

SÜLEYMÂN
THE SECOND
AND HIS TIME

edited by
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and
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INTRODUCTION

Nineteen eighty-seven, for no particular anniversary reason, turned out to be a year in which several cities and campuses in North America witnessed cultural and scholarly activities concerning Ottoman civilization in the age of Süleymân the Magnificent (r. 1520-1566). It was in that year, between January 25-May 17, that the first major exhibition of Ottoman art outside Turkey was opened in the National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C., and then toured several other American cities before moving on to Europe and Japan.¹

The ensuing interest in the age of Süleymân manifested itself in several ways, not the least of which is that this Ottoman sultan was honored as one of the figures to be represented among other major lawgivers of history in the halls of the US Congress. In the academic sphere, two conferences and several lecture series were organized in different cities that again focussed on the Ottoman empire in the sixteenth century. Of the two conferences, one was held at the University of Chicago on June 20-22, 1987, and the other at Princeton University on November 19-22 of the same year.²

This volume brings together most of the papers presented in those two conferences. At the same time, the Institute for Turkish Studies had commissioned a set of papers for an intended book on Süleymân; some of those, too, were eventually included in this volume.

As it will become clear from a study of the table of contents, this book does not aim to present a comprehensive coverage of all aspects of Ottoman history in the age of Süleymân. Nor does it aim to treat its different themes in the same depth or to delineate a common perspective. Based on pieces presented to conferences, the papers represent a variety of positions and even of scholarly traditions that will not escape the cross-referential eye of the careful reader.

The long delay in the completion of this volume was due to various unexpected difficulties, but we felt along the way and continue to believe that the papers retain their value and originality, namely that they represent a significant

¹The catalogue of the exhibition was published by Esin Atıl who was also its curator: *The Age of Sultan Süleymân the Magnificent* (Washington and New York, 1987).

²A similar conference was held in 1990 at l'École du Louvre in Paris to accompany the exhibition at the Galeries Nationales du Grand Palais. Its proceedings have already been published: *Soliman le Magnifique et son temps*, ed. Gilles Veinstein (Paris, 1992).

contribution to the historical studies of the sixteenth century. We can only hope that the authors understand and the readers agree.

It is impossible to name individually all those who have made a contribution to this collection since it would need to include those who have participated in the organization of the Chicago and Princeton conferences. It is recognized with gratitude that the whole staff and faculty of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Chicago as well as the Near Eastern Studies Department at Princeton University have generously given part of their invaluable time and energy. But special mention must be made of Professor Richard Chambers who was at first one of three intended editors for this volume; he spent a good deal of time in securing the papers and organizing the editorial process before he pulled out of the project due to reasons of health and time. It is a pleasant duty to express our thanks to him and to some others who have contributed directly to this publication: Evin Erder, Evren Ergin, Professor Fatma Müge Göçek, Professor Ahmet Kuyaş, Dr. Mark Pinson, Said Saffari, Derin Terzioğlu. Thanks are also due to the Institute of Turkish Studies, Inc., for providing funds to help defray part of the costs of edition and publication.

Halil İnalcık
Cemal Kafadar

THE LIFE AND FAMILY OF SÜLEYMÂN I

Alan FISHER

For a generation of readers who are accustomed to know, or at least wish to know, all the details of public and private lives of public figures, reading about political leaders of the sixteenth century may be a frustrating experience. Not only are there long periods in their lives for which there is no surviving evidence, but these leaders' own contemporaries were not always aware of their activities, or even of their whereabouts at various times in their lives. Much of the evidence surviving for such political figures illuminates more of their public performances than it does of their private lives or personal character.

It is possible to discover a great deal about Sultan Süleymân's official face. He often appeared in public and impressed those around him, both his own officialdom and foreigners, the latter providing often detailed descriptions of Süleymân in reports to their governments or in letters and diaries written later. One of the clearest is that by Anthony Jenkinson, who was present in Aleppo in 1553 when Süleymân entered the city to spend the winter, in the midst of one of his military campaigns against the Safavid Shah Tahmâsb.¹

After them [his retainers] came the great Turke himself with great pompe and magnificence, using in his countenance and gesture a wonderful majesty, having only on each side of his person one pate clothed with cloth of gold. He himself was mounted upon a goodly white horse, adorned with a robe of cloth of gold, embroidered most richly with the most precious stones, and upon his head a goodly white tucke, containing in length by estimation fifteen yards, which was of silk and lincn woven together, resembling something of Callicut cloth, but much more fine and rich. In the top of his crown a little pinnacle of white ostrich feathers, and his horse most richly appavelled in all points correspondent to the same.

¹"The manner of the entring of Soliman the great. Turke. with his armie into Aleppo in Syria, marching towards Persia against the Great Sophie, the fourth day of November, 1553, noted by Master Anthony Jenkinson, present at that time," in Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*, Glasgow, 1904, pp. 105-110 here pp. 107-108.

It is much more difficult to determine what kind of man Süleymân was, behind this royal image. What were his interests, his attitudes, his view of himself as Sultan, his understanding of politics and of the world around him, both within his empire and outside. As with most important figures in Ottoman history, most of the available evidence concerns his public acts, his military exploits, and the great changes which took place in Ottoman society during his long reign. For the man beneath, we are left with inadequate documentation: few personal letters; no personal diary we can be sure was written by Süleymân; little in the way of personal evaluations by his friends and associates. Ottoman chroniclers do include some useful evidence of Süleymân's family circumstances, particularly when these had political significance — for example, his dealings with his sons — and indirect documentation about the sultan's relations with his own officials. But an historian who hopes to uncover the quality and quantity of evidence that is available for a genuine biography of Süleymân's European contemporaries will be disappointed.

Europeans who had personal knowledge of Süleymân, who met with him, and who learned about the sultan from others in the Ottoman government, include in their diaries and reports a great deal of information which is helpful. Good examples of the information of this sort which is available include the following bits of enticing data and evaluation, found primarily in the reports of Venetian envoys to Constantinople.

The earliest one, found to date, provides a description of Süleymân in 1520, the year of his accession to power:

The sultan is only twenty five years [actually 26] old, tall and slender but tough, with a thin and bony face. Facial hair is evident but only barely. The sultan appears friendly and in good humor. Rumor has it that Süleymân is aptly named, enjoys reading, is knowledgeable and shows good judgment.²

Two short descriptions of Süleymân's person appear in Venetian reports from 1526 and 1534. Pietro Bragadino refers to the sultan as "deadly pale, slender. By nature he is melancholy, much addicted to women, liberal, proud, hasty and yet sometimes very gentle."³ Daniello de Ludovisi wrote in 1534 that Süleymân was of a "choleric and melancholy temperament, given rather to ease than

²Bartolomeo Contarini, Venetian envoy to Constantinople from 1519-1520, report summarized in Marino Sanuto, *Diarii*, Venice, 1879-1903, 59 vols.; here vol. 25, p. 352. A full report by Contarini appears in Eugenio Alberi, *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato*, series III, vol. 3, Florence, 1855, pp. 51-58.

³Alberi, III/3, p. 101; the full text of Bragadino's report covers pp. 99-112; it is referred to in Sanuto, vol. 41, p. 396.

business, orthodox in his faith... He is not very alert, nor has he the force and prudence ... seeing he has given the government of his empire.... [to İbrâhîm]⁴

In the 1550s two very important treatments of Süleymân appear which give us an intimate look at the changes in his character and personality from the time of his youth. Bernardo Navagero, a Venetian, reported in 1553 that he:⁵

now drinks no wine ... only fair water, on account of his infirmities. He has the reputation of being very just, and when he has been accurately informed of the facts of the case he never wrongs any man. Of his faith and its laws he is more observant than any of his predecessors.

The second observer from the 1550's was Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, ambassador to Süleymân from the Hapsburg Emperor, and resident in the Ottoman Empire between 1554 and 1562. His letters and reports provide a great deal of information about the Empire, about the Ottoman government, and about Süleymân himself. In his first letter to his government, of September, 1555, he described in some detail his impressions of Süleymân, gained from personal experience with him. From the last third of Süleymân's political life, these views portray Süleymân in a light different from that commonly accepted:⁶

He is beginning to feel the weight of years, but his dignity of demeanour and his general physical appearance are worthy of the ruler of so vast an empire. He has always been frugal and temperate, and was so even in his youth... Even in his earlier years he did not indulge in wine or in those unnatural vices to which the Turks are often addicted... He is a strict guardian of his religion and its ceremonies, being not less desirous of upholding his faith than of extending his dominions. For his age — he has almost reached his sixtieth year — he enjoys quite good health, though his bad complexion may be due to some hidden malady; and indeed it is generally believed that he has an incurable ulcer or gangrene on his leg. This defect of complexion he remedies by painting his face with a coating of red powder, when he wishes departing ambassadors to take with them a strong impression of his good health; for he fancies that it contributes to inspire greater fear in foreign potentates if they think that he is well and strong.

⁴ Alberi, III, vol. 1, Florence, 1840, p. 28; the full text of his report is on pp. 1-32.

⁵ Alberi, *op. cit.*, III/1, pp. 72-3; his full report is in pp. 33-110. Sections of this report and the one cited previously appear in Roger B. Merriman, *Suleiman the Magnificent*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1944, pp. 191-192.

⁶ Edward Seymour Forster (and ed.), *The Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople*, Oxford, 1927, pp. 55-56.

Lacey Baldwin Smith, the biographer of Henry VIII, wisely noted that:⁷

If the conclusions of geriatrics are correct, it is during the final stages of life that man casts off a portion of the protective shield hammered out during childhood and adolescence and reveals the raw personality beneath.

Perhaps because in his last years, from around 1550 to his death in 1566, Süleymân behaved quite differently from the way he had acted in the first thirty years of his reign, this last third of his political life is often glossed over by biographers and historians. By focusing attention on these last sixteen years of Süleymân's life, I hope in this short essay to remove the "protective shield" and find this sultan's "raw personality beneath," as much as the sources permit us to do so.

Süleymân's very last year of life was not a good one for the sultan nor for his empire. He died in September of 1566, in Szigetvar, Hungary, in the midst of a military campaign of little or no consequence, approximately 750 miles from his capital of Constantinople (as the crow flies), in the forty-sixth year of his reign, and at the age of 72. This was not a very impressive place or way to end a career that had earned for Süleymân the title at home of *Kânûnî* (Lawgiver), and abroad of the Grand Turk, the magnificent, the Grand Signior, the Scourge of Europe. What was Süleymân doing in this rather remote place, at that age, expending Ottoman men and treasure to achieve a goal of no importance? The answer to this question may go a long way in helping us to understand the man beneath the magnificent and famous sovereign he was.

Indeed, Süleymân died in the general vicinity of his first major military venture, in 1521, some forty-five years earlier. Then, Süleymân had captured Belgrade, the "key to Hungary," and central Europe, and had set the stage for a career that would extend his state's frontiers in all directions, and would build Ottoman fiscal and military power to a level unmatched before or after. The official title his chancery used on public documents called him:⁸

Süleymân, son of Selîm Hân, Sultan of Sultans, Touchstone of Hâkâns, Distributor of Crowns to the Rulers of the Surface of the Earth, Sovereign of the White Sea, Black Sea, Rumelia, Anatolia, Overlord of Rum and Karaman, of Dulkadir and Diyarbakir, Azerbaijan Syria, Aleppo, Egypt, of noble Jerusalem, of venerated Mecca and sacred Medina, of Jidda, Yemen, and many other lands, Sultan Süleymân Shah and Khan.

⁷Lacey Baldwin Smith, *Henry VIII, The Mask of Royalty*, London, 1971, p. 23.

⁸Josef Matuz, *Das Kanzleiwesen Sultan Süleymans des Prächtigen*, Freiburger Islamstudien, Bd. V, Wiesbaden, 1984, pp. 121-122.

A second collection of Süleymân's titles and political claims appears in an inscription placed at the fortress of Bender, conquered by the sultan in 1538.⁹

I am God's slave and sultan of this world. By the grace of God I am head of Muhammad's community. God's might and Muhammad's miracles are my companions. I am Süleymân, in whose name the *ḥuḥbe* is read in Mecca and Medina. In Baghdad I am the Shah, in Byzantine realms the Caesar and in Egypt the Sultan, who sends his fleets to the seas of Europe, the Maghrib and India. I am the sultan who took the crown and throne of Hungary and granted them to a humble slave. The voivoda Petru raised his head in revolt, but my horse's hoofs ground him into the dust, and I conquered the land of Moldavia.

But in 1566 Süleymân was an old man, and all was not going well either fiscally or militarily with his vast empire. While ultimately successful in this particular venture, the Ottoman army would take Süleymân's goal without him, and it would not be long before this territory would be lost forever to Süleymân's successors. This final battle, later called the Szigetvar campaign, was filled with tragic elements.¹⁰ The problems Süleymân faced, and the ways he approached them provide us with clear evidence of the changing nature of his empire and of the sultan's deteriorating physical and mental condition. A close look at those events in mid-1566 serves to humanize what has become in the historiography of the period an almost superhuman and "Magnificent" Süleymân.

Those close to him had known for a long time that the characteristics and abilities which Süleymân had displayed so forcefully in the first two decades of his career and which had permitted him to provide strong and at times brilliant leadership, were now long gone. A stubborn streak, a hot temper, poor judgment in selecting advice and serious policy mistakes, all played a role in this last event of his life. Such characteristics may have been present to a lesser extent throughout most of his life, but they were magnified in his old age.

For almost half a century he had ruled the largest state of his time, had directed a dozen extensive military campaigns in person against his most

⁹ Cited and translated in Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire, the Classical Age*, London, 1963, (translated by Norman Itzkowicz and Colin Imber), p. 41.

¹⁰ The most important accounts are: İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. II, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1975 (3rd edition), pp. 409-420; Muştafâ Selânikî, *Târîḥ-i Selânikî*, İstanbul, 1864 pp. 23-48; Loḳmân, *Târîḥ-i Sultân Süleymân*, dated 1568-9 Topkapı Palace Library, Ms. H. 1339; A. Süheyl Ünver, "Kanunî Sultan Süleyman'ın Son Avusturya Seferiade Hastalığı, Ölümü, Cenazesi ve Defni," *Kanunî Armağanı*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1970, pp. 301-306; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Kanunî Süleyman'ın 1566 Szigetvar Seferi, Sebepi ve Hazırlıkları," *Tarih Dergisi*, XXI, 1968, pp. 1-14; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Kanunî Sultan Süleyman'ın Macaristan ve Avrupa Siyasetinin Sebep ve Amilleri, Geçirdiği Safhalar," *Kanunî Armağanı*, pp. 5-39.

powerful opponents,¹¹ often more than six hundred miles from his residence, and had established a reputation as one of the most important political figures in Eurasia by mid-century. At the start of his reign, Europe had been ruled by a handful of young, energetic, and capable men. Indeed, neither Europe nor Asia had benefitted from such a concentration of political talent for centuries, perhaps ever. Charles V was 20 when he was crowned Emperor and Louis became King of Hungary and Bohemia at 14. Henry VIII, the "elder statesman", was 29 when he occupied the English throne. Ivan IV of Muscovy became Grand Prince at 17. Francis I and Süleymân were both 26 at the start of their reigns. For decades, European history was written by these men, who grew older together. But by 1566, all were dead save Süleymân and Ivan. Both Henry and Francis had died in 1547 at the ages of 56 and 51 respectively. Charles died in 1558 at 58 and Ferdinand in 1564 at 61. Ivan would outlive Süleymân by 18 years, and was only 36 when Süleymân died. In 1566 Süleymân was a frail 72 years old. His western counterparts were succeeded, as he would be, by rulers of quite different cloth — Philip II and Maximilian, Elizabeth I and Henry II. Ivan IV of Moscow led a newly formed state which would challenge the Ottomans in the future.

Superficially the events of 1566 were not a striking departure from those of earlier years. And there is much to be said for the proposition that the year was a logical continuation of Süleymân's previous behavior. Two events prompted the sultan to undertake this last foolish venture, and his response to them tell us much about his personality and attitudes. The year before, his navy had faced new western fortification technology at Malta and had with great embarrassment failed to capture this small Mediterranean island.¹² Second, Maximilian II Habsburg had reneged on payment to Süleymân of an annual tribute specified by the Habsburg-Ottoman treaty of 1561, and had been testing Süleymân's strength and perhaps health with some minor raids on the Hungarian border. But it also appears that the Sultan had succumbed to criticism he had been receiving for several years from his daughter Mihrimâh and her religious confidant, the Şeyh Nûrûddîn, that Süleymân had been neglecting for too long the requirement to campaign in person against the infidel.¹³ In fact, looking at the chronology of Süleymân's military campaigns, he had not led his army against anyone since the Iranian campaign which began in 1552, and had last fought against the European infidel in person in 1543 at Gran. Süleymân now apparently decided to show that his empire was still a world power to reckon with, that the failure at Malta was an aberration and not a harbinger of the future.

¹¹The earlier campaigns Süleymân personally directed were: Belgrade (1521), Rhodes (1522), Mohacz (1526), Vienna (1529), Güns (1532), Baghdad (1533), Corfu (1536), Suczawa (1538), Ofen (1541), Gran (1543), Tabriz (1548), and Nahcivan (Nakhjivan, 1552).

¹²Şerafettin Turan, "Sakız'ın Türk Hakimiyeti Altına Alınması," *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, IV/6-7, pp. 189-197; and by the same author, "Rodos'un Zaptından Malta Muhasarasına," *Kanuni Armağanı*, pp. 47-117.

¹³See J. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, Paris, 1836, vol. VI, p. 214.

that he would not tolerate insolence from his neighbors, even from an emperor. By deciding to lead his army in person, the largest land army he had ever produced, all would see that he was still physically and mentally the "Grand Turke."

In fact, this campaign would serve as evidence to the Ottomans and their enemies exactly what Süleymân had hoped it would not show: that the sultan was gravely, indeed terminally ill; that the Ottoman army had difficulty, even with a huge manpower and its most advanced technology, in capturing a very minor fortress defended not by the army of the Emperor but by a secondary and second-rate military commander; and that the Ottoman government could not distinguish, in formulating its foreign policy, between what were its essential interests and what were unimportant.

First of all, Süleymân was seriously ill, a fact that was well known in Constantinople and elsewhere in Europe. The sultan had never been physically strong, and reports of his death had prematurely circulated in Europe almost annually since the late 1540s. News reaching most European capitals in the 1560s resembled that arriving in London, which, since 1561 had spoken of his actual or imminent death on a monthly basis.¹⁴

Reports of Süleymân's illness usually identified gout, dysentery, or arthritis, and he may have suffered from all three. The descriptions of his physical appearance focused on his general weakness, his swollen legs, evidence of anorexia, facial swelling, and bad color.¹⁵

When he set out for this, his last battle, Süleymân was in a great deal of pain. Unlike his performance on his first campaign in 1521, whose route through Thrace, Bulgaria, and Serbia he was now retracing, Süleymân could no longer ride on horseback for more than a few minutes. Soon after the environs of Constantinople had been left behind, Süleymân's officials realized that, even protected by soft pillows laid out in the state carriage, their sovereign and commander could not easily last as far as Hungary. His Grand Vezir Şokollu Mehmed assigned a corps of engineers to proceed ahead of the army, under his

¹⁴Statements such as "Letters from Constantinople contradict the reported death of the Grand Turk" (1561); "News is revived that the Turk is dead" (1562); "The Turk is still ill" (1562); "The Turk is still alive, but his death is imminent" (1562); "The death of the Sultan is reported" (1563), appear throughout the state papers in London, and continue right up to Süleymân's actual death. See Joseph Stevenson (ed), *Calendar of State Papers*, foreign series, of the reign of Elizabeth, volumes for 1561-2, 1563, 1564-5, London, 1866-1870.

¹⁵Details of Süleymân's health were often included in the reports of foreign envoys in Constantinople; among the most detailed were those of envoys from Venice. For reports on his condition in 1562, see Marcantonio Doniai's reports in Eugenio Alberi, III/3, pp. 173-298 (with health descriptions on pp. 178-179). My thanks to Dr. William C. Waters, III, for his help in analyzing Süleymân's symptoms, in a letter of November, 1982.

personal command, to prepare the road, to smooth out the dirt and stone surface, and to find alternative routes where spring floods had ruined the road bed. Clearly the process was going to take a long time, and the army's progress would be very slow.¹⁶ Accompanying him were many of his highest officials, a massive army of infantry and cavalry, engineers, and baggage trains. On the second day out of Constantinople, a temporary wooden bridge had to be built at Büyük Çekmece to replace the stone structure recently washed away in a violent rainstorm and ensuing flood.¹⁷

One can imagine the discussions between Süleyman and his advisers on the advisability of continuing this campaign. It took ten days to reach Edirne, and two days of rest there were scarcely enough to permit the sultan to recover his strength.¹⁸ But Süleyman was stubborn and refused to admit the seriousness of his health problems. Şeyh Nürredin's admonitions weighed heavily on his mind.

Along this journey, stretched out in his carriage all the way to Belgrade, Süleyman had ample time to consider the fruits, bitter and sweet, of his reign. By 1529 he had earned the nickname of "Grand Turke" in the west, and perhaps already that of Kanunî at home. He had conquered this city of Belgrade in 1521, much of Hungary including Buda, had driven the Knights of St. John from their Mediterranean stronghold at Rhodes, and had achieved one of the most important military victories of the century at Mohács. In the next decade, Süleyman would defeat the Iranians and conquer Baghdad and briefly hold Tabriz. Receiving requests for alliance and friendship with France in the west and from Islamic states east of Iran, Süleyman's navies ruled the Mediterranean and his armies had been virtually undefeated. The ailing sultan in 1566 could no doubt look back on those early years as times of glory and achievement.

At home, Süleyman had been able to use the rich administrative and financial resources he had inherited to produce what was for the sixteenth century, the model of effective government. Taking into account the diverse nature of his empire, and its sheer size, he could note with satisfaction that there had been few instances of misrule or bureaucratic tyranny. Seldom had he heard complaints, and he could feel sure that there had in fact been few.

¹⁶See *Süleymännâme*, Chester Beatty Library, ms 413, ff. 44b-47b, for graphic descriptions of the trek.

¹⁷The inscription on a new bridge built here, commissioned by Süleyman at this time, and completed in 1568, reads: "This royal bridge is straight, just as Şirât [the bridge from this world to Paradise] is straight; Süleyman himself crossed this bridge directly to Paradise." Erdem Yücel, "Büyükçekmece'de Türk Eserleri," *Vakıflar Dergisi*, IX, 1971, p. 98.

¹⁸*Selânikî*, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-30, provides the most detail on this campaign; *Süleymännâme* ff. 44b-47b, provides the information about Süleyman's attitudes and health.

But these early triumphs were not the whole story of Süleymân's career. There was also much about which to feel disappointed, now, near the end of his life. Most accounts of Süleymân's personal disposition in his last years reported an overriding despair. When his army was finally told of his death, there were many who ascribed its cause to "nikris."¹⁹

There can be little doubt that Süleymân was deeply committed to his family, his mother Hâfşa, his concubines Gülbahâr and Hürrem, his sisters of whom at least one outlived Süleymân, and his children. Some sources indicate that his mother was either a Turk or a Crimean Tatar,²⁰ but in a document establishing the foundation for her mosque in Manisa, his mother's name is given as Hâfşa bint ʿAbdülmennân [Hâfşa, daughter of the slave of God]. This is an epithet given as a name most usually to a convert to Islam, which makes it unlikely that her father had been a Turk or Tatar, both being Muslim, but rather was himself a convert to Islam.²¹

Hâfşa Sultan accompanied her son on his early administrative assignments, in Kefe in 1510, and when he assumed the role of Şehzâde and the governorship of Manisa, she was by his side.²² When her husband and Süleymân's father, Selîm, died, she accompanied her son to Constantinople, where she remained for a long time in the Old Palace. With her death in 1534, Süleymân lost not only a mother, but a good friend and advisor. A mosque was built in Manisa with her *vakfiye* and Süleymân built a *tîmârhâne* there for her too.²³

Süleymân had at least six sisters, all of whom married important Ottoman officials. Hafîce, who became the wife of Süleymân's grand vezir İbrâhîm Paşa, and for whom a 16-day wedding celebration was held in the Hippodrome outside the walls of Topkapı Sarayı in 1524, was one of Süleymân's favorites. A second sister, Şâh Sultan, was married to the Grand Vezir Luîfî Paşa, and lived until 1572, six years after Süleymân's death.

The sultan's daughter, Mihrimâh, whose mother was Hürrem Sultan, exercised a great deal of influence on Süleymân in his later years, and particularly after Hürrem died, may well have been instrumental in encouraging the sultan to

¹⁹Unver, p. 302.

²⁰That she was a Tatar, a daughter of the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray, was a story apparently begun by Jovius, repeated by other western sources, and taken up by Merriman in his biography of Süleymân, p. 27.

²¹M. Çağatay Uluçay, *Padîşahların Kadınları ve Kızları*, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1980, pp. 29-30.

²²M. Çağatay Uluçay, "Kanunî Sultan Süleyman ve Ailesi ile İlgili Bazı Notlar ve Vesikalar," in *Kanunî Armağanı*, pp. 227-228.

²³Uluçay, *Padîşahların...* p. 30.

undertake his last campaign. Married to the grand vezir Rüstem Paşa in 1538, she was in an important position close to the sultan through much of the last half of his reign. The sultan permitted his daughter to be a public figure, and she was able together with Rüstem to amass a considerable fortune. A part of her wealth was used to create foundations to build and support two very large mosque complexes, one in Üsküdar across the Bosphorus, and the other at Edirnekapı on the western edge of Constantinople. The latter mosque was one of the most innovative constructions of the court architect, Sinân.

Of the females in Süleymân's life, however, the most important were the two who bore him children. The first was Gülbahâr (or according to one source, Mâhidevrân Sultan), mother of several sons, including ^cAbdullâh, who died in infancy of disease, and Muştafâ, who was executed by order of his father, in 1553.²⁴ Gülbahâr died only in 1581, outliving Süleymân and all of his children.

There can be no doubt that Süleymân's second concubine, Hürrem, was the single most important person in his life. Because of her Ruthenian origin, Europeans tended to call her Roxelane, while Turkish sources refer to her variously as Hurram Sultan, Hürrem-Şâh Hâtûn, and Hâşeki Hürrem Sultan.²⁵ She joined Süleymân's household while he was still Şehzâde, but it was after he became sultan that Hürrem had such an important influence on his life and activity. There is evidence that Hürrem and Gülbahâr competed for Süleymân's primary affection, a competition that ended with Hürrem's victory after the death of Süleymân's mother, who had been successful in mediating the competition.

It was soon after his mother's death that Hürrem and Süleymân were officially and publically married, an event unusual in Ottoman history. A 1534 Genoese source has an interesting and detailed account of the marriage, which offered the population of Constantinople, native and foreign, a magnificent spectacle:²⁶

This week there has occurred in this city a most extraordinary event, one absolutely unprecedented in the history of the sultans. The Grand Signior Suleiman has taken to himself as Empress a slave woman from Russia, called Roxalana, and there has been great feasting. The ceremony took place in the Seraglio, and the festivities

²⁴Petra Kappert, *Die Osmanischen Prinzen, und ihre Residenz Amasya im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert*, Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut, 1976, p. 75.

²⁵For general accounts of her life, see Michel Sokolnicki, "La Sultane Ruthene," *Bulleten*, XXIII, 1959; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Hürrem Sultan," *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, V, pp. 593-596; Willy Sperco, *Roxelane: épouse de Soliman le Magnifique*, Paris, 1972.

²⁶Found in the journal of the Genoese Bank of St. George in Constantinople, and translated by Barnette Miller in *Beyond the Sublime Porte: The Grand Seraglio of Stambul*, New Haven, 1931, pp. 93-94.

have been beyond all record... There is great talk about the marriage and none can say what it means.

Luigi Bassano da Zara wrote in 1545 that:

He [Süleymân] bears her such love and keeps such faith to her that all of his subjects marvel and say that she has bewitched him, and they call her the *ziadi* or witch.²⁷

Süleymân and Hürrem corresponded with each other while he was on campaign and a number of these letters have been preserved. In one, Hürrem wrote:²⁸

My Lord, your absence has kindled in me a fire that does not abate. Take pity on this suffering soul and speed your letter, so that I may find in it at least a little consolation. My Lord, when you read my words, you will wish that you had written more to express your longing.

Süleymân's responses often were written as poetry, sections of which have survived under the pseudonym of Muhibbî.²⁹ Her death in 1558 was a tragedy for Süleymân.

One of the great sources of Süleymân's "nikris" at the end of his life was undoubtedly the relationship he had had with his sons. An important strength of the early Ottoman system was the availability of outstanding sons to take their fathers' places as sultan, and it is often said of Ottoman history that the first ten sultans of the Ottoman dynasty (Süleymân being the tenth) had been men of unusual ability in politics and military affairs. Mehmed II had introduced the so-called "Law of Fratricide" as a means of preventing the brothers of a reigning sultan from undermining the ruler's authority. The "Law" had been effectively implemented only in the case of Süleymân's father, Selîm, who had been able to eliminate his brothers soon after taking the throne. Süleymân himself was the only surviving son of Selîm in 1520, while his grandfather, Bâyezid II, had had great difficulty in liquidating threats from his brother Cem Sultan. Political activity by a sultan's living sons during the lifetime of their father was a relatively new and ominous development in Süleymân's time.³⁰ From

²⁷*I costumi, et i modi particolari de la vita de Turchi*, Rome, 1545, ch. XIV.

²⁸In M. Çagatay Uluçay, *Osmanlı Sultanlarına Aşk Mektupları*, İstanbul, 1950, p. 31, cited and translated by Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire* p. 87.

²⁹Translations of selections from his poetry appear in E. J. W. Gibb, *A History of Ottoman Poetry*, vol. III, London, 1904, pp. 8-10.

³⁰For discussions of the methods of Ottoman political succession, see A. D. Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty*, Oxford, 1956, pp. 7-8; and Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 59-64.

Süleymân's perspective, which may or may not have been entirely accurate, his sons began struggling to gain the right to succeed him as early as the 1550s with Muştafâ's presumed or real efforts, to raise a rebellion against him. The struggle lasted until the execution of Bâyezîd at the end of the decade.

Süleymân had fathered several capable sons, several of whom showed promise in arenas important to be a successful sultan: in leadership, in military affairs, and in the arts. Moreover, Süleymân's relationships with several officials of his government, particularly İbrâhîm and Rûstem, provided his sons opportunities to develop premature political ambitions before their father died.

His sons meant a great deal to Süleymân from early in his reign, and he developed a close rapport with several of them. One of the most spectacular public events of Süleymân's reign was the twenty-day ceremony celebrating the circumcision of Muştafâ, Selîm and Mehmed in 1530.³¹ Bâyezîd was only five at the time and was circumcised only in 1539, in somewhat less extravagant but still public circumstances.³² His sons had accompanied Süleymân on campaigns, and Muştafâ, particularly, had demonstrated talents appropriate to a military leader. They went hunting together in Edirne, in the forests outside of Constantinople, in Asia Minor, and even in the environs of Aleppo. Until problems surfaced towards the end of his reign, in the 1550s, relationships between father and sons were apparently good. Behind this companionship, however, must have lurked the reality in everyone's mind that only one could actually follow Süleymân as sultan, and if the "Law of Fratricide" were to be implemented, all others would die soon after their father died. It would have been difficult, even in ideal circumstances, for the sons to develop good relationships with each other. That two mothers were involved would inevitably create added complications.

Of Süleymân's sons who reached adulthood, the first to die was Mehmed, of natural causes, in 1543. His death came as a great shock to Süleymân, who apparently had considered him his likely heir, and gave Süleymân his first opportunity to become an architectural patron, with the construction of a mosque in central Constantinople, designed by and built under the supervision of the great Ottoman architect Sinân.³³ But it was to be the circumstances surrounding

³¹ A detailed description of these festivities appears in Celâlzâde Muştafâ's *Tabakâtü'l-Memâlik*, published by Petra Kappert, *Geschichte Sultan Süleymân Kânûnis von 1520 bis 1557*, (Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, Supplementband 21), Wiesbaden, 1981, ff. 194a-201b.

³² *Tabakât*, ff. 337a-339a.

³³ Evliyâ Çelebi, the famous seventeenth century Ottoman gentleman and traveller, remembered that Mehmed was a "prince of more exquisite qualities than even Muştafâ. He had a piercing intellect and a subtle judgment. Süleymân had intended that he would be his successor. But man proposes and God disposes." Evliyâ Efendi, *Narrative of Travels in Europe, Asia and Africa*, tr. Hammer-Purgstall, 2 vols. (London 1845), II: 9.

the death of Muştafâ, ten years later, that gave Süleymân the greatest pain in his last years.

Prince Muştafâ was considered as the probable heir to his father's throne. Busbecq, who was in Constantinople soon after, reports to us that both sultan and Ottoman population in general were devastated by Muştafâ's death,³⁴

...on account of his remarkable natural gifts, [he] was marked out by the affection of the soldiers and the wishes of the people as the certain successor of his father...

But Muştafâ's mother was Gülbahâr, Süleymân's concubine who had been exiled to Manisa in 1534. And Süleymân's wife, Hürrem, intended that one of her own sons would succeed their father, and engineered a plan by which Muştafâ incurred his father's disfavor, and ultimately his hatred.

She was aided by the Grand Vezir Rüstem Paşa, who sent the Aga of the Sipahis, Şemsi, to Istanbul with the story, entirely without merit, that Muştafâ was planning a rebellion against his father with the intention of seizing the throne for himself.³⁵ Soldiers accompanying Muştafâ were reported to have said that:³⁶

The sultan is now too old to march in person against the enemy. No one save the Grand Vezir objects to having him yield his place to the Prince [Muştafâ]; it would be easy to cut Rüstem's head off and send the old sultan to repose.

Hearing this story, and apparently being sufficiently gullible to believe it, Süleymân decided to execute him. In 1553 Muştafâ was Süleymân's eldest living son, being 39 years old; Selîm was 30, Bâyezîd was 28, and Cihângîr was 23. Peçevi described Muştafâ as "smarter and better qualified" to succeed to the throne than any of the other three.³⁷

Süleymân ordered Muştafâ to his camp outside of Konya "to explain his attitude and behavior." But upon Muştafâ's arrival at his father's tent, he was strangled with his father looking on from behind a curtain. Busbecq reported³⁸

³⁴Busbecq, p. 29.

³⁵Petra Kappert, *Die Osmanischen Prinzen*, p. 100; and İbrâhîm Peçevi, *Peçevi Tarihi*, (ed. Murat Uraz), Istanbul, 1968, vol. I, pp. 300-302.

³⁶von Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire*, VI: 54.

³⁷Peçevi, p. 300; for discussion of the personal qualities of Muştafâ, see Joseph von Karabacek, "Geschichte Suleimans des Grossen, verfasst und eigenhandig geschrieben von seinem Sohne Muştafa," *Kaisers Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte*, 1917, pp. 3-10.

³⁸Busbecq, p. 33. .:

that Süleymân, seeing that the mute-executioners were slow about their business,

thrust his head out of the part of the tent in which he was and directed fierce and threatening glances upon the mutes Thereupon the mutes in their alarm, redoubling their efforts, hurled the unhappy Muştafa to the ground, and throwing the bowstring around his neck, strangled him.

Muştafa's body was taken to Bursa where it was interred in a mausoleum originally intended to house the bodies of Süleymân's uncles. Over the tomb was later placed an inscription which read:³⁹

Shah Selîm, son of Khan Süleymân, gave the order. This garden, the image of Paradise and this tomb, the garden of roses, is that of Sultan Muştafâ.

As a probable result of Muştafa's execution, another of Süleymân's sons, Cihângîr, died. Suffering from a birth defect which left him hunchbacked and pigeon-chested, Cihângîr was nevertheless bright, good natured, and an almost constant companion of his father. He had also been very close to Muştafa, was devastated by his brother's execution and his father's involvement in it, and by most reports, soon thereafter died "of a broken heart," in Aleppo where he was spending the winter with the sultan.⁴⁰

Thus, as Süleymân entered his sixtieth year, all of his sons were dead save two: Bâyezîd and Selîm, both of whom were Hürrem's. The sultan must have known that he had been directly responsible for the deaths of two of his favorites. Almost everyone around Süleymân at the time, and Ottoman historians afterwards, believed that Rûstem's story about Muştafa had been entirely false, and the sultan must have come to recognize in time that he had been wrong. His family tragedies were not over yet, however.

So long as Hürrem was alive, she was apparently able to keep both brothers peaceful and their relations with Süleymân on a good footing; in one instance, in 1555, however, Süleymân was led to believe that Bâyezîd was planning a revolt against his authority in the aftermath of Bâyezîd's successful suppression of a rebellion in central Anatolia. As gullible as he had been in the case of Muştafa, Süleymân ordered the execution of Bâyezîd without further investigation. Hürrem was able to persuade Süleymân that the charges were false

³⁹ Albert Gabriel, *Une Capitale Turque, Bursa*, Paris, 1958 vol. I, p. 122.

⁴⁰ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. II, 3rd printing, Ankara, 1975, p. 403.

and to change his mind. But it was increasingly clear that Süleymân was no longer in complete charge of his political faculties.

Both Bâyezîd and Selîm established their own households and courts in the towns where they served as governors, Bâyezîd in Kütahya, and Selîm in Manisa.⁴¹ Hürrem's death in 1558 brought about renewed competition, and soon open conflict, between the two brothers. Although there were other complicating factors in their struggle, relating to competition between different elements of Ottoman society in Anatolia, the two brothers ended up fighting a pitched battle in 1558 near Ankara, a battle which Bâyezîd and his forces lost. Bâyezîd, fearing for his life, fled to Iran where he remained with his wife and children in exile. Negotiations between Süleymân and Shah Tahmâsb dragged on for a while, both sovereigns normally being enemies. The Shah ultimately approved of Bâyezîd's execution by agents sent by Süleymân in 1560.

Some letters sent by Süleymân and Bâyezîd to each other, as well as orders from the sultan to his provincial officials, have survived, and provide an unusual insight into Süleymân's frame of mind in his last years. Süleymân is reported to have told Bâyezîd at the time of his first difficulty, that⁴²

in future you may leave all to God, for it is not man's pleasure, but God's will, that disposes of kingdoms and their government. If he has decreed that you shall have the kingdom after me, no man living shall be able to prevent it.

When Süleymân learned that Bâyezîd was planning to flee from his defeat at the hands of Selîm, perhaps to Iran or Iraq, he ordered officials to the east of Konya that⁴³

you shall gather around you all your men who use muskets and handle bows and arrows and other instruments of war and killing, to block the roads to the said rebel [i.e. Bâyezîd], put his men to the sword, plunder their goods and chattels, and capture and punish him.

After weeks of difficult negotiations, Süleymân was able to have Bâyezîd, and all of his sons, executed in Tabriz, and their bodies were brought back to be

⁴¹The clearest account of these developments and events may be found in Şerafettin Turan, *Kanunî'nin Oğlu Şehzade Bayezid Vakası*, Ankara, 1961.

⁴²Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 59.

⁴³Uriel Heyd, *Ottoman Documents on Palestine, 1552-1615*, Oxford, 1960, pp. 65-67, citing the *Mühimme Defteri*, III, 59, 26 June 1559.

buried in Istanbul. Halil Inalcık offers the following explanation for Süleymân's actions taken against his sons Mustafâ and Bâyezîd:⁴⁴

Suleiman, in taking action against his own sons Mustafa and Bayezid, showed that he considered the idea of law and order more important in his empire than anything else.

The implication here is that Süleymân really did believe that these two sons were plotting to overthrow his government and seize the throne "illegally." Professor Inalcık offers a statement made by Süleymân in a letter to Bâyezîd to show Süleymân's great concern for legality:⁴⁵

O my dear son, Bayezid, if you return to the right path I will certainly forgive you. In any case, do not say that you are not guilty but do say, my dear son, that you repent for what you have done.

Most of the available evidence points to the conclusion that at least in the case of Muştafâ there was no activity which might fit the sultan's definition of disloyalty, but rather that Muştafâ was more than likely "framed" by Hürrem and Rüstem Paşa. In the case of Bâyezîd, there is at least as much evidence to say that he was struggling with his remaining brother for the position of heir as there is to suggest that his actions were aimed against Süleymân. Indeed, the views held by Ottomans at the time and thereafter are almost unanimous in their condemnation of Süleymân for his decision to punish Bâyezîd. Evliyâ Çelebi present a story, obviously fabricated in its details, but probably accurately portraying the attitudes held by Ottomans about Bâyezîd's demise.⁴⁶

It is said that Süleymân, in passing the grave of Bayezid on the way to Kağıthane, said: Rebel, art thou become a monarch, or art thou dead?" Thus saying, a black vapor arose from the Prince's grave, and Süleymân's horse affrighted, threw his rider. In one moment the face of Rüstem Paşa grew black. Süleymân from that day got the gout, and Rustem Paşa's face remained black for seventy days, after which the skin coming off, became yellow as it had been before. Süleymân saw clearly that he had been led by Rüstem to condemn his son and wished him a black face in the other world for the reward of his black deeds.

There can be little doubt that Süleymân, riding in his carriage in great pain on the way to Szigetvar, must have thought long and hard about the mistakes he had made with his sons; only Selîm remained. While Selîm had a

⁴⁴Halil Inalcık, "Suleiman the Lawgiver and Ottoman Law," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, I, 1969, p. 111.

⁴⁵Inalcık, *ibid.*

⁴⁶Evliya Efendi, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

great many positive qualities, among them being his talents in literature and the arts, he was known as personally undisciplined, a consumer of alcohol in great quantities, and a poor judge of character. Most everyone at the time believed that, of Süleymân's sons, Sefim was probably the least qualified to take his great father's place.

There were other elements of Süleymân's character that need to be mentioned in order to give a complete picture of this great man's personality. Süleymân was a man of deep religious convictions. This fact influenced his support for and participation in the arts, including literature and architecture, his application of justice and the law, and in a narrower sense, gave him at times a puritanical attitude towards the behavior of those around him.

Süleymân had been educated in the traditional manner for an Ottoman prince while growing up in Trabzon. He was a goldsmith of average talent and had learned the techniques of writing poetry. As mentioned above, Süleymân usually corresponded with Hürrem in poetry and a good deal of his writing in this genre has survived. Five of his sons were poets as well, and Muştafâ, Bâyezîd, and Sefim are included in Ottoman biographies of poets and artists.⁴⁷ It was Süleymân's support for architecture and literature which provided the impetus for a flowering of Ottoman high culture during his reign. His own personal patronage was responsible for the construction of several large and important mosques in Constantinople: the mosque for his father, for Prince Mehmed, and finally the huge complex bearing his own name. The most skilled of all Ottoman architects, Sinân, found the support necessary to permit his design and construction of hundreds of buildings from Süleymân, his family, and officials in his government who wished to emulate their sovereign.

Süleymân's commitment to the principles of Islam, as he understood them, led him to focus on the emphasis upon the legal foundations of his Islamic Ottoman state. This meant, in practice, that he expected his officials, and even his own family, to act according to the law as it existed, and to establish new laws where the existing structure was defective. On campaign, his troops and officers were expected to behave in a manner consistent with legal norms.⁴⁸ Officials of his government responsible for the administration of provinces were expected to act in the interests of the state and the province in question, and activity aimed at furthering their personal interests at the expense of the people or the government was punished severely.⁴⁹ And finally, even when his own family was involved in behavior which Süleymân believed to be illegal, punishment was swift and firm. Whether or not one thinks that Süleymân made

⁴⁷See E. J. W. Gibb, *Ottoman Poetry*, III: 5-6.

⁴⁸Halil İnalcık, "Adaletnamelet," *Belgeler, Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, II (1955): 49-145.

⁴⁹Halil İnalcık, "Suleiman the Lawgiver," p. 110.

mistakes in his determination of guilt or innocence in individual cases, the evidence is clear that he was even-handed in his application of the law, even when *he* was the ultimate loser.

Finally, it must be admitted that Süleymân's deep religious convictions sometimes led him to pursue policies which, by modern standards, must be identified as narrow minded and puritanical.

Several instances are worth mentioning here. First, in 1527, a religious nonconformist named Molla Kâbiz made public statements to the effect that Jesus was a more important religious figure than had been Muhammad. Arrested, and interrogated by governmental officials, both religious and civil, Molla Kâbiz was determined to have been a heretic and was sentenced to death for his crimes. Süleymân witnessed the final session of the interrogation, and was reported to have been greatly offended by the Molla's claims saying: "This heretic comes to our *divân*, has the boldness to talk nonsense which violates the glorious reputation of our Prophet." In the end Süleymân concurred with the capital sentence.⁵⁰

Secondly, Süleymân's government issued orders in 1537 that any provincial representatives who learned of people under their jurisdictions who "doubted the words of the Prophet should be deemed an unbeliever, and executed." The same orders indicated the government's expectation that mosques would be built in all localities where they did not yet exist.⁵¹ Presumably these orders applied only to the sultan's Muslim subjects as there is no evidence that non-Muslims were treated in an intolerant way consistent with the letter or spirit of these orders.

Finally, in 1555, Süleymân cracked down with force on the sale and production of alcoholic beverages within his empire, ordering that any ship found transporting wine be burned and destroyed, any shops determined to be selling wine or other alcoholic drinks be closed down, and individuals responsible for the sale or production of wine be executed in a particularly brutal fashion, according to d'Ohsson, by having molten lead poured down their throat.⁵² These three incidents do inform us, perhaps, about some elements of Süleymân's own personal religious views, but they do not describe the totality of his religious and judicial attitudes or behavior.

⁵⁰Kappert, *Tabakât*, ff. 172b-175b.

⁵¹Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 182.

⁵²Mouradjea d'Ohsson, *Tableau General de l'Empire Othoman*, vol. IV, part 1, Paris, 1791, pp. 56-57.

In Süleymân's very last days, as he entered Hungary for the last time, the sultan may well have considered the achievements and failures of his reign, much along the lines provided by Busbecq in his last letter to his government.⁵³

It is said that Süleyman has set before himself the achievement of three ambitions: namely, to see the completion of his mosque which is indeed a sumptuous and splendid structure; to restore the ancient aqueducts and give Constantinople a proper water supply; and to capture Vienna. His first two have been achieved; in his third ambition he has been baulked... What has he achieved by his mighty array, his unlimited resources, his countless hosts? He has with difficulty clung to the portion of Hungary which he had already captured. He, who used to make an end of mighty kingdoms in a single campaign, has won, as the reward of his expeditions, some scarcely fortified citadels, and unimportant towns and has paid dearly for the fragment which he has gradually torn away from the vast mass of Hungary. He has once looked upon Vienna, it is true, but it was for the first and last time.

This last campaign, at Szigetvar, some years after Busbecq wrote the above lines, corroborated the ambassador's evaluation.⁵⁴

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⁵³Busbecq, pp. 240-241.

⁵⁴Studies which have appeared in print since this essay was written, and which concern the topics treated in this essay, include:

Halil Inalcik, "Sultan Süleymân: The Man and the Statesman," pp. 89-104; Leslie Peirce, "The Family as Faction: Dynastic Politics in the Reign of Süleymân," pp. 105-116; and Alan Fisher, "Süleymân and His Sons," pp. 117-126; all in Gilles Veinstein (ed), *Soliman le magnifique et son temps*, Actes du Colloque de Paris, Galeries Nationales du Grand Palais, 7-10 mars 1990, Paris, 1992.

SÜLEYMÂN'S FORMATIVE YEARS IN THE CITY OF TRABZON: THEIR IMPACT ON THE FUTURE SULTAN AND THE CITY

Heath W. LOWRY

As the title of this paper implies, it will focus less on the details of Süleymân's birth and subsequent upbringing in the Black Sea port city of Trabzon, than it will upon the effects this fortuitous event had upon the future Sultan and upon the later history of the city.

The approach is dictated by virtue of the fact that we know relatively little in regard to Süleymân's Trabzon years. Even the date of his birth is a matter of conjecture. While all sources are clear in confirming that he was born in Trabzon, even a standard reference work, such as Mehmed Süreyyâ's *Sicill-i 'Osmanî*, lists no less than three different proposed birth dates: Thursday, November 6, 1494; Monday, April 27, 1495; and, during the months of April or May in 1496.¹

Likewise, the actual date upon which he left the city to assume his first *Şehzâdelik* (Princely Governorship) is uncertain, although in all likelihood it occurred in early 1509. What is certain is that Süleymân's formative years, as well as his early education, both transpired in the city of Trabzon.²

Beyond this bare outline of a chronology, one fact is of importance, to wit, in addition to the accident of his birth, Süleymân was linked to the region and city of Trabzon via his paternal lineage, i.e., his paternal grandmother, Hâtûniye, was a native of Trabzon. This fact, uncontested for over four-hundred years has recently become the center of some scholarly controversy. As it relates directly to the ties Süleymân may have had to the city, it is useful to review what is known in this regard.

¹ Mehmed Süreyyâ, *Sicill-i 'Osmanî*, vol. I (Istanbul, 1294/1878).

² Çağatay Uluçay, "Kanuni Sultan Süleyman ve Ailesi ile İlgili Bazı Notlar ve Vesikalar," in *Kanuni Armağanı* (Ankara, 1970), pp. 227-57.

Our earliest descriptive Ottoman source on the city of Trabzon is that contained in the *Menâziru'l-'Avâlim*, a cosmographic account of the Ottoman domain, written by one Mehmed 'Âşık (born ca. 1550). His description of Trabzon is particularly useful as he himself was born and raised in this town. Further, as I have demonstrated elsewhere,³ his detailed physical description of the city, as it was in the second half of the sixteenth century, was a key source for Evliyâ Çelebi's late-seventeenth century portrait of Trabzon. The latter, in his *Seyâhatnâme* (Book of Travels), embellished Mehmed 'Âşık's rather dry physical description with numerous anecdotes and personal details picked up in the course of his own visit which occurred in 1640.

In his discussion of the *Hatuniye Camii* (The Lady's Mosque), Mehmed 'Âşık's account informs us that it was built by Prince Selîm during his *Şehzâdelik* (princely governorship), in memory of his mother who died during his tenure in Trabzon.⁴ These facts, as well as a lengthy physical description of the mosque and foundation which supported it, are picked up by Evliyâ Çelebi, who, in turn, adds one interesting detail. Specifically, he writes: "The mosque of *Hatuniye* was built by Selîm I. [in memory of his] honored mother who was born in Trabzon."⁵ This passage leaves little doubt but that the seventeenth century local tradition, as passed on to and subsequently recorded by Evliyâ Çelebi, was that Selîm's mother was a native of Trabzon.

As to who she was, here the answer is contained on the *Kitâbe* (dedicatory inscription) which adorns her *türbe* (tomb), whereon she is called a *Bânû-i Rûm* ('Greek lady').⁶ That this interpretation was widely known and accepted in Trabzon, is attested by the earliest of the local histories written in the Ottoman period, i.e., the 'History of Trabzon' (*Trabzon Târîhi*) written by Şâkir Şevket in 1878, who states that "From the fact that the inscription on her tomb contains the phrase *Bânû-i Rûm*, we know that the mother of Selîm was a Greek girl".⁷

Indeed, Şevket goes further and accepts the nineteenth century legend, current among the Greeks of the Pontus, that Selîm's mother, whom he states was named Gülbahâr, was a Greek girl from the village of Livera (Gr. *Doubera*; Cont. Turkish: *Yazlık*) in the Maçka valley which lies to the south of the city.⁸

³Heath Lowry, "Trabzon'un Yeni Cuma Camii (New Friday Mosque): Why Is It Called What It Is?", *Bogaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi* 3 (1975): 91-112.

⁴Süleymaniye Lib., Halet Ef. no. 606, 28a.

⁵"Câmi-i Hâtûniye: Selîm Hân-i Evvel bu Trabzon'da Mütevellid Olmagile Valide-i Mükerreremesi [için?] Binâ İtmışdür." *Seyâhatnâme*, Istanbul University Lib., no. 5939, 258a.

