809 opened the way for a direct confrontation with the mountain Berbers. It was only after a humiliating defeat in 1819 that Mawlāy Sulaymān realized how sound al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>C</sup>tī's advice had been.

### C - The Wazzāniya

Between the Sharqāwi and Wazzāni zāwiya-s there were two important similarities. First, both zāwiya-s occupied the foothills of a mountainous area which was often in dissidence. This fact bestowed on these zāwiya-s an important strategic value which the Makhzen attempted to use in order to further its political interests in the inaccessible Atlas and Jbala mountains. Secondly, over time, the two zāwiya-s acquired, with Makhzen encouragement, considerable landed property around the seat of the mother zāwiya. This led to a high degree of centralization which gave them the appearance of landed theocracies (116).

The Wazzāni zāwiya was founded by an Idrisid sharīf, Mawlāy <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh b. Ibrāhīm (d.1678) who was an adept of the Shādhili-Jazūli school. On the doctrinal level, there is hardly any difference between the Wazzāni-s and the other Shādhili ṭarīqa-s. "Our ṭarīqa", wrote Mawlāy <sup>C</sup>Abd

(115) A. Bendāwūd, al-Fath al-wahbī, p.576.

(116) Ali Bey reported in 1803 that the saints of Boujad and Ouezzane had extensive domains the inhabitants of which paid no taxes to the Makhzen. According to the same author, these lands were ruled by the saints without the interference of the sultan. Cf. his Travels, I, p.151.

Allāh, "is based on three principles: the respect of God's ordinances, the avoidance of evil-doers, and the devotion to our Lord the Prophet"(117).

If Mawlāy <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh consecrated his life to worship and contemplation, his successors and heirs of his baraka directed their efforts to the consolidation of the influence of the zāwiya, both inside and outside national boundaries. Towards the middle of the eighteenth century, Mawlāy al-Ṭayyib, the fourth shaykh of the zāwiya, had already adepts and estates in every part of the country(118). At the same time, the zāwiya extended its spiritual influence to the Touat and western Algeria (119). When Sīdī <sup>C</sup>Alī b. Aḥmad took over the affairs of the zāwiya in 1782 the order was about to enter what Abdallah Laroui calls "the third stage" of the zāwiya's life during which economic and political preoccupations overshadow all others (120).

Sidi <sup>C</sup>Alī b. Aḥmad devoted most of his energies to the consolidation of the worldly interests of the zāwiya. He invited the Jews to settle in Ouezzane with the intention of activating trade and crafts. On the other hand, he directed his efforts to provide the zāwiya with a military force. He persuaded his followers to acquire armaments and learn the necessary military skills (121). According to the author of al-Rawḍ al-munīf, Sīdī <sup>C</sup>Alī b. Aḥmad developed a personal interest in the acquisition of military equipment "until he accumulated more armament than is usually found in the arsenals of kings"(122).

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(117) Ḥamdūn al-Ṭāhirī, Tuḥfat, p.272; A. al-Ruhūnf, Ḥmdat al-rāwīn, VII, pp.714-715.

(118) Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib al-Qādirī, Nashr al-Mathānī li ahl al-qarn al-ḥādī ‘ashar wa al-thānī, Ms K 2253, BGR, vol. II, p.132.

(119) G. Drague, Esquisse, p. 231.

(120) A. Laroui, Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain 1830-1912, Paris, 1977, pp. 137-138.

(121) <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh b.al-Ṭayyib al-Wazzānī, al-Rawḍ al-munīf, II, fol.78.

(122) Ibid.; al-Miknāsī, al-Kawkab al-asḤad, lith., Fès, 1906, p.122.

The economic potential of the zāwiya of Ouezzane was considerable. In addition to the large estates it owned in the Gharb and elsewhere, the shaykh-s received each year a considerable amount of offerings from their adepts. Ouezzane used to be a destination for pilgrims from all over the country. Sīdī <sup>C</sup>Alī b. Aḥmad spent most of his time, apparently, receiving ziyāra-s from his visitors (123). The income drawn from these offerings "surpassed that of any king of Morocco" (124). Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī (d. 1850) who succeeded Sīdī <sup>C</sup>Alī b. Aḥmad, multiplied the landed interests of the zāwiya (125) and lived in a splendour unknown to the founders of the zāwiya (126).

Before the death of Sīdī Muḥammad b. <sup>C</sup>Abd Allāh in 1790 the shaykh-s of the zāwiya maintained good relations with the <sup>C</sup>Alawid sultans. In general, they abstained from any action which would irritate the Makhzen and expose their easily accessible domains to its vengeance. On the other hand, the <sup>C</sup>Alawid sultans saw in the zāwiya an important tool in the control, or at least the containment, of the turbulent Jbala tribes. Moreover, the spread of the Wazzāni ṭarīqa to distant places, such as the Touat and western Algeria, gave it additional importance. To reward the traditional loyalty of the zāwiya, Sīdī Muḥammad decided in 1786 to grant the sharīf-s of Ouezzane large administrative concessions (127) at a time when he seemed determined to curb the growing power of the Sharqāwi and Nāširi zāwiya-s (128). Following the death of Sīdī

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(123) A. al-Wazzāni, al-Rawḍ al-munīf, fol.77.

(124) Ibid.

(125) Ibn Ḥassūn, Fahrāsa, Mic. 829, BGR.

(126) Michaux-Bellaire, "La maison d'Ouezzane" in Revue du Monde Musulman, vol.V, 1908, p.45; Villes et Tribus du Maroc, IV, pp.246-247.

(127) These concessions consisted in the right of the Wazzāni shaykh-s to (1) administer the sharīf-s without interference from the Makhzen (2) appoint the qāḍī for Ouezzane to whom the qāḍī-s of the Jbala would be responsible (3) exercise a control over Makhzen qāḍī-s at Ouezzane and the Gharb (4) administer local ahbās. Cf. al-Ḍuḥayf, pp.198-199.

(128) Cf. al-Ḍuḥayf, pp.197 and 210 about the action of Sīdī Muḥammad against the Sharqāwi and Nāširi zāwiya-s.

Muḥammad, however, the shaykh-s of the Wazzāni zāwiya departed from their traditional neutrality in political affairs and played an active role in the dynastic crisis which destabilized the country during the early years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. This interference, together with Mawlāy Sulaymān's repudiation of his father's concessions to the zāwiya-s, led to the deterioration of relations between the two sides.

Sīdī <sup>C</sup>Alī b. Aḥmad was the first Wazzāni shaykh to involve himself openly in the country's political affairs by actively taking part in the 1790 dynastic crisis (129). After the collapse of Mawlāy Maslama's rule in Ouezzane in April 1792, the head of the zāwiya attempted by all available means to improve his relations with Mawlāy Sulaymān, particularly by offering his mediation efforts in bringing about the submission of the rebellious coastal provinces. Mawlāy Sulaymān was, however, determined not to allow any concessions over Makhzen sovereignty. He first of all wanted to curtail the administrative autonomy of the zāwiya by appointing his own officials at Ouezzane. This constituted a clear violation of the understanding reached in 1786 between Sīdī Muḥammad and the shaykh of the zāwiya (130). In 1795 Mawlāy Sulaymān nominated an eminent <sup>C</sup>ālīm from Fès—Muḥammad al-Zarwālī—to be qāḍī for Ouezzane. A few days later, this nomination was revoked and al-Zarwālī was replaced by Aḥmad al-Dar<sup>C</sup>āwī al-Wazzāni, most probably on Sīdī <sup>C</sup>Alī's intervention (131). The following year, the Sultan extended the authority of his qāḍī in the Gharb, al-Jilānī b. al-Mufaḍḍal, to include Ouezzane and the tribe of Masmouda, as well as other neighbouring territories considered by the sharīf-s of Ouezzane as falling within their sphere of influence (132).

(129) Cf. chapter IV above, pp. 176-181.

(130) Cf. note 66 above.

(131) Al-Ḍu<sup>C</sup>cayf, p.301.

(132) Ibid., p.325.

For Ouezzane, al-Jilānī delegated a Makhzen official to reside in the town itself.

SĪDĪ <sup>C</sup>ALĪ b. Aḥmad was deeply irritated by Mawlāy Sulaymān's attempts to abolish the administrative privileges of the zāwiya. He energetically resisted these attempts and sought every means of preventing Makhzen qā'id-s from exercising their duties. On this issue Mawlāy Sulaymān was not ready to compromise. "Ouezzane being part of the Moroccan territory", he wrote to SĪDĪ <sup>C</sup>ALĪ b. Aḥmad, "any official who is appointed there should feel at home ... The person appointed by our uncle must govern in conformity with the sharī'a and will therefore remain as long as he respects it and observes our directives" (133). Mawlāy Sulaymān succeeded, no doubt, in installing his qā'id-s but relations between the Makhzen and the sharīf-s of Ouezzane were often disturbed by similar incidents over the appointment and the administrative prerogatives of Makhzen qā'id-s (134).

The other issue on which Mawlāy Sulaymān refused to compromise related to the function of the zāwiya as a refuge for dissidents and common law offenders. "A zāwiya, he wrote to SĪDĪ <sup>C</sup>ALĪ b. Aḥmad, "is supposed to be a shelter for the oppressed and not for the oppressor" (135). The zāwiya, he argued, can in no way enjoy more respectability than Mecca and Medina because, even these holiest of places are not empowered by the sharī'a to shelter offenders (136). In other words, Mawlāy Sulaymān affirmed his determination

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(133) Al-Jilānī was referred to as "our uncle" by Mawlāy Sulaymān because he belonged to the Maqil Arabs from which had come the Sultan's mother. Cf letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to SĪDĪ <sup>C</sup>ALĪ b. Aḥmad in al-Ḍuḥayf, p. 326 (appendix 12).

(134) Another example of this tension between the Wazzāni zāwiya and the Makhzen is the case of the governorship of Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj over the Gharb province. After repeated complaints by the sharīf-s of Ouezzane, Ḥamdūn was finally revoked. Cf. al-Ḍuḥayf, p. 436; Ḥamdūn's Dīwān, pp. 178-179.

(135) Letter referenced in note 133 above.

(136) Ibid.

not to allow the zāwiya to become a cover for subversive action. Many precedents induced him to adopt such an attitude. During 1795 and 1796 alone, the zāwiya gave refuge to at least three former qā'id-s whose extradition was demanded by the Makhzen (137).

Until 1811, when Sīdī <sup>C</sup>Alī b. Aḥmad died, Mawlāy Sulaymān followed a policy of cautious cooperation with the Wazzāni zāwiya while using the good offices of the sharīf-s of Ouezzane to obtain the submission of political dissidents (138). The death of Sīdī <sup>C</sup>Alī marked a turning point in Mawlāy Sulaymān's relations with this zāwiya. The contest over the succession between Sīdī <sup>C</sup>Alī's sons offered the Makhzen a golden opportunity to reduce the power of a religious group whose open interference in the political arena twenty years before had threatened the <sup>C</sup>Alawid dynasty itself.

Sīdī <sup>C</sup>Alī b. Aḥmad left two candidates for his succession, Sīdī al-Tuhāmī (d.1825) and Sīdī al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī (d. 1850). During their father's lifetime they assumed different roles within the zāwiya. The eldest, Sīdī al-Tuhāmī, had developed strong ties with the urban notables, the cālim-s, and the Sultan's entourage. Sīdī al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī, on the other hand, was used by his father to settle disputes among tribes and enjoyed, consequently, the sympathy of the rural notables and of the far distant regions on Morocco's eastern and south-eastern borders (139). In the succession dispute, Mawlāy Sulaymān openly sided with Sīdī al-Tuhāmī. He wrote to the notables of the country urging them to recognize Sīdī al-Tuhāmī as the legitimate heir of

(137) Among these were: al-Ghāzī b. Salāma who escaped the prison of Mehdiā, Sulaymān b. al-Qurshī, and Ibn Khaddā al-Sharqī; cf. al-Ḍuḥayf, pp.313,316-317, 340.

(138) In 1797, Sīdī <sup>C</sup>Alī b. Aḥmad succeeded in a joint mission with some cālim-s of Fès, in bringing about the submission of <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Raḥmān b. Nāṣir; cf. al-Ḍuḥayf, pp.367-368.

(139) A. al-Wazzānī, al-Rawḍ al-munīf, II, p.66; Ibn Ḥamza al-Miknāsī, al-Kawkab al-asḤad, pp.185-187.



his father's baraka (140). Eminent <sup>C</sup>ālim-s, such as Ḥamdūn b.al-Ḥāj and Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt, also supported al-Tuhāmī's candidature (141). The sympathy of common people, however, as well as that of the adepts of the zāwiya in general, went primarily to Sīdī al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī (142).

The history of the Wazzāniya religious order during the second decade of the nineteenth century was characterized by acute rivalry between the two sons of Sīdī <sup>C</sup>Alī over the leadership of the zāwiya. On more than one occasion Mawlāy Sulaymān was asked to mediate between Sīdī al-Tuhāmī and Sīdī al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī. Replying to a complaint by the former, Mawlāy Sulaymān confirmed once more his partiality in the conflict. He asserted that Sīdī <sup>C</sup>Alī b. Aḥmad had chosen Sīdī al-Tuhāmī as his successor and demanded that Sīdī al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī should not interfere anymore in the affairs of the zāwiya (143). However, Mawlāy Sulaymān saw no way of preventing Sīdī al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī from receiving visitors and ziyāra-s. "Had Sīdī <sup>C</sup>Alī left one thousand sons", wrote Mawlāy Sulaymān, "all would receive their share of the ziyāra-s without causing any harm to each other" (144).

(140) A.al-Wazzānī, al-Rawḍ al-munīf, II,p.66; see also letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī al-Tuhāmī supporting his candidature in Ms.K.1264, pp.361-365 (appendix 51).

(141) Al-Miknāsī, al-Kawkab al-ascad, pp.191-218; A.al-Wazzānī, al-Rawḍ al-munīf, II,p.48.

(142) A. Bannānī, Taḥliyat al- ādhān wa al-masāmi<sup>C</sup>, Ms K 650, BGR, p. 131.

...وَجَلَّ الْمُنْتَسِبِينَ إِلَيْهِمْ أَوْ كَلِمَهُمْ عَلَى اعْتِقَادِ الثَّانِي (سَيِّدِي الْعَرَبِيِّ) وَبِشَهَادَةِ  
لَهُ قُوَّةُ الظُّهُورِ بِالْحُكْمِ التَّصْرِيفِيِّ الَّذِي لَا يَبْنَالُ بِالتَّصَوُّرِ وَلَا بِالْحَدِثِ فِي الْأُمُورِ وَإِنَّمَا  
يَخْصُ بِهِ مِنْ شَاءِ الْعُلَمَاءِ بِخَفِيَّاتِ الْأُمُورِ وَخَفَايَا الصُّدُورِ ...

(143) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī al-Tuhāmī, no date, in al-Rawḍ al-munīf, II,p.48, in which Mawlāy Sulaymān confirmed the legitimacy of his succession to the leadership of the zāwiya (appendix 52):

...وَأَمَّا التَّعَرُّضُ مِنْهُ (سَيِّدِي الْعَرَبِيِّ) لِلْمَقْدَمِينَ وَالتَّكَاثُفُ لِلْأَفَاقِ وَالدُّخُولُ فِي أُمُورِ  
الزَّوَايَةِ فَهُوَ ظَالِمٌ أَشْهَدُ بِاللَّهِ أَنَّ أَبَاكَ قَدِمَكَ وَفُوضَ لَكَ فِي حَيْلَتِهِ وَأَنْتَ كُنْتَ حَاكِمًا عَلَيْهِ  
فِي حَيَاةِ وَالِدِهِ... وَأَمَّا كَوْنُ النَّاسِ يَذْهَبُونَ لَهُ بِالزِّيَارَةِ فَلَا عَلَيْكَ، وَكَوْنُ تَرْكِ سَيِّدِي عَلِيٍّ أَلْفَ  
وَلَدٍ كُلِّهَا تَزَارُ لَا ضَرَرَ وَلَا ضَرَارَ، وَأَمْرُ الزَّوَايَةِ شَيْءٌ وَهَذَا شَيْءٌ.

(144) Ibid.

At one time coexistence between the two brothers became impossible. Sīdī al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī was finally obliged to abandon the mother zāwiya to his brother and settle at Tétouan (145). After the death of Sīdī al-Tuhāmī in 1825 the leadership of the zāwiya was assumed by his son al-Ṭāhar. It was only in 1840, when Sīdī al-Ṭāhar died, that the zāwiya was again united under the leadership of Sīdī al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī.

Ultimately, Mawlāy Sulaymān failed to weaken the Wazzāni zāwiya by supporting one brother against the other. His policy towards the zāwiya during the second decade of the nineteenth century served only to antagonize Sīdī al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī and the rural groups that were supporting him. In fact, Sīdī al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī could never forgive Mawlāy Sulaymān's interference in the internal affairs of the zāwiya (146). He was to play a leading role in the Fès rebellion of 1820-1822.

#### D - The Darqāwiya

With the foundation of this new ṭarīqa during the second half of the eighteenth century, Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī al-Darqāwī (1737-1823) intended to breathe a new life into the Shādhili doctrine, at a time when existing religious orders became almost exclusively preoccupied with worldly

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(145) Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahā<sup>2</sup>, p.169.

(146) This interference in the internal affairs of the zāwiya extended also to marriage alliances. In 1802, Mawlāy Sulaymān married one of his sons to a Wazzāni sharīfa in spite of the opposition manifested by the sharīf-s of Ouezzane (al-Ḍu<sup>C</sup>ayf, p.422). In 1815, Mawlāy Sulaymān also obliged Sīdī al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī to ally with the maraboutic family of Awlād al-Majdhūb of Masmouda, traditionally held in contempt by the sharīf-s of Ouezzane (al-Rawḍ al-munif, II, pp.40-42).

interests. Favoured by the sharifdom of its founder, the Darqāwiya succeeded, within a few decades, in becoming one of the most important Sufi orders of the Maghrib.

In fact, it was the shaykh of Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī, <sup>C</sup>Alī al-Jamal (d.1779), who paved the way for the emergence of this new ṭarīqa. In his works, we find the basic ideas advocated later on by his disciple. Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī's contribution resided in the popularization of his master's principles (147).

The doctrine of the Darqāwi ṭarīqa is based on the curbing of human passions and self humiliation as a means of rising above worldly attractions. The murīd should detach himself from the material world in order to concentrate on the path of God. This detachment (al-tajrīd) (148) which involves both body and mind, should lead man to a state of fanāʿ, or complete dissolution in God. In order to defeat man's temptations, the ṭarīqa advocated "the breaking of the custom" (kharq al-<sup>C</sup>āda), whereby its adepts were to wear patched garments (al-muraqqa<sup>C</sup>a), practice mendicancy and lead an unconventional life (149). "The curbing of temptations", wrote Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī, "leads man to an authentic knowledge of God, dissipates his doubts and puts him nearer to the Divine presence" (150).

The Darqāwi ṭarīqa accorded great importance to dhikr sessions and the practice of the samā<sup>C</sup> as a means of achieving ecstasy. Orthodox ḥālim-s condemned these practices and Mawlāy Sulaymān sought to attack such detestable innovations at every opportunity.

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(147) Compare al-Yawāqīt al-ḥisān by <sup>C</sup>Alī al-Jamal (Ms.D.1741, BGR) to Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī al-Darqāwī's Rasāʿil (lith., Fès, 1901) and his al-Mudhākara al-qalbiya (Ms.D.1736, BGR).

(148) The tajrīd means detachment from both sensual and moral preoccupations in order to concentrate on God. A complete detachment supposes the abandonment to all means of livelihood and the wearing of al-muraqqa<sup>C</sup>a; cf. al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān, Sharḥ al-ḥikam al-ḥaqāʿiya p.6.

(149) Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī al-Darqāwī, Rasāʿil, Ms K 3095, BGR, p. 79.

(150) Ibid., p.68.

The opposition of orthodox Cālim-s did not, however, prevent the Darqāwi ṭarīqa from spreading rapidly, particularly among the rural populations and the lower urban classes. The sharifdom of the founder facilitated this rapid expansion. During the latter part of the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century, the Darqāwi ṭarīqa rapidly replaced the Nāṣiriya order among the Sanhaja Berbers of the Fazāz. Ibn al-Ghāzī, leader of the Zemmour confederation, was a devout disciple of the Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī and his successors adhered to the Darqāwi order. In Algeria, the zāwiya became so powerful at the beginning of the nineteenth century that it posed a serious political threat to the Turkish rulers there.

Despite this success, Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī felt uneasy about the resistance of the Cālim-s and the upper classes to his teachings. The unorthodoxy of some practices by the Darqāwi-s and the advocacy of pauperism discouraged many Cālim-s and wealthy townsmen from joining the new order (151). When the zāwiya was subjected to Makhzen repression during the early years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign, the Cālim-s usually sided with the Makhzen (152). To overcome these difficulties, Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī eventually deemed it necessary to adopt a different approach towards the khāṣṣa, particularly by providing more flexible criteria for recruitment.

These concessions were best illustrated by the case of Muḥammad al-Ḥarrāq (d.1845), an eminent Cālim and preacher at the great mosque of Tétouan, who was accepted into the order without being required to wear the muragga<sup>C</sup> or practice mendicancy (153).

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- (151) The author of Tārīkh Titwān affirmed that among the Darqāwi adepts in Tétouan, there were no scholars "which shows that the Cālim-s of Tétouan and its faqīh-s during that period were not in favour of Sufism and ascetic life"; cf. Dāwūd, al-Nūr al-barrāq fī tarjamat al-shaykh Muḥammad al-Ḥarrāq, Tétouan, 1968, p. 31.
- (152) Muḥammad al-Makūḍī, al-Irshād wa al-tibyān, pp.199-223; Dāwūd, III, pp.206-223.
- (153) Dāwūd, al-Nūr al-barrāq, p.21.

For Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī, the presence of an eminent <sup>C</sup>ālim within the order became even more important after the death of his two lieutenants, Aḥmad b. <sup>C</sup>Ajība (d.1809) and Muḥammad al-Buzīdī (d.1813). An <sup>C</sup>ālim such as Muḥammad al-Ḥarrāq would, according to Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī, defend the ṭarīqa against its ideological detractors and improve its image in the eyes of the intellectual circles (154). Muḥammad al-Ḥarrāq seemed to fulfill all the necessary requirements. He was at the same time <sup>C</sup>ālim, sharīf, a respected townsman, and he maintained good relations with Makhzen officials.

Al-Ḥarrāq engaged the ṭarīqa upon a new direction. He repudiated the Darqāwi principles of humility and pauperism and maintained cordial contacts with the Makhzen. This new orientation allowed the Darqāwi order to consolidate its position within the urban upper society and helped, at the same time, to put an end to the persecution of Darqāwi-s by the Makhzen. Experience had convinced the founder of the ṭarīqa that his order could not develop while subjected to attacks from the <sup>C</sup>ālim-s and repression by the Makhzen.

On the accession of Mawlāy Sulaymān to the throne in 1792, the Darqāwi zāwiya was hardly significant as a religious group. Unlike the Wazzāni and Sharqāwi zāwiya-s it did not take any part in the dynastic crisis of 1790's. Nevertheless, in a relatively short period of time, Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī al-Darqāwī succeeded in spreading the word of his ṭarīqa even beyond the national borders. This rapid expansion, particularly in the countryside, is usually ascribed to the simplicity of its teachings and its exaltation of poverty, which made its message similar to the way of life of the mass of people.

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(154) Ibid., p.26.

It was precisely this popular appeal of the ṭarīqa which raised the apprehensions of the Makhzen. When Darqāwi teachings first made their appearance in northern Morocco during the 1790's, Makhzen authorities were clearly determined to stamp out this subversive order. Mawlāy Sulaymān's governor at Tétouan, al-Ṣarīdī, launched a campaign against adepts of the ṭarīqa in 1795 and put Aḥmad b. <sup>C</sup>Ajība —an eminent disciple of Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī al-Darqāwī— in prison (155). Ibn <sup>C</sup>Ajība and his imprisoned companions were accused by the authorities of heterodox Sufi practices, mingling with women, unconventional dress and ecstatic dances (156). Aḥmad b. <sup>C</sup>Ajība was ordered by the governor of Tétouan to abandon his muraqqa<sup>C</sup>a and return to his normal teaching activities, but his Sufi convictions remained unshakable. Mawlāy Sulaymān himself was informed of Ibn <sup>C</sup>Ajība's case. His order to the governor was categorical: "if he does not return to his former state, put him in chains and send him to me" (157).

While in prison, Ibn <sup>C</sup>Ajība was visited by a delegation of Darqāwi-s who came from other parts of the country. They were also arrested and imprisoned and asked to abandon their Sufi practices (158). At the same time, the branch of the zāwiya at Tétouan was closed. In the face of this

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(155) Aḥmad b. <sup>C</sup>Ajība was a cālim before he was converted to the Darqāwi ṭarīqa around 1793. After he completed his religious education at Fēs, he returned to Tétouan in order to devote himself to the teaching of religious sciences. He produced numerous works dealing mainly with Sufism. His conversion to the Darqāwi ṭarīqa was a great shock to Tétouani society. He liquidated all his property and turned into a wandering mystic wearing the muraqqa<sup>C</sup>a, walking barefooted and sleeping in the street. Cf. his Fahrāsa, Ms.D.1845, BGR; M.al-Mu<sup>C</sup>askarī, Kanz al-asrār, Ms.K.2841, BGR; Dāwūd, III, pp.206-233; J.L.Michon, L'autobiographie (fahrāsa) du soufi marocain Aḥmad Ibn<sup>C</sup>Ajība (1747-1809), Leiden, 1969.

(156) Al-Makūdī, pp.206, 210, 233-234; Dāwūd, III, p.219.

(157) J.L.Michon, p.115; Dāwūd, III, p.210.

(158) Among the imprisoned visitors figured Muḥammad al-Makūdī, author of al-Irshād wa al-tibyān, which relates the suffering of the Darqāwi-s at Tétouan.

fierce repression, Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī could do nothing but exhort his adepts in Tétouan to remain faithful to their principles and wait for the end of the storm (159).

For the Makhzen the Darqāwi-s threatened not only public tranquility but also the moral values of the khāṣṣa. In Tétouan, they met with the opposition of all categories of the urban elite: notables, ālīm-s and sharīf-s (160). There is no doubt that the hostility of the upper urban society to the ascetic principles of the ṭarīqa was a major obstacle to its success in the urban milieu and deprived it, consequently, of any solid support in its moment of adversity.

The immediate result of this repressive campaign was the adoption of new tactics by Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī al-Darqāwī. The new plan consisted in withdrawing his disciples from towns where they attracted the attention of Makhzen authorities too easily, to concentrate on the countryside and neighbouring Algerian territory. Thus, the head of the northern branch of the zāwiya, Muḥammad al-Buzīdī, was ordered to take refuge at Tlemcen where he was joined by a al-Hāshmī b. <sup>C</sup>Ajība, brother of Aḥmad b. <sup>C</sup>Ajība. After he was freed in 1795-1796, Aḥmad b. <sup>C</sup>Ajība refused to resume his teaching activities and preferred, instead, to follow the advice of his shaykh and settle in his native tribe of Anjra (161). This new tactic bore fruits within a short period of time. In less than ten years, the Darqāwi-s became so powerful in western Algeria that they destabilized Turkish rule in that area. Realizing his inability to stop the spread of the Darqāwiya order, Mawlāy Sulaymān then tried not to antagonize it.

(159) Cf. letters from Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī to his followers in Tétouan in Ms.D.1856, BGR, pp.254-270.

(160) Dāwūd, III, p.213. On the hostility of the Wazzāni-s, cf. Ibn CAjība's Fahrāsa, p.38. The Raysūni sharīf-s of Tétouan were also hostile to the Darqāwi-s and approved Makhzen repression. Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt was among the few to raise his voice against the persecution of the Darqāwi-s. Cf. al-Mashrafī, al-Ḥusām, p.451.

(161) Dāwūd, III, p.210.

The unexpectedly rapid success of the Darqāwiya called forth a more conciliatory attitude on the Makhzen's part. The spread of the ṭarīqa into some of the most uncontrollable regions (the Jbala and eastern provinces) which were also considered as thughūr (points of confrontation with the enemy) induced Mawlāy Sulaymān to improve his relations with Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī and seek his cooperation. By 1797, two years after the repressive campaign of Tétouan, there were indications that relations between the two sides were beginning to improve. During that year, Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī was able to intercede before Mawlāy Sulaymān and obtain the release of an imprisoned qā'id (162). In return, Mawlāy Sulaymān requested the good offices of the Darqāwi shaykh in his differences with Mawlāy Maslama. Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī was asked in October 1797 to proceed to Algeria and arrange for Mawlāy Sulaymān's brother to return to Morocco (163).

In 1805, the prospects of cooperation between the two sides appeared so encouraging that Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī thought of using his spiritual influence in western Algeria to bring about the annexation of Tlemcen to Morocco. Following the repression of Darqāwi adepts by the Bey of Oran, a disciple of Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī, <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Qādir b. al-Sharīf, decided to lead a rebellion against the ruling Turks in the summer of 1805. Weakened by a severe famine and an unstable internal situation, the Algerian government proved to be incapable of putting the rebellion down. Ibn al-Sharīf succeeded in besieging Oran from all sides, except from the sea through which the town received its supplies (164). The Algerian Turks were so helpless that the Dey decided to call upon Mawlāy Sulaymān for assistance. Ibn al-Sharīf's rebellion, the Dey stated in a letter to Mawlāy

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(162) Al-Ḍuḥayf, p.364.

(163) Cf. letter from Mawlāy <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Salām, the Sultan's brother, to Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī al-Darqāwī, dated 22 Rabī' II, 1212/14 Oct., 1797 in al-Fāsī al-Fihri, Qabilat Banī Zarwāl, Rabat, 1962, p. 45.

(164) Cf. story of Ibn al-Sharīf's rebellion in al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol. 181-182; Ibn al-<sup>C</sup>rajj al-Sulaymānī, Zubdat al-tārīkh, vol. III, pp. 124-127; an anonymous Ṭaqyīd on the Darqāwi uprising in Western Algeria, Ms. D I492, BGR.



Sulaymān, was nothing more than the tail of a snake whose head lay in Morocco. To prove his good disposition, Mawlāy Sulaymān sent Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī al-Darqāwī on a mission to Tlemcen with the aim of re-establishing peace between Ibn al-Sharīf and the Bey of Oran (165).

To Mawlāy Sulaymān's great surprise, the Darqāwī shaykh returned from Tlemcen with a written bay<sup>C</sup>a from Ibn al-Sharīf and a delegation of notables to present their allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco (166). Mawlāy Sulaymān was by no means ready to involve himself in an adventure the outcome of which was still not clear. "The people of Tlemcen were well received", wrote al-Salāwī to the British consul who asked for clarification, "but were ordered by His Majesty to return to their country and their rulers, because he said, it is illegal for us to set one Muslim against another" (167). On the other hand, Mawlāy Sulaymān did not want to hurt Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī's feelings. He praised his salutary efforts and promised him that as soon as the winter was over, he would go in person to Tlemcen in order to receive the allegiance of Ibn al-Sharīf and his followers (168). At the same time, he sent his brother Mawlāy Mūsā with a contingent to Oujda so as to prevent his subjects from getting involved in Algerian affairs (169) and dispatched the qā'id of the Oudaya army to Tlemcen in order to come between Ibn al-Sharīf's followers and the Turks. <sup>C</sup>Ayyād Ludiyyī was instructed to remain in Algeria until the Bey had taken firm control of the region (170). The promises given by the Sultan to Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī were, apparently, nothing more than a manoeuvre intended to put off

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(165) Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī dated 16 Jumādā II, 1220 in al-Fāsī al-Fihri, Qabīlat, pp.44-45. Cf. also F.O.52/13, 10 March, 1805.

(166) This bay<sup>C</sup>a was met with joy and festivities in Morocco; cf. al-Du<sup>C</sup>ayf, p.444; Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt, Dīwān, pp.156-157.

(167) F.O.174/284, letter from al-Salāwī to Matra, dated 13 Jumādā I, 1220/9 Aug., 1805.

(168) Cf. two letters from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī al-Darqāwī in al-Fāsī al-Fihri, Qabīlat, pp.44-45.

(169) F.O.174/284, letter mentioned in note 167 above.

(170) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.182.

the head of the Darqāwiya order.

One of the reasons behind Mawlāy Sulaymān's refusal to accede to the wishes of Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī was certainly his reluctance to bring under his control a turbulent region from which subversion could easily spread to other parts of his kingdom. Even the existence of an independent Darqāwi republic on his eastern borders would have constituted a serious threat to the eastern provinces which had only been recovered from the Algerian Turks in 1798 (171). The annexation of Tlemcen, besides the difficulties it would have raised with the Dey of Algiers, would certainly have placed Mawlāy Sulaymān in debt to the shaykh of the Darqāwiya order and would have increased the power of this most uncontrollable religious group. Other considerations resulting from the European wars, weighed in favour of a cautious decision on Mawlāy Sulaymān's part. Moroccan fears of a European invasion increased with the breakdown of the Peace of Amiens and the resumption of hostilities in 1804. Any military adventure on the eastern borders would have been most undesirable at a time when the Makhzen was paying particular attention to the fortification of the northern ports and even cherishing the hope of recovering the fortress of Ceuta from Spanish control (172).

Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī's deception over the bay<sup>C</sup>a of Tlemcen was followed by a certain coolness in relations between the zāwiya and Mawlāy Sulaymān. This tendency was reinforced by Mawlāy Sulaymān's attacks on heterodox Sufi practices and his sympathy with Wahhābi reformist ideas (173). Contact between the two sides, however, was not completely lost. In 1812, Mawlāy Sulaymān agreed to grant refuge to <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Qādir b. al-Sharīf and promised to receive him as hospitably as he had received al-Tijānī in

(171) Al-<sup>C</sup>Du<sup>C</sup>ayf, p.380.

(172) Cf. M. El Mansour, "Mawlāy Sulaymān's Endeavours to Recover Ceuta" (in Arabic), Majallat Kulliyat al-Ādāb, Rabat, V-VI (1979), pp. 29-44.

(173) Mawlāy Sulaymān's essay on the samā<sup>C</sup> was written in 1806, and was designed to discredit such practices which concerned the Darqāwi-s in the first place.

1799 (174). The following year, the people of Tlemcen and Oran sent again a delegation to Meknes in order to renew their bay<sup>C</sup>a to Mawlāy Sulaymān (175). Despite the popular enthusiasm for this event (176), Mawlāy Sulaymān seemed as determined as ever not to compromise himself in any such adventure. Was this refusal motivated by similar considerations to those behind the rejection of the preferred bay<sup>C</sup>a in 1805, or was it motivated by the increasing difficulties which faced the Makhzen during the last decade of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign ?

Whatever the answer, relations between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Darqāwi zāwiya deteriorated steadily during the second decade of the nineteenth century. This deterioration was intimately linked to the progress of the Darqāwiya among the Sanhaja Berbers of the Zemmour and the Middle Atlas. Ibn al-Ghāzī, leader of the Zemmour and a devoted adept of the Darqāwi ṭarīqa, "never acted except on the advice of his shaykh" (177). Abū Bakr Amhāwish also maintained cordial relations with Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī and sympathized with his teachings. This implantation of the Darqāwi ṭarīqa among the troublesome Berber tribes led to greater involvement of Mawlāy al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī in the political affairs of the country. In 1820, the Darqāwi shaykh, for whom contempt for temporal power and worldly attractions constituted a basic principle, figured among the most militant elements in the Fès rebellion.

Meanwhile, however, the emergence after 1818 of the new tendency within the ṭarīqa, represented by al-Ḥarrāq, inaugurated a new era in the relations between the Makhzen and the Darqāwi zāwiya. Owing to his urban origin

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(174) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the governor of Fès dated 16 Jumādā I, 1227/28 May, 1812, in Mic.12/67, HPMD, Fès, 1978.

(175) CCC, vol. 24, 26 May, 1813; al-Ḍu<sup>C</sup>ayf, p.499.

(176) Ibid. Public rejoicing was reported at Tangier and Rabat.

(177) Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahā, p.195.

al-Ḥarrāq maintained excellent relations with the Makhzen and succeeded in gaining over disciples from among government officials such as Mawlāy 'Abd al-Raḥmān's minister, Muḥammad al-<sup>C</sup>Amrāwī, and this latter's kātib, the author of al-Ibtisām (178). This new tendency manifested its independence during the Fès rebellion when al-Ḥarrāq refused to sign the bay<sup>C</sup>a proclaiming Mawlāy Ibrāhīm despite the imprisonment of his shaykh by Mawlāy Sulaymān during the whole period of the rebellion (179).

#### E - The Tijāniya

One of the characteristics of Moroccan Sufism since the fifteenth century had been its national orientation under the influence of al-Jazūlī's teachings. Eastern Sufi schools, such as the Qādiriya, were progressively replaced by Jazūli oriented ṭarīqa-s. The introduction into Morocco of a new ṭarīqa by Aḥmad al-Tijānī (d.1815) was bound to provoke reactions from the local zāwiya-s against this intruder who claimed pre-eminence over all other Sufi Poles (quṭb-s).

Before he founded his ṭarīqa at Aīn Madi (Algeria) in 1782, Aḥmad al-Tijānī had been a disciple of many ṭarīqa-s including the Wazzāniya, the Darqāwiya and the Nāṣiriya. None of these ṭarīqa-s had satisfied his aspirations, however. "We have had several shaykh-s", he wrote, "but none was of any help to us. Our teacher and spiritual reference for this ṭarīqa is our Lord Muḥammad himself" (180).

(178) Dāwūd, al-Nūr al-barrāq, pp.66-68; al-Ḥajwī, Ikhtisār al-Ibtisām, p.355.

(179) Al-Tuhāmī al-Wazzānī, al-Zāwiya, Tétouan, 1942, pp. 199, 201.

(180) M. b.al-Mushrī, Rawḍ al-muḥibb al-fānī fī mā talaqqaynāhu min Abī al-<sup>C</sup>Abbās al-Tijānī, Ms D 2028, BGR, p. 236.

Al-Tijānī claimed that it was from the Prophet that he received the order to found his own ṭarīqa which he preferred to call "Muḥammadiya". The litanies he prescribed to his adepts were supposed to be dictated by the Prophet Muḥammad with whom al-Tijānī was able to communicate while awake (181). Al-Tijānī ascribed to his order special privileges. Not only he claimed to be the "seal of saints" (khātim al-awliyāʿ), but also the "Pole of Poles" (quṭb al-aqṭāb), the highest spiritual power of his time (182). Moreover, al-Tijānī guaranteed to his followers a position superior to that of the greatest saints and which could normally be attained only by the Prophet's companions (183).

The claim that the ṭarīqa's teachings were received directly from the Prophet led al-Tijānī to impose special restrictions on his adepts. A disciple of al-Tijānī could not attach himself to a second ṭarīqa "because true love cannot be divided" (184), nor could he give up this path and turn to an alternative, since this would mean turning away from the Messenger of God himself (185). The Tijānī-s were consequently forbidden to visit other saints, whether dead or alive (186).

Unlike the Darqāwiya, the Tijānī ṭarīqa did not advocate privation, pauperism and the curbing of man's passions. Aḥmad al-Tijānī, we are told by his adepts, lived in luxury "wearing the best of clothes and riding the best of mounts" (187). The Prophet is supposed to have ordered al-Tijānī to adhere to this ṭarīqa "without any need for retreat or isolation" (188). Al-Tijānī in fact had

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(181) Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, London, 1965, p. 38.

(182) Muḥammad Gannūn, Rafʿ al-Citāb ʿamman taraka al-ziyāra min al-ashāb, Ms K 2028, BGR, p. 342; Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, p. 28.

(183) Tijāni Letters, p.169.

(184) Muḥammad Gannūn, Rafʿ al-Citāb, p.345.

(185) Ibid., p.338.

(186) Tijāni Letters, p.169; ʿUmar al-Fawtī, Suyūf al-Saʿīd, p.21.

(187) Muḥammad Balmīnū, Taqyīd, p.117.

(188) ʿUmar al-Fawtī, Suyūf al-Saʿīd, p.76.

the reputation of being able to ensure wealth for his adepts in this world and salvation in the life to come (189). This incited many wealthy people to join the ṭarīqa and thus contributed to the development of the order into an aristocratic congregation.

The spread of the Tijāni ṭarīqa was hindered by a number of factors. The non-sharīf origin of Aḥmad al-Tijānī constituted a handicap in a country where sharifdom had become a vital criterion of legitimacy. Aḥmad al-Tijānī attempted to forge a sharifian lineage for himself but without success (190). The repudiation of the Shādhili doctrine was another obstacle which faced the Tijāni order. This latter represented in fact an attack on the very principle of popular Moroccan Islam which was based on the cult of saints. Finally, the opposition of existing zāwiya-s must have slowed down the spread of the Tijāni order. Aḥmad al-Tijānī's ideas inevitably antagonized these zāwiya-s when he affirmed that the Tijāniya was derived directly from the Prophet and that it was not only superior to all ṭarīqa-s, but also the seal which abrogated all other Sufi paths (191).

The Tijāni order recruited its adepts from among the non-sharīf urban khāṣṣa: Makhzen officials, merchants and influential families. "Most of his adepts", wrote al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī al-Mashrafī, "are merchants and people of wealth" (192). This ṭarīqa counted also many of adepts from among the Bildiyyīn of Fès who happened to control a sizable share of Fāsi economic power, particularly in the commercial field. There

(189) Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, p.47.

(190) Al-Tijānī's alleged sharifdom is based on a supposed personal confirmation by the Prophet but rests on no objective evidence; cf. Ibn al-Mushriī, Rawḍ al-muḥibb, p.313. Al-Tijānī attempted by all means to gain over the sharīf-s, or at least temporize their hostility. He even wrote an essay in the defence of the holy lineage entitled "Nuṣrat al-shurafā fī al-radd Calā ahl al-jafā", Ms.K. 1574, BGR, pp.517-556.

(191) Muḥammad Gannūn, al-Durr al-mandhūm, Ms D 2135, BGR, p. 276.

(192) Al-<sup>C</sup>Arbī al-Mashrafī, Nuzhat al-abṣār, p.431.

is no doubt that the benevolent attitude manifested by Mawlāy Sulaymān towards Aḥmad al-Tijānī encouraged many people from Makhzen circles to join this religious order. For the Makhzen this brotherhood seemed to offer a valuable opportunity to counter-balance the preponderant influence of popularly based zāwiya-s which were far less easy to control than a zāwiya based among the urban elite.

When Aḥmad al-Tijānī fled the persecution of the Algerian Turks in 1798 he chose to reside in Fès where he was offered a most hospitable reception by Mawlāy Sulaymān. He was given a magnificent house which cost, according to al-Zayānī, 20,000 mithqāl-s (193) and a regular allowance which largely covered his needs. Later on, he was assisted with the building of his zāwiya and offered protection against the people of Fès who attempted to obstruct construction (194).

Mawlāy Sulaymān seems to have been so impressed with the piety of al-Tijānī, his ascetism and his scholarship that he invited him to join his learned council which included the most eminent ʿālim-s of the country (195). This benevolence does not, however, mean that Mawlāy Sulaymān shared the ideological tenets of the Tijāniya. Refuge and hospitality were traditionally granted by Moroccan sultans to all those who fled political or religious persecution (196). The hostility of al-Tijānī to the cult of saints and the celebration of mawsim-s (197) was certainly appreciated by Mawlāy Sulaymān whose opposition to heterodox practices has been already underlined. However, contrary to claims by Tijāni sources, Mawlāy Sulaymān never considered

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(193) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.172.

(194) Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, p.20.

(195) Ibid., p.21.

(196) In 1812 Mawlāy Sulaymān manifested his readiness to receive Ibn al-Sharīf, the Darqāwi leader in Algeria, persecuted by the Turks.

(197) Balmīnū, Taqyīd, p.147.

joining the Tijāni ṭarīqa (198). Aḥmad al-Tijānī did, in fact, propose to him the Tijāni wird, alleging that he had received a special message from the Prophet for "his son Sulaymān" (199). Apparently, Mawlāy Sulaymān remained insensible to this appeal. His joining of the Tijāniya would have been incompatible with his obedience to the Nāṣiri ṭarīqa whose strict observance of the Sunna coincided more with his orthodox tendencies. Shortly before his death, Mawlāy Sulaymān still acknowledged his loyalty to the Nāṣiri ṭarīqa (200). Nonetheless, the Sultan must have thought about using this new ṭarīqa to counteract the power of the Shādhili-sharifian zāwiya-s.

The Ālim-s manifested a different attitude towards the founder of the Tijānī ṭarīqa. Ibn Kīrān, the shaykh al-jamā'a, is reported to have attacked him publicly in the meetings of the learned council (201). Another contemporary Ālim, Aḥmad b. Abd al-Salām Bannānī, considered the allegation by the Tijāni-s according to which the Prophet attended their dhikr sessions in person as evidence of "their absurdity, imbecility and ignorance" (202). Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj, on the contrary, maintained good relations with Aḥmad al-Tijānī (203). An attempt was made by this latter to recruit him into his order, but without success (204).

The sharīf-s and the zāwiya-s could only adopt a hostile attitude, the Tijāniya being a rebellion against both sharifian ideology and the Shādhili Sufi school from

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(198) Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, p.20.

(199) Letter from Aḥmad al-Tijānī to Mawlāy Sulaymān inviting him to join his order, no date, in Tijāni Letters, pp.159-160.

(200) Cf. Ijāza by Mawlāy Sulaymān to Aḥmad b. al-Nādī, 15 Shawwāl, 1236/16 July, 1821, authorizing him to recite the Nāṣiri wird, in D.A.R. Cf. also A.al-Kattānī, Fihris, II, p.331.

(201) Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, p.21.

(202) A. Bannānī, Taḥliyat al-ādhān, p.186.

(203) al-Ḥafnāwī, Taḥrīf al-khalāf bi rijāl al-salaf, Algiers, 1906, p. 37.

(204) A letter from Aḥmad al-Tijānī to Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj, no date, in al-Tijānī, Tijāni Letters, Ms K 2815, BGR, pp. I58-I59.



which almost all Maghribi ṭarīqa-s derived. Indeed, al-Tijānī condemned the cult of saints, the visitation of their shrines and the celebration of mawsim-s, all fundamental traditions of Moroccan Islam. This explains the little success encountered by his order in Fès where the visitation of the shrine of Mawlāy Idrīs could not be dispensed with. So attached were the Fāsi-s to this saint that al-Tijānī was obliged to compromise on this particular issue (205).

Nor did the Shādhili zāwiya-s accept the allegation by al-Tijānī about the supremacy of his ṭarīqa. Al-Tijānī claimed, in fact, that his ṭarīqa automatically abrogated all previous ones, in the same way Islam superseded all previous religions (206). He also affirmed that his adepts held before God a position higher than that of the most eminent saints (207). This placed him in direct confrontation with the traditional ṭarīqa-s the wird-s of which he had adopted and abandoned.

At one time the Fāsi milieu had become so inimical that Aḥmad al-Tijānī considered emigrating to the Arab East (208). Only the protection of the Makhzen enabled him to overcome his difficulties. The friendliness of the Sultan induced, no doubt, many members of the Makhzen to join the Tijāniya. One of Mawlāy Sulaymān's sons, Mawlāy <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Salām, adopted this ṭarīqa (209), as well as Akansūs who was counted among the closest collaborators of Mawlāy Sulaymān. Numerically, however, the Tijāniya was still insignificant when its founder died in 1815. Its importance, until then, resided more in the ideological challenge it posed for Moroccan religious groups than in its intrinsic power.

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(205) In order to attract new recruits al-Tijānī allowed sometimes his followers to visit this shrine; cf. al-Ruhūnī, Umdat al-rāwin, X, pp. 147-148.

(206) Muḥammad Gannūn, al-Durr al-mandhūm, p. 276.

(207) Letter from Aḥmad al-Tijānī to ?, in Tijāni Letters, p. 169.

(208) Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, p. 21.

(209) Al-Faḍīlī, al-Durar al-bahiya, lith., Fès, 1895, vol. I, p. 177.

Another son of Mawlāy Sulaymān, Mawlāy <sup>C</sup>Alī, openly attacked the Tijāni ṭarīqa and the allegations made by its founder according to which he was the seal of sainthood. Cf. Muḥammad b. <sup>C</sup>Azzūz, Kashf al-rān, Ms K 644, BGR, p. 233.

## CHAPTER VII

## THE FÈS REBELLION (1820-1822): THE TRADITIONALISTS' REVENGE

The Fès rebellion of 1820-1822 represents the culmination of the socio-political crisis—latent for many years before—of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. This political uprising which led to the proclamation of a rival prince, was the outcome of Mawlāy Sulaymān's growing isolation as well as a result of adverse factors over which he had no control. By virtue of his tribal and religious policies, Mawlāy Sulaymān had deprived himself of reliable allies and made too many enemies. The Sultan's lack of a flexible and coherent tribal policy deprived him of important strategic allies and his religious ideas also alienated the religious groups. Lacking enough funds and a reliable army, Mawlāy Sulaymān could not possibly withstand the joint effects of desolating natural calamities and a humiliating military setback.

I - Gathering Storms

The Battle of Azrou (April 1811) is generally considered as a turning point in the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān and the onset of a steady decline of his authority. However, the difficulties encountered by the Makhzen during the second decade of the nineteenth century were not solely the result of military failures. Experience proved that when the Makhzen disposed of enough income, a major military setback — such as the one suffered in 1800— could easily be overcome. What made the situation increasingly untenable for Mawlāy Sulaymān after 1811 were the financial difficulties that resulted from the fall

of maritime trade returns. The end of the Napoleonic wars in the Iberian Peninsula resulted in a decline of provision exports which, before 1814, went to the British, Spanish and Portuguese armies (1). To compensate for the consequent fall in Makhzen revenue, Mawlāy Sulaymān decided in 1815 to raise import duties for Moroccan Muslim merchants from 2.5% to 10% and, in February 1817, consented to major tariff reductions on some basic exports, thus inaugurating a new commercial policy. More important, however, were the natural calamities (famine of 1817-1818, plague of 1818-1820) which greatly affected Makhzen finances. These calamities also contributed to the deterioration of relations between the Makhzen and the tribes, as the latter were unable to honour their tax obligations, thus creating propitious conditions for the disruption of internal peace.

#### A - The Famine of 1817-1818

The crop failure of 1812 marked the end of agricultural abundance which characterized the middle era of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. Nonetheless, it was followed by three years of relatively good harvests which allowed peasants to reconstitute their reserves. The country was again exposed to scarcity in 1816 as a result of a locust invasion (2).

It was during the early months of 1817 that the spectre of famine became certain. "The continuation of a desolating drought of which there are few examples in this country had thrown into consternation the African monarch and all his subjects", wrote de Lesseps in March 1817 (3). "... The inhabitants of every sex, age and religion live in lamentations, fasting and prayers. The recent experience of a scarcity which emptied the silos adds to their alarm" (4).

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(1) Cf. above chapter III, pp. 167-168.

(2) OCC, vol.25, fol.29-33.

(3) OCC, vol.25, 24 March, 1817.

(4) Ibid.

The rise in cereal prices was enhanced during the spring of 1817 by Mawlāy Sulaymān's unfortunate decision to allow wheat exports to France. One month after the arrival in Rabat of French officials who were to supervise these exports, wheat prices rose by at least 50%, reaching as much as 22 ūqiya-s for the mudd, as compared with 2-4 ūqiya-s in time of abundance (5).

By September 1817 the mudd of wheat cost about 26 ūqiya-s (6). At that price, few people could afford to buy cereals. By the end of the year the Makhzen took the initiative, for the first time, of distributing free meals made up of herbs, roots and rice to indigent people (7). To relieve the sufferings of a starving population, European consuls also decided to import maize from Gibraltar to assist the needy inhabitants of Tangier (8). "Never Morocco offered a more distressing picture", wrote Sourdeau (9).

The drought continued in 1818. In February the mudd of wheat cost 22 ūqiya-s at Rabat (10). "More than half the population lived on herbs", wrote Sourdeau, "as they could not afford the price of cereals" (11).