⁶Ömer Akbulut, *Trabzon Kitabeleri* (Istanbul, 1954), pp. 5-8.

⁷*Trabzon Târîhi* (Istanbul, 1294/1878), pp. 121-22.

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 122-23.

There are strong oral traditions among the Greeks of the Pontus that Gülbahâr's original name was Maria and that subsequent favor shown to the Monastery of Soumela (which was located near the village of Doubera) by both Selîm and Süleymân, stemmed from a desire on the part of these two sixteenth century Ottoman rulers to honor their mother and grandmother respectively.⁹

The accuracy, or lack thereof, of the legends concerning the linking of Hâtûniye to one or another Pontic village need not concern us here. What is clear is that she was a Greek from Trabzon who returned to the place of her birth when her son Selîm became *Şehzade* (Governor) in 1495. She spent the remainder of her life in Trabzon and upon her death, was buried in a tomb, the *kûtâbe* of which bears the date 911 (1505). Stated differently, when Süleymân was nine or ten years old his paternal grandmother passed away.¹⁰ Nor was this the only loss suffered by Prince Süleymân during his sojourn in Trabzon. For the tomb of Hâtûniye also contained the remains of two of Sülcymân's siblings, his brother Şehzâde Şâlih, who died in 1499, and his sister, Kamer Sultân, who died in 1503.¹¹ What effect the loss of these two siblings and his paternal grandmother may have had on the young Süleymân is a matter for conjecture; however, it seems reasonable to speculate that his childhood was not without its share of trauma.

Despite the clear and, I would argue, convincing testimony as to the origins of Süleymân's paternal grandmother, contemporary Turkish authors writing on Trabzon have gone to some pain to argue that Hâtûniye was neither a Greek, nor from Trabzon. Indeed, some have gone to great lengths to establish a clear Turkish pedigree linking her to the Turkish dynasty of Zülkadir in southeast Anatolia.¹² The most xenophobic of such writers is Mahmut Goloğlu, who conveniently ignores the testimony of the famous seventeenth century traveller, Evliyâ Çelebi, and attempts to explain away the phrase *Bânû-i rûm* on the *Türbe* with the argument that the world *Rûm* refers to Anatolia, hence the phrase *bânû-i rûm* simply means that Selîm's mother was an 'Anatolian Lady'.¹³

He argues that:

⁹Anthony Bryer and David Winfield, *Monuments and Topography of the Pontus* (Washington, D.C., 1985), pp. 183, 196, 255 and 320.

¹⁰H. Lowry, "The Ottoman Tahrir Defters as a Source for Urban Demographic History: The Case Study of Trabzon (ca. 1486-1583)," unpub., PhD Thesis, UCLA, 1977, pp. 122-28.

¹¹Mahmut Goloğlu, *Trabzon Tarihi (Feihten Kurtuluşa Kadar)* (Ankara, 1975), pp. 25-27; and, Şamil Horuloğlu, *Trabzon ve Çevresinin Tarihi Eserleri* (Ankara, n.d., 1985 or 1986), pp. 124-25.

¹²Akbulut, pp. 24-26; Goloğlu, pp. 31-35; Horuloğlu, pp. 81-83.

¹³Goloğlu, pp. 33-34.

"There are those evil-intentioned people, who like to take advantage of every opportunity to twist our history, who, based on the phrase '*Bânû-i rûm*' which appears in the inscription on the *Türbe*, have advanced all kinds of false theories. These ignorant and evil-intentioned, by arguing that the phrase '*Bânû-i rûm*' (which appears in the first line of the inscription), means 'Greek Beauty,' have said that Sultan Yavuz Selim's mother was a Greek girl, i.e., they have tried to show that she wasn't a Turk and a Muslim."¹⁴

At the risk of running foul of Mr. Goloğlu and his ilk, i.e., of being ranked among the "ignorant and evil-intentioned," it is he who does the disservice to Turkish history by attempting to infuse twentieth-century Turkish nationalism into the realities of sixteenth-century Ottoman political life. That Hâtûniye, or any of numerous other mothers of the Ottoman sultans was born a Greek, or Serb, or Russian, and converted to Islam upon entering the palace, is not a matter for shame, rather it is simply a reflection of the nature of Ottoman life. Contra Goloğlu, the terms Turk and Muslim were not synonymous in the sixteenth century. While certainly Hâtûniye died a Muslim (I am unaware that anyone has ever suggested differently), she was a convert to the religion of Islam as were many of the consorts and wives of the Ottoman rulers.

What is important here, however, is less the nature of revisionist historiography than a coming to grips with the relationship between Süleymân the Magnificent and the city of his birth, Trabzon. Indeed, it seems fair to assume that whatever feelings he may have had for his birthplace were closely linked to the fact that it also was the home of his paternal grandmother.

It is when we begin to search for signs of some attachment on the part of Süleymân for the city of his birth, that the importance of Hâtûniye becomes clearer. In memory of his mother, Sultan Selim established a religious foundation (*vakıf*) to support an '*imâret* (soup kitchen) he founded in her name. At the time of his death in 1520, this foundation was the recipient of the following sources of income:

- | | | |
|---|-------|--------------|
| 1) Annual rent from the Trabzon <i>Bedestan</i>
(covered market): | 6,322 | <i>akçes</i> |
| 2) Annual rent from the double bath in Trabzon: | 5,833 | <i>akçes</i> |
| 3) Annual payment for the bath in the Tekfür-Çayır
quarter of Trabzon: | 400 | <i>akçes</i> |
| 4) Income from the <i>mukâta'a</i> of the Saray Gardens
in Tekfür-Çayır: | 1,000 | <i>akçes</i> |
| 5) Income from the <i>mukâta'a</i> of Tekfür-Çayır: | 1,500 | <i>akçes</i> |

¹⁴Ibid., p. 32.

6) Income from the <i>mukâta'a</i> of the land stretching from the palace in Tekfür-Çayır to the Palace of Çelebi Sultan:	1,000	<i>akçes</i>
7) Income from the <i>mukâta'a</i> of the Namazgâh-Çayır:	40	<i>akçes</i>
8) Annual income from the <i>mukâta'a</i> of the <i>Karos-bahçesi</i> (Gardens):	505	<i>akçes</i>
9) Annual income from the <i>mukâta'a</i> of the cemetery's olive orchard:	300	<i>akçes</i>
10) Annual income from the <i>mukâta'a</i> of the Yonçalık (clover field):	500	<i>akçes</i>
11) Annual income of the <i>mukata'a</i> of the Çayır (field) next to the mill:	360	<i>akçes</i>
12) Annual income from the <i>mukâta'a</i> of the six watermills next to the <i>Degirmen-deresi</i> bridge:	12,000	<i>akçes</i>
13) Annual rent from 124 small shops:	10,000	<i>akçes</i>
14) Annual income from the <i>mukâta'a</i> of the new bath next to the Sultan Bayezid Mosque in Istanbul:	75,000	<i>akçes</i>
	<i>Total</i>	114,760 <i>akçes</i>

The annual total of 114,760 *akçe* income earmarked for the Foundation of the Poor House of Yavuz Sultan Selim's Mother in Trabzon¹⁵ was a significant sum of money, and a clear indication of the esteem in which Hâtûniye was held by her son Selim. One hundred fifty years after it was established the Ottoman traveller Evliyâ Çelebi described it in the following glowing terms:

"The İmâret of Hâtûniye, close to the mosque, is not to be equalled, even at Trabzon; passengers and boatmen may dine here at their pleasure; there is an oven for baking white bread, and a cellar (kilâr) for keeping the provisions of the İmâret. Near the kitchen is the eating place for the poor, and the students have a proper dining hall. Every day, in the morning, and at noon a bowl of soup and a piece of bread is provided for each, and every Friday a Zerde Pilaw and Yakhni (stewed meat); these regulations are to remain in force, as long as it pleases God."¹⁶

Clearly, the charitable foundation established by Şehzâde Selim was sufficiently endowed, and, indeed its largesse obviously made an impression on the well-travelled Evliyâ Çelebi. In this regard, an important qualification is in order. Namely, the scope of the foundation witnessed by Evliyâ in ca. 1640, was

¹⁵Tayyib Gökbilgin, "XVI. Yüzyıl Başlarında Trabzon Livası ve Doğu Karadeniz Bölgesi," *Belleten* 26 (1962): 293-337; see p. 308.

¹⁶Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, ed. and tr., *Narratives of Travel in Europe, Asia and Africa, in the Seventeenth Century, by Evliya Efendi*, 2 vols. (London, 1834-36), II: 47.

far greater than that which existed during the lifetime of Sultan Selim (d. 1520). Stated differently, the annual income of 114,760 *ağçes* (small silver coins), which had appeared in a tax register of ca. 1523, i.e., immediately following the accession of Süleymân to the Ottoman throne was greatly augmented during the following decades. In other words, it appears that Süleymân himself, conscious of his grandmother's origins in Trabzon, added significant income-producing properties to the endowment which his father had previously established in her memory.

This fact, hitherto unnoticed, is of interest for two reasons: a) It is the first of what we shall subsequently see are several indications that Süleymân's interest in the place of his birth continued once he assumed the Sultanate; and, b) it suggests a close relationship must have existed between the young Süleymân and his paternal grandmother.

The extent of his interest in this regard is indicated by the testimony of a *mufaşşal* (detailed) tax register compiled in the year 1553, that is, thirty-three years after he became Sultan. Therein, in addition to the *evkâf* properties enumerated in the ca. 1523 register (which I am assuming were established by Sultan Selim) we find a list of new endowments which have more than tripled the income earmarked by his father:

- | | |
|--|----------------------|
| a) In the <i>nâhiye</i> (county) of Akçaabad, the endowment of the Mother of Sultan Selim in Trabzon, is the recipient of the income from 21 villages, comprised of 1,655 households (80 Muslim and 1,575 Christian); said income provided the foundation the annual sum of: | 150,997 <i>ağçes</i> |
| b) In the <i>nâhiye</i> (county) of Yomra, the income of 48 <i>hânes</i> (households) and 18 <i>baştines</i> (free-holdings) in the village of Hoç, are included in the total income of the 'Imâret foundation of Gülbahâr Hâtûn in the city of Trabzon: | No Figure Given |
| c) In the <i>nâhiye</i> (county) of Maçka, the income of five villages, comprised of 542 households (40 Muslim and 502 Christian); said income provided the foundation of Sultan Selim's mother in Trabzon the annual sum of: | 56,507 <i>ağçes</i> |
| TOTAL: | 207,504 <i>ağçes</i> |

It would appear that Sultan Süleymân indeed continued to take an active interest in the endowment established by his father in memory of his paternal grandmother, Hâtûniye of Trabzon. I say appear, because no copies of the *vakıfnâme* (endowment charter document) establishing the 'Poor-House Foundation' of Hâtûniye in Trabzon have survived.¹⁷ Given this lacuna we may only conjecture that Süleymân was the most likely donor of the income-producing properties added to the foundation following his father's death.

Trabzon's 'Hatuniye Complex,' clearly began with the construction of the '*imâret* (soup kitchen) which gave its name to the religious endowment established for its support. However, soon it was expanded to include, in addition to the '*imâret* and *türbe* (Tomb of Hatuniye herself), a *medrese* (school), library, bathhouse, and, most importantly, a mosque, all of which are generally assumed to have been built by Yavuz Selîm (d. 1520) in honor of his mother.

I said that the entire complex is generally 'assumed' to have been constructed by Selîm in recognition of the fact that in its present-day form it is impossible to date with accuracy. As currently preserved, only the mosque and the *türbe* are extant, and, of these two buildings, only the *türbe* is dated: h. 911 (1505).¹⁸ As for the mosque, following accounts given in the sixteenth century work of Mehmed 'Âşık, which, subsequently were incorporated in the seventeenth century works of Evliyâ Çelebi and Kâtib Çelebi, it has traditionally been assigned to 1514. The most detailed study of this site to date is that of Halil Edhem's, written in 1915. While accepting the 1514 date for the mosque's construction, he stresses the fact that the *vakıfnâme* for the foundation which supported this complex (and in keeping with the formulas according to which such documents were drawn up it must have been dated) has been lost.

In short, the absence of a firm date for the mosque's construction, coupled with the lack of any clear archeological evidence (the mosque has been repeatedly and badly repaired and renovated in the past four hundred years), raises the interesting possibility that rather than the *Hatuniye Camii* having been constructed by Sultan Selîm in memory of his mother, its actual builder may well have been Süleymân, who did so in honor of his paternal grandmother. Bearing in mind that we have only one clear date, 1505, which is that of the construction of the *türbe*, let us review the evidence in support of an alternative explanation as to the history of the mosque's construction:

This case, while largely circumstantial, is supported by the testimony of a series of sixteenth century *tahrîr defter*s (tax registers) covering the city of

¹⁷Halil Edhem, "Trabzon'da 'Osmanlı Kitâbeleri," *Târîh-i 'Osmanî Encümeni Mecmû'ası* 48 (1334/1915): 320-58; see pp. 339-43.

¹⁸Lowry, "Case Study of Trabzon," pp. 122-28, provides the basis for the following analysis.

Trabzon. Compiled respectively in ca. 1523, 1553 and 1583, these registers provide us with three sixteenth century soundings on the city's topography as it was at the time they were compiled:

1) *Tapu-Tahrir No. 387* of ca. 1523 (in the İstanbul *Başbakanlık* Archives) is an *icmâl* or summary register which lists ten Muslim quarters in the city, each of which is named after a mosque (two) or mesjid (eight). From the fact that this register also includes a list of all *vakıf* (religious foundation) controlled buildings in Trabzon, we may deduce that each of the city's ten Muslim quarters had been named after an existing mosque or *mesjid*. Noticeably lacking in either the list of quarters or of *vakıf* structures in the city is any mention of a '*Hatuniye Camii*'.¹⁹

In short, the ca 1523 tax-register contains no indication that a mosque of *Hatuniye* existed at the time of its compilation. If the mosque had in fact been completed in 1514 it seems strange that in the intervening nine years it would not have been registered among the city's religious foundations. As noted above, the ca. 1523 list of *vakıf* controlled buildings lists only two mosques (*câmi'*) and eight small mosques (*mesjid*). The two mosques were a) the *câmi'*-i '*atîk*' (the old mosque), i.e., the former Byzantine Church of the Chrysokephalos, shown as being in the middle section of the walled city; and, b) the *câmi'*-i *cedîd* (the new mosque), i.e., the former Church of Saint Eugenios, which was located in the city's eastern suburbs, and had been converted into a mosque during Selîm's tenure in the city.²⁰ The Mosque of Hatuniye, located in the city's western suburbs, simply does not appear among the ca. 1523 *vakıf* buildings.

The ca. 1523 list of *vakıf* buildings in the city does, however, list an imperial *vakıf* under the heading: *evkâf-i 'imâret-i vâlide 'an merhûm Sultân Selîm Hân der nefs-i Trabzon*, that is, 'The Foundation of the Soup Kitchen of the mother of the deceased Sultan Selîm Hân in the city of Trabzon.' While this reference clearly establishes the presence of the '*imâret* (soup kitchen) in ca. 1523, any mention of the mosque is noticeably absent.

2) *Tapu-tahrir No. 288* of 1553 (in the İstanbul *Başbakanlık* Archives) is a *mufaşsal*, or detailed register, which, for the first time, lists a: *Mağalle-i 'Imâret-i Hâtûniye* among the city's Muslim Quarters. There is still no mention of the mosque in the *mağalle*'s name, i.e., it is called: 'The Quarter of the Soup Kitchen of *Hâtûniye*.' Despite this, there can be little doubt but that the mosque had been built prior to this date. First is the fact that this quarter in 1553 is shown as having 50 *hânes* (households), who are identified as new residents (*hâric ez defter*), who, in all likelihood, were the mosque's congregation. This

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 90-91.

²⁰Lowry, "Yeni Cuma Camii."

interpretation is supported by the fact that among the residents of this *maḥalle* is an individual identified as: *Hamzallâh veled-i İbrâhîm (imâm-i câmi')*, that is, Hamzallâh the son of İbrâhîm, prayer leader of the mosque. While no specific mosque is named, the fact that Hamzallâh is the first person appearing in the list of residents of this *maḥalle* (quarter), strongly supports the idea that he was in fact the *imâm* of the *Hatuniye Cami*;

3) *Tapu Kadastro No. 29* of 1583 (at the Ankara *Tapu ve Kadastro Umum Müdürlüğü*) is a detailed (*mufaşşal*) register. It is this survey, which, for the first time, contains concrete proof of the existence of the *Hatuniye Camii* in Trabzon. It shows that the *Maḥalle-i 'İmâret-i Hâtûniye* (the Quarter of the Soup Kitchen of Hatuniye) has been renamed as the: *Maḥalle-i Câmi'-i 'İmâret-i 'Âmire-i Hâtûniye*, that is, 'The Quarter of the Mosque of the Imperial Soup Kitchen of Hatuniye.'

*
* * *

On the basis of the surviving tax registers alone we would logically date the construction of the Hatuniye Mosque as post ca. 1523. This interpretation is supported by the absence of any mention of the mosque in the list of *vakıf* (religious foundation) properties in ca. 1523, plus the fact that the residents of this quarter in 1553 are clearly labelled as new immigrants (*hâric ez defter*). Were the mosque constructed post-ca. 1523 it would appear that it was built, not by Sultan Selim who initially established the *vakıf*, but by his son Sultan Kânûnî Süleymân (1520-1566), himself a native son of the city.

Additional support for this hypothesis is given by yet another native of Trabzon, an Armenian priest known as Per Minas Bijişkyan, who was born in 1777. This eighteenth-century native wrote a detailed work on the history of the region, which provides us a great deal of insight into the city at the end of the eighteenth century. Of particular interest to the present discussion is the fact that during his lifetime the *kitâbe* (dedicatory inscription) of the *Hatuniye Camii* was still extant. Bijişkyan describes the complex in the following terms:

"... The '*İmâret* is located on a hill and surrounded by walls with two doors. In its center stands a lustrous mosque with an extraordinary dome. The mosque's doors open to the west into a beautiful marble covered courtyard. The inscription on the mosque contains the Hegira date 952 (1545), which must be the year it was repaired. In front of the '*İmâret* is a fountain surrounded on all sides by chambers for the students and a wide courtyard; to the south lies a cemetery; and to the east lies the *türbe*. I read the date of *hicri* 911 (1505) on the inscription on the coffin of Yavuz Sultan Selim's mother which lies in this tomb. The mosque bears the name of the deceased royal mother, the Hatuniye

Camii. At one time the existing kitchen and bread oven provided two meals a day to the students and to the poor; however, it no longer does...²¹

Clearly, the mosque once contained an inscription bearing the date 1545. Just as clearly, Bijişkyan was troubled by the obvious discrepancy between this date and the local tradition that the mosque was constructed thirty-one years earlier, in 1514. To account for this he states that the inscription must refer to a repair date rather than the date of construction.

Recalling the testimony of the sixteenth century *tahrirs* discussed above, it becomes obvious that what Bijişkyan read may well have been the original dedicatory inscription of the Hatuniye Mosque. If this interpretation is correct, it would account for the fact that the ca. 1523 register does not list the mosque among the city's religious foundations, whereas that of 1553, allows us to deduce its relative newness, i.e., if in fact it were completed in 1545, our hypothesis to the effect that its donor were Sultan Süleymân rather than his father Sultan Selîm, would be strengthened.

Contra this construction is a passage in the work of the contemporary native of Trabzon, Mehmed 'Âşık (born ca. 1550), who grew up in the neighborhood of the Hatuniye Mosque (his father was a teacher in the school attached to the Erdoğan Bey Mosque which lay one half mile south of the Hatuniye Complex), wherein he states that the mosque was completed in the year 920 (1514). To establish this date, however, he does not refer to an inscription but uses the commonplace Ottoman practice of determining dates according to the different numerical values which each letter in the Arabic alphabet were traditionally assigned. As if to reinforce his point he cites two different phrases, both of which contain the numerical value of 920 (1514). In his first example, he quotes "a poet of the period" who has said that the mosque can be dated by adding up the numerical values of the letters contained in the phrase: 'Beytül-'ibâdet,' which is taken from an unidentified verse. His second source, whom he identifies as "someone else" has observed that the numerical values of the letters contained in the Arabic word: *fa-tammât*, which means "and it was finished," literally add up to the date upon which the construction of the *Hatuniye Camii* was completed, i.e., 920 (1514).²²

What we are really left with then are two contradictory, and, to my way of thinking, hard to reconcile views as to the year in which the Hatuniye Mosque was constructed. While fully cognizant of the problems created by the testimony

²¹P. Minas Bijişkyan, *Karadeniz Kıyıları Tarih ve Coğrafyası (1817-1819)*, ed. and tr. Hrand Andreasyan (Istanbul, 1969), p. 50.

²²See Lowry, "Case Study of Trabzon," pp. 126-27.

of Mehmed 'Âşık (which strangely makes no mention of a dated inscription, and, instead cites unnamed informants), the manner in which the testimony of the contemporary tax registers is validated by that of Bijişkyan, who clearly states that the inscription on the building is dated 1545,²³ together with the fact that following the death of his father Selim and prior to 1553, i.e., between ca. 1523 and 1553, Sultan Süleymân greatly expanded the holdings of the Hatuniye Religious Foundation, and, that the ca. 1523 *tahrir* fails to list the Hatuniye Mosque among the city's religious foundations, lead me to advance the hypothesis that the *Hâtûniye Camii* in Trabzon was built by Süleymân in the year 1545.

If this hypothesis is ultimately accepted, Süleymân's connections to the city of his birth will be greatly strengthened, i.e., not only was he a native son of the city, he was also the patron of its most memorable Ottoman building, the Mosque of Hatuniye.

Nor were Süleymân's links to the city severed by either his own departure in 1509, or, by his pious acts of completing the construction and endowing of the Hatuniye Complex in memory of his paternal grandmother. Evliyâ Çelebi's description of the city contains two additional anecdotes relative to Süleymân and Trabzon.

The first concerns its administrative status, and suggests that Süleymân, in recognition of its role in his own life, may well have favored the city. Evliyâ writes:

"Süleymân was brought up at Trebisonde, which has been the seat of four Ottoman Emperors. In remembrance of his youth spent here, he sent his mother to this place and raised it to a separate province, with the addition of the Sancak of Batûn."²⁴

And, in so doing, suggests that throughout his reign Süleymân's interest in and support of the region continued. Albeit, the dispatching of his mother, Hafsa Sulţân, to Trabzon, may well be indicative of a desire on the part of Süleymân's consort, Hürrem, to rule the harem unchallenged, i.e., not to be subservient to the *Vâlide Sulţân* (Queen Mother). In other words, domestic tranquility, rather than a special attachment to Trabzon, may have been the overriding factor in this decision.

²³Here his suggestion that this may have been a date on which the building underwent major renovations is unconvincing given the fact that if we accept the 1514 date of construction, it would only have been 31 years old in 1545. ;

²⁴von Hammer, tr., II: 42.

The second anecdote concerns his education and training during the years he spent in Trabzon. This is a subject about which we know very little. In addition to the fact that he was taught by one *Hayrüddin Efendi*, who remained as a member of his retinue following his departure from Trabzon in 1509, i.e., accompanied him during his *Şehzâdelik* in Kefe and Manisa, thereby suggesting that their relationship must have been harmonious,²⁵ we have a passage in *Evliyâ Çelebi's* description of the arts and handicrafts in Trabzon, which reads as follows:

"The goldsmiths of Trebisonde are the first in the world. The art of a goldsmith, and cut dies for the coin of his father *Bâyezîd*, so skillfully, that they appeared as if engraved in marble; I saw some of this coin at Trebisonde."²⁶

The passage continues:

"... *ve Süleymân Hân dağı bu Trâbefzûnda (Trabzon) dogup Beşiktaş'da medfûndur Yahyâ Efendi ile sût karındaş olup, onuñla Koşanşine nâm bir Rûminin şâgirdi olup, Süleymân Hân üstâd zerger olmuşdı.*"²⁷

That is:

"... And *Süleymân Hân* was also born in Trabzon. *Yahyâ Efendi*, who is buried in *Beşiktaş*, was his foster-brother, and together with him he was apprenticed to a Greek goldsmith named *Koşanşine*. *Süleymân Hân* became a master goldsmith."

Interestingly enough, this passage, unlike those dealing with the physical description of the city which *Evliyâ*, without benefit of citation, copied more or less verbatim from *Mehmed 'Âşık*, was actually written by *Evliyâ Çelebi* himself, i.e., it represents something he learned during his sojourn in Trabzon in the year 1640.

There can be little doubt but that there was a strong local tradition extant in seventeenth century Trabzon to the effect that during his youth in the city, *Süleymân* (following the example of his father *Selîm* who had undergone similar training), learned the goldsmith's art at the feet of a native craftsman. Further,

²⁵Uluçay, pp. 227-28.

²⁶von Hammer, tr., II: 48.

²⁷Ist. Üniv. Lib., no. 5939, 259a. In the Topkapı Palace ms. of the *Seydâhainâme* (B. 304, 250a), there are two variations in the preceding passage: a) the goldsmith's name is written as "*Koşanşine*;" b) rather than being identified as a "Greek," he is called a "*zimmî*," i.e., a non-Muslim subject.

that the skills exhibited by the young Süleymân in this regard had left a deep and lasting impression in the city's local folklore.

Of interest to our earlier discussion of historical revisionism is the fact that in the only printed Ottoman edition of the *Seyâhatnâme*, that of 1896, the entire sentence relative to Süleyman's birth in Trabzon and training as a goldsmith was left out of the text. Given the relatively heavy censorship which existed during the reign of Sultan 'Abdülhamîd II, and numerous similar examples of heavy-handed editing which occurred in this edition of the *Seyâhatnâme*, this should not be that surprising.²⁸

To what extent did the early training Süleymân underwent in learning the goldsmith's art, evidence itself in his later life? For the answer to this query we must once again turn to the work of Evliyâ Çelebi. Here, recalling the fact that Evliyâ's father was Dervîş Mehmed, the chief of the goldsmith's guild in Istanbul, it is not surprising to find a very lengthy description of this profession in his listing of the guilds. The relevant sections read as follows:

The Goldsmiths, numbering five thousand men, with three thousand shops, are one of the most numerous of the guilds ... The Goldsmiths attained the high degree of consideration they enjoy through Sultân Selîm I. and Sultân Süleymân, both having been brought up at Trebizonde as apprentices in the art of the goldsmiths, and the Greek, Constantine, who was Süleymân's master is yet alive. Once having grown angry with the Prince, he swore that he would give him a thousand sticks [degnek/blows]. His mother begged him to forgive the prince, and gave to the goldsmith a thousand ducats, but to no purpose. Constantine ordered the prince to draw this gold by the steel-plate (haddeli) into five-hundred fathoms of wire [degnek], which being done, he wrapped these five hundred gold-wires twice around Süleymân's feet, in order to acquit himself of his oath. This story is well known. I, myself, poor Evliyâ, saw sometimes this old Greek, who was a lively frank old infidel. Süleymân having ascended the throne, to show his favor to the goldsmiths, built for them the fountain called Saka chesmeh, with a large factory provided with a mosque, a bath, an assembly-room, and numerous other rooms and

²⁸See p. 91 of Evliyâ's *Seyâhatnâme*, vol. II (Istanbul 1314/1896). What is more disturbing is that contemporary editions of the work, appearing in modern Turkish orthography, are repeating the tendency begun under 'Abdülhamîd. Namely, they too are carefully editing out sections of Evliyâ's account which they feel may offend Turkish nationalist sensitivities. As a case in point, we may cite the edition of Tefvik Temelkuran and Necati Aktaş (vol. II, Istanbul, 1976, pp. 418-19) wherein, likewise, the section on Trabzon contains no mention of the fact that Süleymân was apprenticed to a Greek goldsmith. Here however, it should be noted that their failure may simply stem from sloppy scholarship; namely, they may well have used the printed edition of the original work rather than the extant manuscripts for their text.

cells. He founded there, as wakf, a thousand plates, with five hundred kettles and pans. Every twenty years they were allowed to make a great feast, for which purpose ten purses were afforded them from the treasury, and the Imperial drums and kettle-drums granted to them. This feast lasted ten days and nights. I, poor Evliyâ, myself a goldsmiths by profession, saw this feast at three different times. It was I, who kissed Sultân Murâd's hand at this Feast. A year before the solemn meeting of all goldsmiths on the plain of Kaghid-khânah, where the emperor treats them during ten days and nights, they were summoned by chaûshes to appear, who came themselves, or sent their head men with ten to fifteen thousand piastres. The Emperor sent his own tent to the place fixed for the assembly, and repaired thither with his Vezîrs to the sound of drums and kettle-drums. Twelve masters (khalifeh) kissed the hands of the Emperor, of the Mûfî of the vezîrs, of the chief of the goldsmiths, the Nakîb and the Senior, according to the canon of Sultân Süleymân. The head of the goldsmiths presented the Emperor with a plate, an inkstand, harness, a sword and mace all set with jewels. Twelve thousand fellows (khalifeh) then kissed the hand of the Koyûmcîbâşî (head of the goldsmiths). During seven days and nights boys with girdles set with jewels, and all dressed in gold, bearing golden daggers, and knives and silk aprons, walked like so many peacocks of Paradise to kiss the hands of the Seniors (Pîrs). From five to six thousand tents were set up on the plain of Kaghid-khânah, and during twenty days and nights the crowd was flocking to and fro; in short it is a feast, which no other guild can boast of. At the procession of the camp they make a most magnificent show and blind the eyes by their splendor. They exhibit on wagons and litters, knives, daggers, girdles set with jewels, censors, vases for rosewater, harnesses, swords, maces and some thousand other precious articles, which are beyond all description, and all, be they Moslems or Infidels, wrap round their heads red and green sashes."²⁹

Leaving aside a degree of exaggeration, which undoubtedly stemmed from his father's role as chief of the goldsmiths' guild, Evliyâ's account leaves little doubt but that in the seventeenth century Sultan Süleymân was viewed as the patron par excellence of the goldsmiths. Not only had he personally endowed their headquarters in Istanbul, he also had established (at twenty year intervals), a major celebration in their honor, which he, and his successors graced with their presence. Indeed, Evliyâ proudly states that they "attained the high degree of consideration they enjoy" as a direct result of Sultan Selîm I and his son, Sultan Süleymân, having been "brought up at Trabzon as apprentices in the art of the Goldsmith." Clearly, Süleymân's youthful training was a matter of some pride

²⁹ von Hammer, tr., I/2: 188-89.

for him, and, upon assuming the sultanate, he used his authority for the benefit of his fellow craftsmen.

Less convincing is Evliyâ's claim that Kostantine, Süleymân's former teacher, was still alive during his own lifetime. While it is quite possible that Kostantine may have been brought (or followed Süleymân) to İstanbul, upon his ascension to power in 1520, Evliyâ's claim strains human credulity. Namely, if we assume that Kostantine was already a master craftsman during Süleymân's childhood years in Trabzon, he would have been born in the last quarter of the fifteenth century, i.e., if Süleyman were apprenticed to him in ca. 1505 (when he was ten years old), Kostantine must already have been thirty years of age, which would place his birth in ca. 1475. Given the fact that Evliyâ was born in the year 1611, Kostantine, had he still been alive, would already have been over one-hundred thirty years of age! In all likelihood, Evliyâ in this passage is 'personalizing' a story he had heard from his own father, who was indeed of an age to have known Kostantine.

One fact, however, is indisputable: both in Trabzon and in the Ottoman capital, İstanbul, strong traditions linking Süleymân to the goldsmith's art existed as late as the seventeenth century. In that sense, his boyhood training was not forgotten.

THE TRABZON OF SÜLEYMAN'S YOUTH:

Having discussed what little is known about what the effects of Süleymân's birth in Trabzon may have been on the subsequent history of the city; and, likewise, having enumerated the few events of import to his life which are known to have occurred during his years in the city, that is, the death of his paternal grandmother and of his two siblings, as well as his training as a goldsmith and life-long interest in that art, we must now turn to a brief description of the city itself in the closing decade of the fifteenth and opening years of the sixteenth centuries. By examining the environment in which Süleymân was born and raised, we may gain some additional insight into the effect it had on his later life.

The city of Trabzon and surrounding regions had become part of the Ottoman polity in the year 1461, when the Byzantine kingdom of the Comnenos was surrendered to the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II., by its last ruler, David. In keeping with the terms of its surrender most of its indigenous inhabitants were allowed to remain in their homes. By the time of Süleymân's birth in 1495, Trabzon had been an Ottoman-administered city for just over a generation.

By piecing together the testimonies of two Ottoman tax-registers covering the city, compiled respectively in ca. 1486-7 and ca. 1523, that is, just a decade prior to Süleymân's birth, and some fourteen years after his departure from the city³⁰ we can extract the following profile of the city's inhabitants:

a) In ca. 1486-7, the permanent residents of the city accounted for 1,385 households, of which approximately one in five were Muslims. Of the remaining 80.78% of the inhabitants, 65.16% were Greek Orthodox Christians, 12.49% were Gregorian Armenians, and 3.13% were Venetian and Genoese of the Roman Catholic persuasion. The Muslim inhabitants were identified as new settlers, whereas the Christians were the residue of the pre-conquest population;

b) A generation later, in ca. 1523, the Muslim element in the city's population has shrunk from 19.22% of the total, to 14.32%, and now accounted for a total of 1,005 inhabitants, the city had nonetheless begun to be more fully integrated into the Ottoman administrative system, e.g., the Muslims are now listed as the residents of permanent *mahalles* (quarters), rather than *cemâ'ats* (communities) of new immigrants, the status they enjoyed in ca. 1486-7. As for the city's Christians, 69.22% were Greek Orthodox, 12.93% were Gregorian Armenians, and, 3.53% were Roman Catholics.

As even this sketch of the city's ethnic and religious profile suggests, Trabzon, during the years that Süleyman lived there, was very much a frontier city. Greek was certainly its *lingua franca*, and Turkish must have been used primarily for administrative purposes.

Without any great flight of imagination we may assume that the young Süleymân grew up with more than a passing familiarity with Pontic Greek, as well as with a full awareness of the multi-national, polyglot nature of the state which one day he would rule.

³⁰See Lowry, "Case Study of Trabzon," pp. 33-104.

THE MYTH OF THE GOLDEN AGE: OTTOMAN HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE POST- SÜLEYMÂNIC ERA

Cemal KAFADAR

Towards the end of his reign (and life), Murâd III (r. 1574-95), grandson of Süleymân the Magnificent, was haunted by occurrences which he read as signs of the corruption of his time. In 1594, for instance, Istanbul suffered a devastating fire, not an infrequent hazard of life in the city; but this time flames reached the gates of the palace whereupon Murâd is reported to have said: "This occurrence in our vicinity is a sign for us!"¹ And he is related to have shed blood-filled tears soon thereafter when one of the ships passing by the shore pavillion where the sultan was resting, blasted salutatory cannon shots as was custom which, on that inauspicious occasion, shattered the glass windows of the kiosk as well as a piece of crystal right next to the sovereign.² Yet it must simply have been too overwhelming for Murâd to show any reaction, for he dismissed it as a "jumbled reverie," when his favored slave-servant Sâ'atçı Hasan Paşa, a graduate of the recently-established watch-makers' atelier in the palace and "unequaled in the science of the stars" according to the historian 'Âfi, communicated a dream he had.³

In Hasan's dream, he and the sultan are walking in the garden of the Topkapı Palace when a renowned preacher appears and presents something that looks like a stick (of admonition?). It is the key given to him by Murâd, the preacher says, but it does not move the lock it was meant to unlock. At that moment, Sultan Süleymân, now dead for nearly three decades, appears in his august majesty. Murâd immediately walks over to his grandfather paying respect as custom dictates, but Süleymân remains cold "turning his face ... and looking like he has been offended." While Hasan interferences and asks that Murâd be forgiven, the preacher now produces a sundial which, he says, is a *çable-nümâ*, namely a compass that points at the direction of Mecca, the pivot of orientation

¹*Tarih-i Selânikî*, ed. M. İpşirli, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1989), I:416.

²*Muṣṭafâ 'Âfi, Künhü'l-ahbâr* [hereafter, *Künh*], 418b.

³*Ibid.*, 417a-418a. A few days later, however, when Murâd became aware of his (eventually fatal) affliction, he decided to take some action "as required by the [paşa's] dream."

for all Muslims of the world at the time of prayer. Süleymân hands the instrument over to the *sâ'atçi* and asks: "Is this correct?" Sensing that his grandfather may have dropped his guard and hoping to butter him up, Murâd jumps in and praises Süleymân for the accuracy of his judgement, for having asked the question to the technical expert, the "master who reinvented the *kible-nûma*," (whom Süleymân cannot have known in his own lifetime). Süleymân does not budge but develops an interest in the instrument which, in the hands of the watchmaker, turns into a map with one end held by Hasan, the man of technology, and the other by the man of religion. From the end held by the watchmaker, the map keeps unfolding and expanding to reveal the well-protected dominions of the Ottoman state," particularly the numerous castles in the Hungarian frontier "which Süleymân identifies one by one. Just when he points to one and says that it certainly did not exist in his glorious time, the map rapidly rolls back and then reverts to a mere sundial.

So many themes and sensibilities of Ottoman historical consciousness in the post-Süleymânîc age are cued in this dream, dreamt of all people by a maker of watches, a new and distinctly Frankish kind of technical expertise, that I would not have time to say anything else if I were to attempt an interpretation of its details. Naturally, somewhat consciously, somewhat unwittingly, I must already have allowed some of that interpretation to sneak into my narrative that is itself based on the textual rendering of a dream which, whether indeed seen by Hâsan Paşa or not, comes to us through the composition of Gelibolulu Muştafâ 'Âlî, an author with his own personal and political agenda. Leaving aside the very potent theme of the duality between scientific-technical and religious knowledge, which is to play a major role in later reformist discourse but makes a surprisingly early appearance in this late 16th century dream text, I will simply underline here the unmistakable sense of anxiety felt in the later decades of that century accompanied by an equally unmistakable reverence felt for Süleymân. And the two sensibilities are not unrelated since the anxiety is partly one of living up to the glorious deeds of ancestors.

Starting from the last quarter of the 16th century, Ottoman intellectual life is imbued with a sense of decline. The Ottomans seem to have felt that their social order was crumbling down and their military supremacy becoming questionable. This emerging sensibility had profound consequences on Ottoman culture in the following centuries. Most importantly for our purposes here, it was paralleled by a deeply felt nostalgia for a past which was believed to have been the locus classicus of Ottoman "universal" order, *nizâm-i 'âlem*, held together by Ottoman laws and traditions, *kanûn ve 'âdet-i 'osmânî*. "In those fortunate days" versus "our time of corruption" became the major axis of thought around which much of post-Süleymânîc historical consciousness was structured.

The topos of "the good old days when Ottoman classical traditions and laws held sway" is not devoid of historicity, however. It refers back to a specific time period from the middle of the 15th to that of the 16th century, in other

words from the reign of Mehmed II (1451-81) to that of Süleymân I (1520-66). Furthermore, rather than a lumpsum treatment, specific rulers are often singled out for specific achievements, and Süleymân is not always the favorite. In fact, Mehmed II and Selîm I (r. 1512-20) seem to have the upper hand, while Bâyezîd II (r. 1481-1512), the saintly ruler, struck later generations as more saintly than kingly.⁴ Hezârîfen Hüseyin Efendi, for instance, a prominent intellectual from the second half of the seventeenth century and a friend of learned European writers of influential orientalia such as Count Marsili or Antoine Galland, points to Selîm I as a ruler who remains unequalled in not only Ottoman but even world history. Still, as an epoch, Süleymân's age is the one that was most often singled out because of the unmistakable sophistication and extensive territorial control reached then. Mehmed II or Selîm I may have done much more important jobs, but the fruits of their achievements were enjoyed to the utmost in the age of Süleymân if only because cultural maturity and self-confidence are acquired over time.

While later Ottoman historiography depicted the reign of Süleymân as an exemplary age of glory and order, however, it did not indulge in indiscriminately showering praise and kindling nostalgia. The "myth of the golden age" is a convenient target for modern scholarship which has tended to characterize Ottoman historical consciousness, indeed all Islamic intellectual life in what corresponds to Europe's late medieval/early modern era, as static, un-innovative, tradition-bound, and even more importantly for our purposes here, as a unitary, monochrome universe made of a single cloth. Perceiving the rise of Europe and the decline of Ottoman power, these intellectuals are believed to have observed their society's ills with perspicacity and moral integrity but also stubbornly clung to Ottoman traditions as the sole remedy, until the importation of ideas and institutions from the West. Ottoman intellectuals of both the traditionalist and Westernizing phases are then supposed to have posited the age of Süleymân as a "golden age" in which their social order was perfectly harmonious, their justice absolute, and their world supremacy uncontested.

This depiction of the Ottoman intellectuals' response to what they perceived to be the decline of their order and supremacy fails to do justice to the sophisticated intellectual world where anxiety concerning the present and future was not infrequently accompanied by critical attitudes towards even the most revered institutions and personages of the past. Namely, to see in the post-Süleymânîc historical consciousness only frozen reverence to the age of Süleymân, only an unconditional appreciation of all its practices, traditions, and institutions is to iron out all underlying currents of critique and dissent. I hope it is not considered deviant of me if I now concentrate on the wrinkles, for beneath the surface of admiration and nostalgia was brewing a considerable re-assessment

⁴See, for instance, the story in Evliyâ's *Seyâhatnâme*, vol. I (Topkapı Palace Library, B. 304) 201. But Bâyezîd's reign, too, was credited with some major distinctions; see the passage from 'Alî's *Küh* cited in C. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire, the Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)* (Princeton, 1986), p. 205.

of Süleymân and his reign — in a rather "Manneristic" blend of anxiety and anti-classicism.⁵ This is not to bring disrepute to Süleymân, but to promote some appreciation for the sophistication, polyphony and dynamism of Ottoman intellectual life.

It should first be pointed out that the whole notion of a "golden age" seems alien to the Ottoman intellectual tradition, except in a very specific context that has nothing to do with imperial history as shall be mentioned below. Such conventional usage, borrowed from European historiography or coined by imaginative popular historians, have been all too readily accepted in Ottoman studies thus far and re-circulated without scrutiny. Anachronistic characterizations of particular personages or periods have thus become part of regular usage in the field and at times impede one's efforts to appreciate Ottoman consciousness in its own terms. For the remarkably catchy depiction of Nevşehirli Dâmâd İbrâhîm Paşa's grand vezirate between 1718-1730 as the "Tulip Period," for instance, we are indebted to the historical imaginations of Yahya Kemal Beyatlı and Ahmed Refik Altınay, two late Ottoman/early republican authors. But are we justified in using it -un-self-consciously as we are doing? An exploration of this question, which need not take any credit away from Altınay, must be conducted with respect to both the image of "tulip," which was quite common before 1718, and the notion of a self-contained "period" that falls within those years.

Much more importantly for this paper, we must begin to ask since when sultans are given the epithets by which modern historians are so accustomed to calling them. Since when, for instance, and by whom is Selîm referred to as Yavuz, or Süleymân as Kânûnî? This does not seem to have been common practice in their own times. Süleymân may indeed have gained some reputation as a just ruler in his own lifetime and been recognized for his legislative activity.⁶ However, "Kânûnî" or an epithet like it is missing in so many major

⁵This is not the place to further elaborate on this "Ottoman Mannerism," but see, again in this book, Aptullah Kuran's piece that touches on the later phase of Sinân's career, and the one by Michael Rogers that finds reminiscences of "the work of Bronzino or other Mannerist portraitists" in Nigârî's portraits. One could also mention Esin Atil's study of the late 16th century painter Nakşî who seems to have been as interested in distorting as in capturing the traditional formal elements of Ottoman miniature-painting. In literature, too, a conscious departure from classicism can be detected in the new pride taken in the use of Turkish as opposed to Persian and in the invention of new genres. This is not to say that Ottoman civilization followed the course of Western European civilization with its own Renaissance (High Sinân) and Mannerism (late Sinân, Nakşî, etc). Without such an apologetic revision of history, one can note parallels in the alternating rhythms of confident dialogue with the "classics" to anxious "modernism."

⁶The Venetian diplomat Navagero, for instance, writes in 1553 that Süleymân "has a reputation for being very just." (*Relazioni*, ed. E. Alberi, III:73). This example and others, in Turkish as well as European sources, are noted by Halil İnalçık ("Suleiman the Lawgiver and Ottoman Law," *Archivum Ottomanicum* I (1969): 105-106) who clearly proves that Süleymân's name was associated with justice and legislative activity in the 16th century. My concern here is rather with the use of the epithet. The late 16th century *Risale-i Tezkirell'Ebniye* (ed. R. M. Meriç, p. 60) refers to him in one place as "Süleymân Hân-i 'Adil (S. H. the Just)" but this

sources of the late 16th and 17th centuries that one can at least conclude that it was not a regular, widely-used title, as routine an appendage of Süleymân's name as it has become in modern scholarship and popular historical consciousness.⁷

Süleymân's reign was certainly not free of censoring voices.⁸ "Complaint about the times" is one of the oldest clichés and not always easy to distinguish from more specific critique of a particular ruler or set of policies.⁹ The most pointed opposition in the age of Süleymân must be the continued anti-Ottoman position of the pro-Safavid Türkmen tribes. Busbecq, the mid-16th century Habsburg envoy, for instance, had heard the following story in Istanbul about "how much the Asiatic peoples [i.e., the Anatolian *kızılbay*] dislike the religion and the rule of the Ottomans ... Süleyman, as he was returning [from a campaign in the East to Istanbul] had enjoyed the hospitality of a certain Asiatic and had spent a night at his house. On the sultan's departure, his host, considering his house to have been defiled and contaminated by the presence of such a guest, purified it with lustral water, much fumigation, and due ceremonial ritual. When this was reported to Süleyman, he ordered the man to be put to death and his house razed to the ground. Thus the man paid the penalty for his aversion of the Turk and his zeal for the Persians."¹⁰ And it is worth noting that Prince Muşafâ is said to have promised he would be like his grandfather Selîm if he were to ascend the throne, which seems to imply that he did not care to point to the earlier part of his father's reign as the example he would want to emulate.¹¹ Even though there may be some relationship between the two, however, presentist political opposition is not the same as critical historical consciousness to which I will now turn my attention.

appears more like a staple adjective of praise (particularly appropriate to keep the rhyme scheme) than a regular epithet. Note, on the other hand, that Selîm I, too, is claimed to have had a reputation as a just ("*âdil*") ruler according to S. Tansel, p. 253. Or note that in Ibn Kemâl's chronicle, Selîm's justice ("*adl*") crushes tyranny; quoted in A. Uğur, "İbn Kemâl'in Siyasî Görüşleri," *Şeyhülislam İbn Kemâl*, eds. S. H. Bolay et al. (Ankara, 1986), p. 78.

⁷Just to give a sample, one could note that "Kânûnî" does not appear as an epithet in 'Âlî's *Künhü'l-ahbâr, Târîh-i Selânikî Hırzû'l-mülûk*, Bostânzâde's *Târîh-i Şâfi, Kitâb-i Müsteşâb*, Hâlisî's *Zafer-nâme*, Hezarfen Hüseyin's *Telhîsü'l-beyân, Târîh-i Gilmânî*, even though Süleymân is often mentioned as an exemplary ruler in these works. The earliest mention I was able to find of "Kânûnî" as a popular epithet for Süleymân is in Dimitrie Cantemir's early-18th century *History of the Growth and Decay of the Ottoman Empire*, trans. N. Tindal (London, 1734-35), part I, book 3, p. 174. Among the 16th-century references mentioned by İnalcık, the one that comes closest to "Kânûnî" is "Şâhîb-i kânûn" in the Vita of Mahmûd Paşa.

⁸See the paper by Barbara Flemming in this book. The case cited by Walter Andrews probably does not belong in the same category since Laîlî's complaint seems to stem from the fact that this author had just lost his patron.

⁹For a broad treatment of this theme in pre-modern, mostly pre-Ottoman, Islamic thought, see F. Rosenthal, *Sweeter than Hope: Complaint and Hope in Medieval Islam* (Leiden, 1983). The only Ottoman example in this book (see p. 39) is interestingly enough the scholar Taşköprülüzâde, from the reign of Süleymân, who complains that pseudo-scholars of his day were complaining abstractly of "the times" in order not to face their own concrete failings.

¹⁰*The Turkish Letters of Oghier Ghiselin de Busbecq*, trans. E. S. Forster (Oxford, 1927), 67.

¹¹Cited in Ş. Turan, *Kanunî'nin Oğlu Şehzade Bayezid Vakası* (Ankara, 1961), p. 24.

To begin with, it is naturally impossible to expect homogeneity among hundreds of intellectuals from various social backgrounds over several generations who were grappling with the themes of disorder and decline in the framework of Ottoman history. While it is natural to trace common assumptions and broad trends, one should not be too hasty in glossing over the major streams of disagreement that existed. Ottoman intellectual history should take note of at least two distinct and often rival attitudes within the decline-and-reform discourse of the post-Süleymânic age. The vision that I have summarized above, namely the vision of an exemplary Ottoman order, with a mature political-legal-social paradigm, located in a classical age stretching from Mehmed the Conqueror to Süleymân the Lawgiver, is generally presented as if it were the only Ottoman perspective on Ottoman history. With its emphasis on the *kânûn*, this might be considered the dominant position represented by the better-known reformists like 'Âlî, Koçi Bey, Hezarfen Hüseyin. It would be more accurate, however, to regard this *kânûn*-minded viewpoint as only one position, related to specific social groups which wanted to revive "the Ottoman tradition" as they understood it and as it suited them. Yet tradition is not a clear-cut, transparent notion; it can be invented, re-invented, re-interpreted and undergo all sorts of transformations even in the hands of traditionalists who may be divided among themselves as to what tradition is and what one ought to do with it.

We must here consider at least one other strand of thought in Ottoman cultural history which has hitherto been either neglected or underrated in terms of its contribution to the decline and reform discourse. This *selefi* ("fundamentalist") strand, with deep roots and influential representatives in earlier Islamic history, ran through Ottoman intellectual life over many centuries and did not fail to produce its own critical stance on the trajectory of the Ottoman order, particularly in the post-Süleymânic age. For this specific and not insignificant group, the "golden age" paradigm was particularly meaningful, but there was only one golden age and that was way back in the time of the *selef*, namely Prophet Muhammad and his companions.¹² *Selefi* thinkers had their own traditionalist program of reform which they elaborated in various treatises presenting different views, at times sharply different ones, than the reform treatises of *kânûn*-minded intellectuals like 'Âlî or Koçi Bey. We might view *selefism* as a persistent mode of analysis or historical consciousness in Islamic societies that turned into intellectual-political movements at certain conjunctures. The earliest learned manifestation of this phenomenon in Ottoman society indeed occurred under Süleymân himself, probably in the wake of the religious-conservative reaction to the syncretism of İbrâhîm Paşa and to the excessive influence he and Alvise Gritti, son of the Venetian Doge, enjoyed over Sultan Süleymân.

¹²To some extent, this attitude has always been shared by all Muslims who have been touched by mainstream interpretations of the history of Islam. But the *selefi*s took it more literally and made it into the cornerstone of concrete socio-political agendas. For an interesting depiction of all human and even angelic history, including "the time of the Message (of Muhammad)," as times that offered "ample cause for complaint," see Rosenthal, pp. 26-29.

The intellectuals who led the movement were severely critical of numerous practices which they considered to be harmful deviations from the *shari'a* even though such practices had been accommodated within the extra-*shar'i* legal space provided by *kanun* (secular dynastic law) and *'urf* (custom). The institutions of *devshirme* and cash-wa \ddot{q} f, for instance, were seen, by the more literalist interpreters of holy law, to go not only beyond but also against the *shari'a*. There was a monumental effort under Süleymân, spearheaded by Ebüssu'ûd (d. 1574), the grand mufti of the later part of his reign, to achieve a more acceptable synthesis between the *shari'a* and *kanun*, yet some staunch opponents like Birgivi (d. 1573) were not satisfied.¹³

In the next century, Ottoman cultural and political life was shaken by several waves of *shari'a*-minded movements. There were times when leaders of these movements managed to exert influence on government or palace circles and thus shape policy. As might be expected, neither *'urf* nor *kanun*, so dear to the dominant classicizing reformist tradition, meant much to this second trend which had its own, *selefi* version of a reform agenda to reverse the tide of decline. Indeed, a dogmatic reliance on *kanun*, whether it was codified in the age of Süleymân or of others, seems to have been resented by the "fundamentalists" as one of the factors behind decline.

There is an extremely interesting example of a reform treatise from the 1640's, representing, or at least heavily influenced by, this position.¹⁴ Several passages in this anonymous work, probably written by an imam or a lesser-ranking member of the ulema, advance some fresh ideas for new institutional arrangements which deviate from the practices of the classical age. The author himself is well aware that his proposals represent new departures, so he feels obliged — or, one might say, he feels audacious enough — to argue that there is no reason to maintain practices just because they have been implemented in the ages of previous rulers whoever they might be. Who established those earlier Ottoman laws and practices anyway, he probes, certainly not the Prophet but some ignorant *devshirme* vezirs.¹⁵ In a couple of passages, he even names the vezirs he has in mind and they happen to have flourished in the early sixteenth century, namely smack in the middle of the classical age.

To move beyond texts and take a particular administrative policy adopted in the same spirit of blatant irreverence towards the laws of the age of Mehmed II and Süleymân I, one could mention the example of Fâzil Muştafâ Paşa from the Köprülü family, the mini-dynasty of "traditionalist" reformism. When serving as grand vezir (1689-91), he was unwilling to set maximum prices (*narh*),

¹³For a masterly study of one of the most important aspects of Ebüssu'ûd's efforts, see Inalcik, "Islamization of Ottoman Laws on Land and Land Tax," *Festgabe an Josef Maraz, Osmanistik - Turkologie - Diplomatie*, eds. C. Fragner and K. Schwarz (Berlin, 1992), 101-116.

¹⁴*Kitâbu Mesâlihi'l Müslimîn ve Menâfi i'l-Mü'minîn*, ed. Yaşar Yücel, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilâtına Dair Kaynaklar*, II (Ankara, 1988).

¹⁵See, for instance, p. 80 of facsimile of text.

consistently practiced in the classical age and written into codebooks of *kânûn*, because, he explicitly argued, price setting "is not written in the [Holy] Book."¹⁶ These should suffice to demonstrate that *kânûn*-mindedness was not the sole attitude in post-Süleymânic reformist historical consciousness and political practice.

We can now return to the dominant position of *kânûn*-minded reformism which clearly does not have any monopoly over Ottoman decline and reform discourse. This is a much more vigorous or visible trend with much more significant impact because of its grip on the imagination of the majority of Ottoman administrators and intellectuals. Once again, the precursor of this literature was ironically produced right in the middle of Süleymân's reign: *Âşaf-nâme*, written by Luţfi Paşa, grand vezir to Süleymân for two short years between 1539 and 1541.¹⁷

And further examples multiplied after 'Âlî's *Counsel*, written around 1580.¹⁸ Even in these works, however, no ruler of the classical age is immune from reproach. Just to give an example, one could cite 'Âlî's criticism of Mehmed the Conqueror who, with good intentions but unwisely according to 'Âlî, moulded the world of scholarship into a regular career path with a rigid hierarchy of ranks and offices, thereby paving the way for patronage and bribery to become more important than learning.¹⁹

To turn specifically to the treatment of Süleymân's reign with this problem in mind, one is struck by a subtly displayed ambivalence. Next to nostalgic reverence is abundant and severe criticism. Many of the authors who consistently refer to the practices of the Süleymanic age in paradigmatic terms do not fail to admit that most of the practices which were perceived as corruptions of the classical order did appear again in that ruler's reign. After criticizing Mehmed II's policy with respect to higher education, for instance, 'Âlî adds that the "full corruption of the scholarly career path did not become manifest until the latter part of Süleymân's reign."²⁰ Even Kocı Bey, who has been treated in

¹⁶For further discussion of Fâzıl Muğafâ Paşa's policy and its repercussions, see this author's unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, "When Coins Turned into Drops of Dew and Bankers Became Robbers of Shadows: The Boundaries of Ottoman Economic Imagination at the End of the Sixteenth Century" (McGill University, 1987), pp. 134-35.

¹⁷Several editions of this important work exist, such as those by 'Alî Emîri (Istanbul, 1326 A.H.), R. Tschudi (Berlin, 1910), A. Uğur (*Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi İslâm İlimleri Enstitüsü Dergisi* 4 (1980)). None of these can be considered definitive, however. See, for instance, the copy (Istanbul Univ. Library, TH 786) with an extended treatment of *narh*, mentioned in M. Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi ve 1640 Tarihli Narh Defteri* (Istanbul, 1983), p. 5. It should also be noted that, strictly speaking, *Âşaf-nâme* is not a representative of the decline literature. It warns that bad days may come if certain things are not heeded.

¹⁸*Muğafâ 'Âlî's Counsel for Sultans of 1581*, ed. and trans. A. Tietze, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1979-82).

¹⁹*Zıyâfet Sofraları (Mevâidü'n-nefâis fî kavâidü'l-mecâlis)*, ed. and trans. O. Ş. Gökyay, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1978), I: 106.

²⁰*ibid.*

Ottoman studies as the most representative of the reform treatise writers given to unabashed idealization, comes right out to say that "all the seeds of corruption in the Ottoman order can be located in the age of Süleymân."

What are some of the basic elements of this critique? The most unexpected one may be the critical assessment of what are seemingly Süleymân's undeniable achievements, his military muscle and expansionist drive. In the eighteenth century, when Ahmed Resmî Efendi wanted to argue that Russia's expansionism would not be long-lived because she was over-extending herself, he chose to give two examples from history: Chingis and, most surprisingly, Süleymân, "all that hubris being against the nature of the flow of time / bu debdebeler tabî'at-i dehrden hâric olmağla ..." ²¹ While Resmî Efendi levelled his criticism of over-extension against Süleymân's deployment of navies in the Indian Ocean, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, a prominent intellectual of the nineteenth century, found the sultan at fault for spending too much of his energies in Europe and neglecting the task of unifying the Islamic world. ²² Be it over-extension or wrong orientation, such charges leveled at Süleymân's "foreign policy" are recorded in much later sources. His military achievements and westward orientation do not seem to have been questioned by the declinists of the late 16th and 17th centuries. To go back to Hasan Paşa's dream and to attempt an interpretation of one of its layers, the *kıble-nümâ* image suggests that some tension between the two orientations (Mecca vs Europe) was possibly recognized even in the 16th century but, if there was such a tension, Süleymân appears to have maintained the proper balance. The dream narrative in fact underlines the awe felt by the next few generations in front of the kind of military supremacy and muscle Süleymân's name invoked. The best compliment that a chronicler of the relatively unimpressive Hotin campaign of 1621 could pay to its commander 'Osmân II (r. 1618-22) was to underline that this young sultan was able to go a few camping sites deeper into Moldavia than Süleymân ever had. ²³

Certain developments that took place under Süleymân in Ottoman political life, however, were seen critically soon after if not already during his reign. Many historians seem troubled with his very first appointment to the grand vezirate. Eyebrows are raised not only at the dismissal of Pîrî Paşa, who is remembered as a wise representative of the classical tradition, but also at the promotion of İbrâhîm Paşa from the rank of a mere *hâş odabaşı* (leading page of the private chamber). İbrâhîm's story is seen on the one hand as a fascinating instance of the Ottoman meritocratic system at work: it is nothing less than a

²¹ Resmî Efendi's work is given in facsimile and modern Turkish rendering by İsmet Pakmaklısoğlu, "Bir Türk Diplomatinin Onsekizinci Yüzyıl Sonunda Devletler Arası İlişkilere Dair Görüşleri," *Belleten* 47 (1983): 527-535; see pp. 48-49 of facs.

²² For a *shari'a*-minded 20th century assessment along the same lines, blaming Süleymân for not maintaining his father's eastward vision and determined effort to quash the Shi'i menace, see A. Asrar, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Devrinde Osmanlı Devletinin Dinî Siyaseti ve İslam Alemi* (İstanbul, 1972). For Süleymân's policy toward the Safavids in the east, which indeed differed widely from that of Selim, see Rhoads Murphey's article in this book.

²³ Hâlisî, *Zafer-nâme*, ed. Y. Yücel (Ankara, 1983), facs. of ms. from 1621, pp. 183-84.

moral tale of the fickle fingers of fate which can raise a slave boy to the position of the most powerful man in a mighty state yet can also make him lose everything in an instant as casually as the change of a single letter to spell *Maḳtûl* (Executed) instead of *Maḳbûl* (Favored). On the other hand, it does not go unnoticed that the favors Süleymân bestowed on this childhood playmate and confidante exceeded established norms. This was true not just in the case of the appointment but also in the licence later given by the sultan to the grand vezir to act in nearly absolute freedom. In the end, the crucial subtext suggests, İbrâhîm Paşa had come to equate himself with the sultan because his excesses had been tolerated for too long, because he had been spoiled.²⁴

This episode represents merely a preface to the real story of political "corruption" under Süleymân, namely the rising influence of palace factions. Much more important than the İbrâhîm Paşa episode was the string of blunders and corruption associated with the grand vezirate of Rüstem. The execution of princes under the influence of a palace faction, led by Hürrem (Roxelana) and her partner-in-crime Rüstem Paşa, haunted Süleymân for the rest of his life and tainted his image thereafter.

Even though blame is often deflected to the factions themselves, it ought to be remembered that, in Ottoman political thought, sultanic authority has to be the absolute arbiter of all social conflict. The pursuit of self- or group-interest is only to be expected of the subjects, but the ideal ruler is one who would steer the course of state in adherence to certain absolute principles above and beyond the muddy waters of worldly interest through the application of *siyâset* (executive power). In that respect, Süleymân had failed since he had allowed himself to be led, or rather misled, by a faction pursuing its own interest — the faction of Hürrem and Rüstem. That factionalism managed to carve itself a permanent niche in Ottoman politics was much lamented by the authors of the decline-and-reform literature, and the beginnings of such factionalism, as well as the "pernicious" influence of the harem, was placed squarely in the reign of Süleymân.

The topos of mischievous factions and scheming courtiers enabled authors to concentrate their critical energies primarily on Rüstem, but as Âlî kept reminding his readers, "so long as the king shows no circumspection and alertness in the supervision of the vezirs, he implicitly authorizes the oppression of the Believers and by selecting the tyrannical vezir he approves of the destruction of the country."²⁵ It is with this awareness that we must read Ottoman historians reprehending Rüstem for, among other things, transforming hard-won state lands into private or waqf holdings and thus reducing the amount available to be distributed as fiefs. Koçi Bey sees this as a major factor in the demise of the timar system. Despite the convenience of Rüstem as the scapegoat,

²⁴ Âlî (*Kürh*, 371b) relates, for instance, that Süleymân allowed İbrâhîm Paşa to build an "unequaled palace," covered with a lead dome like the royal one, whereas Ottoman "kânûn" was different until then.

²⁵ *Counsel*, p. 27.

however, not all authors bother to abstain from mentioning Süleymân's name in conjunction with this harmful policy; in the *Hırzû'l-Mulûk*, the magnificent sultan is specifically named as the one who, transgressing the bounds of "fairness/inşâf," granted many villages to Şokollu Mehmed Paşa as temlik (freehold) and, again, caused the reduction of fiefs.²⁶

A sub-genre of Islamic belles-lettres in which the Ottomans seem to have taken great pleasure consists of works of *evveliyât* which occupied themselves with identifying the first instances of particular traditions or practices. Mirrors for princes, reform treatises, and histories made quite common use of this motif, particularly to point out the very first instance of a specific corrupt innovation and to contrast it to the pure forms of an ideal paradigm. Rüstem Paşa was often given the dubious honor of being the first to open the gates of bribery. Süleymân, unlike some later rulers, is clearly and unequivocally untainted by any such charge.²⁷ Nevertheless, the Süleymanic age appears as the source of yet another corruption which was to constitute a major theme of censure in Ottoman decline consciousness.

Yet Ottoman authors, typically in term of their ambivalent treatment of the Süleymanic age, did not quite know what to do with this undisputed evidence. One wonders if they or their readers could hold back their smiles when they wrote (and read) that Rüstem took bribes and grew as rich as Pharaoh but knew what mercy was and did not charge much.

Perhaps the best example of this ambivalence is to be found in the *Kitâb-i Müsteşâb*, an anonymous reform treatise from the 1620's, which may have been used by Koçi Bey as a model.²⁸ In this work, whenever Süleymân is directly referred to, he is the paradigmatic ruler. Yet there is a revealing story which puts the blame for the post-Süleymanic fiscal crises, lamented by the author, on policies that were adopted under Süleymân.²⁹ In addition to his stupendous wealth, Rüstem Paşa is well-known for his measures to augment state revenues and for his success in filling the coffers of the Treasury to an unprecedented scale.³⁰ But the story in the *Kitâb-i Müsteşâb* suggests that the apparent strength of Ottoman finances under Rüstem did not convince everyone that the state stood on firm ground in that age of opulence and magnificence.

While hunting near Dimetoka where Luţfî Paşa, Rüstem's predecessor, is pensioned off, Süleymân demands to see his ex-grand vezir Luţfî. The sultan asks

²⁶*Hırzû'l-mülûk*, ed. Y. Yücel, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilâtına Dair Kaynaklar*, III (Ankara, 1988), p. 177.

²⁷According to 'Âlî (*Küh.*, 294a), Şemsî Paşa was able to talk Murâd III into accepting bribes.

²⁸Ed. Yaşar Yücel (Ankara, 1974).

²⁹*Ibid.*, 20-21.

³⁰Süleymân was so impressed by his vezir's achievement that one of the coffers in the Treasury was sealed as "the money collected by Rüstem" to serve as a reminder of what a revenue-minded statesman could do.

the dismissed vezir why the Outer Treasury was not full during his term of office whereas his successor Rüstem managed to increase state revenues and savings to such an extent that filled not only the Outer Treasury but also flowed over into the extra storehouse of Yedikule. Luţfi Paşa, a voice of wisdom in post-Süleymânic advice and reform treatises whose authors apparently cherished his prescient *Âşaf-nâme*, answers that the Treasury has been filled allright by Rüstem, but only at the expense of the impoverished *re'âyâ* (the producing-taxpaying subjects), the only genuine treasure. And he adds, with foresight which to the author of *Kitâb-i Müsteşâb* is nightmarish hindsight, that this policy — the policy of Rüstem but, ultimately, of Süleymân himself as well — implies eventual depletion of not only the extra reserves of Yedikule but also the Outer Treasury itself.

In the end it seems Süleymân the Magnificent won over Süleyman the Lawgiver. The basic refrain in the decline-and-reform literature is about *zulm*, or tyranny, which is often associated with overtaxation and related to the oppressive weight of an overgrown, overly magnificent state. In Ottoman historical consciousness, the closest the Ottomans ever came to reaching the golden mean or the paradigmatic balancing act between imperial magnificence and law-abiding justice vis-à-vis the subjects was under Süleymân. And yet it was again in his age that the fine balance started to be broken in favor of magnificence and courtly excesses (including fiscal, political, and moral corruption) which led to the neglect of law, hence — narratologically, if not chronologically, *after* Süleymân — to *zulm*, hence to social disorder, and hence ironically, to the eventual decline of Ottoman might and magnificence. As to the public perception of the impressive legislative activity that took place under him, it cannot be divorced from the image of Ottoman law itself concerning which the popular saying went: "Osmanlı'nın kanunu yatsıya kadar / Ottoman law (of prohibition) is [valid] until forenoon."³¹

³¹Proverb cited in *Kitâbu Mesalih*, pp. 50-51 of facs text. A modern version of this goes: "Osmanlı'nın kanunu üç gün / Ottoman law is valid for three days."

PUBLIC OPINION UNDER SULTAN SÜLEYMÂN¹

Barbara FLEMMING

The age of Sultan Süleymân has left its imprint on men's minds. Indeed, his government's political aims, as those of his father, grandfather and great-grandfather, were extraordinarily ambitious. The intention was a continuous Holy War and a continuous expansion of the *Dârü'l-İslâm*.² If Yavuz Selim had been the first *Hâdimü'l-haremeyn*, if Bâyezîd II claimed to be *Eşrefü's-selâsin*, if Mehmed II had been the greatest *gâzî*, Süleymân laid claim to the "Supreme Caliphate."³

The aim in view remained a universal Muslim empire and at the same time a true Frontier State. The means: a great central army developed out of the sultan's own household troops, disciplined, resilient, single-minded, ready to die in the *gâzâ*. Other loyalties, to origin and region, to dervish orders, were subservient to this goal. Holy War was the uniting ideology. All were subjects of the Ottoman sultans,⁴ the greatest of whom was Süleymân.

The splendor surrounding this sultan in history tempts us to idealize his reign as a true golden age. Yet Sultan Süleymân's popularity declined in the 1540's. Surely nobody in this conference is feeling an urge to prove Süleymân less than his reputation. But his reputation should be measured in contemporary Ottoman terms, not in ours. In order to adequately measure the ruler against the values of his own times, we need the narrative sources. In this paper, I shall try to point out one aspect of the age of Süleymân, of "public opinion" in the sense of opinion publicly held and expressed.

¹This is a revised and slightly enlarged version of the paper read at the Conference on the Age of Süleymân the Magnificent, Princeton University, November 19-22, 1987. I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Eva Baer, Professor Cornell Fleischer, Dr. Remke Kruk, Professor Bernard Lewis and Professor Andreas Tietze for their encouragement and many helpful suggestions.

²See H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, (London, 1973) p. 6.

³See further İnalcık, *Classical Age*, p. 57.

⁴İnalcık, *Classical Age*, p. 80.

This was in the first place that of the central government. The sultan's historiographers made known the course of events in such a way as to "prevent misunderstanding and to forestall uninformed criticism."⁵ But next to this, it was possible for the educated to express their view, concealing their identity if necessary.⁶

The work which I shall discuss, written by an author who does give his name, belongs to a little-known genre of "public opinion," prophecy. Its writers were adepts of *reml* and of *cifr*, esoteric knowledge concerning the destinies of nations, in its apocalyptic aspects, a literature which is also known as *melûhim*, eschatological expectations centering around natural calamities, great conjunctions and eclipses.

For the prophetic writers, in distinction from the later *naşihatnâme* writers, the most insistent questions revolved around the perfection of man's soul, made most urgent by the expectation of the Mahdî. The *Câmi 'û'l-meknûnât*, "Collector of the Concealed", is such a book.

Its author, Mevlânâ 'Îsâ, was born in about 879/1474-1475 (according to his own words) in Hamîd ili (according to Muştafâ 'Âlî).⁷ He studied law and became a deputy judge. He may have been in some way affiliated to a dervish order; I have suggested the Hâlvetiye.⁸ He had studied 'arûz and history, in which chronology and millenarian speculation attracted him.

The text is found in three manuscripts dating from the first years of the seventeenth century. They are:

Le: Library of the University, Leiden, Cod. Or. 1448. Part I of a manuscript of two parts, dated 10-20 Ramazân 1013/February 1605. 13 lines to the page. It was first described in 1865.⁹

⁵B. Lewis and Ch. Pellat, "Djarîda", El, 2nd ed., s.v.

⁶The *Vâlî'ât-î Sulţân Cem* and the *Gurbetnâme*, both describing the life and deeds of Prince Cem, remained anonymous, even in the time of Süleymân. Ş. Turan examined an anonymous, *İtî'atnâme*, the author of which was in the service of Prince Selîm (later Selîm II); J. Turan, *Kanunî'nin Oğlu Şehzâde Bayezîd Vak'ası* (Ankara, 1961) p. 9.

⁷C. H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire. The Historian Mustafa Âlî (1541-1600)* (Princeton, 1986) 247f.; J. Schmidt, *Muştafâ 'Âlî's Künhü'l-ahbâr and its Preface according to the Leiden Manuscript* (Istanbul-Leiden, 1987) pp. 8, 35, 72.

⁸Table Ronde "L'ordre des Bektachis" in Strasbourg, June 1986. On these matters see now Ahmed T. Karamustafa, *Vâhidî's Menâkıb-î İfvoça-î Cihân ve Neûce-î Cân: Critical Edition and Historical Analysis*, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, (Montreal, 1986). I thank Dr. Karamustafa for putting his Ph. D. thesis at my disposal.

⁹P. de Jong and M.J. de Goeje, *Catalogus Codicum Orientalium Bibliothecae Academiae Lugduno Batavae III* (Leiden, 1865) 26 no. DCCCXLIV.

An: Library of the Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, Y. 240/4. Part six of a manuscript dated Receb 1012/beg. 11 June 1603. 15 lines to the page. First described by its former owner, Osman Ferid Sağlam.

Is: Library of the University, Istanbul, T. Y. 3263, formerly İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal (İnal). In the colophon İsmâ'il el-kâtib writes that he finished the "rough draft" (*tesvîd*) on Muharrem 1 of a year ending with six (the rest of the date has been cut off); probably late sixteenth or early seventeenth century. It consists of 150 folios, with 15 lines to the page. The manuscript has been rebound at least once.¹⁰

The manuscripts represent three recensions, a short one (Le), a longer one (An), and an even longer one (Is). Contrary to what I said in an earlier paper, I now think it possible that these recensions were made, in that order, by the author himself. In Le and An the work is dated 936/beg. 5 September 1529 and 940/beg. 23 July 1533; in Is 950/beg. 6 June 1543 is given as the final date.

The book is ostensibly a *gazavât-nâme*,¹¹ but its essential object is announcing the end of the world and preparing the initiated for this event. It is written as a *meşnevî* poem alternating between the metres *hezec* and *remel*; the form suggests that the text was to be read aloud to listeners who are addressed *iy feîâ* etc. In order to make the contents more accessible to his public, use is made, especially at the beginning, of fables and parables.

In the longest recension the work is divided into one hundred twenty-five (unnumbered) short chapters, of which the first forty-seven consist of a history of creation, of the *nûr-i Aḥmed*, "light of Muḥammad", and of the prophets. The nativity horoscope of the Prophet is set out in detail, because it helps in the recognition of the Mahdî.

Chapters forty-eight to ninety-five tell the history of the Ottomans from the legendary beginnings of the dynasty to the death of Selīm I. Chapters ninety-six to one hundred and twenty-three are mainly devoted to the reign of Sultan Süleymân.

¹⁰For earlier literature see my "Der Gâmi ül-mekûnât. Eine Quelle Âîs aus der Zeit Süleymân's", in H. R. Roemer and A. Noth (eds.), *Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Vorderen Orients. Festschrift für Bertold Spuler* (Leiden, 1981) p. 86, and "Şâhib-Ḳırân und Mahdî. Türkische Endzeiterwartungen im Ersten Jahrzehnt der Regierung Süleymân's", Gy. Kara, ed., *Between the Danube and the Caucasus* (Budapest, 1987) p. 51. I thank the keepers of the Leiden, Ankara and Istanbul collections for putting microfilms of their manuscripts at my disposal.

¹¹Cf. Orhan Şaik Gökay's contribution to his volume, "The Literature of Expansion and Conquest."

Many passages of 'Îsâ's poem deal with situations which were half-forgotten when he was writing, and with people who had long been dead. He had suffered during the great famine, followed by the plague, of 1503, and had witnessed the earthquake which in 915/beg. 21 April 1509 destroyed the inner city of Istanbul. Nearer to his own time were the revolt of the Mamluks in Syria and Egypt; the campaign of Rhodes; the conquest of Belgrade, Mohács, Pest, and the conquest and re-conquest of Buda.

Quite close to the author's old age — he was seventy-one when he wrote his final version — were the third Hungarian campaign, known as the "Raids in Germany", *gazavat-ı vilâyet-i Alâmân*, begun with the hope of conquering Vienna but settling for the small fortress of Kösek (Güns, Köszeg); the peace with Ferdinand who agreed to pay an annual tribute, the campaigns against the Safavids and especially the Baghdad campaign; the raids on Corfu and Apulia (Körfüz and Pulya) under Luîfî Paşa; Hayruddîn's conquests by sea; the secret pact with infidel France and the disappointment at the French betrayal; the campaign in Moldavia.

The end of 'Îsâ's longest version takes us to the year of writing, 1543, when Ottoman campaigning led to the occupation of several fortresses in western Hungary, sc. Esztergom (Gran), Tata and Székesfehévár (Istolni Belgrad, Stuhlweissenburg), before Süleymân started home with his army.¹²

What should 'Îsâ write about his own time? With the world at war, with such catastrophes as the bloody civil war in Anatolia behind one, with such feats of piracy as the capture of Algiers and Tunis and such unexpected failures as Vienna, with the incessant moving of armies and ships from east to west as the situation demanded. The first twenty years of Süleymân's reign had been years of almost uninterrupted warfare and crisis.

The final battle had not yet been fought. Sultan Süleymân, with all his might, had not been able to lure either the Habsburg monarchs, Charles V and Ferdinand, or the Shah of Persia, Tahmâsb into open battle, to decide who was the "supreme ruler of all the world".¹³ The term denoting this universalist aspiration was *şâhib-kırân* "lord of an auspicious conjunction, invincible hero."¹⁴ The Turkish author takes Charles V's aspirations¹⁵ seriously: he quotes him as asking the Pope for the crown and as announcing that he would go to the

¹²I gave an impression of this part in a paper entitled "Mevlânâ 'Îsâ's view of Ottoman Hungary" at the 7th CIEPO Symposium in Pécs, 7-11 September 1986.

¹³Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, I (Cambridge, 1976), p. 94.

¹⁴C. Fleischer, "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and Ibn Khaldûnism' in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Letters", *Journal of Asian and African Studies* XVIII (1983), p. 206.

¹⁵See John Elliott's contribution to this volume.

mountain of the *Qaf* which forms the frontier of the terrestrial world (An 144a). Süleymân writes to Charles V: *çu kılduñ da 'vâ-i şâhib-kırânî er iseñ qarşula saña varanı* (since you have claimed universal lordship, meet, if you are a man, him who is advancing towards you).

In those years Sultan Süleymân was *şâhib-kırân* rather than *kânûnî*. Ebû's-su'ûd, as Şeyhü'l-islâm (after 952/1545), was yet to undertake the great revision and compilation of the *kânûn* which earned Süleymân the title of "lawgiver."

'Îsâ's statements about Sultan Süleymân must be seen against the background of politic and religious expectations of his time. His *Câmi 'û'l-meknûnât* contains detailed statements concerning the end of the world, and some remarkable prognostications about the political future.

The world's life-span was seven thousand years; to the Imam Ca'far aş-âdiq (d. 765) the author ascribes the statement that a thousand years had not yet passed and that forty-five years were left; to Aristotle the foretelling that there would be a flood once in seven thousand years (Is 66a/b).

The author discusses its date, which he locates in an obscure, but imminent future. The Mahdî, he suggests, would come soon. Born under the same constellation as the Prophet, he would be preceded by thirty perfect human beings, *aqtâb*, several of whom were Halvetî sheykhs. 'Îsâ affirms that the present sultan, Süleymân bin Selîm, was such a mighty *ğâzî* that he might well be the Mahdî himself, but he moderates this claim immediately by adding that at any rate he might be his chief paladin (server).

Towards the end of the Istanbul version, written in 1543, only seven years after the death of Maqbûl İbrâhîm Paşa, 'Îsâ touches on the extraordinary power of the *ser'asker* of the sultan and the shock of his fall, after which Ayâs Paşa became Grand Vizier.

But in a prophetic passage, ostensibly written earlier, 'Îsâ traces a picture of the Ottoman society to come. What did he see? A *pâdişâh* who would leave matters of state to his vizier; a lawlessness of the emîrs of the time, who would rob the *re'âyâ* with impunity; a corruption among the kadîs who would violate sacred law and substitute ruses for it; but then suddenly there would be a remedy: the killing of the vizier by the sultan, who would then reign as another Maĥmûd (of Ghazna) with his Ayâs...

Such statements — and the last one has all the appearances of a prophecy *ex eventu* — may reflect 'Îsâ's opinion of the reigning sultan; but conclusions can only be drawn after a closer examination of his work. At the moment, one

may only consider the treatment of certain key themes, where the author discusses not so much what happened but what people thought was happening to them and was going to happen.

I shall give four short illustrations of what may be called Mevlânâ 'Îsâ's political convictions. The first concerns the succession to the throne. 1543 was a critical year. The aging Sultan Süleymân, his favorite having died, showed his preference for his youngest son and transferred the eldest to Amasya. People saw that there were troubles ahead, princes taking up arms against their brothers or against their father. For 'Îsâ, who does not refer to this directly, the troubled years preceding the deposition of Bâyezîd II and Selîm's usurpation of the throne must have been living realities.

He depicts Selîm I as a just ruler who removed innovation, *bid'at*, tyranny and corruption, *dalâlet*; in his time the sheep could walk with the wolf, the mouse could put its bead on the cat's paw. 'Îsâ imputes to the dying Selîm I an expression of regret on three accounts; that he died before the Kızılbâş, that he did not build an 'imâret for himself, and that he did not wage Holy War.

It is surely no accident that Mevlânâ 'Îsâ, who was of the same generation as Sultan Selîm I, pays special attention to Bâyezîd II's forced abdication, deposition and death. Early on in his work, 'Îsâ gives a glancing hint, praising the times of 'Oşmân, "when fratricides did not yet exist."¹⁶

Not long after 'Îsâ's writing the army was going to demand Süleymân's retirement to Demolika (Dimetoka): this would have reduced the *şâhib-karân* to the pitiable state of the aged Bâyezîd II.¹⁷ Indeed, this precedent was what Prince Muştafâ had in mind, as his letters (admittedly not until the early fifties) reveal.¹⁸

My second illustration bears on the issue of social order. Did people recognize that it was breaking down, and that the sultan's policies were responsible for it? Among modern historians there is a growing awareness that this breakdown began in the early years of the sixteenth century.¹⁹

Contemporary Ottoman historiographers, it has been suggested, were blinded to the more immediate social and economic causes of Anatolian unrest, which they preferred to attribute to religious causes, especially the "hideous

¹⁶Here, as elsewhere, 'Îsâ probably uses the Anonymous Chronicle as a source for his work; see my paper in Pécs.

¹⁷Turan, *Şehzâde Bayezid Vak'ası*, p. 11.

¹⁸A. D. Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty* (Oxford, 1956); Turan, *Şehzâde Bayezid Vak'ası*, p. 25.

¹⁹M. A. Cook, *Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia 1450-1600* (Oxford, 1972) p. 32.

Safavid doctrine."²⁰ This may be accounted for, not by lack of insight, but by their function, mentioned above, of presenting the course of events according to the opinion of the central government.

"When the plain of Syria had been conquered", 'Îsâ wrote, "the sultan said: feel ashamed as long as the Turks have not taken root here. The people of this country will not be obedient until Muslims have settled down here. In order to deport many tribes (*il*) from the Bozoklu and fill that country, a beg went and a number of kadis. These (tribes) were not willing to be deported; they rebelled, they slew the beg and also killed the kadis."

For Mevlânâ 'Îsâ, deportation and forced resettlement, not Safavid doctrine, is the cause of the first great tribal disturbance. Here and elsewhere in the *Câmi'ü'l-meknûnât* there is no lack of insight into social conditions and their causes. This would bear out the view that 'Îsâ was not an official historian.

My third example concerns 'Îsâ's treatment of booty, *ganîmet*. Professor İnalçık²¹ noted certain facts about the reservoirs of slave labour that were opened through the Turkish conquests in Christian lands. Soldiers could get cash out of prisoners from the slave-merchants who set up their markets at the end of a battle.²² Mevlânâ 'Îsâ often has occasion to write that after a successful siege or campaign the army took such a vast amount of booty and prisoners that they were "drawn" in them. The slave market actually plummeted after the battle of Mohács and the ensuing raids into Hungary. *Akıncıs* and *göñüllüs* carried off thousands of prisoners; "every poor man in the army got rich;" "one man took thirty to forty captives and sold them — it was unheard-of; but ten of them did not surpass the value of one, and there was nobody who would pay a hundred akçe for one, so that when everybody had his fill, they were not left in the army but put on the boats; they took pencik alive for the state treasury, amounting to 120.000 prisoners, compare this now with the 600.000 taken" (An 142b).²³

My final illustration concerns the need for appointments. 'Îsâ refers to survivors inheriting the positions of the dead. He observes the heavy losses of the Ottoman army during certain campaigns, especially after the sieges of Belgrade and Rhodes. Tens of thousands were dead or disabled, positions had to

²⁰J. R. Walsh, "The Historiography of Ottoman-Safavid Relations in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", B. Lewis and P. M. Holt, eds., *Historians of the Middle East*, 2nd ed., (London, 1964) pp. 206-209.

²¹H. İnalçık, Introductory Address to the Princeton Conference.

²²H. İnalçık, "Ghulâm" in *El*, 2nd ed., s.v.

²³According to İnalçık, "Ghulâm:" "in the second half of the 9th/15th century the average price of a slave was 40-50 Venetian ducats"; Pakalın writes: "when there were many captives, their price fell to 125 akça" (*Tarih Deyimleri* II 766).

be refilled. After a Hungarian campaign two hundred (akçe?) were paid to each disabled soldier (*mahrûc*) (Ist 91).

Though he does not actually mention unemployment among the kadis, it is clear that Mevlânâ 'Îsâ who had served as a substitute judge during thirty-five years, foresaw misery for his own profession. He warned that the Final Hour would be preceded by the portent '*alâmet*, "humiliation of the learned": Judges and professors would be put to shame; when the flute or the violin would be played they would be alert, but they would pay no heed when Traditions and Commentaries on the Koran were read.

Mevlânâ 'Îsâ's sources must have been diverse. He knew and cited Aḥmedî's *İskender-nâme*; he had recourse to the *Tevârîḫ-i Âl-i 'Osmân*. He displays a thorough knowledge of writings containing the wisdom of Aristotle and Ca'far aṣ-Şâdîk. His profession must have given him access to works²⁴ and libraries where such works were kept.²⁵

He discussed these matters with his three friends, two of whom were kadis. He does not say much about the judge İṣṭübâde Aḥmed, whose companion he was during the reign of Sultan Bâyezîd II. He is more informative about another judge, Kâdî Muḫyîddîn, whose close friend he was between 1512 and 1520 and who was well versed in all the sciences and eminent in *cifr*. Mevlânâ 'Îsâ admired this learned kadi from the naval port of Gelibolu, whose full name was Mehmed b. İsmâ'îl, Muḫyîddîn, with the nickname Kepecioglu. For him 'Îsâ made the final copy of his (Muḫyîddîn's) Turkish compilation concerning juridical questions, *mesâ'il*, entitled, tantalizingly, *Minhâc* (only the Istanbul manuscript contains this information). Mevlânâ 'Îsâ admired Kâdî Muḫyîddîn who practised, among other sciences, *cifr*. A third friend was the colonel (*mîralay*) Murâd Beg, an expert astronomer/astrologer.

These men may perhaps be regarded as the author's patrons. The book is not expressly dedicated to the reigning sultan. Did Sultan Süleymân actively try to influence public opinion through the prophetic writers? A *remi*-prophecy was presented to him after the execution of Prince Muṣṭafâ.²⁶ The *Rumûz-i Kunûz* of the Bayrâmî Şeyḫ Ibn 'Îsâ Akḫişâri (died 1559/60) was completed under his reign.²⁷ What did he think of the Bayrâmî-Melâmetü Şeyḫ Pîr 'Alî, who claimed to be the Mahdî? We hear of a conversation between the two men, in which the

²⁴An example would be the Turkish version of the *Risâle-i sî faṣl* by Naṣîraddîn Tûsî, described by M. Götz, *Türkische Handschriften*, (Wiesbaden 1979) (VOHD XIII, 4), 341 no. 355.

²⁵F. Sezgin, *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums* VII (Leiden, 1979) refers to many Arabic manuscripts in Turkish libraries.

²⁶Turan, *Şehzâde Bayezîd Vak'ası*, 25 note 2, quoting T. Gökbilgin.

²⁷M. Götz, *Türkische Handschriften*, Teil 4 (Wiesbaden, 1979) (VOHD XIII, 4), 353 no. 369; H. Sohrweide, *Türkische Handschriften*, Teil 5, (Wiesbaden, 1981) (VOHD XIII, 5), 275 no. 293.

şeyh is said to have uttered, "my *pâdişah*, now to outward appearance you are the Mahdî..."²⁸ Again, some years later, Seyyid Lokmân was to write that Süleymân had left behind şeyhs of religious orders in his pious asceticism and had attained the degree of the perfect men, *ağâb*...²⁹

With regard to *gazâ* 'Îsâ speaks as an expansionist Ottoman: *gazâ* is the sultans' duty; integration of the conquered lands is necessary. Vienna must be destroyed in the interest of a safe and prosperous Buda (Ist 90a); it had been necessary that the Ađincis had turned Hungarian and Austrian lands into a desert; at least 'Îsâ boasted that they had done so. After Mohács there was no Ottoman soldier who had not cut off five to ten heads; they used corpses as cushions for their own heads (An 142b). At the same time 'Îsâ was interested in Christian affairs; he records, in the style of the *gazavâtname*, the deliberations of their leaders; he describes the Sack of Rome; he welcomes the sultan's generosity in giving the Christians back one of their churches in Esztergom.

Perhaps the *Câmi'ü'l-meknûnât* was designed for instruction of a circle of friends, who may have had dervish (Halvetîye? Melâmîye?) connections. By 'Îsâ's time, suspicion had long turned against subversive Shî'îs. The hold of the Sunnî establishment had tightened. The Kızılbaş were an abomination. But 'Îsâ's chapter on the death of Shah Isma'îl is surprisingly mellow. The Kızılbaş finds his resting place in Kerbelâ, where he has built a canal.

With millenarian beliefs speculations sprang up that, pending the end of days, a good life on earth would come. In this mood it was possible to raise the question of the cost of the *gazavât*, considering the terrible price in dead and wounded, but concluding that it was worth it.

The book's archaic Old Ottoman and the *meşnevî* form, which became anachronistic from the seventeenth century onwards, may have been responsible for its being neglected for some time. But it was not wholly forgotten, because Muştafâ 'Âlî quoted from the work in his *Kühû'l-ağbâr*. Its semi-esoteric nature must have appealed to him. Through 'Âlî, public (though not official) opinion under the sultans Murâd III and Mehmed III remained in touch with Mevlânâ 'Îsâ's *Câmi'ü'l-meknûnât*, three generations after Sultan Süleymân.

²⁸ Abdülbâkî (Gölpınarlı), *Melâmîlik ve Melâmîler* (İstanbul, 1931) with an anecdote of Sultan Süleymân setting free a Melâmî prisoner to ensure victory at Rhodes.

²⁹ *Kıyâfetu'l-İnsâniyye fî Şemâilü'l-'Osmâniyye* (fascismüle, İstanbul, 1987) 48b.

STATE, SOVEREIGNTY AND LAW DURING THE REIGN OF SÜLEYMÂN

Halil İNALCIK

I. THE CONCEPT OF STATE

A. "JUSTICE." FOUNDATION OF THE STATE

With regard to the concept of state, while the ulama laid emphasis on the Islamic notions, the bureaucrats (*küttâb*) insisted on the Turco-Iranian traditions. The titles of *hüdâvendigâr* and *pâdişâh* (both meaning great king or emperor in Persian), as well as the titles of *hân* and *hakân* (emperor in the Central Asian empires), were used by the *küttâb* when they intended to stress the Turco-Iranian character of sovereignty.

Süleymân is believed to have embodied in his person the most accomplished image of the Middle Eastern ruler. In the eyes of the Ottomans, he overshadowed the Sassanian emperor Anûshirwân Husraw (Chosroes I, 531-579) and matched the Quranic image of the perfect ruler, Salomon. In their glorification of Süleymân, they laid emphasis on his sense of justice and equity as the most significant characteristic of his rulership. In fact, their emphasis on the principle of justice is not just a matter of rhetoric. Ever since ancient Mesopotamia, justice had come to be considered as the most effective ethical and wise principle of conduct of a king in the successive empires of the Middle East. But it is to be noted that in this tradition, the concept of justice gained quite a specific meaning, not to be simply limited to the ethical notion of equity.

The particular notion of 'adâlet¹ (Ar. 'adâla) as the key principle in the pre-Islamic Persian or Middle Eastern political system appears to have been introduced into the Islamic state system by the Persian bureaucrats and literati in the service of the Caliphate. The notion obviously originated from pre-Islamic

¹See H. Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), pp. 65-69; also Inalcik, "Adâletnâmeler," *Belgeler*, vol. 2 (Ankara: 1965), pp. 49-52.

Indo-Persian advice literature. The famous story in al-Tabarî about the Sassanian King Parwîz discussed pragmatic issues for a successful government. There, the main issue was how to increase the state revenues without causing discontent among the taxpaying majority. The question was that when the discontent of the masses went unheeded, it might cause the loss of power. The case of Parwîz exemplified the power-state or tyranny. It argued that since the ruler's power was sanctioned by God, he had the right to use any means to consolidate it, which included increasing taxes. But through long historical experience, it was learned that a despotic government based on the use of sheer force could not last long. In the story, this kind of government is discarded not only because an oppressive government might result in an impairment of the productive capacity of the taxpayers (and thus in a decrease in government revenues). As the alternative, it was proposed that protection of the tax-payers against the abuse of royal power was the best policy because it would enhance production and state revenues and consequently would solidify the royal power.

Thus, justice had quite a specific meaning in this system of government. Its definition has a crucial importance for us in understanding the whole structure of the Middle Eastern state. Justice in this system is defined as the prevention and elimination of the oppressive acts, *zulm*, by those who exercise power in the name of the ruler. This would be achieved through the *dîvân al-mazâlim* or the Ottoman *Dîvân-î Hümâyûn* functioning as a supreme court, through a constant check and spying on the governors, summary punishments under the *siyâsa* laws, periodic promulgation of 'adâlet-nâmes or rescripts of justice, and the public's recourse to *riq'a* and 'arż-i mahzar, or petition rights against the abuses of power of the agents of state. The whole administrative system rested on a notion of 'adâlet conceived in this manner. In this system, 'adâlet is not simply a principle of equity and impartial judgment, but also a principle of social action.

Within this system, power and justice were considered not as a dichotomy, but as interdependent principles. Power was for justice and justice for power. Arbitrary use of power was injustice. The ultimate goal of supreme power was to establish justice and it was justice that consolidated power. Thus, I believe that the term 'oriental despotism' in western literature is a misconception of the real state system in the east.

The concept of one ruler with absolute power was of central importance for the system, because the only way to realize the 'adâlet was believed to be by means of an omnipotent ruler independent from all external influences, deciding and acting in absolute freedom, responsible only before God for his actions. In other words, absolute power was believed to be the ultimate guarantee and shelter for the oppressed. The ruler should be on the watch all the time against injustices and be prepared to hear complaints directly from his subjects. The imperial

council presided over by the ruler himself and open to the humblest of his subjects was the key institution of the empire.

The 'Tower of 'Adâlet,' or *Cihânnümâ* in the Ottoman court symbolized the constant watch of the ruler. Further investigation, particularly of the classical Ottoman system of government, demonstrates that the social class with which the ruler was primarily concerned in establishing the 'adâlet or protection, was the peasant *re'âyâ*.

The peasantry lived in isolated small communities in the countryside and were victims of all sorts of exactions and acts of violence. In the narrow sense of the word, *re'âyâ* meant those family farm units in the countryside. They constituted the backbone of the productive classes and the main source of public revenues. Thus, from the times of Hammurabi or Anûshirwân Hûsraw I, the justice-seeking measures concerned the peasantry, land holding, and land taxation. In the Ottoman Empire, a whole series of laws and regulations were designed principally to protect the peasants against the exactions of provincial *ûmâr*-holding soldiery and local authorities. 'Adâlet meant for the Ottoman bureaucrats primarily the protection of the *re'âyâ* against abuses of power in the provinces.

It is my belief that the special meaning of justice in the Middle Eastern state is of key importance in understanding that state. Methodologically, it is necessary to study comparatively the rather unsystematic collection of maxims and stories in the advice literature, with the actual government organization and policies. Thanks to the archival source, the study of the Ottoman state offers the most detailed and reliable picture of a typical Middle Eastern empire.

In the Ottoman Empire, the central government's great concern to redress the injustices can be seen in the following measures and institutions:

1. The principle of accessibility

In the Ottoman government system, even the humblest member of the society had the right to take his complaints to the imperial council. A series of books in the Ottoman archives known as the *defter-i şikâyet*² indicate also the wide use of written grievances against provincial authorities. Such applications, when done through the kadi, were called 'arz-i mahzar, or petitions, and often bore many signatures of Muslim and non-Muslim *re'âyâ*. Complaints were directed against tax collectors, the local military, or even against the governors. The sultan encouraged the *re'âyâ* to bring injustices to his attention.

²Such a *Defter-i Şikâyet* is published by H.G. Mayer et al., *Das Osmanische "Registerbuch der Beschwerden" (Şikâyet Defteri) vom Jahre 1675*, vol. 1, Vienna 1984.

2. The Idea of Just Era

On his accession to the throne, every sultan introduced certain dramatic measures to declare to the world that his reign was going to be an era of justice. Thus, many rulers in Iran began their reign by abolishing the *tamgha* taxes.

It was a custom of the Ottoman sultans to promulgate periodically rescripts of justice, or '*adâlet-nâmes*, to warn the government agents in the provinces to refrain from such illegal acts as imposition of forced services and dues on the re'âyâ, making exactions, staying in the homes of the peasantry, and forcing the latter to feed their large retinues. These were the most common abuses the sultan tried to prevent under the threat of the severest *siyâsa* penalties. The sultan asked the local kadi to publicize his orders and give a copy of it to whoever wanted one. Such abuses perpetrated by public agents were subject to a special jurisdiction called *siyâsa*. No cash compensation was accepted for such crimes and *siyâsa* punishments were particularly severe.

3. Royal Watch on Injustices

An elaborate intelligence and espionage network was believed to be established primarily to keep watch on the acts of the public agents to prevent unjust acts. Also the Ottoman sultans' secret tours in disguise were designed to discover the abuses and to redress injustices. All these Ottoman practices sound so familiar for a reader of Nizâm al-Mulk's *Siyâsetnâme*.³ Actually the tradition was transmitted by the *küttâb*, the bureaucrats, and by a large literature designed for the *küttâb*, such as advice books, manuals on state finances and accounting, or *inşâ'* (epistolography) and history books. It is no coincidence that in Ottoman literature, the first translations consisted of books in these fields.

4. Symbolism and Iconography of Justice

Astral symbolism of power and justice goes back to the Mesopotamian civilizations. The combinations of the sun and the lion, or the sun and the moon symbolized royal power and justice. Sassanian and Seljuk coins bear the same emblems. In the famous Turkish book of advice *Ḳutaḍḡu Bilig*,⁴ Kün-Toḡdı, rising sun, is the ruler and represents justice ; his vizier Ay-Doldı, full-moon, represents intellect and *dawla* - fortune. The ruler's supreme duty is to eliminate injustices. *Ḳutaḍḡu Bilig* says the sword in the ruler's hand symbolizes his power

³See, for instance, p. 456 of the edition by H. Drake (Tehran: 1962).

⁴Yūsuf Hâşş Hâjib, *Wisdom of Royal Glory (Ḳutaḍḡu Bilig), A Turco-Islamic Mirror for Princes*, trans. R. Dankoff (Chicago, 1983).

to establish justice by immediate decision and execution. The emblems of sun, moon, lion, and sword of justice are to be found together or individually on all the regalia of Asiatic states.

The pictorial arrangement of the 'adâlet, revenue, army, and power in the form of a circle meant to show the whole system, or the dependence of each component on the others. In a circle it is not clear which element, 'adâlet or power, is the initial point; all the elements are considered to be absolutely interdependent. On the other hand, prevention of illegal taxation being the central concern of the ruler and his subjects, particular care was taken to announce 'adâlet measures to the public, as demonstrated in the royal tax inscriptions throughout the Middle East. The decrees engraved on the walls of the Masjid-i Jum'a in Isfahan, the Ilkhanid inscription on the gate of the Ankara castle are among such examples.

The theme of justice and royal power also pervaded historiography, the inşa' literature, and court poetry. This pattern had crucial significance for those who considered the concept of a just ruler as the very foundation of society. A series of semiotic conventions in art and literature would be clear to us the moment we realize the pervasive meaning of this particular outlook of state and society.

In conclusion, contrary to what is believed, the advice literature is only one part of the evidence of a system of government which prevailed in the Middle East since antiquity. Without it, the medieval Near Eastern state cannot be understood and defined. Süleymân is reported to have read with great interest the advice to kings literature.⁵

Süleymân's rescript of justice from 1565 declares in its preamble that he is determined to eliminate injustices perpetrated against his subjects by the provincial authorities, notably the governors and judges, and to ensure for the subjects a secure and prosperous life "under his time of justice."⁶ The rescript banned the most widespread abuses, the forcible marriages and false testimonies. In other rescripts, the common forms of injustices included the collection of taxes not in accordance with the tax registers, the illicit collection of dues and service fees, making false accusations to exact money from the peasants, or frequently visiting villages with large retinues with the pretext of investigating criminal acts and in the process forcing the peasants to feed them and to pay indemnifications. The imperial rescript ordered that such official tours be repeated only every three months and that no provisions be received from the peasants

⁵A translation of *Kalîla wa Dimna* by 'Alî b. Şâlih, for instance, was generously rewarded by Süleymân: Perçevi, *Tâ'rih* (Istanbul: 1281/1864), pp. 60-1.

⁶Inalcık, "Adâletnâmeler," 99-104.

unless they were paid for. The rescripts of justice specifically prohibited extra labor services which were imposed by the local authorities on the peasants. There, fiscal concern was emphatically expressed by the statement that as a result of such exactions, the peasants were abandoning their lands and thus revenue sources were lost.

The first acts of Süleymân upon his accession to the throne, are described by Ottoman historians,⁷ almost all of whom were bureaucrats, as being acts which were in full conformity with the Middle Eastern notion of the just ruler. Immediately after his accession to the throne he let free the deportees from Egypt, whom his father had forcibly brought to the Ottoman capital, to stay or return to their homeland. He also ordered that all the properties which had been confiscated from the silk merchants, Iranian or Ottoman, when Selim I had declared a ban on the Iranian silk imports in 1515, be returned to their owners. Other acts of justice included summary execution of those state officials who, under his predecessor committed acts of cruelty and injustices. Ca'fer Beg, admiral of the Ottoman navy at Gallipoli, known as "Bloody Ca'fer," and the Governor of Prizren, who was accused of enslaving and selling Ottoman Christian subjects, were executed for their crimes after investigations. In addition, the commander of the cavalry division of the *silâhdârs* at the Porte was dismissed and five of his men were executed when it was proven that they had dared to break in the Dîvân where meetings were held and to assault some viziers and state officials. These acts were designed to show that the new sultan would not tolerate the abuse of power against the powerless by his agents, and that he demanded due respect and obedience to those who exercised authority in his name. All these acts were emphatically mentioned as proofs of his justice. His order of 1521 to the kadis concerning the rates of court fees was another important measure of a practical nature.

The following policies of Süleymân were also mentioned as the principles of a wise and just administration, the neglect of which would later on be referred to as the main causes for the deterioration and decline of the Ottoman Empire. 'Âlî,⁸ the historian-bureaucrat, observed that the office-holders, the kadis and the *sancâk-begs* used to be kept in their assigned posts for a long period of time. He pointed out that under Süleymân, officials were not dismissed for a trivial fault,

⁷ F. Babinger, *Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke* (Leipzig, 1927); Turkish trans. C. Uçok, *Osmanlı Tarih Yazarları ve Eserleri* (Ankara, 1982), nos. 58-67. For the works of Matrakçı Nasûh, see H. G. Yurdayın, *Kanunî'nin Cûlûsu ve İlk Seferleri* (Ankara: 1961); idem, *Matrakçı Nasuh* (Ankara: 1963); P. Kappert, *Geschichte Sultan Süleymân Kanûnîs von Celâlzâde Muşafâ genannt Koca Nişancı* (Wiesbaden, 1981); also J. Matuz, *Das Kanzleiwesen Süleymân des Prâchtigen*, Freiburger Islamstudien Bd. 5 (Wiesbaden, 1974); idem, *Herrscherurkunden des Osmanen Sultans Süleymân des Prâchtigen. Ein chronologisches Verzeichnis*, Islamkundliche Materialien, Bd. 1 (Freiburg, 1971).