For the common people, the rise in cereal prices was intimately linked to the export concession made by the Sultan to the Christians. Mawlāy Sulaymān's decision was most unpopular among the urban population and in the inland provinces. Despite all precautions by the Makhzen to give the least publicity to the exportation of wheat, the news led to a general rise of prices, especially at Fès and Marrakech (12). Even wheat that

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(5) Ibid., 12 April, 1817. Cf. chapter III above, pp. 99-100.

(6) Ibid., 29 Sept., 1817.

(7) CCC, vol.25, 13 Dec., 1817.

(8) CCC, vol.26, 19 Feb., 1818.

(9) Ibid.

(10) Ibid.

(11) Ibid.

(12) CCC, vol.25, letter from Ahmad b. M'bārak to Sourdeau, 9 Qa'ḍa, 1232 / 20 Sept., 1817.

was loaded from Safi to Tangier for the relief of the northern provinces was taken by the common people to be part of the deal concluded with France (13). In Rabat "a population alarmed about its own existence" attacked the boats that came to load wheat (14). In September 1817, the people of Fès remonstrated against the export of cereals and reminded Mawlāy Sulaymān of the promise he made in 1792 not to allow the sale of cereals, oil and wool to the Christians (15). The Sultan found himself compelled to order an immediate stoppage of exports, but could he dispense with his customs revenue at a time when the agriculture-based taxation system was in no position to provide the necessary funds (16)?

B - The Scourge of God : The Plague Epidemic of  
1818 - 1820.

The two year famine had already paved the way for the subsequent epidemic. This time, the plague attacked the country through the northern ports after the arrival of a number of returning pilgrims in May-June 1818. The outbreak of the malady was preceded by the arrival in Tangier of a British three masted ship from Alexandria. It was among the 430 pilgrims she had brought back that the first casualties occurred by the middle of June (17).

This second epidemic was less violent in its nature and less devastating than the previous one in 1799-1800, although it lasted a little longer. Average daily estimates represented between one third and two thirds of those recorded in 1799-1800. This was partly due to the fact that the population afflicted in 1818 was less numerous. The previous eighteen years had hardly been sufficient for the reconstitution of the population.

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(13) Ibid.

(14) CCC, vol.25, 12 April, 1817.

(15) Ibid., 29 Sept., 1817.

(16) On the Sultan's commercial policy after 1817 cf. pp.169-170 above.

(17) CCC, vol.26, 18 June, 1818.

During the year 1818 the plague remained confined to northern and eastern Morocco. Tangier lost 2,000 souls during the first six months of the epidemic (18). At Tétouan, death rates in 1818 remained moderate : 10 to 20 per day as a maximum. It was in the spring of 1819 that the epidemic reached its apex there, at a time when the south still remained free from the malady. In March, the number of deaths at Fès reached several hundreds per day. The British Health Agent reported that in Fès "people are employed from sunrise to sunset in burying the dead" (19). In April, their number was supposed to have reached 400 per day (20). At Tétouan, the number of victims daily fluctuated between 70 and 100 (21).

The middle of 1819 constituted a turning point for the epidemic. In the north, it was everywhere on the decline. In some places, such as Tangier, Larache, Fès and Meknès, it had ceased entirely by September (22). At this point the plague spread to the Tamesna and the southern provinces where it reached its apex in the spring of 1820. In February 1820, there were about 200 deaths per day at Marrakech. In March, the record figure of 900 per day was reached (23). In April, this number fell to 600 and continued to decline until the disease disappeared almost completely in July (24). With the end of the summer, the epidemic seemed to exhaust itself everywhere. By October, it still persisted at Agadir but that was to be the last sign of it (25).

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(18) CCC, vol.26, 28 Dec., 1818. Moroccan sources mention that Tangier lost 1/5 of its population during the whole epidemic (cf. Abd al-Salām b. Sūda, Ithāf al-muṭāliʿ, events of the year 1233 AH.

(19) C.O.91/74, 8 April, 1819.

(20) Ibid., 10 May, 1819.

(21) Tétouani contemporary sources quoted by Dāwūd estimated the losses at the apex of the plague at 80 per day; cf. Dāwūd, III, p.249.

(22) C.O.91/74, 7 Oct., 1819.

(23) C.O.91/76, 24 March, 1820.

(24) Ibid., 28 July, 1820.

(25) Ibid., 6 Oct., 1820.

The losses during the second plague of 1818-1820 were much smaller than those of the Great Plague of 1799-1800 as local estimates for the cities of Fès and Tétouan during the first and second epidemics show. In 1799-1800, the number of casualties at the height of the epidemic reached 2,500 per day according to the author of al-Ibtisām (26). In 1818-1820, the maximum at Fès never exceeded 300 per day according to the same source (27). Contemporary Tétouani sources affirm that the maximum daily losses in 1818-1820 represented a little more than half of the 1799-1800 maximum (80 deaths against 150) (28).

The Makhzen was greatly affected by the plague of 1818-1820. Propitious conditions for social unrest resulting from the drought of 1817 were further enhanced. Contrary to the situation that prevailed during and after the Great Plague of 1799-1800 (firm control of the country by Mawlāy Sulaymān after the pacification was achieved, death of major political opponents, agricultural abundance after 1800), this second epidemic only aggravated the problems facing the Makhzen. The decrease in Makhzen revenues as a result of the drought which continued in 1818 undermined its means of intervention and made it very difficult for Mawlāy Sulaymān to benefit from the inheritance of the plague victims as in 1800.

Makhzen income was also reduced by the interruption of commercial relations with most European countries. Between 1818 and 1821 Great Britain withdrew its consul general and suspended almost all contact with Morocco. Even provisions for Gibraltar ceased to be drawn from Morocco (29). Spain also refused to receive in her ports ships arriving from Morocco (30). Only France attempted

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(26) Al-Ibtisām, p.7.

(27) Ibid.

(28) Dāwūd, III, pp.234, 249.

(29) F.O.52/24, 23 Feb., 1823.

(30) CCC, vol.26, 2 and 6 October, 1818.

to encourage commercial exchange with Morocco during the 1818-1820 epidemic with the aim of restoring French presence in Morocco. On the whole, commercial contact with Europe was greatly reduced during these three years.

The army suffered equally from the plague. In 1819 Mawlāy Sulaymān's military potential, at the time he confronted the Aīt Oumalou, was greatly weakened by the epidemic. The army consisted then of a large number of new recruits. The losses from the disease were so significant in 1818 that Mawlāy Sulaymān deemed it necessary to replace soldiers who perished in the plague by their adult sons (31). In 1819, the joint effects of the Zaïan defeat and the plague imposed further reorganization measures. The Oudaya were reinforced in August of the same year by the incorporation of two Arab tribes from the country adjacent to Fès (32). At the same time Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to reorganize what remained of the army on the basis of an old system adopted by his father (33). Owing to the lack of the necessary financial means, however, Mawlāy Sulaymān proved incapable of ensuring an adequate reorganization of the army.

Plague when it coincides with the breakdown of order, as in 1819-1820, creates a certain psychological climate in which the image and authority of the ruling prince is seriously undermined (34). Epidemics were

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- (31) D.A.R., letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the qā'id of the Oudaya dated 7 Muḥarram, 1234/6 Nov., 1818, concerning the replacement of the deceased soldiers.
- (32) D.A.R., letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the qā'id of the Oudaya dated 21 Shawwāl, 1234/13 Aug., 1819, concerning the incorporation of Himyane and Oulad el-Haj into the Oudaya army.
- (33) D.A.R., letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the qā'id of the Oudaya dated 21 Shawwāl, 1234/13 Aug., 1819, concerning the reorganization of the army after the end of the plague in the northern provinces.
- (34) Biraben and Le Goff, "La peste du haut Moyen Age," p.1498.



commonly regarded as God's punishment for man's increasing insubordination and an illustration of the divine anger (35). For the popular masses, however, the scapegoat for their bitterness tended to be the temporal power itself. The authorization granted by Mawlāy Sulaymān to France in 1817 to export wheat in the midst of a severe drought while "the population was alarmed about its own existence" (36), and his determination to dismantle the Moroccan navy during the same year, thus abandoning the jihād, could only be perceived as manifestations of a benevolent policy towards the enemies of Islam and the cause for God's anger. In the summer of 1817 the French consul reported that "the saints, or individuals who have a great influence on the people of towns and countryside, invoke God in their prayers to give them another king" (37). In 1819, while the plague was raging, Mawlāy Sulaymān confirmed, once again, his hostility to the heterodox practices of the zāwiya-s by prohibiting the celebration of mawsim-s, or religious fairs (38). Conservative religious groups did not fail to point out what they considered as religious deviation on Mawlāy Sulaymān's part and accused him of Wahhābism in 1820 (39).

The conjunction of natural calamities and the imām's failure in his duties served to enhance the all-pervading pessimism and led people to draw a parallel between these calamities and the shortcomings of the temporal power (40). The general feeling of despair and helpless-

(35) Ibid.

(36) CCC, vol.25, 12 April, 1817.

(37) Ibid., 20 Aug., 1817.

(38) Cf. extracts from Mawlāy Sulaymān's khuṭba (1819) in al-ʿArbī al-Mashrafī, Sharḥ al-shamaḥmaḥiyya, unnumbered pages.

(39) Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-ʿAmrāwī, Nafḥat al-araj, Ms.Z.3866, R.L., p.50.

(40) On such a parallel cf. reflections by Muḥammad b. Ḥamza al-Miknāsī quoted in ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Ṭayyib al-Wazzānī, al-Rawḍ al-munif, Ms.K.2304, BGR, II, fol.157-158:

وَأَمَّا زَمَانُنَا الَّذِي نَحْنُ فِيهِ وَهُوَ الْقَرْنُ الثَّلَاثُ عَشَرَ الَّذِي كَثُرَتْ فِيهِ الْفِتْنُ وَقُلُ فِيهِ الْحَيَاءُ وَالْإِيمَانُ وَسَادَ أَهْلُ الظُّلْمِ وَالطُّغْيَانِ وَفُشِيَ فِيهِ الْفُسَادُ وَالْعَصْيَانُ مِنْ عَهْدِ مَنْكَرٍ وَلَا نَاهِيٍّ وَلَا أَمْرٍ وَلَا مُنْتَهِيٍّ، سَيِّمًا بَعْدَ الطَّاعُونَ الَّذِي عَمَّ أَقْصَا بِلَادِ الْمَغْرِبِ وَأَدْنَاهُ... (written in 1821-1822).

ness facilitated the emergence of mahdī-s (pretenders) in whom the common people hoped to find an alternative for a temporal power condemned by the divine providence. It was for the triumph of Islam that a charismatic figure such as Abū Bakr Amhāwish led his men against the troops of the Makhzen in the midst of the 1818-1820 plague (41).

Natural calamities tend also to favour popular religion and enhance the prestige of religious groups such as the sharīf-s and the zāwiya-s. The fact that opposition to Mawlāy Sulaymān acquired a more accentuated religious character after 1818 was not merely a fortuitous coincidence.

#### C- The Zaian Defeat (May, 1819)

The undecisive character of the Battle of Azrou had left the mountain Berbers of the Middle Atlas virtually outside Makhzen rule. Being unable to submit them militarily, Mawlāy Sulaymān spared no effort since 1811 to tighten the economic blockade against the Aīt Oumalou. He believed that the denial of lowlands cereals to the dissidents would easily bring down Abū Bakr Amhāwish and the Aīt Oumalou leaders. In 1813 the Zaer, the Zemmour and the Ourdigha tribes were forced to pay heavy fines for selling cereals to mountain Berbers (42). At the end of 1818, in the midst of a devastating famine, Mawlāy Sulaymān renewed his determination to stifle the Aīt Oumalou. He ordered the lowland qā'id-s to prevent wheat sales to the Aīt Oumalou and declared that every tribe which did not respect his orders could be plundered by its neighbours (43).

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(41) Jeannine Drouin, Un cycle oral hagiographique dans le Moyen Atlas marocain, Paris, 1975, p. III.

(42) Al-Du'ayf, p.498.

(43) Letters from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the qā'id of Agourai (near Meknès) dated 3 Ḥijja, 1233/4 Oct., 1818 and 11 Ḥijja, 1233/12 Oct., 1818, in D.A.R.

In the spring of 1819 Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to lead a major expedition against the mountain Berbers. The decision was apparently taken upon the advice of Muḥammad b. al-Ghāzī, leader of the Zemmour and Mawlāy Sulaymān's newly appointed qā'id for the Berber regions (44). Ibn al-Ghāzī's plan, according to al-Zayānī, provided for a major offensive which would assail the Aīt Oumalou from the south. The Haouz tribes, under the leadership of Mawlāy Sulaymān, and the northern army commanded by Mawlāy Ibrāhīm and including the Zemmour, the Arab tribes of the Azghār, the Oudaya and the 'Abīd were to meet at the Tadla and from there would invest the Adekhsān (upper Oum er-Rbia valley), considered to be the breadbasket of the Aīt Oumalou.

The military expedition coincided with the height of the plague epidemic in the northern provinces (45). "People were in great distress", wrote al-Zayānī, "and were in no state to take part in this military campaign" (46). Mawlāy Sulaymān, who was then at Marrakech, seems to have been unaware of the devastating effects of the plague epidemic in the northern provinces. Indeed, al-Zayānī blames Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, son and vice-regent of Mawlāy Sulaymān at Fès, for not having informed his father of the real extent of the epidemic and the great suffering it had caused to the population (47).

The number of Makhzen troops assembled in the Tadla amounted to about 60,000 men (48). In May 1819 Mawlāy Sulaymān headed to the Adekhsān where he ordered the destruction of cereal plantations belonging to the Aīt

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(44) Al-Zayānī, Tārīkh al-wilāya, p. 3.

(45) Cf. evolution of the second plague epidemic above.

(46) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.191.

(47) Ibid., fol.23.

(48) Al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.134.

Oumalou. Military confrontation between the Makhzen and Abū Bakr Amhāwish could have been avoided when the Aīt Oumalou came to the Sultan's son, Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, asking for forgiveness and manifesting at the same time their readiness to pay the indemnity demanded and provide the necessary hostages as a guarantee for their good behaviour (49). However, Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, "an extremely hot-headed prince" not only persuaded his father to reject this offer but massacred a number of women and children among the peace delegation which came to him (50). According to al-Zayānī, the Sultan refused the peace offer on the advice of Ibn al-Ghāzī who was at the origin of the whole plan of the battle (51).

During the first day of the battle, casualties were mainly limited to Makhzen contingents from the Arab tribes. According to a "trustworthy" witness of the battle quoted by al-Nāṣirī, Ibn al-Ghāzī, commander of the lowland Berbers, had previously agreed with the Aīt Oumalou to spare each other by using only gunpowder in the firing (52). Having suspected the malevolence of Ibn al-Ghāzī, Mawlāy Sulaymān ordered on the second day of the battle the withdrawal of Berber contingents from the fighting to test, he argued, the military competence of his Arab troops. As soon as the fighting resumed, Ibn al-Ghāzī decided to abandon the Sultan and join the Aīt Oumalou. Caught between mountain and lowland Berbers, Makhzen troops were completely overwhelmed and demoralized. As a result, all tribal contingents deserted Mawlāy Sulaymān who was left with the 'Abīd and the Oudaya (53).

(49) Al-Zayānī, Tārīkh al-wilāya, p. 4.

(50) E. Mercier, Histoire de l'Afrique septentrionale (Berbérie) depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à la conquête française (1830), Paris, 1888, vol. III, p. 513.

(51) Al-Zayānī, Tārīkh al-wilāya, p.4.

(52) Akansūs and al-Nāṣirī ascribe the defeat of Makhzen troops to the betrayal of Ibn al-Ghāzī who decided to join the Aīt Oumalou at the last minute (al-Jaysh, p.315; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.134-135). Al-Zayānī's version is that Ibn al-Ghāzī's tribesmen and other lowland Berbers just deserted in front of the heavy fire of the Aīt Oumalou (al-Rawḍa, fol.191 and Tārīkh, p.4). Akansūs's allegation reflects most probably the official justification of the defeat.

(53) Al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.135.

By the end of the second day, the Makhzen armies were completely routed. Mawlāy Ibrāhīm was mortally wounded and Mawlāy Sulaymān himself made prisoner. At no time, however, was he ill-treated by his enemies. On the contrary, once identified he was shown every respect as a sharīf. His tent was torn into pieces and distributed among the Aīt Oumalou Berbers as an invocation of his baraka (54). After three days of captivity he was accompanied to the outskirts of his capital, Meknès, and set free.

After the battle, rumours about the defeat of Mawlāy Sulaymān circulated for many days (55). The tidings of this defeat quickly spread to the whole country, generating confusion and restlessness both among the army and the tribes. Communications between Fès, Meknès and their surroundings became unsafe after the Berber rebels spread into the surrounding plains. The populations of the Azghār, already suffering from the plague, had to bear the consequences.

Mawlāy Sulaymān took the shock of his captivity and the death of his elder son and heir presumptive badly. For months he remained secluded in his Meknès palace. His ability to act was also greatly reduced after many officials and army qā'id-s had died in the battle (56). Aḥmad b. M'bārak, who had replaced Muḥammad al-Salāwī as chief minister, was the only official of importance who remained and through whom Mawlāy Sulaymān transmitted his orders (57). "His Majesty", wrote the French consul, "is in an awkward position vis-à-vis his own people who, after making him prisoner, escorted him to his palace. His only safeguard", added Sourdeau, "resides in the veneration due to him as a sharīf" (58).

(54) CCC, vol.26, 10 June, 1819.

(55) Ibid.

(56) Ābd al-Kabīr b. al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, p.347.

(57) CCC, vol.26, 18 July, 1819.

(58) Ibid., 30 June, 1819.

The disintegration of the army under the joint effects of the plague and the Zaïan defeat prevented Mawlāy Sulaymān from taking any concrete action to restore the Makhzen's credibility among his subjects. The army needed reorganization, as well as clothing and equipment. The incapacity of the army was such that it even proved unable to convey military equipment safely from the ports to the besieged capital (59).

Mawlāy Sulaymān's handling of the after-effects of the defeat only helped to perpetuate the political crisis. In the summer of 1819 he imprisoned a delegation of six hundred Berber notables from the Aīt Idrassen who came to Meknès asking for his forgiveness. After they were hospitably received, the palace gates were secured and the notables put into irons. Mawlāy Sulaymān apparently intended to keep them as hostages for future good behaviour. However, his actions only added fuel to the flames of Berber dissidence. Infuriated by what they regarded as a betrayal on the Sultan's part, the Berber tribes united under the leadership of Abū Bakr Amhāwish and laid siege to Meknès. "This (action) led to the deterioration of the situation and set fire to all parts of the Maghrib", wrote Akansūs. "The Berbers united in a common front and solicited the coming of the imposter" (60). For a time, the traditional antagonism between lowland and mountain Berbers was set aside and the Makhzen was no longer able to play on it to contain the dissidence of the Aīt Oumalou. In September, 1819 the siege around Meknès was tightened after Amhāwish himself took command of the Berber contingents. All attempts by Mawlāy Sulaymān to bring some Berber tribes over to his side failed "after concord was realised among them and differences forgotten" (61).

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(59) *Ibid.*, 30 Sept., 1819.

(60) Akansūs, p. 318.

(61) *Ibid.*

Mawlāy Sulaymān was more isolated than ever. Not one provincial qā'id was able to raise an army and come to his assistance at Meknès. Left without pay, some contingents of the army refused to carry out their duties (62). In the capital itself, insubordination spread to the 'Abīd. who, in November, 1819, massacred Aḥmad b. M'bārak, their commander and the Sultan's chief minister (63).

The liberation of the Berber hostages at the beginning of 1820 after the marabout 'Abd Allāh b. Ḥamza al-'Ayyāshī interceded on their behalf, failed to end the siege of Meknès (64). Mawlāy Sulaymān had not been able to leave his capital since his liberation by the Aīt Ouḥalou in May 1819. On the verge of despair, he declared that he placed his confidence in God alone who makes and unmakes kings (65).

## II - Prelude to an Urban Rebellion

Fès, with its industry and commerce, was deeply affected by the famine of 1817-1818 and its consequences. Its people were particularly upset by Mawlāy Sulaymān's decision to allow wheat exports to France in 1817. The French official who was supervising the export of wheat at Rabat wrote in September 1817 that Fès was "most discontented because every outlet of its commerce and industry was closed" (66). The news of the Zaīan defeat and the ensuing increase of banditry in the Saīs plain rendered all commercial relations with the outside world very risky. The repercussions from the economic

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(62) CCC, vol. 26, 30 June, 1819.

(63) *Ibid.*, 3 Dec., 1819.

(64) Akansūs, p.319. Many of these hostages (100 according to the French consul) had died in prison because of the insalubrious conditions there. Cf. CCC, vol. 26, 20 Sept., 1819.

(65) CCC, vol. 27, 22 Jan., 1820.

(66) CCC, vol. 25, 29 Sept., 1819.

difficulties and the political uncertainty which had prevailed since May 1819 soon found their way to Fāsi politics.

The persistence of tribal agitation in the Saīs plain and the absence of effective Makhzen authority within Fès itself were bound to disturb the precarious coexistence between the various components of Fāsi society. Fès had always had three qā'id-s, one for each of the three sections of the city (ʿAdwa, Andalus and Lamṭiyīn) and Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh respected this tradition (67). Mawlāy Sulaymān, however, succeeded in imposing a single qā'id, an arrangement which was accepted by the Fāsi-s only so long as the Makhzen proved powerful enough to ensure peace and tranquility in their city. This, however, was no longer possible after the Zaīan setback.

Mawlāy Sulaymān had spent more than eight months confined in his capital when, in February 1820, he received the first alarming news from Fès. At the beginning of 1820 the ʿAdwa section of Fès objected to the governorship of Muḥammad al-Ṣaffār, who was Andalusian, and sought to have him recalled (68). Group loyalties welled up to the surface and inevitably led to violence. Mawlāy Sulaymān, who was besieged in Meknès, wrote a letter to the people of Fès in which he satisfied neither his governor nor those who objected to him (69). He particularly blamed the notables, who, he claimed, instead of assisting the Sultan in suppressing disobedience, preferred to spend their time in their villas and gardens.

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(67) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.167.

(68) Sources at our disposal make no reference to the nature of grievances: the people of Fès, and the ʿAdwa in particular, had against al-Ṣaffār. However, Mawlāy Sulaymān in his letter to the people of Fès (al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.139-141) accused the governor of Fès of avarice and compared him to a dog who was attacked by other dogs for having refused to share his food with them.

(69) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès in Akansūs, pp. 320-322 and al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.139-141.



In the same letter he expounded on the principles that governed his policy towards the city of Fès. " I entrust your government to outsiders (barrānī-s) because they are less likely to arouse your jealousy ... and to merchants because they do not covet others' wealth and content themselves with their prestigious position on order to fructify their capital" (70).

The letter produced no effect on the Fāsi-s, for the gravity of the situation required action rather than words. Mawlāy Sulaymān was not totally unaware of this, yet he hoped he would be able to appease tensions in Fès while he was besieged by Berber tribes in Meknès. The release of the Berber hostages had no discernible effect on the tribal agitation around the capital, so Mawlāy Sulaymān finally resolved to leave Meknès and head for Fès despite the grave risks involved. During its night-time journey to Fès, the Sultan's convoy was assailed by Berber insurgents from all sides and the protection of the marabout Muḥammad b. Ḥamza al-‘Ayyāshī, who accompanied Mawlāy Sulaymān, proved to be of no avail (71).

Immediately after his arrival on Fès, Mawlāy Sulaymān ordered that all Berbers in the city should be destituted. Great excesses were committed and the generalised conflict between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Berbers acquired a tinge of racial antagonism between Arabs and Berbers (72). Nevertheless, Mawlāy Sulaymān did succeed in restoring tranquillity within the city itself. Muḥammad al-Ṣaffār was recalled and replaced by a waṣīf, Qāsim b. Sākin, who was an officer of the

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(70) Ibid.

(71) Akansūs, p. 319.

(72) Ibid., cf. also al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, p. 348.

ʿAbīd army (73). This measure temporarily quelled the unrest within the city and allowed Mawlāy Sulaymān to direct his attention to the pacification of the coastal regions of the Gharb where the authority of the qāʿid-s had been greatly weakened after the Zaīan defeat (74).

In his journey through the Gharb the Sultan was accompanied by the ʿAbīd and Oudaya armies who agreed to leave their families in Fès and Meknès only after having been promised that they would not have to go beyond Rabat. He also had contingents from the Haouz tribes who were among the few remaining supporters of the Makhzen. Once in Rabat, Ibn al-Jilālī, qāʿid of the Rehamna and companion of Mawlāy Sulaymān in his captivity amongst the Zaīan, proposed that the Sultan change his residence temporarily to Marrakech where he was more likely to enjoy the support of the neighbouring tribes (75). The Oudaya and the ʿAbīd, however, were quite unwilling to abandon their families to the insecurity which reigned around Fès and Meknès and, therefore, refused to proceed to Marrakech as requested by the Sultan. The notables of the Haouz, on the other hand, warned Mawlāy Sulaymān that if he returned to Meknès he might lose the chance of reaching their country for ever (76). Mawlāy Sulaymān was thus presented with an embarrassing choice: if he satisfied the Haouz notables he risked alienating his army, but if he chose to return to Meknès he risked his throne. Finally, he resolved to head southward even if his army refused to follow.

When he left Rabat in June 1820, Mawlāy Sulaymān was not even sure he would reach Marrakech safely because of the insecurity of roads. He decided, therefore,

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(73) Al-Zayānī, Jamharat man ḥakama bi Fās, p.9; Akansūs, p.319.

(74) Akansūs, p.323.

(75) Ibid.; al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, p.348.

(76) Al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, p.348.

to travel in disguise among the Seraghna, who on their way to Marrakech, spread rumours that the Sultan was still at Rabat. For several days, people in the northern part of the country were unable to ascertain where the Sultan was in fact. The Oudaya and the 'Abīd who returned to Fès and Meknès created the greatest confusion. The Sultan, they reported, had abandoned the Azghār and fled to the south (77). In addition to spreading injurious rumours, the 'Abīd and the Oudaya began to plunder Jewish quarters in both Fès and Meknès (78) thus inaugurating a cycle of violence which was impossible to control.

### III - The Power Vacuum and the Fāsi Response

The hasty and ill-timed departure of Mawlāy Sulaymān to Marrakech had a disastrous effect on the course of events in the north. The Sultan had delegated authority to his two sons, Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn in Meknès and Mawlāy 'Alī in Fès. The two princes, however, were effectively incapable of making their voice heard, even among the army. Immediately after the departure of Mawlāy Sulaymān towards the middle of June 1820, the Oudaya plundered the Jewish quarter of Fès for three days. This attack on the millāḥ affected the interests of the Muslim population as well since many Fāsi merchants used to entrust their merchandise and financial capital to Jewish associates. "This incited the people of Fès to rebellion", wrote al-Zayānī, "because they lost considerable sums of money" (79). What alarmed the people of Fès was the declared intention of the Oudaya to extend their plundering to Old Fès itself. "After the small

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(77) Ibid.

(78) Ibid.

(79) Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahā?, K 241, p. 226.

millāh", said the Oudaya, "we will plunder the big one" (80). The people of Fès were exposed to external violence for the first time since the unstable reign of Mawlāy ʿAbd Allāh (1729-1757).

The Sultan's prolonged residence at Marrakech during the summer of 1820 made the Makhzen's administrative presence in the north less and less perceptible. The appeal addressed by Mawlāy Sulaymān to the Oudaya to return what they had plundered in the millāh to its legitimate owners remained a dead letter (81). The Oudaya even escalated their aggression by blockading Old Fès. They looted every caravan that entered or left the city and plundered livestock belonging to Fāsi-s. Inside Old Fès itself, crafts and trade were paralyzed as a result of the blockade. In order to deal with the growing insecurity which they faced, the Fasi-s decided to fill the power vacuum by appointing their own qāʿid-s. Each of the three sections of the city appointed its own qāʿid, thus resuming a tradition which had disappeared with Mawlāy Sulaymān. The qāʿid-s who had to ensure security within their sections and organize resistance to the Oudaya were ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Fāris, Qaddūr al-Mqarfī and Aḥmad al-Ḥārthī.

Another conflict emerged along with the power vacuum: the contest between the muftī and the qāḍī. The rivalry between the muftī, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī and the qāḍī, al-ʿAbbās b. Sūda cannot be fully appraised unless seen in the light of the privileged relations that existed between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Ibn Sūda family. Since the second half of the eighteenth century, this family had enjoyed the favours of the ʿAlawid sultans more than

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(80) Ibid.

(81) Cf. Mawlāy Sulaymān's letter to the people of Fès exhorting them to return Jewish property, dated 2 Shawwāl, 1235/13 July, 1820, in CCC, vol.27, fol.68-69.

any other learned family of the country. This was largely due to the reputation gained by al-Tāwdī b. Sūda as the uncontested authority during the second half of the eighteenth century. According to Muḥammad al-Ruhūnī, al-Tāwdī had served as teacher of all Ālim-s of his time, excepting one only—Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim al-Sijilmāssī (82). Al-Tāwdī was not only respected by sultans and his fellow Ālim-s, but also by sharīf-s. Nothing illustrates better this esteem than the unanimous decision taken in 1792 by the Ālim-s, sharīf-s and notables of Fès to give him a free hand in the choice of a new sultan for the country (83).

His son Aḥmad was appointed qāḍī of Fès by Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh and, after having been discarded by Mawlāy al-Yazīd, was re-established in his office in 1792 by Mawlāy Sulaymān (84). In addition to the exercise of justice in the city of Fès he was invested by Mawlāy Sulaymān with the power to supervise all judges of Morocco (qāḍī al-quḍāt) (85). Aḥmad b. Sūda held this post for the period extending from 1792 to 1816 with a short interruption in 1801 (86). The competence of Aḥmad b. Sūda was such that Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to dispense with the post of muftī (87).

For Mawlāy Sulaymān the Ibn Sūda-s were not only teachers, but spiritual guides as well. Indeed, it was through al-Tāwdī b. Sūda that he received the Nāṣiri wird (88). This explains the great esteem in which he held his shaykh-s. During the early years of his reign, Mawlāy

(82) Muḥammad al-Ruhūnī, Awḍaḥ al-masālik wa ashal al-marāqī ilā sabki ibriḥ al-shaykh ‘Abd al-Bāqī, Cairo, 1888-1889, vol. I, p. 13.

(83) Cf. chapter IV above, pp. 178-179.

(84) Cf. Sulaymān's dhahīr appointing Aḥmad b. Sūda as qāḍī of Fès in al-Ḥawwāt, al-Rawḍa al-maqṣūda, p. 320 (appendix 3). Cf. also al-Ḍu‘ayf, p. 414.

(85) Al-Ḥawwāt, al-Rawḍa al-maqṣūda, pp. 320-321; al-Zayānī, Takmil, p. 9.

(86) Al-Ḍu‘ayf, p. 414.

(87) Al-Ḥawwāt, al-Rawḍa al-maqṣūda, p. 323.

(88) ‘Abd al-Ḥayy al-Kattānī, Fihris, II, p. 329; al-Ḥawwāt, al-Rawḍa, p. 322; Muḥammad b. Ja‘far al-Kattānī, Salwat, I, p. 116.

Sulaymān kept al-Tāwdī b. Sūda informed of the political developments in the country and sought his advice on the important issues of his time (89). The Sultan continued to observe the same attitude towards Aḥmad b. al-Tāwdī b. Sūda. Even when he was on bad terms with the people of Fès, he continued to write to the qāḍī acquainting him with major political events (90). This attitude towards the Ibn Sūda-s who monopolized the royal privileges for several decades, caused a great embitterment on the part of other learned families of Fès as well as the sharīf-s (91).

When Aḥmad b. Sūda lost his sight in 1816, the post of qāḍī was conferred upon his youngest son, al-ʿAbbās who was by that time twenty-nine years old. On the other hand, Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī, a senior and aged ʿālim, was nominated muftī. Al-Dukkālī was disappointed with Mawlāy Sulaymān's choice for a young ʿālim from the Ibn Sūda family to serve as qāḍī of Fès, considering himself as better qualified for this most prestigious judicial post in the kingdom (92). In addition, al-ʿAbbās proved to be uncooperative and manifested a firm determination to render justice without the services of a muftī (93). In the conflict which opposed the two judicial authorities at Fès, Mawlāy Sulaymān sided with the qāḍī every time he was asked to intervene. In 1817, he restricted the judicial prerogatives of the muftī and, at the beginning of 1820, abolished the post of muftī altogether after an argument

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(89) Cf. for instance letter of Mawlāy Sulaymān to al-Tāwdī b. Sūda, no date, Mic.3,HPMD, Fès, 1978, in which the Sultan informs him about the submission of the Chaouia and asks for his legal opinion concerning the export of wheat to the Christian nations.

(90) Al-Ḍuʿayf mentions that in 1797 Mawlāy Sulaymān wrote a letter to Aḥmad b. Sūda informing him of the political situation in the Chaouia. The letter was read publically to the people of Fès (p.361).

(91) Ibn Zaydān, *al-ʿIzz wa al-ṣawla*, II, p.90.

(92) Al-Zayānī, *Takmil quḍāt Fās*, p.12.

(93) *Ibid.*

between the two judicial authorities over a case involving two sharīf-s of Fès (94).

The qāḍī-muftī antagonism acquired a new dimension when on June 11, 1820, al-Dukkālī and another senior ḥālim, ‘Abd al-Salām al-Azamī (the only two remaining ḥālim-s who had signed Mawlāy Sulaymān's bay‘a) wrote a letter to the Sultan asking for the recall of al-‘Abbās b. Sūda. The two signatories denounced Ibn Sūda's incapacity and injustice and pointed to his youth, his inexperience and his contempt for the muftī's opinion (95). Mawlāy Sulaymān received the letter at Rabat while considering whether to proceed to Marrakech or return to his capital. Apparently, he underestimated the gravity of the case over which the muftī and the qāḍī were quarreling, assuming that the conflict was nothing more than normal professional rivalry (96). He did not deem it necessary to send a reply.

After the plunder of the millāḥ by the Oudaya at the end of June and the consequent appointment of sectional qāḍīd-s by the Fāsi-s, al-‘Abbās found himself in an increasingly untenable situation as he lacked the necessary means to enforce his sentences. During the summer of 1820, he was attacked by a sharīf, Sīdī al-Ṭāhar al-Kattānī, who fired at him while he was holding a public audience (97). The consequent arrest of al-Kattānī by Makhzen officials, already overshadowed by the locally appointed qāḍīd-s, provoked a general reaction

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(94) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī restricting his judicial prerogatives, dated 5 Ramaḍān, 1232/19 July, 1817, in DAR, (appendix 74). The circumstances of his dismissal are not clear. Akansūs mentioned that the muftī was revoked following a confrontation between Ibn Sūda and al-Dukkālī over a case involving two sharīf-s from Fès, but gave no details about it. Al-Nāṣirī who relied on Akansūs reproduced the same story, adding that the case was "well known" (al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.146). In the material we have consulted we have found no trace of this case.

(95) Letter from al-Dukkālī and al-Azamī to Mawlāy Sulaymān, dated 29 Sha‘bān, 1235/11 June, 1820 in al-Mashrafī, al-Ḥusām, pp.328-329; cf. also al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.146-147.

(96) Akansūs, p.326.

(97) Ibid.

of solidarity with the Kattāni sharīf. Ultimately, the Andalusian notable, Ibn al-Rāziq, intervened and forced his liberation (98). Terrorized by the attempt made on his life, Ibn Sūda could no longer leave his home. The Kattānī case proved, furthermore, that it was no longer possible for the qāḍī to adequately fulfil his judicial functions. The rebels simply dismissed him and appointed a new qāḍī, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Dilā’ī. This dealt the final blow to what remained of Makhzen authority in Fès.

Nonetheless, the people of Fès in no way disputed Mawlāy Sulaymān's legitimacy. By appointing their own qā’id-s and nominating a new judge they did not intend to overthrow the local representatives of the Makhzen; they simply made up for a deficient administration which proved to be powerless in the face of the events that were taking place. The people of Fès still looked forward to the return of Mawlāy Sulaymān to his seat of government and for the normalization of the country's political situation. In the summer of 1820, al-Dukkālī wrote to Mawlāy Sulaymān, on behalf of the Fāsi-s, asking for his prompt return to the Azghār (99). The Sultan, however, did not respond to this request. On 22 August, he answered the people of Fès with a most ambiguous and enigmatic letter which only served to inflame the situation (100). In it, Mawlāy Sulaymān ascribed the political crisis to the weakness of the army and its

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(98) Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès, no date, in al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahā’, pp.181-185 (appendix 89).

(99) Al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, p.349.

(100) Cf. letter in Ms.D.2795, BGR, p.393. The letter dated 13 Qa‘da, 1235/22 Aug., 1820, must have arrived in Fès much later than the date given by Akansūs (Shawwāl 1235/July-Aug., 1820); cf. Akansūs, p.326. According to the author of Tadhkirat, p.349, Mawlāy Sulaymān's reply was written on the back of the letter sent to him by Ibn Ibrāhīm and al-Azamī. This letter is reproduced in appendix 82).



inability to ensure the collection of taxes. He, implicitly, admitted his impotence and advised the Fāsi-s to take the responsibility for their own security upon themselves by seeking the alliance of Berber tribes, as used to be the case during the chaotic reign of his grandfather, Mawlāy ʿAbd Allāh. This alliance, he said, would allow them to thwart the Oudaya attacks while he was away. The most confusing statement in the letter was the allusion he made to abdication when he wrote: "May God reserve a happy ending to what remains (of my life) and ensure my replacement among the Muslims ... I am not the first to abandon this matter; those who are more virtuous than myself, such as al-Ḥusayn, the noblest among the sons of Fāṭima al-Zahrāʾ, already did" (101).

The Sultan's enigmatic letter reached Fès during the second week of September 1820. It was addressed to Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī, Sīdī Muḥammad b. al-Ṭāhar al-ʿAlawī and al-Ṭālib b. Jallūn. Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī who was the first to read the letter, made a copy of it before he handed over the original to Mawlāy ʿAlī, the Sultan's son and vice-regent in the city (102). Some ḳālim-s also had an opportunity to see the original. Upon the reception of the royal message, Mawlāy ʿAlī convened the notables in a mosque adjacent to his residence and read it to them in the presence of a large crowd (103). A great turmoil resulted among the audience, but the prince, who did not appreciate his father's attitude, refused to hand it over and, after shutting himself up in his house, burnt it. As a result, suspicion about the Sultan's real intentions increased.

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(101) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès in Ms.D.2795,BGR, p.393.

(102) Al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, p.349.

(103) Akansūs,p.326.

What was the real intention of Mawlāy Sulaymān in addressing the people of Fès in such vague terms as those used in his letter? Apologists for the ʿAlawid dynasty, such as al-Zayānī and Akansūs, refuse to see any explicit mention of abdication on the Sultan's part in the letter. Al-Zayānī refuses categorically any idea of abdication, even accusing al-Dukkālī of having falsified the letter (104). Akansūs, on the other hand, rejects the accusation by al-Zayānī against al-Dukkālī and recognizes the equivocal character of the letter (105). Nevertheless, as usual, Akansūs finds an excuse for Mawlāy Sulaymān. His intention was not to abdicate, argues the author of al-Jaysh, but to arouse the people of Fès and incite them to manifest a greater attachment to his person (106). ʿAbd al-Kabīr b. al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, whose father was involved in the rebellion, offers a different interpretation. According to the author of Tadhkirat al-Muḥsinīn, Mawlāy Sulaymān was genuine in his proposal of abdication (107). Even an objective chronicler such as the anonymous author of al-Ibtisām tends to support the latter explanation, claiming that Mawlāy Sulaymān chose to abdicate in order to avoid further bloodshed and social disorder (108).

Indeed, a careful examination of Mawlāy Sulaymān's letter leaves no doubt about his intention to abandon his responsibilities as head of the Muslim community. His reference to the case of al-Ḥusayn, son of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, could only be interpreted as a determination to abdicate. Moreover, it was not the first time that Mawlāy Sulaymān had expressed his will to relinquish power. Since the Zaīan military setback he had become increasingly pessimistic about the future of his reign, particularly after the death of his elder son Mawlāy

(104) Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahāʿ, pp.178-179. Al-Zayānī produced a slightly different version of the letter which, he claimed, was al-Dukkālī's copy freed from all additions and alterations.

(105) Akansūs, p.327.

(106) Ibid.

(107) Al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, p.349.

(108) Al-Ibtisām, p.65.

Ibrāhīm, the assassination of his only minister, Aḥmad b. M'bārak, and the collapse of his army. During the summer of 1820, while at Marrakech, he told Rehamna notables that he had been tempted more than once by the idea of abandoning the political scene to dedicate the rest of his life to the worship of God (109). Whatever his real intention, his letter offered the Fāsi-s an unexpected occasion to rid themselves of a sultan who had effectively ceased to rule since May, 1819.

#### IV - The Proclamation of a New Sultan

Thoughts of dethroning Mawlāy Sulaymān went back at least to the summer of 1817 when, in the midst of a catastrophic famine he allowed wheat to be exported to Christians and also decided to end the jihād at sea by disarming the Moroccan navy. The French consul general noted then that "the saints, or individuals who have a great influence over towns and countryside, implore God in their prayers to give them another king" (110). By then the name of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, son of the late Mawlāy al-Yazīd, was mentioned as a possible candidate (111).

The deposition of a sultan, however, is not made easy by the sharīʿa. The imām cannot be deposed unless officially declared incapable of meeting the ultimate goals prescribed for the imamate, namely the guarantee of public tranquility which is an essential condition for the exercise of religious and worldly duties. He can also be replaced by another imām if he admits his incapacity to govern (112). The most perplexing issue which faced the leaders of the rebellion since the arrival of Mawlāy

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(109) Akansūs, p.327.

(110) CCC, vol.25, 20 July, 1817.

(111) Ibid., 29 Sept., 1817.

(112) On the imamate in Islam cf. ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fāsī, Risāla fī al-imāma al-ʿudhmā wa shurūṭ man yataqalladuhā, Ms D I86I, BGR, pp. 368-388; Aḥmad al-Ruhūnī, Nuṣṣ amīr al-mūninīn, Ms D 2I60, BGR.

Sulaymān's letter of abdication was the question of how to find a legal justification for the deposition of the Sultan.

At the request of the rebellion leaders, who overwhelmingly belonged to the Andalusian notability (113), al-Dukkālī and other ʿālim-s spent more than two months trying to build up a legal basis for the destitution of Mawlāy Sulaymān. The most important document on which they could rely was obviously what they considered to be the abdication letter, but the original copy had been lost and the people of Fès were only left with an unauthenticated copy. To authenticate this duplicate, the ʿālim-s and ṭālib-s who had the chance of reading the original copy, were convened and asked to testify that the copy made by Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī conformed to the original. Three scholars only were able to provide such a testimony (114).

Now that the authenticity of the letter in question was legally established, the ʿālim-s could issue a fatwā authorizing the deposition of Mawlāy Sulaymān. In fact, two fatwā-s were issued on the basis of the Sultan's letter. They were signed respectively by Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī and Muḥammad al-Yāzghī. These fatwā-s were supported by a number of ʿālim-s who agreed that the letter was a clear abdication on Mawlāy Sulaymān's part and an explicit recognition of political impotence. "The Muslims are called to appoint an imām", wrote Ibn Ibrāhīm, "otherwise, two parties would have sinned: the people of tying and untying (ahl al-ḥall wa al-ʿaqq) and the candidate who fulfills the conditions of the imamate" (115).

(113) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat, pp.155-156. The main Andalusian leaders of the rebellion were: Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Rāziq, Muḥammad b. Sulaymān, Qaddūr ʿAmir and ʿAllāl al-ʿĀfiya. Cf. also Akansūs, p.328.

(114) Cf. certified copy of Mawlāy Sulaymān's letter in Ms.D.2795, BGR, p. 393, appendix 82.

(115) Cf. fatwā by al-Dukkālī in Ms. D 2795, p.393 (appendix 83).

In principle, this well-grounded fatwā could have in itself offered sufficient justification for the dethronement of Mawlāy Sulaymān. However, many Cālim-s were reluctant to support the fatwā. The authenticity of the letter, which had served as the basis of the fatwā, was still contested by a number of influential persons who refused to join al-Dukkālī and his party. Furthermore, the letter appeared to be vague and enigmatic. Nowhere was there a clear statement of abdication. For many Cālim-s the dethronement of the imām was too important a question to be grounded on such a meagre evidence. Accordingly, the fatwā issued by al-Dukkālī and his party failed to rally enough support for the rebels. The Oudaya and the ʿAbīd, in particular, refused to join the movement.

To overcome the hesitations of many reluctant Cālim-s the leaders of the rebellion resorted to a second device. Apart from the question of voluntary abdication of the imām, the Muslim community is empowered by the sharīʿa to depose him if his incapacity to govern and ensure internal peace is proved. The leaders of the rebellion, therefore, established a notarial act to prove that since the unfortunate Zaīan battle, the country had been virtually without government (116). This notarial act was produced at the beginning of November, 1820, less than two weeks before the proclamation of the new prince. On the basis of this notarial act the Cālim-s were asked to issue a second fatwā authorizing the Muslim community to appoint another ruler.

The second fatwā (\*) relied on the following arguments:

1. the manifest disintegration of the Sultan's authority,
2. his inability to ensure the respect for law and order,
3. the break up of unanimity around him, and
4. the rejection of his authority by the army and by the centre of legitimacy, i.e. Fès.

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(116) Cf. notarial act dated beginning Ṣafar, 1236/ Nov., 1820 in Ms D 2795, pp. 397-398 (appendix 84).

( \* ) Cf. appendix 85.

"This act", wrote 'Abd al-Salām al-Azamī, "is sufficient in itself for the proclamation of a new imām, even if the first one maintains himself" (117). The proclamation of a new prince became, according to Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī, not only desirable, but a most urgent obligation of the Muslim community (118). Mawlāy Sulaymān was, therefore, to be deposed on the basis of two fatwā-s, relying on both his letter and the notarial act establishing his powerlessness. The number of Ḍālim-s who lent their support to the second fatwā had considerably increased since the promulgation of the first fatwā, six weeks before (119).

The legal ground having been cleared, the people of Fès proceeded on 16 November, 1820 to the election of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm b. al-Yazīd as the new sultan. The proclamation ceremony was attended by Sīdī al-ʿArbī al-Wazzānī, Mawlāy al-ʿArbī al-Darqāwī, Abū Bakr Amhāwish, Muḥammad b. al-Ghāzī and Muḥammad b. Ḥammū Waʿzīz. The Fāsi rebellion ceased, therefore, to be a purely urban uprising and stretched beyond the walls of Fès to acquire the dimension of a dynastic crisis. The rebels failed, however, to gain either the Oudaya or the ʿAbīd armies. Most Arab tribes of the Azghār also refused to back the rebels' cause.

The Idrisid sharīf-s and the adepts of the two shari-fian zāwiya-s seemed at first in favour of a complete dynastic change. Ibn al-Ghāzī, head of the Zemmour and devout disciple of Mawlāy al-ʿArbī al-Darqāwī, proposed the proclamation of an Idrisid candidate (120). The Andalusian notables, on the contrary, fearing a drastic swing in favour of the sharīf-s, expressed their opposition to this idea and called for the proclamation of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm who, they argued, was more likely to rally the sympathy of the army (121).

(117) Fatwā by al-Azamī in Ms.D.2795, p.399, appendix 85.

(118) Fatwā by al-Dukkālī in Ms.D.2795, p.398.

(119) 19 Ḍālim-s signed the second document, while the first fatwā was approved by 9 Ḍālim-s only.

(120) Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahā, p.194.

(121) Ibid., pp.194-195.

Mawlāy Ibrāhīm did not have any political ambitions. He even refused the sultanate at the beginning and accepted only reluctantly under the threat of an Idrisid prince being chosen. For the popular masses, however, he symbolized the myth of his father, the hero of the jihād, and was capable therefore of rallying the sympathy of the northern provinces which, thirty years before, were the first to proclaim Mawlāy al-Yazīd.

#### V - The Word Spreads

The creation of a political alliance between the people of Fès and the Berber tribes of the Fazāz determined the army and most of the Arab tribes to stand aloof from the movement. The Berber contingents, therefore, remained the main military force upon which the new regime depended to enforce its authority beyond the walls of Fès.

After drafting the bayʿa, the rebels started a campaign to secure its acceptance by the northern provinces. These not only constituted the stronghold of the Idrisid sharīf-s, but offered material and political advantages for the regime as well. Through the northern ports, they could both control maritime trade and develop contacts with the representatives of the European countries from which they could obtain political recognition and military equipment.

Mawlāy Ibrāhīm left Fès for the north at the end of January 1821 (122). He was accompanied by his chief advisor, Sīdī al-ʿArbī al-Wazzānī. The Wazzānī sharīf appealed to his followers everywhere to recognize the newly proclaimed sultan (123). As he approached each village or town he proclaimed that "Mawlāy Sulaymān's star

(122) F.O. 174/26, 19 Feb., 1821.

(123) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahāʿ, Ms K 241, p. 171.

is set and Mawlāy Ibrāhīm is the Sultan to be obeyed" (124). The religious prestige of both the Wazzāni and the Raysūni sharīf-s was used to gain support for the new sultan, particularly in the countryside (125). In the Gharb, the Sefiane under the leadership of Muḥammad al-Lūshī, provided reliable support (126). In the Jbala, the religious influence of the sharīf-s of Ouezzane was of great help to the rebels. However, the coastal towns of Tangier and Larache refused to join the new regime because of the important 'Abīd garrisons stationed in them. Of all the northern towns, only Tétouan agreed to open its doors to Mawlāy Ibrāhīm.

Indeed, Tétouan's situation was in many respects similar to that of Fès. As an industrial and commercial centre, Tétouan had been exposed ever since the summer of 1819 to continuous siege by the neighbouring tribes. In July 1820, following the plunder of the Jewish quarter of Fès by the Oudaya, the Jbala tribes attempted the same against the millāḥ of Tétouan (127). The blockade enforced around the town affected not only the commercial interests of the Tétouani artisans and traders, but even prevented a normal food supply. In the summer of 1820, the inhabitants found themselves obliged to import wheat from Gibraltar (128). For the people of Tétouan, therefore, as for the people of Fès, the rebellion promised an end to a distressing situation.

It was only after the insurgents left Fès that Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to act. The news of their heading to the northern ports made him very uneasy about the future. The control of the ports would offer his enemies the necessary

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(124) C.O.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.

(125) Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-'Amrāwī, Nafḥat al-araj, Ms Z 3866, RL, p. 68.

(126) CCC, vol.27, 1 March, 1821.

(127) CCC, vol.27, fol.57-58. The attack was put off by the qā'id of Tétouan, 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Ash'āsh, with the assistance of the population who—it was remarked on this occasion—"volunteered to act in defence of the Jews and evinced an extraordinary determination to protect them" (C.O.91/76, 15 June, 1820).

(128) CCC, vol.27, 24 July, 1820.



funds to consolidate their rule and allow them to acquire arms from Europe, thus making their defeat extremely difficult. The 'Abīd and the Oudaya were also pressing for the return of Mawlāy Sulaymān to the Azghār.

In fact, Mawlāy Sulaymān's situation had significantly improved since the proclamation of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm in November, 1820. The major development was the refusal of the Oudaya and the 'Abīd to join the rebels. Several tribes also refused to proclaim the new sultan more from hostility to the Fāsi-Berber alliance than from fidelity to Mawlāy Sulaymān. These groups which were indifferent or hostile to the rebels soon felt the need for an alternative and turned back, therefore, to Mawlāy Sulaymān. Tribes which before the proclamation of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm had refused to take sides, were placed in an embarrassing situation after the rebellion. Ultimately, it became impossible for them to stand idly by. Tribal antagonisms played an important role in polarizing support around one prince or another (129). The 'Abīd and the Oudaya, who a few months before had abandoned Mawlāy Sulaymān, not only refused to join the rebels, but went to Marrakech to ask for his forgiveness and request his return to his capital (130). In a sense, the proclamation of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm offered Mawlāy Sulaymān a real chance to re-establish his authority over the country.