⁸ Muşafâ 'Âlî, *Nuşhatu's -Selâsin*, ed. and trans. A. Tietze, *Muşafâ 'Âlî's Counsel for Sultans of 1581*, I (Vienna, 1879); see *Lâzima* no. 16 on fols. 50v-52r of the text.

and if they were dismissed because of a major misconduct, they were never reinstated. Thus, our historian asserts, they served the state in confidence and justice. Another advantage of long tenure, it was argued, was that the officials could build up and maintain a large body of retainers with necessary equipment without resorting to bribery and exactions.

Süleymân was particularly concerned about preventing the soldiery from harassing and plundering the peasants on their way to a campaign. There are cases related in our sources as to how severe he was against those who did not observe his order.⁹ Soldiers were constantly reminded to pay for whatever they obtained from the peasants. It was believed that Ottoman logistics was at its best in Süleymân's time.¹⁰ Preparations in building up stocks of wheat and barley at suitable places along the campaign route would be started one year prior to the campaign. Ottoman bureaucrats saw in this policy the wisdom of *istimâlet*, winning over the allegiance of the subject peoples. It was also argued that unruly conduct on the part of the soldiery would cause the flight of the peasantry and thus the ruin of the sources of public revenue. Consequently, the protection of the local population, or, "justice" was believed to be a necessity for both moral and practical purposes.

5. Justice and Public Opinion

The general assumption is that in the traditional Middle Eastern state, the ruler, being aloof, did not care about public opinion, and ignored what the ordinary people, the townsfol and the peasantry thought of him. However, the oriental ruler was much concerned with his image in the eyes of the masses, because it was a traditionally established fact that potential rivals around him, in the periphery or neighboring lands were all ready to exploit any reversal in public opinion against him. Popular discontent often appeared among the populace in the form of gossip about the moral weakness of the ruler, i.e., his neglect of religious duties, his wine drinking, and most important of all, his inability to prevent 'injustices' (*zulm, hayf*), and abuses of authority perpetrated by his agents against his subjects.

⁹"Two silâhdârs were executed because they had let loose their horses to graze on the peasants' crop in the fields." "Daybook of the campaign of Buda." Feridûn, *Münşe'ât al-Selâtin*, I (Istanbul, 1274/1857), p. 555.

¹⁰See G. Veinstein, "Some Views on Provisioning in the Hungarian Campaigns of Suleyman the Magnificent," *Osmanistische Studien für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte in Memoriam Vančo Boškov*, ed. H. G. Majer (Wiesbaden, 1986), pp. 177-185.

'Alî demonstrated the crucial importance of public opinion for ruler in safeguarding power.¹¹ Enumerating the matters necessary for the rulers, he mentioned as the first concern, "to gain the love of their subjects so that the weak, who have been committed to their charge by the Creator of all creatures, make them the beloved of their hearts. Now if the kings lead a pious life, if they take care of the people who are their subjects, if they always mix and associate with philosophers and wise men and at all times avoid the company of blockheads, if they again and again study the teachings of history, that is, the life stories of the kings of old, if they restrain as much as possible their own violence and aim at equity and justice, if fools and eunuchs and mutes and the courtiers, those kindlers of sedition and disintegration, do not take over the affairs of the state..., and if they always protect the weak and the poor under their rule from the fire of poverty, and destitution by means of their liberality and limitless patronage, they will tie the hearts to themselves in affection and will motivate people after the five ritual prayers to pray for the continuation of their might and glory."

In fact, the ritual of allegiance to the ruler is rendered in the prayers said after each Friday sermon (*hutbe*) in the mosques throughout his dominions. A Muslim ruler loses his legitimacy the moment his name disappears from the Friday sermon. Even if the Friday prayers cannot be interpreted truly as a renewal of popular approval of the ruler's conduct, it nevertheless was a reminder of the importance of public opinion. In any case, the Ottoman sultan selected the preachers from among popular *Şeyhs* and appointed them by means of a special diploma, and thus kept some sort of control on this delicate matter. There were some rare cases in which a particularly bold preacher denounced the sultan's acts or policies. The drinking and coffee houses were shut down not simply because the sultan wanted to comply with religious prohibitions, but also because these places were centers of gossip against the government.¹² In fact, criticisms and discontent were voiced during Süleymân's era, not to mention the violent uprisings among the Kızılbaş Türkmens.

However, contemporary observers testify that, by his behaviour and conduct which conformed to the tradition Süleymân generated in his person the image of a highly charismatic sultan. It was of crucial importance that the monarch create an image of a just and forgiving 'father' of the people, ensuring that all groups within the society earned their livelihood, and that the poor and the powerless were protected.

¹¹Tietze, vol. 1, Lâzime, no. 11, 41r, 3 margin; cf. note in the Relazione of D. Trevisano, the Venetian bailo, cited by Ş. Turan, *Şehzâde Bayezid Vak'ası* (Ankara, 1961), p. 46.

¹²A. Refik, *Onaltıncı Asırda İstanbul Hayatı, 1553-1591* (Istanbul: 1935), pp. 141-42; coffee houses in İstanbul first appeared in 962/1554-55; see Peçevi, *Tarih*, vol. 1, pp. 363-6.

It had been the custom of every Ottoman sultan to begin his reign with a major victory or conquest, which was considered as a sign of his ability and good fortune. At the beginning of his reign, Süleymân's military successes at Belgrade and Rhodes, where Mehmed the Conqueror had failed, were interpreted as a sign of divine support (te'vid-i ilâhî), and won him at the outset an unparalleled prestige with the army and the populace.

B. THE CONCEPT OF THE UNIVERSAL EMPIRE, THE CALIPHATE

The words and titles which Şeyhü'l-islâm Ebû's-Su'ûd used for Sultan Süleymân in the inscription on the main gate of his mosque in Istanbul (completed in 964/1557) can be seen as indicative of the particular concept of state held by him and his contemporaries. In our simplified style, the inscription can be rendered as follows:

"This slave of God, powerful with God's power and his mighty deputy on the Earth, standing by the commands of the Qur'an and for the execution of them all over the world, master of all lands, and the shadow of God over all nations, Sultan over all the Sultans in the lands of the Arabs and Persians, the propagator of the Sultanic laws, the tenth sultan among the Ottoman *Hâkâns*, Sultan, son of Sultan, Sultan Süleymân Khan..."

Here, the attributes and titles indicate two distinct traditions, the Islamic and the Turco-Persian. While, on the one hand, the accent is put on God's support as he stood by God's commands, on the other hand, he is exalted as a *hâkân* spreading the sultanic laws. We shall return to this point subsequently when dealing with the concept of law. Stressing the image of Süleymân as the deputy and shadow of God, and his executing God's commands on earth, the first lines emphatically assert his capacity as an Islamic caliph. Since every Muslim ruler claimed the same title as the upholder and executor of the Shari'a after the universal caliphate of the Abbasids disappeared in 1258, there is actually nothing new in Süleymân's titles. The same can also be true for the assertion of his supremacy among Muslim rulers in the world. But the unusual aspect of Süleymân's case was that he believed in bringing all these to reality through the tremendous power he held.

The striking point in the whole inscription is the concept of a world empire, his claim to supremacy as the shadow of God on all nations. In 1557 the year the inscription was written, Süleymân celebrated his victories over the Habsburgs in the West and the Safavids in the East. Twenty years earlier, in 1538, in the famous inscription of Bender, he pompously announced his world-wide undertakings in these terms: "I am a slave of God and I am the master in this world. ... God's virtue and Muhammed's miracles are my companions. I am

Süleymân and my name is being read in the prayers in the holy cities of Islam. I launched fleets in the Mediterranean on the part of the Franks in Maghreb as well as in Indian Ocean. I am the Shah of Baghdad and Iraq, Caesar of the Roman lands and the Sultan of Egypt. I took the land and crown of the Hungarian king and granted it to one of my humble slaves..."¹³ In his letters to the Habsburg rulers, Ferdinand and Charles V, he asserted his supremacy among the rulers of the world through God's favor, adding to his titlature the title of "master of the lands of the Roman Caesars and Alexander the Great." He rejected using the title of "Caesar" for Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor.

Ottoman claims to the heritage of the Roman Empire in the East, as well as in the West originated from Mehmed the Conqueror's conquest of Constantinople. Since then, the conquest of Rome, symbolized by the Turks as 'Kızıl Elma' (Gold Apple for the golden globe in the hand of the Roman emperor), had become a dream for the Ottoman sultans. In his campaign of Corfu in 1537 Süleymân actually planned invading Italy and capturing rome.¹⁴ As the conquest of the West was always on his mind, he supported every separatist movement in Europe against the Pope and the Emperor who claimed to be the head of a unified Christian Europe. Süleymân's support of the French and the Protestant princes in their fight for independence, which was a policy designed to keep Christendom divided, effectively contributed to the rise of national monarchies in the West and the establishment of Protestantism in Germany.¹⁵

As for Süleymân's claim to supremacy in the Islamic world, it found expression in his titles of "the Caliph of the whole world" and "the Caliph of all Muslims in the world" (*Halife-i Rû-yi Zemîn* or *Halife-i Müslimîn*).¹⁶ Since the conquest of Constantinople, Ottoman sultans claimed a position of supremacy in the Islamic world, asserting that since the time of the first four caliphs, the companions of the Prophet, no other Muslim ruler could claim supremacy over the Ottoman sultans because of their unprecedented success in protecting and extending the domain of Islam against the infidels. After the annexation of the Arab countries (1516-1540), particularly of the Hijaz (1517), the Ottoman sultans took over from the Mamluk sultans the most prestigious title in Islam, that of the "Servitor of the two Holy Sanctuaries" (Mecca and Medina). The Mamluk sultans before the Ottomans had used it to assert their primacy among the Muslim sovereigns. Süleymân took this title in all seriousness as the basis of his claim to universal caliphate and declared that it was his prime duty to keep

¹³M. Guboglu, *Paleografia și diplomatica turco-osmană* (Bucharest: 1958), p. 133.

¹⁴For Süleymân's plan to conquer Rome, see E. Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, vol. 1 (Paris: 1848), pp. 320-4.

¹⁵See S. Fisher-Galati, *Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism, 1521-1555* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1959).

¹⁶See *The Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: 1970), eds., P. M. Holt, A.K.S. Lambton and B. Lewis, pp. 320-3.

the pilgrimage routes to the Holy cities open for all the Muslims in the world. This entailed a worldwide active policy of supporting Muslim countries which were overrun or threatened by the European expansion in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, Indonesia, Africa and the Eurasian steppes (e.g., repulsion of the Spanish reconquista in Tunis, Algeria and Libya in 1520-1555, the expedition to Gujerat in 1538, the promise of technical aid to the sultan of Sumatra and preparations for a campaign against the Muscovites to free the cities of Kazan and Astrakhan which actualized later in 1569). It was during this period that the Uzbek khanates of Central Asia, as a result of the Muscovite expansion, appealed to Süleymân to restore the freedom and safety of their subjects on the pilgrimage and trade routes from Transoxania to the Crimea.

It was on the basis of a worldwide struggle against an aggressive Europe, which was actually an extension of the earlier frontier *gazâ* policy of the Ottomân state, that Süleymân forged his idea of a universal caliphate, or Ottoman world domination. In a pamphlet on the caliphate, Luḫî Paşa, his grand vizier (1539-1541), advocated Süleymân's notion of the revival of the universal caliphate on the basis of his *ğâzî* power and protection of Islam in the world.¹⁷

But how to reconcile all this with the Ottoman policy of warring and eliminating other Muslim dynasties and annexing their territories? In order to live up to their image of protectors of Islam and of Muslims, the Ottomans, ingeniously distinguished between the dynasties and their Muslim subjects, and claimed that the fight was exclusively against the dynasts who either held an oppressive rule (the Mamluks), or tried to impose by force a heresy on their Muslim subjects (the Persians). Following his predecessors, Süleymân too, obtained the written opinion (*ferwâ*) of the religious authorities before his campaigns against Iran. It was asserted that it was actually the caliph's, i.e., Süleymân's obligation to restore the Sharî'a and eradicate the heresy (*rifd u ilhâd*), giving the whole operation the semblance of a true *gazâ* action. In fact, the Ottomans aimed at the overthrow of the Safavids, and establishing their own control over the silk producing provinces of northern Iran (Azerbaijan, Shirvan and Gilan), which were of vital importance for the Ottoman economy and finances.¹⁸ Here too, religious ideology and pragmatic goals were inextricably combined.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 322.

¹⁸Inalcık, "İharîr," Eİİ, s. v.; J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont, "Notes sur une saisie de soies d'Iran en 1518," *Turcica*, 8/2(1976), pp. 237-253.

6. State and Religion

As Süleymân believed he could restore the unity of Islam worldwide through his unmatched power, he also believed it was imperative for him to ensure that absolute rule of the Islamic law in his own lands became a reality. In this task, his source of inspiration and support was Ebû's-Su'ûd, the great Ottoman scholar who wrote a famous commentary of the Qur'an and presided as Şeyhü'l-İslâm (1545-1574) over the entire Ottoman ulema for a long period of time. Süleymân made him his confidant and counsellor, calling him in his old age "my brother in this world and in the other." As will be seen later, Ebû's-Su'ûd became responsible for some fundamental modifications in the Ottoman land and taxation laws, adjusting them according to the shar'î principles formulated by the great imâms of the ninth century while sultanic law-making and bureaucratization underwent considerable development during the same period.¹⁹

Surely, one can speak of this trend as the beginning of a more conservative Sharî'a-minded Ottoman state. Ebû's-Su'ûd's activities included the construction of a mosque in every village and obliging the villagers to conduct their prayers there, so that the heretics were exposed. In the name of the Sharî'a, he condemned heretical sects, thereby, further alienating the Turcomans.

The popular religious orders (*tarikât*) such as the Kâlelerîs, the Haydarîs and the Bektâşîs who were dominant among the Turcoman-Yürük pastoralists — and since the rise of the Safavids (1501) they appeared to be more aggressive than ever — became the most serious challenge to the patrimonial absolute authority of the Ottoman sultan. Under the influence of the Kâlelerî babas, Turcoman-Yürüks in Anatolia, now mostly called *Kızılbaş* under Safavid patronage and the frontier people of the same origin under hereditary begs on the Danube constituted large groups who defied Süleymân in terrible rebellion in 1527. The real issue underlying these eruptions was the social conflict between pastoralist nomads and sedentary society. Expansion of the agriculturist population dependent on the *tîmâr*-holding *sipâhis* was an accelerated process at the expense of the pasturelands of the Turcomans under Süleymân. This situation had resulted from the population explosion (an increase of over 40 percent) during this period. Following the traditions of the Middle Eastern, imperial system, Süleymân's bureaucracy systematically encouraged and supported the agricultural interests operating under a particular agrarian organization (*çifti-hâne* system) against the pastoralists, and showed a vigorous reaction ideologically and militarily against the Turcoman rebels.

¹⁹Inalcık, "Suleiman the Lawgiver and Ottoman Law," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 1 (1969): 105-38; Inalcık, "Kânûn" E12, s.v.

What made the conflict particularly violent was that from the time of 'Osman Gâzi, the Turcoman babas, so powerful on the Ottoman frontier society, continued to claim to be the mentors of the sultans as before.²⁰ Believing in the esoteric Sufi theory of *velâyet* (sainthood), babas, spiritual leaders of the Turcomans, wanted to keep the sultans under their own influence. The chief baba, called the "Pole of the World," was believed to be God's absolute embodiment in the universe, or the Divine Truth (*al-Hakk*), or God's emissary. They believed that he was in control of all things and happenings in this world including the sultan and his deeds. The followers of the babas had a fanatic belief in all these and had no allegiance to the sultan. Baba did not hesitate to use all the symbols of sovereignty, the throne, crown, and scepter, as well as the royal titles of sultan, *hünkâr*, and shah. He claimed that in all decisions, including the military and the political ones, the sultan should consult him and receive his permission. Otherwise, a divine punishment such as defeat, natural disasters, earthquakes, epidemics or famine would befall the land. Not only his immediate followers, but also large masses of the commoners among the settled population believed and showed reverence to the babas in their lifetime, and after a baba's death, a saint cult was formed around his tomb and a religious order was established. This was a very important aspect of Turkish life in the countryside and in towns, which shocked foreign visitors in Süleymân's era and thereafter. Babas and the cult of saints had such a tremendous spiritual social force in this society that the Ottoman sultans felt, by piety or political expediency, compelled to share the general enthusiasm towards them. Following the tradition, each sultan had his own favorite şeyh and maintained or appeared to maintain a close connection with him. But those şeyhs who were accepting the sultan's favors came within the patrimonial control of the sultan. The radical Kâterendî babas, however, never accepted favors and stayed with their *Kızılbâş* as militant leaders of their folk.

For the consumption of the populace, some of the Ottoman sultans such as Murâd I or Bâyezîd II, assumed the role of a *velî* in the popular imagination and their miracles were told in public. Thereby *velî-sultâns* were believed to be followed by all groups in society. Occasionally, Süleymân also is mentioned as the "master in the manifest as well as the unseen world."²¹ But the Safavids in Iran secured a tremendous advantage over the Ottomans when İsmâ'il I (r. 1501-1524) assumed the *wilâya* (*velâyet*), spiritual authority over the Turcomans in the Ottoman Empire.

When Süleymân was a governor in Manisa in his youth, between 1512-1520, he had frequented the convent of the Halveû Şeyh Musâ Muşlihüddîn, also

²⁰İnalçık, "Sultan and Dervish: An Analysis of the Otman Baba Vilâyetnâmesi," Paper read at the Conference on Saints and Sainthood in Islam, San Francisco, April 1987.

²¹Peçevi, vol. 1, p. 3: "zâhirde ve bâında ânâî hükmi revâdur."

known as Merkez Efendî (d. 1552), and had his moments of ecstasy during the rituals. After he became sultan, he continued his close relations with the mystic and appointed him the preacher of the Great Mosque of Istanbul, Ayasofya. It is interesting that Celâlîzâde, a rational bureaucrat and someone close to the sultan, disliked the *şeyh* and did not conceal his feelings in the presence of the sultan. Although Süleymân remained faithful to his old friend Merkez Efendî, who also was a conservative Hâlvetî he never associated himself with esoteric religious orders.²² In his religious policy, Sultan Süleymân took a new orientation by systematically following a puritanical Sunnî policy, and with the support of his Şeyhü'l-İslâm, first Kemâlpâşazâde (1525-1536), and later, Ebû's-Su'ûd, attempted to revise the basic Ottoman institutions in accordance with the Shari'î principles of Islamic religion. Thus, under him, the Ottoman state, abandoning its historically developed eclectic character of a frontier state, became rather worthy successor to the classical Islamic caliphate in its policies, institutions and culture.

C. THE TRANSFER OF THE SOVEREIGN POWER

In Ottoman history, Süleymân's father Selîm I, had given an example by deposing his father Bâyezîd II (r. 1481-1512) who was considered too old and unable to assume the command of the army in the face of external threats. A similar situation came up towards 1553 when the eastern frontier of the empire was again threatened. It is to be remembered that in the Ottoman traditional society, a precedent established a custom and gave validity to a later course of conducts. In 1553, Süleymân was an ailing old man, and his eldest son Muştafâ was regarded as the heir apparent by public opinion. He was particularly popular with the Janissaries and the ulema as a worthy successor to his father.

In fact, there was no succession law governing the inheritance of sultanic authority among the Ottomans; every member of the ruling dynasty had a claim on the right to rule; there existed neither a primogeniture nor a *senioratus* principle of inheritance.²³ According to the old Central Asian Turkic belief, the question as to who was to receive sovereign authority was determined by divine kut (*sa'âda* in Arabic, meaning fortune, felicity). So, human attempts to make laws for the succession to the throne were futile.

Whoever established himself on the throne from among the sons of a deceased sultan was to be obeyed as the legitimate ruler, because his success was

²²On the closing of the *kalenderhânes*, see S. Faroqhi, *Der Bektaschi-Orden in Anatolien* (Vienna: 1981), pp. 39-47.

²³İnalçık, "Osmanlılarda Saltanat Veraseti Usûlü ve Türk Hakimiyet Telâkkisiyle İlgisi," *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 14 (1959), pp. 69-94.

considered as the proof that he was chosen and supported by God. A Byzantine historian Dukas wrote: "Among the Ottomans, whomever kingship passes to, whether it be from father to son, or from brother to brother, in short to whomever fortune aids, the *kuls* give faithful allegiance to his new leader." Even the reigning sultan's arrangements about his succession were disregarded in the face of this ancient belief as seen in Ottoman history down to Süleymân.

Another ancient Turco-Mongol steppe tradition was that the land is the joint possession and inheritance of the Khan family and, accordingly, a division of the country among the members of the dynasty was in order. This old custom "can be linked to the migratory tribal ethos and organization" of the Turco-Mongol peoples.²⁴ Conquered territories were considered the private possession of the ruler and would be divided among the members of the dynasty. This system of appanage, so persistent among the Turco-Mongol states, was practiced from the earliest times by the Ottomans, though it was modified as the state and society expanded and increasingly came under the influence of the sedentary cultures, particularly the Islamic-Iranian. But, for a long time, even under Süleymân, making arrangements for the succession to the throne was regarded as an interference with God's decision and with *kut*. Brothers would sometimes openly oppose the selection of one from amongst them as the heir apparent and rebel. Süleymân was careful not to express his wish in favor of any one of his sons even when he had his preference.

Over time, under the influence of a public opinion which felt no longer strictly bound with the traditions of the pastoralist Turkic background, modifications were introduced. Ottoman civil society, following the Islamic tradition represented by the ulema, was particularly disturbed by the recurrent crises and internecine wars as a result of this Central Asiatic tradition.

Passage of sovereign power to the new ruler was in reality the outcome of the struggle for power between various forces and existing interest groups. The ulema class and the Janissary corps were the most visible of such groups. Though not so visible, the urban population, particularly in the capital city, also influenced the process.

Bâyezîd II came to the throne through the action of a faction supported by the Janissaries. A pacific man by nature, he was praised by bureaucrats as the restorer of the shar'î principles in state policies, and of a good administration, which consolidated the territories conquered by his father, Mehmed the Conqueror. On the other hand, Selîm I, Süleymân's father, who was a restless conqueror, an impatient autocrat, who beat his viziers with his own hands, became sultan only after a long struggle against a faction with the support of the

²⁴Ibid.

Janissaries. Selim had to fight against his rival brothers to seize the throne while prince Süleymân was anxiously awaiting, in his governorship in Caffa, the outcome of his father's struggle. Death for the loser and his sons was an inevitable end. When his own term came, Süleymân was lucky because he was the only son when his father died. But his own sons became restless when he was getting old, and they thought an appointment to a governorship nearest to the capital was a special favor.

While the Ottoman pādîshâh is considered in total control, in actual fact, the bureaucracy surrounded him with rigid principles and rules to maintain the system. In 1581, the historian and statesman 'Alî observed that the bearer of sovereign power had to be alone, that he could not share it with anybody including his own offspring. He writes: "They [the Ottoman sultans] reside all by themselves in a palace like unique jewels in the depth of the oyster-shell, and totally sever all relations with relatives and dependents."²⁵

This situation became dramatically clear in the most pathetic moments of Süleymân's life, when he was told he had to execute his own sons, Muştafâ and Bâyezîd, because the rules of the game required it for the preservation of the unity of power and the salvation of the empire. In this dramatic moment, the father addressed himself to his rebellious son Bâyezîd in these pathetic words:²⁶

"My son do not claim the Sultanate. It is God who gives it to whomever he wishes. God made me shepherd over all these subject people of mine. My only desire is to eliminate the wolf that tries to harm them. God forbid it I intend to kill you without sin from you. Come, do not say you are innocent, confess your sins my son dear to me like my own life."

D. DECISION MAKING IN THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT

In this system of government, the ruler's personal attention to public affairs was considered of crucial importance, and later on, critics attributed the decline to the neglect of this point. Within the bureaucratic process, as well as in the military campaigns, every decision was expressed formally as deriving directly from the person of the sultan. But, of course, since it was impossible for one person to pay attention to every single problem in such a vast empire, the bulk of the business was left in practice to the charge of the bureaucrats, and only the most important political matters, in particular those directly concerning state politics, key appointments, and matters involving the sultan's authority, were

²⁵Tietze ed., II: 22r of text.

²⁶Ş. Turan *Şehzâde Bayezid Vak'ası*, 209-10.

brought to his attention by the grand vizier in a special audience on certain days of the week, or in reports ('*arz* or *telhis*) presented as a rule by the government head. The sultan's order, mostly in hand written form (*hast-ı humâyûn*) is obtained on the most important issues.

To give an example, the appointments of the kadis and the medrese professors were considered one of the most important tasks of the sultan which required his personal attention.²⁷ But the actual procedure was that, the *kâdî 'asker* who was responsible for the small town kadis and the small medreses, periodically made a list of the candidates, the selection of whom was made according to strict rules laid down in the regulations, and submitted to the sultan's approval. The sultan gave his approval following a few stereotyped questions about the list submitted. If any of the appointees caused problems later on, the *kâdî 'asker* was held personally responsible. By an order of Süleymân, the appointments of the higher positions in kadiship or professorship were put under the responsibility of the Şeyhü'l-İslâm who would prepare the list. But it was the grand vizier who would personally submit it to the sultan in the routine audience days. If the sultan had in mind a particular person for an important position, such as that of the *kâdî 'asker*, or the kadiship of great cities, this was decided at the audience.

On the most important issues concerning the future of the dynasty or the state, the strategy to be followed during a major campaign, a high consultative council (*meclis-i meşveret*) was convoked to reach a decision. In accord with a Quranic verse and the Prophet's sayings on the advantages of consultation, such *ad hoc* consultative gatherings were held in Süleymân's time. Although occasionally bold opinions were expressed for the sake of '*Dîn ve Devlet*' (Islam and Islamic state), debates followed, as a rule, a certain routine of patrimonial character leaving the last word always to the sultan and keeping an absolutely consultative character. The composition of the council varied according to the issues to be debated. If it was a war council, the most experienced frontier generals were invited and their opinions bore weight on the decisions. If the issue was of a political nature, the most influential people in office or retirement representing the government, the ulema and the commanders of the standing army were invited, but nobody representing the *re'âyâ*, the Muslim and Christian tax-paying subjects, was present. The *re'âyâ* made their wishes and complaints heard through individual or communal petitions (*rik'a*; '*arz-i hal*'), or by sending a delegation to the imperial council under the sultan.²⁸ In brief, decision making as

²⁷İnalçık, "The *Rûznâmçe* Registers of the *Kadıasker* of Rumeli Preserved in the Istanbul Müftülük Archives," *Turcica*, XVI.

²⁸For the study of '*arz-i mahzar*' see İnalçık, "Right of Complaint: '*Arz-ı Hâl*' and '*Arz-ı Mahzars*,'" *Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 7-8 (1988), pp. 33-54.

a rule, remained personal and patrimonial, something which was unavoidable in this imperial system.

II. SÜLEYMÂN THE LAWGIVER AND "OTTOMAN LAW"

Süleymân was known as *kânûnî* (lawgiver or law-abiding) already in his own time. He is glorified in the inscription of his mosque as "*Nâshiru kawânîn al-Sultâniyye*," or the "Propagator of the Sultanic Laws."²⁹ After his death, bureaucrats, in an effort to restore "the good Ottoman laws," which were believed to be the underpinning of the centralist empire under Süleymân, further enhanced his reputation as a lawgiver and regarded his age as the golden age of law and order. In the famous rescript of 1595, seeking to eradicate the injustices and abuses of power in the empire, Mehmed III declared that "formerly Sultan Süleymân Khan — may God place him in the highest of the paradises — in his days of justice enforcement had imperial law codes (*kânûnnâmes*) written and placed in the courts of the kadis, and since they had complied with its content, no one suffered injustice and oppression and everything was taken care of the best way, and the subjects who are a trust by God lived in peace and prosperity."³⁰

Kânûn, or sultanic law, meant a general ruling emanated from the will of the ruler.³¹ Though independently enacted, a *kânûn*, in principle, had to conform to the Islamic Law and had to deal with a case which was not covered by the Sharî'a. Legists added that *kânûn* should follow a custom or principle generally accepted by the Islamic community as a basis of analogy. This interpretation of *kânûn* is acceptable by Hanafism, the most liberal Islamic school of law.

Turkish rulers in general adopted Hanafism as the officially approved shar'î system in their realm. Under Süleymân, Hanafism was declared, at least in the heartlands of the empire — Anatolia and Rumelia — as the exclusive school of law according to which the kadis had to give their decisions on matters that fell under the jurisdiction of the Sharî'a. Since the good of the Islamic community was the determining factor in making laws outside the Sharî'a, Turkish sultans or their civil bureaucracy employed this principle to promulgate laws and regulations which were considered necessary for the good order of the Islamic state and society. Thus, under the Ottomans, in the first two centuries of the state, a large collection of sultanic laws and an independent legal system emerged, particularly in the sphere of public law.

²⁹For the text of the inscription see C. Çulpan, "İstanbul Süleymaniye Camii Kitabesi," *Kanunî Armağanı* (Ankara: 1970), 293.

³⁰İnalçık, "Adâletnâmeler," p. 105.

³¹See "*Kânûn*," *supra*, n. 19.

The significant place of the sultanic law in the Turkish-Islamic states can be linked to a Central Asiatic tradition.³² This tradition demanded that the imperial law, called in Turco-Mongol *Törü* (Türe) or *Yasa*, be obeyed as a quasi-sacred foundation of the empire, without which even imperial authority lost its legitimation. This was a tradition which was introduced into the Islamic-Iranian state system through the Turkish invasions of the eleventh century, and revived under the Mongols in the thirteenth century. While the Iranian *pâdişâh's* power was considered totally discretionary, and above the law, the Turco-Mongol *hâkân's* authority was believed to be valid as long as it followed the *Törü* or *Yasa*. Among Muslim rulers, however, it was first Mehmed the Conqueror who compiled and officially promulgated sultanic law codes completely independent of the Shari'a. His two codes, one dealing with the state organization, the other with the status and taxation of rural populations (*re'âyâ*) under the *mîrî* system (see infra), were enacted in the form of sultanic orders (*fermân*).

The Conqueror's law code for the *re'âyâ* was widened with later additions and took its final form by 1501. What we know as the "Süleymân's code of law" is actually this code of 1501.³³ The practice was that under each sultan, the head of the Ottoman bureaucracy, the *nişânçı*, revised the law code in the name of the new sultan, making a few necessary changes. Besides, the general code of law, which contained general rulings as well as special cases, was superseded by the codes enacted after each survey for individual sancâks. It was the latter that represented the objective law in force at a given date. General law codes were drawn up for general guidance. However, as indicated above, Süleymân declared his general law code as the compulsory reference in the law courts.³⁴

Under Süleymân, sancâk codes tended to represent a standard type since the basic principles for the peasant status and tax system had attained their final formulation by that time. Several sancâk law codes in a region demonstrated uniformity. The reason was that Ottomans applied to a newly conquered land, the law code of the adjacent sancâk with or without modifications. Thus, the law codes of Western, Central and Eastern Anatolia exhibit common features which were due principally to the particular conditions of the time of the conquest. While, for instance, regulations of Western Anatolia, conquered in the fourteenth century, did not contain the *ispence* tax, those of Eastern Anatolia, conquered in the sixteenth century, did because by this time this particular tax of Balkan origin, had become part and parcel of the Ottoman tax system. As a matter of fact, the Western Anatolian type contained the most archaic features so far as the Ottoman tax system was concerned.

³²Ibid.; *idem*, "Kutadgu Bilig'de Türk ve İran Siyaset Nazariye ve Gelenekleri," *Reşit Rahmeti Arat İçin* (Ankara: 1966), pp. 259-270.

³³Inalcık, "Suleyman the Lawgiver," pp. 117-120.

³⁴See Inalcık, "Adâletnâmeler."

That the sultanic legal system gained its final classical form under Süleymân, is confirmed by the fact that in the second half of the sixteenth century, "Ottoman law" (*kânûn-i 'Osmânî*), was directly applied in the conquered lands (Hungary, Cyprus, Georgia), while in the earlier conquests, Ottoman administration was tolerant toward the pre-conquest laws and customs, thus accepting a period of transition. Moreover, a strong Islamic influence in making sultanic laws conforming to *şer'î* principles, is visible in later codes (the non-Muslims, for example, were now paying one fifth of their agricultural produce as *harâc* instead of one eighth or one tenth.) Also Celâlzâde modified some of the provisions of the general code, thus introducing a more rigid definition of the status groups. All these were in conformity with the dominant trends which arose under Süleymân, i.e., a more strict traditionalism and religious orthodoxy. This general uniformity in law was in accord with the imperial standardization efforts in other areas — in weights and measures, currency, in urban and rural organizations, and in architecture with its classical imperial style.

F. PATRIMONIALISM, BUREAUCRATIZATION AND LAW-MAKING

Obviously, his tutor (*lala*) was responsible more than anyone else for Süleymân's image of the ideal ruler and government. In order to prepare them for their future responsibilities as rulers, it was a custom to send Ottoman princes to provinces as governors when they reached the age of twelve, i.e., adolescence (also see the custom of appanage above). An experienced and trustworthy person was assigned as a *lala* to the prince. Süleymân's tutor was Cezerî Kâsım Paşa, descended from a famous family of bureaucrats of Arab origin, who served the Ottoman sultans as *defterdâr* and *nişancı* for more than a century and were considered the founders of the bureaucratic organization in the Ottoman state.³⁵ Kâsım himself, had been a *nişancı* and vizier under Bâyezid II, and the governor of Caffa. A distinguished bureaucrat and a well-known poet, Kâsım must have had a significant influence on Süleymân's training as an administrator and a ruler in the old Iranian tradition (the Cezerî family had migrated to Iran and Kâsım had lived in Shiraz for a long time). Süleymân respected his tutor. As soon as Süleymân succeeded his father, Koca Kâsım, then a very old man, was made a vizier in the imperial *divân*, and thus he continued to be an advisor to Süleymân.

As Ebû's-Su'ûd was going to be responsible for the bureaucratization of the religious institution (*'ilmiyye*), the same role was assumed by the powerful

³⁵Sehî Beg, *Heşt Bihîşt, The Tezkire of Sehî Beg*, ed. Günay Kut (Cambridge, Mass: 1978), pp. 319-21, 118; for his ancestors see Mecdî's translation of *Al-Şakâ'ik* (Istanbul: 1269/1852), pp. 62-66.

nişancı Celâlzâde in the civil administration.³⁶ Through the laws and regulations enacted under the supervision of Celâlzâde, the basic institutions of the Ottoman imperial system received their final forms and were systematically applied throughout the empire. For example, the *gulâm* or *kul* system, which consisted of employing the sultan's slaves as his personal, trusted agents in the army, government, provincial administration and tax collections, was more methodically applied under the new administration.

In other words, under Süleymân the ruling elite consisting of the sultan's household, and acting in the name of the sultan's absolute power, became more exclusive and more powerful than ever before. The *re'âyâ*, i.e., all those groups who were engaged in economic production and formed the tax-paying masses — agriculturalists, merchants and artisans — were left out of the ruling elite (*'askerî*) more systematically than ever. This means further consolidation of the sultan's monopoly of power, and thus bureaucratization became in fact instrumental in intensifying the patrimonial control of the sultan. This ideal type of the oriental ruler, an autocrat embodying all power and enjoying an absolute control over things and persons in his realm, is believed to have come nearer to reality in the person of Sultan Süleymân. Thus, it is no wonder that theoreticians of absolutism in contemporary Europe turned to him as the most accomplished example of an absolute ruler.³⁷

It is pointed out that in its most advanced form, the absolute patrimonial power led to arbitrariness, putting the autocrat above the existing laws and established customs.³⁸ In fact, Süleymân's career demonstrates the contrasts and contradictions inherent in the system. While Süleymân, on the one hand, tried to show himself as a law-giving and law-abiding ruler, he had, on the other hand, acted as a ruler who was above the rules, just to demonstrate that he was an omnipotent sovereign whose will was not limited.

There occurred actual situations in which Süleymân asserted himself as such an autocrat. For example, he appointed his favorite servant in the Privy Chamber, İbrâhîm, to the grand vizierate (1523-36), in disregard of established law and practice. Ahmed Paşa who was the formal candidate to the position, was sent away by the governorship of Egypt. There, he established relations with rebellious factions and declared his independence.³⁹

³⁶For his biography see, İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, "Tosyalı Celâl-zâde Mustafa ve Salih Çelebiler," *Bellefen* 22 (1958), pp. 391-441.

³⁷For Jean Bodin's opinion in particular see, D.C. Rouillard, *The Turk in French History, Thought and Literature* (Paris: n.d.), pp. 388-395.

³⁸Max Weber, *Economy and Society, An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, vol. 1, eds. G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley: UCP, 1978), pp. 226-235: arbitrary type is called *sultanism*.

³⁹See İnalçık, "Ahmad Pasha," EİZ, s.v.

One section of the polity where the sultan's patrimonial disposition found a particular limitation, was the Islamic institution. In principal, the ulema were against appointments which were not in accordance with the established "path for ulema" ('ilmîyye yarıki). Süleymân, ignoring the rules for promotion, appointed his favorite poet Bâkî, to a religious professorship. The *kâdî 'asker's* reminder of the regulations was overlooked by the sultan. However, Süleymân's act was recorded by the ulema as an unusual and irregular interference.⁴⁰

In an empire where the ruler enjoyed such absolute power, the proper functioning of the system as a whole depended on the personal qualities of the monarch. The authority of a ruler who was not apt to wield such an unlimited power, might actually be appropriated or influenced by a bureaucratic faction or by the ruler's close relatives and favorites in the palace. The analysts of the Ottoman decline point out that under Süleymân's successors, this had indeed been the situation.⁴¹ However, historians question whether or not Süleymân himself was always in full control, and was able to prevent irresponsible people around him, from exploiting his authority for their personal goals and interests. For the Ottoman critics of the seventeenth century, in general Süleymân was conscious of the importance of keeping supreme authority intact. An actual case is mentioned to illustrate this point. Once, Celâlzâde, head of the government bureaus and a favorite, made critical remarks about the grand vizier Sokolli Mehmed Paşa. Süleymân became upset and banned him from his presence.⁴²

Bureaucrat-historians criticized him for being too indulgent toward his beloved wife Hürrem, and his daughter Mihrimân who influenced him to execute his grand vizier İbrâhîm (d. 1536), and later his sons Muştafâ and Bâyezîd, born from other women. An intimate letter⁴³ sent to Süleymân (possibly during his campaign of 1526) reveals how Hürrem tampered with the sentiments of the sultan. She wrote, "when your letter was read, your son Mîr Mehmed and daughter Mihrimâh and myself shed tears in longing for you. Seeing them in tears drives me out of my mind as if there is mourning for a death... You are inquiring about my being hurt by the Paşa (İbrâhîm). When we meet again — God willing — you will hear about it."

After fourteen years of a successful career as grand vizier, İbrâhîm was accused by his enemies of having grown too powerful, and of having coveted the privileges of the sultan. As a proof of this, they mentioned that he called himself

⁴⁰ Aulâî, *Hadâ'ik'âl-İhakâ'ik...* (Istanbul 1268), pp. 183, 243; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmîye Teşkilâtı* (Ankara, 1965)

⁴¹ Ideas common to Selânikî, 'Âlî, Akhişârî, the anonymous author of *Kitâb-i Müstetâb*, Azîz Efendî and others are eloquently reformulated by Koçî Bey, *Risâle*, ed. A.K. Aksüt (Istanbul 1939), pp. 21, 59, 61-4.

⁴² Koçî Beg, *Risâle*, p. 21; cf. 'Âlî, *Nuşhat*, ed. Tietze, I: 130 of text.

⁴³ Published by Ç. Uluçay, *Osmanlı Sultanlarına Aşk Mektupları* (Istanbul: 1950), p. 31.

ser'asker-sultân, or, commander-in-chief and sultan. The fact of the matter was that he was appointed *ser'asker-i sultân*,⁴⁴ or, the commander-in-chief of the sultan with full powers to ensure the success of the military campaign as was a normal assignment in the Ottoman state tradition. In any case, further investigations will show to what extent those factions seeking power could manipulate the sultan for their own purposes.

It was considered the sultan's most important duty, to be present at the imperial council, particularly when the case involved the redress of injustices committed against the re'âyâ or the powerless. In 1527, a religious scholar, Molla Kâbiz, was publicly declaring spiritual superiority (*afdaliyya*) of Jesus Christ over the Prophet Muḥammed. Süleymân who followed the hearing was not satisfied by the *kâdî'asker's* decision to have the Molla executed as a heretic, because the Molla's arguments were not refuted on the basis of the Islamic precepts. Then, upon the sultan's order, the hearing was renewed in the presence of the most authoritative scholar of the time, Şeyḫü'l-İslâm Ibn Kemâl, who listened calmly to the Molla's arguments, and refuted each point on the basis of religious proofs. The Molla stood silent for a moment, not being able to answer Ibn Kemâl's replies. Then Ibn Kemâl asked him: "Now the truth became apparent. Do you have anything more to say, or do you want to give up the error and accept the truth?" But the Molla did not retreat from his belief, and the Şeyḫü'l-İslâm gave his religious opinion that the accused was in error and heresy, and left the legal decision to the *kâdî'asker*. The latter invited him again to renounce his error. The Molla insisted on his belief, and was sentenced to death. Incidentally, this trial reminds us of another famous trial in the presence of the Emperor Charles V a few years earlier which had ended with the death penalty on the man who said he could not contradict the truth which his conscience dictated.

In contrast to the personal, even arbitrary disposition of the *pâdişâh*, the bureaucratization, and thereby the consolidation, of the centralized imperial system made further advances under Süleymân. During the period of decline, bureaucrats, trying to determine the causes of the change, looked back to Süleymân's time as the Golden Age of the empire with all its institutions in their perfect forms *under the guarantee of the imperial laws and regulations*. Thus, together with the Islamic tradition, bureaucracy was considered as some sort of control apparatus modifying the arbitrary power of the Ottoman ruler. Here, the contradiction within the system became apparent from the fact that the same bureaucrats were responsible at the same time, for the reinforcement of the sultan's absolute power. Bureaucrats wielded the sultan's authority in their capacity as his agents and often, the tyranny of the bureaucracy concealed itself behind that of the ruler. Celâlîzâde employed it to create perhaps the most

⁴⁴The diploma of *ser'askerlik* was composed by Celâlîzâde who was a close friend of the grand vizier.

developed form of a bureaucratized centralist empire, and the sultan had to show himself as abiding by the laws and regulations made in his name.

As the main apparatus to keep the sources of revenue and the status of groups under control, the survey and registration (*tahrîr*) system, constituted the underpinning of the Ottoman bureaucracy.⁴⁵ In Ottoman bureaucratic procedure, any new appointment or grant, first had to be checked at the official survey book (*defter*) whether it concerned a *tîmâr*, a kadiship, a tax-farm, or a guild office. Thus, *defters* were kept in various departments of the government for *tîmâr*, *vakîf*, tax-farms, or guilds, ulema, etc. But the most important *defters* were those made by country surveys (*il tahrîri*) which recorded the tax payer's name, each tax with its source and amount, immunities, and land holdings whether they were state- or privately-owned or endowed in each administrative unit. In early *defters*, the *tîmâr*-holders were also listed. Under Süleymân, through *nişancı* Celâlzâde's efforts, surveys and book keeping methods became more sophisticated and reached their perfect forms never surpassed thereafter. Now, more often, separate *defters* were drawn up for *tîmâr*-holders, *vakîfs*, and pastoralists, in addition to the detailed main survey book. *Defter* sizes were enlarged, arrangement and script improved, detailed indexes and other apparatus were added for a faster identification of items.

During Süleymân's time general surveys comprising vast regions were made: the sancâks of Rumelia and Anatolia in 1528, those of Eastern Anatolia in 1540, those of Hungary in 1545-1546, and those of Syria and Palestine in 1525-1526 and 1538. A detailed survey was made for each sancâk immediately after its conquest — the sancâks being the original, integrated administrative-military unit. The direct Ottoman administration was considered as established in an area when a *sancâk begi* and a kadi were appointed and a survey was carried out. An *emîn*, a trustworthy, experienced high official was appointed to carry out the survey. A scribal expert with knowledge of the indigenous tongue accompanied him. As described in a *fermân* containing instructions to the surveyor, a survey in Süleymân's time was carried out as follows:⁴⁶

1. To begin the survey, the *emîn* summoned the local kadi and *tîmâr*-holders in the kadi's area of jurisdiction.
2. Everyone in possession of a public revenue source, — *tîmâr*-holders, possessors of free-hold or *vakîf* lands, tax-farmers — would hand over to the *emîn* the pertinent documents in their bands.

⁴⁵Ö. L. Barkan, "Les grands recensements de la population et du territoire de l'empire ottoman et les registres impériaux de statistique," *Iktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 2 (1940-1941), pp. 21-34, 168-178; İnalçık, *Sûret-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid* (Ankara: 1954), pp. XIII - XXIII.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. XIX.

3. Then the *emîn* would visit each village. Summoning in his presence the elderly, the heads of the households, and the *ûmâr*-holders, he determined the three years' produce of each peasant family and other taxes. The surplus from the amounts of the previous survey were carefully recorded. It was most important that all the possible revenues due to the treasury were brought to light, and that no person or source of revenue was left out.

4. The *ûmâr*-holder had to bring to the presence of the *emîn* all the taxable adult male peasants in his *ûmâr* area. But it was forbidden to register the non-taxable minors and underestimate the revenue due by taxable adults. Those acting otherwise lost their *ûmâr*s. If there was any surplus found, it had to be added to the *ûmâr*-holder's income.

5. Until after the survey was completed and presented to the sultan's chancery, no motion for the appointment of a *ûmâr* was permitted to be made by the surveyor.

As a rule, a regulation (*kânûnnâme*) was, at the same time, prepared by the *emîn* who determined the rates of the taxes, local measurements, payment dates, and solutions for all possible points of dispute between the peasants and the *ûmâr*-holders in this particular *sancâk*. In addition, separate surveys were drawn up for the extraordinary impositions for the government (*avâriz-i divâniyye*), for the non-Muslim poll-tax (*harâc*) and the market dues (*bâc ve tamga*). These were made as a rule by the local kadis.

Of course, the obvious reason for such elaborate surveys was to determine all available sources of public revenue, but as I tried to show before, the surveys also constituted basic reference books in the government offices and were in current use. Changes in *ûmâr*-holding or possession of land were recorded in these *defters*. In addition, the *defter* was a decisive source of reference to settle disputes arising between the various status groups.

Tahrîr and *defter* were the main instruments to maintain the Ottoman centralist imperial system. Bureaucrat-historians after Süleymân's reign would attribute the decline or loss of control by the central bureaucracy of the provinces, to the neglect of the *tahrîr* and the bookkeeping system.⁴⁷

The bookkeeping techniques, the methods used to record thousands of names of individuals and places, in lands as varied as Syria, Albania and Hungary, to arrange and classify them in such a way as to be able to locate them later in a short notice are all quite remarkable. The collection of the Ottoman

⁴⁷See 'Aynî, *Kavâmîn-i Âl-i 'Osmân der Hülâsa-i Defter-i Divân* (Istanbul: 1280/1863), written in 1018/1609.

domesday books should be considered as an achievement as monumental as the Süleymaniye mosque. The great genius behind this grandiose bureaucratic apparatus was the *Ğoca Nişancı Celâlzâde* who perfected the system and created classic examples for future generations.

To a modern liberal mind, however, the negative aspects of the system cannot remain unnoticed. The *tahrîr* was designed to put every individual within the society in a status compartment with defined obligations — taxes and services — to the state. It best characterized the patrimonial-autocratic nature of the Ottoman state. In fact, in the *tahrîr* came into conflict the two fundamental policies of the empire, namely the maximization of the public revenues on the one hand, and on the other, the '*adâlet-istimâlet*'⁴⁸ policy, i.e., not taking taxes beyond the capacity of the individual, and not causing discontent among the *re'âyâ*, the peasants in particular. Nomads who resented being registered and being subject to paying taxes to an assigned government authority — the beg, the tax-farmer or *vakıf* — were totally against the *tahrîr*. For them, registration meant losing their freedom and coming under the constant control of the bureaucratic machine. To spare the peasant population, the main source of public revenue, Ottoman bureaucracy employed nomads in all sorts of heavy undertakings, as a labor pool, in construction, cleaning and safeguarding of roads and bridges, in mining and transportation, and forcing them to deliver animal products to the state.

Due to the inadequate means of communication, however, many subjects managed to escape being recorded in the *tahrîr*, and thus avoid the obligations which were imposed. Abandoning the village individually or *en masse* or hiding during the registration were the most common methods of escape. In rugged highlands, poor and warlike people, the Albanians or the Turcomans had recourse to arms in protest. It was the surveyor's over-assessment of the tax of a certain Süglün-ođlu Ğoca's piece of land and the ill-treatment of the Ottoman authorities that set off the terrible *Kızılbaş* uprising in the large area from Tarsus to Sivas in the summer of 1527. The surveyor and the *kadi* were the first victims. In order to suppress the insurrection, armies had to be sent and final victory was celebrated as a major achievement.

⁴⁸*Istimâlet*, to win over by tolerance and generosity, was one of the fundamental maxims of Ottoman rule, without which we cannot explain the Ottoman expansion and administration.

III. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

1. POPULATION

As first suggested by Fernand Braudel, and later documented by the late Ömer Lütü Barkan, the Ottoman empire shared the universal population explosion of the sixteenth century.⁴⁹ Hypotheses giving priority to climatic changes, biological mutation or economic expansion with improved worldwide communication, are suggested as being responsible for this widespread phenomenon. In any case, in the sixteenth century, in the western half of the Mediterranean, Braudel finds the population doubled, with a rapid increase in the first half of the century.

Barkan, using Ottoman surveys for taxation, finds about two million taxable households in Asia Minor, Ottoman Rumeli, Syria and Palestine for the period 1520-1535. His estimate of the non-taxable population not included in the surveys is another one million households. Using a coefficient of five per household, he obtains a population of 15 million for the entire population in the aforementioned territories during the first decade of Süleymân's reign. His calculation of population growth being about sixty percent, the population of the same regions gives a population figure of 24 million at the turn of the century. Adding the newly conquered lands under Süleymân, he suggests a population of about 30 million for the whole empire. Braudel's estimate was between 22-25 million. Barkan also makes suggestions on the social structure of this population.

A small percentage, less than ten percent, lived in the cities, although the urban population growth rate was higher, about 83%, during the same period. The Muslim pastoralist population was quite sizeable. In Anatolia it consisted of about 16% of the entire population. Its low rate of increase of 38% against the average rate of increase of 60% is explained by the accelerated settlement of the pastoralists during this period. In absolute figures, there were 160,564 pastoralist households in Asia Minor in the period 1520-1530, while the Christian pastoralists of the Balkans, called Eflâk, numbered 34, 970 households in 1540.

The breakdown of the Balkan population in terms of religion gives 195,000 Muslim households in contrast with 863,000 Christian households. In other words, in the period of 1520-1535 one fifth of the Balkan population was Muslim.

As Barkan himself admits, all these figures are only tentative, because of the particular character of the Ottoman fiscal censuses. But still, it is possible to

⁴⁹See my "Impact of the *Annales* School on Ottoman Studies and New Findings." *Review*, vol. 1, 3/4 (1978), pp. 71-80.

assert that high population growth was an undeniable fact during Süleymân's reign. A closer examination of the populations of certain regions, Syria and Palestine by B. Lewis, A. Cohen, and A. Bakhit; of Anatolia by M. Cook, H. İslamoğlu, L. Erder and S. Faroqi, seems to confirm this hypothesis.

As for the socio-economic changes during this period, as related to the population growth, we observe the following developments. In general the studies mentioned above show that after a period of stagnation or decline immediately following the conquest, a period of boom in the economy and the population began, which lasted to the 1550's.

An important development is a dramatic extension of the cultivated lands in the empire. Surveys made under Süleymân indicate that extensive amounts of new arable land was put under cultivation during this time. The following is an example of this development.

Sirem (Syrmia) was devastated and depopulated particularly during the period 1521-1526.⁵⁰ When it was annexed in 1526, the Ottomans encouraged settlers, through tax exemptions, to come and found villages. But we learn from a report of 1578,⁵¹ that at this time there were still vast tracks of unsettled arable land (*ifrâzât*). Also, peasant families in the existing villages were in small numbers and the land in each peasant's possession was much larger than the amount allowed under the law. In addition, they claimed exclusive rights to cultivate the unsettled lands in the vicinity while private persons were proposing to bring peasant families and settle. The surveyor asked to be authorized by the sultan, to measure and delimit the lands, so that new family farms could be created on the surplus land (*ifrâz*). One reason for the frequent *tahrîrs* under Süleymân, was such resettlements and the expansion of agriculture — a movement which paralleled the population explosion.

Agricultural expansion may explain the great quantity of surplus wheat in the Levant, and the massive exports of cheap grain to Italy during the Turkish wheat boom in the 1548-1564 period. Here the question is whether the boom was due to a long-term economic development or to occasional factors. However, we have to keep in mind that the increase in cultivated land can, at the same time, be both the cause and the effect of population growth. What is to be noted is that the state was actively and directly involved in the growth of agrarian economy through the systematic application of its *re'âyâ-çiftlik* (see *infra*) and settlement policy. However, we should also consider the fact that the state's direct interest in this matter was fiscal and not economic. The concern of the Ottoman bureaucrats was to create new sources of revenue for the treasury, or for

⁵⁰B. McGowan, "Sirem Sancığı Mufassal Tahrir Defteri, (Ankara: 1983), pp. LVI-LXI.

⁵¹Barkan, "Defter-i Hakâni" *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, vol. 2-2, p. 230.

the *timâr* system. The idea of a national, global economic development was a totally anachronistic notion for the sixteenth century Ottoman empire. Although the expansion of cultivated lands is an undeniable fact, it appears that it did not keep pace with the population growth.

B. POPULATION PRESSURE

Starting from the middle of the sixteenth century, a series of adverse developments, particularly food shortages affecting urban populations, have been interpreted as signs of population pressure in the Ottoman Empire. From 1565 onwards, the Ottoman government put regular prohibitions on wheat exports, with the result that Italy turned to the northern countries for massive wheat imports after 1594.⁵² After 1565, Ottoman sources witness recurrent shortages in western Anatolia, the main source of the wheat exported to Italy. Akdağ and Barkan share the theory that high prices offered by Western nations and extensive contraband were the real causes of the wheat shortages in this period, i.e., that the shortages were due to an external factor rather than a real disparity between population and economic resources within the empire. A close examination of the problem through the Ottoman *tahrîr* surveys suggests a real population pressure, resulting from the fact that "the population growth was more rapid than the extension of cultivation," as Michael Cook concluded in his *Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia*.⁵³ Cook also observed substantial diminution in the size of the average peasant family farm (*re'âyâ-çiftlik*). The dramatic increase in the proportion of unmarried adult males in the villages which were studied was also taken as a proof of the population pressure. However, for a definite answer, Cook also points out the statistical inadequacy of the Ottoman surveys as well as the lack of information on the actual change in the agricultural methods utilized by Ottoman farmers. Recent studies on village population in various regions demonstrate an exceptional increase and confirm our general conclusion.⁵⁴ In any case, demographic agrarian expansion during Süleymân's reign signified a major economic development, the evidence of which is the great amount of *ifrazât*, or new lands added to agriculture in the successive surveys.

Other important social and economic changes in the empire during this period can be summarized as follows.

⁵²Inalcık, "Impact," pp. 80-83.

⁵³London: 1972, pp. 10-11.

⁵⁴See Inalcık, "Impact," pp. 86-90.

First, all state services, particularly the timariot army and navy expanded and improved, and the patronage of art flourished.⁵⁵ Second, urbanization made rapid headway under Süleymân. According to Barkan's calculations, while the general rate of population increase was about 60 percent, it reached 83 percent in the cities. Population pressure in the countryside is suggested as one reason for the migration from rural areas to towns. It coincided with the relaxation of the laws prohibiting the peasant to leave his home and the *tîmâr*-holder for the town. As is well known, in order to preserve the specific agrarian and tax system, Ottoman laws in general made a legal distinction between the *şehirli* (town dweller) and the *re'âyâ* (peasant) as distinct status groups. A *tîmâr*-holder was authorized to bring back a peasant to his home village from his place of immigration within fifteen years. Now the time period was reduced to ten years. Besides, the indemnification of the taxes due to the *tîmâr*-holder was easier to meet under the new economic conditions. In general, the growing cities became more and more attractive for the rural unemployed. Already under Süleymân, measures were taken to check the rural emigration.⁵⁶ On the other hand, Süleymân improved the living conditions in the cities, and in particular, gave attention to the water supply system. Architects and experts from his water supply division (*su-yolcuları*) were sent to such cities as Jerusalem and Mecca to construct waterways and aqueducts which are still in use today. In addition, the religious endowment system was the main mechanism of building hospices, hospitals and other facilities in the cities.⁵⁷

Third, the rural unemployed could also become the source of discontent and intermittent brigandage and rebellions in the provinces.⁵⁸ We find them as mercenaries under the names of *yevmlü*, or *sekbân*, or *şarıca*, who formed or joined *Celâli* brigand bands once unemployed, or took part in the uprisings which became widespread in the second half of the sixteenth century.

It is suggested that large numbers of unemployed peasant youths joined organizations or created their own to fall upon and plunder villages and towns throughout Anatolia. First we find them joining the *yevmlü* groups who played an important role in swelling the ranks of the troops of rival *şehzâdes* (princes) during the reign of Süleymân;⁵⁹ then, we see them among unruly *şöfta* (*şâhite*)

⁵⁵Construction of the Süleymaniye complex cost 897,350 gold florins, or 53,841,000 silver *ağçe*. This was about one tenth of the public revenues (in 1527-1528). One year's revenues including the revenues assigned to *tîmârs* and *evkâf* amounted to 537,929,006 *ağçe*; see Ö. L. Barkan, "H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Maliye Yılına ait Bütçe Örneği," *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 15 (1953-1954), p. 277.

⁵⁶See, İnalçık, "İstanbul," EİZ, s. v.

⁵⁷For the vakıfs established under Süleymân I, see *İstanbul Vakıfları Tahrir Defteri*, eds. Ö. L. Barkan and E.H. Ayverdi (İstanbul: 1960).

⁵⁸M. Akdağ, *Türkiye'nin İktisadî ve İctimai Tarihi*, vol. 2 (Ankara: 1971).

⁵⁹Turan, *Şehzâde Bayezid Vak'ası*.

bands, or the provincial medrese undergraduates who were mostly of peasant origin;⁶⁰ later on, during the Austrian wars in the last decade of the sixteenth century, among the thousands of *sekbân* and *şarıca* mercenaries who turned into the brigand bands known as the *Celâli* and wreaked havoc throughout Anatolia. At the root of all these ruinous eruptions in Anatolia is found the disparity between population and economic growth.

C. THE PEASANT FAMILY FARM (RE'AYA-ÇİFTLİK) SYSTEM

The survey system was designed to maintain a specific agrarian system under state control to serve both the peasant family production as well as the imperial polity. *Tahrîr* was an instrument of control and supervision in the hands of the central bureaucracy, to ensure that the peasant family farm system remained the dominant form of agricultural production. Since taxes were determined and registered on the basis of units called *çift* or *çiftlik* and on peasant families, the surveys were relatively easy to carry out, which spared the administration to engage in the extremely difficult and unpractical cadastral surveys. But due to the fact that the whole imperial system rested on the *tahrîr* and on the maintenance of these units, the central bureaucracy did not permit changes in them, and clung to a rigid system. Under Süleymân, through his bureaucracy's efforts, the system attained its most developed forms, and was most systematically implemented. Süleymân's reign saw indeed the apex of an empire based on family units, or the *re'âyâ-çiftlik*s, in its rural economy and taxation. Seen in this perspective, Süleymân's empire can be considered as a perfect example of the traditional peasant empire.

The name "peasant empire" is used in the sense that the imperial autocracy was justified and employed for the maintenance of free peasant family farms against tendencies to bring them under the control and the exploitation of a class of local landowners. In discussing above the concept of state, it was made sufficiently clear that this was the avowed ideology of the empire. Once, in a private gathering, Süleymân reportedly asked: "Who do you believe is our benefactor (*veli-ni'met*) in this world?"⁶¹ The unanimous answer was of course: "You, Your Majesty." Süleymân corrected them, saying "no, gentlemen, our benefactor is the peasant; he forgets his own comforts for the sake of producing food for all of us." A parallel controversy is to be found in Islamic works on ethics and politics, as to whether crafts or agriculture is more important for society, and some granted the first place to agriculture.

⁶⁰M. Akdağ, "Medreseli İsyanı," *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, vol. 11 (1949/50), pp. 361-387.

⁶¹Cited by Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 2 (Ankara: 1964), p. 420.

The state's role and its justification is, of course, always open to debate. While one school of thought does not see any difference, whether the "feudal" appropriation of surplus product was made by the local feudal lord or by the state, a second interpretation is that, under the medieval conditions of agrarian production, the latter was the ideal symbiosis between the protective political power and the direct producers.⁶²

Just as the Ottomans considered the craft guild system as the fundamental institution of the city, they regarded the family labor farm system, *re'âyâ-çiftlik*, or *çift-hâne*, as the foundation of agricultural production and of rural society. What then is the *çift-hâne* which dominated the Ottoman countryside? First, let us recall that in the Ottoman domesday books, the registered peasantry was divided into categories as *çift*, *nîm-çift*, *bennâk*, *bîve*, *ğara* or *caba*; and the unregistered *re'âyâ (hâric-ez-defter)* was treated as an independent category. Although this seems to be simply a fiscal arrangement, it was actually based on the economic potential of various groups in the rural society. The normal unit, the *çift*, was a mature peasant family in possession, by a *tapu* (lease), of a certain amount of arable land and the two oxen to cultivate it. The size of his piece of land called *ra'iyyet çiftliği* as against the *ekâbir çiftliği* (absentee large landowner), varied with the fertility of the soil, from 50 to 150 *dönüm*, or from about 5 to 15 hectares. The head of the household was to pay the full "peasant" (*ra'iyyet*) tax called *çift-resmî* which originally corresponded to seven labor services due to the landlord. The rate of it was one gold coin or its equivalent in silver coins.

Now, a peasant who had in his possession half of this was considered *nîm-çift* and had to pay half of the *ra'iyyet* tax. Thus, this was a peasant tax for the combined assets of family labor and land. If the land was less than half of a *çiftlik*, then the labor factor was taken as a basis for the assessment of the tax. If the peasant was married, in other words, if he represented a family labor unit with wife and children, he paid 9 *ağçe* as a rule; if he was unmarried, he only paid 6 *ağçe*. A widow in possession of a *çiftlik* still paid the lowest rate, because in order to maintain the *çiftlik*, she had to hire hands until her children grew up and took over the responsibility. The *bennâk* and *ğara* peasants were considered *yöksul*, poor, possessing little or no land.

During the Byzantine era, the peasantry was categorized in the same way, but it was often possession of traction power, oxen, rather than the size of the land, which determined the peasant tax. Under the Ottoman practice, the land was taken as a basis, apparently because the peasant was supposed to hire oxen if he did not have any of his own.

⁶²See the preface to the second edition of my *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age* (New York: A.D. Caratzas, 1989).

One of the crucial points for the imperial bureaucracy was the impartibility of *çiftlik*s. When a *çiftlik* owner died, his sons inherited the possession rights and held the land jointly. The law encouraged, by reward, the integration of *çiftlik*s that were broken up. The impartibility of the *çiftlik* was not only based on the administration's concern about the tax fixed per unit, but at the same time, it was considered necessary to maintain the family labor unit which was thought to be crucial for the system.

As a rule, the *çift* household was a typical patriarchal family, in which the father organized and controlled the production. However, wherever the basic assets, that is, the arable land and the oxen, were concerned, custom demanded that he obtain the accord of the entire family. The size of the average peasant family household was estimated by Barkan as five for the entire empire while it seems to be less than that in many cases.⁶³

I call this agrarian organization, the *çift-hâne* system, because the normal and basic components of the unit were the family and the *çift* whether it was interpreted as a pair of oxen or a land workable by a pair of oxen. The *hâne*-family was considered perhaps more important in the system because it provided the labor unit, and the size of the capital assets were determined by it. Land and animal power were of the size to maintain an average peasant family under normal conditions.

It is obvious that for the maintenance of the system, a constant supervision over changing conditions was necessary, particularly as far as land and family labor were concerned. It was this necessity that demanded the state's *dominium eminens*, or *rakabe*, on agricultural land and the restrictions on the peasant's movement. The peasant was considered 'free' as long as he organized his economic activities independently, and nobody was permitted to impose forced services on him, or his family, beyond those defined in the regulations and laws. Even the sultan's authority was limited on this matter, theoretically, by the strength of the 'good old custom,' and practically, by the flight of peasant families when they were demanded to perform forced labour beyond a degree which was economically permissible. State ownership of land was a prerequisite of the system and it was applied exclusively on the land in possession of peasant families designed for grain production. The change in the use of such land was also prohibited.

All these principles were most systematically applied under Süleymân, which consequently made his reign the culminating point in the development of this specific system based on the *çift-hâne* in the agrarian production and rural social organization in the history of the Ottoman empire. What was the

⁶³See İnalcık, "Impact," p. 80.

economic end result of this agrarian system for the average peasant household? Bruce McGowan's careful examination of food supply and taxation of the average peasant household in the four Ottoman *sancâks* of Sirem, Segedin, G'ula and Semendire in the period 1568-1579, suggests that when every source of income is calculated in terms of a natural unit, the kilogram of wheat equivalent, the average peasant household looks quite prosperous.⁶⁴ "Per capita food production averages are well above the theoretical level regarded as the threshold of modern European agriculture."⁶⁵ The annual production was well above the subsistence level (about 300 kg of economic grain). The peasants could "sell off a goodly proportion of their surpluses in the market."⁶⁶ Another observation is that in these four *sancâks*, the taxes in cash, compared to those in kind, amounted to fifty per cent or more. This means that quite an important part of the agricultural produce was converted to cash in the market.

⁶⁴"Food Supply and Taxation on the Middle Danube," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 1 (1969), pp. 139-196.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, Graph 1, p. 145.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, Graph 5 B, p. 176.

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF AN EMPIRE: OTTOMAN STATE UNDER SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT

Fatma Müge GÖÇEK

In 1547, when Süleymân the Magnificent corresponded with the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, he addressed him as "the *King* of the province of Spain" rather than "*Kayser* (Caesar)," the Ottoman term for emperor. He referred to himself as Sultan Süleymân Hân bin Selîm Hân bin Bâyezîd Hân, the *Pâdişâh* "who commands the caesars of the era and crowns the emperors of the world."¹ This exchange, with its precise use of titulature, signifies the elements that socially constructed the Ottoman empire; it reveals the three traditions of universal sovereignty with which the Ottomans associated themselves which. Among the titles of Süleymân the Magnificent, *Hân* symbolized the Central Asian tradition and *Sulţân* the Islamic one. *Pâdişâh* referred to the Ottoman imperial synthesis which emerged under Süleyman's rule to give new meaning to the term as the *Ottoman* emperor.² The title *Kayser* which Süleymân abstained from bestowing upon Charles V indicated the Ottoman association with the Eastern Roman claims to universal sovereignty. Süleymân, as the descendant of Mehmed II, the conqueror of the Eastern Roman Empire, rejected the claims of Charles V to be the Roman emperor.

This paper employs Ottoman titulature as a vantage point to study the Ottoman construction of an empire under Süleymân the Magnificent. First, it analyzes the three traditions of universal sovereignty — the Central Asian, Islamic, and Eastern Roman — which constructed the Ottoman concept of empire. It then discusses the Ottoman conceptions of absolutism and justice, the two significant elements that differentiated the Ottoman imperial tradition from its predecessors. The paper concludes with an analysis of the cultural symbol which reproduced the Ottoman concept of empire.

¹ See H. İnalcık "Osmanlı-Rus Rekabetinin Menşei ve Don-Volga Kanalı Teşebbüsü (1569)" *Belleteri* XII, p. 349, and H. İnalcık *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age* p. 57.

² See H. İnalcık "Osmanlı Padişahı" *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* XIII/2, pp. 68-79.

I. THE FORMATION OF THE OTTOMAN CONCEPT OF EMPIRE: THE HERITAGE

The Ottoman dynasty structured its concept of empire and acquired its drive for expansion from the three traditions of universal sovereignty it came into contact with throughout its history. The Central Asian tradition influenced the nature of Ottoman rule, particularly its state structure and administration. The subsequent development of an Indo-Iranian Islamic imperial tradition around the possible universal sovereignty of Islam informed the concept of the Ottoman ruler, particularly the supreme nature of his rule. The interaction in Asia Minor with the Byzantine Empire first as an adversary and then as the successor advised the Ottoman dynasty of the Eastern Roman imperial tradition and its European claims; the frequent Ottoman campaigns to the West reflected the Eastern Roman aspect of this universal sovereignty.

THE CENTRAL ASIAN TRADITION

The Central Asian association with the title emperor dates back to Çingiz Hân and Oğuz Hân. The ancient Turkic epic *Oğuznâme* depicts Oğuz Hân as the first world emperor who conquered the world with his six sons; the Ottomans trace their lineage to the three older sons who inherited the claims to a world empire.³ Çingiz had regarded himself as the emperor of the world, one who had been sent to that position by the heavens. Later, according to the Chinese sources, Temuçin was given the title emperor, "Çingiz," by the assembly he had gathered in 1206, whereby he regarded himself, in contrast to the Chinese emperor, as the emperor of the nomads.⁴ According to both of these depictions, the ruler was imbued with sacredness through his association with the eternal powers. He ruled the earth with the powers given to him by the eternal sky. His sovereignty on earth was as vast and broad as the ocean; like the ocean, he touched and ruled all the shores of the world: he was the world emperor. He descended from god because his mother as a princess who was impregnated by a light descending from the sky.⁵ The pre-Islamic beliefs of the Turks shaped this naturalistic image of the sovereignty of the Turkic ruler and the expanse of his rule.

The creation myths of subsequent empires all drew upon the legitimation offered by this sacred origin: the founders of both the Seljuk and Ottoman dynasties had dreams that capture this sacred association which promised them a

³See H. İnalçık "Osmanlılar'da Saltanat Veraseti Usulü ve Türk Hakimiyet Telâkkisiyle İlgisi" *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 1959, pp. 77-8, and O. Turan *Türk ÇiTan Hakimiyeti Mefkûresi Tarihi* p. 147.

⁴See O. Turan "Çingiz Adı Hakkında" *Bellekten* 1942, p. 267.

⁵See H. İnalçık "Osmanlılar'da Saltanat Veraseti Usulü ve Türk Hakimiyet Telâkkisiyle İlgisi" *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 1959: XIV/1, pp. 74-5, and O. Turan "Çingiz Adı Hakkında" *Bellekten* 1942: V/18, pp. 270-5.

world empire.⁶ Seljuk's father Dukak dreamt of three trees growing out of his navel, branching out to spread the world empire. 'Osmân Gâzî (1281-1324), the founder of the Ottoman dynasty, had a similar dream with an additional Islamic component. He, after having shown utmost respect to the Qur'an while a guest of Sheikh Edebali, dreamed that a moon emerged from the Sheikh and entered 'Osmân's breast whereupon an enormous tree ascended to branch out and cover the world. The Sheikh interpreted the dream as foreshadowing the future world empire to be founded by the dynasty of 'Osmân Gâzî, and gave him his daughter Mal Hâtûn in marriage.

These myths of origin and the claims of sovereignty they offered created conflicts among different dynasties in Asia Minor. In 1040, the Seljuk ruler Tuğrul Bey sent an envoy to the Ghaznavid sultan informing him that while the sultan descended from slaves (*kölezâde*), Tuğrul Bey, who could trace his lineage to Oğuz Hân, had come from a dynasty of rulers.⁷ In the fourteenth century, both the Ottomans and Timur and his sons claimed descent from the Central Asian dynasty of world emperors. Timur wanted to legitimate his rule of the area by stating that he, as a descendant of "a lineage of rulers going back to Çingiz Han," had a natural right to rule whereas Bâyezîd I (1389-1403) who was "a mere frontier lord" did not.⁸ Bâyezîd countered this assertion by producing a genealogy to the ancient Turkish hân of Central Asia, claiming descent from Oğuz Hân, thereby holding on to his right of rule. This was the only serious challenge to the Ottoman appropriation of the Central Asian heritage which structured the Ottoman imperial synthesis through its conceptions of sovereignty, legislation, and state formation. Symbolically, the Ottomans kept drawing on the legitimation of this tradition in their accession ceremonies; the girding of the sword of 'Osmân to the newly established ruler was one such Central Asian practice adopted by the Ottoman dynasty.

The Ottoman attempts to establish this Central Asian conception of universal sovereignty are evident in the endeavors of Mehmed II (1444-1446, 1451-1481) and Süleymân I, the Magnificent (1520-1566). Giacomo de Languischi recounted that Mehmed II had stated there must be one world empire, with one faith and one sovereignty⁹. Already possessing the heritage of the Central Asian and Islamic traditions of universal sovereignty, and having just conquered the Eastern Roman Empire, Mehmed II undoubtedly saw himself as

⁶See H. Inalcık "Osmanlılar'da Saltanat Veraseti Usulü ve Türk Hâkimiyet Telâkkisiyle İlgisi" *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 1959: XIV/1, pp. 77-8, and O. Turan *Türk Cihan Hakimiyeti Mefkûresi Tarihi* 1978, pp. 150-2.

⁷See O. Turan, *Türk Cihan Hakimiyeti Mefkûresi Tarihi* 1978, p. 269.

⁸See H. Inalcık, "Osmanlılar'da Saltanat Veraseti Usulü ve Türk Hâkimiyet Telâkkisiyle İlgisi" *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* XIV/1: 1959, pp. 77-8, and H. Inalcık *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age* 1973, p. 56.

⁹See H. Inalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age* 1973, pp. 57-8.

the most likely candidate for such a position. In constructing his rule, Mehmed II was also influenced by¹⁰ Trapezuntios who called him the Roman emperor, and Pope Pius II who promised to make him, if he accepted Christianity, the most powerful emperor of the world and bestow upon him the title of "the emperor of the Greeks and the East". The Ottoman chronicler Kemâlpasazâde also mentioned that Mehmed II sought after world sovereignty. The establishment of an Ottoman navy for sea conquest supports this claim; Mehmed II's campaign against Otranto was no doubt the first step in his conquest of Rome a plan aborted upon his death. The subsequent conquest East and West of his great grandson Süleymân I to establish sovereignty over the seas by conducting campaigns to the Indian Ocean signify the continuation of this notion of universal sovereignty.

THE ISLAMIC TRADITION

The title *sultan*, meaning authority or government in Arabic, had become a common designation employed by independent Muslim rulers in the tenth century. It became an official title in the eleventh century as the Seljuks redefined it as the supreme political and military head of Islam.¹¹ Sultan then turned into the usual Islamic title of sovereignty. The Ottoman attempts to use this title increased as they fought Christian Byzantium and slowly expanded beyond the control of the weakening Seljukid state. Orhan Gâzi (1324-1360) was the first Ottoman ruler to bear the title of *sultan* and to strike the first Ottoman coins as a token of independence. His son Murad I (1360-1389) carried the titles *hüdâvendigâr* (emperor), and *sultân-i â'zâm* (the most exalted sultan).¹² Yet it was with the rule of Bâyezîd I that the Ottoman dynasty attempted to have the Abbasid Caliph in Cairo formally recognize the title of *sultân ar-Rum*, the sultan of the Byzantine lands. After his rule, as the power of the Ottoman dynasty expanded over Muslim lands, the title sultan became an integral part of its titulature. The conquest of Constantinople had made Mehmed II the most eminent Muslim ruler; when his grandson Selim I (1512-1520) expanded the Ottoman boundaries to cover Syria, Egypt and Arabia, the Ottoman rulers became the protectors of all Muslims.

The Seljuk redefinition of sultan differentiated the political and military head of Islam from its religious head, associated with the title *halife*, the deputy (of God). The title *halife* had initially signified authority deriving directly from God, one supreme Muslim ruler above all.¹³ After the destruction of the caliphate in Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258, the title lost its significance and came to be applied to all those Muslim rulers who acted to protect Islam; its real

¹⁰See H. İnalcık "Mehmed II" in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* 1957, volume 7, pp. 513-4.

¹¹See B. Lewis *The Political Language of Islam* 1988, pp. 51-2.

¹²See H. İnalcık *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age* 1973, pp. 55-6.

¹³See B. Lewis *The Political Language of Islam* 1988, pp. 46-7.

power was replaced by the title of sultan. Selim I thus became the protector of Mecca and Medina, and the guardian of the pilgrimage routes. By the era of Süleymân the Magnificent, the Ottoman usage of the title Caliph of the Muslims was accepted by all. The institution of the caliphate had lost its power by then. The classical definition of the caliphate in terms of lineage became replaced by action in the name of Islam, Süleymân could therefore claim the right to the title as a protector and defender of Islam. Nevertheless, another title Süleymân employed, *halife-i râ-i zemîn* (the caliph of the world), suggested world sovereignty, this time articulated in Islamic terms.¹⁴ Symbolically, the Ottomans kept drawing on the legitimation of this Islamic tradition in their accession ceremonies. For example, each new sultan visited the tomb of Eyyüb Enşârî, a Companion of the Prophet Muḥammad. After 1520, the Ottoman accession ceremony occurred, in the Topkapı Palace at the room where the holy relics of the Prophet Muḥammad (brought to Constantinople from Egypt by Selim I and considered to be the symbols of the caliphate) were kept. The accession contained, in the Islamic tradition, a *bi'at* ceremony whereby the Ottoman officials and the military swore allegiance to the new sultan.

THE EASTERN ROMAN TRADITION

The title "emperor" originated in the Latin *imperium*, from *imperare*, to command, indicating the sovereign or supreme monarch of an empire. It designated the sovereigns of the ancient Roman Empire. After 27 B.C., *imperator* was regularly adopted by the Roman ruler as a forename and gradually came to apply to his office. The spread of Christianity affected the sovereignty of the emperor. In medieval Europe, Pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne, the King of the Franks and the Lombards, emperor in Rome. Henceforward, until the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453, there were two emperors in the Christian world, the Byzantine and the Western. The title empire thus implied sovereignty over the Christian world, one that was fully supported by the sovereignty of God.

With the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, the term emperor was attributed to Mehmed II. Because of the Greek Orthodox and the Roman Catholic division within Christianity, the Greeks saw Mehmed II as their emperor and as the true heir of Rome and the Western world. Mehmed II in turn assumed the former Byzantine capital as the capital of his empire, appointed the Greek Orthodox and Armenian patriarchates, and beckoned the Chief Rabbi to reside in his capital. His employment of the sons of Greek notables in the palace his use of Greek in correspondence, his constant interest in Christianity and in European

¹⁴See H. İnalcık "Osmanlı Padişahı" *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* XIII/2:1958. pp. 70-1.

culture¹⁵ can be interpreted as indications of Mehmed II's interest in sustaining the Eastern Roman tradition of sovereignty over the civilized world.

These three traditions of universal sovereignty and the titles associated with them thus structured the Ottoman concept of rule and produced a new title that the Ottomans themselves gave meaning to: *padişah*, the supreme shah.¹⁶ This term was first attributed to Mehmed II who through his conquest of Constantinople, combined the Central Asian, Islamic and Eastern Roman traditions within himself. Even though Mehmed II gave meaning to this title through his conquests, it was only by the era of Süleymân I the geographical boundaries and the wealth of the Ottoman state reached world empire heights to signify what a *padişah* needed to strive for in order to merit the title. The care the Ottomans took in using this title became evident¹⁷ during the Zsitva-Torok Treaty negotiations in 1606. These almost failed because of the Ottoman resistance to concede the title to the Holy Roman Emperor (whom they had addressed instead as the King of Vienna). Even then, the Ottoman chronicler Re'isü'l-Küttâb Hüseyn remarked that he fervently wished the Ottomans would ultimately "wipe the name of Caesar from the surface of the world."¹⁸ Yet the Ottoman imperial synthesis extended beyond the symbol of a new title. The Ottomans socially constructed an empire that, in addition to drawing upon these traditions, contained two new concepts of absolutism and justice which differentiated the Ottoman empire from its predecessors.

II. THE ELEMENTS OF THE OTTOMAN CONCEPT OF EMPIRE: ABSOLUTISM AND JUSTICE

Most studies of empires¹⁹ focus on the political conditions that structure an empire. An empire comprises "wide, relatively highly centralized territories with an autonomous center which contains both the person of the emperor and the central political institutions".²⁰ An empire differs from other societal formations in that it is a *political* system; of the ideological, economic, military

¹⁵See H. İnalcık "Mehmed II" in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, volume 7, 1957, pp. 532-35.

¹⁶See H. İnalcık "Osmanlı Padişahı" *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* XIII/2: 1958.

¹⁷See B. Lewis *The Political Language of Islam* 1988, p. 98.

¹⁸See O. Turan *Türk Cihan Hâkimiyeti Mefkûresi Tarihi* 1978, p. 358.

¹⁹See, for example, M. Weber *Economy and Society* [1978], S. Eisenstadt "Empires" in *The New International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* 1968, P. Anderson *Lineages of the Absolutist State* 1974, R. Bendix *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule* 1978, J. Kautsky *The Politics of Aristocratic Empires* 1982, and M. Doyle *Empires* 1986.

²⁰See S. Eisenstadt "Empires" in *The New International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* 1968, p. 41.

and political components of power,²¹ the political dominates the other three. This political formation is also unique in that the centralization and monopolization of political power and resources are necessary conditions for its construction.²² This sociological definition is mostly informed by the context of the European historical experience and the analyses of Max Weber.²³

Max Weber defined empire with respect to the type of political authority it entailed. According to him, the Ottoman empire would be a type of traditional authority, namely sultanism — a form of patrimonialism. Traditional authority referred to a political system legitimated by the sanctity of age-old rule and powers. Patrimonialism, and its extreme case, sultanism, emerged when this domination developed an administration and a military force which were the personal instruments of the ruler. Patrimonialism transformed into sultanism when the ruler broadened the range of his arbitrary power at the expense of tradition.²⁴ This emphasis on arbitrary power formed the basis of Weber's depiction of justice within sultanism. The system of justice was not a rational but an ad hoc one, based entirely on the ruler's personal discretion and exercised by his officials without restraint. Hence a typical feature of the patrimonial state in the sphere of law-making was "the juxtaposition of inviolable traditional prescriptions and completely arbitrary decision-making, the latter serving as a substitute for a regime of rational rules."²⁵ Subsequent attempts to develop comparative classification system of empires did not alter Weber's fundamental interpretation of patrimonial systems.²⁶

How accurate is this sociological depiction of the Ottoman empire? The analyses of Halil İnalcık²⁷ demonstrate that the Ottoman conception of an empire was different and unique. The Ottoman definition of an empire centered more around the idea of sovereignty over many states — on a Central Asian legacy, rather than on the Western conception of empire which emphasized territories, political institutions, or religion as its unifying principle. The portrait of Mehmed II where he is surrounded by six crowns for the six states he had conquered (see Necipoğlu in this volume), and the correspondence of Süleyman I

²¹See M. Mana *The Sources of Social Power* 1986, pp. 518-9.

²²See N. Elias *The Court Society* 1983, p. 2.

²³See M. Weber *Economy and Society* [1978].

²⁴See M. Weber *Economy and Society* [1978], pp. 226-7.

²⁵See M. Weber *Economy and Society* [1978] pp. 1013-14.

²⁶See S. Eisenstadt *The Political Systems of Empires* 1963.

²⁷See, for example, "Osmanlı-Rus Rekabetinin Menşei ve Don-Volga Kanalı Teşebbüsü" *Türk Tarih Kurumu Bülteni* XII: 1948, "Osmanlılar'da Saltanat Veraseti Usulü ve Türk Hâkimiyet Telâkkisiyle İlgisi" *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* XIV/1: 1959, "Kutadgu Bilig'de Türk ve İran Siyaset Nazariye ve Gelecekleri'in Reşit Rahmeti Arat İçin 1966, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age* 1973, and "The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State" *International Journal of Turkish Studies* II: 1980.

where he refers to himself as "he who crowns the emperors of the world," for example, demonstrate the validity of this definition. The ruler who governed the Ottoman empire derived his sovereignty from his membership in a dynasty, the Ottoman dynasty, rather than from a nation, a territory, or a religion. Sovereignty was not given to a person, as in the West, but to this dynasty, so much so that the Ottoman empire was "not an empire with a dynasty but a dynasty with an empire."²⁸ The Ottomans differentiated this new conception of empire from its predecessors through their exercise of absolutism and justice. These Ottoman conceptions of absolutism and justice contradict Weber's depictions of the incontestability of the ruler's power and the arbitrariness of rule, however. Absolute authority did indeed develop around the Ottoman ruler, but was never arbitrary. Instead, an elaborate system of justice based on both religious and civil laws bound the ruler and the ruled.

THE CONCEPT OF ABSOLUTE RULE AND SUCCESSION

The Ottomans retained the Central Asian succession procedure where all members of the dynasty contended for the throne, but altered the apportionment of the state among the contenders. It was this alteration that enabled the Ottomans to centralize rule and make it absolute. Originally, the Ottoman rulers, in accordance with the Central Asian tradition and the Seljuk practice before them, distributed the lands among their sons. The first ruler of the Ottoman dynasty, 'Osmân Gâzî, followed this pattern. The succeeding Ottoman rulers, however, started sending their sons to the provinces as governors rather than relinquishing these areas to them. They also carefully selected the tutors and administrators to accompany their sons, closely controlled the amount of revenues each received, and structured their obedience to orders from the center.²⁹ The Ottoman heirs were appointed to the provinces upon reaching puberty. For example Murâd I sent his older son to Kütahya, his second son Ya'kub to Karesi, and kept his youngest at the center. Of his predecessors, Orhan's (1324-1360) son Savcı was the only Ottoman prince to be sent to a governorship in the European side; all others were assigned to former state capitals in Asia Minor.

When Timur defeated Bâyezîd I in 1402, he attempted to terminate this new Ottoman practice by apportioning the Ottoman state he had defeated among Bayezid's sons.³⁰ Yet one of the sons, Mehmed I, united the Ottoman state under his rule and executed his brothers. This act drew criticism from Timur's son Shâhrûh who stated that fratricide was against the Central Asian Ilkhanid

²⁸See H. İnalcık *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age*, 1973, p. 59.

²⁹See H. İnalcık *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age*, 1973, p. 60.

³⁰See H. İnalcık "Osmanlılar'da Saltanat Veraseti Usulü ve Türk Hakimiyet Telâkkisiyle İlgisi" *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* XIV/1959, pp. 84-6, 90.

tradition of rule. Mehmed I (1413-1421), in reply, emphasized that the Ottomans were shaping their own tradition; "in sovereignty," he is said to have stated,³¹ "Ottoman rulers have let experience be their guide and therefore do not accept partnership in rule." The Ottomans could have adopted the practice of fratricide from the Iranian political tradition where it was common. Mehmed I also stopped the convention of giving land and estates to uncles and brothers. He only permitted the ruler's sons to retain this privilege, and then only in their capacity as provincial administrators of the Ottoman state.³² This Ottoman principle of centrality of rule had become so ingrained by the fifteenth century that when Mehmed II's sons Bâyezîd and Cem were contending for the throne in 1480 and Cem suggested dividing the empire into the European and Asian parts, Bâyezîd II (1481-1512) replied that "the Ottoman state was such an honorable bride that she could not tolerate the demands of two grooms; the bride of sovereignty could not be divided."³³

Fratricide demonstrated the prevalence Ottomans gave to the dynasty and its empire over blood ties. Although Bâyezîd I was the first Ottoman ruler to practice fratricide in 1389 against his brother over the fight for succession, it was Mehmed I who codified this practice for the sake of the state. He decreed that "for the welfare of the state, the one of my sons to whom God grants the sultanate may lawfully put his brothers to death. A majority of religious scholars, *ulema*, consider this permissible."³⁴ Another significant aspect of the Ottoman fratricide was the mode of death it employed.³⁵ As in the Central Asian tradition of rule, it was forbidden to spill the blood of members of the ruling dynasty. Even though forbidden in the Islamic tradition, some Seljuk and early Ottoman rulers were mummified before burial. The contending members of the Ottoman dynasty were, upon defeat, strangled with a bowstring. Only Muştafa "the pretender," who claimed to be the son of Murâd II, was executed like a commoner.

The Ottoman pattern of sending sons to the provinces underwent changes with the centralization of sovereignty. As the sultan became identified with the center, with the core of the empire and its charisma, he or any of his possible descendants could no longer leave the center of the empire which had assumed a centrifugal symbolic force. After Süleymân, Sefim II (1566-1574) and Murâd III (1574-1595) only sent their oldest sons to governorships. Mehmed III (1595-1603) ended the practice of sending heirs to the provinces. From then on, they

³¹See O. Turan *Türk Cihan Hakimiyeti Mefkûresi Tarihi* 1978, p. 334.

³²See H. Inalcık, "Osmanlılar'da Saltanat Veraseti Usulü ve Türk Hakimiyet Telâkkisiyle İlgisi" *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* XIV/1: 1959, p. 90.

³³See Hoca Sa'deddin and 'Âşikpaşazâde in O. Turan *Türk Cihan Hakimiyeti Mefkûresi Tarihi* 1978, p. 328.

³⁴See H. Inalcık *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age* 1973, p. 59.

³⁵See O. Turan *Türk Cihan Hakimiyeti Mefkûresi Tarihi* 1978, p. 172.

became confined to the palace in Istanbul instead.³⁶ The marriage patterns of the rulers and their daughters underwent similar changes with the Ottoman consolidation of power. The Ottoman rulers had initially expanded their political power by marrying the daughters of local potentates in Asia Minor. After they started to conquer vast territories on their own, however, the Ottoman sultans attempted instead to monopolize and consolidate power within their empire. The sultan's female slaves, who had no political power except that bestowed by the sultan, replaced the daughters of potentates as the sultan's mates. Personal devotion rather than alliance thus became the main mate selection criterion as the Ottoman state transformed into an empire. The sultan's sisters and daughters, initially married to the sons of local potentates, also started to be wedded instead to the ruler's administrators. As the Ottoman state expanded territorially into an empire, the loyalty of the administration which governed in the name of the sultan became more pivotal in sustaining the government.

The Central Asian tradition of letting divine dispensation determine the candidate favored by the heavens succeed the throne persisted until the end of Ottoman rule, however. According to the Ottomans, the strength God gave made one Ottoman candidate win over others. The persistence of this tradition overruled all earthly attempts to regulate succession. It made all male members of the Ottoman dynasty equally eligible in the competition for the throne; the victorious one succeeded "by God's will and his own fortune." This principle of the role of divine intervention was so strong that when Bayezid, the son of Süleymân the Magnificent, attempted to seize the throne, his father told him that "it is not man's pleasure but God's will that disposes of kingdoms and their government. If he has decreed that you shall have the kingdom after me, no man will be able to prevent it."³⁷ The sacredness, brilliance which descended from the skies to envelop one contender against others was called *kuş*, fortune which imbued sacredness on ordinary people.³⁸ The term and its depiction is very similar to Weber's conception of charisma, to charismatic authority which emanated from "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he was considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers and qualities... (which were) regarded as of divine origin and as exemplary."³⁹ These qualities caused the person to be treated as a leader. If, however, he could not provide proof and success, and if he failed to serve his followers, the leader quickly lost this charismatic quality and, with it, the right to rule. Like the Central Asian perception, it was as if the heavens withdrew their blessings from him.

³⁶See H. Inalcık *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age* 1973, p. 60.

³⁷See H. Inalcık *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age* 1973, p. 59.

³⁸See H. Inalcık "Osmanlılar'da Saltanat Veraseti Usulü ve Türk Hâkimiyet Telâkkisiyle İlgisi" *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* XIV/1: 1959, p. 74.

³⁹See M. Weber *Economy and Society* [1978], p. 241.

If, on the other hand, his "fortune" persisted, the charisma extended beyond the rule of the sovereign to become routinized. Routinized charisma could either take the form of hereditary charisma "where the selection of heir stayed within a kinship group," — as in the case of the Ottoman dynasty — or get translated into the charisma of office "where legitimacy was no longer directed to the individual but to acquired qualities and the effectiveness of ritual acts."⁴⁰ As charisma became routinized, the grounds for the success of some contenders against others altered. The administration routinizing this charisma became an important factor in legitimating Ottoman succession. The creation of this administration from household slaves was another Ottoman innovation that enhanced Ottoman absolutism.⁴¹ The Turkish and Mongol rulers of Central Asia had employed leaders of defeated tribes in their retinues. The Ottomans continued this tradition, establishing, in addition to the supply of slaves purchased from the marketplace and those given as gifts to the sultan, a system of levying the sons of Christian subjects for the sultan's service (*devşirme*). Mehmed II was the first Ottoman ruler to delegate his authority to his slaves rather than to leaders of old Ottoman families. He eliminated local dynasties and strong frontier lords, filled administrative posts with his own slaves, established new military units loyal to his person, and started the tradition of having slave females rather than marrying daughters of local potentates.⁴² A century later, Mehmed IV (1648-1687) displayed the increasing power of the Ottoman administration when he stated that he had acceded the throne "by God's will, his own abilities, and the consent of the civil officials and religious scholars (*ittifâk-i ârâ-i vlzerâ ve 'ulemâ*)."⁴³ This administration was to play a significant role in the other unique concept of Ottoman rule: justice.

THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATION

The Ottoman concept of justice unfolded around two bodies of law that were equally significant: the sultan's law of the ruler (*kânûn*) and the religious law of Islam (*yeri'at*). What differentiated the Ottoman synthesis was that each one was as significant as the other. This legal modification also enhanced the new image of absolutism in the person of the sultan.⁴⁴ In creating this Ottoman synthesis, Mehmed II and Selim I focused on institutionalizing the authority of the sultan, and Bâyezîd II emphasized the sovereignty of religion. Yet it was Süleymân I who, for the first time, united these two components under his rule.

⁴⁰See M. Weber *Economy and Society* [1978], p. 248.

⁴¹See H. İnalcık "Osmanlı Padişahı" *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* XIII/2: 1958, p. 494 and *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age* 1973, p. 77.

⁴²See H. İnalcık "Mehmed II" in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, volume 7, 1957, pp. 511-2.

⁴³See H. İnalcık "Osmanlılar'da Saltanat Veraseti Usulü ve Türk Hâkimiyet Telâkkisiyle İlgisi" *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* XIV/1: 1959, p. 74.

⁴⁴See H. İnalcık "Osmanlı Padişahı" *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* XIII/2: 1958, p. 77.

The codification of many practices from the inception of the Ottoman state formed the basis of the Ottoman sultanic law, *kānūn-i 'osmānī*. The equal treatment of this sultanic law with the religious did not increase the arbitrariness of justice as Weber implied, however. Instead, the sultanic law suppressed this arbitrariness as it required the sultan personally to guarantee that his empire rested on law and justice.

The close Ottoman tie between sovereignty and justice originated in the Central Asian tradition of political rule which combined politics and ethics through "the circle of justice."⁴⁵ This circle stipulated that state control required a large army, and such an army required great wealth; the prosperity of the people which would provide this wealth depended on having just laws. Only through such laws could the ruler control the state: the failure to have just laws would undermine his sovereignty. A just ruler also had to possess certain qualifications such as⁴⁶ justice (*'adl*), gentleness (*hilm*), generosity (*shād*) in treating his subjects. He also had to display bravery (*seca'at*) and wisdom (*hikmet*). What facilitated sovereignty was not military strength alone but a combination of these personal qualities. This conception of justice differed from the Persian tradition which defined justice as the grace and favor of the sovereign's absolute authority, thus interpreting it in accordance with the pragmatic goals of the ruler.⁴⁷ In the Persian tradition, the ruler did indeed precede law as Weber claimed; yet the Ottomans followed the Central Asian tradition which put the law before the ruler — sovereignty was coupled with law, not the ruler.

Since sovereignty resided in the Ottoman dynasty and was entrusted to a particular member on the condition that he administer his people justly, the ruled could oppose and rebel against an unjust ruler. The Ottoman sultans therefore took many measures to secure a fair administration of justice. The sultan's court was both the supreme organ of government and a high court of justice. Everyone in the empire, regardless of their social position, was invited to petition the court for the administration of justice.⁴⁸ The sultan exercised his just rule through delegating his executive power to two officials, the grand vezir and the sheikh-ul-islam. The grand vezir was, as in the Central Asian tradition, the sultan's absolute deputy in civil administration. The two creators of the Ottoman imperial tradition, Mehmed II and Süleymān I, fully delineated the post of the Ottoman grand vezirate; they increased its responsibilities to meet the increasing demands of an expanding empire. The sheikh-ul-islam was the absolute

⁴⁵See H. Inalcik "Kutadgu Bilig'de Türk ve İran Siyaset Nazariye ve Gelenekleri" in *Reşit Rahmeti Arat İçin* 1966, pp. 261-3, and *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age* 1973, p. 66.

⁴⁶See H. Inalcik "Kutadgu Bilig'de Türk ve İran Siyaset Nazariye ve Gelenekleri" in *Reşit Rahmeti Arat İçin* 1966, p. 266.

⁴⁷See H. Inalcik, "Kutadgu Bilig'de Türk ve İran Siyaset Nazariye ve Gelenekleri" in *Reşit Rahmeti Arat İçin* 1966, p. 267, and *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age* 1973, p. 66.

⁴⁸See H. Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age* 1973, pp. 89-91.

representative of the sultan's religious authority. The religious administration he directed constituted the greatest power in the empire independent of the grand vezir. The religious and civil administration together oversaw the fair execution of justice in the Ottoman empire.

The composition of the sultan's administration was of crucial importance to the sultan because these officials were given the authority to execute justice in his name. After Mehmed II, these officials were recruited more and more from among the sultan's household slaves whose allegiance was exclusively to their provider, the sultan, and their goal paralleled his, i.e., a just administration. The sultan also sent inspectors and spies throughout the empire to affirm the fair execution of justice. He also proclaimed rescripts, *'addâletnâmeler*, redressing the malpractice of his administrators. The branches of government were divided into a system of checks and balances to guarantee justice. In the provinces, for example, three separate authorities represented the sultan: the governor had the sultan's executive authority, the kadi his legal authority, and the treasurer (*hazine defterdârı*) his financial authority.⁴⁹ The Ottoman imperial tradition thus formulated a very elaborate system of absolute and just rule as it modified the imperial succession and molded a scrupulous administration.

III. THE REPRODUCTION OF THE OTTOMAN CONCEPT OF EMPIRE: CULTURAL SYMBOLS

The cultural reproduction⁵⁰ of an empire occurs through the symbols that are associated with it. The ruler as the nucleus of the empire, the capital as the geographical center, the newly constructed building complexes as the physical image, the court and public ceremonies as rituals that extend beyond time, and the victory celebrations as salutes to the greatness of the empire, culturally construct and reproduce the empire. As political power is successfully centralized and stabilized, the boundaries of action extend from the person of the ruler beyond time and space. As Clifford Geertz⁵¹ states, "the court mirrors the world the world should imitate; society flourishes to the degree that it assimilates this fact; and it is the office of the king, wielder of the mirror, to assure that it does." It is the ruler who provides the magic that enables the whole system to work. The intensive concentration of political power in the person of the sovereign moves him from the realm of the natural to that of the supernatural.

⁴⁹See H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age* 1973, pp. 104, 118.

⁵⁰See M. Foucault *The Archeology of Knowledge* 1972, and P. Bourdieu *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* 1977.

⁵¹See C. Geertz "Centers, Kings and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power" in *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* 1983, p. 124.

Mehmed II was the first Ottoman sultan to concentrate power in himself and his capital. As he lived in his palace surrounded by an elaborate court ceremony his power became more abstract and celestial. Süleymân the Magnificent's ritual⁵² of visiting in Constantinople the tombs of his ancestors (specifically of Mehmed II, Bâyezîd II and Selîm I) before going on campaigns, his paying homage to the tombs of the Hungarian kings during the Estergon campaign and that of Imam Abû Hânîfa in Baghdad during the Eastern campaigns, in addition to his praying in a newly conquered church that had just been converted into a mosque all drew upon and reproduced the celestial power that grew around him. He symbolically obtained strength from all that was sacred in the past and present. He and his dynasty then emanated strength that surpassed temporal and spatial boundaries.

The capital city⁵³ plays a significant role in reproducing imperial rule; it provides a physical setting for the centralized political power of an empire. Most ceremonies of the empire, those performed vis-à-vis foreign ambassadors, local dignitaries, the urban populace take place within the capital. The capital of the Ottoman state was Bursa in Asia from 1326-1402 and Edirne in Europe from 1402-1453. With Mehmed II's conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Constantinople, situated on the two continents of Asia and Europe, provided a geographical locus for the Ottoman boundaries that kept expanding to form an empire. Mehmed II actively aided the reproduction of Ottoman society around the symbols of an empire. He built up the physical image of Constantinople as he ordered the construction of the Fatûh complex. Süleymân the Magnificent, his great-grandson, followed his ancestor's example; imperial construction in Constantinople reached its zenith under him and his architect Sinân. Süleymân had six mosque complexes constructed in Constantinople, for his father Selîm I, his deceased sons Mehmed and Cihângîr, his daughter Mihrimâh, his spouse Hürrem, and, the Süleymaniye complex for himself. The imperial palace and buildings such as the mosques, markets, schools and libraries, aqueducts for water provision, and libraries furnished a physical image to the expanding Ottoman power. Byzantine structures informed this new imperial space and Islamic forms gave shape to it. This image and the new rule expanded to the provinces as Süleymân repaired the tombs of Rûmî, Imam Abû Hânîfa, 'Abd al-Kâdir Gîlânî, Seyyid Baţâl Gâzî, as he built walls built around the old city in Jerusalem, and as he constructed an educational complex in Mecca.

Ceremonies and festivities celebrated this new Ottoman imperial image and extended its impact beyond spatial boundaries. The court ceremonies recreated the Ottoman power for the visitors; the public ceremonies in the capital enabled the populace to share the Ottoman imperial image. The circumcision and

⁵²See T. Gökbilgin "Süleymân I" in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, volume 11, 1970, p. 102.

⁵³See N. Elias *Power and Civility: The Civilizing Process* 1982, p. 45.

wedding ceremonies, elaborately celebrated under Süleymân the Magnificent in 1530 and 1539, displayed Ottoman power. The parades of the guilds, the military, and exhibits of elaborate gifts given to the sultan by foreign ambassadors demonstrated, both geographically and economically, the expanding boundaries of the empire's might. In addition to the life-events of the sultan and his household, Ottoman victory festivities celebrated the military greatness of the empire that had been created. As the populace joined in these celebrations, they symbolically supported and enhanced Ottoman conquests and reconfirmed their trust in the sultan; the victories during the German campaign of 1532, for example, were celebrated in Constantinople in great pomp.