When Mawlāy Sulaymān returned to the Azghār in March 1821, accompanied by contingents from the army and the Haouz tribes, he had for the first time since 1819 a military force with which to assert his authority. The pacification of the northern tribes did not pose any major difficulty. The situation, however, was differ-

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(129) Thus, the Beni Hsen, traditionally opposed to the Sefiane and the Zemmour, refused to join the rebels because of the outstanding role played by the leaders these two confederations in the rebellion.

(130) Al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, p.352.

ent in the case of Fès and Tétouan, which the rebels had already entered, and where they entrenched themselves. The reduction of these two cities necessitated a long siege.

#### VI - The Collapse of the Rebellion

The unexpected death of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm on 15 March, 1821 seemed to offer a solution to the dynastic crisis which had resulted from the Fès rebellion. The news of his death was received with a great joy by Mawlāy Sulaymān who was preparing the siege of Tétouan. The insurgents, however, manifested a firm resolution to persist in their rebellion, for immediately after the death of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm they proclaimed his brother, Mawlāy Saʿīd under the same conditions originally proposed in the bayʿa of 16 November, 1820 (131). The bayʿa of Tétouan, drawn up by ʿAbd al-Mālik al-Murrī, a Fāsi sharīf who played a significant role in the rebellion, reiterated these conditions according to which the sharīf-s and all those who enjoyed "a noble genealogy" were to assume a prominent role in the public affairs of the country (132). The bayʿa of Mawlāy Saʿīd also reflected a certain ascendance of the Wazzāni sharīf-s who were the most militant agitators in a region considered to be the stronghold of the Idrisid sharīf-s outside Fès.

From March 1821 to April 1822 Mawlāy Sulaymān's attention was mainly taken up with with the siege of Fès and Tétouan. Mawlāy ʿAlī, the Sultan's son, was entrusted with the military operations in the north, while Mawlāy Sulaymān took residence in New Fès to direct in person the siege of the neighbouring town. Mawlāy ʿAlī succeeded in subduing the northern tribes, but the Tétouani-s offered a fierce resistance to the 15,000 strong army sent by the Makhzen. Tétouan was in a better position to resist Mawlāy Sulaymān for two main reasons. First, the city

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(131) Cf. bayʿa of Mawlāy Saʿīd in Dāwūd, III, pp. 259-264.

(132) Ibid.

had a larger rumāt (urban militia) force than Fès. In 1795 Tétouan was still able to mobilize 2,000 militia men (133). It had also many competent artillerymen (ṭubjiya) some of whom had been sent to assist the people of Fès (134). Secondly, Tétouan, being a maritime town, had larger stores of military equipment. Moreover, the people of Tétouan managed to control the port of Martil until January 1822. Martil served not only as a maritime outlet, but also as an important depot of military equipment (135).

The siege of Fès and Tétouan lasted for about a year. During this period events began progressively to favour Mawlāy Sulaymān. In the spring of 1821, the rebels suffered a major defeat at the hands of the Oudaya when Mawlāy Saʿīd attempted to enter Fès after having been proclaimed at Tétouan. In June, 1821 the Beni Mguild submitted to Mawlāy Sulaymān (136) and in July, Sulaymāni troops inflicted heavy losses on the Aīt Oumalou after Abū Bakr Amhāwish attempted to relieve Fès (137). This military success was mainly due to the artillery received by the Makhzen from Tangier (138). It encouraged other tribes to submit to Mawlāy Sulaymān, particularly the Guerouane and Oulad al-Haj (139).

Following these military successes, Mawlāy Sulaymān headed north at the end of October, 1821 to inspect the forces besieging Tétouan. He spent most of the winter at Tangier from which he directed military operations.

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(133) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.315.

(134) Akansūs, p.336.

(135) C.O.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.

(136) Letter from ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Turkī, chief bombardier of Mawlāy Sulaymān, to Khālīd al-ʿUmarī, qādī of Tangier, dated 17 Ramaḍān, 1236/18 June, 1821 in CCC, vol.27.

(137) Letter from Fès dated 6 Qaʿda, 1236/6 Aug., 1821, in CCC, vol.27.

(138) Ibid.

(139) Ibid.

Despite a reinforcement of 3,000 men who were mobilized by his nephew, Mawlāy 'Abd al-Raḥmān from the Doukkala, Abda and Chiadma, Mawlāy Sulaymān failed to break the Tétouani resistance. In January 1822, Makhzen troops gained control of the Martil fortress, but were unable to subdue Tétouan itself. In February 1822, after the besiegers suffered heavy losses, Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to abandon the siege and return to Fès (140).

In February-March 1822, Mawlāy Sulaymān led a pacification tour through the country north and east of Fès. By subduing the Ghiatta, and particularly the Hayaina, he succeeded in depriving the Fāsi-s of their most important source of cereals. Henceforth, Fès was unable to maintain effective contact with Tétouan or with the surrounding tribes. Tired with the long siege, the people of Fès opened the gates to Mawlāy Sulaymān who entered the city on 20 April, 1822. The submission of Tétouan automatically followed on 3 May, 1822 (141).

Strangely enough, it was the rebellion of Fès which saved the country from the political impasse it had reached after the Zaīan defeat. It was only after the proclamation of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm in November, 1820 that a certain consensus began to take shape around Mawlāy Sulaymān. Instead of overthrowing Mawlāy Sulaymān, the Fès rebellion did in fact contribute to the restoration of his authority.

The major factor which contributed to improve Mawlāy Sulaymān's situation was the refusal of the army to rally the rebels' cause. The war which broke out in October, 1820 between the Oudaya and the Fāsi-s (142) was decisive in this respect. The Fāsi-s who had forgotten all about warfare "because of the long period of peace", were

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(140) C.O.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.

(141) *Ibid.*

(142) *Al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī*, *Tadhkirat*, p.351.

completely overpowered by the Oudaya cavalry (143). The people of Fès had no other alternative but to appeal to the Berber tribes for assistance. Ultimately, this Berber intervention on behalf of the Fāsi-s made any reconciliation between these and the Oudaya impossible and persuaded the latter to treat the rebellious regime with hostility.

The nature of the coalition behind Mawlāy Ibrāhīm (sharīf-s, Fāsi-s and Berbers) persuaded most of the Arab tribes of the Azghār to rally to Mawlāy Sulaymān's cause. Tribal antagonisms to a large extent determined the outcome of the rebellion. Thus, the Beni Hsen declared their allegiance to Mawlāy Sulaymān immediately after their traditional opponents, the Zemmour and the Sefiane, rallied to the party of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm (144). Traditional tribal animosities were also responsible for the disintegration of the united Berber front. The first major defection occurred within the Aīt Oumalou themselves. In June 1821, the submission of the Beni Mguild (145) was followed by that of other Berber tribes such as the Aīt Morghad and the Aīt Izdeg who, together with the Beni Mguild, were able to provide Mawlāy Sulaymān with one thousand cavalrymen (146). With the assistance of these tribes, Mawlāy Sulaymān won a major victory over Abū Bakr Amhāwish on 29 July, 1821 (147). This military success led to the defection of the Guerouane, thus undermining the fragile Berber coalition led by Amhāwish (148). Thereafter, the Berber alliance ceased to be of any use to the people of Fès.

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(143) Ibid.

(144) COC, vol.27, bulletin covering the period from 4 to 19 March, 1821.

(145) Cf. letter mentioned in note 136 above.

(146) Cf. note 137 above.

(147) Ibid.

(148) Ibid.

The rebels were also weakened by the fortuitous arrest of the head of the Darqāwiya religious order. Mawlay al-ʿArbī al-Darqāwī was taken into custody by the Oudaya after he failed to persuade them to join Mawlāy Ibrāhīm's party. Ibn al-Ghāzī was greatly concerned about the future of his shaykh and manifested, therefore, great moderation while the latter remained in Mawlāy Sulaymān's hands.

The role of the Darqāwi-s in the rebellion was also tempered by the political ascendance of the Wazzāniya religious order, particularly after the movement extended to the northern provinces. Contrary to Darqāwi hopes, the new sultan did not confer any leading role in his government upon Ibn al-Ghāzī (149). The real leadership of the whole movement was taken instead by the Wazzāni sharīf-s. The political dominance of the Wazzāni-s necessarily moderated Darqāwi enthusiasm for the cause of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm and his brother, Mawlāy Saʿīd.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's success was also made possible by the financial difficulties of the rebels. When they had proclaimed the new sultan, the rebellion leaders had anticipated that they would gain a rapid control of the northern ports from which they could establish commercial contact with the outside world. Their failure to subdue these places considerably diminished their chances of success. Nor were Fès and Tétouan able to establish any durable contacts with their hinterland. The financial resources of the rebels ran out very quickly. Makhzen funds left by Mawlāy Sulaymān in the treasuries of Fès and Tétouan were soon consumed. Other public funds such as the aḥbās and the inheritance of the munqaṭiʿūn were also used up (150). Fāsi and Tétouani merchants who had staked their support on a lightning victory were the next victims of the financial difficulties that faced the rebels. After the exhaustion of public funds, the rebels turned to them

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(149) Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahāʿ, K 241, p.196.

(150) Al-Ibtisām, p. 67; al-Majdhūb al-Fāsi, Tadhkirat, p. 353.

so that their resources were also consumed by the expenses of the war.

Moreover, lamentable living conditions within the besieged cities of Fès and Tétouan greatly undermined the population's morale. "During these days", wrote the author of al-Ibtisām, "the people of Fès were in a great distress because of the rise in food prices and the interruption of communications" (151). The shelling of residential quarters by Makhzen artillery made even worse the living conditions of the Fasi-s and the Tétouani-s. Food stores inside Fès were hit and eye witnesses reported scenes of streets running with oil, honey and butter (152). The economic blockade of Fès became unbearable after Mawlāy Sulaymān's military successes over the Berber coalition under Abū Bakr Amhāwish in the summer of 1821 and the submission of the neighbouring Hayaina in February 1822.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's victory was also made easier by his military superiority. The failure of the rebels to control the ports deprived them not only of an important source of revenue, but also prevented them from receiving sophisticated military equipment from abroad. Mawlāy Sulaymān, on the contrary, benefited from the regular flow of heavy arms which he received from Europe. In 1820, he received fifty canons from France, Great Britain and Sweden (153). The following year, he was supplied with twenty mountain guns from Gibraltar (154). The use of artillery proved to be decisive in the defeat of Abū Bakr Amhāwish in July 1821 as well as in the siege of both Fès and Tétouan.

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(151) Al-Ibtisām, p.67. Cf. similar observations by al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, pp.353-354.

(152) A letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān's chief bombardier at Fès to the qādī of Tangier dated 17 Ramaḍān, 1236/18 June, 1821 reported that shelling continued even during the holy month of Ramaḍān. Cf. CCC, vol.27, fol.218.

(153) CCC, vol.27, 25 May, 1820.

(154) F.O.52/22, 17 March, 1821.

Finally, Mawlāy Sulaymān's success was partly due to the benevolent attitude of the European countries. During this political crisis, European nations were unanimous in their support of him. The conservative nature of the rebel regime and the religious groups that were behind it had raised the apprehensions of the European consuls. "The European powers", wrote Sourdeau, the French consul, in 1820, "are determined to use every possible means in order to keep the present Emperor, with his peaceful policy, on the throne" (155). The fact that the new regime was easily identified with the short-lived reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd and that he depended on the same intransigent groups excited the fears of European nations. "Soon we will see the Moroccan navy, at present annihilated, privateering in the Straits and disturbing trade in every possible way" wrote Sourdeau in 1820 (156). The European consuls refused to recognize or assist the rebels and provided Mawlāy Sulaymān with every possible assistance. Not only did they comply with his appeal to boycott the port of Martil, the only window the rebels had on the outside world, but also provided him with the necessary artillery to ensure a military superiority over his opponents. Not less important was the military assistance received from Spain through the fortress of Ceuta and which was used in the siege of Tétouan (157). Great Britain assisted him financially, facilitated the transfer of Muḥammad Bejja's inheritance (158), and granted him a loan of 50,000 Spanish dollars in 1821 (159). During the same year, Denmark

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(155) CCC, vol.27, 20 May, 1820.

(156) Ibid.

(157) CCC, vol. 29, 4 Jan., 1822.

(158) C.O. 91/79, Order by the Governor of Gibraltar concerning Bejja's property, dated, 11 Aug., 1821. Cf. note 82 in chapter IV above.

(159) F.O.52/22, 16 April, 1821.



agreed to pay its arrears of tribute amounting to 100,000 Spanish dollars (160) without making any juridical protest over the existence of two rival princes (161). This financial assistance proved to be highly valuable at a time when Mawlāy Sulaymān's income was greatly reduced by the political and economic situation.

### VII - The Nature of the Rebellion

Some European authors have seen the Fès rebellion as the creation of trading interests and a reaction by the merchant class against the restrictive commercial policy of Mawlāy Sulaymān (162). A more careful examination of facts leaves no doubt, however, about the conservative character of the movement. While the rebellion did allow the merchant class to play a more active role in the country's political affairs after 1822, it was by no means carried out by merchants.

Indeed, a glance at the bayʿa issued by the rebels to Mawlāy Ibrāhīm on 16 November, 1820 tends to invalidate Lazarev's claim that the Fāsi upheaval against Mawlāy Sulaymān constituted a "bourgeois revolution" (163). The authors of the bayʿa called upon the new sultan to remove merchants from government and to rely instead on the sharīf-s and the traditional notability. "The interests of the Muslim community should not be placed in the hands of merchants and wealthy people", underlined the text of the bayʿa, "but in the hands of individuals whose noble

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(160) F.O.52/22, 17 March, 1821.

(161) In 1794 Denmark had refused to pay its tribute on the pretext that Mawlāy Sulaymān was not in complete control of the country; cf.F.O. 52/10, 21 Sept., 1794.

(162) Cf. in particular Thomassy, Des relations politiques et commerciales de la France avec le Maroc, 1842, et G.Lazarev, "Aspects du capitalisme agraire au Maroc avant le Protectorat", in Annuaire de l'Afrique du nord, CNRS, 1975, pp.57-90.

(163) Lazarev wrote about the rebellion: "Il semble qu'elle ait été plus qu'une révolte, mais une révolution qui porta la bourgeoisie commerçante au pouvoir dans la cité de Fès"; cf. his "Aspects du capitalisme", p.59.

ancestry stands out as the surest guarantee against deviation and treachery" (164). The conditional bayᶜa also called upon Mawlāy Ibrāhīm to respect and honour those of noble ancestry, "without overlooking the distinction that exists between sharīf-s and non-sharīf-s (165). Makhzen responsibilities, demanded the bayᶜa, should be entrusted to families whose loyalty to the ᶜAlawid dynasty had been proved during the reign of Mawlāy Ismāᶜīl— in other words, to the prestigious traditional families (166). The composition of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm's government brings a further proof of the conservative nature of the rebellion. Muḥammad b. Sulaymān, an Andalusian, was appointed chief minister, while Sīdī al-ᶜArbī, head of the Wazzāniya religious order, assumed the role of advisor to the new sultan (167).

The examination of the Fāsi signatories of the bayᶜa also makes the predominance of the Andalusian and sharifian elements clear. The ᶜālim-s and merchants, on the other hand, seem to have played a secondary role in the rebellion. While the traditional Fāsi notables and the Idrisid sharīf-s remained convinced enemies of Mawlāy Sulaymān throughout the rebellion, the support of the ᶜālim-s and the merchants slackened very quickly.

#### A - Rumāt and Notables

Since the breakdown of Makhzen authority after the Zaīan defeat, the Andalusian notables, particularly those belonging to families traditionally known to have provided the politico-military leadership in Fès,

(164) Cf. text of the bayᶜa in Dāwūd, III, p.256 (extracts in appendix 86).

(165) Ibid.

(166) This is a clear reference to Mawlāy Ismāᶜīl's reliance on Andalusian notables in the government of Fès. Andalusian families such as al-Rūsī and al-Gharnāṭī provided governors and army officers during his reign. The Bildiyyīn, on the contrary, seem to have been held in disgrace by Mawlāy Ismāᶜīl. Cf. N. Cigar, "Une lettre inédite de Mūly Ismāᶜīl aux gens de Fès," in Hespéris-Tamuda vol., XV, 1974, pp.105-118.

(167) CCC, vol.27, 1 March, 1821.

reacquired an importance they had lost under Mawlāy Sulaymān. In view of the growing insecurity caused by Oudaya attacks, the people of Fès were forced to turn to these notables to whom they entrusted the defence of their lives and property. However, the importance of the rumāt leadership tended to decline as the rebellion broadened to become more than a purely Fāsi movement.

The rumāt (pl. of rāmī) formed the urban militia of some ḥaḍariya towns, such as Fès, Tétouan and Salé. They were initially armed with crossbows, but adopted firearms later on (168). It is not possible to ascertain when and how the institution originated, but the rumāt were, apparently, first used by the Makhzen during the reign of the Saʿadian sultan Aḥmad al-Manṣūr (1578-1603) (169). They were financed on a local basis and their main duty was the defence of the town against tribal attacks and the guarantee of tranquillity within the town itself in times of political instability.

Under the ʿAlawid dynasty, the city of Fès was usually requested to contribute to the Makhzen's military needs by sending a contingent of rumāt to fight alongside the army. The size of this contingent varied greatly from one reign to another. Under Mawlāy Ismāʿīl, Fès used to support a military force of 3,000 men (170). Following his death, the military contribution of Fès was reduced to only 500 men. This did not prevent the rumāt leaders from playing a significant role in Fāsi politics during the chaotic reign of Mawlāy ʿAbd Allāh. The Andalusian family of al-Lirīnī, for instance, provided both rumāt commanders and

(168) Ibn ʿAlī al-Dukkālī, Ithāf, 13,009, R.L., p. 16.

”وكان فيها [سلا] الرّماة بالنبال  
 . . . . . تمت بعده رّماة المكحلة  
 أسنى مقام خارج البلدة حـ  
 فصل سلا عن حوت من كمله

(169) Al-Nāṣirī, V, p. 163.

(170) Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahā, K241, p. 192.

Makhzen governors during this period (171). The military contribution of Fès was subject to a further reduction with the accession of SĪdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh to power in 1757. During his reign the people of Fès supported a modest force of only 50 men (172). His successor, Mawlāy al-Yazīd, brought back the Fès quota of rumāt to 500 men (173). After 1792, Mawlāy Sulaymān reduced the military contribution of Fès to a symbolic figure of eighteen men, one for each quarter. In his military campaigns he was often satisfied with ten men only (174). Despite their modest size, the rumāt of Fès took part in the pacification of the Chaouia in 1797 (175) and in 1800 in the Makhzen expedition against the AĪt Oumalou (176).

It is clear that the importance of the rumāt as a military force was considerably reduced during the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān. The reduction of their number by the Makhzen, in addition to the long period of peace enjoyed by Fès during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, were the main factors behind this decline. When hostilities erupted between the Oudaya and the Fāsi-s in October 1820, the latter realised that they had completely forgotten military practice. As a result, they were helpless before the Oudaya "because they had no longer any experience in fighting", wrote the author of Tadhkirat al-Muḥsinīn, "after the long period of peace (...). It was the first fighting witnessed by the people (of Fès)" (177)

Akansūs, who witnessed the early phases of the rebellion, affirmed that the most active group was not

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(171) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p. 148; Aḥmad Ibn al-Ḥāǧ, al-Durr al-muntakhab, Ms. Z 1875, R.L., p.289; al-Nāṣirī, VII, p.35.

(172) Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahā<sup>2</sup>, p.193.

(173) Al-Ḍuʿayf, p.242; al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahā, p.193.

(174) Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahā<sup>2</sup>, p.193.

(175) Al-Ḍuʿayf, pp.344-345.

(176) Ibid., p.410.

(177) Al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat; p.351.

made up of merchants and wealthy people— as Mawlāy Sulaymān had assumed while he was still at Marrakech— but of "individuals who make their appearance in time of trouble only, called al-rumāt" (178). The mere fact that Akansūs had to explain what was meant by the term rumāt already shows how unacquainted his contemporaries were with this institution. The rumāt who led the Fès rebellion were certainly not from the lower ranks of the urban militia since the institution had almost ceased to exist as a military force by 1820. Moreover, the lower ranks of the rumāt were usually temporary recruits, drawn essentially from the "rabble" and, therefore, unable to perpetuate rumāt traditions during a long and peaceful reign such as that of Mawlāy Sulaymān. Only the prestigious families which had traditionally monopolized the military and administrative leadership on the city were capable of playing such a significant role in the rebellion.

Al-Zayānī, who also was a witness of the rebellion, made no reference at all to the rumāt. Instead, the leading role he attributed to the Andalusian notables. Mawlāy Sulaymān himself, in a letter to the people of Fès during the rebellion (179), vehemently attacked the Andalusians accusing them of being "at the root of the evil". The ʿAdwa and the Lamṭiyīn, on the other hand, maintained Mawlāy Sulaymān, were only misled by the Andalusians. In fact, the rumāt referred to by Akansūs and the Andalusians mentioned both by al-Zayānī and Mawlāy Sulaymān were one and the same. We find the same names of families who traditionally supplied the leadership of the rumāt (180). They also provided local governors during the reigns of Mawlāy Ismāʿīl and Mawlāy ʿAbd Allāh.

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(178) Akansūs, p.328.

(179) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès (1821), in al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahāʿ, pp.185-188, appendix 89.

(180) Among these names we find: al-Lirīnī, al-Gharnāṭī, al-Jazūlī, al-Khaṭīb, ʿAdīl and others. Cf. list of Fāsi notables who deposed Mawlāy Sulaymān and proclaimed his nephew in the text of the bayʿa of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, Dāwūd, III, p.254.

The primordial role attributed by Akansūs to the rumāt leaders, who were predominantly Andalusians, appears to be contradicted by the insignificant size of the rumāt force by 1820. Their importance, however, resided not in their number, but in their ability to officer the rabble and organize the defence of the city. Moreover, their weight within Fāsi society was not merely due to their sense of military organization and mobilization. It was also due to their political leadership for, under the Ḥalawid dynasty, they provided not only rumāt commanders but also Makhzen qā'id-s. Sometimes, the same individuals happened to be rumāt commanders and local qā'id-s at the same time (181). Owing to their importance within Fāsi society, the rumāt leaders were counted among the aṣyān, or notables, and were, therefore, consulted on important matters, particularly when it came to the designation of a new sultan.

As a socio-military force, the rumāt became particularly powerful in times of political uncertainty when their military experience was sought by the other social groups. They even acquired the upper hand during periods of weak central authority. "Once they make their appearance", wrote Akansūs, "wealthy people fall under their might and mercy" (182). The fact that their military importance had declined during the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān did not mean that they had ceased to exist in 1820. Even if the lower ranks could easily disband and disappear over time, the traditional leadership was more likely to survive as it was closely associated with the Fāsi notability.

Mawlāy Sulaymān was aware of their existence within the Fāsi social structure, but he never gave them any

(181) N. Cigar, An Edition and Translation of the Chronicles from Muhammad al-Qādirī's Nashr al-Mathānī, Ph.D. Thesis, 1976, Oxford University, p. 14.

(182) Akansūs, p. 333.

"أهل فاس وأهل العصية منهم قوم يقال لهم الرماة لا يظهرون إلا في وقت السببية والفتنة وأما في وقت الأحكام فإنهم خادمون لا يبال لهم. فلذا كان وقت ظهورهم كان أهل الأموال والأصول تحت ذمتهم وتصرفهم يفعلون فيهم ما أرادوا."

importance. His centralizing administrative policy led him to erode the power of this private military force by reducing its numbers and removing its leaders from local Makhzen responsibilities. "Between Mawlāy Sulaymān and these rumāt leaders", noted Akansūs, "there was a deeply rooted hatred" (183). He never solicited their aid or advice because he preferred "people of decency and religiousness" to them (184). Apparently, Mawlāy Sulaymān had little desire to depend on individuals who derived their influence from "street power". Moreover, their strong sense of ṣaḥabiyya (esprit de corps) made them uncontrollable and unreliable for Makhzen purposes. In running the affairs of Fès, Mawlāy Sulaymān preferred people who had no particular attachments to this traditional politico-military elite. The government of the city was always entrusted to outsiders (barrānī-s), palace slaves (waṣīf-s) or to merchants "who were solely interested in the fructification of their capital" and whose loyalty to the Makhzen was, therefore, more likely to be assured.

Governors of Fès, 1792-1822

|           |   |  |
|-----------|---|--|
| 1792-1802 | Aḥmad al-Yammūrī  | Makhzen <u>qāḍid</u> from the Aīt Immour     |
| 1802      | āl-Ḥabīb b. ʿAbd al-Hādī<br>Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Ṣādaq<br>Aḥmad al-Yammūrī | Sultan's affine<br><u>waṣīf</u>              |
| 1802-1803 | Muḥammad al-Salāwī  | <u>waṣīf</u>                                 |
| 1803-1807 | Abaḥqīl al-Sūsī   | Makhzen <u>qāḍid</u>                         |
| 1807-1810 | Muḥammad Waḥzīz   | leader and <u>qāḍid</u> of the Aīt Idrassen  |
| 1810-1811 | ʿUmar Abū Sitta<br>Muḥammad b. Sīrāt al-Sharguī                           | Makhzen <u>qāḍid</u><br>Makhzen <u>qāḍid</u> |

(183) Akansūs, p.328.

(184) Ibid. Akansūs wrote about Mawlāy Sulaymān's relation with the rumāt leaders:

”وكان السلطان لا يُبالي بهم لأنه يعلم ظلمهم وفسادهم ولا يعيل إلا لأهل المروءة والدين، وهؤلاء الرماة لا مروءة لهم، فهو يبغضهم غاية وكانوا مُصرين على بغضه كذلك.”

|           |  |   |
|-----------|--|---|
| 1811-1812 | ʿAbd al-Qādir Ṣfīra                            | merchant                                    |
|           | ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ṣfīra                           | merchant                                    |
| 1813-1815 | Muḥammad al-Salāwī                             |   |
|           | Muḥammad al-Ṣarīdī                             | <u>waṣīf</u>                                |
|           | Muḥammad Mezwār                                | merchant                                    |
|           | ʿAlī Majjūṭ                                    | Makhzen <u>qā'id</u> from<br>the Aīt Immour |
| 1815-1817 | Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Ṣādaq                      |   |
| 1817-1818 | Aḥmad al-Qusṭālī                               | <u>kātib</u>                                |
| 1818-1820 | Muḥammad al-Ṣaffār                             | merchant                                    |
| 1820      | Qāsim b. Sākin                                 | <u>waṣīf</u>                                |
|           | (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Fāris                       | ) Fāsi notables                             |
|           | (  | )   |
| 1820-1822 | (Qaddūr al-Mqarfī                              | ) chosen during the                         |
|           | (  | )   |
|           | (Aḥmad al-Ḥārthī                               | ) rebellion                                 |
| 1822      | (April-Nov) Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Raḥmān<br>b. Hishām |   |

Sources: Al-Zayānī, Takmīl quḍāt Fās; Idem, Jamharat man ḥakama bi Fās; Al-Ḍuʿayf; Akansūs, al-Jaysh.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's administrative policy and his dislike for the rumāt leaders greatly disturbed the traditional Fāsi notability. The break down of Mawlāy Sulayman's authority after 1819 offered them a chance to openly express their hostility and make common cause with the sharīf-s, in so far as the traditional privileges of both groups were threatened. An examination of the conditions imposed on Mawlāy Ibrāhīm in the bayʿa of 1820 makes the identity of interest of the traditional notables and the sharīf-s clear. However, the extension of the rebellion beyond the walls of Fès greatly reduced the importance of the rumāt leaders in the movement and opened the way for the sharīf-s to dominate it.

#### B - The Sharīf-s

The use of military power by the rumāt leaders in 1820 undoubtedly brought them to the front of the political scene but it did not confer the leadership of the rebellion upon



them. In fact, the political leadership of the movement remained the prerogative of the sharīf-s whose influence was further increased with the involvement of the sharifian zāwiya-s and the extension of the rebellion into the countryside.

The sharīf-s never forgave Mawlāy Sulaymān for having attempted to erode their privileges by every means available (185). The sharīf-s of Fès viewed Mawlāy Sulaymān's policy of favouring people of scholarship and wealth at the expense of those who belonged to the Prophet's holy lineage with indignation. His learned council mainly involved ʿālim-s belonging to the Bildiyyīn or the ʿāmma, to whom he referred for advice on important matters. Nothing could be more shocking to the sharīf-s of Fès than the decision taken by Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1804 to bury his Bildi shaykh, ʿAbd al-Qādir b. Shaqrūn, within the walls of the holy shrine of Mawlāy Idrīs (186).

Of all the Fāsi social groups the sharīf-s were the most resentful of Mawlāy Sulaymān's sympathy with the Bildiyyīn. The long period of peace that the city had enjoyed primarily favoured a group such as the Bildiyyīn whose main strength was based on wealth and learning (187). The outstanding achievements of the Bildiyyīn in the fields of scholarship and trade during this period tended to exacerbate friction with groups whose privileges were inherited (sharīf-s and traditional notables) and, on the other hand, groups whose achievements in the fields of learning and trade represented the only means of improving

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(185) Cf. chapter VI. above, pp. 303-309.

(186) Ibn al-Muwwāz, al-Maqāla al-murḍiyya, Ms.493, R.L., p.21. The only other Bildi ʿālim to have been buried in the shrine of Mawlāy Idrīs is ʿAbd al-Salām Gassūs (d.1709). By ordering his burial within the walls of the holy shrine, Mawlāy Ismāʿīl apparently sought to expiate his killing of the famous ʿālim of Fès. Cf. al-Nāṣirī, VII, pp.94-95.

(187) N. Cigar, "Conflict and Community in an Urban Milieu under the ʿAlawi-s," The Maghreb Review, Nov.-Dec., 1978, p.5.

their social status (ʿamma and Bildiyyīn). Mawlāy Sulaymān's neglect of the sharīf-s can only be explained by his eagerness to avoid being tied to a group whose ʿaṣabiyya and particularist tendencies were likely to compromise his efforts at centralization. His reliance on people of wealth and learning did not involve such a risk. Mawlāy Sulaymān was openly criticized by his contemporaries for his partiality towards the Bildiyyīn. "The Sultan", wrote al-Ḍuʿayf, "respected their views and had a great affection for them. He preferred them to the rest of the people of Fès and entrusted them with his money and trade from which they gained considerable fortunes" (188).

During most of the rebellion, the Idrisid sharīf-s, in particular, proved to be the most ardent enemies of Mawlāy Sulaymān's regime. The attempt made by al-Kattānī in the summer of 1820 on the life of the qāḍī, al-ʿAbbās b. Sūda, presaged the downfall of Mawlāy Sulaymān's authority in the city. When Makhzen officials arrested him, sharifian ʿaṣabiyya began to work and al-Kattānī was immediately freed by his fellow sharīf-s (189). Another sharīf, al-Faḍīl al-ʿImrānī, who already distinguished

(188) A contemporary of Mawlāy Sulaymān expressed his criticism of the Sultan's sympathy with the Bildiyyīn in the following verses:

|  |   |
|--|---|
| من الأمير وحازوا غاية الأرب<br>على بني المصطفى وجملة العرب | بنو فريضة قد نالوا مرادهم<br>لا عيب فيه سوى تفضيلهم |
|--|---|

The old controversial issue of the alleged preference of the Israelite race by the Quran was raised again during the early years of the nineteenth century (al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna al-kubrā, p.357). The issue used to be raised everytime the friction between the Bildiyyīn and the other Fāsi groups reached an explosive stage. Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Salām Bannānī (d.1818) devoted a long work to the issue (Taḥliyat al-āthān wa al-masāmiʿ, Ms.K.650, BGR). Mawlāy Sulaymān, we are told by Bannānī, did not approve of the campaign that was launched against the Bildi ʿālim-s. Cf. Bannānī, Taḥliyat, p.16.

(189) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès (1821) in al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahā, pp.181-185.

himself by his militancy against the Wahhābi reformist movement, took an active part in the rebellion by inciting the Fāsi-s to violence (190). Ālim-s of sharīf origin played a critical role in clearing the legal ground for the dethronement of Mawlāy Sulaymān. Sharifian ālim-s were heavily represented among the signatories of the fatwā-s which authorized the deposition of Mawlāy Sulaymān (191). This also applied to the bayʿa which brought Mawlāy Ibrāhīm to the throne in November 1820 (192).

The sharīf leadership of the rebellion was, above all, determined by the involvement of two important sharifian zāwiya-s, the Wazzāniya and the Darqāwiya. Sīdī al-ʿArbī al-Wazzānī found in the rebellion a means to avenge himself on a sultan who, since the death of Sīdī ʿAlī b. Aḥmad in 1811, had constantly sided against him in the succession contest in the zāwiya (193). Owing to the wide influence he had amongst the tribes, his role became decisive once the newly proclaimed sultan needed to extend his rule to the northern provinces. Indeed, without the crucial support of the Wazzāni sharīf-s, the extension of the rebellion to the countryside would not have been possible. When the movement reached the northern provinces, a Wazzāni sharīf of Tétouan, Sīdī ʿAbd al-Karīm b. ʿAbd Allāh, became the main agent of rebel

(190) Ibid., p.174.

(191) Cf. fatwā-s in Ms.D.2795, BGR, pp.393-404.

(192) Cf. signatories of the bayʿa in Dāwūd, III, pp.253-254. The sharīf-s represented 1/3 of the signatories and there was not a single Bildī cālim among the proclaimers of the new sultan.

(193) Cf. chapter VI. In a long poem (urjūza) al-Zayānī pointed out the leading role of the sharīf-s in the Fès rebellion:

إذ سبقوني للسمي في الشقاق  
صالوا وياضوا بعش النفاق  
هم ندما وحجاب الرواق  
يقودون الوفد مع الرفاق

و غاظني فعل بني أبيكم  
و من بغاس من بني علي  
و صلحائهم أهل الإمراني  
و شرفا العلم والنجدي

propaganda in the northern Jbala (194). His devotion to the new regime and his religious influence led him to be appointed vice-regent for Tétouan and its surroundings. His zeal for the rebellion was such that, even after the surrender of Fès and Tétouan in the spring of 1822, he still refused to abandon the struggle (195).

The Darqāwiya religious order whose founder was an Idrisid sharīf himself, also took an active part in the rebellion, particularly during its early stages. Mawlāy al-ʿArbī al-Darqāwī attended the proclamation of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm and used his religious influence in an attempt to gain over the Oudaya to the cause of the rebels. His disciple, Muḥammad b. al-Ghāzī, leader of the Zemmour confederation, took a prominent part in mobilizing Berber support for the new regime. According to al-Zayānī, he was in favour of a complete dynastic change, as he proposed the designation of an Idrisid prince (196). The importance of the Darqāwiya religious order tended, however, to diminish after the arrest of the Darqāwi shaykh by the Oudaya and the emergence of the Wazzāni sharīf-s as the uncontested leaders of the rebellion.

### C - The ʿĀlim-s

It is not easy to evaluate the nature of the ʿālim-s' involvement in the rebellion as they did not represent a distinct social group or a particular set of group interests. Their loyalty was often a function of the social connection they had with existing groups (sharīf-s, Bildiyyīn, ʿāmma) or their membership of a particular religious order.

(194) Al-Wazzānī, al-Zāwiya, p.200; Dāwūd, III, pp.260-261.

(195) Al-Wazzānī, al-Zāwiya, p.200; al-Ruhūnī, ʿUmdat al-rāwīn, II, p.192.

(196) Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahāʿ, p.169.

There is no doubt that the changes which occurred within the corps of ʿālim-s during the second decade of the nineteenth century (197) had a significant impact upon the political loyalties of the scholarly elite during the rebellion. During this decade worsening internal difficulties tended to monopolize Mawlāy Sulaymān's attention and, consequently, made his relations with the ʿālim-s very distant. The meetings of his learned council became very rare. The institution itself tended to disintegrate after the death of its most prominent members : al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān (d.1812), Yaḥyā al-Shafashāwnī (d.1813), Ḥamdūn b.al-Ḥāj (1817) and Aḥmad b. Sūda (d.1820). The corps of ʿālim-s fell progressively under the influence of the sharīf-s. Indeed, the ʿālim-s of sharifian origin such as ʿAbd al-Salām al-Azamī, ʿAbd al-Mālik al-Murrī and Abū Bakr al-Manjra, played a leading role in the legitimization of the rebellion.

Despite this, the proportion of ʿālim-s who lent their support to the rebellion remained insignificant (198). It should also be borne in mind that many ʿālim-s whose names appeared at the bottom of the fatwā drafted in November 1820 were, a few days before the proclamation of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, subject to pressure and threat (199). Thus, we find among the signatories of this fatwā the deposed qādī, al-ʿAbbās b. Sūda and other members of his family who were exposed to great sufferings during the rebellion (200).

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(197) Cf. chapter VI.

(198) 12 ʿālim-s signed the bayʿa on 16 November, 1820 out of a total of 90 ʿālim-s belonging to the first and second categories — those who were liable to appear at the formal act of proclamation. Cf. bayʿa of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm in Dāwūd III, pp.253-254; list of ʿālim-s established by Mawlāy Sulaymān around 1818 in Ibn Zaydān, al-ʿIzz wa al-ṣawla, II, pp.168-169.

(199) Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahāʿ, p.158.

(200) Cf. fatwā issued at the beginning of Ṣafar, 1236/early Nov., 1820 in Ms.D.2795, pp.398-404; cf. also Gharrīṭ, Fawāsil al-jumān, p.92 on the persecution of the Ibn Sūda family during the rebellion.

The sympathy of the Ālim-s for the rebellion slackened very quickly after the new regime failed to gain enough support in the country at large. Some Ālim-s such as Muḥammad al-Yāzghī, the author of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm's bayʿa and one of the most fervent militants of the early phase of the rebellion, rallied to Mawlāy Sulaymān's party later on and, consequently, suffered imprisonment and torture by the rebels (201). When Mawlāy Ibrāhīm died four months after his proclamation, very few Ālim-s were ready to approve the bayʿa of his brother, Mawlāy Saʿīd (202).

#### D - Merchants

In his study on precolonial social structures in Morocco (203), G. Lazarev blames the Fès rebellion on a commercial bourgeoisie in search for a greater share in public affairs. A similar interpretation was formulated by R. Thomassy when he claimed that Mawlāy Sulaymān's commercial policy was the main reason behind the political agitation experienced during the latter part of his reign (204). The examination of Moroccan sources, however, allows us to draw a different conclusion .

During Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign, Fès, as an industrial and a commercial city, enjoyed not only a long period of peace, but also a period of prosperity to which a number of fiscal privileges contributed. Mawlāy Sulaymān, who believed at the beginning of the rebellion that merchants and people of wealth were the ring-leaders of the movement, could not understand why the Fāsi-s should be so ungrateful to him after all the privileges he had granted them (205). In a letter to them following the proclama-

(201) Al-ʿAmrāwī, Nafḥat al-araj, p.45.

(202) 10 Ālim-s only from Fès and Tétouan approved the bayʿa of Mawlāy Saʿīd, proclaimed on 17 March, 1821. Cf. text of the bayʿa in Dāwūd, III, pp.259-264.

(203) G. Lazarev, "Aspects du capitalisme agraire", pp.58-60.

(204) R. Thomassy, Des relations, p. 316.

(205) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès, in al-Ḥayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahāʿ, pp.181-185 (appendix 88).

tion of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, he reminded the merchants of his past endeavours to promote their interests (206). He mentioned in particular the abolition of the maks, the reduction of port duties for Moroccan Muslim merchants from 10 to 2.5% and the alleviation of the city's military burden. Indeed by reducing the rumāt contingent from 500 men to a symbolic force of only 18 men, he considerably alleviated the financial burden on the Fāsi merchants since they used to make the largest contribution to the equipping and maintenance of this urban militia. People of wealth could not hope for more favourable conditions : a peaceful reign, light taxation and an insignificant contribution to the military effort. "Fāsi merchants ... were firmly attached to Abī al-Rabī<sup>c</sup> (Mawlāy Sulaymān) because it was during his times that they attained prosperity", wrote the author of al-Ibtisām, "but they were overpowered" (207).

The fiscal privileges enjoyed by Moroccan merchants remained unimpaired until 1815 when Mawlāy Sulaymān's financial difficulties induced him to operate some changes in his commercial policy. However, neither the increase of import duties for Muslim merchants (1815) nor the limitation on the travel abroad of Moroccan nationals (1816) seem to have seriously affected the interests of Fāsi and Tétouani merchants. Despite these measures, the big merchants of these two towns continued to have commercial relations with Europe and the Arab East (208). The liberalization of the export trade after 1817 (209) was not either disadvantageous to the Moroccan merchants. These complained above all about the decline of contact with

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(206) Ibid.

(207) Al-Ibtisām, p.67. On merchants under Mawlāy Sulaymān cf. chapter III above, pp. 108-117.

(208) Cf. private correspondence of Muḥammad Bejja in D.A.R., years 1232-1234 A.H. Among these merchants we find Ibn al-Ṭālib, Muḥammad Mezwār, al-<sup>c</sup>Abbās Buhlāl, Muḥammad al-Sarrūkh, al-Ṭāhar Baddū and Muḥammad al-Brūbī.

(209) Cf. chapter III above, pp. 169-170.

the outside world and the harmful effects of the drought (210).

The involvement of Fāsi merchants in the rebellion was thus essentially motivated by circumstantial considerations. The breakdown of Makhzen authority after 1819 led to the spread of insecurity in the northern provinces, and consequently threatened the commercial interests of Fès. Moreover, natural calamities disturbed the country's economy and worked against the immediate interests of the merchant class. The prospect of a political change was, therefore, tempting for merchants who were seeking a more stable and a more efficient regime. Their hopes were soon frustrated, especially when they realized they had to pay the bill for the rebellion (211).

The text of the bayʿa which brought this latter to the throne dispels any illusion about the bourgeois character of the rebellion. The bayʿa called upon the new sultan to rely on the sharīf-s and the traditional notables and "to avoid placing the affairs of Muslims in the hands of merchants and the wealthy because it is the cause of ruin" (212). The fact that merchants tended to play a more prominent role in Makhzen affairs after 1822 should not mislead us in assessing the significance of their participation in the rebellion. The ascendance of the merchant class after 1822 was largely due to the encouragement of the Makhzen for whom this class represented the only counterweight capable of upsetting the influence of conservative groups.

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(210) Letter from Muḥammad al-Brūbī to Bejja, Jumādā II, 1234/March-April, 1819.

(211) Al-Ibtisām, p.67; al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, p.353.

(212) Cf. bayʿa of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm in Dāwūd, III, p.256.



## CHAPTER EIGHT

C O N C L U S I O N

Although Mawlāy Sulaymān did eventually succeed in crushing the rebellion led by traditionalist groups, his prestige had been damaged beyond measure. Other misfortunes were to confront him during the last months of his reign, particularly the humiliating military defeat in July 1822 at the hands of the Charrādi zāwiya near Marrakech (1).

After having completed the pacification of northern Morocco, Mawlāy Sulaymān proceeded to the south, where tribal antagonism between the Cherarda and the Rehamna tribes threatened to develop into a violent confrontation. The confrontation between these two tribal groups had originated from rivalry over land in the Nfis valley (2). However, the leadership of al-Mahdī al-Charrādī among his tribesmen and the intervention of Mawlāy Sulaymān on the side of the Rehamna led to a direct confrontation between the Charrādi zāwiya and the Makhzen. In July 1822, the Makhzen troops were defeated and Mawlāy Sulaymān was himself held prisoner for several days (3).

In the autumn of the same year the Sultan suffered a final blow from the Cherarda tribes. Together with some of the Chiadma, the Cherarda attacked a Makhzen convoy which was carrying taxes collected from the Essaouira

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(1) Cf. Drague, Esquisse, pp.91-92.

(2) P. Pascon, Le Haouz de Marrakech, Rabat, 1917, I, p.197.

(3) Akansūs, pp.344-345. Mawlāy Abd al-Rahmān avenged this humiliation when in 1828 he razed the zāwiya to the ground and transferred the Cherarda to the Ghārb. Cf. al-Nāṣirī, IX, pp.17-20.

trade and they plundered it (4). Considerable amounts of money and goods were lost at a time when the Makhzen was still trying to enforce its authority over the country. Mawlāy Sulaymān was deeply affected by the incident which caused his health to deteriorate until he died on 28 November 1822.

The encounter with the Charrādi zāwiya was, in one way, a further attempt against Mawlāy Sulaymān by traditionalist groups. However, neither the Fès rebellion nor the Charrādi encounter succeeded, and they only served to confirm the Makhzen in its new post-1817 policies. In fact, by then Mawlāy Sulaymān had realised that commercial contact with Europe was the only way he could reduce his financial dependence on the uncertain countryside and, at the same time, effectively resist traditionalist groups. The commercial opening to Europe which began in early 1817 with the granting of important reductions in tariffs was continued during the following years, particularly during the period of the Fès rebellion. Indeed, without export income, which was mainly used to pay for military equipment, the defeat of the rebellion would have been impossible.

Thus, to overcome opposition, Mawlāy Sulaymān had to return to the liberal commercial policy he had adopted during the 1790s. However, this time he was apparently determined not to abandon trade with Europe as an important potential source of revenue for the Makhzen. In fact, Mawlāy Sulaymān was confronted with a much more fundamental choice. Instead of the unsatisfactory system of taxing

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(4) Akanṣūs, p.346.

the tribes and relieving the fiscal burden of urban-based economic activity, the Makhzen was obliged to rely on trade and merchants as part of a permanent strategy. Unlike the commercial policy adopted by Mawlāy Sulaymān after 1798 when he had pacified the country, the end of the Fès rebellion was not accompanied by any restrictive measures on exports to Europe. Indeed, several decisions seemed to confirm that he had broken with his past experience once and for all. By agreeing to establish diplomatic relations with Sardinia in September 1822 (5) and by deciding to reopen the port of El-Jadida to European trade one month before he died (6), Mawlāy Sulaymān showed that the time had come to end Morocco's isolationist tendencies.

His choice of his nephew, Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, as his successor was partly dictated by his concern to ensure continuity for the policies of his later years. Indeed, as governor of Essaouira from 1821 to 1822, Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Raḥmān not only proved himself to be a competent administrator, but he had also turned out to be an enthusiastic encourager of trade as well. During his residence there he had developed personal ties with Jewish and European merchants (7). In a way, his career resembled that of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh who, prior to his assumption of power in 1757, had also been governor

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(5) F.O. 52/13, letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the King of Sardinia, 29 Sept., 1822.

(6) F.O. 174/28, 2 Nov., 1822. Cf. also F.O. 52/23, 23 Nov. 1822 and a letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Beloniel (Jewish merchant) requesting his assistance in the reopening of the port of El-Jadida in D.A.R. (year 1238 AH).

(7) F.O. 174/155, 24 Jan., 1823 and 31 Dec., 1823.

at Essaouira. As soon as he acceded to the throne, Mawlāy<sup>ʿ</sup>Abd al-Rahmān called upon the wealthy Fāsi merchant al-Ṭālib b. Jallūn to serve as his chief minister (8) and immediately thereafter granted Meir Macnin large monopolies over the export trade.

Merchants, of all social categories, seemed to be the only group whose alliance was of strategic value to the Makhzen. There is no doubt that the merchant class, particularly in Fès and Tétouan, was greatly weakened after 1817 as a result of natural calamities and the political instability which followed the Sultan's defeat at the hands of the Zaïan. It was weakened even more by the Fès rebellion during which Mawlāy Ibrāhīm and his brother Mawlāy Sa<sup>ʿ</sup>īd extorted large sums of money from both Fāsi and Tétouani merchants. Nevertheless, weakened as it was in 1822, the urban mercantile bourgeoisie emerged from the rebellion as the only victorious group on which the Makhzen could rely to keep the traditionalist groups in check.

As a practical statesman, however, Mawlāy<sup>ʿ</sup>Abd al-Rahmān was anxious not to antagonize these groups, particularly at a time when the embryonic merchant class was not yet powerful enough to provide solid support to the Makhzen. As a result, to temper any potential opposition they might have demonstrated, he granted them a number of concessions. He had inaugurated his reign by a gesture of goodwill towards the Idrisid sharīf-s when he ordered the enlargement of the shrine of Mawlāy Idrīs (9). The Wazzāni sharīf-s were

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(8) F.O. 52/24, 11 Feb. 1823.

(9) Al-Nāṣirī, IX, p.8.

allowed to take control of the inheritances of people who died without heirs in the Touat. Traditional notables of both urban and rural origins were also given a share in the government of the country. Al-Ṭayyib al-Biyyāz, one of the leaders of the Fès rebellion, was entrusted with control of the customs of Tangier and, later on, appointed qā'id of Fès itself (10). Muḥammad Ū-Mimūn, leader of the Guerouane, was appointed qā'id of Tangier and Muḥammad b. al-Ghāzī, of the Zemmour, became one of the closest advisors to Mawlāy Sulaymān's successor for a time. This policy of rapprochement with the traditionalist elements within Moroccan society was, in fact, nothing more than a tactical policy designed to neutralize their hostility. After 1822 these groups progressively lost ground to the mercantile bourgeoisie which took an increasingly active role in running the Makhzen bureaucracy. Indeed, the history of Morocco during the rest of the nineteenth century was dominated by the ascendance of this merchant class whose development went hand in hand with the country's commercial opening to Europe.

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(10) ibid.

## B I B L I O G R A P H Y

I - STATE ARCHIVESA- Morocco

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## G L O S S A R Y

- <sup>C</sup>Adl (pl. <sup>C</sup>udūl), notary.
- Aḥbās Pious endowments.
- Ahl al-dhimma The protected people, particularly Jews living under the protection of the Muslim community.
- Ahl al-ḥall wa al-<sup>C</sup>aqd People responsible for tying and untying matters of religion. They include the <sup>C</sup>ālim-s, sharīf-s, notables and army chiefs.
- <sup>C</sup>Ālim A religious scholar.
- Amīn Tax collector; superintendant; head of a professional corporation.
- <sup>C</sup>Āmma Common people.
- <sup>C</sup>Aṣabiyya Group cohesion, "esprit de corps".
- <sup>C</sup>Āshūrā<sup>3</sup> Tenth day of Muḥarram, first month of the Hijra year.
- A<sup>C</sup>yan Notables, people of distinction.
- <sup>C</sup>Azīb Territory the inhabitants of which pay their taxes to a zāwiya instead of the Makhzen.
- Baraka Supernatural power owned by saints and sharīf-s.
- Bay<sup>C</sup>a Vow of allegiance.
- Bayt al-māl State treasury.
- Bid<sup>C</sup>a A blameworthy innovation.
- Dhikr Incessant repetition of certain words or phrases in praise and remembrance of God.
- Dīwān A collection of poems, register.
- Fanega Spanish measure equivalent to 1.58 bushels (or 4 Moroccan mudd-s).
- Faqīh Jurisconsult, learned man.
- Fatwā Formal judicial opinion issued by the muftī (or by a prominent <sup>C</sup>ālim).

|                           |  |
|---------------------------|--|
| Ḥaḍariya (towns)          | Seats of urban civilization (Fès, Tétouan, Rabat and Salé).                                      |
| Ḥadīth                    | Tradition going back to the Prophet.   |
| Hadiyya                   | Present, gift.   |
| Ḥanṭa                     | Professional association of artisans or traders.   |
| Ḥarṭānī                   | (pl. ḥarrātīn), descendant of a black slave.   |
| <sup>c</sup> Ilm          | Knowledge, science of divine things.   |
| <sup>c</sup> Ilm al-kalām | Dogmatic theology.   |
| Imām                      | "Leader" in public worship, the spiritual and temporal leader of the Muslim community.           |
| Ijāza                     | Recognition of authority in a field (or fields) of learning.                                     |
| Jaysh                     | Army; tribe providing troops in return for exemption from taxes.                                 |
| Kabīra                    | Major sin.   |
| Karāma                    | Saint's miracle, sign of God's favour.   |
| Kasb                      | Acquisition, personal initiative.  |
| Kātib                     | Secretary.   |
| Khādīm                    | Servant, adept of a particular <u>zāwiya</u> or religious order.                                 |
| Khāṣṣa                    | Elite, people of distinction   |
| Khuṭba                    | A homily delivered at the Friday prayer.   |
| Madrasa                   | A higher religious school.   |
| Madhhab                   | Juridical school, rite.  |
| Makhzen                   | Storehouse or treasury. By extention, used in Morocco to mean the State.                         |
| Maks                      | Arbitrary (non-religious) taxes. They include gate taxes, market dues and the State monopolies.  |
| Manāqib                   | Virtues of saints, works of merit.   |
| Mawlāy                    | My Lord, title of distinction given to <u>sharīf-s</u> (used interchangeably with <u>Sīdī</u> ). |
| Mawsim                    | Religious fair.  |

|                        |   |
|------------------------|---|
| Mehalla                | Army detachment on expedition.  |
| Millāh                 | Jewish quarter.   |
| Mudd                   | Measure for cereals and other agricultural produce. At the beginning of the XIXth century, it equaled 12.5 kilograms for wheat and 10 kilograms for barley. The Rabat <u>mudd</u> was three times the standard (Fāsi) <u>mudd</u> . |
| Muhtasib               | Market provost and supervisor of public morality.   |
| Mujāhid                | (pl. mujāhidūn), fighter in a holy war.   |
| Munqaṭi <sup>c</sup>   | (pl. munqaṭi <sup>c</sup> ūn), a person who dies without leaving heirs.   |
| Murābiṭ                | A man who devotes his life to worship in a retreat, a popularly acclaimed saint.  |
| Muraqqa <sup>c</sup> a | Patched garment worn by the adepts of some religious orders, particularly by the Darqāwi-s.   |
| Murīd                  | Aspirant, disciple.   |
| Mushrik                | Heretic, polytheist   |
| Mutasharrif            | False <u>sharīf</u> .   |
| Nādhir                 | Administrator of pious endowments.  |
| Qā'id                  | Chief; governor.  |
| Qaṣīda                 | Poem.   |
| Qinṭār                 | Moroccan quintal, equivalent to 118 English pounds. As a monetary measure it equaled 1,000 <u>mithqāl-s</u> .   |
| Rātib                  | Salary.   |
| Riḥla                  | Travel, travel account.   |
| Rumāt                  | Urban militia of some major towns, such as Fès and Tétouan.   |
| al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ      | Pious ancestors.  |
| Samā <sup>c</sup>      | Use of musical instruments for cult purposes.   |
| Sanad                  | Chain of transmission of knowledge.   |
| Shafā <sup>c</sup> a   | Intercession of a saint or a prophet between the believer and God.  |

|                      |   |
|----------------------|---|
| Shahāda              | Profession of faith.  |
| Sharī <sup>C</sup> a | Islamic law.  |
| Sharīf               | A descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad.   |
| Shaykh               | Spiritual leader; teacher; head of a religious order.   |
| Shirk                | Polytheism.   |
| Şila                 | A voluntary allowance; a regular gift from the sultan.  |
| Silsila              | The line of succession in a religious order traced to some religious authority.   |
| Sunna                | Prophet's traditions.   |
| Tabā <sup>C</sup> a  | Sultan's personal guard.  |
| Tabaqa               | Category (of <sup>C</sup> ālim-s or saints).  |
| Takfīr               | Excommunication from the Muslim community.  |
| Ṭālib                | Student; learned man; secretary.  |
| Ṭarīqa               | Sufi path.  |
| Ṭubjiya<br>(Turkish) | Artillerymen.   |
| Urjūza               | A poem according to a particular metre called <u>rajaz</u> .  |
| Ūqiya                | The basic monetary unit in pre-colonial Morocco, based on bronze. In 1818 it cost 3 shillings and 6 pence or 40 French centimes.                |
| <sup>C</sup> Ushūr   | Quranic tax of one tenth on agricultural produce.   |
| Wali                 | (pl. awliyā), God's friend, saint.  |
| Waşīf                | Sultan's slave.   |
| Wazīr                | Minister.   |
| Wird                 | Litany; initiation formula communicated by a <u>shaykh</u> to a <u>murīd</u> .  |
| Zakāt                | Tax of 2.5% paid on precious metals, merchandise and livestock after one year's uninterrupted possession of a certain minimum ( <u>nişāb</u> ). |
| Ziyāra               | Offering made to a saint or a <u>sharīf</u> .   |
| Zāwiya               | A convent or a retreat. In North Africa also used to designate a religious order.   |

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN MOROCCO  
DURING THE REIGN OF MAWLĀY SULAYMĀN  
1792 - 1822

by

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T H E S I S

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A P P E N D I C E S

Almost all the documents contained therein are being published for the first time here. By reproducing these documents we aim at:-

1. Providing those who seek a deeper knowledge of the period with first hand information for a more intimate acquaintance with the issues discussed in the thesis.

2. Assembling as much documents as possible about a reign which is not only under-studied but which is also strikingly poor in documents.

Thus, we would have contributed to clear a major obstacle which has prevented until now the study of the period.

The documents are organized chronologically. Documents which bear no date and which we were unable to situate in time will come last.



Appendix 1 : Letter of rebuke from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī 'Alī b. Aḥmad concerning the latter's support for Mawlāy Maslama.

Date : not mentioned (1792)

Source: Ms.K.1264, BGR, p.365.

من عبد ربه سليمان بن محمد إلى علي بن أحمد .

بلغنا كتابك المشتمل على السفطة والجدل المبهرج بالتمريض وقد كنا نكتب إليك على نيّتنا ونخاطبك بالخطابة والبرهان حتى وقفنا على هذا الكتاب فعملنا أنك تخبط خبط عشوى ، وأن لاحسب لك إلا اتباع الهوى ، وقولك لي فنسأل عنك ، فأنا أعرف الناس بك كما أنت أعرف الناس بي . أنت رجل مسلم ترتكب الصالح والطالح ، إن قابلك الله بعدله عذبك ، وإن قابلك بحلمه غفر لك ، لأنك تاكل أموال الناس بالباطل ، وكل من أكل أموال الناس بوصف وهو ليس فيه فهو أكل له بالباطل ، كما هو منصوص عند العلماء وليس لك والحمد لله طريق تدلّ بها على الله الا ولنا يسد " أطول من يدك من حفظ القرآن والتفقه في الدين وطهارة النسب ، وهذا من باب التحدّث بالنعمة . فاعلم أنك دخلت أمراً ما راعى من هو خير " منّي من هو خير " منك فيه حرمة ولم يدخل فيه هذا الدخول ، ومما عرضت به نفسك للهلاك قدومك لفاس من غير إذنتنا على وجه السعي في الأرض بالفساد . والآن إن قدمت علينا فالتائب من الذّنوب كمن لا ذنب له ، وإلا جازيناك بما أنت به مجني في الكتاب بحسول الله وقوتــــه .

Appendix 2 : Letter from Mawlāy Hishām to the king of Spain asking for money and military equipment.

Date : 29 Jumādā II, 1206 / 23 Feb., 1792.

Source : A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4328.

### إلى السلطان الصنيول الري كرسوس الرابع

السلام على من اتبع الهدى . أما بعد فاعلم أنى قد قدمت لك كتاباً تاريخه سبعة وعشرين من جمادى الثانية سنة ستة ومائتين وألف وعلمتك منه بجميع الأخبار الواقعة عندنا بالغرب ، وما زاد وما نقص ، والآن نريدك المال الذى تريد توجهه لحضرتنا العالمة بالله مع الآلات الحرب من المدافع والبارود والمكاحل والسكاكن وجهه منه لطيط الجديدة على يد خادمنا القائد الحاج الهاشمي بن العروسي الدكالي ، فلن مرستها سهلة وطيبة ونحب عمارتها أكثر من غيرها والبعض من ذلك وجهه لشغرا آسفي . وعلى هذا يكون العمل إن شاء الله والسلام .  
وفي التاسع والعشرين من جمادى الثانية عام 1206 .

Appendix 3: Dhahīr by Mawlāy Sulaymān appointing  
Aḥmad b. Sūda qāḍī of Fès.

Date : 21 Rajab, 1206 / 15 March, 1792.

Source: Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt, al-Rawḍa al maqṣūda,  
Ms. K.2351, pp.320-321.

الحمد لله وحده و صلى الله على سيدنا ومولانا محمد وآله وصحبه

عن الأمر المولوي الهاشمي العلوي الذي تجددت بسعادتة مفاخر أسلافه  
وعاد المعقد بحول الله وقوته إلى حسن انتظامه واثلافة وجمع الله به شمل  
هذا الإقليم المغربي بعد انصداعه وهد أركانه والله تبارك وتعالى أعلم حيث  
يجعل رسالاته سيدنا ومولانا أمير المومنين وناصر شريعة سيدنا ومولانا محمد  
الصادق الأمين

عبد ربه سليمان بن محمد ابن عبد الله  
كان الله له (توقيع مولاي سليمان)

أمدّه الله بالتأييد والفتح المبين ونصر به عساكر المسلمين ، يستقر هذا الظهير  
الأسمي المبارك الأنحر الأحمى بيد الفقيه الأجل العالم العلامة الأفضل النزيه  
الوجيه الأسعد أبي العباس السيد أحمد بن الشيخ الإمام علم الأعلام وبركة  
شيوخ الإسلام سيدي محمد التاودي بن سودة أبقى الله مصباح فضله تستضاء به  
هذه الأمة ويتعرف منه بحول الله وقوته وشامل يمنه وبركته أننا ولينا خُطبة  
المنصب الشرعي بمحروسة حضرة فاس الإدريسية صانها الله وكلاها ومن كل  
ما يضرها وقاها وقد انتخبنا وتخيرنا لهذا المنصب الشريف وطوقناه إياه  
لما نعلم من علمه ودينه . إن المسلمين لا يصيبهم معه إن شاء الله ضيق  
ولا تحريف ويكون عنده في مقطع الحق سواء القوى والضعيف والشريف والمشروف  
أمدنا الله وإياه بالهداية والتوفيق وسلك بناوسه أوفق طريق حتى يكون

إن شاء الله ثالث القضاة ، ومحلى في العلم والعمل بالخلل المرتضاة ، وقد بسطنا له يد التصرف في أمر الشهود على المنهج القديم المعهود ، فمن ثبتت عدالته فليقره على حاله ، ومن تطرقت إليه الألسن بسوء أو كانت فيه ريبة تخدش في مروته فليذهب لحال سبيله كائناً من كان ، ومن كان حاله على هذين الوضعين وأبقاه منصوباً للشهادة أو قبل شهادته فإثم ما يترتب في ذلك على رقبته وعهدته عليه ، ونحن براء من ذلك دنيا وأخرى والله تبارك وتعالى يتولى هداية الجميع ويوقفنا لما يرضى به عنا سيدنا ونبينا ومولانا محمد صاحب القدر الرفيع والسلام . صدر الأمر بهذا في الحادي والعشرين من رجب الفرد عام ستة ومائتين وألف .

Appendix 4 : Letter from Mawlāy Maslama to the European consuls at Tangier concerning his different with Mawlāy Sulaymān.

Date : 21 Sha<sup>ḥ</sup>bān, 1206 / 14 April, 1792.

Source: A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4328.

بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ . . . . . وَلَا حَوْلَ وَلَا قُوَّةَ إِلَّا بِاللّٰهِ

ليعلم النصراني فراشيشكو الجنويز وكافة القونسوات بشفر طنجة أن أخانا مولاي سليمان حين بايعه الشلح محمد وعزيز شرط على نفسه أنه على الفرة مع جميع أجناس النصارى ولا صلح له معهم حيث علم أننا معكم على المهادنة والصلح . وها وصفاننا عبيد سيد البخاري تخاصموا معه ونصرونا ونحن أعلنناكم بهذا الخبر الذي ورد علينا لتكونوا محققين بخبره . انتهى .  
وفي 21 شعبان عام 1206 .

Appendix 5 : Letter from Juan Manuel Salmon, Spanish consul general to Mawlāy Sulaymān concerning the official Spanish attitude towards the dynastic crisis in Morocco.

Date : End of Shawwāl, 1206 / June , 1792.

Source : A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4327.

### رسالة من دون خوان سالمون إلى سليمان

" أيها الأمير المعظم وصاحب المقام المفخم سيدي مولاي سليمان  
أدام الله عزه .

حين تشرفت بمرور عزيز كتابكم فقد قبلته بكل اعتبار وإكرام واحترام  
وإني أرسلته إلى حضرة مولاي الملك سلطان اسبانيا لكي يقف على فحواه  
فإتاني الأمر أن أوضح لديكم أنه قد انسزَّ وانحط جداً ومدح حسن  
ميلكم وموافقكم على الصلح والمسالمة مع دولة اسبانيا ورغبتكم برجوع رهبان  
طائفتنا الفرايلية إلى محروسة مكناسة وخلاف قناصرنا إلى مساكنهم  
المعينة وبإطلاق مراكبنا إلى أساطل دولة مراكش العامرة كما كان في  
حياة صاحب الذكر المؤيد والدكم سلطان محمد وأنه سيوفيكم بفعل  
الجميل كلما يتوقف له عما أبد يتموه له من إمارات الحب والوداد والصدقة  
التامة ، ولاكن يُضيف بالقول حضرة مولاي الملك أنه لا تمكته الآن الموافقة  
على ما أشرتموه حيث مثل هذه الإشارات الظاهرة تعلن إقراره ورضاه  
بتقدمكم وتوليتكم التامة على مملكة مراكش العليّة مع وجود أمير آخر وهو  
أخوكم الذي يطلب هذه الحقوق عينها لذاته ويجد على الوصول إليها .  
إذا قد تحسن عنده هذا الرأي المصيب الأي داخل ويعارض حقوق أحد  
ولا يقدم ولا يآخر الواحد على الآخر من الإخوان بالإعلان والإقرار أن هذا  
هو السلطان ، وذلك قد اعتمد الآن على حفظ المسالمة مع

سيادتكم الشريفة ومع الأمير أخيك بحال الاعتدال التام وأنه سيجعلها  
 إن شاء الله على ثبات بعقد العهد مع من يستوتب أمره و تقوّت  
 سلطانتـه على الدولة الإسماعيلية ورعاياها، غير أن مولاي الملك  
 يرغب بنوع المحبة والأناسة إن حضرت سعادتم والأمير الآخر أخاكم  
 تتفقان في حقوقكم . وإني بلغت سعادتم جواب مولاي ملكك  
 اسبانيا أؤكدـه لديكم أنني أرغب مُجداً حفظ المسالمة بين هذه الدولة  
 وسعادتم السامية ، وأطلب من الله دوام حياتكم سنين عديدة وأيام  
 مغلدة والسلام . حرر في أواخر شوال سنة 1206 من الهجرة .

الداعي إلى مقامكم السامي  
 دون خوان كـزالتر سلمون

Appendix 6 : Letter from al-Ghāzī b. Salāma (Mawlāy Sulaymān's qā'id) to the Spanish consul general, J.M. Salmon, concerning the concession of Dar al-Bayda to the Spanish.

Date : 2 Shawwāl, 1207 /13 May, 1793.

Source : A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4330 (2).

## بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ

من خديم المقام العالي بالله القائد الغازي بن سلامه إلى القونصلوا ملوين سلمون الصبنيولي سلام على من اتبع الهدى، أما بعد بلغني كتابك وما ذكرت فيه عرفته وعلمت بأنك تحب الإصلاح وتجري في ما يُلِّغُ إليه بين مولانا ومن ينعمه أولانا أمير الملة المحمديه مولانا سليمان نصره الله النصر المبين ونصر عساكره وأيده بالفتح المعين وبين أميركم وذاك الذي يجلب لك الرضى ومن يفعل هذا ينبغي له أن يُلحظ وتغضى جميع أموره لأنه لا يجري في مثل هذا إلا من له عقل ومروءة وما ذكرته لي بأنك تكلمت مع سلطانكم وأنه أمر لمرابك تجاركم تخرج لمراسينا بقصد التجارة فإنه بنفس ما دخل يدي وقرأته صرت به لحضرة مولانا السلطان نصره الله وقرأته عليه فلما سمع ذلك أيداه الله كتب في الجين لجميع مراسيه يوصيهم بمرابكم بأن يفرحوا بهم ويوسقوا لهم وإن كانت مرابك القرصان يخرجوا لها الفريشك على عيادة سيدنا ومولانا الكبير رحمه الله وأن يزيدوا في الإحسان لهم بأضعاف ما كانوا يعهدون وأعطاكم سيدنا أطال الله عمره مرسى الدار البيضاء كما كانت بأيديكم في حياة سيدنا والده قدس الله روحه وأمركم ان قدمتم الدار البيضاء أن تحوزوا الدار التي عندكم بها وجميع المخازن ويحوز مفاتيح الجميع لكم قونصو الفرانصيص الذي برباط الفتح لأنبي علمته يحبك وهو الذي قال لي نتكلم لك مع مولانا السلطان في شأن مرسى الدار البيضاء وحوز دارك والمخازن التي



بها ففعلت ذلك وكلمت سيدنا ومولانا سليمان خلد الله ملكه وقد أعطاها لك  
افعل بها ما أردت وسيدنا ومولانا الطيب أخو مولانا السلطان أيداه الله تراه  
نازلاً بل قاطنا في الدار البيضاء بحال كثيرة عنده بتامسة وما ذكرته بأن أحدا  
كتب لك من طنجة يريد أن يخسر ما بيننا وبينك فلا تسمع ذلك ولا تنصت إليه  
لأننا لا نقبل ذلك لما نعلمه من حال مولانا السلطان أدامه الله وأنه لا يسمع ذلك  
ولا يقبله في جنس الصنيول لأمر منها أنكم جيراننا الأقرباء ولما كان من المواصلة  
بين سيدنا الكبير رحمه الله وبين الري كارلوس وكذلك يحب سيدنا ومولانا  
سليمان نصره الله يكون مع ولد الري كارلوس أو أكثر من ذلك لما يصلح الله به  
بين الفريقين وقد وصفنا حالك وخدمتك لمولانا الإمام لما نعلمه من وقوفك في  
الإصلاح بين المسلمين والصنيول وأنت عنده في منزلة كبيرة وإن كتابك الذي  
بعثت لي أولاً وصلني ومولاي محمد الذي كان بالدار البيضاء قائماً قبضه مولانا الإمام  
وهو مسجوناً عندي وقونصوا الفرانصيص الذي بالرباط يحبك كثيراً ويحب لك الخير  
والسلام على من اتبع الهدى، وفي 2 شوال عام 1207 .

Appendix 7 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Antonio Gonzales Sálmon, Spanish vice-consul, apologizing for the attack made by Jbāla tribesmen on Spanish vessels and seamen at Martil and showing readiness to receive Spanish friars in Morocco.

Date : 3 Sha<sup>c</sup>bān, 1208 / 6 March, 1794.

Source : A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4331 (1).

الحمد لله وحده ولا حول ولا قوة إلا به

(التابع)

خدبنا انطوني صالمون نائب قونصوا الاصبنيول بشعر طنجة حرسه اللسه  
 امين السلام على من اتبع الهدى أما بعد فقد ورد على شريف مقامنا من  
 عندك أربعة كتب أولها زمام هديتك وهدية أخيك الواصلة وقد بلغت على ما  
 هي عليه في زمامك فعافاك وعافا أخيك المذكور فإنكما لنا وقد صدقت محبتكما  
 وخدمتكما لجانبنا حرسه الله وليكن عملك فيما جئت به من الخمسة والعشرين  
 ألف ريال ان توسق واجبها وتكمل ما بقي لك بعد قطع الحساب حتى لا يبقى  
 لك منها ولو موزونة على الواجب الأول وهو ثمان أواقى لكل فنيكة فإنك  
 متاعنا ولانعامك إلا بما يليق بك ويفرح به أخوك وزعماء جنسك. وما وقع  
 بعرتيل عرف جنسكم بحقيقة أمره وانه إنما وقع من الزمنطوط ومثل ذلك يقع في كل  
 جنس وفي كل دولة ولا يضر ولا يؤثر في جانب السلطنة ومع ذلك فإنه لا يضيع  
 من دمائكم ولا من أموالكم شيء إن شاء الله وستسمعون ما يقع بأولئك الشياطين  
 أصحاب ذلك الفعل من العقوبة إلى أن يبلغ خبرها لجميع بلاد صبانية والله  
 على ذلك قدير ومسئلة لفرنصير وما ذكرت عنهم قد تحققناه وأشهر لكريم علمنا  
 وما داموا معكم على غير اتفاق فلا حاجة لنا بهم ولا بما ياتي من عندهم وها  
 أمرنا لجميع خدامنا أهل مراسينا الجهادية عمرها الله وحرسها بأن لا يتركوا أحدا  
 من جنس لفرنصير يربي عندهم ولا يدخل اليهم ولا ينفعمونه ولو بشرية ماء

وإذا ورد عليهم قرصان من جنسكم أنتم يفرحوا به ويعطوه ما أراد كما أمرناهم  
قبل وقد منا لهم وخدامنا لفرايلية ها نحن جدونا لهم على ما بأيديهم بعد  
وقفنا على ظهائرهم وردها إليهم وعلى ما كانوا عليه من الملاحظة والاعتبار  
يقعون، وبتاريخ ثالث شعبان من عام 1208 .

Appendix 8 : Letter from Mawlāy Maslama to the Governor of Ceuta asking for amunitions while he was entrenched in the shrine of Mawlāy<sup>ʿ</sup>Abd al-Salām b. Mashīsh (1795).

Date : 8 Şafar, 1210 / 24 August, 1795.

Source : D.A.R.

الحمد لله وحده                      وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد وآله

( الطابع )

إلى حاكم سبتة والسلام على من اتبع الهدى . أما بعد  
فنامرك أن تبعث لنا قنطران بارود وقنطار اخفيف لأنكم عندي أفضل  
الجنوس ونعرفكم حينئذ تحب جانبنا العالي بالله ؛ ونجازيكم  
إن شاء الله بأحسن الجزاء ولا بد ولا بد وابعث لنا ما ذكرنا . 8 صفر  
عام 1210 .

Appendix 9 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī'Alī b. Aḥmad following the normalization of relations with the Wazzāni zāwiya.

Date : 1795.

Source: al -Ḍu'ayf, p.308.

من عبد ربه سليمان بن محمد أمير المؤمنين لطف الله به آمين  
الى الشريف البركة سيدي علي بن احمد ، سلام عليكم ورحمة الله  
وبركاته ،

وبعد فأنا وإياكم على عهد الله وأخوته ، ولا نحب ( ان ) يقع  
منكم الا الخير العام كما هي عادتكم وعادة أسلافكم ، وتحققنا  
( أن ) قدمك لفاس انما ( كان ) فرارا بنفسك ودينك ، وقد جعل  
الله فيك خيراً كثيراً ولا نسمع في جانبك كلام أحد لم نعتقد فيه  
من الدين والاستقامة والنصح . وهذا الأمر الذي أولنا الله  
تعالى والله ما طلبناه ولا سعينا فيه ، وحيث كلفنا الله به  
وجب علينا القيام به والرضى والتسليم إذ نحن عبيد الله نرضى  
بما قدره علينا وقضاه ، غير أننا نحب من أمثالكم أن يكونوا  
لنا أعواناً "وتعاونوا على البر والتقوى ولا تعاونوا على الإثم  
والعدوان" ، والله في عون العبد ما دام العبد في عون أخيه ،  
وليس تحت أديم السماء من يعرف قدركم ويجلّكم مثلنا بحول  
الله وقوته ، ونطلب منكم صالح الدعاء والسلام .

Appendix 10 : Letter from Mawlāy Hishām to Carlos IV, king of Spain, introducing his ambassador.

Date : 1 Sha<sup>c</sup>bān, 1210 / 10 Feb., 1796.

Source: A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4331.

الحمد لله وحده ولا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله العلي العظيم

إلى الرّبي كارلوس الرابع سلطان سيسيلياس ارغور سيسيلياس وغيرهم من نواحي صبانية السلام على من أتبع الهدى أما بعد فـليكن في علمك أن الله تعالى تولى أمرنا بفضله، ووفّق قومنا للخير برشده وطوله، وأحلنا دار المملكة بلحسانه ومجده، وولّانا سبحانه الأمور السلطانية بـجـوده، وسياسة عبادته وجنوده، وأهلنا لنصب الويتة على رؤسنا وبنوده، بمراكش وليّاته ونواحيه، وارجاء حاضرتهم وضواحيه، بدار مملكة والدنا وأسلافه، رحمهم الله تعالى ووجب علينا إعلامك بذلك وقد وجهنا لك كتابنا المحفوظ بالله مع خديكم سلمون، ليقع في علمك ما نحن عليه من نية الخير عازمون، ولنعلمكم بما منّ الله تعالى علينا به من النصر والتمكين، والعافية والتسكين، واتجديد الصّاح والمهادنة التي كان معكم عليها والدنا المرحوم بالله ولاشروا منّا إن شاء الله تعالى إلا الخير ودوام العافية والذي يصاح ويليق برعيّتنا ورعيّتم هو الذي يكون إن شاء الله تعالى وقد بعثنا لك كتاباً آخر مع صاحبنا الفقيه الشريف مولاي عبد الله بن الحاج لأننا وجهناه إلى السلطنة مرّية ومن عندها يقدم إلى عندك بأمرنا الشريف انتهى، وفي فاتح شعبان المبارك من سنة عشرة ومانتين وألف.

Appendix 11 : Letter from 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Nāsir to the Spanish consul general J.G. Salmon concerning an embassy sent by Mawlāy Hishām to the Spanish Court.

Date : 1 Sha'bān, 1210/ 10 Feb., 1796.

Source: A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4331.

الحمد لله وحده ولا يسدوم إلا ملكه

إلى التوصلوا دُجنرل اجوان تُجلس سَلْمون السَلَام على من اتبِع  
 الهدى أما بعد فقد كتبت لك هذا الكتاب لنخبرك فيه وأتينا معكم على  
 العهد القديم الذي كان بينكم وبين مولانا المرحوم بالله وبعد وفاته رحمه  
 الله كنا جددناه معكم وكنت أنت الواسطة في ذلك بيننا وبين سلطانكم  
 ونُخبرك أيضا وأن السلطان سيدنا ومولانا هشام نصره الله بحمراء مراكش  
 صانه الله مؤيداً منصوراً والحمد لله على ذلك وها كتابه الشريف لسلطانك  
 يصلك على يد خديكم زُراف اكروز وفي خديكم المذكور كفاية الخبر ونحن على  
 معرفتكم كما تعلم منا ذلك وأكثر ونذكرك في قولكم الغائب وهو أنكم قلتهم أولاد  
 سيدنا ومولانا أمير المؤمنين رحمه الله كلهم واحد عندكم في المعرفة والإحسان  
 وفيما يجب للملوك على الملوك ونخبرك خبر الحق اليقين الذي لا يتحول  
 إن شاء الله هو سيدنا ومولانا هشام نصره الله نصرأ عزيزاً وهذا ما نُخبرك به  
 لأنك تحبنا والواجب أن لا نغيب عنك خبره ونعلمك بأنه يصل إلى سلطانكم  
 كتاب اخر غير هذا الوارد بيدك مع الفقيه الشريف مولاي عبد الله لأن سيدنا  
 ومولانا هشام نصره الله أمره أن يركب البحر بأمره الشريف لسلطانة البردقـيـز  
 ومنها يقدم إلى سلطان صبانية بكتابه الشريف ونعلمك بأن سلطاننا مع توفـر  
 جنوده وكثرة جيوشه وبنوده لا يخرج من بلده صائلا على أحد ممن ليس  
 في إيلته إلا إذا زاده الله من فضله على ما أعطاه من القبائل فلا بأس

بذلك، كل ذلك منه نصره الله لحفظ الأعراس وحقن الدماء ولنفسى  
الأغراض وتقييد النعماء وإظهارا للشكر الواجب للرب على عبده في سره  
وجهره، انتهى، وفي فاتح شعبان المبارك من سنة عشرة ومائتين وألف .

خديم المقام العالي بالله

عبد الرحمان بن ناصر المخيزني أمّنه الله



Appendix 12 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī 'Alī  
b. Aḥmad concerning the appointment of Makhzenian  
qā'id-s in Ouezzane and the neighbouring region.

Date : Ḥijja, 1210 / June-July, 1796.

Source : al-Ḍu'ayf, p.326.

الحمد لله وحده . وصلى الله على من لا نبي بعده .

من سليمان بن محمد لطف الله به إلى العالم البركة سيدي علي بن  
أحمد الحسيني ، وبعد اعلم أنني إنما أردتُ من يكون بزاوية وزان واقفاً  
على الشرع المطاع ويكون كالشهاب بجميعها من الشياطين لأنها بلد  
بالمغرب ، ومن كان بها كأنما يكون ببلده . . . . وأنت بمعزل عن القوم الذين  
يريدون مجرد الجاه الدنيوي ويجعلون أمكتهم خيراً من مكة والمدينة لجهلهم ،  
لأنهما لا يجيوان عاصياً ، ويتعرضون إلى لعنة الله ورسوله والملائكة  
والناس أجمعين والخراب ولو بعد حين بلإيوائهم الحداثين . وحققة الزاوية  
أن يلجأ إليها كل من هرب إلى الله من ظالم وليست مهربات للظالمين ، وذلك  
الرجل الذي جعله خالنا الجيلاني بن المفضل يكون واقفاً على الشرع ومتبعاً  
لكلنا هذا فلن هو اتبعه فيبقى ، وإن اتبع هواه وضرره فلا يبقى معنا  
ولا مع الله ، وأنا معتم به وعليه الاتكال والسلام . في ذي الحجة 1210 .

Appendix 13 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān's minister Muḥammad Ibn 'Uthmān to the Spanish Prime Minister Godoy concerning the rebellion of the southern coastal provinces.

Date : 16 Muḥarram, 1211 / 22 July, 1796.

Source : A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4345.

بسم الله الرحمان الرحيم

أيها السيد الذي سما مجده وفخاره وملأت الأسماع آثاره وزير الدولة الاصنيولية البرنسبي ، أي أمير الصلح ، أما بعد أعرفكم أنه ورد علينا من عند منويل سلمون كتاب كتبه لسيدنا أمير المومنين بأمر دولتكم يذكر فيه أن ملك اصبانية عزم على إعطاء الإذن لمراكب رعيته في التوجه لمرستي آسفي وطيط بسبب قدوم من قدم عليه من تلك الناحية يطلب ذلك مُحتجاً بما صدر من الملك المذكور من أنه لا يميل لأحد من أولاد أمير المومنين سيدي محمد رحمه الله إلا بالخير وذكر أنه كتب بذلك لسيدنا الملك عام 1792 من تاريخ المسبح وأن سيده كتب بعد ذلك يستدعي تجاركم ومراكبكم للقدوم على أيسالة سيدنا إلى هذه الناحية وتلك ، وبقي الأمر على ذلك إلى عام 1209 من تاريخنا حيث ظهر من قبيلتي دكالة وعبداه ما ظهر من نبد أمر مولاي هشام والخروج عنه ، وبقيت مرسى طيط وآسفي بيد الثوار القائمين فرجع حينئذ ملك اصبانية عن معاملتهم ومخالطتهم بسبب خروجهم عن الأحكام الواجبة . وعرف سيدنا أمير المومنين جميع القنصولات الذين ببلده وأعلمهم بأن لا يتوجه أحد إلى تلك الناحية ، فعمل على ذلك ملك اسبانية إلى أن ورد هذا الرجل عليه آخرًا بمكاتب مـولاي هشام يخبره فيها بأنه مسموع الكلمة مطاع في تلك الناحية وأن مرسى آسفي وطيط ، نعى أسكالة ، تحت حكمه وطلب من الملك إتيان مراكب جنسه للتجارة هنالك ، ولذلك أمر الملك القونصوا منويل سلمون بالكتب لسيدنا

أمير المؤمنين ليامر مراكبه بعدم التعرض لمراكب جنسه قائلا أن ذلك لا ضرر فيه ، وذكر منويل المذكور أن الملك ساءه هذا التفرق وتمنى جمع الكلمة لسيدنا أمير المؤمنين . فأعلمت سيدنا بجميع ما ذكر وأمرني أن نجيب القونصوا منويل وأن نكتب حضرتكم .

فأقول أولا أما استدعاء سيدنا أيده الله جنس الاصنيول للقدوم على آيائه لاشتراك الرعايا في التجارة وسائر المعاملات ولو كان على ذلك الوجه من التردد إلى هذه الناحية وتلك فالحامل عليه هو المحافظة على ما كان عليه والده سيدنا محمد رحمه الله معكم وإزالة ما حدث من الوحشة بعد وفاته لتعود الحال كما كانت مراعات لحقّ الجوار الواجب .

وأما اعلامه ثانيا بأن لا يتوجه أحد لتلك الناحية وذلك عام 1209 لأن من بها ليس متقلداً حكما ولا طاعة كما بلغ ذلك ملك اسبانية فهو كذلك ولا زالوا على هذه الحالة إلى الآن ، فأولئك الذين ظهر لملك اسبانية الاتخاطهم رعيته هم الموجودون الآن ومعهم الكلام ، وأما مولاي هشام فليسوا عند أمره ولا يُنصتون لرأيه وإنما يذكرونه عند إرادتهم قضاء غرض مثل هذا ليتوصلوا إلى مرادهم من الفساد الذي هم عليه وفراراً من الأحكام . وأما قوله أن مرسى آسفي وطيط وعشيرة دكالة وعبداه عند حكمه فهذا كلام باللسان ولا وجود له في العيان والحق أقول إنما أولئك القوم متلاعبون يسمعون في الفساد ويريدون الإعانة عليه بإقامة المتجر عندهم ليتوصلوا بذلك لاستمرار حالهم الذميم حيث تيقنوا بتفرق من معهم إن لم يجدوا ما يعطونهم ، فهذه حقيقة الأمر وغير هذا كله باطل ، وذكر القنصوا المذكور في كتابه أن سيدنا أمير المؤمنين وافق على إتيان مراكبكم لتلك الناحية قبل هذا ورضي به فلا حجة فيه لأنه ظهر من الفساد وإعانة أهله عليه بإقامة المتجر معهم ما هو مشهور وهو السبب في دوام التفرق فلا يتعين الوقوف مع الفساد لأنه لو بقي أولئك القوم من غير أن يحصل لهم مدد من التجارة لتفرق عليهم من يعصبون به ويدعون ضرورة وربما يسلمهم من معهم باليد . وذكر القونصوا المذكور في كتابه المكتوب بأمر الدولة الصبانيولية أن ملك اسبانية ساءه هذا التفرق ويتمنى جمع الكلمة لسيدنا أمير المؤمنين ، فهذا هو المظنون به ولا نشك في ميله الطبيعي إلى الخير ، غير أن الملك بحسب الظاهر لا علم له بحقيقة الأمر فأمر على نحو ما سمع . فأعلمك لتعلمه أن توجه مراكب

التجار لتلك الناحية هو السبب في إبقاء أهل الفساد على فسادهم ولوبقوا مهجورين غير مخالطين لاذعنسوا . وأما كونهم متقلدين طاعة أو حكما فلا يتوهمه الملك . وذكر القونصوا في كتابه من أن سيدنا يوصي رؤساء مراكبه بعدم التعرض لمراكب جنسكم ورعيتكم فهو قد فعل ذلك من قبل من غير طلب وذلك واجب ، وما صدر من ذلك الرئيس الأحقق لمركبكم قريبا فقد سائنا وأمر سيدنا بقبضه وعقابه ونزعه وزجره . وأما جمع كلمة المغرب على سيدنا أمير المؤمنين فهي مجموعة والحمد لله فأبي نسبة لقبيلتين دكالة وعبداه من قبائل المغرب وعشائره؟ فجميع من وراءهم مغربا إلى الصحراء كلهم متقلدون طاعة سيدنا وجميع من أمامهم شرقاً إلى ما وراء تافلات فكذلك ، فالحككم للأكثر لا للأقل ما عدا أولئك رؤوس الشياطين يستميلون أمثالهم بما يتحصل في يدهم من المدد بوجود التجارة عندهم فاقضى الحال أن بينا لكم الأمر كما هو الحق والواقع لئلا يعتقد الملك أن توجه مراكب التجارة لتلك الناحية فيه صلاح لجُمهور المسلمين ، ما فيه إلا إعانة تلك الشرذمة الخارجة عن الجماعة .

وأما حال سيدنا أمير المؤمنين معكم فهو على ما كان عليه من البرور والإكرام لجميع جنس الاصبنيول ويقضى لكم كل ما يمكن قضاءه ، حرر في سادس عشر من المحرم فاتح عام 1211 بحضرة فاس ، كتبه مُحبكم الداعي لكم بالبقاء وحسن المال محمد ابن عثمان لطف الله به .

جميع ما رسم بأمر مولانا السلطان  
ليعلمه جنابكم ويخبر الملك  
بالحق الذي لا غبار عليه .

Appendix 14 : Letter from the Ottoman Sultan, Selīm III, to Mawlāy Sulaymān requesting his help to defeat French designs in Egypt.

Date : 3 Rabīʿ I, 1213 / 15 August, 1798.

Source : F.O. 174/124.

...

The French nation having risen into rebellion and renounced all belief in the One and Omniscient God, as well as in the Apostles and Prophets, and being intent on subverting all religious institutions, have destroyed churches (sic) and banished every worship. They deny Universal Resurrection and Judgement and having devoted themselves to tenets contradictory of immortal life are become followers of the odious doctrine of metempsychosis.

They having thus united in an attack against all Christian nations in order to bring them over to the vile principles and new invented laws which they have introduced into their own country, have at last by dint of war and pillage forced the greatest part of the French to embrace their stupid system. In a word their national character being constructed on principles of rebellion, treachery and tyranny, they are become a vile race, seeking only to spread anarchy on all sides. Thus, owing to a spirit of deceit and arrogance, and without advice being given to the Sublime Porte by their republic relative to a rupture or having made any declaration of war, as practiced by all regular governments, a wretch named Bonaparte lately came at the head of a great number of troops to a province—which is under Ottoman jurisdiction—there threw off the mask by the attack of Alexandria and Rosetta...

Their visible end in thus breaking treaties, violating the peace and in perpetrating the above stated aggression is to extend their attacks against all in the faith of Islam. For as it has been ascertained from sundry intercepted dispatches, their plan is to assail the three holy cities of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, it becomes a religious duty incumbent upon all true believers whether in the East or West, in Persia or in Arabia, to develop all their power and force at the cost of their lives and properties to repell and defeat that nation unto total extirpation.

When all this, therefore, be known to the Sultan of Morocco, it is the hope and desire of the Sublime Porte that—the favour of God being first implored and the fullest confidence put in his help—the most sollicitous measures be adopted for the purpose of intercepting the ships which may be sent to the succour of the French invaders of Egypt, and thus cutting off their communications as a means of adding to the Mooselmen strength while theirs be curtailed: In a word that nothing be left undone to stop their ships carrying dispatches and to intercept and weaken the above nation, by falling upon them from all sides to the honor and defense of Islam.

3 Rabeah Ewell, 1213

(15 August, 1798 )

Certified (signed) Spencer Smith,  
H.B.M. Minister Plenipotentiary  
at the Ottoman Porte.

Appendix 15 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the French Directoire concerning the seizure by French cruizers of property belonging to Moroccan merchants.

Date: 22 Rabīʿ I, 1213/ 3 Sept., 1798.

Source: A.F. III, 74, Archives Nationales (Paris).

باسم الله الرحمان الرحيم ولا حول ولا قوة الا بالله العلي العظيم  
من عبد ربه أمير المؤمنين سلطان مراكش وفاس ومكناسة وتافيلالت  
ودرعة وسوس والباقي سليمان بن محمد كان الله له .  
(الطابع السليمانى)

الى أعظم ديوان في الملة النصرانية الشهير الذكر الجمهور القائم  
بالدولة الفرنسية .

أما بعد ، فإنه غير خاف عنكم ما كان عليه سلفنا مع دولتكم من  
الرعي الجميل والإحسان الجزيل من الجانبين ولما ألقى الله  
تعالى الأمر إلينا سلطنا مسلك من قبلنا في المحافظة على العهد  
القديم والرعي الصميم نلاحظ رعاياكم مثل ما نلاحظ رعايانا . ثم  
إن بعض مراكبكم لم تحافظ على ما أسسه السلف وبنى عليه  
الخلف فصاروا يتعرضون لرعيتنا في البحر ويأخذون أموالهم  
من غير حق ولا موجب ، وقد طال ما تكلم في نازلتهم قونصوكم  
الذي عندنا بطنجة ، وكرر الكتب في أمرهم فلم يسمع كلامه ،  
ولما طال بأصحاب المال الأمد وهم ينتظرون ما يرد على  
القونصو في شأنهم فلم يظهر لهم شيء ، طلبوا منا الكتب إليكم لتأمروا  
عاجلا برده متاعهم عليهم ، وأصحاب الدعوى حملة هذا الكتاب  
اليكم الفقيه السيد الحاج عبد السلام زكور نائب ولده عبد الرحمان  
بن زكور الفاسي ورفيقه الحاج بن صالح من أهل آسني في  
دعوى مالهم المأخوذ أيضا من غير موجب . ونحن في انتظار قنصوهم

علينا من عندكم مجبوري الخاطر برّد متاعهم مع  
اعطاءكم الأمر لرؤساء مراكبكم البحرية بأن يتحافظوا على  
العُهود التي بيننا وبينكم كما تقتضيه الصّحبة، ونحن  
على عهدكم واللام.

في ثاني وعشرين من ربيع الأول عام 1213.



Appendix 16 : Letter from 'Abd Allah b. 'Abd al-Mālik, governor of Tangier, to the British consul general J.M. Matra, asking for the purchase of two war vessels in England.

Date : 6 Shawwāl, 1214 / 3 March, 1800.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

صاحبنا كالأمر فنصروا كما تجليز جميعهم ميري معك أمنا بصري بلان دابل  
 عنك غايه ووعا حوالا ونفر ح حيث نتمرك حيز انت وولاميتك واعلم  
 وان سيرت ابيك الله او في بالكلع معك في قسقلية وهو حيز اذ اتنا انك  
 في صاه الدير بليغون باقامتهم وصرابهم ويكونون على ضرر وخرولم  
 لوراد العرايش والكر على سيرت في ذال الح غايه وها نحن تكلمت مع نايك  
 بردها وبيئت له وجه العمل وكيف يكون القراء وغيره واولي  
 سيرت ابيك الله ان نعرك ان ذالك او كرامور عن سيرت وبسيه نغرا  
 عن سيرت محبة فيك ونضم الميزية الكيمه في اذ ابيك والحركة  
 متفق في محبتك فيه وحتك مع جميع المسلمين الكثر وغيركم  
 فيسيه في ذالك في غيركم بفضاء ذال الح وقران سيرت ابيك  
 الله في جميع في الله في العرايش والرباط وكلمته ونقول حيز منة  
 المالك وضمهم لالكر اراة موكلنا طرا وكلا المالك ياتون موجودين  
 باقامتهم زيادة على ما نضمه في الغيب ونحب الجواب  
 في ذال كما يجب سيرت وان كان عندك ما يقضي في مناسب  
 لا في حيز ان تفيد في صا بلح وهي عن اول ما يتقرر وكما جعل  
 حقتك وحتك فينا ووجبات سيرت لاصح ابيك الله وادع شريك  
 وعلى عهدكم والمشاع في 6 شوال عام 1214 هـ

خروج المفاد العلى بالله  
 عبد الله بن عبد الملائك

Appendix 17 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J.M. Matra expressing Moroccan satisfaction at the expulsion of the French from Egypt and inquiring about the situation in the Mediterranean.

Date : 8 Sha'bān, 1216/14 December, 1801.

Source: F.O. 174/ 286.

وكل حول كافة البلاد

القول وهو

الحق انتم صوابا وجميع ما هم لا امان في بعض بلادكم منكم انتم وعرقت  
وانما ما شكنت بلدتنا تاخر كقبحنا علينا بعض الامم من عروبت  
ونذرتنا مع كتاب الله من غير خفيين واعلمت بسبع في الله على  
سكتة فيها رجا جوابا ابريقين بطل وجه الهبة بعضه سابع  
علم الله بل اراد الاقباد بليلت في الامان ونضينته تطرية كما شيد  
و وصلت لسبع اية الله كهيئة جزور كبح انه ونقصوا امرها وسيد كسر  
لما يكون في امرها ان شاء الله واخبرته اية ما الله بجميع الاخبار  
التي كنت في بها ورجوها غايه حيث اراد الله عليه من الصرع  
وتعنتا باحسانكم مع اهل عنتكم وجر بكم جميع الامر على الطريق  
المتكافين بالامر في الامر على الامر وتحققنا باحسانكم مع  
السلطان العقلان وروىكم من جانبنا في هذا الحق الذي تكلمكم ولا تقبنا  
علينا خم مقلع علمكم بالانوار فمعة انتم صور وما نصه اليه انصم بالتحلة  
التي في اصلا نيه بلانكف لنا الامم يخفق عندك وما ذكرته على اختلاف  
التي بيننا وبين الحاج العرب في طاعة اليه فبعض اعلمت بسبع في الا  
بفان في انه اية الله لان انهم على عسكرهم بجبل طارق بوسى اليه تورا  
في كل سنة الا يلزم عليها فليلد ولا تقيم من اراد رسو في اخر يقف  
الطاعة التي يجمع عيم لا يوسو بها بالرمس بل اراد بلبوسو رسو  
اراد بلبتبع وعضة احد الامر به حيث كنت بحكم في سوان اهل البت  
بل الله على يد الخديم الحاج كيد الرمان عشقنا من مرضى الكلال في هذا الحق



Handwritten notes and signatures in Arabic script, including a large signature that appears to read 'محمد بن عبد الله' (Muhammad bin Abdullah) and other illegible text.

Appendix 18 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J.M.Matra dealing with various issues among which the Moroccan promise to allow a British establishment at Ksar el Seghir or Beliounech.

Date : 27 Rabī<sup>c</sup> II, 1217/27 August, 1802.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

الحمد لله وحده  
والمجد والفضل لله العظیم

الى الفونصوا جميع مراد ما علم الاما بعدد يطيل امتي لا تكثر فخبك  
تقت لنا منه على اربعة اشغى لجميل كل من ارادتهم لنوعه ورايبك  
وكلا والزياد الى البقر لاهل جبل كل من لم تنس له الا انتم الوجبة  
ميد كما ترفع عن اعنه هو وامر المرسين المعلومتين بنيو لشر والفعل  
الضعيف وامرهم في باك ورايبك من فضلكهم على ايدينا ان تشاء الله وما اراد  
صاحب المذابيح وسفهم اعلمنا به ييسر الله امرنا على ايدينا ان تشاء  
الله ونسئد الا وجدنا على شيء من كتمان صلينة ارما هو احسن منه  
ان ظنم شيء احسن منه ووجدنا بنو ملع ورايبك الجميع والشكر لله

27 ربيع الثاني على 1217  
واعين الله على كتمانك عنه من  
اخبر البحر عزنا ولا به  
المسكاري ووفيه

Appendix 19 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to J.M.Matra concerning the redemption of ten Muslim captives held at Malta.

Date : 23 Sha‘bān, 1218/8 December, 1803.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم ولا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله

( الطابع السليمانى )

إلى القونسو مري ماترا أما بعد فقد بلغنا أن عشرة من المسلمين أسارى  
بمالطة فأردنا استخلاصهم من الأسر ولم يظهر لنا من نكلفه بأمرهم وفدائهم  
إلا أنت، فنامرك بوصول أمرنا إليك تبعث لمن يشتريهم ويخلص ثمن شرائهم  
ويبعث إليك لتوجههم لمقامنا العالي بالله ، ونامرك بقبض الثمن . فقف في  
هذه المسئلة فلنك تنال خاطرنا بقضائها والعزم بها . صدر الأمر به  
في 23 شعبان المبارك عام 1218 .

Appendix 20 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to J.M.Matra concerning preventive measures against epidemics.

Date : 11 Rajab, 1219 / 22 May, 1804.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ      وَلَا حَوْلَ وَلَا قُوَّةَ إِلَّا بِاللّٰهِ

(الطابع السليمانی)

الى جيس ما طرا قونصر اللنجليزه اما بعد وصلنا كتابك و ذكرت لنا فيه ان الوباء  
عندكم بجبل طارق و في بلد اصبنيول و الباركوات اذا كانوا يترددون من  
تطوان لجبل طارق فانتم تعرفون كيف تتعاملون مع اهل الوباء في بياعتكم  
و مشترياتكم و تجعلون الدراهم في الخل و تحفظون منه كل التحفظ  
و المسلمون لا يعرفون ذلك و لا يتحفظون مثل تحفظكم منه و ذلك  
فيه ضرر على المسلمين و على قونصوات النصارى الذين بطنجة، في  
11 رجب عام 1219 .

Appendix 21 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J.M. Matra  
giving clarifications about the Darqāwi rebellion in  
Western Algeria.

Date : 13 Jumādā I, 1220/9 August, 1805.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

الحمد لله وحده  
والمعول ولا فتى اللابله العلى العلى

الوالفونصوا اجمعين من ملحقنا امنا بهما بلان المثلانات وطول الحفره السبي  
ايلا الله والعجبوا غايه وقال لا عباك على وفوقها واعلمته ايلا الله بفتح  
البريشك عن مر اكبر القرطانية فوجه له كتابه الشريف للفلاية عبد الملك عشعاش  
وجّهته له بامر له ايلا الله بل اجوع عن غياله وانتقم من موتة اللالاجل الى الطبع  
طبعه الله عليه في جبلته الافتار في كل الامور وكالتة لومنة للجانب الشريف  
من اجله وقد اتانا الدع آيتش فرح طان من عند الامراتت الحماص لجبل طارون وكلاب  
البريشك للمراتت على العمانه باعطيناه 2 اثيران واحواله 2 او ذجراج 5 او اعلمت  
ما افضله للفلاية عبد الملك عشعاش معه الكراما لجنس النجلية والبريشك ياتيه  
من طنجة يا خت ما هو المعتاد واعلم ان خير فتك باشتت الخراجتت عنده فاجعلوا  
مكناة غير وقتلوا اليهود الذين كانوا يجمعون عليهم والفلانم اذنا فام على وكلهم  
وتلمسوا ليعرهم الارعلا وبلان الارعلا لم تقم له فلامنة ومهر بلانجبال لم يذ او هتدا  
الفلانم الثلاثة اسمهم عبد القادر بن الشريف درقلوا ورجه له السلطان ايلا الله  
فسيخه اليسر عبيد الرب الارقلود والحجاج الظاهر بلان يلمسوه بلان اجوع عن هتدا  
البعضول واهل النمسان اتوا للينرا ايلا الله بالبيعة بلان مع وردهم لبلانهم  
وقال لهم ارجعوا السلطانكم بلانجل لنا اشتعال نار الخراب بين المسلمين ووجه  
ايلا الله اخلا مولاي موسم ومحنة معه تنزل بوجبه لثبلة رعيته من الاخول والبعضول  
وهذا هو خير التحفيق الذي تمتد عليه وكتبه اليكم في 3 ايام من الاول على 22 ا

محمد بن عبد السلام

السلوى

ووجه ...

Appendix. 22 : Letter from al-Salāwī to the British consul general J. Green, asking for a British naval pass to convey a quantity of wheat to the Regency of Tunis.

Date : 18 Jumādā I, 1221/3 August, 1806.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
وَأَعْمَلُ وَمَا فَتْوَاهُ الْإِبِلَاءُ الْعَلِيِّ الْعَلِيمِ

الذي القونصوا في مصر الخيس النجليز اما بعد وقد وطنا كتابك وعرفت ان تبارك  
فونصوا الخدمة لسبب كنهه الله بهم حيا بك وكل من يات من عنده السلطان خرج  
هو عنده سبب كنهه الله مقبول عنى وحيث ما لنا عندك وحيث ناك بعفك بعرفنا  
لذا اللغاية لتكون واسطة الخيم بين الدولتين ونصه في جلب الامور التي تزيد  
في المحبة بينهم حتى تزيد اكثر ما كانت ان شاء الله

واعلم ان مركب متلع الدوير لا يربط بالبحر كانه حامل للبحر الزرع اعطاه الله  
نعمه الله لاهل تونس وحيث وقع لهم منكم ما وقع من الخير له وجماله الحال  
وسوا الزرع وبقية طلالا باردا ناكم تطهونه فطايه يكمل ليله فيرض له امد من  
عندهم حيث هو حامل للزرع سبب كنهه الله وهذا اسم الرابن واسم المركب يطاك  
وغرفنته جوابك في الاياتين وكتبه اليكم في 18 جمادى الاولى على ا22 ا

محمد بن عبد الله  
السلوى  
رفبه

Appendix 23 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to J. Green asking redress in favour of Moroccan jew merchants whose property, loaded on three vessels, was seized by British cruizers.