The monuments and public works constructed by the sultan, the public festivities celebrating campaign victories, and the feasts marking the life events of the sovereign and his children thus created an Ottoman imperial image for the entire society. As local and foreign dignitaries flowed through the imperial court, the Ottoman society acquired a sense of who among these was like them and who differed from them. They thus associated the imperial image with a unique social identity. The public ceremonies, spectacles, court rituals symbolically reproduced the exercise of imperial power to communicate what an empire was. As court officials, artisans and visitors traveled to the provinces and to other societies, they diffused this Ottoman imperial image, this identity, to the rest of the world.

CONCLUSION

The Ottomans, as they reformulated the existing practices of succession and administration, constructed a new conception of an empire around the parameters of absolutism and justice. The imperial tradition they created was not, as Weber argued, based on the personal practice of arbitrary authority. Instead, it drew its power from a tradition of rule reinterpreting the Central Asian, Islamic and Eastern Roman practices. It aspired to a world sovereignty that would ultimately result from this just rule. During the era of Süleymân the Magnificent, this ideal Ottoman imperial tradition was institutionalized. It was then that the Ottoman state united its ideological, structural and cultural images of empire into a synthesis that was to last for a long period.

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SULTAN SÜLEYMÂN AND THE OTTOMAN RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT

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Two centuries after the death of Kânûnî Süleymân (1520-66), his descendants presided over a floundering empire. In their search for ideological reinforcement for what was in fact a new kind of sultanate in a new kind of empire, the eighteenth-century sultans looked for fresh ways to draw on the rich symbolism of Islam. In addition to a new ulema "aristocracy" and Ottoman claims to an Abbasid caliphal inheritance, the sultans of the time injected themselves into an increasing number of religion-based observances. The spurt of mosque building and restorations, the institutionalization of the "Command Lectures" (*Huzûr Dersleri*) of Ramadan and the regularization of supererogatory mosque celebrations in the eighteenth century strengthened the identification of the sultanate with religion and the religious.

It is not surprising that sultans in a period of political weakness would attempt to shore up their office with Islamic notions of legitimacy. The centrality of officially sanctioned religion-mindedness in the eighteenth century owed much to that urge. Yet it was during the reign of Süleymân I, a time of political strength, that the most extensive elaboration of Ottoman religious institutions occurred. Even granting that the reign of Süleymân had demonstrable weaknesses and that of Mahmûd I (1730-54), significant strengths, there can be little doubt about the relative power of the two sultans or the empire's vitality in the earlier period.

Süleymân's cultivation of the religious sphere, particularly the 'ilmiyye, the institutions and personnel associated with the ulema and the holy law (*şerî'at*), cannot be explained as a response to weakness, or at least not to the precise weaknesses that plagued the eighteenth century. The vulnerabilities of the eighteenth century — to territorial loss, decentralization and corporate in-fighting — cannot be said to have operated on anywhere near that scale in the sixteenth century. The Süleymanid age did, of course, have serious concerns, and these influenced Süleymân's religious policies. The conquest of the Arab lands under Süleymân's father Selîm I (1512-20) impelled the new Ottoman sovereigns of

these areas to strengthen their association with the faith lest their legitimacy be challenged. Within the older Ottoman provinces, particularly in eastern Anatolia, Süleymân's legacy from his father was more problematic. Selîm's inability to rout out Shî'î disaffection left Süleymân and his successors with a critical domestic threat upon the resurgence of the Shî'î Safavid state on the eastern borders of the empire.

With respect to the Arab lands and Iran, Süleymân's lavish patronage of Sunnî Islamic institutions was a logical and necessary defense. But even these concerns and Süleymân's consequent "vulnerability" cannot explain the extent or the directions of Süleymân's religious policies. Süleymân's policies may indeed have been "defensive." But if so, his overtures to the ulema and the sacred were a function of power, not vulnerability. Many of Süleymân's religious policies can perhaps be read as efforts to soften the impact of an overwhelmingly powerful monarchy. In the mid-sixteenth century, an emphasis on the Islamic character of state and sovereign made for a potent message of unity between old and new Ottoman lands. In an Islamic message, too, there was reconciliation, especially for the newly conquered, who might otherwise remain morally displaced or alienated.

Süleymân's religious policies in their totality brought about the expansion, reorganization, integration and enhancement of the personnel and judgments of the ulema in state service. Some of the details of those efforts, although well known, bear repeating here if only to establish the range of Süleymân's actions with respect to the major institutions of the faith.

The Ottoman ulema, the scholars of the holy law, represented only one — albeit the preeminent one — set of imperial religious dignitaries possessing a distinct approach to the faith. Nonetheless, it was chiefly the institutions affecting the training and functions of the ulema that attracted Süleymân's sustained involvement. And, too, it was largely on the ulema's representation of religiosity and rectitude that Süleymân's religious policies were founded.

Well before the reign of Süleymân, the Ottomans had developed a rough hierarchization of grades for their religious colleges (medrese) and judgeships. Depending on one's level of training in the religious sciences, medrese students who opted for a religious career could hope to pursue one or more career specialty within the religious profession. The least trained, and ultimately least successful and remunerated, might serve as minor jurisconsults (mufti), medrese professors (müderris) or judges (kâdî / kadi). With more study in the medreses, successful students could aspire to higher ranked and better paid müderris posts or judgeships.

Although training requirements, years in grade and differentiations between one medrese post or judgeship and another were not strictly defined, some general rules applied. When Süleymân assumed the throne in 1520, the hierarchy then in existence was divided between senior kadis and senior müderrises on the one hand, and minor, or small-town, judges, professors and jurisconsults on the other. Senior kadis, or mollas, had not only studied the full range of religious sciences offered in the medreses, but had usually also served as professors in a number of major medreses. Although many senior kadis returned to medrese teaching after serving as kadis, and although many medrese professors neither attained nor sought judgeships, however senior, in general the senior judgeships were superior in status, influence and remuneration to senior müderrises. Along with the Grand Mufti or Şeyhül'islâm of the empire, the highest ulama in the realm were the two chief judges of the army *Kâdî'asker* for Rumelia and Anatolia, followed by the kadi of Istanbul and the kadis of a number of other principal cities.

Senior medreses were also gathered into grades. The highest of the five or so pre-Süleymân grades was reserved to and named for the Şahî-i Şemân, the eight medreses founded by Mehmed the Conqueror (1451-81) as a part of his mosque complex in Istanbul. From their establishment around 1470, until the age of Süleymân, the Şahî-i Şemân was the culmination of medrese study and of medrese teaching posts.

Süleymân's 'ilmiyye policies had at least three aims: to expand the physical capacity of the educational system, to ensure the quality of 'ilmiyye personnel, and to provide opportunities for more sophisticated scholarly inquiry. The three would raise the educational and intellectual resources of the empire to the levels demanded by the empire's new size and might. All three aims found their clearest expression in the founding of the Süleymaniye mosque complex. The Süleymaniye, with its cluster of new medreses, obviously had greatest impact on the medrese hierarchy, i.e., the educational system itself. But it also had far-reaching implications for the entire network of imperial ulama because of the role of medreses in Ottoman culture. Whatever their failures in later times, the medreses of this period trained hundreds of ulama, "the best and the brightest" of their day — Şeyhül'islâms, Kâdî'askers, mollas, kadis, müderrises and muftis — who instructed future generations, interpreted and implemented the holy law, guided public morality, supervised official ethics and directed the ritual life of the empire.

The Süleymaniye complex, completed in 1557, was the largest of the imperial mosque complexes and the last to alter the hierarchical order of the medrese system. In addition to the great mosque itself, the complex included four regular medreses, an advanced medrese known as the Dâri'l-ḥadîṣ, and a medical school (Ṭibhâne). The five medreses became the new capstone of the enlarged

educational system as they displaced Mehmed II's *Şahn* to the middle of the hierarchy. The highest grade in the hierarchy was assumed by and named for the *Dârü'l-hadîs*, and the four regular medreses together made up the second highest grade called, simply, "the Süleymaniye." By the end of the sixteenth century, several of the existing grades had been formally bifurcated to produce eleven official grades. A twelfth grade, also linked to the Süleymaniye complex and ranked just below the Süleymaniye grade, owed its origins to Süleymân's reign, although it, like the *Dârü'l-hadîs* grade, came into regular use only in the early part of the eighteenth century.¹

The preeminence of the new medreses and the resources expended on the entire complex are consonant with Süleymân's image of himself and his reign. When work on the complex was first begun, Süleymân was in the fifty-sixth year of his life and the thirtieth year of his reign. He had subjugated Belgrade, Hungary, Mosul, Baghdad, Rhodes, Yemen, Aden, Oran, Tripoli and Algiers. Ottoman navies dominated both the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. It is not surprising that such a monarch should undertake a monument of the scale of the Süleymaniye. It is no less surprising that the monument, once built, should eclipse so many others that had come before. Insofar as the Süleymaniye's medreses were concerned, they were symbolic of the period's explosive increase in religious architecture and personnel. The number of graded Istanbul medreses came near to doubling in the period, with the architect Sinân alone having designed not only Süleymân's Süleymaniye and Şehzade, but also the medreses endowed by Hâşşeki Hürrem, Rüstem Pasha, Kara Ahmed Pasha, Ca'fer Ağa, Mürimâh Sultan at Üsküdar and Edirnekapi, Zâl Pasha and Piyâle Pasha, among others in the central system. These medreses alone added some 300 medrese students to the central system.

With the rapid expansion of the system's physical capacity, Süleymân could hope to meet the increased demand for ulema throughout the empire. If the old system had been able to supply educators and judicial personnel for a smaller empire, it was already outdated when Süleymân came to the throne. In the first place, just seeing to the traditional level of ulema coverage for the enlarged empire of the sixteenth century would have required an increase in personnel. Additional ulema were also required for other, not unrelated, state matters — for example, the cause of Sunni orthodoxy against the Safavi-Shî'i threat. Dynastic

¹The additional grade, known as the *Hâmîs* or *Hâmîs-i Süleymâniye*, "Süleymâniye's Fifth," was named for yet another medrese-like building located withing the complex. Although this sixth Süleymâniye "medrese" (or fifth if one excludes the *Dârü'l-hadîs*) was original to the complex, it appears to have been a dormitory rather than a working medrese. A hierarchy grade called "the Fifth" was occasionally used as of the late sixteenth century, but it was regularized much later, under Ahmed III (1703-30). These and other hierarchy issues are treated in detail in Madeline C. Zilfi, "The Ottoman Ulema 1703-1839 and the Route to Great Mollaship," Ph. D. diss., University of Chicago, 1976, pp. 11-22.

needs had also to be served as Süleymân undertook to become the supreme patron of religion, arts and letters in the Islamic world. The age of Süleymân was culturally, as well as territorially, expansive and ambitious. Both characteristics were operative in the making of Ottoman Islam under Süleymân.

Ottoman kadis — the military's *kâdî*'askers, the mollahs of the cities and the ordinary judges in the provinces — were the most pervasive and empowered members of the ulema. Kadis were, of course, the backbone of the empire's judicial system. In their courts, criminals, transgressors and shirkers of *qânûn* and *şerî'at* were judged and punished. In the realm of the civil law, where the *şerî'at* reigned, kadis adjudicated, certified and registered matters of divorce, marriage, custody, desertion, death, manumission, inheritance and property transactions, among other cases. Without the empire-wide provision for the kadi courts, there could be no real implementation of the holy law. And, without the holy law, there could be little justification for Ottoman claims to an "Islamic" state. But the demand for kadis went beyond the law courts *per se*. Ottoman judges also monitored the activities of secular officials. Kadis rode the tax circuit and oversaw the market place; their presence was intended to ensure justice in the assessment of taxes and dues.

Ottoman insistence on its kadi network was also tied to another critical imperial concern. Through their implementation of the myriad provisions of the law the kadis were major forces for religious and cultural unity. In the sixteenth century, this was especially vital in an empire that had become stunningly diverse.

The ability of the legal system to deliver on its manifold potential depended in large part on the quality of the medrese system. The sultans' prescriptive decrees regarding the medreses were necessarily comments on the kadis as much as on the pedagogical network that produced them. Whether or not the Ottomans aspired to cultural brilliance, it was vital that Süleymân direct his energies to improving the medrese system.

To ensure the quality of enrolled medrese students, their teachers and those "graduates" who would find employment as kadis or müderrises, Süleymân relied on the time-honored instrument of monarchy, fiat. Although his regulations were addressed to different components of the 'ilmiyye, their overriding concern was to produce a system that was, within the frame of royal prerogative, orderly, incorruptible and merit-driven.

Until Süleymân's time, there was no clear system for assigning medrese "graduates" to entry-level posts. Individual ulema in effect vouched for their own students and protégés. In the smaller Ottoman academic world before the sixteenth century, this kind of "sponsored meritocracy" was practicable. By

Süleymân's day it had become chaotic as ever more candidates became available for more posts. Süleymân assigned the then *Ḳâdî'asker* of Rumelia, later *Şeyḫül-islâm*, Mehmed Ebû's-su'ûd Efendi (d. 1574) to devise a method to regularize the listing of *müderris* and *kadî*-candidates (*mülâzim*). Ebû's-su'ûd's solution, formally enacted around 1560 but at least partly in use much earlier, was the creation of a separate register (*rûznâme*) of candidates with guidelines regarding the level of study required for inclusion on the list, the kinds of officeholders authorized to name candidates to the list, and the "quota" of candidates permitted each such officeholder.

The reform no doubt injected more order into ulema selection methods, but problems continued. There was always a tendency for students, abetted by ulema patrons, to shortcut their studies and bribe their way to official candidacy (*mülâzemet*) status. Under Süleymân such abuses surfaced from time to time, but they were apparently containable. Süleymân issued several regulatory decrees regarding the number of years required for the completion of studies in each of the various *medrese* grades. Similar warnings were issued to curb abuses of *kadis* in the countryside when, for example, *kadis* overcharged for their services or connived with administrative officials to overtax the population. By the end of the sixteenth century, despite the now tedious promulgation of regulations, such abuses had become pandemic. Süleymân's descendants lacked the will or the capacity to act against them.

The restructuring of the *'ilmiyye* in these years also extended to the *Şeyḫülislâm*ate. Principally under the impact of Süleymân, the *Şeyḫül-islâm* was transformed from a prestigious religious figure into the supreme religious authority in the state and the chief custodian of the *'ilmiyye*.

The *Şeyḫülislâm*ate had originally been conceived of as a spiritual post. Its incumbents, who were regarded as having life tenure, functioned as the Sultan's designated jurisconsults, *muftis*, whose profound knowledge of the law qualified them to render opinions (*fetvâ*) on legal questions of broad imperial concern. The dignity and authority of the office grew out of its relative independence from the more worldly pressures attached to the *'ilmiyye* hierarchy. The office had been only loosely associated with the *'ilmiyye*'s graded posts and prerequisites. Although *Şeyḫül-islâm*s had always owed their own appointments to the Sultan, they had theoretically been selected from the whole body of senior ulema irrespective of their hierarchy grade or previous posts. Now the path to the *Şeyḫülislâm*ate would tend to follow that of Ebû's-su'ûd, Süleymân's *Şeyḫül-islâm* for twenty-one years, with a *Ḳâdî'asker* normally ascending to the *Şeyḫülislâm*ate.

It was, in fact, Süleymân's confidence in *Şeyḫül-islâm* Ebû's-su'ûd that shaped the future course of the Ottoman ulema more than did any of the Sultan's

formal regulations as such. Ottoman practice was grounded in tradition. Current generations looked for endorsement in the precedents of the past. Süleymân's reliance on Ebû's-su'ûd, the later's own scholarly and juristic achievements and the forty-six — year legacy of Süleymân himself made for an inescapable — albeit selectively tapped-reservoir of precedent for future generations.

Just as Ebû's-su'ûd's career path became the model for aspirants to the Şeyhülislâmate, the perquisites and emoluments awarded to Ebû's-su'ûd and members of his family tended to be sought by his successors. Eventually similar favors were routinely assigned to future Şeyhül-islâm by dint of their incumbency rather than their actual scholarly achievement. The Şeyhül-islâm became the highest-paid members of the 'ilmiyye, they were permitted the highest quota of mülâzemets, and their ulema children could expect an extra promotion or two because of their father's accomplishment.

Some semblance of the Şeyhülislâmate's independence, always ambiguous at best, might have survived the office's full assimilation into the graded and salaried official career. However, the right to appoint major ulema office-holders was transferred from the Grand Vezir to the Şeyhül-islâm. The transfer altered the character of the Şeyhülislâmate. The precise chronology need not concern us here, but the implications of the transformation warrant discussion.

Around 1574, Şeyhül-islâm Ebû's-su'ûd, who had continued in office after the death of Süleymân, was awarded the right to appoint all senior kadıs (those earning salaries of 150 akçes daily) and senior müderrises (those earning more than 40 akçes daily) as well as a host of minor dignitaries, including local muftıs.

Ottoman commentators describe the transfer as a necessary reform inasmuch as the Grand Vezirs were often ignorant of 'ilmiyye matters. Ebû's-su'ûd himself regarded the right to appointments as a time-consuming burden that would impede him in his primary task of issuing fetvâs. Nonetheless, a new 'ilmiyye structure and pattern of relationships had been set in place. The Şeyhül-islâm rather than the Grand Vezir came to have responsibility for deciding, still on the Sultan's final approval, who would become the major representatives of the faith. Although Ebû's-su'ûd may not himself have made use of his appointment right, his award was invoked as the founding precedent by which future Şeyhül-islâm laid claim to the rich patronage of 'ilmiyye appointments and dismissals. It is important to add, however, that the matter was still being contested in the eighteenth century.

Although these kinds of administrative adjustments and the period's generous religious endowments elevated the official standing of the Şeyhül-islâm and

that of the entire 'ilmiyye, the principal enhancement of the ulema grew out of the collaboration of Ebû's-su'ûd and Süleymân in the making of Ottoman law.

There is much that remains obscure about the nature of that collaboration, but there can be little doubt that these two prodigious figures worked to ensure the Islamic context of imperial laws and decision-making. Although Islamic tenets hold that there can be no law except the şerî'at, the revealed law, there had been for centuries before the Ottomans *de facto* acceptance of the legislative power ('örf) of the ruler to issue regulations (kânûn) for the benefit of the community. Under the Ottomans, as in earlier Islamic states, the ulema, as guardians of the şerî'at, had in principle rejected 'örf. Şerî'at-minded Ottomans had on occasion been moved to violent opposition when Ottoman rulers seemed to circumvent the holy law by establishing institutions, taxes or rates of taxation unknown to the şerî'at. Only the most astute monarchs could legislate without exposing themselves to charges of encroaching upon the şerî'at and, thus, of ruling unjustly.

Süleymân's power was at least the equal of the illustrious Mehmed II, the Conqueror, but Süleymân took greater care to placate the şerî'at-minded. Religious architecture, not only in the capital, but in Jerusalem, Mecca and throughout the provinces, and the reform of the 'ilmiyye were purposeful investments in this overall policy. So, too, was his relationship with Ebû's-su'ûd.

Ebû's-su'ûd was appointed to the Şeyhülislâmate in 1545 and served two sultans until his death in 1574. His was the longest Şeyhülislâmate in Ottoman history as Süleymân's was the longest reign. Quite apart from his official posts, Ebû's-su'ûd was a renowned scholar. He was the author of a major Koranic commentary and a score of treatises in addition to collections of his fetvâs.

As Şeyhül-islâm, Ebû's-su'ûd followed in the tradition of his fourteen Şeyhül-islâm predecessors. That is, his chief function was as a mufti, one who pronounced, when requested, on knotty questions of the law. The opinions of a mufti, even the Grand Mufti, regarding the licitness, according to the holy law, of a given act, device or belief, carried only moral authority. A fetvâ's prescriptions could be enforced or set aside depending on the will of the monarch. Although Ebû's-su'ûd was markedly more powerful than his predecessors, his tenure did not break with the past. It amplified and to a degree regularized powers that had occasionally been permitted his predecessors. The sultans in the past had frequently sought the Şeyhül-islâm's sanction for important state concerns. Ebû's-su'ûd, however, was consulted not only on problems of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) but on the widest range of issues, including the finest points of land tenure and trade transactions. Although even in the case of Ebû's-su'ûd, confirmatory fetvâs were sometimes sought by Süleymân on especially divisive

matters, such as the execution of Prince Bâyezîd in 1562, Ebû's-su'ûd was involved in state policies on an unprecedented scale.

Süleymân's reliance on Ebû's-su'ûd, however, did not completely shield him from şerî'at-minded opposition. Nor did Ebû's-su'ûd escape criticism. Several of Ebû's-su'ûd's ulema peers, before and after his death, reproached him for having misrepresented classical juridical authorities in order to arrive at opinions supportive of secular interests.

Ebû's-su'ûd's approval of cash vakıfs (vakfû'l-nukûd), pious endowments based on cash monies, was one of the most contentious of such controversies.² The legalization of cash vakıfs had profound implications for the perennial debate over the degree to which contemporary legists could depart from classical Sunnî judgments and still remain within the orthodox fold.

Cash vakıfs were monies given over for a permanent religious or charitable purpose. Such an endowment might be for a building like a mosque, a medrese or an orphanage, or for a paid position, like that of a mosque preacher, a medrese professor or a groundskeeper. Whatever the benefactor's object, it was founded on cash and sustained by profits from the principal's being lent at interest. Cash vakıfs predated the Ottomans, but had come into wider use in the Ottoman period. In the mid-sixteenth century, their increasing incidence provoked open disapproval. The main Sunnî authorities of the Haneffî school of jurisprudence, the school preferred by the Ottomans, had condemned cash vakıfs on the grounds that money, unlike immovable property and certain allowable movables, was a "valuation" of some other good or service and, being subject to price fluctuations and revaluations, lacked permanency, the essential feature of property endowed for a pious purpose.

For a few years mid-way in Süleymân's reign, cash vakıfs had been banned, but during Ebû's-su'ûd's Seyhülişlâmate he had ruled them permissible. In doing so, Ebû's-su'ûd cited the opinions of Imam Zufar (d. 775), a Haneffî authority who, although reputable, was regarded as distinctly minor next to Muḥammad al-Shaybânî (d. 805) and Abû Yûsuf (d. 798), the Haneffî founding fathers, who condemned the practice. To Imam Zufar's precedent, Ebû's-su'ûd added the established legal principles of "accepted practice" (te'âmül) and "the welfare of the people" (istihsân). Ebû's-su'ûd's opinion, supported by a number of his most respected contemporaries, prevailed.

Although cash vakıfs remained legal thereafter, debate continued long after Ebû's-su'ûd and Süleymân. In the late sixteenth century and throughout the seventeenth, the cash vakıf was one of several chronic issues of orthodoxy. Not

²See Jon E. Mandaville's seminal "Usurious Piety: the Cash Waqf Controversy in the Ottoman Empire," *IJMES* 10 (1979): 289-308.

only within medrese circles but in society at large, a small but significant group of thinkers and activists argued for stricter imitation (taqlid) of classical authorities. For such men as Birgili Mehmed (d. 1573) and the Kâdizâdelis of the seventeenth century, decisions such as those of Ebû's-su'ûd on cash vakıfs reflected a dilution of the şerî'at and a departure from orthodoxy. In the main, theirs was a losing battle. Certainly in Ebû's-su'ûd's day, established Ottoman practice, the endorsement of Ebû's-su'ûd and his peers, and Süleymân's enforcing decree overrode the views of those we might call the "strict constructionists."

The economic and social import of cash vakıfs has yet to receive the attention it deserves. In general, the legalization of cash vakıfs increased the pool of potential vakıf benefactors as well as of available credit in the countryside, at least in the short term.

Insofar as Süleymân's relationship with the ulema is concerned, it is noteworthy that the Sultan took an active — one might argue an initiatory — interest in what were unquestionably technical issues of holy law. My point is not so much that this capable ruler had the energy and the acumen to ride herd on the ulema. Rather, I would emphasize that the flow of influence and impact between şerî'at and kânûn was a two-way concourse under the Ottomans, perhaps especially in the reign of Süleymân. Süleymân not only brought şerî'at-mindedness to bear on kânûn. He also brought kânûn-mindedness to bear on şerî'at. No history of modern Islam can afford to neglect Ottoman practice and the role of Süleymân and Ebû's-su'ûd in shaping it.

Although Ebû's-su'ûd has been faulted by the Kâdizâdelis for possessing too worldly an outlook, his willingness to give weight to istihsân represents a more flexible approach to the law. It would be useless at this stage to speculate on whether the cash vakıf or Ebû's-su'ûd's approach was ultimately harmful or beneficial. Insofar as Süleymân and the 'ilmiyye are concerned, however, it must be said that Süleymân took care to operate within the framework of religious sanction, as voiced by his ulema. Although Süleymân apparently favored cash vakıfs, he supported their ban when his Kâdi'asker of Rumelia condemned them. Later, when Ebû's-su'ûd and the highest-placed ulema of the day affirmed their legality, he reversed his earlier decree.

In conclusion, it is appropriate to focus briefly on the negative effects of Süleymân's policies given the accepted view of the ulema's moral and intellectual decline after his reign. It is tempting to credit — and to fault — Süleymân for much that took full form only under other reigns and circumstances. In fact, however, the stagnant pedagogical agenda of the medreses and the aristocratization, sinecurism and venality that came to characterize the 'ilmiyye by the eighteenth century evolved slowly and haltingly out of choices made by later generations. For example, the transformation of merit-based emoluments into automatic and

system-wide perquisites of rank was neither wholly rooted in Süleymân's time nor inevitable. The extraordinary awards to Ebû's-su'ûd had antecedents in Mehmed II's stipends to the children of selected ulema and his special grants to the offspring of the first Ottoman Şeyhül-islâm, Şemsüddîn Fenârî (d. 1431). Moreover, the Şeyhülislâmates of Bôstânzâde Mehmed (d. 1598) and Hoca Sa'düddîn (d. 1599) in the reigns of Murâd III (1574-95) and Mehmed III (1595-1603) can be argued as having had a more decisive effect on the privileges and politicization of high 'ilmiyye office than the combined years of Süleymân and Ebû's-su'ûd. In the end, what had been intolerable or anomalous during Süleymân's sultanate would become tolerated and even preferred given the altered powers, resources and habits of mind in later reigns.

Süleymân's reign, if not Süleymân himself, does, however, bear some responsibility for the enormous physical scale of the 'ilmiyye. The 'ilmiyye's properties and personnel could be maintained only under conditions of increasing resources of money, lands and paid posts. An added consequence of this growth was the acceleration of the 'ilmiyye's "Istanbulization." The concentration of preeminent and richly endowed medreses in the capital intensified the intellectual and material impoverishment of provincial centers.

Like the effects of an overcrowded profession, Süleymân's interaction with the Şeyhülislâmâte inadvertently paved the way for the system's disablement. The example Süleymân set in seeking religious sanction for his policies was a prudent investment for an all-powerful monarch of a religion-minded polity. His successors emulated his example, but they did so with a vastly altered Şeyhülislâmâte. Süleymân had made his Şeyhül-islâm the highest-paid and honored religious official in the empire. Süleymân's immediate successors completed the absorption of the Şeyhül-islâm into the 'ilmiyye system by extending his responsibilities for ulema appointments and dismissals. The Şeyhül-islâm's own career path now led inexorably through the ranks, grades and in-fighting of the 'ilmiyye. Moreover, his duties increasingly revolved around the politically charged business of career rewards and punishments. When sultans after Süleymân sought fetvâs, their Şeyhül-islâm's were vulnerable to criticisms having little to do with şerî'at judgments. If a Şeyhül-islâm submitted an unpalatable opinion, it was not difficult to find an unrelated pretext for his dismissal. Even when there was no jurisprudential conflict at issue, the new responsibilities of the Şeyhülislâmâte were inherently political. Responses to his shortcomings were necessarily political as well. By the last decade of the sixteenth century, Şeyhül-islâm's were appointed, dismissed and often reappointed in dizzying succession. The unstable mix of Şeyhülislâmâte functions made it important but well-nigh impossible for moral integrity, şerî'at fitness and managerial agility to be combined in one officeholder. In any case, the pressures of office made it unlikely that the three qualities could be maintained for long.

It is not surprising that in later years the term "Şeyhü'l-islâm," the elder of Islam," with its supervisory connotations, became the preferred title for the holder of the office. Under Süleymân, however, that designation was usually only parenthetical. Far more common in the reign of Süleymân was the title "Müfütü el-Enâm," (The Legal Counsel of Humankind) in accordance with the primary function of the office, the rendering of legal judgments.

KALENDERS, ABDÂLS, HAYDERÎS: THE FORMATION OF THE BEKTÂŞÎYE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Ahmet T. KARAMUSTAFA

It would not be a mistake to state that the *Bektâşî* order attracted the attention of modern historians of the Ottoman Empire consistently more than any of the many other sufi orders that were active within the borders of that colossal political formation. The one persistent reason for this popularity of the *Bektâşîye* with Ottoman historians has been the enigmatic connection of the order with the *Yeniçeri* corps, the one-time most trustworthy guardian of central authority that later turned into the most formidable opponent of the central administration. It is, therefore, not surprising to see that much of the scholarly discussion on the formative period of *Bektâşî* history is interwoven with the question of the emergence of the *Yeniçeris* and the related institution of *devşirme*. There is nothing inherently objectionable in this state of affairs, but the ever present shadow of the *Yeniçeri* corps seems to have obscured the study of the early history of the *Bektâşîye* somewhat, and the true protagonists of this history, namely the dervishes themselves, have been delegated to the background.

It is my intention here to place the dervishes into the the center of the picture, at least for the purposes of the present essay, and to tackle the issue of the formation of the *Bektâşî* order from this particular angle. I will be guided in this effort by a primary source of supreme importance, namely the *Menâkıb-i Hıvoca-i Cihân ve Neîce-i Cân* (hereafter *Menâkıb*), a work on mysticism in Ottoman Turkish that was composed in the year 929/1522 by an otherwise unknown Vâhidî.¹ My overall aim is to present, within the limited space allotted to me, a richer and livelier account of a crucial period of popular mysticism in the Ottoman Empire than has hitherto been available.

¹ This text is edited and analyzed in Ahmet T. Karamustafa, "Vâhidî's *Menâkıb-i Hıvoca-i Cihân ve Neîce-i Cân*: Critical Edition and Historical Analysis," Ph.D. Dissertation, McGill University, 1986 and is forthcoming in the series "Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures, Turkish Sources" directed by Şinasi Tekin (Harvard University) and Gönül Alpay Tekin, Duxbury, Mass.

II

It seems proper to start with a summary of what we know concerning the early history of *Bektâşî* dervishes.² As in the case of some other dervish groups and orders, in the case of the *Bektâşîs* too, we are faced with an undocumented period between the lifetime of the eponymous leader Hâcî Bektâş and the later emergence of the *Bektâşîye* as an institutionalized collectivity in the tenth/sixteenth century.³ Evidence for the existence of *Bektâşî* dervishes prior to this latter date is at best circumstantial, and the fact that the *Yeniçeri* came to pay allegiance to the figure of Hâcî Bektâş, itself a very unclear process, does not serve to clarify the matter.⁴ In connection with this latter issue, two observations are here in order. The first is that the earliest clear evidence for *Yeniçeri* allegiance to Hâcî Bektâş dates back only to the time of Mehmed II (855-86/1451-81, second reign) - I have in mind here the *Vilâyetnâme-i Otman Baba*, completed in 888/1483, where the soldier accompanying Otman Baba to Istanbul at the orders of Mehmed II declares that his headgear is modeled after that of Hâcî Bektâş.⁵ The second, and more important observation is that in itself the reverence of the *Yeniçeris* for Hâcî Bektâş can be no evidence for the existence of *Bektâşî* dervishes themselves. It is, of course, certain that the memory of Hâcî Bektâş survived, most likely preserved by disciples such as those mentioned in his hagiography, yet there is hardly any trace, and certainly no substantial description, of such followers prior to the first quarter of the tenth/sixteenth century. One exception is a short notice in the hagiography of Otman Baba, where a disciple, or possibly a descendant, of Hâcî Bektâş called Mahmûd Çelebî

² A comprehensive bibliography of modern studies on the *Bektâşî* order can be found in Suraiya Faroqhi, *Der Bektaschi-Orden in Anatolien (vom späten fünfzehnten Jahrhundert bis 1826)*, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Sonderband 2 (Vienna: Verlag des Institutes für Orientalistik der Universität Wien, 1981).

³ On Hâcî Bektâş, see *Türk Ansiklopedisi* (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1946-84), s.v. "Bektaş, Hacı Bektaş-i Veli" (A. Gölpinarlı) and Ahmet T. Karamustafa, "A Study on Pre-Islamic Survivals in a Turkish Islamic Text: The *Vilâyetnâme*," (M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1981), pp. 22-26. Definitive summaries of the early history of the *Bektâşîye* appear in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Maarif Vekaleti/ Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1940-), s.v. "Bektaş" (M. F. Köprülü) and *Türk Ansiklopedisi*, s.v. "Bektaşilik" (A. Gölpinarlı?).

⁴ For details on *Yeniçeri* - *Bektâşî* relations, see Mehmed Fuat Köprülü, "Anadolu'da İslâmîyet: Türk istilâsından sonra Anadolu târih-i dinisine bir nazar ve bu târihin menba'ları", *Dürûl-fünûn Edebîyât Fakültesi Mecmû'ası* 2 (1922-23), pp. 405-8 and İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatından Kapıkulu Ocakları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1943-44), 1, pp. 147-150. A recent evaluation is Irène Mélikoff's "Un ordre des derviches colonisateurs, les Bektachis: leur rôle social et leurs rapports avec les premiers sultans ottomans," in *Memorial Ömer Lütfi Barkan*, Bibliothèque de l'Institut Français d'Études Anatoliennes d'Istanbul, no. 28 (Paris: Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient Adrien Maisonneuve, 1980), pp. 149-157.

⁵ Adnan Ötügen II Halk Kütüphanesi, Ankara, ms. no. 643 (dated 1173/1759), fol. 93a. See also Hüseyin Fehmi, "Otman Baba ve Vilâyetnâmesi" *Türk Yurdu* 5 (1927), p. 241, and Abdülhakî Gölpinarlı, ed., *Vilâyetnâme: Menâkıb-i Hacı Bektâş Veli* (Istanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1958), p. 129.

is depicted as a somewhat orthodox figure, dressed in a robe and turban and riding a horse, also accompanied by a few nondescript dervishes.⁶ The important *Bektâşî* hagiographies *Menâkıb-i Hâcî Bektâş-i Velî* and *Vilâyetnâme-i Hâcım Sultân*, most probably composed around the turn of the tenth/sixteenth century, are silent on *Bektâşî* dervishes of the period, while on a different front, it is not possible to trace even a single *Bektâşî* poet prior to the same century.⁷ On a similar note, it should be pointed out that of the *tekkes* that can clearly be identified as *Bektâşî* establishments, none can be traced back to the ninth/fifteenth century and only six to the following century.⁸ Under these circumstances, it seems fair to state that our sources are on the whole silent on the early history of *Bektâşî* dervishes.

III

Seen against this background of silence, the importance of Vâhidî's *Menâkıb* as the source of the earliest firsthand description of the *Bektâşîs* available to us becomes quite obvious. The *Menâkıb* contains a separate chapter on these elusive dervishes, which I will need to summarize here in order to be able to make a few comments upon it later.⁹

The heads and faces of Vâhidî's *Bektâşîs* are clean-shaven. They wear twelve-gored conical caps of white felt that are two hands wide and two hands high. These caps are split in the front and the back and are ornamented with a button made of 'Seyyid Gâzî stone' (meerscham?) at the top, to which are

⁶*Vilâyetnâme-i Otman Baba*, fols. 112b-113a. (note 5).

⁷The published versions of the hagiographies mentioned are Gölpanarı, ed., *Vilâyetnâme* (note 4), and Rudolf Tschudi, ed., *Das Vilâyet-nâme des Hadschim Sultan: Eine türkische Heiligengedichte*, Türkische Bibliothek 17 (Berlin: Mayer & Müller, 1914). The standard work on *Bektâşî* poets is Sadeddin Nüzhet Ergun's *Bektaşî Edebiyatı Antolojisi: Bektaşî Şairleri ve Nefesleri*, 2nd ed., 3 vols. in 2 (Istanbul: Maarif Kitaphanesi, 1955-56). Although Ergun lists many "Bektâşî" poets who lived prior to the tenth/sixteenth century, his identification of these poets as "*Bektâşîs*" rests only upon an indiscriminately broad definition of that term and not upon any concrete evidence. I have demonstrated the necessity of adopting more restricted and specific definitions for such names of dervish-types as *Bektâşî*, *Abdâl*, *Kalender*, and *Hayderî* elsewhere ("Vâhidî's *Menâkıb*, [note 1]) and, upon closer examination, find it impossible to identify as *Bektâşîs* any of the pre-tenth/sixteenth century poets enumerated by Ergun. The poet Nedîmî, who appears to have been a genuine *Bektâşî* assigned to the second half of the ninth/tenth century by Ergun (*Bektaşî Edebiyatı Antolojisi*, 1, p. 29) could more reasonably be dated back to the first half of the following century in accordance with the notice on this poet in *Sehî Beg's Heşt Bihîşt*, Günay Kut, ed., *Sources of Oriental Languages and Literature* 5, *Turkic Sources* 5 (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), 59b: in any case, the only legitimate conclusion that one can draw in the absence of other information on this poet is that he was dead before the composition of *Sehî Beg's* work in 945/1538-39, which is not sufficient reason to date him back to the ninth/fifteenth century.

⁸Faroghî, *Der Bektaşchi-Orden*, 14, n. 1 (note 2).

⁹See text in Karamustafa, "Vâhidî's *Menâkıb*," 74a-80b (note 1).

attached long woolen tassels reaching down to the shoulders. On four sides of the fold of the cap are written (i) *lâ ilâhe illa'llâh*, (ii) *Muhammedün resûlallâh*, (iii) *Âlî Mürtezâ*, and (iv) *Hasan ve Hüseyin*. The dervishes are dressed in short and simple felt cloaks and tunics. They carry drums and tambourines as well as banners and are busy chanting hymns and prayers.

It is explained that their faces and heads are clear-shaven after the example of Hâcî Bektâş, who supposedly lost all the hair on his head and face as a result of forty years of ascetic exercise which he completed on top of a tree. Caps as well are worn in memory of Hâcî Bektâş: by carrying these caps on their heads, the *Bektâşîs* demonstrate their submission to their spiritual leader. Similarly, the writings on the caps are intended as means of glorifying the Prophet, 'Alî, Hasan and Hüseyin. The button on the cap stands for the human 'head', since the *Bektâşîs* are in reality 'beheaded dead people' (*ser-burîde murde*), that is, they have died before death. Indeed, they are none other than the hidden *evliyâ* themselves.

IV

This relatively short account of Vâhidî is interesting on a number of fronts. First of all, it immediately strikes one that there is in this description no sign of characteristically *Bektâşîs* paraphernalia such as *çerâğ*, *pâlheng*, *teslîm taştı*, *mengûş*, and *teber*.¹⁰ Nor is there any reference to *Bektâşî* saints such as Balım Sultân (Hızır Baltı, said to have been the supreme *Bektâşî* leader between 907/1501-2 and 922/1516-17), Hâfâyî (Shâh İsmâ'il, 907/1501-24), Nesîmî (d. 407/1404-5 or 420/1417-18), Abdâl Mûsâ (fl. 8th/14th century) and Kaygusuz Abdâl (fl. second half of 8th/14th century and the first quarter of 9th/15th century), all of whom become so prominent in later periods.¹¹ Perhaps more significantly, not even a single one of the unmistakably *Bektâşî* tenets of the later times such as the Allâh-Muhammed-'Alî 'trinity', the doctrine of the 'four gates' or veneration of the twelve *imâms* and the 'fourteen innocents' is mentioned.¹²

¹⁰For these and others not mentioned by Vâhidî, one should consult John Kingsley Birge, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes* (Hartford, Conn.: Hartford Seminary Press, 1937), *passim*. Also cf. *Türk Ansiklopedisi*, s.v. "Bektaşilik" (note 3). Vâhidî's description of the *Bektâşî* cap is, however, in agreement with *Bektâşî* tradition, see *ibid.* under the subtitle "Bektaşî Cihazı."

¹¹For the dates of Balım Sultân, see for instance Gölpınarlı, ed., *Vilâyetnâme*, XXV (note 4). Basic information on other 'saints' mentioned can be found in the following studies: Kathleen R. F. Burdill, *The Quatrains of Nesîmî: Fourteenth-Century Turkic Hurufları* (The Hague: Mouton, 1972); Mehmet Fuat Köprülü, "Abdal Musa," *Türk Kültürü* 11 (1973), pp. 198-207; and Abdurrahman Güzel, *Kaygusuz Abdal*, Doğumunun 100. Yılında Atatürk Yayınları, no 29 (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1981).

¹²Details can be found in Birge, *The Bektashi Order* (note 10).

Is it possible to account for these rather curious features of Vâhidî's chapter on the *Bektâşîs*? In order to be able to answer this question, we should turn to a general consideration of the *Menâkıb* as whole, which will serve to extend the scope of our investigation beyond the one limited dervish group of the *Bektâşîye*.

V

Although it is in the first instance a didactic treatise of soteriological guidance that is designed to initiate the reader into and inculcate in him the basic doctrines of the 'correct' sufi path, the *Menâkıb* is simultaneously a most remarkable source for the history of mysticism in the Ottoman Empire at the inception of Süleymân the Magnificent's reign (926-74/1520-66). I have to pass in silence over the highly interesting structure of the *Menâkıb* and underline instead the feature of the work that is of immediate relevance to us here, namely that it contains substantial accounts of nine different dervish groups and thus enables us to have a panoramic view of Ottoman *taşavvuf* at the turn of the tenth/sixteenth century. The nine dervish groups, in the order in which they are described by Vâhidî in separate chapters are *Kalenders*, *Abdâls of Rûm*, *Hayderîs*, *Câmîs*, *Bektâşîs*, *Şems-i Tebrîzîs*, *Edhemîs*, *Mevlevîs*, and a final group simply designated as *Şûfîs*. Each chapter starts with a vivid physical description of the dervishes under scrutiny and proceeds to provide the reader with essential information on their beliefs and practices. The narrative itself is in a lucid and flowing style, and the result is a set of lively portraits of the dervish groups enumerated which, for the most part, can hardly be matched by the rare and meagre references that other historical sources have to offer on the subject.¹³

Looking over this list of dervish groups, one cannot at first sight help being surprised at the inclusion of a separate group called *Şûfîs*. Upon closer analysis, however, this apparent inconsistency of classification is easily resolved: *Şûfî* is the name by which Vâhidî designates the members of the 'Orthodox' orders, in particular the *Halvetîye* and the *Zeynîye*, which were the largest and most influential sufi institutions in the Ottoman Empire of the period and with which Vâhidî himself was to all indications affiliated. It is, in any case, clear that his own commitment is to the *Şûfîs*, whom he describes at the end of his work, devoting to them far more space than all the other groups and singling them out for the most detailed treatment.¹⁴

¹³Summaries of the chapters in question are given in Karamustafa, "Vâhidî's *Menâkıb*," Chapter 3, pp. 88-192 (note 1).

¹⁴For a close analysis of Vâhidî's '*Şûfîs*,' see Karamustafa, "Vâhidî's *Menâkıb*," pp. 183-192 (note 1).

Of the remaining eight groups, Vâhidî extends his approval to only two, namely the *Edhemîs* and the *Mevlevîs*, while he severely criticizes all the others as being 'false' *Şûfis*. Vâhidî's evaluation of these antinomian groups is itself worthy of study, yet what interests us here is the fact that the *Bektâşîs* figure in the *Menâkıb* as only one of a larger family of dervish groups to which we can assign the general name of 'mystical antinomians' or more appropriately 'mystical anarchists'.¹⁵ Indeed, a careful reading of the *Menâkıb* suggests that the different types of antinomian dervishes under scrutiny formed distinct social groups that were distinguished from each other by appearance, distinctive paraphernalia and specific set of beliefs and practices. This observation is vindicated by an exhaustive study of the history of the dervish groups in question on the basis of information extracted from independent source materials in Arabic, Persian and Turkish. From this study, to which I can refer here only in summary fashion, it becomes clear that, in spite of the often tedious and indirect nature of the relevant documentation, it is quite possible to identify the distinctive features of all of these groups and to trace them, admittedly not as conclusively as one would like to, through time and space.¹⁶

VI

Thus it emerges that of the six mystical anarchist groups described in the *Menâkıb*, the *Kalenders* and the *Hayderîs* first flourished especially in the Arab Middle East and Iran in the seventh/thirteenth and eighth/fourteenth centuries, simultaneously spreading to Muslim North India in the East and Anatolia in the West. Both of these early groups came into being under the formative influence of founding fathers who lived in late sixth/twelfth and early seventh/thirteenth centuries and whose memories survived long after this date, namely Jamâl al-Dîn-i Sâvî in the case of the *Kalenders* and Quṭb al-Dîn Ḥaydar in that of the *Hayderîs*. Jamâl al-Dîn and Quṭb al-Dîn, of Iranian and Turkish stock respectively, were austere ascetics who, whether in spite of their intentions or in accordance with them, attracted sizeable following through sensational practices and miracles, and it is clear that the most characteristic features of their followers, namely the shaving of the head, beard, moustache and eyebrows (a practice known as *chahâr zarb* in later times) in the case of the *Kalenders* and wearing iron collars, rings, earrings, bracelets and belts in the case of the *Hayderîs*, can be traced back to their personal example. These two groups attained

¹⁵I borrow the term 'mystical anarchists' from Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages* (London: Paladin Books, 1970. Reprint. 1984).

¹⁶Here and in the remaining sections of the article, I am drawing directly upon my doctoral dissertation, "Vâhidî's *Menâkıb*" (note 17). The documentation for the views presented in these sections is simply too copious to be cited within the confines of this short paper, and I have to refer the interested reader to the dissertation itself.

a remarkable degree of popularity all over the Islamic lands in the Later Middle Period, which did not lose its intensity until after the tenth/sixteenth century. To illustrate the Ottoman case in particular, the indubitable presence of the *Kalenders* and *Hayderis* is demonstrated not only by numerous references in Ottoman sources and, significantly, in the accounts of European travellers such as Spandugino and Menavino, but also by the existence of several *Kalenderî* and *Hayderî* hospices during the ninth/fifteenth and tenth/sixteenth centuries within the borders of the Empire.

The remaining four groups, *Abdâls* of Rûm, *Bektâşis*, *Câmîs* and *Şems-i Tebrîzîs*, were on the whole geographically restricted to Anatolia and the Balkans and attained their high points in the second half of the ninth/fifteenth and the first half of the tenth/sixteenth centuries. Of these, the *Şems-i Tebrîzîs* are historically the least well-known, though it seems clear that they should be identified with the 'intoxicated' arm of the *Mevlevîye* known as the arm of Şems which seems to have particularly thrived during the tenth/sixteenth century around the figures of Yûsuf Sîneçâk (d. 953/1546) and Dîvâne Mehmed Çelebî (d. second half of the century), as opposed to the 'sober' arm known as the arm of Veled after Jalâl al-Dîn Rûmî's son, Sultân Veled. For their part, the *Câmîs* saw themselves as followers of Shihâb al-Dîn Abû Naşr Ahmad al-Nâmaqî al-Jâmî, an early Iranian mystic of the fifth/eleventh and sixth/twelfth centuries whose connection with his late Ottoman disciples remains obscure. A gay lot much taken to music and poetry, the *Câmîs* attracted general attention by their pleasant concerts, their apparel and their elaborately coiffeured long hair.

More numerous, however, than both the *Şems-i Tebrîzîs* and the *Câmîs*, or the *Bektâşis* for that matter, as well as more widespread were the *Abdâls* of Rûm. The history of this group is very complex and is in need of further research, but the contours of the movement as it existed in the latter half of the ninth/fifteenth and the first half of the tenth/sixteenth century can be reconstructed with some certainty. The two central figures of the group were Sultân Şücâ' and Otman Baba, whose life stories are preserved for us in their hagiographies (*Vilâyetnâme-i Sultân Şücâ'* and *Vilâyetnâme-i Otman Baba* respectively), and the physical center of the movement was the mausoleum and later the hospice of Seyyid Gâzî in Eskişehir. The *Abdâls* were fervent *Şî'îs* who practiced blood-shedding as well as self-cauterization during the month of Muḥarram and whose paraphernalia included an 'Ebû Müslimî' hatchet, a 'Şücâ't' club, a distinctive horn and a very large yellow spoon with an ankle bone suspended from its handle. They included among their numbers well-known poets such as 'Askerî, Kelâmî, Yeûmî, Şemsî and Hayretî and possessed many hospices and mausoleums especially in central Anatolia and the Balkans.

VII

To return to the *Bektâşîs*, it should now be clear that they were but one, and to all indications not even the largest one, of the many mystical anarchist groups that existed in Ottoman society of the first quarter of the tenth/sixteenth century. Already, however, certain social processes were at work that were to lead to the unification and institutionalization of mystical anarchist movements as well as some other 'heretic' sects such as the *Hurûfiye* under the umbrella of a larger central organization which became the *Bektâşî* order of the late tenth/sixteenth century and beyond.¹⁷

This is not the place to examine this complicated and obscure development in detail, but it is clear that at least in part the somewhat surprising institutionalization of anarchist movements that one would expect to have been inimically disposed towards any kind of organization should be attributed to the increasingly obvious necessity that must have made itself felt among antinomian dervish groups of the Ottoman Empire to acquire sufficient respectability to avoid severe persecution by the state. In this respect, and disregarding all other factors for the moment, the *Bektâşîs* had a crucial advantage over all other groups in their unbreachable, and for the modern historian still enigmatic, connections with the backbone of the Ottoman army, the *Yeniçeris*, and it is not surprising to see that they became the melting pot for the other anarchist dervish groups, with the exception of the *Şems-i Tebrîzîs* who had a safe refuge in their parent organization the *Mevlevîye* and the *Câmîs* who died out altogether. The *Abdâls* of Rûm, for whom the danger of persecution was particularly acute since they openly professed *ihnâ 'asharî* beliefs, the *Kalenders* and *Hayderîs*, whether deliberately or in the course of time, all joined the ranks of the *Bektâşîs*, and thus arose the 'classical' *Bektâşî* order of the later Ottoman period with its characteristic rites, paraphernalia and syncretic doctrines.

VIII

We can now answer the question that was raised earlier on in the paper concerning the conspicuous absence, from the chapter of the *Menâkıb* on the *Bektâşîs*, of the distinctive features of the later *Bektâşî* order. It should be evident by now that it is not possible to attribute this state of affairs to the ignorance of the author Vâhidî, whose accounts are so faithful to historical reality. In the light of the above discussion, it seems inevitable to accept that the *Bektâşîs* of the early tenth/sixteenth century were indeed more or less like Vâhidî described them and that everything not mentioned by Vâhidî but known to have been present in

¹⁷On *Hurûfiye*, see especially Abdûlbaki Gölpınarlı, *Hurufîlik Metinleri Kataloğu* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1973).

later *Bektâşîye* developed only through later accretions in post-Vâhidî times. One could, for instance, point out that the *teber* ('Ebû Müslimî' hatchet) and the *mengûş* (iron carring) were more characteristic of the *Abdâls* of Rûm and the *Hayderîs* respectively and that they were incorporated into the emerging *Bektâşî* order later on in the sixteenth century. The appearance of Abdâl Mûsâ, Kaygusuz Abdâl, Nesîmî, etc. in the *Bektâşî* 'pantheon' and the development of *Bektâşî* doctrines, especially their passionate *Shî'ism*, should also be explained through similar arguments. Admittedly, a detailed history of the process of fusion whereby the earlier and distinct groups of mystical anarchists united to form the later *Bektâşîye* would be very difficult to write, but, however relevant, this is a different research topic that would require a separate study, and the lack of such a study at present does not detract from the central thesis of the present essay, namely that the 'classical' *Bektâşî* order came into being only during and after the time of Süleymân the Magnificent through the blending together of the earlier antinomian mystic groups of the *Kalenders*, the *Hayderîs*, the *Abdâls* of Rûm and the *Bektâşîs* — as well as another more elusive movement that was not taken into consideration here, the *Hurûfîs*.