Date : 20 Jumādā II, 1221/ 4 September, 1806.

Source: F.O.174/284.

الحمد لله  
ولا حول ولا قوة الا بالله



نحن انبي خدمتنا التبريد فريش فونخو جفمن الانجليز بحضرة كهنبة  
حرمها الله واميه اما بعمرنا ان تكثب لكوز حيسى الانجليز بيحوا  
مراكب ذمى خرمنا السجيس مريدوخ وقرشنا شوع اننا فتحي لدو اجيبى  
ذ الانجليز بعنهم تركب امهم هورنش هانا وسفدر يكوز شو او سفد من بلرنا  
لهاه شورك والاخر اسمهم كومبيرسيه وانثالث اسمهم وان بيلا ووقد وزحوا  
له من امهم شرجاع بالسلع للمسوخ حرمها الله ولا خبية انه مني نوبعا يكاجبونه  
وكلمه عيسم الياسمبورج متفنا لانها اذ مبيتي خدمتنا وتحت كحلنا ومن  
ابالتنا وتحت حرمنا ولا سبل الاخرى اجناس النحرى انزى من مضم على  
انصا دنه والتصلح عليهم ولا يكوف بقا هتيمه ولا يفري ثوبه متاعهم وتعلي  
هنا ابكرو عجله ولا ياخذ في تراج ولا افعال نجيت لا يضيع كمناسخه من متاعهم  
على انقائهم المعنوه بيننا وسبكم وبجزا حصرنا من ان الترييف ابير الله به  
من جماداتي الثلثة اعلم

بيلما



Appendix 24 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green regarding the liberation of Muslim captives held at Lisbon and the evacuation of the Jewish community in Larache.

Date : 4 Rajab, 1221 / 17 Sept., 1806.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَرَأْسُ حَوْلٍ وَمَا فَؤَادُ الْآبَاءِ اللَّهُ الْعَلِيُّ الْعَلِيمِ

إلى العون فوجسوا في ما بهي وبعلم ان بعض الامارى من الجزائر بالاجبولة  
 طلبوا من سيدينا الله بقاءهم بلنا انك تفرح على اني انهم بندي بع  
 لك جميع مساجير الخمر التي تملأ فينا بمرسى ايتش وتعلمنا في يدك  
 بلا اسارى وعلما ما نلا فيهم منهم واعلم انه لم يبق بالبحر ايتش حتى يهود  
 بامر سيدينا الله وكنت تركت تسلمو بودرهم حتى يفضي غرضكم ومي  
 فضاه وجهنا العجبة اليكم ايحيي بسلام الله لنعلم سيدي بلنا لم يبق  
 حتى يهود بها ثم طلب منه ايدي الله رجوع ناكيبكم لانه وافق على  
 امركم بالبحر ايتش واعلمنا بالخمر را به وكتبه اليكم نعم بر عبد الملك السلوى  
 وبعده الله به 4 رجب العمود الحرام على 1221

Appendix 25 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green concerning the redemption of Muslim captives held at Leghorn.

Date : 14 Shawwāl, 1221 / 25 Dec., 1806.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم ولا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله العلي العظيم

إلى القونصو الكرين لنجليزي أما بعد ،

فقد وصلنا كتابك وعرفت منه أنك وجهت على الكرديال ، فذلك الظن بك ، وأعلم أن بعض الأسارى من المسلمين بالجُرنَة وأمرني سيدي نصره الله نكتب لك تعلمني هل تجد سبيلا إليهم وأمرني سيدي نكتب لك تكتم هذا الأمر بيني وبينك لا يطلع عليه أحد لأنك إذا حصلت له سيدنا نصره الله كل ما تريد فيه من أموركم تقضى لكم وما خصكم به سيدنا نصره الله دون جميع القونصات إلا لتحقيقه أيده الله بمحبتكم في جانبه أيده الله وتعملون جهدكم في ذلك غاية وأعلمني بالذي كان عزمًا ، وكتبه إليكم في 14 شوال المبارك عام 1221 .

محمد بن عبد السلام السلوي وفقه الله

Appendix 26 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to J. Green declining a British demand for the permission to export provisions from Essaouira.

Date : 2 Rabī<sup>c</sup> I, 1222 / 10 May, 1807.

Source: F.O. 174/285.



الحمد لله وحده

جيمس كوشن فونصو انجليز وطولتلك منرا وقر قبله مضته وما  
 ذكرته على تشریح ما يمتد جنه فرا صينكم من الغنم والبقر والرجل ج  
 مسرة نغلمهم بشغف الشوك المحر ورسالة بل علم ان الشغف المذكور  
 بعناية الضيفة عن سلطنة وفلانة العمارة بل لكم اجد بين غلب الاوقات  
 بعفرا الصلة المحر والحض بل للكنية بفضلاء اي نيز عليهم غير هرس  
 واما كهنجه وتكولان والعرايش بل انهم ورسلم الغريب وجميع  
 سواهم بعناية العمارة والحصب والحمر لا يفي بقرتكم، مثل  
 يمتد جنه فرا صينكم وقر اصير عنيتكم وهذا ان تعلم اننا  
 وغنيرك من لاقية التلاير والسلا بعلاني ربيع الاو اعلا 1222

Appendix 27 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green requesting a pass for a Moroccan vessel carrying a present to Napoleon.

Date : 2 Rabīʿ I, 1222 / 10 May, 1807.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
وَمَا عَزَلْتُ وَأَسْفُؤْتُ أَبَا بَكْرٍ عَلَى الْعَقِيمِ

الوالد الغر نفوسا جهم الأثير لنجائنا ما بعد ما علمنا العرا نصيم كل طلب من سيز كنتم الله  
شراء عدي من الخيل ويجهلهم من هنا ثم ان سيز كنتم الله استكثره الا الا ان  
وذا لاهم اير الله هذا عدا دكتور وان كل الاعداد في كل باب من به نظيره اكرم من  
عندي فوجبه لهم اير الله احد عشر من الخيل مع بعض اهل بلده الا ان يريدك تف  
وفوف الجدل في اعطاء بسمك من عنده المرات ان العاصم ان اقام لي كجواب في مركب  
المركب السقي البطا شربا ريوه واسم ال ايسر يتختر فيلهم وتبع ال المجهود في هذه  
الخدمة بانها الكيد وايد وايد وفد وطنه كتابا على الامر اني اتاك من عنده ال كليل  
بها انا اعلمت الناس بيننا الجبل يكون في الا ان شاء الله وهذا له المسئلة التي كلوي  
بها سيز كنتم الله ما يدى اى من الوفوف فيها وكتبه اليكم محمد بن عبد السلام العلوى  
في تاريخ النبوي الا نور على 222

Appendix 28 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green giving the reasons behind the limitation of exports.

Date : 6 Rabī<sup>ʿ</sup> II, 1222/ 13 June, 1807.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم ولا حول ولا قوة الا بالله العلي العظيم

الى القونصوا جيمس أكثرين لنجليزي وبعد فاعلم ان كتابك الذي وجهت  
 لحضرة مولانا العالیه بالله وصل وتعرف سيدي بكل ما ذكرته وأمرني  
 أيده الله ان نجيبك عنه بأمره العلي بالله، وما ذكرته أنك تعلم سلطانك  
 دائما يسعى فيما يجلب خاطر سيدنا نصره الله وما يرضاه وتطول بسـه  
 دائما المهادنة والمحبة فلا شك عند سيدنا نصره الله في ذلك، كما انكم  
 عارفون أنتم ومتحققون بما لكم عند سيدنا نصره الله من المحبة والمكانة  
 التي ظهرت لكم بمنع جميع النصارى من الوسط الا جنسكم مية سيدنا  
 نصره الله بحمل ما يحتاج لجبل طارق من وسق الثيران بأقل مما يعطى  
 فيه على قدر محبتكم في جانب سيدنا نصره الله، غير أنكم تعلمون أن الملوك  
 الذين استرعاهم الله أمر رعيته وأوجب عليهم النظر في أمور مصالحهم لا بد  
 لهم من ذلك، و سيدنا نصره الله يخشى في رعيته لأنه أيده الله كان منع  
 تجار أهل الذمة وغيرهم <sup>لأنهم</sup> يكثرون في ذلك الاكثار ويضرون بالرعيية  
 غاية الضرر، وهذه العمارة طالت وكثير ما يخرج فيها وتسمعون أمر  
 هذه السنين وما يقع فيه، أي الغرب، من الغلا وأين بلغت قيمة السمن  
 ولولا ان الله تعالى سبحانه تداركنا آخر السنة لبلغ الغرب الى الضرر  
 الفادح، وأنتم به وليس من رءا كمن سمع، وأما جنسكم بعيد ولا يعرف  
 حقيقة الأمر كما تعرفون، ولمنزلتكم عند سيدنا نصره الله ومكانتكم لا بد  
 ان يترك لكم باقية لا ضرر فيها لاكن على شرط أمور يحصل فيها بعض  
 النفع للمسلمين يهون معه ما يحصل من الضرر، وكلامكم في ذلك  
 مع الكاتب السيد محمد بن عبد السلام السلوي، فكسل ما يفعل معكم في  
 ذلك أمضيته ونحن فعلناه في حد ذلك وما يدفع عنه والسلام،  
 هذا نص جواب سيدنا نصره الله اليكم وكتبه في 27 ربيع النبي .

والآن والحمد لله الذي يسر الله لكم هذا الأمر على هذا الوجه، والآن اعلم أن سيدنا نصره الله ما كان أمر أول الأمر بسوق الثيران إلا بالبارود فأتوا به اليهود أولاً ثم قطعوه، وقد استكفى سيدنا نصره الله ولا يحل له أيده الله اعطاء الثيران إلا بما يحصل به بعض النفع للمسلمين، ونحن اليوم متوقفون على بعض إقامة البحر والأبراج، فإذا كنتم تاتون بها فإن السوق يسرح قدر معلوم أو إلى أجل معهود، لاكن بعد الاتفاق على القيمة والصاكة واعطاء خط يدك بمجسي، الإقامة في أجل معهود على أن ذلك لا يكون على يد اليهود وتختارون أنتم من يشتري لكم على أيديكم فهو أرفق لكم وأنفع ولا يدخل في أمركم أحد إلا من تريدونه أنتم فيسهل عليكم وعلى الرعية ذلك، ولو وجد سيدي أيده الله فسحة في دينه تحل له تسريح الثيران ما طلب منكم هاذه الإقامة ولا غيرها، غير أنه لم يجد فسحة في دينه إلا بما فيه نفع للمسلمين وهذه الإقامة علم سيدنا أيده الله وتحقق أنكم لا تعجزون فيها ولا ضيق عليكم فيها حتى تاتوا في مقابلتها بالإقامة توسقون اليوم ولو ما محبتكم في جانبه العلي بالله ما نظر لكم، والآن وجه لنا من تعتمد عليه في ابرام الكلام معه وامضائه وحده لأن الكتابة لا تفي بالمقصود ولا بد من ترداد الكلام معه في ذلك، وكتبه اليكم محمد بن عبد السلام السلي وفتحه الله في 6 ربيع الثاني عام 1222 هـ.

Appendix 29 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green  
inquiring about the rupture between Great Britain and  
the Sublime Porte and requesting a pass for a Tripoli-  
tan vessel to proceed from Larache to Tripoli.

Date : 11 Rabī<sup>c</sup> II, 1222 / 18 June, 1807.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَعُوذُ صِينَا وَنَعْمُ الْوَكِيلِ

المراد بقدرنا من الترخيص لتجليز اما بعد بما علمنا، هلاذاه القيمة سمعنا هلا  
بينكم وبين السلطان العثماني، وميث لم تعلمنا بهنا لم تتخفوها، وحيث ان  
وجه الحمل عندها مركب متلع الحم ابلس ينتج زوجه مراكب بفتح موز  
عليه من اللاجبوة، وحيث سمع هلاذاه القيمة ما عرف ما يوضع، والآن نجيبك  
تعلمنا بل بحقيقة عمل القيمة، وفلانت بحقيقة ان اللواذ او فلت هل  
تقدر على اخراج البصر لك لهما، والى الناس اهل الحم ابلس يلجفهم هذا  
الذي عندنا باع ايضاً لللاجبوة، ويتوجهون لبلاد سلمير، ان لم تقدر على  
ذاك، ولا بد اعلمنا بما نقول عليه، في امرهم ان شاء الله، وكتبه  
اليوم في الرابع من الثاني على 1222

محمد بن عبد الله  
الشلبي

وفيه

Appendix 30 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green advising him on how to approach Mawlāy Sulaymān to get more supplies for British naval forces.

Date : 10 Jumādā I, 1222 / 16 July , 1807.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَكَأَمْرًا بِاللَّهِ الْعَلِيِّ الْعَلِيمِ

والى الفونصوا الذين لم ينجسوا ما باعوا باعوا علم وان توجعت لخدمه امراء العلية  
 بل له وهذاه الرحمة الله تعالى ارادها الصلحكم ان شاء الله ولتعلم وان سيب  
 ايذاه الله ونحوه لم يفصدا ايضاً الله منع لتجلى من الرسو ومعه وما قطع  
 الرسو الا فصول الرسو برعيتك لان كل ملك اوجب الله عليه ينظر في حاج رعيته  
 وحيث لم يزل ايذاه الله في الدواب والواجب على اهل محبته ان يعصوا الكرامة وهو  
 ايذاه الله من سديد نكاحه كيف تايضع في امركم حيث تقوى ايذاه الله  
 بمحبتكم في جانب العلي بالله بلنا الاما ارضيك واوكيد عليك به ان لا تكثر  
 كلامك كثيرا الرسايل بانها اوردوا نبعكم يريدون ضرركم واذا اردت  
 بلنا نكتب لسيدنا الله الات وتلفظ في السؤال من جملة ما تكتب  
 به اذا اردت لسيدنا الله ان تقول في مخاطبتك ان البلاد والامامه متنازع  
 سيدنا الله يدع من شاء ويمنع من شاء ومتى شاء وكله سيدنا انعم على  
 جيشنا الذي بجبل هارون بالبحر ثور في السنة احمنا فامنه وتكر ما ورجلا  
 بميشنا ونميت حتى هذاه العمارة ايظن بظنه عليها كما ختم على اهل جبل  
 الطراننا علمون ومخففون ان سيدنا يرفق بميشنا ويحب له الخير كيف  
 ميشنا العبيد وعلمنا وتحفتنا ان سيدنا هو الله لم يرد معنا وانما  
 فله عن جميع تجار ايلته لا كثر خبنا عننا يقول ان خاطر سيدنا متغير  
 علينا والواجب علينا حيث كنت وامهنة في بلاد سيدنا نطلب من سيدنا كل خير  
 بهو محله وبظله والله امرنا به نتبعوه ونحن من جملة من كان مثل هذا

1222 10 Jumada I  
 1807 16 July  
 (Handwritten notes and signatures in Arabic script, including dates and names)



Appendix 31 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green  
concerning the handling of exports by Jewish merchants.

Date : 20 Jumādā I, 1222 / 26 July, 1807.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ      وَلَا حَوْلَ وَلَا قُوَّةَ إِلَّا بِاللّٰهِ الْعَلِيِّ الْعَظِيمِ

إلى القونصو اكثرين لنجليزي أما بعد فقد وصلني كتابك وعرفت كل ما ذكرته وكله حقيقة ، وها كتاب سيدنا نصره الله يصلك تركب متى أردت واعلم أن اليهود هم الذين يضرونكم بتسويقهم لكم الثيران فلو تسوقتم مثل ما يتسوق البرطقيز لظهر لكم فعل اليهود من جودة الثيران ورخاء الثمن ، وبه كتب محمد بن عبد السلام السلوي وفقه الله في 20 جمادى الأولى عام 1222 .

Appendix 32 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green regarding the redemption of Muslim captives in Sardinia.

Date : 23 Ramaḍān, 1222 / 24 Nov., 1807.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم  
 وما حول وما فؤة ابا بل الله العلي العظيم

الوالفوضوا التي ليجلينر اما بعد يا وكذا اميرنا عندهم هو توقف علينا  
 في قضية هذه المسلمين الذين فيضهم اهل سر دانية كيف خلاصهم  
 من ايديهم لان سمعنا انهم اعجابكم ربينا عهده الله ليرجيت معهم كيرة  
 ويا جعل عشة من الالامعهم الابعير امر من سيرة عهده الله واذا اردت تكتب لهم  
 ونعزمهم بهذا الامر فاذا اتوا بالمسلمين بهم على ما كنا نواعليهم فديما من الامان  
 وما اخذ لهم عشة من لو تشكوا به لبينا عهده الله لرد له عليهم وهم لم يظلم لهم  
 احد يتكلم عليهم واذا ارادوا يركلونك او غيرك عليهم ربيع البصال ان شاء الله  
 طبعني بنه الال وابع لانهم عملوا على المسلمين المعية ونحركل من فيضنا له احسننا  
 اليه ولونعلموا عليه عهده الله والنصارى هم بده ونا بتعديب الاسبير والمركبة به عليك  
 هو الوفوف في هذا الامر ولا يبر ولا يبر به تنل كل ما نريك ان شاء الله واما الكلال التي كتبت  
 له به مع طويرير فيكون كهمس من ذلك بل الامر عنده في ذلك بلا اكلية من تنضوي حتى التفت  
 بك ان شاء الله وبيد كتب اليكم عن اشمل السلوى وفقه الله في 23 رمضان 1222

ادنا بيب  
 لورا

على 1222

Appendix 33 : Pledge by Muḥammad b. Abd al-Salām al-Salāwī to the British government regarding the fortress of Ceuta.

Date : 10 Shawwāl, 1222 / 11 Dec., 1807.

Source: F.O. 52/13.

Blessed be the only God and faith in him, witnesses that I, Sidi Mohamed ben Abdeslam Slawi, servant of the Almighty God and subject of His Imperial Majesty Mulay Sliman, whom God preserve, minister of marine and foreign affairs, being vested with due authority by His Imperial Majesty, to bind myself to the English nation, thus, if the English nation will take possession of Ceuta from the enemies now residing there and restore it to the Moors, a free exportation of oxen, sheep, fowels, eggs, and vegetables shall be allowed paying for the same as in the time of my master Sidi Mohamed ben Abdallah, whom God rest his soul; and I further pledge myself to allow the exportation of gums, wax, hides, and other articles of trade paying the same duty as in the time of the aforementioned Sidi Mohamed ben Abdallah, but these privileges shall only be granted to English Christian merchants.


To the above conditions His Imperial Majesty and myself severally bind ourselves, according to His Imperial Majesty's authority vested in me, as witnesses my hand and seal at Tetouan, this tenth day of Shawwal, 1222.

Appendix 34 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Muhammad  
b. 'Abd al-Sādaq concerning the purchase of a war vessel  
in England by Meir Macnin.

Date : 28 Hijja, 1222 / 26 Feb., 1808.

Source: F.O. 52/14.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
وَلَا حَوْلَ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ الْعَلِيِّ الْعَلِيمِ



خبرنا وروينا ان الحاج احمد بن عبد الظاهر واعاقده الله وسلام علينا ورحمة الله وبركاته  
وبعد بعد فخرنا من كتابه بوضوح الترتيب والتفصيل الى الزائر من حيث انشراح الخ انصحه  
على الا يتبرؤ وحينئذ بقنا من ان نكتبنا للتاجير من غير مقصود فله يفتا ويختار حتى يشتر ولنا  
من مننا من كما فرطنا واكثر بحسب ما وجهنا من الترتيب والتفصيل للتبليغ ان كان كما يكيد الا لو اهدوا  
والا فليزد عليه يكره من المالك الجريدي التي اخرتها جسر لتبليغ من الساعة وفيه من المزارع  
اثنا عشر من بعد الا غير من التفصيل الخ والعزم في الماء من الشبعة اشبار التي اخر عشر شيئا  
ليس من الا باي عند قوله ان كل من شئ وما ذكرناه وكيفية لا يتعزنا ولا يشتر على فطامنا  
الخ من ان شاء الله بوزر الذرلة لتبليغ فيه قار الخي به الله يفتا في حاجتنا ولا يفجر في جانبنا وحين  
يشترى ذلك في موخير في الثمرات من ان شاء الله فطامنا وازماننا من ان شاء الله عندنا  
ويجربنا من تبليغنا وما يحتاج اليه بوجهه الخ حتى بنا السعيدة انما في مزار العطار ان يشر له او  
في الامية الخ الخهيا وان من مزار البصر الخ بوجهه مينا علمنا انه لا وفوق له في خرمنا التي بية  
وحي من ان تبليغنا وعمد منبجها واسلامنا في التاجر والعهد من خرمنا في العجة الخ مع علمنا 222

Appendix 35 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green on Anglo-Moroccan preparations for the siege of Ceuta.

Date : 11 Şafar, 1223 / 8 April, 1808.

Source: F.O. 174/17.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
 وكما حول وكما فؤة الابا لند العلى الفليم

الى الفونسو اليرى لنجليخ اما بكذا فبذ سمعت انكم علمتم لمدايع جبل طارق  
 كى اربط المعنى وما كذا عنكم من كى اربط العود انما علمتمهم في الخازن بلذ الى  
 انما اوجيد ناك تنبث لنا على ما بينة كى يكتة منهم نضعها من مرة ثمانية  
 عشر ونضعها من مرة اربعة وعشرين والابى ابث لنا عليهم واذ اعمت  
 بلنا امرت من ينزل على جزيرة اتنا ورا جنداك اول العلة التي تواعدت  
 بها مك نجهها عن الابلابيهو لند ذال الامسلة فحجبا تمنعهم  
 من النزول للبر والمعاملة مع العمينة وكل ما يخصهم يا تونك عليه لفتنة  
 هذا قبل الشروع بالحرب واذ اتم عمتم في الحرب بلا يخصك في ذال شارة الله  
 وبه كتب اليكم محمد بن عبد الله الشلوى وقبض الله في الاصح الخيم على 1223

Appendix 36 : Letter from J. Green to Mawlāy Sulaymān giving assurances about the British landing on the Moroccan islet of Tawra .

Date : 16 Şafar, 1223 / 13 April, 1808.

Source: F.O. 174/17.

أما بعد أنهي لكریم علم سيدنا آيدہ اللہ وأنہ في شهر شوال كت أخبرت جانب مولانا العلي بالله بالمسائل التي قالها لنا كاتب سيدنا محمد السلوي طالباً من جنسنا أخذ سبته من يد أعداء سيدنا الذين هم بها ، فأجابنا سيدنا نصره اللہ في كتابه العزيز بأنه كل ما عملنا مع كاتب سيدنا المذكور هو ماض ، ومن ذلك الوقت آيد اللہ نصر سيدنا ، واني مشغول بالمكاتبة على ذلك لوزير د ولتنا حتى اتاني آخر جوابه أنه قد خرج الأمر بمحاصرة سبته في البحر. ولأجل أن يكون أمرنا على عهد كتب لنا حاكم جبل طارق بأن نطلب لوزير سيدنا نصره اللہ السيد محمد السلوي إذنه بنزولنا الجزيرة المسماة " تورة " فذكرت جميع هذا كله للسيد محمد المذكور وقالني بأنه يطلب لنا ذلك من جانب مولانا العلي بالله حين نكثوا موجدین لذلك ، ولما رأينا عدونا ، أبى اللہ نصر سيدنا ، كل يوم ياتيهم المدد والميرة ويجهدون أنفسهم ما أمكننا ، بارك اللہ في عمر سيدنا ، إلا أن أسرعنا لنزول هذه الجزيرة ، وهي فارغة ولاشيء من العمارة بها وأنزلنا بها مائة من الجيش وبعض الخدامين وستة من المدافع وبعساها بعض قراسيننا بقصد الحصار على سبته قائمين في ذلك على ساق جد ولولا نزولنا ، بارك اللہ في عمر سيدنا ، بهذه الجزيرة لكان عدونا كل يوم يزداد مدداً فيصبرون بذلك ما نعيمين من أخذها . فلذا لم نزل بهذه الجزيرة لا يستقيم لنا حصار ، فلأجله يكون سيدنا المنصور بالله مطمئن البال فإنه لا غرض لنا في هذه الجزيرة ولا نفع إلا الحصار على أعداء سيدنا وإخراجهم بعون اللہ من سبته . هذا وقد سمعنا أن أعداءنا كتبوا لجانب سيدنا نصره اللہ بخلاف ما ذكرناه . فحاش اللہ أن يكون عندنا جانب سيدنا المقدس بهذه المكانة مع أننا ، أبى اللہ نصر سيدنا ، ما نزلنا

بها إلا لمنفعة سيدنا والقيام بالحصار على سبتة فلا بد من هذه الجزيرة  
وإن أمر سيدنا بالخروج عنها فنخرجوا منها وندفعوها لخليفة سيدنا يعمرها  
بمن شاء وما نحن إلا عند الأمر والنهي ومن جملة خدام سيدنا وجيشه  
كذلك نعلم جانب مولانا العلي بالله بأن الإقامة الجهادية للأبراج التي كان  
أمرنا سيدنا بالإتيان بها هاهي اليوم ساعة الكتب تنزل بالمرسى وبعد فراغ  
المركب من نزولها أيد الله نصر سيدنا يرجع لجبل طارق للإتيان بإقامة المراكب  
نفع الله سيدنا ومولانا بأجر ذلك .

Appendix 37 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green  
concerning the British landing on the Islet of Tawra.

Date : 18 Şafar 1223 / 15 April, 1808.

Source: F.O. 174/2.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
وَأَعْلَى كِتَابِ اللَّهِ الْعَلِيِّ الْعَلِيِّ

الى الفونصوا الكبر للخليج اما بعد فبعد رطنة كتابي اعرفت وانك ما شكيت وبقى  
الحال في ظاهري من اجلك فلا يكون عندك باس ان شاء الله رفته وطال الفكاير التي تشبهت  
واخبرنا بما مرنا ورا وما عمل معنا في البحر وفي وجهنا لا سيما في هذه التي  
له امرها ويطلب الكتاب الذي اني به اليك من عندي مع خفاية الامر به وابقته لنا  
واعلم اني كتبت لكم انصيح والضمير انكم اعلمتم بنا ورا لا سيما في هذه التي بجميع  
ما علمتم فيها يعلم بها جميعكم ثم انما منكم وفلت لكم ان متوجه اليها  
نعم ولا يجيشنا ان شاء الله بكنه الا انت شتخ عندي الفونصات انكم اردتم الخروج  
منها وتسليمها للمسلمين لتزويجوا على رؤسنا حتى يفتح سين كنه الله وبعليته  
الخير يا تيد بها هو ان شاء الله بالعمل على ما يلزمه اليك من عندي تاو اعني بالبلد  
من الافامة ورا بعد وبالاسم اعلم بركب عواد ففد توجه بالسلامة وبعي كتب اليكم  
ثم عبرتم في الامسوى وقبضتم اليه في 18 اصبغ الخير على 22 23 اار وجه لنا كلار كنة  
البغاز من دارك ووجه لنا على خمسين كلار كنة ثلاثة مع الافامة لم اكتب سين  
نعم الله والاب والكر اربا اذا ووجه ناشي ما نكر هو يا تيد ورا بعد



Appendix 38 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green on the Ceuta question and the British landing on the islet of Tawra.

Date : 27 Şafar, 1223 / 24 April, 1808.

Source: F.O. 174/17.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم  
وكما حول وكما فتوة الابا بالله اعلم الاطلاع

الى الله هو الاكبر ليخبرني اما بعد بان جواب مولانا شيخه الله وطلعه على سبب  
قاورة واوجب ديننا الله نزلناكم بهذا البطل من غيركم ولو كلفتم النزول وانتم لنا  
بخطبة او الفخر الصغير لقلنا لكم والان اذا كنتم تفقدون على نزول واللة الحرب  
مع محلة من عندكم بمرنا المحطار سبتنا اعطينه فخر يدك بهذا لتشتغلوا نحن بعملنا  
معظم نبيهم واهل نظيمه وراكنتم هذا الامر على كل احد واربقيه بينه وبينك لا يطلع  
عليه احد واعطينه فخر يدك بالجمرة انكم فيها على وجه الغير متفق كالمبتدئ بها  
تخرجوه عنها وكل ما يخص عنكم من الكمانية والحرم وغيره كله من عندنا وتظلمنا  
فخر يدك بسببنا تظلموها اسين الله واذا تابى بك في اكثر من هذا من غير  
فخر يدك لاكنه نريد نعلمه في يوم عملت عنده اسين الله وكل ما تظلمون من الامور  
فظلمها الله ويظلمها لكم عنده اسين الله فقول ما تظلمون وفيه اعجبنا الجواب  
الذي اتنا في عليه له سبعة ايلع من اكثر يسوع خرج اسين الله من مر الشرح وجهه  
لنا وهو ايلع الله يوع الكتب وطل تولد له فاصح امكنا منة الريتون بالهنا والاعلاجة  
ان شاء الله وانت فخرنا بالجمرة والحق في هذا الامر واعطينه متفق يكون المحطار والنزول  
لنعا به اسين الله الله مشا بهتة منة اليه فخرنا بالجمرة والحق اليسوع واياك والتم اش  
والفلاكل ربه كتب اليكم فخر عبد الملك القاسوي رقبه الله في 27 صبر الخيم على 223

Appendix 39 : Letter from al-Salāwī to James Green concerning a joint British-Moroccan blockade of Ceuta.

Date : 28 Şafar 1223 / 25 April, 1808.

Source: F.O. 174/17.

## بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم و سلامك و كفاؤك الابله العلي العظيم

الى الفونسوا الكرمين لبلينما ما بعدد بغيره و صلت كتابا و عرفت ما فيه باعلم و انسه  
 امير الكتب النور و جهت لما فيه كتابا في بلهنا و جهت للخليفة بتسبته  
 بهر حل عن قاوره و ينزك بهلا شيبا قليلا و يتوجه لسيته بتكافه من مته و ييزد  
 به الحرامته و العتمة و بلاغته في الابل الجند و الخبز كلبه يجفت على قاوره  
 تخرج لها عصابة من سيته ليللا و تلعب بيها بلنا المازوت في عتمة سيته  
 و قاوره انما كنا عملنا لها العتمة حيث كمال الامر مبهم على عتكم و كم وعدونا  
 و انما ما بقى الابل الجند بانهم يطلبون الامر لنا نعمل عليه القيمة لمعهم و كنا  
 نلهم هم حتى نهيروا جيشنا و نجمع عتكتنا و ابقينا نتخرج غير مطركم و اعلم  
 اذا حكم منكم الحصار في البحر بلنا عتكتنا تصح رابطة في البحر و تخاربع راذ الاربع  
 نزل حلة عندنا و بعض من حلة عتكتنا و اذ التم تفعل رواد الاعلى حرب البحر  
 بنس نكجوكم بحول الله حرب التهر و اذ التم يقع عليها الحصار اليوع النور  
 هم مشهورون مع البر انصيص بمقوي يفتح و هيبت نسج لم نكر عندكم مراكب  
 كبيره و كثيره في البغاز ينفون على مشهورنا بالبحر في خلاف عليها يستهرون بمسها  
 من ستر و اذ الحكم منكم اليوع العرع و الجند بلنا نصبح بالبحر بالعتبة  
 و حين تشتغلون بالحرب نزل على سيته و هذا الامر ما بقى بيننا و ابقي  
 بيننا الجند و جميع الامور التي هو اكرم عندنا في اليوع ميسرة و ابقينا ما عندكم  
 و الكرمية بلنا بلا افانته للبحر ايش و يرجع بها و نسج له البريسر و البطانة  
 كل ما ير بيبا بالبحر ايش و غنم ارضيت و اعلم لنا بلنا جواب و الابل  
 و ابرو به كتب اليكم فخر عبد القليل السلوي و فقه الله 28 صبر الخير 223

و دخل لك و انما تارة و اسمعته و اعلمت بالبحر انصيص و الصنيرة و سلم

Appendix 40 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green on the Ceuta question.

Date : 1 Rabīʿ I, 1223 / 27 April, 1808.

Source: F.O. 174/17.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وكما هو وكافرة الابا لله العلى العظيم

الى الفوهود الكير لبحلن اما بده وفطه وطنه كناده وما ذكرته على رايسر البطلان  
 بالعمل على ما في الكتاب الذي هو للمير والخليفة بفالعه واعطيه لهم واكتب  
 لهم نسخة من الكتاب الذي رجعت له واعطيه لهم وجميع ما طلبت منه ها انلا  
 فلاح علىكم بيوع والسبت ان شاء الله ويفضرك كل ما تريه وجوه ما تكس  
 غير انه انما كنت صفتين كاء البغاز من مر ايكتم الكبار وتر اغيتم في العصار  
 على سبتة باعلنه ما سبب ذلك والتميط اذا انتم نتم في بطنجة وان وجدت الاربع  
 بلانجه معرويه كتب اليكم في غير الشهر السلوى وقته الله في اول ربيع القيسوي  
 على 1223

Appendix 41 : Letter from the governor of Essaouira to the British Chancellor of the Exchequer concerning the purchase of a war vessel in England.

Date : 16 Rabī' I, 1223 / 12 May, 1808.

Source: F.O. 52/14.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَلَا حَوْلَ وَلَا قُوَّةَ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ

من عبدي ربه تعلم ونحن في المفاع العلي بالله فلا بد من  
الصورة وناظر جيشها السعيد الحاج أحمد بن محمد الصلوة  
كان الله له البر كبر جنسه وخليقة مملكته وزير الدولة  
الإنجليزية ورؤسها وفهرمانها الأكرام وسابها طاب  
الوزير الرفيعا انزبا ان مشرتز سبال فحبتك كثيرا وان تكون  
وعلى خير وتقتريه منه لأنك رجل مبالغ لا نسمع عليك إلا  
الخير وذلك هو المحبوب عليك فبشر معك على منة سيدهنا  
المنصور بالله مولانا سليمان راداع الله وجوده ذامير وبغ  
باز سيدهنا نصره الله امره حديقه الزمه ابن مغير الصوري ان يشتري  
له مركبا فزطانا من المراكب الجديده التي احد ثمنها في هذه  
الساعة فبعتك ارتقى معه بك ليمتلك وتكون في عونته حتى  
يشتره على الكيفية التي امر بها سيدنا ايدله الله عزما ويكون  
على خسر المراء وان فحتمه في الوفوف في ذلك كما هو المكنون  
فيك وانك لا تفكر في مسألة جانبنا سيدنا الأعراب ونحن منك  
ومبتك في جانبنا الشريفا كصرت وثبتت اعلمنا الله وانما على الخربة  
الشريفة ذامير من أربع النوى الافور عام 1223

Appendix 42: Letter from al-Salāwī to Admiral Collingwood proposing the supply of Spain with horses in return for the fortress of Ceuta.

Date: 20 Jumādā, 1223/ 14 July, 1808.

Source: British Museum, Add. Ms. 40,098.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وساموئل وكافؤا الهابا الله العلي العظيم

المرات المعظم الفخري كلفنا طامب كليل امور البحر والكلف بامور له بر كبله  
اشتر المقيم على فالمر اما بعد بلان كتابا الله، وجهت لميسرا ابيد الله ونحوه  
وطل حضرتنا العلي بالله وتعرف ما طلبت من جانبنا الله بالله بلعبد ابيد له  
استخر انكم في بحر محبتنا حتى عا د غير كم بطلبكم تنو سكون له في فضاء امورك  
وذاك في ليل على صدى المحبة منكم في جانبنا الشريف وامرنا ابيد الله  
ان نجيب عن الله باعلم ان هذه الامر صفت نبيته على سيره في الله كان الملبسي  
بما يرضونه ولا يفلوننا الا اننا الكانت منبجعة تعارضه لانه امر ان في ينزلوا لاجل  
لنا بعلد الا اذ الكا، ما ذكرنا ولو لولاه ممة الدير ما صعبت على سيره في الله في جانب  
محتكم واعلم ان في شيا محبتكم في هذه الجانب الشريف ما يصحني تفصير اموركم  
رغبنا فضاءها على بيا، بل اننا المحم للمجد في طلبنا اللوردوا بفضولنا على ما نانا نهم  
به واننا الكا يسهل تبليغه اليهم في مودة فريية من غير تعجيل ولا مشقة في ذلك  
والكل ان تكلمت في مع الفونصوا الدير من كتبنا لاجلنا بيا منبجعة طلبتكم  
ميرتانا في الكلا بيه وفدا عن علينا طلب هانا المسئلة التي هي ممنوعة  
علينا في الدير ولو كانت غير ممنوعة ما رجعت طلبتنا وان اذ وفد الامر في كذا  
بلانه يفضوان مثلنا الله وبه كتب من محروسة نهم ان في مودة الدير على



وزير البحر والمكلف بامور الاجناس  
محمد بن عبد الملك السلولي محمد بن الاناس

1223

20 Jumada  
= 14 July

Appendix 43 : An example of a Sulaymāni passport.

Date : middle of Jumādā II, 1223 / August, 1808.

Source: F.O. 174/17.

بسم الله الرحمان الرحيم ولاحول ولا قوة إلا بالله العلي العظيم

( بعد الطابع الشريف )

يستقر هذا المرسوم الشريف والظهير المنيف أسماه الله  
بيد الخديم الرايس ابراهيم ومعه تسعة وخمسون من البحرية من أي جنس  
أراد يسافر بسنجانا المنصور بالله في المركب المسمى " تطوان " تحمل عشرة  
آلاف قنطار وفيها ستة عشر مدفا ، يسافر آنا حيث شاء من بلاد المسلمين  
وبلاد النصارى الذين هم بالمهادنة والصلح معنا . فعليه نعرف أجناس  
النصارى المصالحين مع جانبنا العلي بالله بذلك ليقدروا حرمة وبراوا حقهم  
كما هو المقرر في قوانين الصلح وقواعده ، وقدر مدة عمل الظهير الشريف عشر  
سنيين . صدر الأمر به تام الرسم فافذ الأمر والحكم في أواسط  
جمادى الثانية عام 1223 .

Appendix 44 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green asking for a maritime pass to secure the return to France of Captain Burel.

Date : 24 Rabī<sup>c</sup> I, 1224 / 9 May, 1809.

Source: F.O. 174/17.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وسامحول وكافؤة ابا بالله العلي العظيم

الى الفونصوا اقرير لتخليز اما بعد وفيك وصل الطيب بخير وعلاوة ووطننا  
 معه كتابا وعرفت مسيحية بعزمنا ورفوقنا واعتناء الحكام بعزمه فبسر  
 نصيحة ائيل الله الكار عرفنا الماهي عا ذنكم مع جانبه العلي بالله  
 وكذا الماعربت جواب الكماري اليك على مسعينة الميرين بل علم اننا  
 لما نسمع كمال الاماياتينا عنك وكان نطقك بالوقوف والاعتناء  
 بخدمة سيدي الله واعلم انه يوع اننا الى النصر الى البر انصيف رسونا  
 ورجع من غير امورنا الله يعير ما امل ان طلب من هو ورفونصوهم  
 التذير على توجبه ذال الارسول بفلن لوان لتخليز من كثر ته محبتك  
 بجانب سيدي الله وصبر فمعتنا ان الحلب من اذكا غير بطلبه  
 لنا لان جميع ما يطيب على غير ايمه اعلمه بجانب سيدي الله  
 واليوع طلب من التوجبه في مركب ابرار الخالب المتوجبه لم سبيليه هو  
 وفضلهم معه وذال السبع والبوله يلقته هم معه وادنا تخمش وخبهنا  
 معه تطلبه كاعير الخا بيلام به وكابو وكابو وادبع ذال المير الخلقفة وكابو  
 وبه كتب اليكم ثم مر عهد الله الفلوري وفيه الله 242 ربيع النبوي  
 الانور على 1224

Appendix 45 : Letter of rebuke from Mawlāy Sulaymān to al-<sup>ʿ</sup>Arbī b al-Ma<sup>ʿ</sup>ṭī, head of the Sharqāwi zāwiya .  
Date : not mentioned in the text, but letter written during al-<sup>ʿ</sup>Arbī b. al-Ma<sup>ʿ</sup>ṭī's exile in Fès (Dec., 1808-Aug., 1809).  
Source: Ms. K.1264, BGR, pp.361-365.

### الحمد لله وحده

إلى الفقيه السيد العربي بن المعطي الذي لاتزال فراستنا فيه تُصيب ولا تخطي . جعلنا الله وإياكم ممن لم يتخذ لإلهاً سواه . سلام عليكم ورحمة الله . أما بعد أيها السائر على غير طريق من الليالي المدلهمّة ، طال ما أردتم أن تُطفئوا نور الله بأفواهكم ويأبى الله إلا أن يُتمّه . أما للعاقل في قول تاج الدين ما يكفيه ، ما ترك من الجهل شيئاً ، من أراد أن يظهر في الوقت عندما أظهره الله فيه ، خرجت أولاً عن الجماعة ، ثم خدعتنا في الله بلسان الضراعة ، فسترنا عورتك ، وأقلنا عثرتك ، وقابلنا إساءتك بالإحسان ، الذي ليس لك بشكره يدان ولا لسان ، وقلنا للنفس قول من ليس عن ربه بِبلاءٍ ، ” وإن يريدوا أن يخدعوك فلن حسبك الله ، فاذكروا نعمة الله عليكم إذ كنتم أعداءً إلي فأنقذكم منها ” هل البيعة التي كانت في رقبتم إلا بالسمع والطاعة ولزوم السنة والجماعة ، وإحاض النصيحة جهد الاستطاعة ، فهذا النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم قال: ”الدين النصيحة لله ولرسوله ولأئمة المسلمين” . وقال: ”أسمعوا وأطيعوا وإن استعمل عليكم عبد حبشي كأن رأسه زبيبة” . وقال: ”السمع والطاعة على المرء المسلم فيما أحب وكره ما لم يوجر بمعصية ومن خرج عن الجماعة قدر شبر فقد خلع ربقة الإسلام من عنقه إلا أن يرجع ، فلاتك في سكرة الخواطر الكاذبة ، لما عليك للسلطان من الحقوق الواجبة . لقد جئت شيئاً قريباً ، ونبذت عهد الله وراء ظهرها . أين العهد والميثاق



والقوي ياكل الضعيف بين ظهرانك في الأسواق ، بل لولاك ما فسدت تلك البلاد ، ولا خرج أهلها عن طريق الرشاد ، حتى شاركت في الدماء شعرت أولم تشعر . فيا خسارة من يريد الريح ولا يدري أين يتجر ! أنشدك الله أكان ذلك ؟ فأنت أعرف ما هناك ولا أظن يسعك الإنكار ، والأمر أوضح من شمس النهار ، كم رفعنا ألوية الولاية تبادلاً ، فما أعنت جانبنا ولا وافقت عاملاً ، وكانوا ما بين ولد وأخ وصهر . وحاضر أو باد من عبد وحر . كل ذلك لا يسرعوزك ، فما حملت من جهدك على ما يوافق سرك ، ولا رجح أحدٌ منهم عنك راضياً ولا بما حفظه من سوء سيرتك ناسياً . ألم تراقب الله تعالى في ذلك الوطن ؟ الذي ثارت فيه بسيط الفتن وما كان آباؤك إلا رحمة لتلك البلاد ، لا ينتقمون على الحكام بـجـرد الخلاف والعناد ، حسبهم الوقوف عندما حد لهم ، وأرجو أن يزكي الله بذلك عملهم ، قلما صار الأمر إليك ، و تعين القيام بطريقتهم عليك ، واستهل هلال إقبالك ، وأنت من الشباب ترفل في أديالك ، كان ذلك استحقاق مملكة مولانا الوالد الغالب بالله ، أمير المؤمنين محمد بن عبد الله ، سقى الله بالرحمة ثراه ، وكان أحلم الناس ، معاوية زمانه في الرحمة والبأس ، أهلك على ضخامة ملكه محل الوالد ، لا الأخ الشقيق والولد المساعد ، ثم لم يبرح يعنويصفح وعن كل ما أحدث حدثاً واً ويتموه يفض ويصفح ، حتى جعل غض الطرف عن جانبكم والصفح عما يقع من المناكر بيبابكم من أعظم ذنوبه التي يستغفر منها موله ، العالم بسره ونجواه ، وأنتم لم تراعوا ذلك كله حق رعايته ، حتى أوقعتم أهل بلادكم في شرك الهلاك وحبالته ، ونجيتم بأنفسكم وما نجيتم عند الله بتسميكم ، أنشدكم الله ثم أنشدكم الله أفي رقبة مولانا الوالد ما وقع أم في رقبتم ؟ فعدتتم عليه باللوم ، ولم تنظروا من الملوم ، واستعبدوا بالله من نظر الغشوش الغشوم . ولما أفضى الأمر إلى نجله هذا العبد سليمان المرتجي من الله جميل العقود والغفران ، لم يقتصر في أمركم على ما كان عليه الوالد من بركم ، بل تلمد وتحبب ، وبتربأنواع البرور وتقرب . عساه أن يردكم عما عودتتم به أنفسكم ، ويترككم لعبادة ربكم ، في حال بعدكم أو قربكم ، فلم تشكروا النعمة ، ولم تحذروا فجأة النعمة ، ولولا ما نرجوه من الرب الكريم ، لوقع على يده أكثر مما وقع على يد أبيه من العذاب الأليم ، طلبنا

منكم ما فيه عند الله نجاتكم ، وهو في الحقيقة لأنفسكم الميتة حياتكم ، من  
الخرج معنى عن أسواق العامة ، التي لا يعمرها من له المروءة  
النامة ، أو الخروج حساً إلى مدينة فاس ، واشتغالكم بالله وبيدنيته  
القوم عن الناس ، فما قدرتم عن التقصي عن العامة ، ولا رجعتهم عن  
مكتابة الحكام والخوض في الفتنة الطامة ، وكنتم طلبتم الذهاب لتفقد  
زرعكم وضرعكم ، ونقل أولادكم إن أذن لكم ، على أنه خرج بسبيكم  
من تعلمون ، وأنتم ما وقع لهم في رقبة من تظنون ، فذهبتهم وقرر  
لكم القرار ، وبعدهما وعدتم أن ترجعون في أيام قصار ، وبعد أن خرج  
الإخوان والأخوات وأبناء الأعمام والعمات ، ومن له هنالك شأن من الفقهاء  
الأعيان ومن ليس بخروجه سبب ، ولا كان لنا في انتقاله أرب ،  
واغتنمتموها فرصة بإقامتكم ، وقد خرج من كانت عليكم منهم غصة ،  
وأظهرتم التهاون بكلام من وجبت عليكم طاعته ، وصحبتهم في الزمان  
الطويل عنايته ، إن كنتم تعتقدون ذلك وما أنا لكم ممن سلك تلك المسالك ،  
وصرتم إلى ما كان يظن بنخيركم من المخالفة ، وهل تدخل الأوتاد المزاجفة ،  
ما عذرکم في الجلوس بجعيديان بعدما خرج من هو أضعف منكم بالأهل  
والولدان ، وإنما طولبتم بالخرج بأنفسكم فخرت صفقة الظنون من نظركم ،  
أوردوها سعد وسعد مشتتمل \* ما هاكذا ياسعد تورد الإبيل !  
فاتق الله وارض بقضائه ، ولا تعاند القدر فتصاب ببلائه ، واصبر كما صبر  
الذين خرجوا من ديارهم قهراً ، لما علموا أن الله عوضهم عنده خيراً ،  
فانظروا لما وقع للقاضي عياض وهو مفوض لله من غير سخطه ولا اعتراضه  
وأزعج إلى الرحيل أبو إسحاق بن الحاج ، فقطع من الأندلس البحر اللجاج  
متبوا منها مراكش الحمرا على عهد السلطان يوسف بن الناصر الموحددي ،  
وانظروا لحال القطب أبي مدين وأين دُفن ، بعد أن صلب على كبر السن ،  
وكذلك الشيخ الغزواني أخرجه الواسطي من زاوية بني زكار ، وأشخص إلى  
مراكش فكانت له دار قرار ، وغيرهم ممن أخرجوا من أرضهم ، فلن شئت  
كان لك إسوة حسنة في بعضهم ، على أنهم لم يكونوا لمثل ما تفعل  
فاعلين ، ولا للرعاع السفلة مجالسين ، ولئن قلت قول من لعبت به يد  
الهواء أنك أجل أن تقتدي بهؤلاء ، فارتفع نفسك إلى الصحابة الكرام  
الذين هم كالنجوم في الاهتداء للأنام . فهذا أبو ذر الغفاري وكان من

أكابر الصحابة أسلم رابعاً أو خامساً استقدمه عثمان من الشام لشكوى معاوية به وأسكنه الريدة بعد أن أخرجه من المدينة لما كثر عليه الناس ، لما رأه في ذلك من المصلحة ليس معها التباس لما في تعدد الرؤساء من المفسد ، التي يجب درءها في الغائب والشاهد ، على أن الصحابة عدول ، وكل واحد منهم مجتهد فيما يفعل أو يقول ، فلم يتأخر أبوذر ولم يسترجع أمثالاً لقول النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم اسمع وأطع ، وأين أنت أيها المتجاهل من هؤلاء السادات الأفاضل ؟ هيهات هيهات ! ليس الماضي كالات ، بل أين أنت من الشيخ الحسن اليوسي نقله مولانا الجد أبو النصر اسماعيل إلى مدينة فاس ، وأمره أن يتخذ بها له ولبنيه خير كس ، ولم يفته من الاعتذار ما نظر ونشر ، عما يجب منه الرضى بالقضاء والتسليم للقدر . وكان قصده من إخراجهم من بلادهم جميلاً ، ليقم به على علماء الحضرة من العلم والعمل دليلاً ، لا سيما وكان له المقر في أقبح بلاد لا يامن عليه الاعتذار ، بما ليس له عليه من أثر العامة اقتدار . إذا كان هذا في الزمن السلف ومن اقتفى آثارهم من خيار الخلف ، فما بالك بهذه الأزمان التي لا يجتمع أهلها على علم أو عرفان ، فلم يبق عندهم إلا العزلة في الحين ، لكل من تمسك بحبل العقل والدين ، وأحمد الله أن جعل خصمك عاقلاً ، متحققاً بحب الخير لعباد الله مفضولاً وفاضلاً ، لا يريد أن يجري الله على يده شرّاً ، بل يريد أن يكون مظهرًا لرحمة الله في خلقه نهياً وأمرًا ، ولا يفسد ملكه بهضم أمثالك ، وأنا بريء من يلقي نفسه في المهالك . ولولا مكان الشفعة عليك ، ومحبة الخير كله إليك ، لتركتك ترعى هبلاً ، وتهيم في كل واد مع الأخرسين عملاً . ” ذرهم يخوضوا ويلعبوا حتى يلاقوا يومهم المذي يوعدون ” ، وذر الذين اتخذوا دينهم لعباً ولهواً وغرتهم الحياة الدنيا . ولكن المدين النصيحة ، ولا يكون المومن مومنًا حتى يحب لأخيه المومن كما يحب لنفسه . ” والمومن للمومن كالبنيان المرصوص يشد بعضه بعضاً ” ومن وجد أخاه على شفا فليأخذ بيده ، وإلى الآن فنفذ أمرنا الذي لا معقب لحكمه بنصر أو قياس . إنا نأمركم ولا نعدل عن أمرنا بالسكن بمدينة فاس ، ولا تخرجوا منها إلى أبي الجعد أصلاً . ولا ترتقبوا بعد القطع عنها وصلًا ، ومن يشق عليكم رحيله من ضعفة الذرية والبنات والبنين اتركوهم من

جُملة من بقي بها من المستضعفين ، وبادروا بالإجابة والامتناع  
والإنابة قبل أن تعظم الحوية ، فتسد باب التوبة ، فلا تجدون سبيلا  
للسلوك على الصراط المستقيم ، "وليحذر الذين يخالفون عن أمره  
أن تصيبهم فتنة أو يصيبهم عذاب أليم" . ولا تلقوا بأيديكم إلى  
التهلكة بكثرة الأعذار ، وقد سجل الحكم عليكم بعد تعدد الأعذار  
والإنذار ، على أن عذركم كله كسراب بقيعة ، وحصونة البنية على  
الباطل غير منيعة ، فلن اطراح العذر خير من العذر ، فلن  
امثلتم نجوتهم ، وإن أبيتم خذلتهم . فلا عهد لكم ولا طاعة ، وكنتم ممن  
فارق السنة والجماعة ، "وسيعلم الذين ظلموا أي منقلب ينقلبون ، كلا سوف  
تعلمون ثم كلا سوف تعلمون" ، وحسبي الله ونعم الوكيل ، ومن يعتصم  
بالله فقد هُدي إلى صراط مستقيم .

Appendix 46 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green  
concerning the draining of foreign specie from Morocco  
by Jewish merchants.

Date : 26 Rabī<sup>c</sup> II, 1224 / 10 June, 1809.

Source: F.O. 174/17.

## الحمد لله وحده وكما حول وكافؤة الأبلثة

بتلك المسئلة امرها فریب و بلا لهاكل عندك ولم يحطت و بلا غاهو من جملة من تعم حوونه  
منهم به ما تنبضونه و ما تقبل منك عن غير ابيهم غير ابيهم و اوايشو له عنك و لاير و لا ابي  
و به كتب محمد بن عبد الله بن الصلوي و بنده الله في 26 ربيع الثاني على 224  
في جميع الاخبار

ان الله صرتك و صرت جميع خلق الله يطلب انهم يعلموا ان الظالم حتى هو  
او الدنيا كما كانت و اما ما ذكرته على البصيرة و با علم و ان اليهود اشتغلوا بياتون  
بها بسوق و يشترون الاضليون و ال ياك باذون منه و ينقلونه من المغرب و الان من بلاد  
بلاد المغرب و غير بلاد عشره و الاف ريبان اذا اتى بها باله بسيفه بلا يفر و اذا كان  
بلاد خمسة و الاف او ستة و الاف كلهم بسيفه بلا تقبل الا و الان هلا ان افان عليش  
ان شاء الله و اذا كان طور ريبان ما اتى بها غير علامه الهرة ترد له ما اخذ و امنه  
و اذا كان بلاد بها مع غيرها من الضليون و ال ياك كذا الان ترد له و اذا كان بلاد بها  
فيل و حدها و حصل هذه الهرة بليصير هو من جملة الناس و ما غرض اللامه و الكافه  
لغ على شئ و بلا غاهم ما مورون بلا لومة عليهم و بسببك نحيه اسم لا غرض له في عشوره  
و انما غرضه ايماء الله في قطعها و عدها اتيانها و اما ما ذكرته على بصيرتك فخلص ايماء نصيحه  
بتلك المسئلة امرها فریب و بلا لهاكل عندك ولم يحطت و بلا غاهو من جملة من تعم حوونه  
منهم به ما تنبضونه و ما تقبل منك عن غير ابيهم غير ابيهم و اوايشو له عنك و لاير و لا ابي  
و به كتب محمد بن عبد الله بن الصلوي و بنده الله في 26 ربيع الثاني على 224

Appendix 47 : Fatwā by the ḥālim-s of Fès concerning the sale of horses to Spain in return for the restitution of three presidios on the Mediterranean coast.

Date : 1809-1810.

Source: al-Mahdī al-Wazzānī, al-Nawāzil al-jadīda al-kubrā, Lith., Fès, 1910, vol.III, pp.35-36.

" لما أمر سيدنا أمير المؤمنين المعتمى بإقامة شعائر الدين أبو الربيع مولانا سليمان العلوي أبقى الله بركته للمسلمين أن يقيد له ما يتضمن الحكم فيما سأله عنه بعض فرق النصارى من الذين بيننا وبينهم الهدنة أن يتخلوا له عن ثلاثة ثغور ما بأيديهم في عدوتنا على أن يأذن لهم في شراء عدد من الخيل من المسلمين لاحتياجهم إليها في قتال من يريد التغلب عليهم من جنسهم دمرهم الله تعالى ، هل يفتقر ذلك في جنب استخلاص تلك الثغور من أيديهم ليعمرها المسلمون ويامنوا أن ياتيهم العدو من قبلها . قيدنا في ذلك بموافقة بعض أصحابنا ما نصه : إن الواجب في المسألة الاحتياط وتوخي المصلحة الراجحة إذ أصل المسألة لولا اغتنام استخلاص تلك الثغور المنع الشديد ، ومنهم من عبر فيها بالكراهة زمن الهدنة . قال في المُدَوَّنَة : " ولا يباع من الحربيين آلة الحرب من سلاح وكراع وسروج وغيرها ما يتقوون به في الحرب من نحاس وخرشى وغيره " . قال أبو الحسن في التقييد ، محمد بن يونس ، قال ابن حبيب كانوا في هدنة أو غيرها ، وأما الطعام فيجوز بيعه منهم ففي الهدنة ، فأما في غير الهدنة فلا . وقال ابن الماجشون وغيره ، فيغلظ الإمام في ذلك وينذر أن من فعله منهم نقض العهد ويتقدم إلى المسلمين في بيعه منهم ويفتش عليهم في انصرافهم ، وكذلك جرى أمر أهل الدين . قال سحنون : من أهدى للمشركين سلاحاً فقد أشرك في دماء المسلمين ، وكذلك في بيعه ذلك منهم ، قال الحسن من حمل إليهم الطعام فهو فاسق ومن باع منهم السلاح فليس بمومن . والخرشى بالثاء الخبأ وماعون السفر ، عياض :

الكراع الخبي خاصة ، وقيل الدواب كلها هـ . وفي القوانين إذا قدم أهل الحرب إلى بلادنا جاز الشراء منهم والبيع إلا أنه لا يباع لهم ما يستعينون به على الحرب ، ويُرهبون به المسلمين كالخيل والسلاح والألوية والحرير والنحاس ولا يباع منهم من الكسوة إلا ما يقي الحر والبرد لا ما يتزينون به في الحرب وفي الكناش . ووقع في جواب لشيخنا أبي حفص الفاسي رحمه الله حمل الكراهة في كلامها ( أى المقدمات ) على ظاهرها من الشريعة ، وحاول رد ما في المدونة إليها ولفظه " ولما ذكر في الواضحة في البيع الصّرف عن مطرف وابن الماجشون أنه يكره قال ما نصه : " وإذا كانت الهدنة بيننا وبين المشركين فلا بأس أن يباع منهم الطعام ويكره أن يباع منهم الكراع والسلاح والحديد " ثم قال مالك " كل ما هو قوة على أهل الإسلام مما يتقوون به على حربهم من كراع وسلاح وخرش ونسيبه مما يعلم أنه قوة في الحرب فلا يباعون ذلك " هـ . قال وليس فيه تصريح بالكراهة ولا بالتحريم فلأن حملت على الكراهة كانت وفاقاً للواضحة والكراهة التنزيهية تتضمن الجواز الأعم ، وإذا كان البيع المحض جائزاً فما بالك بالواقع في مسألتنا ، وإن حمل على التحريم فيكفي التمسك بكلام الواضحة عند الحاجة إلى هذه المسألة .

Appendix 48 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green about the Ceuta question.

Date : 15 Rabīʿ II, 1225 / 20 May, 1810.

Source: F.O. 174/21.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَبِأَمْرِهِ كَمَا خُذَهُ اللَّهُ بِاللَّيْلِ الْعَلِيِّ

إلى الموقنصوا الثغر للبلن امانا بما جاء في هذا الكتاب كتبت له اليكم فيه ثلاثة مسائل  
 وكما بدأ تقبلوا واحدا منهم وتجبوا علينا بما يطعن به فلو بنا في امر سبتة بل علموا اننا  
 نصرنا الله لما نصرناكم من قبله فمننا ومن لم نمتصت منا فاولئك الذين هملنا الله في  
 آياته وما هم بمؤمنين بل هم قوم خصاصة ولما جئناهم بالحكم بل كبروا عليه  
 فاجتنبوا ما نزلناهم به وما نزلناهم به الا حكمة وهم اقل من ان يعلموا ما هم  
 فيها الا من اراد ان يتق الله فله اجر عظيم ان كان قد علم ان الله لا يهدي  
 القوم الظالمين ولما جئناهم بالحكم بل كبروا عليه فاجتنبوا ما نزلناهم به  
 وما نزلناهم به الا حكمة وهم اقل من ان يعلموا ما هم فيها الا من اراد ان يتق  
 الله فله اجر عظيم ان كان قد علم ان الله لا يهدي القوم الظالمين ولما جئناهم  
 بالحكم بل كبروا عليه فاجتنبوا ما نزلناهم به وما نزلناهم به الا حكمة وهم  
 اقل من ان يعلموا ما هم فيها الا من اراد ان يتق الله فله اجر عظيم ان كان قد  
 علم ان الله لا يهدي القوم الظالمين ولما جئناهم بالحكم بل كبروا عليه فاجتنبوا  
 ما نزلناهم به وما نزلناهم به الا حكمة وهم اقل من ان يعلموا ما هم فيها  
 الا من اراد ان يتق الله فله اجر عظيم ان كان قد علم ان الله لا يهدي القوم  
 الظالمين ولما جئناهم بالحكم بل كبروا عليه فاجتنبوا ما نزلناهم به وما  
 نزلناهم به الا حكمة وهم اقل من ان يعلموا ما هم فيها الا من اراد ان يتق  
 الله فله اجر عظيم ان كان قد علم ان الله لا يهدي القوم الظالمين



Appendix 49 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green about the seizure by British cruizers of merchandize belonging to two Fāsi merchants.

Date : 25 Shawwāl, 1225 / 23 Nov., 1810.

Source: F.O. 174/21.

الحمد لله ولا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله العلي العظيم

إلى القونصوا اقرين لنجليزي ، أما بعد فلن تاجرین من أهل فاس أحدهما السيد محمد التازي والثاني اسمه الحاج الطاهر القباج ركبنا من الجزائر تاجرین فلقينهما أحد مراكبكم فأخذهما بهما ومتاعهما ، فالهؤكده به عليكم بوصول الكتاب إليكم تكتب عليهم للممرات والحاكم يسرحانها بما لهما كما هي عادتكم المعتادة في كل من هو من إيالة مولانا ورعيته ، ونريدكم أن لا يصحبكم تراخي في هذا الأمر عزمًا ولا بد ، وبه كتب إليكم محمد بن عبد السلام السلوي وفقه الله في 25 شوال المبرك عام 1225 .

Appendix 50 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green asking for the restitution of a vessel belonging to 'Abd al-Karīm b. al-Ṭālib, captured by the British navy at Malta.

Date : 14 Rabī' I, 1226 / 8 April, 1811.

Source: F.O. 174/21.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَكَمَا حَوْلَ وَمَا فَوْقَهُ لِمَا بَدَأَ اللَّهُ الْعَالَمَ الْعَظِيمَ

التي انقضت صوابا اقرير لجنابكم اني قد اخطيتكم وخطيتكم وخطيتكم وخطيتكم  
 الحاج عبد الكريم بن الطالب على شدة مركبه التي اخطاه له النجيلة بالكله  
 من غير موجب باننا نعلم به وتعرف اموره كلها منبنيه على الفواعل  
 وما وجد ياخذنا له بلنا الانزيبه كما ان تكتب له عليه للم انش وتقف مقله  
 في رده بمتاعه كله وانقبل منك عن رايه وهد كتب اليكم غير عبد السلام  
 السلولي وفيه الله وامين في 4 اربع النبوي الانور عام 1226

Appendix 51 : Letter of congratulation from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī al-Tuhāmī upon his accession to the leadership of the Wazzāni zāwiya in 1811.

Date : 17 Rabī<sup>c</sup> II, 1226 / 11 May, 1811.

Source: Ms.K. 1264, BGR, pp.361-365.

الحمد لله وحده . وصلى الله على سيدنا ومولانا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم

يهني السيادة اذ جلوت صباحها \* ومددت من نور الهدى أوضحها  
وعقدت عهدك في الوفاء وعهدها \* ووصلت راحك بالعلاء وراحها  
ووفرت من حظ الوراثة حظها \* فحمت جانبها ورشت جناحها

الولد الذي اختاره الله لبابه ، الحافظ الواقى والعالم السمي المراتب  
والمراقى ، والحلي المقلد فوق الترائب والتراقي ، والكثر المؤمل والدختر  
الباقي ، ذو الخلق السمي والخلق السني ، والمجد العلي ، أبو محمد سيدي  
التهامي ابن محبنا في الله سيدي علي حجب الله عين السوء عن عين  
كمالك ، وصير الفلك الدوار مطية آمالك ، وجعل اتفاق اليمين مقرونا  
بيمينك ، وانتظام الشمل معقودا بشمالك ، ولا برج ثوب سيادتكم سابغا  
وقمر سعادتك كلما أفلت الأتقار بازغا ، أسلم بآتم السلام عليكم ،  
وقلوبنا شيقة إليكم ، من حضرتنا العلية بالله حرسها الله ، عن ذكر لكم  
يتضوع طيبه ، وودد لكم لا يدوي وإن طال الزمان طيبه ،

وبعد ، فلنسى أحمد لكم الله الذي لا إله إلا هو وأصلى على خاتم  
أنبيائه ، وأنهى إليكم أنه وصلنا السادة الإخوة والعشيرة الحائزة  
قصب السبق في حلبة المروة ، وكتابكم ، وانتهى إلينا جوابكم وخطابكم ،  
وما ذكرتم في شأن كتابنا المتضمن . . . . . الاخاء الحافظه  
المشتمل على سني الفوائد والمواعظ . وغير خاف عليكم أن والدكم

سقاء الله صوب الرّحمة أغدقه ، وأسدى إلى روحه الكريمة من نسيم  
المغفرة أعقبه ، كان لنا في هذا الأمر الذي تحملنا أمره ، وتسوّفنا  
سرّه ، أعذب مَعين وأفضل ناصر ومَعين ، حازرحمه الله من مكارم  
الأخلاق مالمو مزج به البحر لنفى ملوحته ، وصفى كدورته ، أخلاق جمعت  
المروءة أطرافها ، وحرست التقى أكنافها ، إلى أن قبضه الله إليّه  
واختاره لما لديه ، ونحن في خلال هذا نتأمل أحوالك ونستبريها ،  
ونتتبع شيمك من بين إخوتك ونستقرئها ، حتى اتضحت لنا فيك  
المخايل ، وأعربت عن فضلك قواطع الدلائل ، فرشحك لهذا الأمر في  
قائم حياته ، وقلدناك سني موشحاته ، ورجونا بحول الله أن تكوّن  
الخليفة من بعده ، وساداً ثلثة فقهه ، إذ تلوح مخايل اللّيث في شبليّه  
ويكون النجيب فرعا تابعا لأصله ، حَقّق الله رجائنا فيك ، وخوّلك من خير  
الدّارين ما يشفيك ، وجعل الحكمة صادرة أبدا عن فيك ، حتى يكون من  
خلفك في حكم الخالد وإن أصبح فانيا ، والمقيم بأهله وإن أمسى بالعرء  
ثاويا ، وإنك وإن جمعت بحمد الله إلى شرف الأعراق شرف الأخلاق ،  
فلا تقف عندما بنته الأوائل ، وتكسل عن الاستكثار من حسن الفواضل  
والفضائل ، وانظر إلى قول القائل : إذا أعجبتك خصال امرئ فكفها يكن  
ما يعجبك ، فليس على المجد والمكرمات إذا جتتها حاجب يحجبك ، وإلى  
قوليه :

لسنا وإن كرمت أحسابنا يو \* ما على الأحساب نتكلم  
نبني كما كانت أوائلنا \* تبني ونفعل أقبح فعل  
وفرق بين من تنهى في الفضل أمره ، وعلم بالضرورة مجده وخيره ، وبين  
ذي البدايات ، ومن يروم حصول النهايات ، وحافظ فانك اليوم ذو المقام  
المعلوم ، وآسي الكلوم ، تحمّلت أمرا ، وأرهقت فيما تعيّنت له عسرا فاستعن  
على ذلك بقول خير القائلين : " وإن قال موسى لقومه استعينوا باللّه  
واصبروا إن الأرض لله يورثها من يشاء من عباده والعقبة للمتقين " ،  
وبالشكر فإنه ترجمان السنية ولسان الطوية ، وشاهد الإخلاص ، وغنوان  
الاختصاص ، وللاخوان عدّة تشدّهم وتقويهم ونورا يسمي بين أيديهم ،  
وبالحلم على العشيرة والاخوان ، وقابلهم ولو أساءوا بجميل البرور والإحسان ،  
ولله درّ من قال :

إذا أدمت قوارضهم فؤادي \* كظمت على أذاهم وانطويت  
ورحت عليهم طلق المحييا \* كأننى ما سمعت ولا رأيت  
وبكل حال فلن تكن أيدينا بالأس أمسكت على القلوب خوف انصداعها  
وانزعاجها ، فقد مسحت بك اليوم على الصدور عند استراحتها وانفراجها  
ولئن عظمت البلوى بمصرعه ، فقد سدّها الله منكم بأعظم خلف ، ولله درّ  
من قال فأنصف :

لئن فجع الأحشاء منّا بفقده \* فما فاتته من أنت تعقبه خير  
وإن فقدته الخلق شيخ هداية \* فقد طال ما أضعت وأنت لها دخر  
جلا وجهك الليل البهيم لفقده \* كذاك غروب الشمس يعقبه البدر  
والله أسأل أن يحقق فيك الرجاء ويعطر من شرك الأرجاء ، ويقيي  
مجدكم يانعة بالفضل أدواحه ، ومؤيدة بروح الله أرواحه ، ومشى بالسعد  
صباحه ونسيم سناك شهرا غدوة وشهرا رواجه \* امين .

Appendix 52 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī al-Tuhāmī supporting him in his conflict with Sīdī al-‘Arbī over the leadership of the Wazzāni zāwiya.

Date : not mentioned. Written following the death of Sīdī ‘Alī b. Aḥmad (April 1811).

Source: al-Rawḍ al-munif, II, Ms. K.2304, BGR, fol.48-49.

من سليمان بن محمد لطف الله به إلى أخينا في الله الشريف الحسنی  
العلمي سيدي التهامي بن سيدي علي ،

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله ،  
وبعد فهذا داء عضال تلقاه بالصبر والاعراض عنه وتصفية الباطن ،  
والجأ إلى الله ، والزبد يذهب جفاء ، وأما ما ينفع الناس يمكث ، ومن  
يدعي ما ليس فيه فضحه الله . أما التعرض منه للمقدمين والكتابة  
للآفاق والدخول في أمور الزاوية فهو ظالم أشهد بالله أن أباك قدمك  
وفوض لك في حياته وأنت كنت حاكماً عليه في حياة والده ، وأما كون الناس  
يذهبون له بالزيارة فلا عليك فيه ولو ترك سيدي علي ألف ولد كلها تزار  
لا ضرر ولا ضرار ، وأمر الزاوية شيء وهذا شيء ، وفي الجبل في كل زمان  
أكثر من مائة زاوية كلها تزار ولا ضيق في طريق الله ، وإن لم يزر هو يزار  
غيره كأولاد التليدي وصاحب صرصر وغيره ، فإن كان صادقاً فلخوانه  
أسعد الناس بصلاحه ، وإن كان كاذباً يفضحه الله ، ونامر الفقيه  
الرهوني وابن عفا سيدي محمد بن الصادق أن يقولوا له مضمّن كلامنا  
يكف عن التعرض لأمر الزاوية والمقدمين في النواحي ، ومن أتاه يزرور  
على الخصوص لا علينا فيه ، ولو أراد أن يكتب لأحد في البلدان يطلبه  
أو يطعم فيه لا علينا ، فلن شراوة كلهم يأكلون بسيدي أحمد الشرقي  
وكذا أهل وزان بمولانا عبد الله الشريف ، لكن التلبس والبهتان لا ،

أو يرحل من وزان ويتخذ زاوية على الاستقلال في بلد بالجبال  
أو الوطى فلن أولاد بن ناصر لهم زوايا ، وإن أبي الالتمادي على  
العصيان فالله ينتقم منه على القرب إن شاء الله والسلام .

Appendix 53 : Fatwā by the ‘ālim-s authorizing the resumption of pilgrimage to the Holy Places in the Hijāz after its take over by the Wahhābī-s.

Date : not mentioned (1811)

Source: Ms.D.2753, BGR, pp.95-98.

الحمد لله وحده و صلى الله على سيدنا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم تسليماً

دام مقام مولانا الأصعد ، مصعد من يريد سمواً وركنه الأسعد مقصد من يزيد نمواً ،  
كعبة المستجير التي لا تزال تزيد علواً ، ولا يجد المستطیع عنها سلواً ، أمير  
المومنين و حامي بيضة الإسلام محيي شعائر الدين ، و سنة جدّه عليه السلام من  
لم تنزل عتباته ملتزم الأمال و ملتئم شغاه الكمال ، و علومه رمز الظمان في كل  
جيل و ان ، و أعلا مه بالله منصوره ، و على النصر و الفتح مقصورة ، و أوامره معمولاً  
بها مرفوعة ، و كتبه على العيون و الرؤوس موضوعه ، ربيع القلوب و الأزمان أبي  
الربيع مولانا سليمان ، على مقام مولانا أزكى سلام الله و رحماته و بركاته يجرى عليه  
في سكناته و حركاته ما جرت أقلامه في الطروس بما لا يكاد يجرى مثله في  
الدروس ،

أما بعد ، فقد أتانا كتاب مولانا المنصور بالله ، الأول والثاني ، و قرأناهما  
قراءة المثاني ، و أطربانا بعبانيهما البارعة ، و معانيهما الرائعة و لا طرب  
ذي الثالث و المثاني ، و قد أفصح مولانا عن جواب مسئلته بحيث لم يدع  
مقالاً لقائل ، و قال من حضر من النبهاء و الفضلاء ما المسؤول عنها بأعلم من  
السائل . و أجمعوا على أن أهل الغرب كغيرهم في وجوب الحج على كل قبيل  
من استطاع منهم السبيل ، و إلا ضرر يلحقهم في إياب و ذهاب ، من جهة عبء  
الوهاب ، إذ لم يدع أحد من مرّ بالحجاز في دولته أنه دعاه إلى قوتسه  
أو خاف منه على نفسه أو ماله أو عاقه شيء ، في بلوغ آماله ، بل وقع به الأمن



والطمأنينة حقيقة في كل مجاز من دروب الحجاز . ولعله من الذين يُؤيد بهم هذا الدين . والناس فيما علمنا من تجار وذوي حرف لطلوع الركب متشوقون ولكمال أمر سيدنا متشوقون ، وكماله بأمر رؤساء البلدان من قاص ودان أن يحشوا على الحج من استطاع منهم ولا يغفلوا عنهم ترغيباً وترهيباً ، وتسهيلاً وتقريباً ، غير جاعلين ذلك حبالاً لأخذ المال ظلماً . عالمين بأن الله قد أحاط بكل شيء علماً . وفي قول مولانا جل وعز ، مع أن الإيجاز طريق القرآن ونهجه " ولله على الناس حج البيت من استطاع إليه سبيلاً " دون " ولله على من استطاع إلى البيت سبيلاً حجه " أو " ولله حج البيت على من استطاع إليه سبيلاً " وغير ذلك من التقادير الموجزة التي يديها من كان نبياً ، إشارة وتنبيه لكل نبيه على أن الحج واجب أو كالواجب على الناس عامتهم ، ولو ببحثهم المستطيع وإقامتهم ، سيما من أمير عامة صاحب كلمة تامة ، ومن مُفتٍ ومدرس وخطيب ، ومرغب بما به النفس تطيب حتى لا تعوق العوادي والأعادي ، ويهون الخطب ولو سحبا على الوجنات ، وقد عد ما صدر من القاضي في تلك الأبيات من الهينات ، ولم يرد في غير الحج من الأركان ما ورد في تركه مع الإمكان ، وكفى قول الله " ومن كفر فإن الله غني عن العالمين " وقول رسوله ثانياً " فلا عليه أن يموت يهودياً أو نصرانياً " وقوله : " لا ضرورة في الإسلام " أي سنة الدين أن لا يبقى أحد من المسلمين يستطيع

أن يحج ولا يحج حتى لا يكون ضرورة في الإسلام أصلاً .

وأما ما أشار إليه مولانا من تعيين التجار فذلك من وظيفة مولانا وهو بهم أدرى من الغير ، وربما يغني الله عن ذلك بمن ينتدب منهم من أهل الخير ، وقد أهلت خيمة أولاد أبي هلال وفي ذلك براءة استهلال أن يكمل بدر أمر مولانا الطالع السعيد المطالع بجاه خاتم النبيين والمرسلين ، وقائد الفر المحجلين عليه وعلى فرعه سلاله النفس الزكية أزكى تحية تعمنها نفعاتها الزكية ه .

— الحمد لله ، بعد إهداء سلام كريم طيب بر عميم لمولانا أمير المؤمنين ومن به تقام السنة والدين ، بما سطر أعلاه يقول عبد الله بن أحمد التاودي بن سودة كان الله له .

- وعبد ربه محمد بن محمد بن ابراهيم لطف الله به ،

- الحمد لله على ما في المسطور أعلاه يوافق عبد الله محمد بن عمرو الزروالي  
أصلح الله حاله بمنه آمين ،

- وعبد ربه ادريس بن زيان العراقي وفقه الله بمنه ،

- وعبد ربه محمد بن منصور وفقه الله ،

- وعبد ربه حمدون بن الحاج سلك الله به أقوم الحاج ،

- الحمد لله ، في الخطاب والمعيان في مبحث الاستطاعة ما ينبغي لسيدنا  
الإمام مراجعته ، ثم يبحث عن حال الطريق فإنه أقرب إلى معرفته على  
التحقيق ، ثم لا يكره أحد ولا يامر بإكراهه ، وإنما يندب الناس لإجمالاً ويامر  
بتذكيرهم ، ولينظر قول الرسالة وغيرها ، ومن ترك الحج مستطعاً فالله حسبه ،  
وما سطر عرضه حسن وكتب عبد ربه الطيب بن عبد المجيد بن كيران ،

- الحمد لله ، المقيد عرضه وأعلاه صحيح والسلام ، وكتب عبد ربه وأسير ذنبه عبد  
السلام الأزمي الحسنبي لطف الله به آمين .

الحمد لله

من سليمان بن محمد لطف الله به ،

ساداتنا الأئمة الأعلام ، وفقكم الله والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله تعالى وبركاته .  
فعلامة التيسير أن شرح الله صدركم لإحياء هذه الدعيمة ولست ممن يُجبر  
ولا يوصف بشدة شكية ، ولما لم يمكسب الذهاب بنفسي ها أنا وهبت  
للمسلمين ولدي في مكاني ، وعلى الله تمام العزيمة . انتهى .

Appendix 54 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the qā'id of the Oudaya on the eve of the battle of Azrou about the tactic to be adopted vis-à-vis the Fazaz Berbers.

Date : not mentioned (1811)

Source: Mic.1207, BGR, pp.465-467.

سلام الله عليك وتوابعه ،

وبعد تعلم أننا لو لم يوفقنا الله للخروج مسرعا وأظهرنا  
الله للقبائل اظهار رحمة و هناء لله الحمد ،فسدت كل قبيلة على  
عاملها حتى لا ينفعنا أحد ولا يصلنا لمكاسة لو دام ذلك الهرج .  
اذ العامل الفاش المناق تلك شهوته الخوض ويعتذر بالفساد . وأما  
المحبّ النَّاصح فلم تكن له قدرة على الوصول اليها كما تريد ، ومن  
أتى بجمييل مرغوبا لا ينفع . وعليه فلا يختبر الانسان بهذه السكينة  
التي من الله بها مع المدارات وجريان العامة على خاطرها . فليغتم  
الانسان غفلة العامة ويبرم أمره ، ويجعل لها في غفلتها أنشطة  
وسلسلة في غفلة لا يمكنها معها الجموح . فقد جرئت وأيقظتها  
هذه النبأة ، فما أمن مولانا اسماعيل غائلة العامة حتى لم يبق لها  
فرسا ولا سلاحا وتركها كالأنعام السائمة منقادة لراعيها بعد  
جور العمال والسبي والقتل الفادح ، وقد كان علي وشو ولد ببركا  
والباشا غازي وغانم الحاجي ، وأضربهم سنة الله التي قد خلت في  
عباده ، فان قال العامة ليس عمال اليوم كأولئك ، قلنا لهم لستم أنتم  
كتملك الرعية ، وقلت لهم ما رأينا يقوم على العامل الا الأكاير الذين  
منعوا من التصرف من شهواتهم . وأما الضعيف فلا قدرة له ، وما  
رأينا أحدا يشتكي بعامل لقلة دينه أو لعدم صلاته وصيامه ، وزناه  
مثلا ، وشرب الخمر ، وأنما يشتكي بما لا يسمعه الشرع منه من كسوف  
العامل ليس أخي ، وما درى أنه أمر بالطاعة ولو لعبد حبشي ، و  
قال له صلى الله عليه وسلم "أد الذي عليك واطلب من الله الذي  
لك" ، ولم يقل "انتصر لنفسك" . فاحتفظ بهذا الكتاب فان فيه

حكما و سياسة و يقرأه عليك من يفهمه لك ، و احفظه عندك فأبي الناس  
أظهر الله سياسته كمولانا الجد اسماعيل فقد كان البربر كلهم  
لهم عامل واحد ، و أما ولد بركا و فلان و فلان في اقليم ، أو كان  
جاعلا لكل قبيلة أشياخا ، لكن الفساد هو الذي جرأهم علينا ، و بالقهر  
امتثلوا أمره ، فعليه اذا نزلنا ان شاء الله تادلا ، فعند ذلك ان شاء  
الله شدّ روحك مع ايت يوسي و ردّ المظالم كلها و اقبر أهل الفساد  
و انزل بعين السمّار بمن بقي من الأوداية و حلتها كلها لا تبعد  
عن زرعها ، و قل لهم ان أصلحتم أنفسكم أنا ضامن لكم خاطر السلطان  
و الا فانه ياتيكم من بهت على أزرو على ثيئوه و نحن من هنا ، و تكون  
ان شاء الله محلّة بن ناصر عن يمينك ، و السيد محمد السلاوي بالدراج  
حتى تصلح إن شاء الله تلك القبائل كلها التي دبّ فيها الفساد  
و تردّ المظالم . و هذا الكتاب عند نزولنا ان شاء الله تادلا وجهه  
مع طالبك حتى يقرأه على السيد محمد الشاهد ، أما اليوم اكتبه  
و سر بما أنت سائر به من الاحسان و لطافة العامّة على شهواتها ،  
و الانسان يفسر أمام عدوّه اذا كان على غير أهبة ثم يكرّ و السلام .

Appendix 55 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sa'ūd b. 'Abd al-'Azīz expounding the Sultan's position regarding the Wahhābi doctrine.

Date : not mentioned (1811).

Source: Ms.4629, R.L., fol.1-5.

" من ملكه الله أزمة العرب وقيادها ، فأحسن سياستها وأصلح سيرتها  
ومهد بلادها ، وبشر على يديه حسنة أمن السابلة من القطاع  
والنهاب ، وتيسر وصول الحجاج والعمار والزوار إلى نيل الأوطار والآراب ،  
فأصبح وقد أحرز بذلك الثناء والثواب وحصل به في الدارين أفضل جزاء  
وحسن مثاب ،

أخونا في الله فلان حفظكم الله من جميع الأسواء وأدام عليكم سبوغ  
النعماء ، سلام عليكم ورحمة من الله نامية وبركات متزايدة ، وأياد  
صافية ، ومنن مترادفة وعافية غير عافية ،

وبعد فإننا نحمد إليكم الله الذي هداكم وهدى بكم فلقد سرتنا ما  
بلغنا عنكم من سيرتكم وشيمكم وأحوالكم من الزهد في الدنيا وإحياء  
رسوم الدين والحض على طريق السلف الصالح وسُنن المهتدين والحمل  
على إخلاص التوحيد لرب العالمين وقطع البدع والضلالات التي هي  
منشأ زيغ العقائد وكثرة الجهالات ، وما برحنا نسمع عنكم ما قد أصبتم  
فيه كل الإصابة ووافقتم فيه كتب العلماء ومذاهب السلف والصحابة كما  
لا يخفى على من مارس موطأ الإمام مالك ، وما في الصحيحين وطالع مسند  
الإمام الأئمة الزاهد أحمد بن حنبل أمير المؤمنين في الحديث بلا ميين .  
ومذهبننا معشر المالكية مبني على ما أنتم عليه من سد الذرائع وإبطال  
البدع والمحدثات ، ولا تكفر مع ذلك أحدآ بذنب من أهل القبلة ولا من  
أهل الأهواء في المعتقدات إلا من خرج ببدعته عما علم من الدين

ضرورة كُنْكَرِي علم الله تعالى بالجزئيات ، وعلى هذا إمام أهل السنة  
 أبي الحسن الأشعري والأئمة الأربعة وهو المرید بالقطعيات ، أخرج  
 الطبراني عن أنس قال خرج علينا رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم  
 فقال: "إن بني إسرائيل افترقوا على إحدى وسبعين فرقة وستفترق هذه  
 الأمة على اثنين وسبعين فرقة كلها على الضلالة إلا السواد الأعظم ،  
 قالوا من السواد الأعظم ؟ قال من كان على ما أنا عليه ، وأصحابي من لم  
 يُمار في دين الله ، ولم يكفر أحداً من أهل التوحيد بذنب غفر له ،  
 وروى البيهقي بسند صحيح أن جابر بن عبد الله سئل هل كنتم تسمون  
 شيئاً من الذنوب كُفراً أو شركاً أو نفاقاً ، قال معاذ الله ولا كنا نقول  
 مؤمنون مذنبون ، فالفاسق إذا مات بلا توبة في المشيئة لا يـُـمـَـرُّ ،  
 ويغفر ما دون ذلك لمن يشاء ، وهي مخصصة لمعومات العقاب فلن عقوب  
 لم يخلد بل نقطع بخروجه ودخوله الجنة كما صح في أحاديث الشفاعة  
 المتواترة ، وفيما رواه البزار والطبراني بسناد صحيح " من قال لا إله إلا الله  
 نفعته يوماً من دهره يصيبه قبل ذلك ما أصابه " . فارتكاب الكبيرة  
 لا يزيل اسم الإيمان خلافاً للمعتزلة في أن مرتكبها غير مؤمن ولا كافر  
 فيخلد في نار دون نار الكفار وخلافاً لقول الخوارج أنه كافر ، ولا تكفر نافي  
 الرأية وخلق الله تعالى لأفعال العباد واختلف فيمن يقول بخلق القرآن  
 فأطلق قوم أنه كافر ، وثبتت عن الشافعي ، وقال آخرون مُبتدع لا كافر  
 وتأول البيهقي قول الشافعي على كفران النعم دون الخروج على الملّة  
 ورد بأن الشافعي أفتى بضرب عنق حفص القرد لقوله بذلك . ولعل ما  
 ينقل عنكم من تكفير جفأة الأعراب إنما هو فيمن استحق ذلك منهم  
 باعتقاد ما يخالف ما علم من الدين ضرورة ، إذ الظن بكم التثبت في الأمور  
 لاسيما في هذا المقام الصَّعب فلا يخفى عليكم ما ورد في تكفير عوام المسلمين  
 من التشديد وغاية الوعيد الشديد لحديث مسلم وجامع الترميذي عن ابن  
 عمر مرفوعاً "أيما امرئ قال لأخيه كافر ، فقد باء بها أحدهما إن كان كما  
 قال وإلا رجعت عليه" . ولأبي داود عن أبي هريرة رفعة "أيما رجل كفر  
 رجلاً مسلماً فلن كان كافراً وإلا كان هو الكافر" . وهذه مبالغة أو وعيد بأن  
 لا يُختم له بالإيمان ، عصمنا الله وإياكم ، وللبخاري عنه وله وللإمام أحمد  
 عن ابن عمر رفعاه : " إذا قال رجل لأخيه يا كافر فقد باء بها أحدهما "

والأحاديث في هذا أكثر من أن تحصى ، وانظر قوله تعالى " يا أيها الذين آمنوا إذا ضربتم في سبيل الله " إلى قوله " بما تعلمون خبيراً " وفي الصحيح أن المصطفى قال لأسماء : " أقتلته بعدما قال لا إله إلا الله فكيف تصنع بلا إله إلا الله إذا جئت يوم القيامة ؟ " ولما اعتذر بأنه قالها خوفاً من السلاح قال : " هلاً شغقت عن قلبه ؟ " . وانظر ما تواتر من قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم " أمرت أن أقاتل الناس حتى يقولوا لا إله إلا الله فإذا قالوها عصوا فيها فإني مأمورهم وأموالهم إلا بحقها وحسابهم على الله " فاكتمى من جفاة الأعراب بالشهادة حتى يثبت موجب انتفاء العصمة . وما اشتهر بين علماء الأمة وذكره غير واحد كالتقي السبكي والبيضاوي أن الغلط بترك ألف كافراً هون من الغلط بسفك محجمة دم امرئ مسلم . وكيف يتوهم أن يلتبس على أمثالكم الفرق بين المشرك الذي يسجد للصنم وهو يرى أنه يجلب ويدفع ويعصم من الأسواء ، وأنه لا ترد شفاعته بل تعتبر لا محالة من غير احتياج إلى إذن - قال تعالى معرضاً بهم " من ذا الذي يشفع عنده إلا بإذنه " " ولا تنفع الشفاعة عنده إلا لمن أذن له " ، " يومئذ لا تنفع الشفاعة إلا من أذن له الرحمان ورضي له قولاً " ، " وقيل لهم أين ما كنتم تعبدون من دون الله هل ينصروكم أو ينتصرون . " ثم قال " قالوا وهم فيها يختصمون تالله إن كنا لفي ضلال مبين إذ نسويكم برب العالمين " أي في استحقاق العبادة والنفع والضرر ، وقال " ومن الناس من يتخذ من دون الله أنداداً يحبونهم كحب الله " . قال في النهاية الأنداد جمع نِدْ بالكسر ، وهو مثل الشيء الذي يُضاده في أمره ويُضاده أي يخالفه ه . وفي المصباح ولا يكون الند إلا مخالفاً - وبين المسلم المستغِيث بنبي أو ولي مع اعتقاد أن الله هو المعطي المانع الضار النافع وأن يستغِيث به ويرغب إليه على وجه أن يشفع له عند الله استصحاباً للإذن العام في الشفاعة للمسلمين وقضاء حوائجهم أو إسناداً لما يحدث له من إلهام أو كيفية يعلمها الله . وظن قبول شفاعته بمكان خصوصيته . ولا يمنع من ذلك كونه ميتاً فإن الأرواح بعد مفارقة الأجساد دراية عامة بأحوال الأحياء غالباً كما تواطت به الآثار المتكاثرة المفيدة لليقين . قال تعالى " كل نفس ذائقة الموت " والذائق لا بد أن يبقى بعد المذوق . وقال " إذا بلغت التراقي " إلى قوله " المساق " والمسوق

الارواح ، " ولا تحسبن الذين قُتلوا في سبيل الله أمواتاً بل أحياء " إلى آخره . وأحاديث نعيمها وتعذيبها وأن أهل القبور يسمعون سلام الزائر ويردون ويعلمون أحوال أهل الدنيا وأن الأرواح تتلاقى وتتزاور كثيرة جداً . قالوا ولكل روح بجسدها اتصال معنوي . أما الأنبياء فأحياء هم حقيقة على ما للحافظ الأسيوطي في تأليف سماه " أنباء الأذكيا بحياة الأنبياء " وبالجملة ليس لنا أن نكفر إلا بلنكار من علم من الدين ضرورة ، وكل ما لا يخالف إجماعاً ولا نصاً صريحاً قطعياً فرجعه إلى نوع اجتهاد . فليكن رد العلماء فيه بعضهم على بعض برفق مع الجزم بأن المصيب في العقليات واحد وهو من صادق الواقع كقولنا بأن الباري سبحانه يرى في الآخرة وأنه الخالق لأعمال العباد ، وأن صفات المعاني قائمة بالذات العلية ، وأنه تعالى أن يكون في ملكه ما لا يريد أو لا يكون ما يريد . أما الأحكام الفقهية فقد اختلف هل كل مجتهد فيها مصيب أو المصيب فيها واحد وعليه الأكثر . فالآنة القول فيها مع الخصوم أجدر ، وقد أفاد الغزالي في الإحياء في الباب الرابع من كتاب العلم شروط المناظرة والجدل وإفاتهما ، فليُنظر، وليحذر العالم من التشعيب وقلة الانصاف للحق بعد ظهوره واللجاج فيه ، وانظر كيف كانت مناظر الإمام أحمد رضي الله عنه مع خصومه في المعتقدات وغيرهـا بليضاح الحق بأدلة ومظاهرة والاحتتيال في إيصاله إلى الأفهام حتى يزول الالتباس والاشتباه ، وفي هدم الباطل بحل الشبه بلا تعنيست ولا تشغيب وقد كانت البدع والأهواء طافحة في وقته فكان يتعطف في ردها وإبطالها وهذا كله مما سبق إليه الكلام وليس بخاف على أمثالكم من هو بصدد تحقيق الحق وإقامة الأحكام . وأكثر ما تُنكروه على مرتكبيه وهو عندنا معشر المالكية مُحَرَّم أو مكروه أو مختلف فيه ، فقد قال علماءنا يُكره البناء على القبور أو التحويز ، وسواء كان الميت مالكاً أو عالماً أو شريفاً أو سلطاناً أو غير ذلك " وإن بوهي به حرم " ، وجاز البناء الخفيف للتمييز بحجر أو خشبة بلانقش وخذ . صحح الحاكم في المستدرک أحاديث النهي عن البناء والكتابة على القبور ثم استخف الكتابة فقط بأن أئمة المسلمين شرقاً وغرباً مكتوب على قبورهم ، ويسقط المسئلة والخلاف فيها يطول ، وذكر علماءنا أيضاً أن الوقود على قبر الولي ووضع الستور عليه ليس بقربة بل هو مكروه ومن نذر ما لألذلك أو نذره بعينه لم يلزمه لآكن من وضع يده بمال



نذر لذلك وجب عليه جعله بمنزلة شرط الواقف المكروه فإنه يتبجح ، وقد بسط صاحب المدخل الكلام في هذا وغيره من كلامه ولا بأس بذكر مسئلة الصالحين والعلماء والأولياء ما لم يكن منقوشاً على القبر أو على جدار أو في ورقة ملصقة هناك ، وإذا كان هذا ممنوعاً فما بالك بالشمع الكبير الغليظ الذي ليست به حاجة للوقود ولو كان سائغاً فلم يبق إلا أن يكون إضاعة مال ، وكذلك يمنع ما يفعله بعضهم من تعليق قنديل على قبر من كان مشهوراً بالخير والناس يعتقدونه ليأتي الناس إلى مكان الضوء ليزوروا فلينظر تمامه . ومن المختلف فيه زيارة قبور الصالحين فذكر ابن أيوب في اختصار الرسالة العلمية للقسيري أن ذلك ليس من طريق القوم أي الصوفية وذكر ابن العربي من فقهاء المالكية أنه لا يزار قبر لينتفع به غير قبر نبينا صلى الله عليه وسلم . وقال الشارمساحي " قصد الانتفاع بالميت بدعة " ، قيل وهذا ينظر إلى سد الذرائع وحسم مادة البدع المحرمة المتطرفة في ذلك وجعلها الغزالي من العبادة واعتمده صاحب المدخل ، وعمل عليه الجماهير الذين لا يحصون وحظ على ذلك الشيخ ابراهيم التازي في قصيدته المشهورة التي تلقاها العلماء بالقبول وأولها :

زيارة أرباب التقى مرهم يبيدي \* وفتح أبواب العارة والخير . . .  
إلى أن قال :

عليك بها فالقوم باحوا بسرها \* وأوصوا بها ياصاح في السر والجهر . . .  
ثم قال :

ولا فرق في أحكامها بين سالمك \* مربي ومجدوب وحي وذي قبر  
وقال مالك في رواية ابن وهب " إذا سلم زائر القبر الشريف على المصطفى يقف للدعاء مستقبلاً القبر الشريف لا القبلة " وقد سأله الخليفة المنصور " أيهما يستقبل ؟ " فقال " لم تصرف وجهك عنه وهو وسيلتك ووسيلة أبيك آدم إلى الله عز وجل " . وقال مالك في المبسوط : " لا أرى أن يقف يدعو ، لكن يسلم ويمضي " وجمع الشيوخ بين قوله بأن مثل المنصور يعلم ما يدعوا به ، واداب الدعاء بين يديه صلى الله عليه وسلم فأمن عليه سر الأدب فافتاء بذلك وأفتى العامة أن يسلموا وينصرفوا ليلاً يواجهوه بالتوسل به إلى الله أو يدعوا بما يحرم أو يكره ، أو يلغوا جهلاً منهم . وقد حذر الشيوخ مما يفعله بعض الجهلة من الطواف بالقبر الشريف والتمسح بالبناء أو إلقاء المناديل

والثياب عليه - وقد تقرب بعض العامة فأكل الأوز في الروضة الشريفة -  
والقاء شعورهم في القناديل وكل ذلك من المنكرات وإذا كره مالك دعاء  
العوام عند القبر الشريف فما بالك بغيره من قبور الصالحين ، فلن زيارة العوام  
لقبور الصالحين لا يخلو غالباً من سوء مقالات وظهور جهالات ، فمنعهم منها  
حتى يعلموا ما يقولون سداد قياساً على ما في آية " لا تقربوا الصلاة . الآية " <sup>١</sup>  
وحديث مالك " فلعله يذهب يستغفر فيسب نفسه " بجامع الخوف من التكلم  
بالجهل ومالا يليق بجناب الباري سبحانه ، ومن المختلف فيه أيضاً تقبيل  
كل معظم شرعاً وقد أخذ بعضهم الجواز من مشروعية تقبيل الحجر وقد ورد  
في وفد عبد القيس أنهم أكبوا يقبلون يدي المصطفى ورجليه وكذا تعريخ الوجه  
في الأماكن الشريفة ، قالوا ومذهب كثير من العلماء وخصوصاً المالكية الكراهة  
في غير ما ثبت في الشرع كتقبيل الحجر ، وقد نهى مالك عن تعريخ الوجه  
على الحجر ، وكان يفعله إذا خلا به هذا . وفي المدونة وهي أجل كتب  
المالكية " ولو قال علي جزور أو ان انحر جزوراً فلينحرها في موضعه ولو نوى  
موضعاً أو سماه فلا يخرجها إليه كانت الجزور بعينها أو بغير عينها وكذلك  
إن نذرها لمساكين بلده وهو بغيرها فلينحرها بموضعه يتصدق بها على  
مساكين من عنده وسوق البدنة إلى غير مكة من الضلال " وهذا كله من سد  
الذرائع ، وكرامة الأولياء لا تنكرونها فيما بلغنا عنكم كيف وإنما أنكرتها المعتزلة  
وأثبتها جميع أهل السنة وقال جمهورهم ما جاز أن يكون معجزة لنبي جاز  
أن يكون كرامة لولي لا فرق بينهما إلا التحري وعدمه ، وهي متواترة معنى ،  
فلا حاجة للتطويل ، وهذا القدر كاف في هذه الرسالة المبنية على الاختصار  
دفعنا بها أن تظنوا بنا أننا نحن نحوا منحنى الاعتراض عليكم والإنكار . ولما  
اتضح لدينا قصدكم وخلص طويتكم في الدب عن الدين ولحقنا احتياطكم  
وحياطتكم للمسلمين ، ومنعكم الجار وإن جار فكان بكم من اللاتذيين  
ومحافظتكم على الشيم العربية والمكارم الشرعية مقتنعين بذلك منكم مبتهجين  
وانكم لا تعرضون للمفارقة الحجاج والعمار والزائرين ، لم يبق وجه فسي

احتباسهم عن أداء الفريضة والسنة ، وجهنأهم وأحللنا ولدنا وسطهم في هذه  
السنة ملتسمين أجر تلك الخطأ ، وأن يحط بها عنا الوزر والخطأ ، وان نكون ممن  
ندب إلى الطاعة وكان عليها من المسعدين ، وإنك لخليق أن تسلك بهذه  
الأمّة أحسن المسالك ، وأن تكون عليها من المشفقين ، فأحسن جوارها  
أحسن الله إليك ، إن الله يحب المحسنين ، ولا تصغ إلى واش يخادع الله  
وهو خادعه ، ولا يحيق مكر السوء لإابه " والله خير الماكرين " ، عصمنا  
الله وإياكم من كيد الشيطان وجعلنا ممن اضطره إلى استثناءهم بقوله  
" إلا عبادك منهم المخلصين " صلى الله على سيدنا ومولانا محمد سيّد  
الأولين والآخريين ، وعلى آله وأصحابه أجمعين ، وآخر دعوانا أن الحمد لله  
رب العالمين ه .

Appendix 56 : Draft of a letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sa'ūd b. 'Abd al-'Azīz on the Wahhābi doctrine written by Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt.

Date : not mentioned (1811)

Source: Z.2710, R.L., fol. 82-86.