TRADE CONTROLS, PROVISIONING POLICIES, AND DONATIONS: THE EGYPT-HIJAZ CONNECTION DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Suraiya FAROQHI

Scholars dealing with the Ottoman Empire under Kânûnî Süleymân and his immediate successors have long been fascinated by the manner in which the political apparatus commanded and controlled what we today consider "the economy."¹ The dominant principles of Ottoman "economic policies" have also been known for quite some time, and have recently been well summarized by Mehmed Genç.² These include a concern with provisioning and keeping the markets supplied, and a resulting bias in favor of imports and against exports ("provisionism"); a tendency to look back to a (real or mythical) past for guidance in solving the problems of the present ("traditionalism"); and an overriding concern with state finances ("fiscalism"). None of these features is unique to the Ottoman Empire. Marcel Aymard's work on sixteenth-century Venice has revealed the unremitting concern and all-pervasive intervention of the Venetian authorities whenever matters related to the local food supply were involved.³ A tendency to look back to the past for guidance and to dress up even quite radical innovations as a return to hallowed traditions is extremely widespread in pre-industrial cultures. As one example among many, one might name the ideologies of European medieval peasant uprisings.⁴ Finally, fiscalism was the hallmark — and the bane — of European states throughout the early modern period, and the combination of organized violence and fiscalism has

¹For one example among many compare Lütü Güçer, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Dahilinde Hububat Ticaretinin Tabii Olduğu Kayıtlar," *I.U. İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 13, 1-4 (1951-52), pp. 79-98.

²Oral contribution to the congress on Turkish economic and social history (Munich, August 1986).

³Marcel Aymard, *Venise, Raguse et le commerce du blé pendant la seconde moitié du XVI^e siècle* (Paris, 1966).

⁴For an example, see Rodney Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free, Medieval Peasant Movements and the English Rising of 1381* (London, 1973), p. 22.

induced Charles Tilly to compare the state of this period to a vulgar protection racket.⁵

These obvious parallels between "economic policies" in early modern Europe and the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire are worthy of a careful study, an undertaking which at present is still very much in its beginnings.⁶ More important for our present purposes is the problem why the common features shared by Ottoman and European provisioning policies of the early modern period have so rarely been dwelt upon. It is probable that this neglect has nothing to do with provisioning policies *per se*, but rather with more general views about the nature of the Ottoman Empire. After all, European diplomats of Kânûnî's time and twentieth-century scholars generally agree in emphasizing the unique and specific features of the Ottoman Empire, a state and society that are made out to be all but inaccessible to comparison. Even today a comparative approach to Ottoman history still appears to most researchers as an unfamiliar and somewhat risky project.⁷

Part of the answer to this problem must doubtlessly be sought in the political and intellectual history of the Ottoman-Habsburg confrontation, in the role of orientalism and exoticism in nineteenth — and twentieth — century Ottoman studies, and last but not least, in the dominant role of *étatisme* and wartime mobilization during the formative period of Ottoman studies in Turkey. But important though all these factors have been, it is hard to deny that Ottoman provisioning policies also showed some special features which make a preponderant and -by extension- all but unique role of the Ottoman state appear at least plausible. Among the latter, one might name the simultaneous conduct of

⁵ Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," *Bringing the State Back In*, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol (Cambridge, Engl., 1985), pp. 169-191.

⁶ An analysis of Ottoman policies with respect to trade has been undertaken by Halil İnalcık: "Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire" *The Journal of Economic History*, 19 (1969), pp. 97-140. As the most recent contribution see Cemal Kafadar, "When Coins Turned into Drops of Dew and Bankers Became Robbers of Shadows: The Boundaries of Ottoman Economic Imagination at the end of the Sixteenth Century," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, McGill University, 1986. I thank the author for allowing me access to this manuscript.

⁷ The problems involved can be seen with particular clarity if one considers the criticisms of Andrew Hess directed at Fernand Braudel's attempt to treat the sixteenth-century Mediterranean as a unit. Hess, on the other hand, sees the tendency of the Mediterranean world to split apart into two halves ignoring one another as far as possible, as the crucial development of the closing years of the sixteenth century. What makes the issue complicated is the fact that hostility or even the wish to ignore one another does not necessarily exclude the sharing of many common features. In fact, if everyday twentieth-century experience is any guide in this matter, hostility may be all the deeper when there is enough common ground that both sides understand very well the points where they differ... But this matter cannot possibly be adequately treated in a footnote, or even a short paper. See Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen au temps de Philippe II*, 2 vols (Paris, 1966), *passim*; and Andrew Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier, A. History of the Sixteenth Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago, 1978), p. 3 and elsewhere.

wars on both the Balkan and Persian fronts and the mid-sixteenth century control of the Mediterranean by the Ottoman navy, both of which constituted major logistic achievements. In addition, there is the provisioning of half a million or so estimated inhabitants of Istanbul to be considered. Much less in the twentieth-century historian's field of vision, the provisioning of pilgrims and permanent residents of the Hijaz should also be included among the centrally directed operations, through which the Ottoman state manifested its concern with provisioning. All these achievements possessed one common feature, in that they required a considerable mobilization of men and resources, which was in turn achieved by subjecting market processes to fairly stringent central controls.⁸

When explaining how the armies, the capital city or the Hijaz were supplied, we need to look not only at the technical problems involved and at their solutions, but also to the ideology which informed policy. It must be admitted that the present paper is mainly concerned with the practical side of matters, since the provisioning of the sixteenth-century Hijaz has been little studied, and concrete, local problems therefore need to be outlined in some detail. But the ultimate aim is to go beyond a simple analysis of how foodstuffs were moved from Egypt to the Hijaz. Rather the aim is to show how ideology constituted the reason for undertaking certain practical projects, while at the same time conditions in the real world upon occasion made it necessary to settle for compromise solutions as far as ideological requirements were concerned.

This interplay between ideology and practice is of course no more unique to the Ottoman system than are fiscalism, traditionalism and provisionism. But what might be regarded as a drawback of these concepts from one point of view, becomes a virtue when regarded from a different angle. After all, we are interested in understanding not only in what manner the Ottoman system of state and society differed from its neighbours, but also in what broader social categories this system might conceivably be included. But if that is the case, then it is worthwhile to study the manner in which ideological formulations, political requirements, and the material interests of traders affected one another.

WHAT THE OTTOMANS TOOK OVER IN THE HIJAZ

When Sultan Selim I conquered Egypt and Syria in 1516-17, the Hijaz became an Ottoman possession without any further military action. The

⁸ Apart from Güçer's article, an elaborate description of these controls in the case of Istanbul can be found in Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la deuxième moitié du dix-septième siècle, Essai d'histoire institutionnelle, économique et sociale*, Bibliothèque archéologique et historique de l'Institut Français d'archéologie d'Istanbul (Paris, 1963), pp. 179-493.

voluntary submission of the Meccan *Şerifs* provided Selim I with added prestige, since by this act the Ottomans became the protectors both of the pilgrims and of the Holy Cities. But by the same act, the Ottomans took over a set of arrangements that went back to the Mamluk, Ayyubid, Abbasid, or even earlier periods. These arrangements, regardless of the date of their institution, possessed considerable prestige, simply because they were an established feature of life in the Holy Cities and thus could claim religious legitimation.⁹

On this basis of the work that Halil İnalcık has done on Ottoman policies in newly acquired territories, we can compare the situation in the sixteenth-century Hijaz with that in other parts of the Empire shortly after the Ottoman conquest.¹⁰ We know that in territories formerly in the hands of Christian rulers the Ottoman administration was most flexible concerning the retention or rejection of pre-conquest customs. On the other hand, in "old" Islamic territories, the sultans' hands were quite often tied by more or less explicit understandings with members of the former ruling classes. But it was in the case of the Holy Cities that the Ottoman administration possessed least room for manoeuvre. After all, any deviation from charitable and administrative practices established by previous dynasties would have invited invidious comparisons, and thereby undermined the legitimacy of Ottoman rule.

Among the grants-in-aid given by rulers of Islamic states to the inhabitants of the Hijaz, assignment of public revenues to the *Şerifs* of Mecca had a particularly long history. For the Ayyubid period, we possess the testimony of Ibn Jubayr, a Valencian scholar who performed the pilgrimage in 1183 AD. According to this author, Sultan Şalâheddîn had persuaded the *emîr* of Mecca to forego taxing the pilgrims, in exchange for a yearly gift of 2000 *dînâr* and 20002 *irdebb* of wheat, in addition to rents from certain lands in Upper Egypt and the Yemen. But as Ibn Jubayr graphically recounts, in years when the subsidies did not arrive punctually, the *emîr* had no qualms about arresting wealthy pilgrims - the author included - and extorting money from them.¹¹

On the other hand, the Ottoman authorities of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries seem to have been quite successful in eliminating this kind of abuse. *Mühimme* registers of the second half of the sixteenth century contain quite a few references to complaints from pilgrims. But these complaints refer to such matters as marauding Bedouins, depredations of the *beytülmül emîni* and non-arrival of food supplies. To date no reference has been found concerning

⁹For Mamluk-Ottoman continuity with respect to the pilgrimage, see J. Jomier, *Le mahmal et la caravane des pèlerins de la Mecque (XIII-XX siècles)*, Publications de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale, Recherches de philologie et d'histoire, vol. XX (Cairo, 1953), *passim*.

¹⁰Halil İnalcık, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest," *Studia Islamica*, II (1954), pp. 104-129.

¹¹Ibn Jubayr, *The Travels of Ibn Jubayr...* tr. R.J.C. Broadhurst (London, 1952), pp. 71-2.

illegal taxation on the part of the *Şerif* of Mecca. Even Evliyâ Çelebi, who had no particular liking for the *Şerifs* and seemed more than ready to repeat any story which might discredit them, only referred to the illegal taxation of pilgrims as an event that occasionally had occurred in the past, and particularly as an abuse abolished by Sultan Kayıthây.¹² Thus one might speculate that the lavish Ottoman subsidies sent to the *Şerif* of Mecca usually made it seem unnecessary - and inadvisable - for the latter to collect money from the pilgrims. In turn, this state of affairs probably constituted a matter of prestige as far as the Ottoman sultans were concerned, although at present, no official text has been found explicitly forbidding the *Şerif* to tax pilgrims.

Even more binding than the practice of Ayyubid rulers was the example of the Mamluk sultans. We know that Mehmed the Conqueror had offered to reconstruct Mecca's water pipes, and was rebuffed by the then ruling sultan of Egypt and Syria with the reply that these kinds of donations were the prerogative of the rulers of Egypt.¹³ Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Kânûnî Süleymân and his immediate successors should have engaged in massive construction projects in Medina and especially in Mecca, and torn down important Mamluk monuments in the process.¹⁴ But from the provisioning point of view, the Mamluk heritage mainly consisted of the public foundations established in Egypt under the auspices of various sultans, that were meant to provide free grain for the inhabitants of Mecca and Medina. Many of these foundations had been depleted in the course of time, and by 1517 no longer produced significant supplies. This process of depletion, quite often due to the depredations of foundation administrators and others, continued apace during the early years of Ottoman rule as well, if the testimony of the Meccan chronicler Kuşbeddîn is to be relied upon in this matter.¹⁵ But on the other hand, Kânûnî Süleymân and later his grandson Murâd III both set up very sizeable foundations of the same type, which should have compensated the inhabitants of the Hijaz for most of the losses previously incurred. Moreover, throughout the second half of the sixteenth century, piecemeal additions of villages to make up for the depletion of previously assigned resources were frequent.¹⁶ Thus it would seem that the provision of sizeable subventions to the Holy Cities of the Hijaz

¹² Evliya Çelebi, *Seyâhatnâme*, 10 vols. (Istanbul 1314/1896-97 to 1938), vol. 9, p. 682.

¹³ Franz Dabinger, *Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit, Weltentstürmer einer Zeitenwende* (Munich, 1953), p. 443.

¹⁴ For a brief overview of Ottoman construction projects in Mecca, compare Nejat Göyünç, "Some Documents Concerning the Ka'ba in the Sixteenth Century," *Studies in the History of Arabia*, ed. A. Mahmoud Abdalla and others, vol. 2 (Riyadh, 1972), pp. 177-181. Emel Esin, "The Renovations Effected in the Ka'bah Mosque, by the Ottoman Sultan Selim II (H. 974-82/1566-74)," *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, XII-39-40 (1985), pp. 227-232.

¹⁵ Compare Ferdinand Wüstenfeld, *Geschichte der Stadt Mecca, nach den arabischen Chroniken bearbeitet* (reprint, Beirut, 1964), vol. 4, p. 302.

¹⁶ Başbakanlık (Osmanlı), Arşivi, Istanbul. Mühimme Defterleri (from now on MD) 43, p. 203, no. 365 (988/1580-81); MD 53, p. 147, no. 426 (992/1584).

constituted an example of ideological factors, including competition with the Mamluk Sultans, determining the allocation of quite considerable resources. The provisioning of Mecca and Medina was, to an appreciable extent, financed by resources which otherwise would have been at the disposal of the Ottoman central administration.

THE POLITICAL POSITION OF THE MECCAN ŞERIF AND HIS CLAIM TO SUBSIDIES

But apart from the religious considerations and the "politics of prestige" outlined above, there were also more narrowly political factors involved in the decision to supply the Hijaz and thereby facilitate the conduct of the pilgrimage. After all, given the existence of more than one Muslim empire during the second half of the sixteenth century, the *Şerifs* as the local rulers of the Hijaz did possess a certain room for manoeuvre. Certainly, the dependence of the Hijazi population upon Egyptian food supplies ultimately would have made it impossible for the *Şerifs* to entirely turn away from the Ottomans. But the existence of a very active Indian diplomacy in the Hijaz, particularly during the reign of Akbar (1542-1605), must have acted as an added inducement to supply the Holy Cities adequately.¹⁷

Moreover, the Indian presence in the Hijaz provided the Meccan *Şerifs* with room for manoeuvre in yet another sense: in the second half of the sixteenth century, the *Şerifs* possessed a share in the customs revenues of Jiddah, fifty percent of which accrued to the Ottoman central administration, while the other half was collected by the *Şerif*.¹⁸ As long as Indian and Arab ships frequented the port of Jiddah, the *Şerif* thus possessed an independent source of revenue that permitted him a certain amount of leeway in politics. But with the closing decades of the sixteenth century, this source of revenue was progressively to dry up, leaving the *Şerif s* in a difficult position both politically and financially. It would be of interest to know whether these problems had any repercussions upon the regularity of the arrival of Egyptian grain supplies, since a *Şerif* with fewer options was probably treated with less solicitude. But at present no document has been located that would permit us to judge this matter.

¹⁷This matter is treated in more detail in this author's book on Ottoman *hâjj* organization in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: *Herrscher über Mekka: Die Geschichte der Pilgerfahrt* (Munich and Zürich, 1990).

¹⁸*Târih-i Peçevî*, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1283/1866-67, reprinted with an introduction and index by Fahri Derin and Vahit Çabuk, Istanbul, 1980), vol. 1, pp. 484-485.

TRANSPORTING EGYPTIAN GRAIN SUPPLIES TO THE HIJAZ

Not only the Hijazi grain supply itself, but also the transportation of Egyptian grain to the Holy Cities was only in part a commercial venture. A significant though unquantifiable share arrived in boats belonging to the same public foundations of Egypt which supplied the grain. This arrangement differs significantly from Istanbul custom, where in spite of very close state supervision, both the production of the necessary grain and transportation to the capital were in private hands.¹⁹ In the case of shipping, this difference is probably to be explained by the extreme difficulty of procuring timber suitable for shipbuilding and naval stores in the deserts that bounded the Red Sea, for as a result, the construction of ships was even more expensive than usual. As the Nile valley was devoid of timber, the closest source of this essential raw material would have been what remained of the Anatolian forests, and these were partly depleted and partly reserved for the use of the Ottoman navy. Thus it can be explained that from Ibn Jubayr to Richard Burton, travellers complained about the overcrowding and unsafe conditions on Red Sea ships.²⁰

The actual process of grain transportation is reasonably well documented. Grains grown in Upper Egypt were transported down the Nile, then unloaded probably in Bülâk,²¹ and taken by camel caravan to Suez on the Red Sea. From this port, which during the pilgrimage season was quite animated though it was lacking in water, boats belonging to the Egyptian foundations were supposed to take the grain destined for Medina as far as Yanbu^c.²² There it was loaded onto Bedouin camels; this process was supervised by a member of the *Şerif* family resident in Yanbu^c.²³ As to the grain intended for Mecca, it was transported by ship as far as Jiddah and from there to Mecca by camel.

In this complicated process, a key role was played by the *emîn* of Suez, who at the end of the sixteenth century, frequently was not a salaried official, but a tax farmer. The latter was apparently in charge of supplying the boatmen with instruments and naval supplies; for when a boat sank, the responsibility was that of the *emîn* of Suez because he had been remiss in this matter.²⁴ Moreover, the *emîn* of Suez was empowered to check the condition of boats getting ready to

¹⁹Maotran, *Istanbul*, p. 427ff.

²⁰*Ibn Jubayr*, tr. Broadhurst, pp. 64-65; Sir Richard E. Burton, *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah*, 2 vols. (reprint, New York, 1964), vol. 1, p. 172, 189.

²¹MD60, p. 150, no. 350 (993/1585).

²²On Suez before the opening of the Suez Canal, compare Burton, *Narrative*, vol. 1, p. 176ff.

²³MD26, p. 136, no. 336 (984/1576-77); MD60, p. 292, no. 679 (994/1585-86).

²⁴MD26, p. 241, no. 692 (982/1574-75).

leave the port, and prevent overloading.²⁵ However judging from the frequency of complaints, it would seem that many *emîns* viewed their office mainly as a source of profit. As a result, accidents due to overloading were frequent; particularly since most major boat owners, such as the sultan or the larger Egyptian foundations, did not themselves operate their boats but farmed them out to the highest bidder. The latter then had a direct interest in earning as much money as possible through freight charges, but suffered no pecuniary loss if the ship foundered. Under these circumstances, the *emîn* must have played a vital role in controlling the activities of the farmers of institutionally owned boats; and the failure of this control mechanism was no light matter.

But apart from collusion of this type, there existed the possibility that the *emîn* of Suez might come to an understanding with grain merchants plying their trade in the Red Sea. Now Mecca and Medina were in an uncommonly difficult position as far as their food supplies were concerned, as local resources could in no way satisfy demand even in good years. Moreover, the pilgrims, even though they brought some supplies of their own, constituted an additional, and to a certain extent unpredictable, demand factor. As a result, prices were liable to increase dramatically at the slightest indication of trouble, as attested by an interesting document referring to the very last years of Mamluk rule.²⁶ Thus, the delivery of grain from Egyptian foundations was of vital importance not only to the recipients of grain doles, but even to those inhabitants of Mecca and Medina who bought their own food, totally or in part; for the presence of grain in the city helped to keep market prices at a level that ordinary consumers could afford.

On the other hand, for merchants on the lookout for speculative gains, this situation obviously presented a golden opportunity. Even if deliveries from Egyptian foundations were only slightly behind schedule, prices in Mecca would increase enough to permit a tidy profit. For this purpose, it is reported that certain merchants came to an understanding with the *emîn* of Suez.²⁷ In some instances, the latter even went so far as to unload boats already laden with foodstuffs provided by the Egyptian foundations, so that merchants might transport their own goods instead. Under these circumstances, the Ottoman state responded by decreeing that *wakîf* grains were to be accorded priority when space in ships was at a premium. Moreover, the *beg* of Jiddah and the *kadi* of Mecca were enjoined to aid the *emîn* of Suez in controlling the shipowners. These two officials were expected to confiscate all goods that had reached Mecca in ships earmarked for the transportation of foundation-owned grains, and it was hoped

²⁵MD58, p. 158, no. 418 (993/1585).

²⁶Yakup Mughul, "Portekizlilerle Kızılderiz'de Mücadele ve Hicaz'da Osmanlı Hakimiyetinin Yerleşmesi hakkında bir Vesika," *Belgeler*, I, 2 (1964), pp. 37-47.

²⁷MD58, p. 158, no. 418 (993/1585).

that this draconic measure would ensure the timely arrival of much needed food supplies.

Thus in this context, we are confronted with a case in which several potentially competing officials were instructed to supervise one another. A high *‘ilmiyye* official, namely the kadi of Mecca, and the highest-ranking direct representative of the Ottoman administration in the region, namely the *beg* of Jiddah, were expected to intervene whenever the *emîn* of Suez neglected his duties. However, the two officials in question were only instructed to punish contravening shipowners, and not the *emîn* of Suez himself. This preferential treatment of the *emîn* can be explained by the often very pragmatic approach of the later sixteenth-century Ottoman administration toward tax farmers. As long as the latter paid over the sums of money stipulated in their contracts, a blind eye was quite frequently turned towards their other derelictions of duty.

On the other hand, this example is instructive in that it allows us to evaluate the similarities and differences between Ottoman supply policies in Istanbul and the Hijaz. In both cases the Ottoman administration tried to ensure that sufficient supplies reached the target area by assigning reasonably high-ranking officials the responsibility of supervision. But there the similarity ends; for in the case of Istanbul, the intention was generally to promote the extension of private trade, while in the Red Sea region, the avowed aim was often its curtailment. This contrast in policy is all the more worth noting as the "normal" attitude of the sixteenth-century Ottoman administration toward private traders was on the whole positive, and commercial gain was in itself considered perfectly legitimate.²⁸ Given this background, and the fact that the sixteenth-century Egyptian foundations were so often unable to provide the Hijaz with the required quantities of grain, one might have expected the Ottoman administration to move in the direction of a supply system set up according to the model of Istanbul practice. That this did not happen demonstrates the strength of pre-Ottoman political traditions in the area.

TRANSPORTATION AND THE NARÛ PROBLEM

Barring error, the extensive discussion of Hijaz food problems in the sixteenth-century *Mühimme* registers contains no references to an officially determined price for grain proclaimed by the kadi of Mecca. Given the scarcity of documents, one should probably not draw too far-reaching a conclusion from this state of affairs. But at the same time it is not inconceivable that the administration in Istanbul was aware of the fact that an inflexible official price

²⁸On this issue compare İnalçık, "Capital Formation," pp. 98-103.

would be very difficult to enforce under the very special conditions obtaining in the Hijaz, and tried to deal with the situation by other means.²⁹

That this lack of reference to a *narh* for grain may not be quite accidental is moreover suggested by a reference to the transportation of foodstuffs from Jiddah to Mecca in a year of exceptional drought and scarcity. As the Bedouin tribesmen who provided this essential service had died or dispersed, it proved impossible to transport grain at the regular price, and the generosity of a private person was called upon to pay for part of the increment. Now essential transportation services in Istanbul certainly had their officially determined prices.³⁰ But Bedouin camel-herders in the Hijaz were not as easily supervised as boatmen or ox-drivers in Istanbul. If dissatisfied with the price offered, these tribesmen might simply disappear into the desert, while in all probability no replacement would be available. Even worse, if the job was taken out of their hands, aggrieved tribesmen might decide to attack the grain-transporting camels on their way to Mecca or Medina. But since the price of desert transportation entered to a considerable extent into the grain price paid by the consumer in Mecca, it is understandable why Ottoman officials in the Hijaz should have been lukewarm in their attempts to control these prices.

From the Ottoman administration's point of view, which in this case coincided with that of the consumer living in the Hijaz, one of the principal reasons for the Hijaz food problem was the difficulty and expense of transporting supplies across the Red Sea. As we have seen, ships owned by the foundations themselves, played a crucial role; of course the latter were expected to transport *vaqıf* grain free of charge. At the end of the sixteenth century, the foundations of Hâşşekî Sultan, Tâhir Çakmak and Kânûnî Süleymân were all owners of ships, and a new boat was being acquired for the foundation of Sultan Kayıtbây.³¹ However, these boats not only were intended to serve the transportation needs of the *vaqıfs*, but also produced considerable income for the budgets of the respective foundations. Given the scarcity of sixteenth-century figures, it may be permissible to refer to an account dating from the beginning of the seventeenth century, and thus at least give an impression of the order of magnitude involved. In the year 1013-14/1604-6, the foundation of Sultan Murâd III earned more than 80,000 *pâre* from transportation services alone, while in the following year,

²⁹On the determination of official prices compare Mübahat Küçükoglu, *Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi ve 1640 Tarihli Narh Defteri* (Istanbul, 1983) and most recently the relevant chapter of Kafadar's unpublished thesis "Drops of Dew," pp. 110-158.

³⁰For some of many examples, see MD 21, p. 16, no. 56 (980/1572/73); MD 29, p. 136, no. 336 (984/1576-77); MD 35, p. 128, no. 329 (986/1578-79); Küçükoglu, *Narh*, p. 267 ff. For one specific sector, see Cengiz Orhonlu, "Osmanlı Türkleri Devrinde İstanbul'da Kayıklılık ve Kayık İşletmeciliği," *Tarih Dergisi*, XVI/21 (1966), pp. 109-134.

³¹MD64, p. 204, no. 521 (997/1588-89).

earnings under this heading amounted to 76,000 *pâre*.³² Under these circumstances, the Ottoman administration's prohibitions to transport the goods of private persons on ships carrying *vakıf* grains could only be of limited effect. After all, outside of the season during which grain was normally transported, (and if the *vakıf* budget was unbalanced, probably even during the season itself), the administrations of the major Egyptian foundations must have been looking out for customers. Under these circumstances, the line between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' transportation ventures was very difficult to draw.

In order to arrive at a permanent solution to this problem, it would have been necessary to provide for the Egyptian public foundations in such a manner that they did not need the extra income they derived from hiring out their ships. But this proved impossible; for we have seen that throughout the second half of the sixteenth century, the Egyptian public foundations were notoriously short of resources and often no longer able to provide the services demanded of them. Under these circumstances it is scarcely conceivable that the foundations should ever have had sufficient income to dispense with the hiring out of their ships. Moreover, the high cost of constructing boats should have put additional pressure on foundation administrators. After all, it seems likely that in general, the demand for transportation services in the Red Sea exceeded the supply; even if foundation administrators had not been looking for customers, it is likely that potential customers would have sought them out and solicited their services.

Given this circumstance, in the end, private transportation services must have been indispensable. André Raymond's work has shown that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Cairene merchants and *emîrs* invested in this business, and that in fact the Suez-Jiddah connection was one of the Cairo traders' preferred routes.³³ Unfortunately, the sixteenth-century documents located to date give no information on what regulations, if any, existed with respect to freight on private craft. Nor do we know whether the transportation of foodstuffs was in any way given priority. But considering the frequency of complaints concerning shortages in the Hijaz, we do know that the transportation network did not always function very efficiently.

CONCLUSION

If we attempt to draw some conclusions from this continuous movement back and forth of ships and camels, with their loads of donated or else saleable grain, we find that in this particular case, "traditionalism" and "provisionism"

³²Başbakanlık (Osmanlı) Arşivi, section Maliyeden müdevver 5310, p. 2ff.

³³André Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVII^e siècle*, 2 vols. (Damascus, 1973-74), vol. 1, p. 110-111.

weighed more heavily in the balance than "fiscalism." It must be emphasized that in taking over this term from the work of Mehmed Genç, what is meant by "traditionalism" is not the catch-all phrase frequently used by social scientists adhering to the "modernization" paradigm. Rather, a much more specific meaning is intended: Since Ayyubid and Mamluk sultans had founded a tradition of supplying the Holy Cities, and at least the Mamluks had established pious foundations for exactly that purpose, the Ottoman sultans in practical terms had little choice but to continue the same policy. As the inhabitants of the Hijaz had come to regard official subventions as a right and not in any way as alms, any attempt to discontinue support would have thoroughly discredited the newly-established Ottoman regime.³⁴

As to the "provisionism", we find it taking on more extreme forms in the Red Sea region than it ever did in the case of Istanbul. While the provisioning of Istanbul relied exclusively upon private merchants and shippers, and state investment was conspicuously absent, the Ottoman state - through the appropriate foundations - played a major role in securing food supplies for the Hijaz. On the other hand, provisioning the Holy Cities differed from the comparable enterprises of supplying the Palace, the navy or the army on campaign: Thus we do not encounter any attempt to impose special taxes on the population of certain regions in order to finance the Hijaz grain supply. Nor do we observe the otherwise common expedient of exempting people from certain types of taxation, in exchange for which they were to provide transportation or other services.³⁵ Thus the arrangements observed on the Egypt-Red Sea-Hijaz supply route constituted a unique solution to a very specific problem, and have a rather 'non-Ottoman' flavor about them. As certain sixteenth- and seventeenth-century buildings put up by Ottoman governors in the city of Cairo during those same years remind the beholder of Mamluk architecture, the administrative-commercial arrangements relating to the Hijazi food supply also retain a somewhat pre-Ottoman character.³⁶

Viewed from another angle, the defeat of "fiscalism" is apparent from the very sizeable amounts of revenue that were sacrificed every year to support pilgrims and permanent residents of the Hijaz. This circumstance is worth emphasizing, since conventional Ottoman history shows us a government

³⁴ Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyâhât-nâme*, vol. 10, pp. 433-434.

³⁵ Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Derbend Teşkilâtı*, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları No. 1209 (İstanbul, 1967), *passim*, contains a full discussion of services provided against exemption from taxes. As to the use of special taxation for the purpose of supplying the army, see: Lütü Güçer, *XVI-XVII. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan Alınan Vergiler*, İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınlarından No. 1075, İktisat Fakültesi No. 152 (İstanbul, 1964), p. 44ff.

³⁶ For a discussion of Mamluk building traditions in Ottoman Cairo, see André Raymond, *The Great Arab Cities in the 16th to 18th Centuries. An Introduction* (New York, London, 1984), p. 108ff.

concerned primarily with war on the Iranian and Balkan frontiers, and to a lesser degree with the provisioning of the court and capital. Given this orientation, it is then assumed that the provinces were regarded exclusively as sources of revenue. However, when it comes to securing adequate provisions for the Hijaz, we are confronted with a major item of expenditure which could not be expected to produce any tangible return in terms of taxes. Moreover, sixteenth- or seventeenth- century Ottoman officials were in no way expected to perform the *hâjj* as a precondition for a successful career. Therefore one cannot assume that revenue was foregone because Ottoman officialdom had a direct stake in a reasonably safe and comfortable pilgrimage.³⁷ As far as official Ottoman documentation permits us to judge the matter, the dominant reasons for continuing and amplifying the work of the Mamluk sultans were political. Religious concerns must of course have played a role as well. But Ottoman officials rarely touched upon the religious sphere in the documents which they recorded in the *Mühimme* registers, and generally preferred to view -or at least to describe - the provisioning of the Hijaz as basically a political and technical problem.

And unfortunately, as more sophisticated analysis of Ottoman archival documentation is only just beginning, we are not really in a position to do any better than they.

³⁷On this matter, see this author's *Herrscher über Mekka*.

THE OTTOMAN-HABSBURG BALANCE OF FORCES

Charles ISSAWI

A comparison of the main indicators of power shows that, at the time of Süleymân, the Ottoman and the combined Habsburg empires were quite evenly matched. We may consider Area, Population, Agriculture, Minerals, Manufacturing, Transport and Economic Organization.

I. AREA :

The area of the Ottoman Empire was distinctly larger than that of the Habsburgs.

However, the addition of the enormous territories in the Americas that were under effective Spanish control by the 1550's, and which were of the order of 5,000,000 square kilometers, more than made up the difference.¹

*Ottoman Empire*²

Europe	about	1,000,000	square kilometres
Anatolia	about	750,000	square kilometres
Arab provinces (inhabited areas only)			
	about	<u>750,000</u>	square kilometres
		2,500,000	

¹Present day Mexico, Peru and Chile total some 4,000,000 square kilometres. Central America and the larger islands of the Caribbean total over 500,000 and to this should be added large portions of Venezuela, Colombia and Argentina.

²For assumptions and sources see Charles Issawi, "The Area and Population of the Arab Empire," in *idem, The Arab Legacy* (Princeton, 1981) pp. 37-38.

<i>Spanish Habsburg</i>			
Spain	about	500,000	square kilometres
One half of Italy	about	150,000	square kilometres
Netherlands etc.	about	<u>50,000</u>	square kilometres
		700,000	
<i>Austrian Habsburg</i> ³			
	about	250,000	square kilometres

II. POPULATION:

For the Ottoman Empire, quite reliable figures have been provided by Ö. L. Barkan and M. A. Cook.⁴

For Spain and its European possessions, too, reliable figures are available.⁵ But for the Austrian Habsburg Empire there is a dearth of information in the sources just enumerated and in such standard works as that by Tremel. Mols puts the population of the "Danubian Countries" at 5,500,000 in about 1500 and 7,000,000 in about 1600, or say, an average of 6,250,000 for around 1550.⁶ From this a deduction of some 1,250,000 may be made for that part of Hungary occupied by the Ottomans, leaving about 5,000,000. The *Atlas of World Population* puts the population of the Habsburg Empire at 7,000,000 in 1550 and 8,000,000 in 1600.⁷

As regards the Americas, estimates of the pre-Columbian population differ hugely, from some 13,000,000 to over 100,000,000, but all agree that there was a catastrophic decline following the Spanish conquest and estimates for around 1550 put the combined total for Mexico and Peru at around 4,000,000.⁸

³Present day Austria (83,000) and Czechoslovakia (127,000) plus Silesia and a small portion of Hungary.

⁴Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Essai sur les données statistiques des registres," *JESHO* 1 (1957) pp. 9-36; M. A. Cook, *Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia* (London, 1972)

⁵J. Nadal, *Historia de la Poblacion española* (Barcelona, 1966); Roger Mols, "Population in Europe 1500-1700," in Carlo Cipolla (ed.), *The Fontana Economic History of Europe*, Vol. II, 1974, pp. 15-82; Karl Helleiner, "The Population of Europe," in E. E. Rich and C. H. Wilson, (eds.) *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, Vol. IV, pp. 1-95.

⁶*Op. cit.* p. 38.

⁷Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones, *Atlas of World Population* (Harmondsworth, 1978) p. 91.

⁸N. Sanchez-Albornoz, *La Poblacion en America Latina* (Madrid, 1973) pp. 54-66.

Ottoman Empire

Europe	about	8,000,000
Anatolia	about	6,000,000
Arab provinces	about	<u>6-7,000,000</u>
	about	20-21,000,000

Spanish Habsburgs

Spain	about	9,000,000
One-third of Italy	about	4,000,000
Netherlands etc.	about	<u>2,000,000</u>
	about	15,000,000
Americas	about	4-5,000,000
<i>Austrian Habsburgs</i>	about	5-6,000,000

It will thus be seen that, leaving aside the Americas, the combined Habsburgs had a population almost exactly equal to that of the Ottomans.

Two more points may be made. First, in all three empires population was growing, at not too dissimilar rates. Barkan puts the population of the Ottoman Empire around 1600 at 30 million. Moïs shows a Spanish and Portuguese growth from 9,300,000 in 1500 to 11,300,000 in 1600 and a "Danubian" growth from 5,500,000 to 7,000,000. This means that their age structures were probably similar and that the proportion of men of working and fighting age must have been about the same. Secondly, the Ottoman Empire was much more urbanized than the Habsburg ones. No European city had a population approaching that of Istanbul (about 400,000) or Cairo (200,000-300,000) or even Aleppo (probably over 100,000); of all the Habsburg cities only Naples approached the 100,000 mark; Seville, Cordoba, Granada, Barcelona, Antwerp, Brussels, Ghent, Palermo and Messina, had around 50,000 inhabitants and Vienna and Prague probably less.⁹

III. AGRICULTURE:

⁹See H. İnalcık, EI2 s.v. "Istanbul"; Janet Abu Lughod, *Cairo* (Princeton, 1971) p. 131; André Raymond, *Grandes villes arabes à l'époque ottomane* (Paris, 1985); for the European figures see Helleiner, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

Since in all the areas surveyed the bulk of the land was devoted to grain and since the New World crops (particularly maize and potatoes) had not yet established themselves, the most meaningful index for comparison is the yield-to-seed ratio for wheat, which was by far the most widespread crop. However, it should be noted that this ratio does not necessarily reflect yields per acre, since sowing practices differed in various localities.

The only Ottoman figures I have so far found relate to the mid-nineteenth century, and average 5 or 6 to 1 in both Anatolia and Rumelia.¹⁰ There is no reason to believe that sixteenth century yields were appreciably lower, since no significant improvements had been introduced in the intervening period. In the Arab provinces the yield was probably lower, except in the fertile, irrigated, Nile valley where it was much higher.

For Spain, the earliest figure, 3-4 to 1, refers to Catalonia in 1533-1548; by 1780 it had risen to 5.¹¹ There is no reason to believe that the national average for Spain was higher than the figure for Catalonia. In Italy, however, yields were distinctly higher - 5- 6 or over - and in Belgium higher still, averaging 10.9 in 1586-1602.¹² For Austria in the eighteenth century a 3-5 yield prevailed.¹³ As for earlier figures, in the mid-sixteenth century yields of 2 or less were recorded in various parts of Hungary, rising to 3.5 in the seventeenth century, and in 1651-1700 to 3-4 in parts of Czechoslovakia.¹⁴

There is therefore every reason to believe that Ottoman yields were as high as, or higher than, those in the Habsburg lands. Given its wide range of climates and terrain, (from the Balkans to the Nile valley), the Ottoman Empire may also have had a greater variety of crops. It was generally a net exporter of wheat (from Egypt, Rumelia, and Rumania), livestock (North Africa), cotton (from Cyprus, Syria and Greece) and silk (mainly re-exports from Iran).¹⁵

IV. MINERALS :

All three empires were well-endowed with minerals. The Ottomans drew ample supplies of iron, copper, lead, mercury, and silver from both the Balkans

¹⁰Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey* (Chicago, 1980) pp. 214-215.

¹¹B. H. Slicher Van Bath, *Yield Ratios 1810-1820* (Wageningen, 1963) pp. 42, 60.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 42; *Fontana History*, *op. cit.*, p. 616.

¹³Ernst Wangermann, *The Austrian Achievement, 1700-1800* (London, 1973) p. 24.

¹⁴Van Bath, *op. cit.*, p. 61, *Fontana History*; *op. cit.*, pp. 602-604.

¹⁵Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, (2 vols., New York, 1972) pp. 583, 585, 84, 117, 156, 209, 559, and 562-565.

and Anatolia.¹⁶ The main deficiency was tin, which was imported from Britain and elsewhere. Spain was very rich in minerals: iron in the Basque provinces, lead, silver, copper in Huelva, mercury in Almaden and other lesser minerals. Belgium and Italy were also well-endowed with minerals. And, of course, there was the huge influx of gold and silver from America.

The Austrian Habsburgs were even more fortunate. Their mountainous lands contained an ideal combination of minerals, untouched by Roman exploitation, thick forests providing building timber, charcoal and pitprops, and water power to drive the increasingly complex machinery that was installed in the Middle Ages and early modern times. Bohemia, Silesia and Hungary supplied gold, silver and copper, and Styria, Carinthia, Tyrol and Bohemia had large iron mines.¹⁷

It should be noted that mining technology in Europe was more advanced and innovative than in the Ottoman Empire. The amalgamation process for separating silver from its ore was introduced in Spain and its colonies early in the sixteenth century. For iron smelting, the use of blast furnaces also spread from the Netherlands to Galicia, Styria and other parts of Europe at the same time and water driven machinery was increasingly used to crush ores and drain mines.¹⁸ The Ottomans tried to keep up with such developments, but tended to lag behind.

V. MANUFACTURING

On both sides textiles were the leading industry. The Ottomans had such great centers as Istanbul, Bursa, Cairo, Aleppo, Damascus and Salonica. The Spanish Habsburgs also had large centers in Castille, Andalusia and Catalonia, and more important ones in Belgium, North Italy and Naples. The main Austrian centers were Bohemia and Silesia.

In this field too the technological superiority of Europe was already apparent. In textiles the Ottomans tended to import the more valuable woollens and silks and to export cheaper cottons, or textile fibres. Other goods, such as glassware and paper, that had formerly been exported from the Middle East were

¹⁶Robert Anhegger, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Bergbaus im osmanischen Reich*, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1943-1945); Ahmet Refik, *Osmanlı Devrinde Türkiye Madenleri*, (Istanbul, 1931); see also Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey*, *op. cit.*, pp. 273-298.

¹⁷John V. Nef, "Mining and Metallurgy in Medieval Civilization," *Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, vol. II, (Cambridge, 1952) pp. 433-441 and 469-473; see also Ferdinand Tremel, *Wirtschafts und Sozial Geschichte Österreichs* (Vienna, 1969).

¹⁸Domenico Sella, "European Industries", in *Fontana Economic History*, *op. cit.*, p. 395; Nef, *op. cit.*, pp. 458-469.

now imported. In the use of water, and especially wind power, Europe was far more advanced than the Middle East and coal was beginning to be used, for instance in Belgium.¹⁹ In metallurgy and armaments, the Ottomans tried hard to keep up with Europe by using the services of converts to Islam; we do not hear of a reverse flow of men or techniques. And, of course, European industry, mining, commerce, finance and even agriculture, were beginning to profit from the diffusion of printing which, in the Ottoman Empire, was restricted to non-Arabic scripts.

VI. TRANSPORT:

Little need be said on this subject. Both sides suffered from a lack of navigable rivers, the Danube being the main exception, but both the Ottomans and the Spanish Habsburgs used coastal navigation very extensively — the Austrian Habsburg Empire was, of course, landlocked. On land, the Ottomans had the advantage of using the camel, whose load was twice that of the horse or mule;²⁰ on the other hand, Europeans made much more use of carts and carriages. And on the seas there seems little doubt that European ships, including Spanish, which had to sail Atlantic waters, were definitely superior to the Mediterranean galleys and other vessels which constituted the Ottoman navy and mercantile marine. For the same reasons, the art of navigation was more advanced in Europe.

VII. ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION:

Only two brief observations will be made under this heading. On the one hand one has the impression — fortified by what Andrew Hess has said — that the Ottoman monarchs had a much tighter control of their economy than did the Austrian, or even the Spanish, Habsburgs and that they could mobilize a larger proportion of total resources. One also has the impression that the deficits in the Ottoman state budgets were much smaller than those in Spain. There does not seem to be anything comparable to Philip II's huge loans or to his spectacular bankruptcy of 1575. It is true that the Ottoman *akçe* was steadily debased but the loss in its value between 1500 and 1700 does not seem to have been greater than that of the Spanish *maravedi*; however, it was much greater than the decline in the Austrian pfund-pfennig.²¹ But, as against that, economic institutions and

¹⁹A. Rupert Hall, "Scientific Method and Progress of Techniques", in *Cambridge Economic History*, vol. IV, *op. cit.*, pp. 103; Charles Issawi, "Technology, Energy and Civilization", *IJMES*, August 1991.

²⁰Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey*, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

²¹See the graphs drawn by Frank Spooner in *Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 458; for the Castilian budget in 1574 see Geoffrey Parker, *Spain and the Netherlands*

methods in the private sector — including banks, companies, insurance and accountancy — were distinctly more developed in the Habsburg empires than in the Ottoman.

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS :

The preceding analysis suggests that, in the great conflict pitting the Ottomans against the combined Habsburgs, the protagonists were evenly matched. The population, resources and — to a lesser extent — technologies on either side were roughly equal. The additional handicap imposed on Turkey by wars with Iran was offset by that imposed on Spain by the wars with France.

After about 1580, however, Spain tacitly withdrew from the fight against the Ottomans, leaving Austria to bear the brunt of the battle, along with such allies as it could muster. And here the discrepancy was very great — a 10 to 1 advantage in area and 3 or 4 to 1 in population in favor of the Ottomans. No wonder that Austria remained on the defensive until the end of the seventeenth century, particularly after it threw its armies into the Thirty Years War.

There was much resemblance between the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires. Both were multi-ethnic, polyglot states, harboring many sects and held together by common loyalty to a sovereign and an overwhelmingly predominant religion (Islam, Catholicism). But in addition there was a symbiotic relation between them. The Austrian Habsburg Empire arose as a response to the Ottoman invasion. After the collapse of Hungary at Mohács, it became the main defence of Europe. With the decline of the Ottomans, it expanded in the Balkans — and also in Poland. But by then it was no longer fulfilling an essential function, and the center of the action had shifted to Western Europe — to the Netherlands, France and Great Britain. Eventually, both the Habsburg and the Ottoman empires succumbed to the same enemy: Nationalism, born of the French Revolution, Romanticism and the economic and social changes that were taking place in Europe. The first to respond were the Balkans — the Greeks, Serbs, Rumanians and others. Then came the turn of the Central Europeans — the Czechs, Hungarians and Croats. These movements exacerbated the nationalism of the dominant groups, the Turks and the Germans, and the result was intense struggle in both empires. Both were shattered by the First World War and their dynasties were swept away almost simultaneously.²²

(London, 1979) p. 32; for the Ottoman budgets of 1564-65, 1591-92, 1597-98, 1648 and 1650 see Bernard Lewis, *Islam in History* (London, 1973) p. 210.

²²H. A. L. Fisher, *A History of Europe* (London, 1936) pp. 729-735.

OTTOMAN-HABSBURG RIVALRY: THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

John ELLIOTT

According to Vasari, when Charles V was staying in Bologna in 1529-30 for his coronation by Pope Clement VII, the artist Parmigianino would now and again turn up to watch him dining in state. No doubt inspired by what he had seen, he began to work on a large allegorical portrait of the Emperor. The surviving version of the painting described by Vasari shows the seated figure of the young Charles, in armour, with a baton in one hand and a sword in the other. While the winged figure of Fame descends with palm and laurel branch, an infant Hercules offers him a globe. The globe is turned in such a way as to depict, not — as might have been expected — Charles' new empire in the Indies, nor even, with any clarity, his extensive European dominions, but the Mediterranean, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian peninsula and the Indian Ocean.¹

The choice of the region to be depicted would hardly seem fortuitous. The armies of Süleymân had recently withdrawn from their encampment outside the walls of Vienna, and hopes were running high that the newly crowned Emperor would rally the forces of Christendom and march against the Turk. Parmigianino's allegorical representation of Charles as the champion of Christendom against Islam, even if it was not commissioned by the Emperor himself, conformed well with the official imagery being developed by the Imperial entourage in these years. These were the years when the Imperial chancellor, Gattinara, was planning the publication of a new edition of Dante's

¹G. Vasari, *Le vite de' piu eccellenti Pittori Scultori ed Architettori (Opere, ed. G. Milanesi, Florence, 1878-85, vol. 5, p. 229)*. The picture was considered lost, until a painting resembling that described by Vasari was identified in the Cook collection. The attribution to Parmigianino of this version, now in private hands in New York, has been disputed. See S. J. Friedberg, *Parmigianino* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), pp. 112-13, 207-8, and Fig. 132; and Ferdinando Bologna, "Il 'Carlo V' del Parmigianino," *Paragone* 73 (1956), pp. 3-16. Neither of these authors comments on the parts of the globe depicted by the artist, and the question is likewise omitted in the recent iconographical discussion of the painting by Fernando Checa Cremades, *Carlos V y la imagen del héroe en el renacimiento* (Madrid, 1987), pp. 39-40.

Monarchia, the classic statement of the Imperial theme;² when the Christian humanist circle around Charles was advocating the reunion of Christendom and the reformation of the church under the Imperial aegis; and when intoxicating visions were floating in the air of the coming establishment of a universal monarchy and the subsequent return of Astraea, or Justice, to the earth.³ They were also the years that saw the beginning of the construction in Granada of Charles' Imperial palace, whose situation, inside the fortified heights of the Alhambra, commemorated the triumph of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492 and symbolized their grandson's own commitment to the cause of victory over Islam.⁴

Symbolic references to the Emperor's role as the paladin of Christendom against Islam represented a useful device for legitimating the great Habsburg imperial experiment of the early sixteenth century. To the friends of the Habsburgs, the empire of Charles V, with all the exciting prospects that it offered for the reconciliation and reunion of a dangerously divided Europe, provided the best, and perhaps the only hope, for the salvation of Christendom at a time when the Turks were battering against its gates. To the enemies of the Habsburgs, that same empire, and its effective successor, the Spanish Monarchy of his son, Philip II, was aiming at a universal monarchy which would destroy European liberties and subject the continent to the dynastic ambitions of the House of Austria. In this reading, Charles V's use of the Turkish threat as a justification for his actions was no more than a piece of cynical exploitation designed to further his own ambitions and those of his family. The greatest threat to Christendom came not from the ambitions of the Turk but from those of its self-proclaimed champion against the Turk, the Emperor himself. 'I cannot deny,' said Francis I to the Venetian envoy, 'that I keenly desire the Turk powerful and ready for war, not for himself, because he is an infidel and we are Christians, but to undermine the emperor's power to force heavy expenses upon him and to reassure all other governments against so powerful an enemy.'⁵

Whatever the reading of Habsburg intentions, the fact remained that, especially after Mohács in 1526, no European ruler could afford for long to leave out of his calculations the looming presence of the Turks in the Mediterranean, in North Africa and on the Hungarian plain. The empire of Süteymân was a fact of life, influencing at countless points the course of sixteenth-century European development. Whatever Francis I might say, this empire was generally perceived

²John M. Headley, *The Emperor and his Chancellor* (Cambridge, 1983), p. 111; Marcel Bataillon, *Erasmus y España* (Mexico City, 1950), vol. I, p. 270.

³Frances A. Yates, *Astraea. The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century* (London and Boston, 1975), pp. 20-28.

⁴Earl J. Rosenthal, *The Palace of Charles V in Granada* (Princeton, 1985), pp. 263-4.

⁵R. J. Knecht, *Francis I* (Cambridge, 1982), p. 225.

as aggressive and menacing. The European image of Islam, after all, had been shaped by many centuries, and the fears that lay deep in the consciousness of Christendom had been powerfully reawakened by the fall of Constantinople and the subsequent expansion of Ottoman power. Europe, it was true, had successes of its own to set against these disasters—the reconquest of Granada, the Spanish penetration of North Africa, the establishment of a string of Portuguese bases all the way from Africa to East Asia, and Spain's providential discovery of the New World of America. But the discovery and conversion of millions of American Indians were seen as no more than compensation for the subjugation of many other millions of Europeans under the yoke of Islam. Christendom, in other words, saw itself threatened again by its traditional enemy, and automatically responded, as it had always responded to the perceived threat, with talk of a crusade.

The obvious beneficiary of this aspiration was Charles V by virtue of his position as Holy Roman Emperor — and a Holy Roman Emperor, moreover, to whom had fallen not only the traditional Imperial and Habsburg inheritance, but also, through his grandparents Ferdinand and Isabella, an Iberian inheritance, with all the potential reserves of wealth and power that this implied. From Ranke⁶ to Braudel⁷ the rise and coexistence during the sixteenth century of those two great superpowers, the Ottoman and the Habsburg, at either end of the Mediterranean, has exercised a strong fascination over historians. Is Braudel right in thinking that 'history' (one of his favorite notional entities) is 'by turn favorable and unfavorable to vast political formations,' so that Charles V's empire, if not Charles V himself, was in fact preordained?⁸ Or was their simultaneous emergence sheer coincidence, as the fortuitous character of Charles' vast inheritance would appear to suggest? Or did an empire call forth an empire, as Charles' assumption of his God-given mission to defend Europe from the infidel would indicate?

One of the problems about this kind of question is that it can only be answered by what would in effect be an impossibly complex exercise in counterfactual history. What difference, in other words, would it have made to the course of sixteenth-century European history if in 1520, as Paolo Giovio put it, 'a gentle lamb' really had 'succeeded a fierce lion'⁹ — if Süleymân had indeed proved as peace-loving as western observers deluded themselves into believing? One thing at least, I suspect, would have remained unchanged: the west in the

⁶ Leopold Ranke, *The Ottoman and the Spanish Empires in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, trans. Walter R. Kelley (London, 1843).

⁷ *La Méditerranée et le monde Méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, (2nd. ed., Paris, 1966).

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 14.