الحمد لله

أخونا في الله السلطان الذي أصلح الله به ما فسد من أمر الدنيا  
والدين، وإقامة حجة بالغة على أهل الشكوك في بيان التوحيد  
على طريق اليقين الحامي بسيفه دار الإسلام، والداعي إلى القيام  
بالقسط بين الأنام، أمير العرب الذي لا يدرك شأوه في المجد  
والحسب، مالك الحرمين أبو النجا سعود المطاع أمره في الأغوار  
والنجود، يسر الله لكم دوام القيام بمصالح المسلمين، وأمن  
بكم طريق الحجاج والمعتمرين، ثم عليكم السلام ورحمة الله ما  
خرت لكم الأذقان والجباة،

أما بعد، فقد أنهي إلى حضرتنا العلية بالله ممن لم يقع له فيما  
يبلغه غلط واشتباه من حسن سيرتكم وصدق سيرتكم ما يكون  
بأنك من المجددين الذين يجدد الله بهم لهذه الأمة معالم  
الدين، ونرجوا أن تكون من الذين قال فيهم نبيك عليه السلام  
"لا تزال طائفة من أمتي ظاهرين على الحق لا يضرهم من خالفهم  
حتى يأتي أمر الله"، وكيف وقد أخذت بحظ وافر من الخلق العظيم  
الذي أثنى الله به على أشرف رسله في الكتاب الكريم كالزهد  
في الدنيا الذي لا تكون يد صاحبه إلا العليا. روى الامام أحمد  
بن حنبل رضي الله عنه في مسنده عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم  
"الزهد في الدنيا يريح القلب والبدن والرغبة في الدنيا تطيل  
الهم والحزن"، وكالحلم فانه يسمو بالحلم في المقام العظيم  
أخرج الخطيب في التاريخ عن أبي هريرة رضي الله عنه أن النبي  
ص قال: الحليم سيد في الدنيا وسيد في الآخرة، وكالمغفور وهو

أدعى الى الدخول في الطاعة الى قيام الساعة . وقد أرسل الله تعالى اليه نبيّه في غير ما آية ، كقوله تعالى "خذ العفو و امر بالعرف واعرض عن الجاهلين" ، وأخرج الرافعي عن علي بن أبي طالب رضي الله عنه أن رسول الله (ص) قال "عفو الملوك أبقى للملك" . و كالرحمة فانها تبعث على اسباغ النعمة قال تعالى في حق نبيّه عليه السلام "فبما رحمة من الله لنت لهم ، و لو كنت فضا غليظ القلب لانفضوا من حولك" ، و قال "و كان بالمومنين رحيمًا" . وأخرج أبو داود و الترمذي عن عبد الله بن عمرو بن العاص رضي الله عنه عن النبي (ص) : "الراحمون يرحمهم الرحمن ، ارحموا من في الأرض يرحمكم من في السماء" . وأخرج أبو الشيخ عن أبي هريرة رضي الله عنه عن النبي عليه الصلاة و السلام قال "الرحمة تنزل على الامام ثم على من عن يمينه الأول فالأول" ، الى غير هذا من أوصافك الحسان التي لا يفسي بها اللسان ، مع الأخذ بالسنة و طرح البدعة ، و في الحديث الكريم "من أخذ بسنتي فهو مني ، و من رغب عن سنتي فليس مني" ، و ناهيك بما قدمته بين يدي نجواك من الأمر بإخلاص التوحيد لله بما لا يتوهم معه اشراك فلا يسأل غيره و لا يرجى الا خيره . قيل لأبي الحسن الشاذلي "هذا جدك عليه السلام يقول : جبلت القلوب على حب من أحسن اليها ، فقال رضي الله عنه : لا نرى محسنا الا الله" ، و هذا هو توحيد أهل الايمان المتمسكين بالشهود في العرفان ، و بذلك تمت كلمة الله عندك و قمت في حماية الملة و الذب عنها جهداك فعم سلطانك الحرمين و الحجاز بأسره و اليمن عموما مستوي الطرفين فاستزيدوا نعم الله عليكم بشكركم لأنه القائل "و لكن شكرتم لأزيدنكم" و من الشكر على هذه النعم ، و هو لببيت د و امها كالركن الأعظم ، الزيادة في حسن الخلق مع الخلق الذين هم عيال الله الملك الحق فان حسن الخلق خلق الله الأعظم . و لك فيه أفضل اسوة بالنبي (ص) ، و أخرج الدليمي في سنن الفردوس عن أنس رضي الله أن النبي

عليه السلام قال "حسن الخلق نصف الدين" ، وأخرج ابن عدي في الكامل عن ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما عنه عليه السلام "حسن الخلق يذيب الخطايا كما تذيب الشمس الجليد" ، ومن ذلك الزيادة في تعظيم حُرَمَاتِ الله فهو خير له عند ربه ، ومن تعظيمها احترام العلماء الذين هم حملة الشريعة الفراء ، ففي الحديث الصحيح "ان الملائكة لتضع أجنحتها لطالب العلم ، وان العالم ليستغفر له من في السماوات والأرض والحيتان في جوف الماء" ، وان فضل العالم على العابد كفضل القمر ليلة البدر على سائر الكواكب ، وان العلماء ورثة الأنبياء ، وان الأنبياء لم يُورثوا ديناراً ولا درهماً ولكن ورثوا العلم ، فمن أخذه أخذ بحظ وافر" ، أخرجه أبو داود والترمذي عن أبي الورداء رضي الله عنه عن النبي عليه الصلاة والسلام . وفي حكم العلماء العاملين حكم أولياء الله الصالحين ان لم يكن العلماء أولياء الله فليس لله من ولي ، و اذا انتفى اعتقاد التأثير لهم في شيء عن القلوب فزيارتهم أحياء وأموال من الأمر المحبوب ، على هذا بناء العقائد السنّية في أن لا تأثير لغير القدرة الالهية به أخذ أئمة المذاهب الأربعة أحمد بن حنبل ، ومالك بن أنس ، ومحمد بن ادريس الشافعي ، وأبو حنيفة رضي الله عنهم ، واستمرّ عليه عمل الناس في جميع الأقطار من البوادي والقرى والأمصار ، وحديث "لا تشدّ الرحال الا لثلاث" محمول على خصوص الصلاة . فزيارة الصالحين أمر محمود في حق من حصل في سلامة العقيدة على المقصود ، ونية الزائر في زيارته ، وربما أنصح به في عبارته ، انما هو التبرك والاعتبار والدعاء والتشفع بهم لله الواحد القهار ، فان بركة الصالحين جارية بعد مماتهم أكثر مما كانت في حياتهم لأنهم على بساط الحق كما قال الشيخ ابن عقبة الحضرمي ، والدعاء عندهم مستجاب لأن الله تعالى قد اجتباهم وشرّفهم وكرّمهم ، فلما نفع بهم في الدنيا ففي الآخرة أكثر ، قل انما أدعوربي ولا أشرك به أحداً ، على أن العلماء المجتهدين وإن اختلفوا فاختلفهم رحمة

خص الله تعالى بها هاذم الأمة وكلهم على هدى من ربهم ، وان قالوا  
 مع عدم النص برأيهم و ما كان بعضهم يؤثم بعضا و لا يروم لقواعد  
 مذهبه نقضا ، و لكل منهم أتباع مقلدون وإنسا على آثارهم مقتدون ، وكان  
 امام مذهبكم أبو عبد الله أحمد بن حنبل رضي الله عنه أقرب الناس  
 الى الحق و أبعدهم من الباطل ، و كان في زمن كثير فيه المبطلون  
 و قد قل فيه المنصفون ، لآكته كان يسوقهم بزمام السكينة و الوقار ، بعد  
 اظهار الحجّة كأنها علم في رأسه نار . و كذلك لم يقل هو و لا غيره  
 من هؤلاء الائمة الذين انحصرت فيهم المذاهب الأربعة لهذه الأمة  
 بتكفير أحد من أهل الاسلام اذا اقترف شيئا من المعاصي العظام  
 ان لا يتكفر أحد بذنب من أهل القبلة و لو أذنب مع الاسلام عمره كله  
 لقوله تعالى " ان الله لا يغفر ان يشرك به و يغفر ما دون ذلك لمن  
 يشاء " . و أخرج البخاري و مسلم و الترمذي عن ابي ذر الغفاري  
 رضي الله عنه ان النبي (ص) قال " أتاني جبريل فبشّرني أنه من مات  
 من أمتك لا يشرك بالله شيئا دخل الجنة ، قلت و إن زنا و إن سرق ؟  
 قال : و إن زنا و إن سرق ! قلت : و إن زنا و إن سرق ؟ قال : و إن زنا  
 و إن سرق ! ثم قال في الرابعة على رغم أنف أبي ذر " فلا يحكم حينئذ  
 بالكفران على من لم يحكم عليه به القرآن ، لأن الحكم على أحد بالخلود  
 في النار إنما مرجعه الى الوحي في هذه الدار ، و قد أكمل الله  
 الدين على لسان رسوله الصادق الأمين : " و ما أتاكم الرسول فخذوه  
 و ما نهاكم عنه فانتهوا " و من أحدث في أمرنا هذا ما ليس فيه فهو  
 مردود عليه " ، سلك الله بنا و بكم سبيل الطاعة و أمانتنا على السنة  
 و الجماعة ، أبشر رعاك الله ان كانت المنة لك على ملة الاسلام بتأمين  
 الحجاج الوافدين على بيت الله الحرام ، فلا يستطيع اليوم حي من  
 الأعراب أن يمد لهم يد القتل و الانتهاب ، و الجزاء على ذلك عند  
 الله لا يعد له حجّ و لا عمرة ، و إنما يهبه تعالى لمن بذل في نصرة  
 الدين عمره ، لأن الحجاج وفد الله ، و هو تعالى يتولى من تولىه

فيحجون في أمان و يزورون في أمان ، و زيارة قبر النبي عليه السلام مما يهيج به القلب و الشوق و الغرام ، و من فاته العبر اكتفى بالأثر و قضى لفرط ما به بعض الوطر ، و هي من أعظم القربات و أفضل ما يثاب عليه من المستحبات ، بشر فيها الحديث بالقبول لأن شمس عليه السلام ليس لها في الحقيقة أقول . أخرج ابن عدي في الكامل و البيهقي في الشعب عن ابن عامر رضي الله عنه عن النبي (ص) قال " من زارني في قبري و جبت له شفاعتي " ، و أخرج الطبراني في الكبير و البيهقي في السنن عن ابن عمر رضي الله عنهما عن النبي عليه السلام قال " من حج فزار قبري بعد وفاتي كان كمن زارني في حياتي " ، و أخرج البيهقي في الشعب عن أنس رضي الله عنه أنه عليه الصلاة و السلام قال " من زارني بالمدينة محتسباً كنت له شهيداً و شفيعاً يوم القيامة " ، و لا عجب ان كانت بكم ركاب الحاج تؤمن فوجوهها بحسنكم تزيد ؛ أخرج الطبراني في الكبير عن ابن عمر رضي الله عنهما أن رسول الله (ص) قال " زين الحاج أهل اليمن " قد واليك رفعت للخير ، و سعديك بتوفّر خصال الحمد كلها لديك و إنما نحن أعزك الله لما نشر في بساطنا طي ما لكم من المحاسن و شهر في إيالتنا ما سنى الله لكم في الفتوحات في تلك الأماكن أذنا في الناس بالحج في أقطار المغرب لزوال ما كان يختلج في خاطر من الوهم المرهب ، فأجابوا الداعي آتين من كل فج عميق سالكين بعون الله أيمن و آمن طريق ، إذ لم يبق لهم عذر في التخلّف عن هذا الفرض ، و أنتم بحمد الله قد مكّن لكم في الأرض متخلّفين بالأخلاق العربية ، و متمسكين بالأحكام الشرعية ، و هذا ولدنا أصلحه الله و جهنمنا فيهم يلتمس أجر خطاه لأداء حجته و عمرته و السلام على جدّه عليه الصلاة و السلام في حجرتة حتى يثوب إن شاء الله و سعيه مشكور ، و ذنبه بفضل الله و كرمه مغفور . شكر الله سعينا و سعيكم ، و غفر بمنه ذنبننا و ذنبيكم ، أمين و السلام .



Appendix 57 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to J. Green  
requesting a British vessel to bring back his son  
Mawlāy Ibrāhīm from Alexandria.

Date : Beginning of Jumādā I, 1226 / May, 1811.

Source: F.O. 174/21.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَمَا حَوْلَهُ وَلَا فَوْقَهُ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ الْعَلِيِّ الْعَظِيمِ



الرخد عينا الفونصوا افرير ليجليز اما بلحا باعلم واذ وخبثت واما للمشرو  
لحج بيت الله الحرام بلحا الانا مرك ان تكتب عن امرنا للسلطان جرح يا امر  
بسعينة من خيال سفينة تهيئ وتوجه به شتم مائة السنة الاخلة  
ان شاء الله تلعفي ولحا فلانا لا اسكن ربه تخله واحبابه المرسي كنبته  
بعول باله ومات خله حتى لم يسي الامم التي في بلحا المصلي  
وما للمراسم التي في بر النصارى واعلمتك بهذا التكتب اليس وياتين جواب  
من عند السلطان جرح انه هيكذا ان المركب ويسر لتكلم من انفسنا  
بتا الذي وعلا ذلك من اهم الامم التي تلاحقنا فيها بالبحر والخرق واللعن وكابله وجبه  
كتب اليكم في اوابه بمادى الاولى على 226

Appendix 58 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green concerning the payment to Mawlāy Maslama of an allowance by the British consul at Alexandria.

Date : 15 Jumādā I, 1226 / 7 june, 1811.

Source: F.O. 174/21.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وكما هو دلالة ما باله الله العلي العظيم

الى الفونصوا اقرير لتخليج اماره في باعلم وراه سيزا في الله كراه  
امر فونصوا التخليج الذي، بلا لا مسكنه ربه فيما مضى يبيع كما خفيه  
سيزا اموكاى سكرامة الذي، بمصر مائة ريال في كل شهر ويقت  
في من يتعمد عليه ويبيع في الاثمان الك وفي امره مكرانا في الله  
نعمل مع الحساب في ذالها ونقتطع له ما د بقتن له من واجب  
طراكنه الالبع ثور متاعه السنة والآن وكابد ان كل عندك الحساب  
ابقتنا لنا وان لم يكن عندك تعني بالكتب للفونصوا الذي، بلا لا مسكنه ربه  
وتفعله وان لم يكن في بيع له شيئا ففعله يبيع له ذالها من يبيع  
وظله امر سيزا في الله واعني في الا وارا في وكابد ربه كتب اليكم  
تم جيل المسع السلوى وفيه الله في في اوله على 1226


Appendix 59 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to J. Green  
apologizing for the impossibility of allowing the export  
of wheat.

Date : 9 Qa<sup>c</sup>da, 1226 / 25 Nov., 1811.

Source: F.O. 174/21.

وحي السع وسلم على سيدنا محمدا وآله

الجملة وحده



فَنَحْرُ التَّجْلِيذِ اقْرَبِي مَا فَرَأَى الْعَيْنُ السَّيْرِ بِحَرْبِ عَجْزِ السَّلَامِ اَوْ يَسْرَحِ  
لَكُمْ الْقَيْتْرَانِ لِمَا لَمْ يَجَانِبْنَا بِمَا كَلَّمْتُمْ مَعَهُ قَبْلَ وَلَوْ بَقِيَتْ لِمَا اَمَّا سَرَحَتْ  
تَوْرًا بَعُودَهُ عَمَّ مَبَارِيفًا بَرَا عَيْتِنَا وَفَكَّرَ الْهَيَا وَمَا اَنْزَعِ نَسَلُ اللّٰهِ اَنَا يَمِي عَلَيْنَا  
بِيَدِ مَهْرٍ اَلْيَوْمِ فِي بِلَادِنَا كَمَا لَا نَحْمَلُكُمْ سَوْفَهُ بِيَعَا سِيْمَا وَفَدَا خَاخِرَ الْكُرْ اَلْسِي  
مَنْزَا الْاَنْبَاءِ وَاَمَّا فَرَحِبَا اَعَانْتُمْ عَلَي مَا يُرْضِي اللّٰهُ تَعَالَى اَمْلِكُ السَّاعِدَاءِ ،  
وَاَمِي وَالسَّلَامُ عَلَي سِرِّ اَتْبَعِ الْهَنْزِي وَالسَّلَامُ وَبِ وَرَدِ الْفَعْرَةَ الْخَرَامِ عَلَي  
٢٢٦ اَوْ فَوْضَلِ اَوْ جَهَنَّهُ مِنَ الْهَيْدِ يَدِ كَمَا ذَكَرْتَهُ فِي كِتَابِكَ كَمَا اَللّٰهُ  
خَيْرُكُمْ فِي تَلَاوِيحِهِ

Appendix 60 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green asking for a British vessel to bring back the prince Mawlāy Ibrāhīm from Alexandria and requesting verification of rumours according to which Moroccan pilgrims would have been prevented from visiting the Holy Places.

Date : 15 Şafar, 1227 / 29 Feb., 1812.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَلَا حَوْلَ وَلَا قُوَّةَ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ الْعَلِيِّ الْعَظِيمِ

الى الفقه صوا اقرىس ليجلينر اما بهما وفد وطلع كفايا عرفت ما انجمل  
عليه جمع الفقه نصوات في امر المركب الذي بالبحر ايشو حيث كان مركب  
ثلاثة بالصوبه ها نحن نعلم سميها بامرهم باثنيس والهي حكم به عليه  
العمل ان شاء الله يكره هذه من ذالدار العلم ان كان اناك يمليات  
كتاب من صير انعمه الله على الاممينة التي تتوجه للاسكنه ربه  
ثلاثة بالحجاج مع ولد سينا عموه الله ان تغفر عليهم اطلع به المبروك  
في البوم وكان سينا كلف يلة قذاب الملكا مضاع التجلين على المركب  
انه يلة والبيع سموا انهم لم يجتوا هلاذله الصنة بلذ اسان ايزر انعمه  
الله بواعلمنا بما نجيبه واذا اتت العرشا له بانها تاخضا الكملية  
التي تكفوها عن سينا نابلنا كيف يكون في ذالدار اجدر به كتب اليكم  
عمر عبد المسيح الشاربي وبقية الله في ذالدار اجدر به كتب اليكم 1227

Appendix 61 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green  
about the training of Moroccan artillerymen at  
Gibraltar.

Date : 23 Şafar, 1227 / 8 March, 1812.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَكَافُوْنَا لَهَا بِاللَّهِ الْعَلِيِّ الْعَلِيمِ

الى الفرنسيصوا اقرير لىخلىنر اما بقى پير د عليا اربعة من الينبا جيد من شفى  
الصديرة ايامرك سينا صلى الله تنبشهم لجبل كارى يقيمون به عند كمر حنى  
يتعلموا ان شاء الله بالمركبا به عليك ان تويج عليهم بالرفوف مظهر والاعتناء  
بامرهم حتى ياتوا به مراد سينا صلى الله وهما هم يطروننا بحجة كتاب سينا  
السيرة الموهنة وما كنت قلت للمعل اثني سعاير الدير ينزجهمون ياتون بولنا  
سينا صلى الله بالنظر لكره ذاللا ان عرفت من سچينه تكفي بنزاي والابالدى يظلم  
لهم وبه كتب اليهم عمر بن عبد الملك السمرى وفيه الله 23 صبر الخيم على 227

Appendix 62 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green inquiring about the war between Muḥammad 'Alī of Egypt and the Wahhābī-s of the Ḥijāz.

Date : 1 Rabī' I, 1227 / 15 March, 1812.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
 وما حولها من بلادها بالهدى العظمى

الى الغنوص الاثري لثياب زاما بعد بطلان هذا الرجل التظاونه يا مركب ديني نعم له الله  
 فتبعته لحاكم جبل طارون بطلان في مركب الماسكنه ريبه وكلاهما وكما برعنا ما برصوا  
 الكتاب اليه وانقلب عنا ما خلف عنكم من خبر باشق صر وما يفعل مع الوهابية  
 الذي في الججاز وكما برعنا بكتب اليكم نحر عن الشهد السلي وتبينه الله في مهله  
 ربيع الثبوي على 227

Appendix 63 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Ash'āsh concerning the salary and equipment of Makhzenian troops.

Date : 2 Jumādā II, 1227 / 13 June, 1812.

Source: D.A.R.

الحمد لله وحده      صلى الله على سيدنا ومولانا محمد وآله  
 خدينا الحاج عبد الرحمن عشماش ، سلام عليك ورحمة الله وبعمد  
 وصلنا كتابك وعرفنا ما تضمنه بمشاهدة القائدين اقطعهما ومشاهدة العسكر  
 اقطعهما مُعتذراً لهم بقله الداخل ، والخياطة يدفع لهم ثمنها من ذعيرة  
 السيد ابراهيم التي تحت يد السويي ، كل واحد في يده وكل واحد  
 يزيد ما أحب ، وفرق الكتان والملف الصدرية والبدعية وما يخصكم  
 من الملف يملك من الصورة إن شاء الله ، ولا ضرر علينا فيه ، والله يرضى  
 عنك والسلام ، في 2 من جمادى الأولى عام 1227 .

Appendix 64 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Ash'āsh concerning the striking of copper coins to which a proportion of lead is to be added.

Date : 11 Ḥijja, 1227 / 16 Dec., 1812.

Source: D.A.R.

الحمد لله وحده صلى الله على سيدنا ومولانا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم

( طابع : سليمان بن محمد غفر الله له بمنه )

خدیمنا الأمين الحاج عبد الرحمان أشعاش أعانك الله وسلام عليك ورحمة  
الله تعالى وبركاته ، وبعد بلغنا كتابك مع المثالين من سكة الفلوس وقد أعجبنا  
ذلك الصنيع ، أصلحك الله ، وهذا الرقيق أفضل وعليه العمل إن شاء الله ،  
وأوقيتان من الرصاص في كل رطل من النحاس تكفي ليلا تسود الفلوس وتُغش  
بالرصاص حتى تكون منه والله يعينك والسلام .  
وفي 11 من ذي الحجة الحرام عام 1227 .



Appendix 65 :Letter from the governor of Essaouira to the British government about allegations made against James Green, British consul at Tangier, who would have sold to his own account Moroccan cereals allowed initially as an assistance to the British army in the Peninsula.

Date : 6 Şafar, 1228 / 8 Feb., 1813.

Source: F.O. 52/16.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم ولا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله العلي العظيم

من عبد ربه سبحانه خديم المقام العالي بالله قائد ثغر السّوية وناظر جيشه السّعيد محمد بن عبد الصادق كان الله له أمين إلى صاحبنا الوزير الشهير مدبر أمر الدّولة الانجليزية وقهرمانها الأعظم أما بعد فنحب أن تكون على خير وتستزيد منه لأنك رجل مليح تحبنا وتجد الخدمة في جانب أميرنا سيدنا ومولانا سليمان أعاننا الله وإياك عليها أمين ثم اعلم أنه نصره الله كان أمرني أولاً أن نسرح لقنصوك القاطن بطنجة وسق ثلاثين ألف قنطار من النّزر ثلثيها قمحاً وثلاثها شعيراً من غير صاكة إعانة لجيش الانجليز المقابل للفرنسيين بالإجبوة ويقال فوجه من ناب عنه في وسقها وهو الذمي أذاك بإسراييل فوسقها ثم إنه أيده الله أمرني ثانياً أن نسرح له وسق عشرين ألف قنطار أخرى منها عشرة قمحا وخمسة شعيراً أو خمسة قطنية إعانة للجيش المذكور وأيضا من غير صاكة فسرحتها له ووسقها كما أمرني سيدي خلد الله ملكه وحتى الآن سمعت أن القنص المذكور طلب ذلك من مولانا نصره الله على السنتكم من غير شعور منكم ولا أذن له في ذلك ولما أعطاه إياه لوجهكم ووجه سلطانكم واکرام لجيشكم وإعانة لهم على ما هم بصدده باعه بالإجبوة وغيرها وحازريحه لنفسه ولمن شرك معه فيه من اليهود ولم يعن به جيشكم كما طلبه من مولانا وعليه فنحب منك أن تعلمنا بحقيقة ذلك هل كان بمشورتكم أو إذنكم أو من عندي نفسه كما سمعنا وياتينا كتابك إن

شاء الله ببيان ذلك، مع من ياتيك بكتابتنا هاذا وهو الذمي أخ التاجر  
مير بن مقين مطبوعاً عليه بطابعكم المعهود ليزول الإشكال وتثبت  
الحقيقة ويرتفع الجاز وعلى عهدكم والسلام ، في سادس صفر  
الخير عام 1228 .

Appendix 66 : Letter from al-Salāwī to the British ambassador W. A'Court allowing additional export of provisions for the British army in the Peninsula.

Date : 8 Sha'abān, 1228 / 6 Aug., 1813.

Source: British Museum, Add. Ms. 41,512.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
وَمَا حَرَمَ وَلَا فَزَعًا لَهَا بَلَاءًا عَلَى الْعَالَمِينَ

الى البشاد ورا المعظم ويلم الكرم اما بعد يا هيبك ايدنا الله ونسرك  
جمع بك وفلك وامر بالكرامات وتخليجنا ميت اتيت من عند الملك جمع الذي  
يختمه ويقلعه

<sup>4000</sup>  
وفنا شرح لعلكم وفر اصينكم التي بلبعا الله واربعة والاد من ذكور  
البن في هلا فيز العلمين الفلا يليران فله الله العبد في كل سنة 2000  
وفنا شرحهم بطلاة خمسة عشر راسا لكل راس 15  
وامر اتيها الله لكم تتم يح اربعمائة بقلة من ثغر السور ابعث اربابا للبقلة  
وفنا علمت اما التجار يلبوه الشيران باربعين راسا لكل راس  
ويلبوه البغال بستين راسا للبقلة

وكما سبنا اير الله سمعت نفسه المية بيتا اللجنس الخليل على محبتة  
والاعتناء بحمدته ومع هلا ذاك الصاكة التي يلبوه التجار بها ليرطهم  
هيزا عن الله شيئا لانه ينفي للضرر الذي يحطل عينته من الاول وما كان  
الضرر ما عن عليه في في جانكم

وان الفيرنصر الاقرب من عندنا سبنا نحو الله في مكلانته التي كان بها قبل  
وزيادة ولا يسمع فيه كلال احد وفدا وثق بصفه وامانتة وان خدمته  
طامحة للجانين ولا صعب الا في الخير في جميع احواله

واما الزرع بلا يخيب عليكم ما نال الثوب وعارا واجباله من فدا الزرع  
هلا ذاك السنة الملاضية رخص ابناء كلهما بارغه بلا يفكر في خرج منه شيئا البتة  
واما الخيل بلا ياله اسبكا من جهة اليرين وانفلا عن ذاك الله  
في الاولاد وجماعها اسبكا ما عنها بكم وبه كتب اليكم محرر عن الملك  
الشارع وقبنا الله في ناس من قبلنا الملك على 1228



Appendix 67 : Letter from al-Salāwī to the British ambassador William A'Court inquiring about the possibility of sending Moroccan students to London.

Date : 26 Shaḥbān, 1228 / 24 Aug., 1813.

Source: C.O. 2/4.

To the Ambassador William A'Court.

I am directed by His Imperial Majesty to write to you respecting some young men H.I.M. intends sending to England to learn the art of medicine, and the science of gunnery; they are to remain until perfect in both. H.I.M. requests you will make known his wishes upon this subject to H.R.H. Prince George, if he accedes to them, he requests the Minister be directed to acquaint him that H.I.M. may send the young men to London. We beg you will not neglect writing upon this subject as we shall anxiously wait for an answer, and peace.

( S E A L )

Appendix 68 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green  
expressing satisfaction of Moroccan authorities after  
the surrender of Napoleon.

Date : 15 Jumādā I, 1229 / 5 May, 1814.

Source: F.O.174/286.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم  
وكل حول وكافؤة الاباء العلى العليم

الى الفونصوا اقرين لنجليز اما بدى بفتح وطنا كتابك  
وتعربنا منحة الافبار التي سرت اهل الدنيا كلهم  
بذلك عبي والدينا بازيه وصلب الله له ملكه الذي لم  
يعدل فيه وهما ذل عدا له الله في خلقه في البلاغ والملك  
وكاشك اذكم انتم انتم انتم الناس وفوا في هذه الامور  
واعتنا به بما فرضتم وامللتهم حتى انتقم الله منه وبني  
جميعكم على كل في الاجناس ومن له خبره من انطاف بيرو هذا  
ويحفة وكاتغيبنا ما يجبات بفتح ان شاء الله وبه كتب  
الميجر فخر بن عبد الله اللومى وقبض الله في 5 اجمادى الاولى  
على و 1229

Appendix 69 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to ‘Umar Abū Sitta appointing him governor on the ‘Abda tribes after they rebelled against Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Sādaq.

Date : 23 Rajab, 1230 / 1 July, 1815.

Source: Mic.4, H.P.M.D., Rabat, 1978, BGR.

سليمان بن محمد لطف الله به

خدينا القائد عمر بوسته أعانك الله

سلام عليك ورحمة الله وبركاته . وبعد فنأمرك أن تقول لعبدية لست بناقض عهد والدنا وأسلافنا رحمهم الله فيكم ، وخدمتهم ومحبة أسلافهم وإن ضيعوا ، وما رأيت والذي رحمه الله قط أكل عبدة ولا أباحهم ولا جدي ولا أبوه رحمهم الله ، وإنما رأيتهم مع عدم حضورى وأهل الغرب ، وأردت أن أجعل لهم ما يرتدعون به سفهاؤهم وما قط أكلت قبيلة بلا حضور سلطان حتى شراثة أخوال والدنا رحمه الله ما أمر بأكلهم حتى حضر فليحذروا سخط الله ولينظروا كيف لم يراعى والدنا رحمه الله أخواله لما خرجوا عن الطريق لقول الله تعالى " لاتجدوا قوماً يؤمنون بالله واليوم الآخر يوادون من حاد الله ورسوله ولو كانوا آباءهم أو أبناءهم أو إخوانهم أو عشيرتهم " . وهب أن ابن عبد الصادق ظلمهم فالشرع بين ومن لم يرضاه كافر ، ومن ظلم لا يظلم ومن جار عليه عامله لا يحل له أن يحارب ولا أن ينتصر من العامل لقوله صلى الله عليه وسلم " أدوا الذي عليكم واطلبوا الله الذي لكم " وقوله صلى الله عليه وسلم " إن ضريك فاصبر وإن أخذ مالك فاصبر وإن شتمك فاصبر " وإن قمعهم بالحجة الشرعية وعرفهم أنهم استوجبوا الهلاك لولا عفو الله لضيعهم . وهاذه مدة وانهم والناس أجمعين ما شاع عند أحد ولا ذاع ضرر ابن عبد الصادق لهم ولا قامت القبيلة كلها لضرر عام فاش وإنما سفيه جمع سفهاؤهم مباحون المال والدور وصار يدور على صلحاء القبيلة وذوي الأعراض والثروة ويجبرونهم على

القيام للفساد . هذا مبدء أمرهم . واجعل معهم الحساب كم قبض منهم ابن عبد الصادق من المال في غير حق وكم قتل من نفس بغير حق لتكون لنا الحجة على العمال في عزلهم ، وأما إن كان كل عامل أراد تنفيذ الأحكام الشرعية وجريان الحدود الذاتية على من وجبت عليه يقوم سفيه محارب باغ عليه ويجبر القبيلة على الفساد ما بقيت ولاية ثابتة لأحد يراقب الله ويريد الحق وما بقيت أحكام الشرع تجري على أحد وصار العزل والولاية بيد الفساق لا بيد السلطان فتحامهم الحكام وفسد الدين ، واقطعهم بالحجة حتى يعرفوا ، وقل لهم لا يقولوا هذا مديني لا قدرة له على تنفيذ حق في ظالم لذلك أردناه ، وإن فعل بفساقتنا شيئا وجب عليهم قننا عليه كما قننا على ابن عبد الصادق ، بل هو أهون . قل لهم جميع الأيمان تلزمني إن لم أحكم فيكم بما أنزل الله حتى أخرج من وسطكم ولم أرد ولايتكم لشبع بطني ونيل شهوتي من الدنيا بل قبلتها لأكون رحمة للضعفاء أصرف عنهم العذاب العام بحول الله ، وسوط عذاب علي الظالمين أنزل بهم ما يستحقون بحول الله فلن قبلتم وإلا انصرفت عنكم والسلام . في 23 رجب الفرد الحرام عام 1230 .

Appendix 70 : Letter from Ahmad b. Muhammad to J. Green asking for a British bombardier to train Moroccan artillerymen.

Date : 29 Jumādā I, 1231 / 27 April, 1816.

Source: F.O. 174/286.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
وَمَا حَوْلَ وَلَا فَوْقَ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ الْعَلِيِّ الْعَلِيمِ

الى طيبي فوجه وروبيس عشيتيتم الفتنضوا قري من جننار الانجليس  
بلدك له ما ترى من خير الريندا طول المدا والتملاء على وانبع الهوى  
اولا بعن وواعلم ان مولانا امير المومنين نفي الهراي نا مثلا جمة للسلانة  
ان نبعت الى جبل طارق ليدانة اليهنا المعنى العرايش معلم مدهي رمي  
المهراس والمرباع ليرمي مع اولادنا بالاشارة في كل يوم سبعة  
وانت الباب الزئبق قل عليه هذا في يدي بجمتك يا جانب  
مولانا في الله ونظم لك الجميل ان تعنت باوم العشريين وترسل  
الى جبل طارق ليدانة العلم عز ملولان وقل كتبنا للقايير المه  
السبع بهذا وهو واسمكته بينك او بينك والسلك به و

جمادى الاولى عام 1231

الله  
أحمد بن محمد  
وعقد لمنه



Appendix . 71 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Lord Exmouth commenting the English raid on the port of Algiers.

Date : 26 Shawwāl, 1231 / 19 Sept., 1816.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

بسم الله الرحمان الرحيم ولا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله العلي العظيم

( الطابع السليمانى )

المحب الصادق والرئيس المقدم الكبير سيف الدولة النجليزية وزعيمها  
وطالع سعداها ويسار ينها الورد إكسيموت ادمرال ، بلغنا كتابكم تُخبرنا  
بما وقع بينكم وبين أهل الجزائر وذلك علامة المحبة والصدقة الكبيرة ، ولقد  
كنا متشوشين لذلك ومتطلعين له ، ونسئل الله اللطيف لجميع المخلوقين ، وأن  
يجري أحوالهم على النهج القويم والصراط المستقيم " ولولا دفاع الله الناس  
بعضهم ببعض لفسدت الأرض ولاكن الله ذو فضل على العالمين " . وأهل  
الجزائر لم ينظروا لأنفسهم ولا لما يحصل من الأضرار والوهن الناشئ عن  
آراءهم ، ولينصرون الله من ينصره ، ولو حفظوا الله حفظهم ولو لم يخرجوا  
عن أمره لأعانهم ، " وما أصابكم من مصيبة بما كسبت أيديكم ويعفو عن كثير " .  
نسئل الله الكريم أن لا يوقعنا فيما يسخطه عنا وأن يلفظ بعبادته ويوفقه  
لما يرضاه من مراده " آمين " ، وقد أمرنا حاكم طنجة أن يتلقى مراكبكم  
ومن يرد من قبلكم بما يسركم وأن لا يمنع ما فيه معروف وإحسان ويدل على  
كمال المروءة والصحة إن شاء الله وفي 26 من شوال الأبرك عام 1231 .

Appendix 72 : Letter from Ahmad b. M'bārak to the British vice consul at Tangier concerning the punishment of a British citizen according to Muslim law.

Date : 1 Muḥarram, 1232 / 21 Nov., 1816.

Source: F.O.174/286.

الحمد لله

الرفيق فونتموا التبليغ اثيري اما بعد فقد وصل  
 لخصر مولانا المنه وبلانه كتاب الفونده و  
 وهبته كتابا وشا ايقوت وجهنا للفلايد المبر  
 المعين في العالم واما ناديب الفابر لرجل بلايخ الك  
 من الجانيير فالمسلمون بجميع بلاد النصارى تحرم عليهم  
 اهلاك ولا يتقاولو لو سمعنا ان فايه جيلكارو قتل  
 مسلما استوجب القتل واذا به لقلنا يستعوانته  
 في محل محرم الحرام عام 1232



Appendix 73 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Louis XVIII authorizing the export of Moroccan wheat.

Date : 1 Rabī<sup>c</sup> II, 1232 / 18 Feb., 1817.

Source: C.C.C., vol.25.

أما بعد ، بلغنا كتابك ، ونحن لا يعز علينا شيء لجانبكم ولولا ما يسراه قونصوكم من الغلاء هذه السنين ، نسأل الله الرحمة لعباده أجمعين ، ما انقطع الوسق أبداً من بلادنا لبلادكم من الزرع وغيره ، ولأجل وجهك ها نحن نقاسوكم الرخاء والشدة ، فإذا كان يونيه إن شاء الله يسرح لكم ما تطلبون على قدر الوقت والسعر كما تطلبون ، ولكن يكون الوسق من الرباط وتكون دار القونصوفيه كما كان ، وأما غيرها لا تسع ذلك ، والرباط متسعة ويأتي الزرع إليها من تامسنة لأنها محلها ، ولا يقع ضرر على المسلمين إن شاء الله . أما تعيين الصاكة فلو كان للصاكة ما سرحناه بشيء من الدنيا وإنما نسرح ما سرحه لراعتكم إن شاء الله لأجلكم لا غير والسلام .  
في مهـل ربيع الثاني عام 1232 .

Appendix 74 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Muḥammad  
b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī restricting his prerogatives as  
muftī.

Date : 5 Ramaḍān, 1232 / 19 July, 1817.

Source: D.A.R.

### الحمد لله وحده

( سليمان بن محمد غفر الله له بنه )

الفتية السيد محمد بن ابراهيم السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبعد ، لا تعد  
تفتي بنقض أحكام القضاة إلا إذا كان الحكم مخالفاً للشرع من أصله  
وأما من الإعذار أو الإنذار فلا لأن القاضي إذا تحقق عنده لئان الخصم  
ولم يحكم له الإعذار أو الإنذار فله أن يحكم ولا يُرد عليه حكمه لعدم الإعذار  
لكونه أعرف من غيره في ذلك ، وحكم الحاكم مرجع الخلاف سيما قضاة  
البادية كالذي أفتيتهم له بنقض الحكم لعدم الإعذار كيف يخفى عليه عدم  
العلم بمخارجة أبناء عمه في الأصل الذي اشترى منهم بعضه ثم سلمه للشركاء  
وكيف يخفى على القاضي الحق في هذه الدعوة في تلك البقعة الصغيرة  
التي لا يخفى على كافة أهلها ما لبعضهم على بعض ، وبالتوى بنقض  
الحكم في تلك المعنى تفتح علينا أبواباً من الدعاوي وكثرة الخصام ،  
والسلام في 5 رمضان المعظم عام 1232 .

Appendix. 75 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Muḥammad b. al-Rāḏī, qā'id of Agouraī, ordering him to enforce the economic blockade of the Aīt Oumalou.

Date : 3 Ḥijja, 1233 / 4 Oct., 1818.

Source: D.A.R.

الحمد لله وحده . وصلى الله على سيدنا ومولانا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم تسليماً

( الطابع السليمانى )

وصيغنا القائد محمد بن الراضي العليج سلام عليك ورحمة الله تعالى...  
والذي يراد منك هو اجري في العداوة بين ايت امالو وبين قبائلنا المطيري  
والذي الجرواني والزموري وصالح بين قبائلنا واقطع الكيل عن ايت امالو من عند  
والجبرير الطاعة ، وكل فرقة ادخلت قافلة من ايت امالو تعرض لهم بخيلك  
برسر وانها هم وكل من اتى معهم . وقوم لهم من قبيلتهم بالتحريض والطمع  
وانها من يضر بهم ، او ان قدم بها بني مطير حرتش عليهم جروان والعكس ،  
من يضر بهم ، او ان قدم بها بني مطير حرتش عليهم جروان والعكس .  
ونادي في السوق كل قبيلة اكنال منها ايت امال فهي ملعونة والسلام .  
في 3 من ذي الحجة الحرام عام 1233 .

Appendix 76 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to ‘Ayyād, qā’id of the Oudaya, ordering him to reorganize the troops that were spared by the plague of 1818.

Date : 21 Shawwāl, 1234/ 13 August, 1819.

Source : D.A.R.

الحمد لله وحده وصلى الله على سيدنا ومولانا محمد وصحبه  
وسلم تسليما

(الطابع) (التوقيع)

خأنا القائد عياد سلام عليك ورحمة الله تعالى وبركاته وبعد  
نأمرك أن تجمع أخواننا الأودية وسردهم لما عافاهم الله  
والحمد لله من هذا الوفاء واجعلهم مائة مائة وخمسة  
وعشرين وخمسة وعشرين واجعل لكل مائة قائد ولكل خمسة  
وعشرين مقدم حتى لا يكون قائد عنده أقل من مائة ولا مقدم  
عنده أقل من خمسة وعشرين وزم لكل مقدم أصحابه بأسماءهم  
ولكل قائد مائة أصحابه أيضا، واجعل ذلك في دفتر كما جعله  
والدنا رحمه الله على يد القائد قدور والسيد بلقاسم  
يعينك فإنه منكم والسلام.

في 21 شوال الأبرك عام 1234.

Appendix 77 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to ʿAyyād ordering him to incorporate the tribes of Himyan and Oulad al-Ḥaj into the army.

Date : 21 Shawwāl, 1234 / 13 August, 1819.

Source: D.A.R.

الحمد لله وحده وصلّى الله على سيدنا ومولانا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم تسليماً  
( الطابيح )

خالتنا القائد عياد سلام عليك ورحمة الله تعالى وبعد وليناك بحول الله  
أمر احميان وأولاد الحاج وجعلناهم من جملة جيش أخواننا الأوداية  
وزكوتهم وأعمارهم هذه السنة فقط أنعمنا عليهم بها يجعلونها فسي  
السلح وصردهم والسلام في 21 من شوال الأبرك عام 1234.

Appendix 78 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Ash‘āsh calling for the mobilization of the Jbala tribes for the jihād against the dissident Berbers.

Date : 2 Muḥarram, 1235 / 21 Oct., 1819.

Source: D.A.R.

الحمد لله وحده . وصلى الله على سيدنا ومولانا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم

( الطابع السلیمانی )

خدينا الأنصح الأمين الخاج عبد الرحمان أشعاش سلام عليك ورحمة الله تعالى وبركاته وبعد فقد بلغكم فعل هؤلاء الخوارج من البربر من شق العصا وخروجهم على جماعة المسلمين ونهبهم أموال الناس وقطع الطرقات وهتك المحارم وسفك الدماء ، ولا يخفاكم ما أعد الله للمجاهدين في سبيل الله وجهاد هؤلاء الخوارج أولى ومقدم على جهاد العدو والكافر، فالله الله قف وقوف جد وحزم كما هو المعتقد فيك من غيرتك على كلمة الله العليا، وأذن في قبائل الجبل بالجهاد وناديهم يا عباد الله أعينوا إخوانكم المسلمين، الجهاد الجهاد في سبيل الله واجتهد كل الاجتهاد في جمع العدد الكثير من المجاهدين عشرة ألف راجل أو عشرين ألفاً أو ما أمكنك ، وكل من جاء مجاهداً أو جاء به نميرة الإسلام أعطيته وأكرمه وكسنت له اليد عندنا وله عند الله الدرجة العليا. قال تعالى: "لا يستوي القاعدون من المؤمنين... الآية" ، وقال تعالى: "وفضل الله المجاهدين على القاعدین أجراً عظيماً درجات منه ومغفرة ورحمة". والله يوفقكم ويعينكم والسلام . في 2 من محرم الحرام فاتح 1235 .



Appendix 79 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the French consul Sourdeau concerning this latter's grievance against a deranged Baqqālī sharīf.

Date : 12 Jumādā II, 1235 / 27 March, 1820.

Source: C.C.C. vol. 27

بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ      وَلَا حَوْلَ وَلَا قُوَّةَ إِلَّا بِاللّٰهِ الْعَلِيِّ الْعَظِیْمِ

( الطابَع )

قونص جنس الفرنصير صورد اما بعد فانت ضيفنا وفي جوارنا وقونص جنس كبير في بلادنا فلا نحب لك إلا الرفعة الكبيرة والمكانة الخطيرة وتعلم أنه لا يمكن أن يصلك ذلك ولو من أعز أولادنا وأمر الله قدرأ مقدوراً ولا نرضى أن يقع ذلك بأذى الناس أو البهائم ولا نترك له حقه إن شاء الله وأنتم النصرى أرق أفئدة وأصبر على أذى لأنه هذا أتى به رسولكم عليه السلام عيسى بن مريم ويامركم في الكتاب الذي أتاكم به من عند الله من لطمك على هذا الخد فاعطه الخد الآخر، وما انتصر لنفسه صلى الله عليه حين أتت لقتله اليهود حتى رفعه الله وفي كتابنا على لسان نبينا : " ولتجدن أقربهم مودة للذين آمنوا الذين قالوا إنا نصرى ذلك بأن منهم قسيسين ورهباناً وانهم لا يستكبرون " وقال لنا نبينا " رفح القلم عن ثلاث المجنون حتى يفيق والصبي والنائم " وهذا مجنون ليس له عقل ، ومع هذا فقد حكمتك في جنايته إن عفوت فعلت فعل أهل الإحسان أثابك الرحمان وإن أردت أن تاخذ حقه في الدنيا فلك ذلك ولا يخش أحد في إيالتنا ظملاً ولا هضمأ بحول الله انتهى في 12 من جمادى الثانية عام 1235

Appendix 80 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sourdeau, the French consul general, asking for military equipment on the morrow of the Zaīan defeat ( May 1819).

Date : 9 Sha‘bān, 1235/ 22 May, 1820.

Source : C.C.C., vol. 27.

باسم الله الرحمان الرحيم      ولا حول ولا قوة الا بالله العلي العظيم

قونص جنس الزنصيص صورد ، أما بعد لا بد اكتب لمحبتنا سلطانكم  
وفقه الله و للوزير على مدافع عشرين صغار تحمل المدفعة  
بغلة يعطوها لنا من الموحود في خزائكم وفي مراكيكم ، وكل  
ما يناسب في مقابلتها من هدية أو أمر فيه منفعة جيشكم  
اعلمنا به نوجهه لأننا نعلم محبتكم ، ولا نعز شيئاً في  
جنسكم ، وأنتم كذلك ، والمكاحل نريدها تخرج بالرباط ان  
شاء الله .

انتهى في 9 شعبان الأبرك عام 1235 .

Appendix 81 : Letter from Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm and  
 ʿAbd al-Salām al-Azamī to Mawlāy Sulaymān asking for  
 the revocation of the qādī al-ʿAbbās b. Sūda.

Date : 29 Shaʿbān, 1235 / 11 June, 1820.

Source: K.2276, BGR, pp.328-329.

الحضرة التي رضيها الله لكفالة الحق و ايالة الخلق، و آتيها  
 من قوة المعزائم و حدة الصوارم و الفصل في افاضة النعم  
 و العدل ما ظهرت به مزية السبق و تبينت به فضيلة الغرب  
 على الشرق ادام الله ايامها بعزیز داد، و نصر مكيين يتصل  
 به من السماء الامداد،

حضرة مولانا الامام المؤيد الهمام، أمير المؤمنين سيدنا  
 سليمان آيد الله نصره بأزكى السلام، فان من الواجبات  
 المؤكد أمرها و التكاليف المعظم في الشرع قطرها و قدرها  
 النصيحة لله و لرسوله و لأئمة المسلمين و عامتهم، و من أكاد  
 النصائح و أكملها تغيير المنكر و الدب عن المسلمين و أعراضهم  
 و قد أفصحت النصوص بتغييره، و بالوعيد على كتمه. قال تعالى  
 " كانوا لا يتناهون عن منكر فعلوه "، و قال جل من قائل " و ل ان  
 قالت أمة منهم لم تعظون قوما مهلكهم أو معذبهم عذابا  
 شديدا "، و شهير جلي ما هو من شيم مولانا ادام الله تأييده  
 و ما جبلت عليه طبيعته العلوية من النصرة لدين الله تعالى  
 و رعاية و دادة و الدب عن حقوق عباده، و قمع من يلحظهم بعيين  
 الاعتداء، و الشغف بحبة العلم و التلطف على بشه في الآفاق  
 و نشره، و كبت المعتدين و الملحدين ذوي الجرأة و العناد و خصوصا  
 ما يرجع للجور و تضييع حقوق العباد، فهو آيد، الله دائما يجهد  
 نفسه في ذلك بالبحث عن متعلقاتها و الاحتياط في التبع للأحكام

الشرعية . وكيف لا وحفظ الحقوق أحد الكليات الخمس التي تروا على حفظها جميع الأنبياء و الرسل ، ولم تستبهم في شريعة من شرائع الامم قط ، وقد ارتكب قاضي البلدة الفاسية الحكم بالامور الفضية ، و التلبسات والتعديت التي لا صفا لها ولا وجه استقامة ، يحوم حولها ولا شيء فيها يجري على قاعدة من قواعد شريعتها ، وكيف لا وقد جمع بها الطم و الجهل وأخذ الرششي و التحرف عن العدل ، يشهد بذلك من له أدنى ملبسة بالاحكام وفروعها من فقهاء هذه البلدة و غيرها ، فمن يوم عدم أبوه التبت عليه الحقائق فانتبذ ما أصله أهل العلم و أرباب الوثائق ، وخرق الاجماع و السنة و الكتاب ، فلتنظر هذه الأمور التي لم تقع في غير هذا القطر المغربي من بين سائر الاقطار ، ولم يتصف بها أهل عصر ما سلف من الاعصار ، فكيف لا تنهض همة ذي نفس زاكية لحسمها و سد الطرق دونها . فنبتهل السى الله تعالى بأن يولي مولانا أمير المؤمنين كشف بلواها و رفع شكواها ، فقد ضاقت نفس الخاصة و العامة بها درعا ، وما استطاعوا لها نكرا ولا سمعا ، فلمثلها يود أن لا يكون المؤمن موجودا و كيف لا وقد نبذ الشريعة ورفضها وراء الظهر ، و سلك صورة شنيعة تبقى ضحكة أمد الدهر ، معاذ الله أن يقع هذا و أمير المؤمنين موجود ، و العلماء و العلم و الحمد لله حارس على الدين

قعود ، و الله يديم الحضرة العالية ويديم سعودها ،  
و يجعل الاقدار السماوية جنودها و السلام . وفي تاسع  
و عشرين شعبان عام 1235 .

Appendix 82 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fes acknowledging his incapacity to guarantee their security and advising them to seek the protection of Berber tribes. This letter was interpreted as an abdication on the Sultan's part.

Date : 13 Qa<sup>c</sup>da, 1235/ 22 Aug., 1820.

Source : Ms. D 2795, B.G.R., p. 393.

الحمد لله،

ابن عمنا الشريف سيدي محمد بن الطاهر والفقير سيدي محمد بن ابراهيم والطالب بن جلون، احفظوا هذه الوصية واحذروا من مثل هذا، وليقَس ما لم يقل: الجند مع السلطان كمثل موسى مع قومه. ان تصبهم حسنة يقولوا هذا من عند الله وان تصبهم سيئة يقولوا هذا من عندك. "وان دعاهم الى كريمة قالوا اذهب وربك فقاتلا إنا ها هنا قاعد ون". وآخر الدولة إذا ضعف الجند ولم يقدر على قبض الواجب من القبائل وجمع بيت المال نصبوا سلطاناً غراً حدثاً جاهلاً، وربما كان فاسقاً، فالدين النصيحة، اللهم اشهد. فان أردتم امان أنفسكم يا أهل فاس فادخلوا في حلف البربر فان لهم قوانين و مرووّة تمنعهم من الظلم ويقنعون بالكفاف ومن له عصبية كبيرة تقهر كل أحد وترده عن الظلم، أسئل الله ان يتم ما بقي بخير وأن يخليقني في المسلمين بخيره، وإذا أراد الله أمراً هيباً أسبابه وان بقيت بهذه الدولة بقية نصرها الله بفضله وألهمنا العدل والنصر، ومن قال أتى يحيى هذه الله بعد موتها أمانه الله شاكراً في قدرته، وإن أخرجت هذا الأمر عن نفسي فقد خرج من هو خير مني كالحسن ابن علي سيد أولاد فاطمة الزهراء رضي الله عنها وعنهم أجمعين، في 13 من ذي القعدة الحرام عام 1235.

Appendix 83: Fatwā by the ‘ālim-s of Fès in favour of the dethronement of Mawlāy Sulaymān. This fatwā was issued on the basis of Mawlāy Sulaymān's letter of abdication (Cf. appendix 82 above).

Date : Ḥijja, 1235 / Sept., 1820.

Source: Ms.D.2795 , BGR, pp.393-397.

— يشهد الواضع شكله عقبه بأن ما تضمنه الرسم يسرته قد عاين جلّه في براءة سيدنا نصره الله سليمان المنتسخ منها هذا الرسم ، معانية تامة من غير شك ولا ريب وبذلك قيد شهادته في السابع عشر من ذي الحجة الحرام عام 1235 عبد ربه علي التسولي لطف الله به آمين .

— الحمد لله الواضع شكله إثر تاريخه يشهد بأنه وقف على أصل الرسالة السلطانية المنتسخ منها الأسطر الثمانية أعلاه المكحلة بخط الفقيه العلامة الأشهر سيدي محمد بن ابراهيم وعائنها بيد الفقيه المذكور ، وما ذكر في الأسطر المشار لها كلها مثبتة في الأصل المذكور من غير شك ولا ريب وبه قيد شهادته مسؤولة منه في التاريخ أعلاه عبد الوهاب بن العابد القادري الحسني لطف الله به .

— الحمد لله ومن يشهد بمعانية الأصل المنقول منه ما سطر أعلاه يسرته أبو بكر بن زيان الإدريسي لطف الله به آمين .

— ليس النص المسطر أعلاه من معانية الرسوم بل من معانية الرسائل والفرق بينهما معلوم لأن الرسائل جُلّها أخبار والرسوم جُلّها إنشاءات والخبر والإنشاء متباينان حقيقة كما ذكره القرافي في الفروق ، وإذا ثبت بينهما التباين الحقيقي ففي العوارض واللوازم أظهر وأصرح ؛ سلّمنا طريق الجدول

أنها من ذلك ، فإن المسئلة الخلافية أفتى بإفادتها الشيخ أبو الحسن وأبو عبد الله الهوارى وأبو العباس المقرئ ولاريب في ترجيح هذه الطريقة على طريقة ابن عرفة في مثل هذه النازلة دفعاً لما حصل من مفاسد الإسلام ، وما يترتب حصوله أن بقي الناس بلا إمام على أن المقطوع به عندنا في النازلة خروجها عن نطاق الخلاف لأن موضوعه الرسوم التي طريقها الأحاد المقوى بالعدالة ومسلتنا مضمونه الذي وقع الشهادة بمعائنة من العجز ، والخروج ببلغ حد الاشتهار والتحق بالشهرة بوسط النهار ، وصارتواتره كالعيان ، الذي لا يختلف فيه اثنان . فعلى تقدير ان لولم يات من عنده كتاب ، ألم تُخلق على المسلمين الأبواب ؟ ألم تختلف على السلطان كلمة الناس ؟ ألم يهدموا من ركن طاعة الأساس حتى استغى الأماكن التي يطلق له فيها الانتصار ، ويطلع له منها نجوم الاقتدار ، فلم يحصل له من ذلك إيناس وإنما وقع من ذلك الباس . لا يقال الشهادة بالمعارضة من قبيل النقل وشرطها الإذن وأين الإذن في النازلة التي أهوالها إن بقي الناس فوضى نازلة ؟ لأننا نقول فائدة الإذن النقل كما ذكر أبو الحسن الصغير رفع احتمال المجاز والهزل ، وهذا الانتفاء هنا ضروري الانتفاء بالتواتر والشهود المذكورين على أن بعثه الكتاب وأمره بقراءته على الناس في أعلى مراتب الإذن بلا احتمال ، وقد ذكر الفقهاء في الوصية بخط اليد أنها تُقيد إذا أخرجها الموصي من يده وأعطاهما للغير لأن ذلك يرفع احتمال أنه ردها ورجع عنها . ردنا الله إلى التحقيق وجعلنا من سلك أحسن الطريق ، حتى نامن النفاق ونخرج عن دائرة الشقاق ، فلا ندخل في وعيد قول النبي المختار " من كتم علماً أجمه بلجام من النار " . قال ذلك وكتبه عبد ربه المفوض الأمر إلى ربه ، محمد بن بوبكر اليازغي لطف الله به .

— الحمد لله ، لا يخفى على ذي بصيرة أن المسطر أعلاه صحيح .  
وكتب عبد ربه عبد الملك بن الكبير المكري .

— لاخفاء أن صدر ما نقل من الرسالة أعلاه هو اعتراف من اعتراف السلطان بضعف الجند والمسكر وبعدم امثال أمره فيما يامرهم به من القيام بأمر



المسلمين . وَاخْرَجَهُ وَهُوَ صَرِيحٌ أَوْ كَالصَّرِيحِ فِي تَأْخِرِهِ وَخُرُوجِهِ لِأَجْلِ ذَلِكَ  
فِيهَا مِنْ مَصِيْبَةٍ مَا أَعْظَمَهَا ! فَعَلَى الْمُسْلِمِينَ أَنْ يَنْصَبُوا إِمَامًا جَامِعًا  
لشُرُوطِ الْإِمَامَةِ يَقُومُ بِذَلِكَ ، فَلَمَّا لَمْ يَفْعَلُوا حَرَجَ وَأُثِمَ فَرِيقَانِ :  
أَحَدُهُمَا أَهْلُ الْحُلِّ وَالْعَقْدِ وَالثَّانِي مَنْ اجْتَمَعَتْ فِيهِمْ شُرُوطُ الْخِلَافَةِ  
وَلَمْ يَطْلُبْهَا . قَالَ أَمْتَنَا رِضْوَانُ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِمْ . وَاللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ . وَكُتِبَ الْعَبْدُ  
الْفَقِيرُ مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ لَطْفَ اللَّهِ بِهِ .

— الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ ، لَا مَزِيدَ عَلَيَّ مَا سَطَّرَهُ عَالَمُ الْأَنْبَاءِ وَمُفْتِي الْإِسْلَامِ ، وَاللَّهُ  
أَعْلَمُ . وَكُتِبَ مُحَمَّدُ الْعَرَبِيُّ بْنُ الْهَاشِمِيِّ الزَّرْهَوْنِيِّ لَطْفَ اللَّهِ بِهِ .

— الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ ، حَيْثُ دَلَّ أَوَّلُ الرِّسَالَةِ أَغْلَاءَ وَآخِرُهَا أَنَّ السُّلْطَانَ خَرَجَ عَنِ  
الْقِيَامِ بِأُمُورِ الْإِسْلَامِ فَوَاجِبٌ عَلَى الْمُسْلِمِينَ نَصْبُ الْإِمَامِ لِأَنَّ بِهِ انْتِظَامَ الدِّينِ  
وَقِيَامَ حَقُوقِ الْمُسْلِمِينَ ، وَإِلَّا أُثِمَ الْفَرِيقَانِ الْمَذْكُورَانِ فِي الرَّسْمِ الثَّانِي يَلِيهِ  
الْمُصَادِرُ عَنِ عَيْنِ التَّحْقِيقِ الْمُبْنِيِّ أُسَاسَهُ عَلَى سِوَاِ الطَّرِيقِ . قَالَ الْمَوْلَى  
سَعْدُ الدِّينِ فِي الْمُقَادِمِ وَشَرَحَهَا : " يَنْحَلُّ عَقْدُ الْإِمَامَةِ بِمَا يَزُولُ مِنْهُ  
الْمَقْصُودُ مِنْهَا ، وَكَذَا يَخْلَعُهُ نَفْسُهُ لِعَجْزِهِ عَنِ الْقِيَامِ بِمَصَالِحِ أُمُورِ الْمُسْلِمِينَ " .  
وَلَمَّا لَمْ يَجْعَلِ الْعَجْزُ ظَاهِرًا فَقَدْ اسْتَشْعَرَهُ مِنْ نَفْسِهِ وَعَلَيْهِ يَخْرُجُ قَضِيَّةُ  
الْحَسَنِ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ . وَفِي حَدِيثِ الْبَيْهَقِيِّ عَنْ أَنَسٍ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ  
" إِذَا مَرَّتْ بِبَلَدَةٍ لَيْسَ بِهَا سُلْطَانٌ فَلَا تَقْرِبْهَا ، إِنَّمَا السُّلْطَانُ ظِلُّ اللَّهِ  
وَرَمْحُهُ " وَقَالَ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ : " مَنْ مَاتَ وَلَيْسَ فِي عُنُقِهِ بَيْعَةٌ مَاتَ  
مُوتَةَ جَاهِلِيَّةٍ " اللَّهُمَّ بِحَقِّ النَّبِيِّ الْكَرِيمِ الْبَرِّ الرَّحِيمِ الَّذِي بِهِ خَتَمَتِ الرِّسَالَةَ  
وَجَعَلْتَ حُجَّتَهُ قَامِعَةً كُلَّ ضَلَالَةٍ سَكَّنَ الرُّوعَاتِ وَأَنْظَمَ الْجَمَاعَاتِ وَيَسِّرَ  
لِلْخَلْقِ أَسْبَابَهُ ، وَارْفَعْ بِفَضْلِكَ الْعَدْلَ وَرَكَابَهُ . وَكُتِبَ عَبْدُ رَبِّهِ مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ  
بُوبَكْرٍ الْيَازْغِي لَطْفَ اللَّهِ بِهِ .

— الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ مَا صَدَّرَ بِهِ الْمُفْتِيَّانِ أَغْلَاءَ مِنْ كَوْنِ الرِّسَالَةِ الْمُصَادِرِ بِهَا صَرِيحٌ  
فِي الْعِزْلِ أَوْ كَالصَّرِيحِ صَحِيحٌ . وَكُتِبَ عَبْدُ رَبِّهِ مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى السُّوسِي  
الْجَزَائِرِيُّ .

— الحمد لله ما صدر به المفتيان أعلاه صحيح عبد ربه محمد بن العجذوب  
السباعي لطف الله به .

— الحمد لله ما أعلاه صحيح . عبد ربه مالك بن قدور المغفري العقيلي  
لطف الله به آمين .

— العقيد أعلاه صحيح ففي البكري شارح عقيدة ابن الحاجب " ان عزل  
الإمام الأعظم نفسه لعجزه انعزل . " وفي المواقف ما نصه للسيّد  
الجرجاني وشرحها : " وللأمة خلعه بسبب يوجب كاختلال أحوال  
المسلمين وانتكاس أمور الدين " ونقله الإمام العارف بالله الشهير أبو عبد  
الله السنوسي كما نقله أيضاً شارح المقاصد لشيخ الجماعة أبي محمد عبد  
القادر الفاسي لطف الله به آمين حاكياً عليه الاتفاق والله تعالى أعلم .  
وكتبه عبد ربه أبو بكر بن إدريس المنجرة الحسني وفقه الله بمنه .

— لاشك أن ما في الكتاب أعلاه هو كالعجز الصريح ، وما كتبه الأئمة  
الأعلام من النصوص واضح في ذلك صحيح . وكتب عبد ربه عبد الملك بن  
الكبير المرسي الحسني لطف الله به آمين .

— الحمد لله ، وبمثل ما سطر به الأعلام أعلاه يقول عبد ربه محمد بن  
حمدون بن الحاج سلك الله به أقوم الحاج .

Appendix 84 : Notarial act established by the people of Fès to serve as a legal basis for the dethronement of Mawlāy Sulaymān.

Date : Early Ṣafar, 1236 / Nov. 1820.

Source: Ms.D.2795, BGR, pp.397-398.

الحمد لله

الواضعون أشكالهم عقبه يعرفون ما رمت به هذه الأزمان من انسداد باب المعاش والأمان المعرفة الكافية عن الدلائل السامية ومعها يشهدون بأنه منذ وقعت الطامة الكبرى على مولانا سليمان في قبيلة بني مكنيلد وزيان، والفتنة قائمة وعيون الأهوال غير نائمة، وإن الناس بقوا بعد ذلك عاما ونصفا فوضى تتوارد عليهم الأحوال التي لا ترضي من قطع الطرقات ونهب البضاعات وسفك النفوس وانهدام القواعد والأسوس وانغلاق أبواب وافتتاح أنياب، وإن هذا الأمر الهائل والخطب النازل عم المغرب رسمه وحده من مراكش إلى وجدة حتى أصاب هذه الفاسية ذات المحاسن الفاشية، ما أطار المقام عن الأجنان وجرّد السيوف الأجنان من ترادف الصواعق المدبرة والحوادث المسعرة، فمن علم ذلك بالمعانيمة في فاس وأحوازها وبالسمع الفاشي البالغ حدّ التواتر في غيرها، قيده به شاهدا في أوائل صفر الأبرك من عام 1236.

عبد السلام بن الهاشمي البوعناني

عبد العزيز بن بوجيدة عديل

عبد الوهاب بن العابد القادري

عمر بن عبد السلام الداودي

محمد بن التهامي المسي

محمد بن محمد الحلو

عبد السلام بن محمد البكري الدلائي

محمد بن محمد بن عبد الرحمان الدلائي .

Appendix 85 : Fatwā by the ‘ālim-s of Fès authorizing the Muslim community to elect a new sultan.

Date : Early Ṣafar, 1236 / Nov., 1820.

Source: Ms. D.2795, BGR, pp.398-400.

### نص السؤال :

الحمد لله ، ساداتنا القادة الكواكب الوقادة ، جوابكم الكافي ونهكم الشافي عما أحكم ميناه في الرسم المسطر أعلاه هل يُبيح ذلك للمسلمين نصب إمام آخر يقيم لهم أودهم وينصر عددهم ، ويدفع بسبب عدله هذه الفتن التي أظلم يومها وعم شومها . بينوا لنا ما عندكم في النازلة التي أهوالها لازالت نازلة ، فلا زلتم ملاذآ ، ولا برح بابكم معادآ والسلام .

### نص الجواب :

— الحمد لله وحده وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد وآله . الجواب والله الموفق للصواب بمنه أن ما شهد به الشهود بالرسم حيث أشير يوجب على المسلمين نصب إمام آخر ، إذ مما يشترط في الإمام ابتداءً ودواماً كما لغير واحد من الأئمة حتى الشيخ السنوسي في شرح القصيدة كونه قادراً على تنفيذ الأحكام وانتصار المظلوم من الظالم وتجهيز الجيوش والمذب عن بيضة الإسلام ، إذ ذلك هو المقصود والحكمة في نصب الإمام فإذا تعذر وجب على الأمة نصب غيره ممن يقدر على القيام بأمر المسلمين وتدبير مصالحهم العامة ، والله تعالى أعلم .

وكتب عبد ربه تعالى محمد بن محمد بن ابراهيم لطف الله به آمين .

— الحمد لله والله الموفق للصواب . إن ما ثبت أعلاه يبيح للمسلمين إقامة إمام يقوم بمصالحهم ويدفعون به يد الظالم عن المظلوم وتتحل به بيعة الأول لفقد المقصود من الإمامة من حاله ، وهذا مما لا يمتري فيه بين الأئمة . قال في المواقف ما نصه : " وللأمة خلُع الإمام وعزله لسبب يوجبها ، مثل أن يوجد منه ما يوجب اختلال أحوال المسلمين وانتكاس أمور الدين كما لهم نصبه وإقامته لانتظامها وإصلاحها " المراد منه ونحوه في شرحه أيضاً وفي شرح المقاصد من الأسباب المتفق على حل عقد الإمامة بها ما يزول به مقصود الإمامة . ولا خفاء أن ما قيد في الشهادة أعلاه صريح في ذلك . قال في الاستذكار في شرح قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم " وإن تنازع الأمر أهله ، أهله هم أهل العلم والإحسان والفضل والدين مع القوة على القيام بذلك " هـ . السرُاد منه . فالشهادة المقيدة أعلا السؤال سبيحة للمسلمين إقامة إمام يذب عنهم ويقوم بمصالحهم ويدفعون به يد الظالم عن المظلوم لأنه ظل الله ورحمه في أرضه يأوي إليه القوى والضعيف ويطعن به الظالم عن المظلوم . وهذه الشهادة كافية في إقامة شأن مع بقاء الأول سيما ما اشتهر وثبت بخط يده أنه عزل نفسه لعجزه وعدم قيامه بأمر المسلمين ، وهذا كاف في الجواب عن النازلة والله أعلم . وكتب عبد السلام بن بوزيد الأزعي الحسيني لطف الله به .

— الحمد لله ، المُسَطر أعلاه طالع على التحقيق مبناه ، وكيف لا وهو من القضايا المشهورات الملحقة بالضروريات ، والنقول واردة على نسخه وقصده محكمة لرسمه وحده . قال الطيبي في حديث " ألا وُكُلُّمُ مسؤول عن رعيته " إشارة إلى أن المقصود من الإمام الأعظم الحياطة والذب ، وحيث انتفى ذلك في الأول بشهادة الأخبار المتواترة والفتن المتكاثرة المغني تواترها عن تسجيل الشهود في الغيب والشهود ، فلا تخرج الناس عن دائرة الأقسام إلا بخلعه ونصب إمام آخر للإسلام ، لأن نصبه تحفظ الكليات الخمس التي بحفظها بقاء هذا الجنس . لا يقال سلب الإمامة بمجرد سلب الاقتدار منقوض بقضية مولانا عثمان يوم الحصار ، لأننا نقول : أجاب

عن النقض المذكور سيف الدين الأمدى وارتضاه الأبى بأن عثمان رضي الله عنه لم يكن في تلك الحالة عاجزاً عن تنفيذ الأحكام بل كان مطاعاً في النقض والإبرام ، وإنما منعه من الذب والقيام والأمر بذلك للخاص والعام سد أبواب المحن والأحوال وكف أسباب الفتن والأحوال ، بخلاف المشهود في عجزه فإنه اختلف عليه كلمة الناس وهدموا من ركن طاعته الأساس حتى صار منقطعاً عن الأجناد والأتباع ليس له من القدرة قلاماً ، فضلاً عن الباع كما أفصح بذلك كتابه وأعلن به خطابه خروجاً عن عهدة الدماء المسفوكة والأعراض المهتوكة والأموال المنهوبة والأحوال المسلوية . وهبه بقطر آخر نافذ الأمر محكما في زيد و عمرو فلن ذلك لا يجدي وليس إلى كلام يهدي ، لقصور فائدته على قطره وأبناء مصره ، وهذا في نازلتنا أخرى وهو بها أحلى وأجلى . فيجب على الناس نصب غيره للاستفادة ببدره ، ذكره الإمام بن عرفة وغيره ممن اعتقد الحق وعرفه . جبر الله كسر الإسلام بجاء النبي عليه السلام . قال ذلك وكتبه محمد بن أبى بكر بن عبد الكريم اليازعى لطف الله به .

— الحمد لله ، ما ذكر الأئمة أعلاه جواباً وتصحيحاً إشارة وتلويحاً صحيح . كيف لا يجب على المسلمين نصب إمام لما نزل بهم من هذه الخطوب العظام وما نقله الجهابذة النقاد في النازلة كافي يجب عليه الاعتماد لأن عليهم المعول فيما قالوه ونقلوه ورقموه وحملوه . وقد ذكر سيدي العربي الفاسي في تأليف له في المسألة ما فيه الكفاية وإليه الغاية واستيفاء الكلام على النازلة يطول ، وفيما ذكر الحاصل والمحصل . وكتب عبد الملك بن الكبير المري الحسنى وهذا شكله .

— المسطر أعلاه جواباً وتصحيحاً صحيح مما هو معلوم ومقرر في دواوين الأئمة مبين ومحرر ، إن المقصود الأعظم من الإمامة الكبرى صيانة الدين وحياطة المسلمين والقيام بمصالحهم ودفع مضارهم وكف كل يد عادية عنهم أو من غيرهم ، وان نسبة الإمام إلى المصالح الضرورية كسببة ركن الماهية إلى الماهية لا مريية في انعدامها بانعدام ركن من أركانها ، وحيث اختل ركن الإمامة ومرج حال المغرب وماج أهله ، فمن مشرق ومن مغرب

لعجز أميرهم عن الدفاع ، وبقي أمره غير مُطاع منذ زمان ولم يحصل لهم على أنفسهم وأموالهم أمان لبيّن بهذا التفاتهم العظيم والخطب المهائل الجسيم انحلال عقد الخلافة عنه المقصودة منه ، إذ كل ما يزول به المقصود من الإمامة يعزل به صاحبها . قال الآمدي : " الثامن من شروط الإمامة المتفق عليها أن يكون نافذ الحكم مطاعاً قادراً على من خرج عن طاعته فلإن قيل يلزم أن يكون عثمان رضي الله عنه قد خرج عن الأمر حين حُصر في داره لأنه لم يكن قادراً على الزجر ، أجيب بأنه كان نافذ الحكم شرقاً وغرباً ولاكته هاش عليه أو باش من الناس وقصد تسكين الفتنة وأخذ الأمر باللين ، ولم يعلم ما يؤول إليه ه . " والشرط يلزم من عدمه عدم المشروط . وفي المواقف لعضد الدين وشرحها للسيد الجرجاني : " وللأمة خلع الإمام وعزله لسبب يوجب ، مثل أن يوجد منه ما يوجب اختلال أحوال المسلمين وانتكاس أمور الدين " لا سيما مع خلعه نفسه كما في كتابه جزاء الله عن المسلمين خيراً ومنحه مشوبة وأجرأ . ففي المقاصد وشرحها للمولس سعد الدين ما نصه : " ينحل عقد الإمامة بما يزول به مقصود الإمامة كصيرورته أسيراً لأمر لا يرجى خلاصه وكذا المرض الذي يُنسيه العلوم وكذا بخلعه نفسه لعجزه عن القيام بمصالح المسلمين وإن لم يكن ظاهراً بل استشعره من نفسه وعليه محمل خلع الحسن ه . " وقال البكري : " لا يجوز خلع الإمام بلا سبب والسبب المتفق عليه كل ما يختل به مقصود الإمامة ، وإن عزل نفسه بنفسه فلن كان لعجزه عن القيام بالأمر انعزل وإلا فلا ؟ على أن السلطان إذا كان قادراً على التنفيذ وكان بعض البلاد لا يصل إليها حكمه واضطروا إلى الإمام يدبر أمرهم فنقل المازري عن بعض الأصوليين جواز نصب إمام يقوم بأمرهم ، وقال ابن عرفة : " شرط اتخاذ الإمام إنما هو مع الإمكان فلو بعد موضع الإمام حتى لا ينفذ حكمه ببعض الأقطار البعيدة جاز نصب غيره بذلك القطر ه . " كيف لا والناس بقوا فوضى ونزل بهذا المغرب في دين الله ورسوله مالا يرضى ، وقد قال الشيخ زروق في قواعده " قاعدة حفظ النظام واجب ومراعاة المصالح العامة لازم ه . " فيجب نصب إمام يسوس أمورهم ويسد ثغورهم ويجهز جيوشهم ويقهر متغلبهم والمحاربيين والمتلصحين وقطعة الطريق لإجماع الصحابة رضي الله عنهم على ذلك وبادرتهم إليه . وقد قال أبو بكر رضي الله عنه في خطبته المشهورة أن محمداً

قد مات ولا بد لهذا الأمر من يقوم به فبادر الجميع إلى تصديقه وقبول قوله ، ولم يخالف في ذلك أحد وتبعهم على ذلك التابعون ، ومن بعدهم إلى هلم جرا . قال الجزولي : " الإمامة الكبرى فرض كفاية فلإن تواطئوا على تركها فهم عاصون لأن الإمامة ما تصلح به هذه الأمة هـ . " فلماذا لم يقم بها أحد حرج أي أئمة بتركه فريقان ، أحدهما أهل الحل والعقد ، والثاني كل من يصلح للإمامة ففقد . وقال ابن العربي : " لا يُقاتل إلا مع إمام يقدمه أهل الحل والعقد لأنفسهم هـ . " وقال أبو الحسن الصغير : " لا يقيم الله عز وجل بحق المسلمين إلا بالاجتماع والتولية على أنفسهم ويقوم بالحق هـ . والله أعلم . وكتب عبد الله أبو بكر بن ادريس بن عبد الرحمان المنجيرة الحسني غفر الله له .

— الحمد لله ، جميع ما سطر أعلاه جواباً وتصحيحاً صحيح غني لوضوحه لمزيد تصحيح ، إذ لاخفاء أن المقصود من الإمامة هو حماية بيضة الإسلام وحيطة المسلمين والذب عن الخاص منهم والعام . وإن عقد الإمامة ينحل بزوال المقصود منها الذي هو القدرة على تنفيذ الأحكام وحفظ الثغور وانتصار المظلوم من الظالم وتجهيز الجيوش كما قاله أئمتنا رضوان الله عليهم والله أعلم . وكتب محمد العربي الهاشمي الزرهوني (تغمده الله برحمته).

— الحمد لله ما أجاب به الأئمة أعلاه صحيح والله الموفق ، وبه كتب العباس ابن محمد بن كيران كان الله له .

— الحمد لله ، ما قيد أعلاه جواباً وتصحيحاً كله صحيح ، وفقه جلي صريح لا يحتاج لمزيد عليه ، والاستدلال عليه يشبه الاستدلال على النهار والله أعلم . وكتبه عبد ربه تعالى علي التسولي .

— الحمد لله ، لاشك أن ما أوجبه الله تعالى على أهل الإسلام ، الإذعان والانقياد والاستسلام مع السمع والطاعة بقدر الجهد والاستطاعة للأمر والملك ومن تبع طريقهم السلوك مشروط بالقدرة على تنفيذ الأحكام



الشرعية ورد المظالم إلى أهلها والذب عن ( الحقوق ) المرعية . والشروط منتفٍ بانتفاء المشروط بل وغير ذلك من الشروط التي بانتفاءها ينتفسي المشروط . وحيث رمى هذا الزمان بداء رفع الأمن والأمان ، وتعين على أهل الحل والعقد والرد أن ينصبوا إماماً لشروط الكمال جامعاً ، ولضروب الويال رافعاً ، وما نقله الأئمة مصابيح الأمة يجب عليه الاعتماد ويرفع بسببه العناد ، وذلك غني عن زيادة البيان ، وليس الخبر كالعيان . قاله وكتبه محمد بن حمدون بن الحاج سلك الله به أقوم الحاج .

- الحمد لله ، ما سطر أعلاه جواباً وتصحيحاً صحيح غني عن المزيد والتصحيح ، وكتبه عبد ربه علي بن الصديق التوزاني لطف الله به .

- الحمد لله ، ما سطر أعلاه بملصقه جواباً وتصحيحاً صحيح وبه كتب أحمد بن محمد المرنيسي لطف الله به .

- الحمد لله ما سطر أعلاه جواباً وتصحيحاً صحيح ، وبه كتب محمد الشهير بالسنوسي الحسني لطف الله به .

- الحمد لله ، ما سطر أعلاه بملصقه جواباً وتصحيحاً صحيح غني عن التصحيح والله أعلم ، وكتب عبد ربه سبحانه محمد بن الطاهر العلوي الحسني لطف الله به آمين .

- الحمد لله ، ما سطر أعلاه صحيح ، وكتب عبد ربه العباس بن أحمد بن سودة تولاها الله .

- من المعلوم المقرر الذي هو كالشمس أو أشهر أن ما سطره الأئمة أعلاه كله في غاية الوضوح والله تعالى أعلم . وكتب عبد الله تعالى محمد بن الطالب بن سودة الله وليه .

— الحمد لله ، ما سطر أعلاه صحيح . عبد الواحد بن أحمد بن سودة .

— الحمد لله ما افتتح به أعلاه وسرته أهل الإفادة متعين ولير عليه  
من زيادة . وكتب عبد ربه تعالى أبو بكر بن زيان الإدريسي لطف الله به .

— الحمد لله ، ما سطره الأئمة أعلاه مما لا ينكر أو يجهل حلاه ،  
وليس يضح في الأذهان شيء \* إذا احتاج النهار إلى دليل  
وكتب عبد ربه تعالى محمد التهامي بن الحمادي لطف الله به آمين .

الحمد لله ، أعلم باستقلال الرسوم أعلاه بالملتصقين عبد ربه سبحانه وتعالى  
محمد بن محمد بن محمد بن عبد الرحمان الدلائي لطف الله به آمين . ه .

Appendix 86 : Extracts from the bay'ea proclaiming  
Mawlāy Ibrāhīm.

Date : 9 Ṣafar, 1236 / 16 Nov., 1820.

Source: Ms.Z.3772, R.L., unpaginated; reproduced in  
Dāwūd, Tārīkh Tiṭwān, III, pp.250-257.

”... وبايعة الجميع بيعة طلعت في دائرة الاسعاد ، وكمل بها للمسلمين  
المواسم والأعياد ، على السمع والطاعة ، بقدر الاستطاعة ، لما توفر فيه من الشروط  
الشرعية ، والأحوال المرعية ، بقلوب عاقدة الاعتقاد ، خالصة من الاعتراض والانتقاد ،  
مطابقة للالسنة التي أعلنت بنصره ، وتشرفت بثناؤه وذكره ، ملتزمة للعقود التي  
أحكمتها الشريعة المطهرة ، والقوانين المعتمدة ، التزموها طوعا ، وأحكموها شرعا ،  
وأعطوا على ذلك المواثيق التي لا يفصم عقدها ، ولا يفلح حدها ، وقبل أيده الله  
بيعتهم ، وأجاب دعوتهم ، والتزم أن يبذل الاجتهاد في مصالح العباد ، فعليهم  
أن يمثلوا أمره سرا وجهرا ، وأن يحضروه النصح فعلا وذكرا ، وأن يقفوا عند  
حده المحدود ، بالشرع المطاع ، الموافق لما عليه الكتاب والسنة والاجماع  
وأن يقاتلوا دونه ما أقام الدين ، وأشاع شعار المهتدين ، لاتأخذهم في ذلك  
لومة لائم ، ولا صولة قائم ، وعليه أعز الله أنصاره ، وأدام على الطغاة اقتداره  
أن يرفع منارهم ، وأن يحمي ذمارهم ، وأن يعاملهم بالرفق في الأمور ، وأن يحملهم  
على جادة الشرع المشهور ، وأن يسير فيهم بالسيرة المحمودة عواقبها ، المأمونة  
مثالبها ، وأن يسد ثغورهم ، ويحمي ظهورهم ، ولا يهمل فيهم التمييز بين  
الشريف والمشروف ، على مقتضى الشرع والقانون المألوف ، وأن يُنزل الناس  
منازلهم ، لا يحرّمهم نائلهم ، ويمنحهم الأرزاق والجبايات ، على حسب المناصب  
والكفايات ، وأن يختار العمال لفصل الشكايات ، وأن تراعي نفسه الزكية  
المتطلبين بأحسن الرعايات ، وأن يرفع أئدار الشرفاء والعلماء ، ويمنحهم ما  
يستحقونه من التعظيم والاكتماء ، وأن يقدم أهل الرأي والتسديد ، لحضور

مجلسه السعيد ، وأن لا يأنف من مشورة أهل العلم في الأمور بل يشاورهم في الإيراد والصدور ، وأن يرفع القواعد والأسوس ، برفض المغارم والمكوس ، وأن لا يحكم في المناصب الفرض والتصويب ، بل يجريها على حسب الاستحقاق والتصويب ، وأن يضرب صفحا على يد من شهد العلماء ينبذ حكمه ، ووجوب الاعراض عنه في حده ورسه ، وأن يُرسل عنان الفتوى ، ويتجنب أهل الجهل والدعوى ، وأن لا يمكّن العدو والكافر من سوق الوسق ، وأن يسوي بين الجيش والقبائل عند الحركة في الرزق ، وليجعل الأوامر والمناصب المخزنية ، في البيوت التي لها في خلافة مولانا اسماعيل أصدق ثبات ونية ، وأن لا يجعل أمور المسامين ، في أيدي التجار والمترفين ، لأن ذلك سبب التدمير ، واستيلاء الفساد والنكير ، قال تعالى " وإذا أردنا أن نهلك قرية أمرنا مترفيها ففسقوا فيها فحق عليها القول فدمرناها تدميراً " ، وأن لا يعدل عن ظهر حسبه ، وتناسق نسبه لأن ذلك أبقى للمناصب ، وأمنع لها من المصائب ، كتب عمر بن عبد العزيز إلى الحسن البصرى أن أشر علي بأقوام أوليهم ، فكتب إليه ، أما أهل الخير فلا يريدونك ، وأهل الشر لا تريدُهم ، فعليك بسذوي الأحساب ، فانهم لا يدنسون أحسابهم بالثيانات ، وعلى الجميع بالتقوى ، ومراقبة الله في السر والنجوى ، فانها المقصودة من الخلق الذي كرمه الله تكريماً ، وزاده بالخلافة المبنية على أركانها تعظيماً ... "

Appendix 87 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès following their repudiation of his bay'ca.

Date : not mentioned (1820-1821)

Source: Al-<sup>ḥ</sup>Arbī al-Mashrafī, al-Ḥusām, Mic. 1207, BGR, pp.485-487.

### الحمد لله،

كافة أهل فاس سلام عليكم ورحمة الله تعالى وبركاته ،

وبعد فأنشدكم الله بسم استحللتم نقض بيعتنا أو الجرعة على طاعتنا التي أوجبها الله عليكم بالكتاب والسنة والاجماع، قال تعالى : "يأيها الذين آمنوا أطيعوا الله . . ." وقال (ص) "اسمعوا وأطيعوا وان ولي عليكم عبد حبشي رأسه زيبية" ، وقال "كل أمتي يدخلون الجنة الا من أبى ، قالوا يا رسول الله ومن يأبى ؟ قال من أطاعني دخل الجنة ومن عصاني فقد أبى ، ومن أطاع أميرى فقد أطاعني ومن عصا أميرى فقد عصاني" ، وقال " من فارق الجماعة قيد شبر مات ميتة جاهلية" ، وقال " من أهان الخلافة واستدل الامارة لقي الله ولا وجه له عنده" ، وقال " ثلاثة لا ينظر الله اليهم ولا يزكّيهم ولهم عذاب أليم : رجل بايع سلطانا على أن يعطيه شيئا فان أعطى وفي له بيعته وإلا نقضها" ، وقد بايعتمونا بيعة شرعية وأعطيتم عليها صفقة أيمانكم . قال تعالى " وأوفوا بالعهد ان العهد كان مسؤولا" ، وقال " والموفون بعهدهم اذا عاهدوا" . وأما من جهة الشرع فلا سبيل الى ذلك لأن الله تعالى أحل ما أحل وحرم ما حرم وكتاب الله بين أظهرنا وسنة نبيه قائمة بيننا ، وفي مختصر خليل : " الباغية . . ." ، وأما من جهة الكبرياء والغلظة والعظمة فان الله غالب على أمره . وفي الحديث القدسي : " الكبرياء رداي والعظمة إزازي ، فمن نازعني فيها قصمته" . فارجعوا على أنفسكم فقد خلل لكم الشيطان وسؤل لكم وأقلق لكم ، وغرّمكم الامهال ، والظالم يمهل ولا يمهل ، وفي الحديث " إن الله يمهل على الظالم حتى يأخذه ، فاذا أخذه لم يفلقه" . وكان الأنسب لكم لو كانت لكم اعلام

و بصائر أن تعلموا أن الأمور لها أواخر كما لها أوائل و تتذكروا ما  
أسدينا لكم نحن و أسلافنا من جزيل الاحسان و عظيم الامتان و شتان  
ما بين من سبقته السعادة العظمى و من كتب الله عليه الشقاء حتما  
و من كان في هذه أعمى فهو في الآخرة أعمى ، فقد أعلمتم بالشقاء  
و تبرزتم لسوء الأخلاق ، و استوى في ذلك كبيركم و صغيركم و أميركم  
و مأمورك ، و ظننتم أن بيدكم زمام الأقدار و لكم على ما شتم القدرة  
و الاقتدار . كلاً ، لقد أخطأتم بمرادكم الغائل ، و ما تتعصبون به فانه  
طائل زائل ، أرشدناكم و حذرناكم و بسطوة الله و قهريته خوفاًكم  
" انما توعدون . . . الآية " ، " و ما أنتم بمعجزين فليحذر الذين  
يخالفون عن أمره أن تصيبهم فتنة أو يصيبهم عذاب أليم " . و قد  
كتبنا اليكم كم من كتاب فلم يظهر لنا من قبلكم جواب ، فلم ندر أيقع  
ذلك بيد شياطينكم و يكتمونه عنكم أم تسمعونه ثم تنبذونه وراء ظهركم  
عناداً و استكباراً . و الآن ان أردتم السلامة لنفوسكم فاقطعوا عن  
غيبكم و ارجعوا عن بغيتكم فان التوبة تحيي ما قبلها ، و التائب من  
كفر لا ذنب له ، " و إن الله تعالى ليفرح بتوبة العبد العاصي ...  
الحديث " ، و الا فأنتم من عقاب الله بمدرجة حيلة و درك ليلة . اللهم  
إننا بلغنا المجهود و السلام .

Appendix 88 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the sharīf-s of Fès during the Fès rebellion.

Date : not mentioned (1821)

Source: Al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahā', Ms.K.241, BGR, pp.181-185.

" الحمد لله ، إلى كافة أبناء عمنا من الأشراف العلويين والأدارسة الحسينيين والعراقيين والظاهرية الصقليين والمسفرية الحسينيين وعمامة أهل فاس ، سلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته وبعد ، فأني كنت والله أعلم - محسناً إليكم منذ قلدني الله أمركم ، وأسير فيكم بسيرة العدل والعفاف ، ولا أعاملكم بالجور وعدم الإنصاف وأسقطت عنكم ما كان وظفه عليكم أخونا اليزيد من الخمسة رابعاً مع ما كان عليكم من وظيف المكس وأسقطت عن تجاركم ما كانوا يعطون في المراسي من العشر ، وجعلناه زكاة شرعية ربع العشر ، وما ياتوا به في البر وهبنا عشره على الأشراف وكنت أواسي ضعفاءكم ويتاماكم وطلبتكم من بيت المال زيادة على ما رتبناه لهم من الوقف الكبير ومن المارستان وكنت أحبكم وواثقاً بكم ، ومعتمداً على اصطناعكم حتى جعلت أولادي في وسطكم ركوناً إليكم ليكونوا بعدنا في أمن وأمان ، وتراعوا لهم ما أسلفناه إليكم من الإحسان . وأقل يكونون من جملة أشرافكم موقرين محترمين وإن رماهم أحد من ياتي بعدنا بمكروه تدافعون عنهم بل تقاتلون عليهم وتحمونهم لأنهم بين أظهركم وفي جواركم فما شعرنا حتى سمعنا أن دارنا تنهب ومن فيها يسلب ، ومن ينسب إلينا بين محبوس وشريد ، ولم تكتفوا بذلك إلى أن جعلتم ولدنا علي في الحديد ، ورميت ديارنا بالبُنب والكور ، ولم تخشوا عاقبة الأمور ، وأنكرتم الصنيع وسويتهم بين الرفيع والوضيع ، ولولا الثقة بكم والميل إليكم ما آمنت عندكم المدافع والمهارز التي أعددتها لأعدائكم فصرتم ترمون داري بها ، فما رأيت أصفق من وجوهكم . فأناشدكم الله ما نعمتموه منا حتى فعلتم فعلتكم التي

خلعتم بها ربة الإسلام وحللتهم بيعتنا التي لا يجوز حلها ولا يقول به أحد من العاملين الأعلام واعتمدتم على سفهاكم المبتدعين المضلين وخذعوكم بالزور والبهتان وصرتم خلفهم مدلين . فأين عقلائكم وذووا أسنانكم وكسبراء بيوتاتكم الذين حنكهم التجارب ويجتنبون عواقب الأمور ويخافون الوقوع في المحذور وشاهدوا ما حل بالمخالفين المعاندين المحاربين بين الويل والشبور ، وإن ماتوا فقد سمع أولادهم ما حل بهم من سالف الدهور . فأين الحكيم والعسري والخطيب وسامي ، وأين الحارثي وابن عمير وشاذان ، والشاوي ، وأين الفرديس والجزولي وعنون ، والغرناطي والمفرج والبنكاد وأهل زرهون ؟ وأين قداماء الأشراف الإدريسيين والعراقيين الذين حضروا الوقائع وشاهدوا رمي المهارز والمدافع؟ وإذ أعمى الله أبصاركم وبصائرهم وفعلتم فعلتكم وجنيتهم جنائيتكم ، فما موجب رمي البُضْب على النساء ونهب الديار وقبض ولدنا وتضييع الجوار؟ وإن زعمتم أنه حصل لكم منه ضرر أوراكم بِشَرِّ فَأُخْرِجُوهُ عَلَى الْبَابِ يَذْهَبُ لِدَارِ أَبِيهِ ، على أنه عاقل نبيه ، ولا تقولوا أن ابن عمه هو الذي قبضه ونهب الدور فلولاكم ما قبض ولا سجن ولا نهب بل هو معذور ، ولو كان فيكم الخير ولم تنكروا الصنيع ودافعتم عنه الوضيع والرفيع ومنعتموه كما يمنع من الثدي الرضيع ، كيف وقد منعتم الفاسق المارق الكثاني الوضيع وأزلتموه من يد خُدا منا فيا الله من صنع بشيع ! وحتى الآن هذا كتابنا ينطق عليكم بالحق ، فيوافقكم بالنصيحة والصدق إن لم تسرحوا ولدنا لداره أو لدار والده بغاس الجديد وتزيلوا عنه ما عليه من الحديد ، أو أن تجعلوا خطابنا لكم عبثاً ، أو تحدثوا به حدثاً فقد تسببتم في خراب بلادكم وقتل رجالكم وسبي أولادكم وبناتكم ونسائكم ، وحملهم في المنشآت الجوار لبلاد الترك يباعون كما يباع بني الكفار . وما كتبت لكم هذا إلا باعذاراً وإنذاراً لمن معكم من الغرباء والمستضعفين ليخرجوا من هذه الدار ليلاً يعمهم البواره . فقد أفتى علماء المغرب العاملون والأخيار منهم الصالحون ، لا كفتوى سفهاكم المضلون بإباحة دماءكم وأموالكم لخروجكم على إمامكم وشقكم على المسلمين لعمايتكم ، فحمدنا الله على ما صرتم إليه من الذل والهوان وتضييع الأموال والأبدان وعدتتم رعايا البربر الأجلاف يُعاملونكم بقسوة الإنصاف بعد معاملتنا لكم والحمد لله بالعدل والعفاف ولم يَكْفِكُمْ مال الدولة الذي نهبتهم ولا مال الوقف الذي أتلفتم ، ولا مال الأيتام الذي ضيعتم ولا مال



التجار الذي أسلفتم ، وقد بَدْرتم في هذه المدة القليلة أزيد من الألفين قنطار على السفهاء والبربر والفجار ، فكيف لا تحبون من يوافقكم على الظلم والنصب وتقاسمونه مال النهب، ولا بد أن يجازيكم الله على الإساءة للجار ويرسل عليكم شواظٍ من مارج من نار وصواعق مدبرة تخرب عليكم الديار وتسرع بكم إلى دار الخزي والبوار ، فلن سرحتم ولدنا رجونا أن ينقذكم الله من هذه البلوى ويعفو عنكم فلن العفو أقرب للتقوى ، ” وإن الله لا يغير ما بقوم حتى يغيروا ما بأنفسهم ” والسلام .

Appendix 89 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the sharīf-s of Fes.

Date : not mentioned (1821)

Source: al-Zayānī, Tuḥfat al-nubahā?, K.241, BGR, pp.185-188.

الحمد لله وحده

إلى كافة السادات الأشراف بفاس الأدارسة والصقليين والعراقيين  
والمسفرين من بني الحسين ومن هو من أهل الخير من كل فريق،  
سلام عليكم ورحمة الله ونفعنا ببركاته وأهلها هم أولاده ومن نزلها معه من  
قبائل اللمطين جيرانها أهل لمطة وهم الذين أووه ونصروه وقاموا بدعوتهم  
إلى أن ملك المغرب كله فهم أهل السابقة والنجدة . وأما الأندلسيون فما  
نزلوها إلا تحت جوار اللمطين ومن يوم دخلوها دخل السوس والوسواس فسي  
دولة الأدارسة ونافسوا المكناسيين والأمويين على الأدارسة حتى أخرجوهم  
من المغرب كله ، وأنقلهم الأموي للأندلس وبعد أن نزلوا قرطبة تمكنوا من  
السعاية بهم إلى أن نفوهم لإفريقية وذلك دأبهم في الأندلس حتى أخرجهم  
العدو والكافر منها إلى المغرب واستمروا على ذلك في كل دولة ومع كل ناعق ،  
وكل فساد ينشؤ بفاس فأصله منهم وليست بأول فعلة فعلوها ولا يستغرب ذلك  
منهم إنما استغربته من اللمطين الذين هم صميم صنهاجة من حجير وهم أهل  
وفاء ونجدة وحسن جوار ، وكنت راكنا إليهم واثقاً بهم ، وأنزلت أولادي في  
وسطهم اعتماداً على ما أعلمه من صلاحهم وميلهم إلى الجلدة العربية  
ونخوتها ، ثم إنهم اغتمروا بكلام السفهاء الذين يعدونهم فقهاء  
وتبعوا الأندلسيين في فسادهم وقادهم ذلك الشيطان الذي ليس في  
اللمطين أفسد منه ولم يخف عليّ حاله ، فاصطنعته ووليته على المسلمين  
تأليفاً له ونوّهت بقدره لأزيل ما في باطنه مما هو مطبوع عليه ، فلم ينفع

فيه اصطناع ولا إحسان ولا بسد أن يلحق بأصحابه فلن الله لا يهمل أمره فأخبروني أين عقلاؤكم وأين بيوتاتكم ؟ أليس منكم رجل رشيد يرشدكم لما فيه صلاح دينكم ودنياكم ويوظفكم من سنة الغفلة ويذكركم عواقب الأمور ، فأين الحارثي والغرديس وشاذان وابن عمير والجزولي وأمثالهم ؟ فلو كان فيكم خير ما قبض ولدنا في وسطكم وفي جواركم ، ولا نُهب دار ولدنا إبراهيم رحمه الله في جواركم وبين أظهركم ، ولا تقولوا إن ابن عمه نهب أو قبض ، بل تجرأتم لما في ذلك لكم من الغرض ، فلو كانت لكم همة عالية أو نفس أبيّة لقاتلتم دونه وإنكم أكثر منهم رجالاً وسلاحاً وجُنْدنا معكم . وحيث وافتموهم وطؤا بأرجلهم على رقابكم وجروه من وسطكم . وعلى فرض أنه لحقكم منه ما تكرهون أخرجوه على الباب ليتوجه لدار أبيه . فانظروا ما فعله ابن عبد الرزاق في قضية الكتاني فإنه ليس بابن سلطان ولا ذي جاهة بعد أن قبضه خدماً أزاله لهم وأجاره ولم يبال بأحد لاعتقاده على المُفسيدين الذين وراءه لأن الأندلسيين مُفرغون في قالب واحد وما فيهم إلا رجُلان عاقلان مقهوران مغلوبان ، وأنتم فيكم فاسد واحد غلبكم وقادكم بلا رسن إلسى أن يوقعكم فيما تكرهون . ولا تقولوا أنى كتبت لكم هذا عن ضعف أو وهن أو أعجز في جمعكم وجلتكم مع الجواليت الخواج وتعززكم بهم . إنما قدمت لكم هذه إعداراً وإنداراً خوفاً من الوقوع في المحذور حتى لا يبقى عليّ ملامٌ منكم ولا من الأشراف والضعفاء والأيتام والأيامى ، فلن رجعت إلى الطريقة المثلى فقد تجملت على رؤوسكم وعلى من معكم من المستضعفين ، وتخرجوا ولدنا علي من السجن لداره أو تخرجوه على الباب لدار والده ، ولن بقيتكم على عبايتكم فلن الله ياخذكم أخذاً وببلا ، لأن الرحمة تخص والنقمة تعم ، " وإن الله يغير ما بقوم حتى يغيروا ما بأنفسهم " . فقد كتبت في راحة ونعمة شاملة فلم تؤدوا شكرها وكفرتوها فأزالها الله عنكم وإلى الآن لم تبلغ منتهاها . لو كنتم تعتبرون لعرفتكم ما أنتم فيه من الذل والهوان ونهب الأموال والكساد وإمارة الأوغاد وغلاء الأسعار واستطالة الجار زادكم الله صفاراً على صفار وأخلى منكم هذه الدار ، فعن قريب إن شاء الله يرسل عليكم شواظٍ من نار ، وصواعق مدمرة تخرب عليكم الديار حتى لا يبقى لها آثار إذ لا تصلحون إلا على الجور منهوص في الأخبار ، فالجزء من جنس العمل إن شاء الله والعقول إن فعلتم أقرب للتقوى والسلام .

Appendix 90 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès contradicting the Fāsi merchants' decision to prevent Jewish shoemakers from selling their produce in the markets of Old Fès.

Date : not mentioned .

Source: al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, Ms.K.224, BGR, p. 210.

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله ،

من المعلوم أن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم قبضه الله وذرعه مرهونة عند يهودي في سوق المدينة في طعام ، وعمر رضي الله عنه قبض منهم العشر في سوقها وكل مصر فتح فأهل ذمته هم أهل صناعته ولا زال ذلك إلى الآن بمصر والشام والعراق وخراسان وبلاد الترك كلها ، فكيف يمنع أهل الذمة من بيع السباط في أسواق المسلمين ، أو يمنعون من صنعه للغش ودفع ضرر عام ، وإنما قصده جلب ضرر عام وهو غلاء السباط وجلب نفعه ليبيع هو كيف شاء بما شاء . على أن الغش اليوم صار عادة المسلمين في الصنائع كلها أحرى اليهود ولا يمكن التحرز منه في زمننا بل هو مدخول عليه ، فلا يمنعون إلا إذا منعهم الشارع فيما لم أطلع عليه من كلام الأئمة ، وإن كان عندكم نص بالمنع من غير كلام أهل السباط وجهوه لنا والسلام .

Appendix 91 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to al-Salāwī fixing import duties for Moroccan Muslim merchants.

Date : not mentioned.

Source : al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, Ms. K 224, B.G.R., p. 209.

كاتينا السيد محمد السلاوي، سلام عليك ورحمة الله وبركاته،

وبعد، فما ذكرت من قبض العُشر من التجار الواردين من المشرق  
فلا نقبض منهم إلا رُبْع العُشر الذي هو زكاة أموالهم المشروع،  
ونص عليه العلماء وقرره أئمة المذهب في غير ما موضع  
وعليه عملك في المراسي كلها، فان تتبعنا أغراض الناس وقعننا  
في المحذور، لأن التجارة في أرض الحرب حرام سيما في هذا  
الزمن الذي قلت فيه الأمانة في أهلها ولا يميزون بين الحلال  
والحرام، ويتوجهون لأرض الحرب ويتعاملون معاملة الكفار  
وهي حرام، ويأتون بأموال الكفار وهي حرام، حتى صارت أموالهم  
كلها سحت وما يقبض منها سحت فلا تدنسها بقبض العُشر،  
ولا تقبض إلا رُبْعها المشروع، وان كان على غير وجهه، ولو  
كفوا لكفنا، ولو اكتفوا بالتجارة في بلاد المسلمين  
كمصر والشام والحجاز وبلاد الترك لكفنا عن قبض  
الجميع والسلام.

Appendix 92 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to one of his qā'id-s (al-Ghāzī) concerning the maintenance of Makhzenian prisons.

Date : not mentioned.

Source: Ms. K.1264, BGR, pp.357-358; al-Mashrafī, al-Ḥusām, Mic.1207, BGR, pp. 362-464.

" محبنا الفقيه السيد الغازي أمانك الله وسلام عليك ورحمة الله .  
 وبعد فلا يقلقك منا تردد النصح والإفصاح عن خبايا النفس الأمانة بالسوء ،  
 فما ذلك إلا لمحبتنا فيك وما أهملناك كغيرك ، ولو نظرت ما بَلَّغتنا قضية إلا  
 عادت عليك بالمنفعة العامة فيها وفي غيرها ، وإذا رفعنا إليك أمراً فلا تبحث  
 عن قائله ، ولكن ابحث فيه فلن كان كذباً فإنه يذهب جفاء ، أو حقاً فاحمد الله  
 لأنني لست بسلطان تُخشى بادرة سوءه حتى يخرج من القول إليه . وإنما  
 عندنا صدر يقبل الحق والكذب ، ولا أنتقم ولو للحق إلا أن يحكم الله ، وهأنذا  
 أمثل لك ذلك بمسئلة وتأملها وانظر إيلانها إلينا خير لك لما نشأ عنها من  
 النصح أم كونها طويت عنها . هب أنه بلغنا فرار بني زمر من السجن فإننا نعلم  
 أن الأمر لله وقد فر الساجين من سجن كسرى وقيصر والحجاج ، وسجون  
 مولانا اسماعيل والدنا رحمه الله من عند الجعدي ، ومن هو أعظم منه حزمياً ،  
 والأمر لله ، ولو قد رشيء لكان ثم أعطف عليك فأنتهك من حيث لا تدري ولا تشعر  
 فأقول : اعلم أنك ذو خلافة كبيرة وذو إمرة متسعة يجب عليك أن يكون لك  
 سجن متسع من مائتي شبر تربيعه من ناحية السقف ومن ناحية بيوت متسعة ،  
 ومن ناحية ميضات وبشر ، وفي ناحية أخرى مسجد وبئر وإمام راتب ، وعند ذلك  
 من تخلف عن الصلاة ضرب إذ لا ذنب مسجون منه أحد أعظم من تركها ،  
 كيف لا نامره ولا ننهاه وعليها يقتل كفوّاً تاركها ، وانظر إلى سجنك حين قام بأمر  
 الله كم قبضنا فيه من المال على يدك ، فكيف لا نُصير فيه عشرة آلاف وعشرين  
 نفدي بها رقابنا من النار ، وكيف لا ينجيهم الله من النار ويجعل لهم مخرجاً

و فرجاً ، ولم يصف لنا أحد سجنك ، لكن هذا سجن العمال كلهم فأنت  
أشقةنا عليك من دونهم ، فلن قلت في جوابك كل العمال هكذا ، فأقول لك  
وبما ضرك إن أحسنت لنفسك وأساء غيرك ؟ أينقص غيرك من عذابك وهل في  
المعاصي قال الله " وفي ذلك فليتنافس المتنافسون " ؟ لا بل في جوار الله  
في أعلا عليين ، أي في أفعال البر . فما لنا وللتنافس في الهلاك ؟ فلن قلت  
من مات فقد بلغ أجله فأقول لك إن أتاك رجل وقال لك إن هذا الرجل قتل أخي  
ما تقول له ؟ فلن قلت بلغ أجله تخرج عن الإسلام ، وتكذب بالقرآن ، وفيه  
" ولكم في القصاص حياة يا أولي الألباب " وحديث عن النبي ( ص ) " المسير  
مقتول بما قتل به " كما أن ذلك الرجل قتل بسيفه قتلت أنت بسجنك وغمك . أما  
تحذر أن يقتلك الله مثلها ، وكت أخبرتنا بلسانك أن طائفة من أهل ناد لا  
ماتوا بسجنك . أنشدك الله هل تحققت أن بعضهم أو جلهم مات من غم السجن  
وعدم الاعتناء به ؟ وإذا كان كذلك فلم تنظر لنا ولا لنفسك ؟ الله ما هذا !  
وفقنا الله لمرضاته آمين