⁹ Quoted by Roger Bigelow Merriman, *Suleiman the Magnificent* (1944; repr. New York, 1966), p. 37.

first half of the sixteenth century would not have escaped some form of imperial experiment. Dynastic accident and imperial election had combined to concentrate an unprecedented amount of territory and resources in the hands of a single man. Given the traditional associations of the Imperial title, the political rivalries of the European powers, and the religious ferment of early sixteenth-century Europe with the refusal or inability of the papacy to take in hand the urgent work of reformation, it is hard to escape the conclusion that — Süleymân or no Süleymân — this massive concentration of power would inexorably have led to some kind of attempt to make a reality of empire.

The ways in which that concentration of power was used, however, and indeed the degree of success which it succeeded in commanding, seem to have been profoundly affected by the presence of the Turks. If some form of imperial experiment was in any event on the cards for sixteenth-century Europe, we need to know how that experiment was assisted, distorted or impeded by the need to face the perceived challenge of Islam. What, of course, remained unclear to sixteenth-century Europeans was how far that perceived challenge was a real challenge. In spite of western awareness throughout the sixteenth century of Ottoman-Persian rivalry, and periodic attempts by the west to collaborate with the Shah,¹⁰ it was hard for Christendom to grasp that it was not the exclusive focus of the Sultan's interest and of his aggressive intentions. Nor does it seem to have crossed the minds of Europeans that, as seen from Istanbul, it was Christendom that represented the challenge and the threat, and that the aggressiveness which for them was inherent in the behaviour of the Turk might itself on occasions represent a response to some prior Christian attack.

The combination of fear and incomprehension with which sixteenth-century Europe faced the Turk helped create a climate that was favorable to the claims of Charles V, and later of Philip II, to the nominal leadership of Christendom in its struggle with Islam. To that extent at least the proximity of a militant Ottoman power on the flanks of Europe helped to reinforce the universalist aspirations inherent both in Charles' imperialism and in the ideology of the Spain of Philip II. But, as both rulers found to their evident distress, there were sharp limits to the extent to which the reservoir of generalized support elicited by the news of another Ottoman attack could be translated into such practical necessities as money and men. It is striking that even in Castile, conditioned by its centuries of war against the Moors, appeals based on the dangers of a renewed Ottoman advance were all too liable to fall on deaf ears. For Castilians, the Moors and Moriscos might remain uncomfortably close, but the power of the Turks was still remote.¹¹ Similar problems would confront Charles

¹⁰Dorothy Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk* (Liverpool, 1954), pp. 207-14.

¹¹See José Antonio Maravall, *Carlos V y el pensamiento político del renacimiento* (Madrid, 1960), p. 90.

and his brother Ferdinand in their appeals to the Germans. It was always easier to drum up general protestations of concern than practical support.¹²

Yet, for all the recalcitrance shown by subjects, dependants and clients, it was dangerous for them to get too far out of line. The Magyars, the Sicilians, the Neapolitans, the Genoese, all saw obvious advantages in preserving the Habsburg connection, so long as the Turks were threatening and defence costs were high. Expensive fortresses had to be built and manned along the Italian coastline and the Hungarian plain; armies had to be mobilized, and fleets fitted out. Only the Habsburgs could lay hands on the resources to undertake and sustain such large-scale enterprises, and the knowledge of this was to prove a powerful factor in maintaining Habsburg preeminence in sixteenth-century Europe. Braudel suggests¹³ that around 1600 the smaller states of Europe once again began to come into their own, and connects their resurgence with the mutual exhaustion of the Ottoman and Habsburg super-states towards the end of the century. But this may perhaps be a little too neat. For if there was an impulsion towards cohesion in sixteenth-century Europe, as evidenced by the aspiration towards the unity of Christendom and the willingness of some parts at least of the continent to place themselves under the umbrella of Habsburg protection, there were also powerful forces pulling in the opposite direction. The Turks may well have represented a threat, but equally, they represented an opportunity, and an opportunity that was eagerly seized. It was seized, most obviously, by Francis I, who saw in a working alliance with the Sultan his best chance of checking the growth of Habsburg power. It was seized, too, by the Lutherans, who came to realize that the proximity of Turks to the heartlands of Europe provided them with unique possibilities for leverage in their attempts to establish the Protestant Reformation in Germany.

Luther himself at first saw the Ottoman onslaught as a fitting punishment for the wickedness of the pope and the sinfulness of his compatriots, and was opposed in the early 1520's to any campaign against the Turk. But he rather grudgingly changed his tune as the Sultan's army approached.¹⁴ At the same time it dawned on the Lutheran princes and cities that they could turn Ferdinand's growing preoccupation with the threat to Hungary to their own confessional advantage. In 1526 for the first time they used Ferdinand's request for emergency aid as a bargaining counter to demand religious concessions, and this was to become standard practice during the 1530's.¹⁵ At critical moments, in the early 1530's and again in the period of his disastrous Algiers expedition of 1541,

¹²See Stephen A. Fischer-Galati, *Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism, 1521-1555* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959).

¹³*La Méditerranée*, II, p. 46.

¹⁴Fischer-Galati, *Ottoman Imperialism*, pp. 18 and 34.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 35-6.

Charles was forced to draw back from a confrontation with the German Protestants, in part at least because of his preoccupation with the Ottoman danger. When at last, in 1546, he was free to turn back to central Europe and deal with the Protestant rebels it was already too late. The Reformation in Germany had been given sufficient time to establish and consolidate itself under the cover of the Turkish threat. In due course it would extend, especially in its Calvinist form, to regions that had fallen under Turkish domination or influence.

The Ottoman threat, then, played a vital part in affirming and confirming the permanent division of Christendom even as it breathed new life into the concept of Christendom itself. Charles V, embroiled in continuing conflict with Francis I, and harassed at one and the same time by the activities of the Lutherans, the urgent pleas of his brother for help in recovering Hungary, and by the rise of Ottoman naval power in the Mediterranean, found that he had an impossible task on his hands. There were moments of triumph, like the Tunis campaign of 1535, commemorated in a series of twelve tapestries after designs by the Flemish painter Jan Vermeyen. These were carried wherever the Emperor went, and were ceremoniously set up on great state occasions attended by him and his Spanish royal successors, as if to emphasize their continuing commitment to the war against Islam.¹⁶ But Charles could not possibly hope to hold the line simultaneously on all fronts, even with the resources of the Fuggers, and of America, behind him. The Tunis campaign of 1535 was the first Imperial campaign to be financed by the silver of Peru,¹⁷ and consequently deserves to be remembered as the first occasion on which the New World was called in to redress the balance of the Old. Yet even this infusion of New World wealth produced no more than a transitory redressment. The structure was too cumbersome to sustain the weight of the demands being imposed upon it, and by the later years of the reign of Charles V the West's great imperial experiment was visibly faltering. As a response to the Ottoman mega-system, the Christian mega-system was showing signs of possessing mega-faults.

But long before the abdication of Charles V in 1556 a self-adjusting process had got under way. This consisted of the progressive division of Charles' unwieldy inheritance into two distinctive parts. Already from 1532 Charles and his brother were beginning to go their separate ways as Ferdinand, thwarted in his hopes of rolling back the Turks, moved slowly towards an accommodation with the Sultan that would save the Austrian patrimony from further attack in his lifetime, and would lead in due course to a compromise in Hungary.¹⁸ This gradual distancing of Charles and Ferdinand foreshadowed the break-up of Charles'

¹⁶Jonathan Brown and J. H. Elliott, *A Palace for a King* (New Haven and London, 1980), p. 148.

¹⁷Ramon Carande, *Carlos V y sus banqueros*, vol. III (Madrid, 1967), pp. 169-70.

¹⁸Pauline Sotter Fichtner, *Ferdinand I of Austria: the Politics of Dynasticism in the Age of Reformation* (New York, 1982), pp. 100-101.

empire in the early 1550's. In the family negotiations that led to the formal division of the Habsburg inheritance, the Austrian branch of the Habsburgs would be left not only with the Austrian patrimonial lands, but also with the Imperial title, with its large, if vague, responsibilities and its rich ideological connotations. Similarly, the succession of Charles' son, Philip, to his father's Burgundian-Spanish inheritance and the creation of a distinctive Spanish branch of the Habsburgs, was also a formal recognition of pre-existing realities, in particular of the unwieldiness of Charles' empire and the growing preponderance of the Iberian peninsula within it.

Various elements contributed to the development of this Spanish preponderance between the 1520's and the 1550's: the military effectiveness of the *tercios*, the tax-paying capabilities of Castile, its acquisition of a transatlantic and silver-rich empire, and, by no means least, the increasing strategic importance of the western and central Mediterranean in the war against Islam, which thrust Spain itself, Spanish Italy and Spanish North Africa into the front line. The organism that was in fact in the process of development as the successor to Charles' overextended empire was a Mediterranean state, financed by Genoa (less vulnerable than its rival, Venice, to pressure from the Turk) and powered by Castile.

Castile's great and growing improvement in the Mediterranean struggle, which reached its climax in the 1550's and 1560's, grew out of a set of perceptions and interests that were already well-established by 1516, when Charles received the Iberian inheritance of his grandfather, Ferdinand the Catholic. If the reconquest of Granada at the end of the fifteenth century solved one problem for Castile by liberating the last remnants of Iberian territory from Islamic occupation, it created a new and potentially serious problem by bringing under Christian rule a large Islamic community which found itself artificially separated from its brethren on the other side of the straits. The first revolt of the Alpujarras in 1499-1500 had a profound impact on Castilian attitudes and policies. On the one hand, it led to the famous 1502 decree, by which all Moors in Castile were to accept conversion or leave the country. The end result was the creation of a large and unassimilated Morisco community which continued to look with yearning towards the Islamic world of North Africa, and would constitute a growing security problem for the Spanish crown as Mediterranean tensions increased.¹⁹ The other effect of the revolt was to heighten anti-Islamic

¹⁹For Granada and the Morisco question, see especially Julio Caro Baroja, *Los moriscos del reino de Granada* (Madrid, 1957), and Antonio Domínguez Ortiz and Bernard Vincent, *Historia de los moriscos* (Madrid, 1978). The tenacity with which the Moriscos clung to their traditional ways is vividly illustrated by the inquisitorial cases discussed by Mercedes García-Arenal, *Inquisición y moriscos. Los procesos del tribunal de Cuenca* (Madrid, 1978).

feeling in Spain, and prompt fresh calls for a crusade, which would plant the cross on North African soil.²⁰

The high hopes of another great crusade and conquest were to be thwarted by shortage of money, divided counsels in Spain itself, and the unpromising character of the North African terrain, at least as seen by Spanish eyes. The Spaniards settled instead for a policy of limited occupation, based on the possession of a handful of garrison points. In retrospect, this policy gave Spain the worst of every world. The Spanish presence in the Maghrib was assertive enough to heighten tensions and rally the forces of the Muslim opposition, while too weak to keep that opposition under effective control. The Spain of Charles V found itself saddled with a chain of vulnerable North African outposts, while Algiers under Hayreddin Barbarossa was transformed into a nest of corsairs who raided the Spanish and Italian coasts and imperiled Spain's supply routes and shipping lanes. An already uncomfortable situation was made still worse after 1534 when Süleymân responded to the Spanish attack on the Morea by making Hayreddin commander of his fleet.²¹ The subsequent Ottoman naval revival and the tightening of the links between Istanbul and Algiers, brought North Africa and the central and western Mediterranean well within the orbit of Turkish influence. To Spain from the 1530's the power of Süleymân now seemed ominously close.

This frightening sense of proximity helped to create a siege mentality in the Iberian peninsula during the middle decades of the century. At any moment the garrison posts in North Africa might be overrun, grain supplies from Sicily be cut, and Spain's Moorish population rise in rebellion, possibly in conjunction with a Turkish sea-borne invasion. These nightmare prospects go a long way towards explaining Spanish behaviour and reactions between the 1530's and 1570's. Anxieties over the peril from Islam preyed upon a society already alarmed by fears of heresy and Protestant subversion, and inevitably their effect was to intensify Spain's obsession with religious orthodoxy, giving it a sharper, more militant edge. This new religious militancy gave impetus to the revival of crusading idealism — a revival that found visible expression in the two Holy Leagues of 1538 and 1570, when Spain, Venice and the Papacy combined their forces to undertake the great naval enterprises that would lead respectively to the disaster of Prevesa and the triumph of Lepanto in 1571. As tends to happen in super-power relationships, it was almost as if the two super-powers were becoming mirror-images of one another, with crusade responding to jihad and jihad to crusade.

²⁰For Spain and North Africa in the sixteenth century, see Andrew C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier* (Chicago and London, 1978), and F. Braudel, "Les Espagnols et l'Afrique du Nord de 1492 à 1577," *Revue Africaine*, 60 (1928), pp. 184-233, 351-410.

²¹Hess, *Forgotten Frontier*, p. 72.

The mirror-image repeated itself in their internal as well as their external policies, as the heightened militancy brought into sharper relief the problem of domestic deviants. Spain's potentially subversive Moriscos could not escape closer scrutiny at a time of all-out war with Islam. As a result, benign neglect was now replaced by intrusive pressures to conform, with predictably disastrous results. The second revolt of the Alpujarras, between 1568 and 1570, was a traumatic event, not only for the Moriscos, but also for the Christians of Spain. It came at the worst possible moment for Philip II, already hard pressed by the naval war in the Mediterranean and now confronted in northern Europe by the beginnings of the Netherlands revolt.

Recent scholarship has made us increasingly aware of the close connection between Philip's problems in the Mediterranean and his growing difficulties in northern Europe. The Ottoman danger seemed to him so serious that he felt bound during those critical years of the 1560's and early 1570's to give it priority. The effect of his preoccupation with the Mediterranean struggle and the Morisco revolt was to diminish the supply of funds available to his government in the Netherlands during those decisive early moments of Dutch unrest, and to prevent him from throwing the full weight of his personal authority into the attempt to check heresy and subversion in the Netherlands before it was too late. William of Orange and his colleagues were well aware that the Sultan had given them a reprieve, and indeed William sent a personal agent to negotiate with the Sultan in the hope of persuading him to maintain his pressure on Spain.²² Subsequently, the Duke of Alba's attempts to crush the Dutch revolt were to be seriously hampered by the diversion of funds for the Lepanto campaign and its aftermath. In other words, we see a repetition in the Netherlands of the situation in Germany in the 1530's and 1540's. In both instances, the preoccupation with the dangers from the Ottoman Empire had created the opportunity in the west for successful revolt. These two revolts between them changed the face of Europe.

In reviewing the impact of the empire of Süleymân on the western world of the sixteenth century, it is this particular aspect which I would most wish to underline. The confrontation of the two great systems of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman and the Habsburg, ended in stalemate, with their progressive disengagement from the 1570's as the Ottomans turned to their eastern frontier, while the Spain of Philip II turned to face its new enemies in northern Europe. It was, in my view, a paradoxical legacy, reflecting the paradoxes within European society itself.

European history may be regarded as the history of a continuing dialectic between the aspiration toward unity and the pressure for diversity. The empire of

²²Geoffrey Parker, *Spain and the Netherlands* (London, 1979), pp. 29-30.

Süleymân inserted itself into this dialectic at a critical moment in European development. The threat posed by Islam gave a powerful impetus to the yearnings for Christian unity, and helped create a climate in which a universal monarchy became for a moment a thinkable possibility. Both Charles V and Philip II were able to capitalize on these aspirations, and in the Habsburg system that they established and embodied they created a supra-national structure which looked, at least for a moment, as if it could become coterminous with Christendom. But, the stronger the pressure for unity, the greater the resistance; and the effect of the Turkish threat was simultaneously to enhance the opportunities for successful resistance to those very moves towards unity that it had helped to promote. France's challenge to Habsburg dynastic ambitions; the consolidation of the Protestant Reformation; the secession of the Dutch from Spanish rule — all these were powerfully assisted by the diversion of Habsburg energies into the war against the Turk. In other words, if the Turkish challenge at one level reinforced the age-old feeling for the solidarity of Christendom, at another it furthered the process of religious and political fragmentation which made that dream of unity unrealizable. The European world that emerged from the sixteenth-century confrontation with Islam was a world definitively set on the path of political, religious and cultural pluralism. This in turn prompts a final question. Did the confrontation of those two great empires, the Ottoman and the Habsburg, have a similar impact on the Middle East? To this may be added a supplementary question: if not, why not?

SÜLEYMÂN THE MAGNIFICENT AND THE REPRESENTATION OF POWER IN THE CONTEXT OF OTTOMAN-HAPSBURG-PAPAL RIVALRY*

Gülru NECİPOĞLU

Three Venetian woodcuts and an engraving by Agostino Veneziano depict Sultan Süleymân I with a fantastic headgear that could almost be dismissed as a figment of Orientalist imagination (Figs. 1-4). However, in a fascinating article, Otto Kurz has demonstrated that these prints are truthful graphic records of a spectacular golden helmet produced for the sultan by Venetian goldsmiths in 1532. The Venetian diarist Marino Sanuto first saw this headgear, "the memory of which ought to be preserved," on 13 March 1532 at the jewelers' district of the Rialto. Three days later, it was put on public display at the Ducal Palace before being dispatched to the Ottoman court for sale.¹

An invoice published by Sanuto itemizes the detachable parts of the helmet together with the value of its jewels, a list that corresponds closely to the complicated headgear depicted in the prints (see Appendix). This document indicates that besides a plumed aigrette with a crescent-shaped mount, the golden helmet had four crowns with enormous twelve-carat pearls, a head band with pointed diamonds, and a neckguard with straps. Featuring fifty diamonds, forty-seven rubies, twenty-seven emeralds, forty-nine pearls, and a large turquoise, it was valued at a total of 144,000 ducats, including the cost of its velvet-lined gilt ebony case.² As Kurz has shown, this fantastic helmet-crown clearly constitutes the main subject of the series of Venetian prints depicting Süleymân that are

* This article, which was awarded the Ömer Lütfi Barkan best article prize by the Turkish Studies Association in 1991, is reprinted from *The Art Bulletin* 71 (1989) with the permission of the journal. A shorter version was presented at the Princeton conference.

¹ It was Kurz who first established the helmet's authenticity through references in contemporary European sources: see Kurz, 249-258. For the most recent views and bibliography, see the following exhibition catalogues: M. Muraro and D. Rosand, *Titian and the Venetian Woodcut*, Washington, DC, 1976, 208-210; and Rogers and Ward, 53-54. Sanuto, LV, 634-636, is cited in Kurz, 249.

² Sanuto, LVI, 10-11. Although Kurz cites most of Sanuto's references to the helmet-crown, he fails to mention this invoice.

thought to be based on a design by Titian (Figs. 1-4). The tall, compositionally dominant helmet is superimposed on the rather unflattering rendering of the sultan's profile, which appears to have been copied from earlier woodcuts issued in the 1520's. The large undated woodcuts (Figs. 1-3) are more precise in showing the helmet's details than Agostino Veneziano's derivative engraving from 1535 (Fig. 4), which shortens the plumed aigrette drastically to fit the print's smaller format.³

The transactions involving this helmet, which was sold to the Ottoman court for an enormous sum in 1532, have been carefully documented by Kurz, whose research has laid the groundwork for this paper. He has established the basic facts concerning the helmet, but he regarded its creation as a purely speculative commercial enterprise undertaken by a consortium of Venetian goldsmiths and merchants. He visualizes the sultan's first encounter with the helmet's resplendent jewels as the moment from the *Arabian Nights* when Aladdin's mother brought gorgeous jewels to the palace: "When the King saw the gems he was seized by surprise and cried: Never at all until this day saw I anything like these jewels for size and beauty and excellence; nor deem I that there be found in my treasury a single one like them."⁴ This scenario

³Kurz perceptively noted that the prints copied Süleymân's profile from earlier woodcuts; (Kurz, 249, 254-255). For prints and medals from the 1520's that depict the beardless young sultan in profile, see. L. Donati, "Due immagini ignote di Solimano I," *Studi orientalistici in onore di Giorgio Levi della Vida*, Rome, 1956, I, 219-233. The order in which Süleymân's various portraits featuring the Venetian helmet-crown were issued remains controversial. Kurz dates the woodcut of Fig. 1 to 1532, and argues that Agostino Veneziano's engraving of 1535 (Fig. 4), which is less precise in showing the helmet's details, derives from it. More recently, Muraro and Rosand have dated the Fig. 1 woodcut to ca. 1540-50, arguing that it is a copy of Fig. 2, which they date to ca. 1532-40. In their opinion, Fig. 2, which competes with the engraver's art to the degree that it imitates the linework of the burin, is the original woodcut attributable to Giovanni Britto, the fine graphic language of which is coarsened and simplified in Fig. 1, see n. 1. Peter Dreyer, on the other hand, has argued that Fig. 3 is the original woodcut from which Figs. 1 and 2 derive; (*Tizian und sein Kreis. 50 Venezianische Holzschnitte aus dem Berliner Kupferstichkabinett. Staatliche Museen Preussischer Kulturbesitz*, Berlin, n. d., 55). However, Kurz's dating of Fig. 1 to 1532 seems to find support in its depiction of Süleymân without a beard, following earlier images from the 1520's which it copies. The two other woodcuts (Figs. 2, 3) that are more closely related to Agostino Veneziano's engraving of 1535 (Fig. 4) depict Süleymân with a beard — which the sultan grew in his later years — and thus appear to have been issued at a later date, around 1535. The original beardless image in Fig. 1, which later prints elaborated with an added beard and inscriptions, was probably created in 1532 to commemorate the helmet-crown's shipment to Istanbul. Its sober, precise workmanship accurately documents the elaborate stone settings and the harmonious proportions of the tiara-like helmet, which is elongated in an exaggerated manner in later images (Figs. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8a-b). Disagreeing with Rosand's and Muraro's chronology, Oberhuber argues that there is no reason why the original woodcut should have been cut long after the crown's completion in 1532, when interest in the subject had ended: "Prints of this sort are produced when there is an immediate sale in view. They function as posters, flyers, or souvenirs". He adds that the woodcut's lines typify Titian's handling of the pen around 1532, which Britto has faithfully interpreted. See K. Oberhuber, "Titian Woodcuts and Drawings: Some Problems," in *Tiziano e Venezia. Convegno Internazionale di Studi, Venezia*, 1976, Vicenza, 1980, 526.

⁴Kurz, 255.

underestimates the degree of sophisticated cultural interaction that existed between the Ottoman court and the West. The Venetian partners must surely have had some prior indication that an artifact so costly and so unlike the Ottoman/Islamic emblems of sovereignty would be welcome at the sultan's court, before they set out to produce it. This article attempts to demonstrate that Ottoman officials were actively involved in the network of patronage that produced this Venetian helmet-crown and that its iconography was formulated to fulfill a specific propagandistic function in a context of Ottoman-Hapsburg-Papal rivalry. Supplementing Kurz's valuable documentation and building upon his discoveries, this paper uses new textual evidence to present a more detailed picture of the helmet's meaning from an Ottoman point of view. After interpreting the helmet-crown's imperial message and its differing "reception" by Western and Ottoman audiences, the article attempts to situate it within a broader framework of East-West artistic relations during the early part of Süleymân's reign (1520-66). It concludes with a discussion of the political nature of these cross-cultural artistic contacts initiated after the fall of Constantinople (1453), which abruptly came to an end by the middle of the sixteenth century.

THE NETWORK OF PATRONAGE

The patronage of the Venetian helmet-crown can be reconstructed from the patchy evidence available. Describing the international fame of goldsmiths on the Rialto who produced regalia for monarchs all over Europe, Francesco Sansovino writes:

Forty years have passed now since Vincenzo Levriero in partnership with Luigi Caorlini and other famous jewel merchants produced a tall helmet with four crowns for Süleyman, Emperor of the Turks. It was ornamented and completely covered with so many jewels that this Prince, whose singular prudence and power are known to everyone, was stupefied by a thing so remarkable, and they became rich by it.⁵

⁵Sansovino, 134v; cited in Kurz, 250-251. Assuming that Vincenzo Levriero was also a goldsmith, Kurz writes, "No other works are known by the two goldsmiths. Vincenzo Levriero is for us only a name. Luigi Caorlini, who belonged to a family of Venetian goldsmiths, was a friend of Pietro Aretino"; (Kurz, 251). Vincenzo came from a family of great jewel merchants trading in the Levant, including Gaspare di Levriero, who died in Istanbul from the plague during 1526; see Sanuto, XL, 894, 885. Vincenzo himself was a jewel merchant whose trips to the Ottoman court are recorded in contemporary sources; see nn. 8, 13. A document prepared on 17 Nov. 1531 reveals that "Vincenzo di Livriero's" brothers, Giovanni and Pietro, would receive two thousand ducats and divide their paternal and fraternal inheritance among themselves if Vincenzo died, according to the specification of another document drawn up on 6 Mar. 1531. This document seems to have been drawn up just before Vincenzo Levriero was preparing to leave for Istanbul in order to deliver the Venetian helmet (ASV, Misc. Gregolin, Carte Private, Busta 43).

Sanuto agrees that the Caorlini family of goldsmiths produced this helmet in partnership with Venetian jewel merchants, including Vincenzo Levriero, Pietro Morosini, Jacomo Corner, Marco Antonio Sanudo, and the sons of Pietro Zen, who was the Venetian vice-*bailo* residing in Istanbul at that time. In a reference Kurz overlooked, Sanuto curiously mentions a representative of the Ottoman court, the sultan's chief treasurer, *Defterdâr* Iskender Çelebi, among these Venetian partners.⁶ Although Sanuto's invoice assesses the helmet's value at 144,400 ducats, the Venetian partners claimed to have made a hundred percent profit when it was sold for only 115,000 ducats.⁷ This clue implies a substantial Ottoman investment in the piece, as *Defterdâr* Iskender's involvement already indicates.

The sultan's chief treasurer played a pivotal role in the Ottoman court's commercial relations with Venice, and his contacts with the great jewel merchant Vincenzo Levriero are documented.⁸ Iskender's associates also included Alvise Gritti, the illegitimate son of Doge Andrea Gritti, who was a powerful merchant dealing mostly in jewels at Istanbul (Fig. 5). Born to a Greek concubine while his father resided in Pera, the Frankish quarter of Istanbul, Alvise was educated in Italy. Returning to his place of birth, he became rich from diverse mercantile activities. Fluent in Turkish, Italian, and Greek, he dressed in sumptuous caftans of gold brocade, multiple diamond rings, and golden chains, and wore an Italian *beretta* to mark his Christian status. Popularly known as "Prince's Son," this Turkified Venetian lived in regal pomp at his Italianate palace outside Pera, which featured quarters for slave boys, a harem, and stables.⁹ Both Christians and Turks attended his sumptuous feasts, such as the one in 1524 when a performance of the classical comedy *Psyche and Cupid* was followed by songs and dances by Perote women and Turkish entertainers. Gritti's court, which was frequented by Italian merchants seeking his protection, sheltered several humanists, including Francesco della Valle, who served Gritti as secretary and chamberlain. Andronicus Tranquillus, and Augustinus Musaeus.¹⁰

⁶Sanuto, LV, 634-635; LVI, 358-359. *Defterdâr* Iskender Çelebi is referred to as "Celebi defeder." Since Kurz missed this important reference in Sanuto, he concluded that the helmet was a purely speculative Venetian enterprise with no Ottoman involvement.

⁷Although Sanuto initially reports that the helmet was sold for 115,000 ducats, the delayed final payment amounted to 116,000 ducats. For details on the payment, see Sanuto, LVI, 10-11, 358-359, 364, 403, 791, 826; Kurz, 255.

⁸For Pietro Zen's assessment of Iskender's great power, see Sanuto, LV, 615. Iskender's relations with Vincenzo Levriero's brother-in-law are mentioned in Della Valle, 34.

⁹For Alvise (Luigi) Gritti, see Della Valle; H. Kretschmayr, *Ludovico Gritti, eine Monographie*, Vienna, 1896; Giovinetti, 344-347; Ramberti, 308-311; Finlay, 78-118.

¹⁰For a detailed description of Gritti's feast, see Sanuto, XXXVI, 120-121. The works of humanists attached to Alvise Gritti's court, and a satirical drama performed in a carnival by his enemies in 1532, which ended with the burning of his effigy, are mentioned in T. Kardos, "Dramma satirico carnevalesco su Alvise Gritti, Governatore dell'Ungheria, 1532," *Venezia e Ungheria nel Rinascimento*, ed. V. Branco, Florence, 1973, 397-427.

Alvise Gritti quickly became influential at the Ottoman court through the favors of his powerful patron, the grand vizier İbrâhîm Pasha. The contemporary observer Benedetto Ramberti ranked him as the second greatest man of authority in the Ottoman empire after the grand vizier. It was the latter who introduced Alvise to the sultan as a great connoisseur of jewels.¹¹ Contemporary sources agree that, more than any of his predecessors, Süleymân was an avid collector of rare gems. His childhood training as a goldsmith contributed not only to his unprecedented patronage of local goldsmiths and jewelers attached to the court workshops, but also to a lively jewel trade with Venice in which Alvise came to play an important role.¹² For example, in 1529 when Vincenzo Levriero brought a jewel-inlaid gold box from Venice to Istanbul, it was Alvise who sold it to the Ottoman court. Documents at the Mantuan State Archives indicate that the same "Vincenzo di Livrieri" who was residing in Alvise's palace at Pera, acted as the latter's agent in trade during those years. It is therefore not surprising to learn from Francesco della Valle that his master Alvise Gritti acted as an intermediary for Vincenzo Levriero's partners in presenting the jeweled gold helmet through İbrâhîm Pasha to Süleymân. Holding it in his hands, Alvise had shown it to the influential grand vizier first and then to the sultan.¹³ Paolo Giovio, who wrote that Alvise made a fortune by supplying Süleymân with jewels to decorate his horses and the gold-plated walls of certain royal chambers in his palace, confirms that the golden helmet created in Venice for the sultan, together with several other jewel-incrusted artifacts, was Alvise Gritti's *inventione*.¹⁴

¹¹Ramberti, 309-311. About İbrâhîm's protection of Alvise Gritti, and his introduction to the sultan, see Della Valle, 20; Giovio, 345; D. de'Ludovisi, "Relazione (1534)," in Albèri, I, 29-30; Sanuto, LVIII, 639.

¹²For the observation that Süleymân was fonder of jewels than were any of his predecessors, see Sanuto, LV, 635; LVI, 403; Giovio, 345. Payroll registers indicate that the number of goldsmiths and jewelers attached to the Ottoman court nearly doubled in 1526; Atul, 117. According to the 17th-century traveler Evliyâ Çelebi, while a prince, Süleymân was trained in the craft of goldsmiths in Trebizond by a Greek called Constantine. As sultan, he built a royal establishment for goldsmiths in Istanbul, endowing it with a fountain, mosque, bath, and workshops arranged around a court; see Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyâhatnâme*, 10 vols., Istanbul, 1896-1930, I, 570; II, 91. For the jewelry trade through Venice, see Kellenbenz, 1965; and Kellenbenz, 1967.

¹³For the gold box (*cassetta di zoie et d'oro bellissima*) that Vincenzo Levriero delivered to the Ottoman court, see Sanuto, LV, 167. Dispatches sent from Istanbul to Mantua between 1527 and 1530 indicate that Alvise and Vincenzo were supplying quality horses to the Gonzaga stable master Alexandro Marescalco; (Archivio di Stato di Mantova, Levante e Porta Ottomana, B. 795, nos. 141, 145-148, 154, 158). Referring to Alvise's role in the Venetian helmet's presentation, Della Valle writes (p. 35): "L'anno seguente poi fu portato per esso Learieri [i.e., Vincenzo Levriero], et compagni un certo elmo d'oro, fornito di molte gioie per venderlo a Solimano. Il mio Sigre hebbe l'elmo nelle mani, e lo mostro al Bassa, et dipoi a Solimano." The author seems to be confused about the helmet's price (200,000 ducats).

¹⁴Giovio, 345.

Addressed to the Venetian Senate in 1534, Daniello de' Ludovisi's *Relatione* points out that İbrâhîm Pasha depended heavily on the council of two important men: Alvise Gritti and *Defterdâr* İskender.¹⁵ The involvement of both of these individuals in transactions concerning the helmet inevitably brings İbrâhîm Pasha into the picture (Fig. 6). İbrâhîm was, according to the English writer Knolles, the most magnificent and powerful of all Ottoman grand viziers: "He in magnificence, power and authoritie farre exceeded all the rest of the *Dassas*." A royal document issued in 1526 granted him almost complete power as the sultan's alter-ego.¹⁶ Born in Parga, on Venetian territory, İbrâhîm was a strong supporter of the Serenissima's Levantine trade. The *bailo* Pietro Bragadino reports that this pro-Venetian grand vizier was not only fond of reading the lives of classical heroes like Hannibal and Alexander the Great, but that he also avidly gathered intelligence about contemporary monarchs. Wearing many jeweled rings and dressed more lavishly than the sultan, he "bought almost every fancy object he could acquire."¹⁷ In 1530-31 he had insistently requested a unicorn horn from the Venetian Senate, a treasure that was presented ceremonially to the sultan as a token of the Serenissima's friendship with the Sublime Porte.¹⁸

Promoting the ideal of magnificence as an indispensable attribute of sovereignty, İbrâhîm encouraged the sultan to indulge himself in jewels by presenting him with expensive presents. For example, in 1525, his gifts to Süleymân from Cairo included a gold cup inlaid with enormous diamonds, emeralds, rubies, and pearls worth 200,000 ducats. The grand vizier, who boasted about the vast treasures he accumulated in Cairo, possessed a large quantity of jewels and gold, as two inventories of 1536 of his personal treasury indicate. Composed by the contemporary author Lâûîfî, two essays contain descriptions of these legendary jewels and gold and silver objects surpassing even those owned by the sultans. Though İbrâhîm's preoccupation with pomp eventually led to his execution in 1536, he seems to have been the guiding spirit behind the Venetian helmet project and he might well have provided gold and jewels for it from his own collection.¹⁹ This would explain why two contemporary pamphlets in


¹⁵DeLudovisi (as in n. 11), 29-30. About İbrâhîm's dependence on Gritti for advice, also see Sanuto, LVIII, 574. Some sources state that İbrâhîm Pasha was a former slave of İskender Çelebi, whose daughter he later married; R. Knolles, *The generall historie of the Turkes*, London, 1603, 645-646; Postel, Bk. III, 48-50; H.D. Jenkins, *İbrahim Pasha, Grand Vizier of Suleiman the Magnificent*, New York, 1911, 38.

¹⁶Knolles, 607. The document is fully cited in Celâlzâde, fols. 177r-182v.


¹⁷P. Bragadino, "Sommario della Relazione (1526)", in Saunto, XLI 527-559. For İbrâhîm Pasha, also see Postel, Bk. III, 48-61; Jenkins (as in n. 15), and Anon., *Discorsi*, fols. 48r-v.

¹⁸Sanuto, LIII, 344, 531, 570, LVI 42, 155; LV 178-181, 231-232; ASV, *Deliberazioni (Secreta) Senato*, R. 54, (1530-31), fols. 38r-v, 58r, 61v.

¹⁹The "*copa d'oro*" was set with precious jewels, including a fifty-eight-carat diamond worth 31,000 ducats, a twenty-one-carat diamond worth 18,000 ducats, a fourteen-carat diamond worth 18,000 ducats, an emerald for 15,000 ducats, and numerous rubies and pearls; (Sanuto, XL, 124). For jewels in İbrahim's personal treasury, see *ibid.*, XI, 125; XLI 527. The two inventories from




1 Anonymous, *Portrait of Sultan Süleymân*, Venetian woodcut in two blocks, ca. 1532. London, British Museum (from W. Stirling-Maxwell, *Examples of Engraved Portraits of the Sixteenth Century*, London, Edinburgh, 1872, p. 41)



2 Anonymous, *Portrait of Sultan Süleymân*, Venetian woodcut in two blocks, ca. 1535. New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art, Harris Brisbane Dick Fund (from Rosand and Muraro, as in n. 1, no. 48)



3 Anonymous, *Portrait of Süleymân*, Venetian woodcut, ca. 1535. Berlin, Staatliche Museen Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Kupferstichkabinett (from Dreyer, as in n. 3, no. 28)



4 Agostino Veneziano, *Portrait of Sultan Süleymân*, engraving, 1535. London, British Museum (from Bartsch XIV, no. 518)



5 *Portrait of Alvise Gritti* (from P. Giovio, *Gli elogi vite*)



6 Anonymous, *Ibrâhîm Pasha on Horseback*, woodcut, 1529. Vienna, Albertina, Graphische Sammlung


8a Anonymous, *Equestrian Sultan with Panoramic View of Istanbul in the Background*, engraved in Frankfurt, mid-17th century. Münster Stadtmuseum (from *Münster, Wien und die Türken 1683-1983*, as in n. 27, no. 59)



7 Anonymous, *Equestrian Sultan with Panoramic View of Istanbul in the Background*, copper engraving, mid-17th century, "Augsburg zu finden bey Jacob Koppinayr" (photo: Dr. Julian Raby)




8b Anonymous, *Equestrian Sultan with Panoramic View of Istanbul in the Background*, copper engraving, mid-17th century, "Zu finden in Nürnberg bei Jacob Standrart Kupferstecher" (photo: Dr. Julian Raby)




9a *Süleymân Receiving the Austrian Ambassador in a Tent at Nish in 1532*, ca. 1557, in 'Äriff, *Süleymännâme*, Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, MS H. 1517, fol. 337r




9b *Süleymân Receiving the Austrian Ambassador in a Tent at Belgrade in 1532, ca. 1557, in *ibid.*, fol. 346r*



10 *Military Parade of Sultan Süleymân to Baghdad in 1534, ca. 1580, in Loğman, *Hünernâme*, II, Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, MS H. 1524, fol. 261r*



11 Anonymous, *Charles V's Entry into Bologna in 1529*, from a series of Venetian woodcuts, ca. 1530. Vienna, Albertina, Graphische Sammlung (from W. Stirling-Maxwell, *The Entry of the Emperor Charles V into the City of Bologna on the Fifth of November MDXXIX*, Florence, London, Edinburgh, 1875)



12 Anonymous, *The Coronation Cavalcade of Charles V and Clement VII*, woodcut, 1530 (from *ibid.*)



13(a-c) Domenico del Riccio, known as Brusasorzi, details from a fresco depicting the coronation cavalcade of Charles V and Clement VII, ca. 1564. Verona, Palazzo Ridolfi (from V. Filippini, *Il Palazzo Ridolfi e l'Affresco di Domenico Brusasorzi*, Verona, 1953, figs. 3, 6)

PL VIII OTTOMAN-HAPSBURG-PAPAL RIVALRY



14 Nicolas Hogenberg, *The Coronation Cavalcade of Charles V and Clement VII*, from a series of woodcuts, 1530. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Cabinet des Estampes (from the anonymous publication of Junta Nacional del IV Centenario, *La Coronacion Imperial de Carlos*, Madrid 1958)

KAROLVS · ROEMISCHER · KAISER · DES · RHEINISCHEN REICH
1530



15a Anonymous, *Portrait of Charles V after the Bologna Coronation*, woodcut, 1530 (from Sanuto, *Diarii*, LIII)



15b Anonymous, *Charles V and His Coronation Regalia*, woodcut, ca. 1530. London, British Museum (from Stirling-Maxwell, *The Entry of Emperor Charles V*)



16 Robert Péril, *The Coronation Cavalcade of Charles V and Clement VII*, detail from a series of woodcuts, 1530. Vienna, Albertina, Graphische Sammlung



17 *Audience of an Ancient Near Eastern monarch, 1594-95, Darir, Siyer-i Nebi, Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, MS H. 1221*



18 *The Mughal Emperor Jahangir Holding the Ceremonial Crown of Timur, ca. 1620. London British Museum, Stowe Or. 16, fol. 2b (from I. Stchoukine, *La Peinture indienne à l'époque des Grands Moghols*, Paris, 1929, pl. 21v)*



19 Gentile Bellini,
Portrait of Mehmed II,
1480. London,
National Gallery



20 Gentile Bellini, *Bronze Medal of Mehmed II*, undated.
Lisbon. Calouste Gulbenkian Museum



21 Mitre-crown made for the Habsburg emperor Rudolf II in 1602 by the court goldsmith Jan Vermeyen. Vienne, Kunsthistorisches Museum



22 Süleymân Investing his Vassal John Zapolya with the Holy Crown of St. Stephen in 1529, ca. 1557; in 'Arifi, *Süleymännâme*, Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi Müzesi, MS H. 1517, fol. 309r




23 Agostino Veneziano, *Portrait of Francis I*, engraving, 1536. London, British Museum (from Bartsch XIV, no. 519)




PIADEIVS BARBARVSSA CIRTHAE LVIII
 REX AC OTOMANITAE CLASSIS PRINCIPALIS

24 Agostino Veneziano, *Portrait of Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha*, known in Europe as Barbarossa, engraving, 1535. Cambridge, Fitzwilliam Museum (from Bartsch XVI, no. 520)

25 Hans Miclich,
Ottoman parade
helmet from the
Schatzkammer of
the Bavarian dukes,
album drawing, ca.
1550. Bayerisches
National museum,
Inv. Nr. R. 8248
(from Kopplin,
"Turcica und
Turquerien," in
*Exotische Welten,
Europäische
Phantasien* as in n.
51, pl. 10)





26 Ottoman parade helmet of gold-inlaid steel, set with repoussé gold plaques encrusted with turquoises and rubies, 16th century. Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi, 2/1187



27 *Circumcision Festivities of Süleymân's Sons in 1530, with Three Bronze Statues from Buda Raised in Front of İbrâhîm Pasha's Palace, in Loğmân, Hünernâme, 1587-88. İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, MS H. 1524, fol. 119v*



28 Pieter Coecke van Aelst, *Procession of Süleymân through the Hippodrome, with Three Statues from Buda Raised in Front of İbrâhîm Pasha's Palace*, from a series of woodcuts published in 1553 at Antwerp after drawings made by Coecke in 1533. New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art (from Stirling-Maxwell, as in n. 56)



29 Portrait of Süleymân, by Melchior Lorich, 1559

German and Italian and a German folksong composed by Hans Sachs—all apparently deriving from a common source—state that the Venetian helmet was a gift from İbrâhîm Pasha to Süleymân.²⁰

The grand vizier's chief advisers, İskender Çelebi and Alvise Gritti, probably negotiated the details of this enterprise with Vincenzo Levriero, who frequently traveled between Venice and İstanbul, as well as with the vice-*bailo* Pietro Zen, whose sons were among the partners. The Ottoman court's interpreter, Dragoman Yûnus Beg, who visited Venice on several diplomatic missions during December 1529, January 1530, and December 1532, could also have acted as a liaison. Moreover, it is not altogether unlikely that the Venetian goldsmiths themselves were briefly present in İstanbul to receive instructions about the design from Gritti, who helped conceive it. After all, the brothers Luigi and Marco Caorlini are documented to have visited the Ottoman capital later in 1532-33, probably in the company of Vincenzo Levriero, who with his companions, according to Della Valle, delivered the helmet to its destination.²¹

Well aware of the helmet's whereabouts before it even reached Ottoman territory, İbrâhîm Pasha was instrumental in ensuring its safe transport. He sent an impressive escort to Ragusa, led by one of his slaves, to assure its delivery over land to the Ottoman court.²² At the head of his army, Süleymân had already departed from İstanbul for a second campaign to Vienna, when the helmet arrived

1536 list numerous rubies, pearls, diamonds, emeralds, turquoises, and jeweled rings, Topkapı Palace Archives, D. 5927, D. 10023. For relevant passages in the two essays, see A. Sevgi, ed., *Lâtiî'nin iki Risâlesi: Enisü'l-Fusâhâ ve Evsaf-ı İbrâhîm Pâşâ*, Konya, 1986, 12-16, 24.

²⁰Using Rabbi Ben Meir's derivative *Chronicle of the Kings of France and Sultans of Turkey*, which directly copies sources from 1532, Kurz dismisses İbrâhîm Pasha's involvement: "We see that already by the middle of the sixteenth century — the Chronicle was finished in 1535 — a false rumor was current that the helmet was a gift from the wealthy grand vizier to his overlord"; (Kurz, 255-256; J. Ben Meir, *The Chronicles*, 2 vols., trans. C.H.F. Biallobotzky, 1836, II, 141). Two anonymous pamphlets published in 1532 state that the Venetian helmet, which cost 140,000 ducats (a figure remarkably close to the 144,000 ducats cited in Sanuto's invoice), was İbrâhîm's gift to the sultan; see Anon., *Copey*, fol. 3v; Anon., *Copia*, fol. 2v. A song composed by Hans Sachs in 1532 repeats the same information without mentioning the helmet's price; (see Sachs, 56). All three sources are quoted in n. 31. Like the mid-16th-century chronicle of Ben Meir, that of Gomara copies this information from the above-cited pamphlets; (F.L. de Gomara, *Annals of the Emperor Charles V*, trans. R.B. Merriman, Oxford, 1912, 91-92, 224).

²¹Dragoman Yûnus Beg's missions are explained in Setton, III, 384. For the presence of the Caorlini brothers in İstanbul, see a document published in Kellenbenz, 1965, 365-366, 374-377. Luigi Caorlini's visit to İstanbul is also referred to in Pietro Aretino's play, *La cortigiana*; see De Sanctis, 173, cited in L. Klinger and J. Raby, "Barbarossa and Sinan: A Portrait of Two Ottoman Corsairs from the Collection of Paolo Giovio," *Ateneo Veneto* (forthcoming), 9. It is also mentioned in a letter published in P. Larivaille, *Lettere di, a su Aretino nel Fondo Bonghi dell' Archivio di Stato di Lucca*, Paris, 1980, 17. A letter from Marco di Niccolò to Aretino, written in İstanbul on 8 Sept. 1533, confirms Caorlino's presence at the Ottoman capital: "Il Caorlino vi bacia la mano, e mandavi una turchese bella e di prezzo; ma pregate pure İddio che le cose nostre vadino bene"; Landoni, I, pt. I, 94-95. For the helmet's transport to the Ottoman court by Levriero and his companions, see Della Valle, 35 (as in n. 13).

²²Sanuto, LV, 634-635; LVI 7.

in Edirne. There, it was delivered on 12 May 1532 to İbrâhîm Pasha, who is reported by Sanuto to have admired it immensely.²³ Pietro Zen's firsthand reports on the transactions indicate that the helmet's costs were covered in Istanbul by the sultan's acting treasurer Maĥmûd, who openly disapproved of this extravagant expense on the eve of a costly military campaign. Since there was not sufficient cash at hand, only 100,000 ducats were paid at first, while the remaining debt of 15,000 was covered several months later from the revenues of Aleppo and Tripoli. Pietro Zen noted that this was "an excellent and notable payment in a time of this sort," which advertised to the whole world the sultan's wealth.²⁴

THE ICONOGRAPHY OF POWER

Now let us turn to the iconography and the ceremonial functions that the Venetian helmet-crown fulfilled. Why did İbrâhîm Pasha acquire this idiosyncratic headgear, given that such imperial regalia as crowns, scepters, orbs, or golden chains were foreign to the Ottoman tradition of sovereignty?²⁵ The helmet's acquisition in 1532 was not an isolated case. Observing that it was conceived as part of a larger group of Venetian ceremonial objects commissioned by a different consortium, Sanuto writes: "This helmet will be sent together with a jewel-studded saddle and saddle cloth ordered by another partnership. These, too, are estimated to be worth 100,000 ducats."²⁶

This is confirmed by Francesco Sansovino who states that, besides the golden helmet with four superimposed crowns, the Venetian goldsmith Luigi Caorlini had also made "a cushion, a chamfron for the sultan's horse, and an aigrette, with other precious things of inestimable value." A letter by the renowned humanist Pietro Aretino, addressed to his friend Luigi Caorlini in 1536, indicates that for Süleymân the goldsmith had made a scepter, furnishings and other jewels worth more than 100,000 ducats. Marco di Niccolò, one of the merchants belonging to the second consortium, informed Aretino on 5 May 1530 that he had shown Pope Clement VII in Rome the jewels he obtained from Naples for the scepter (*mazza*) and the other artifacts that the Caorlini were making for the sultan. Giovio mentions the same scepter simultaneously with the gold helmet and a bejeweled mirror as objects created in Venice on the basis of Alvise Gritti's instructions, which Süleyman found to be marvelously pleasing. In a letter from 1535, Giovio links the name of his relative Pietro della

²³*Ibid.*, LVI, 364.

²⁴*Ibid.*, LVI, 403, 791, 826.

²⁵The absence of such regalia is noted in S. Schweigger, *Ein neue Reyssbeschreibung auss Teutschland nach Constantinople and Jerusalem (1578-1581)*, repr. Graz, 1964, 56-57; cited in Kurz, 254.

²⁶Sanuto, LV, 635, LVI, 6-7; cited in Kurz, 254.

Porta to the consortium of this bejeweled scepter which is depicted in a seventeenth-century print representing the misidentified sultan with the helmet-crown as he rides on a horse with rich caparisons. Together with two other variants, which omit the scepter, this German print is probably based on a sixteenth-century design and confirms that the Venetian helmet-crown was conceived as part of a group of ceremonial parade accessories (Figs. 7, 8a-b).²⁷

Guillaume Postel, who accompanied a French embassy to Istanbul in 1534-37, notes that in 1532 Venetian merchants had also sold Süleymân a gold throne studded with jewels and pearls, estimated to cost 40,000 ducats.²⁸ These ceremonial artifacts constitute a category different from the playful curiosities and automata made in Italy for the sultan in those years, such as a tiny alarm clock set in a gold ring, a perpetual clock, a dancing mechanical wooden doll, and a ship moving on a board.²⁹ The production in 1532 of these ceremonial objects — a parade helmet, horse furnishings, a scepter, and a throne — was not accidental. They were pompously displayed with other regalia of Ottoman workmanship as the sultan advanced with his whole court toward Vienna. The contemporary historian Celâlzâde congratulates İbrâhîm Pasha for skillfully choreographing this triumphal procession, punctuated by several ambassadorial receptions, for which an enormous fortune was spent to exhibit the sultan's magnificence to the world.³⁰

Contemporary descriptions preserve the memory of Süleymân's triumphal march to Vienna in 1532. Departing from his capital, the sultan arrived after

²⁷Sansovino, fol. 134v: Camesasca, 29-30; cited in Kurz, 250-251. For Marco di Niccolò, see Landoni, I, pt. 1, 92-94. For Giovio's reference to the scepter, see Giovio, 345. Giovio's letter referring to Pietro della Porta is cited in Klinger and Raby (as in n. 21), 11. I would like to thank Dr. Julian Raby for bringing the two prints (Figs. 7 and 8b) to my attention and for providing me with their photographs. Fig. 8a is published in the catalogue of an exhibition at the Münster Stadtmuseum, *Münster, Wien und die Türken 1683-1983*, Münster, 1983, 82-84, no. 59.

²⁸Postel, Bk. III, 4.

²⁹For these curiosities made by Giorgio Capobianco of Vicenza, see Camesasca, 103; Sanuto, LV, 14, 636; LVI, 6-7.

³⁰For İbrâhîm Pasha's role in conceiving these ceremonies and processions in 1532, see Celâlzâde, fols. 217b, 228r-v. Several Ottoman-made artifacts seem to have been commissioned specifically for the military parade of 1532. For a ceremonial gold sword of Ottoman workmanship, carrying the inscription "Sultân Süleymân Hân may his victories be glorious, Constantinople, 1531/32," see Atıl, 154, pl. 87. It is tempting to propose that a 16th-century parade helmet (fig. 26), its matching ceremonial mace, and the celebrated gold canteen (*matara*) used for carrying the sultan's drinking water, were also produced for this occasion. For these objects, usually dated to the second half of the 16th century, see Atıl, 123, 148-151, pls. 54, 84, 85; Rogers and Ward, 130-131, 144-145, 148-151. Descriptions of regalia paraded by Süleymân's pages in 1532 include references to spectacular ceremonial helmets as well as to a gold canteen (*une mastrapano, zioè uno boccal d'oro per beber acqua*); see n. 20, and Sanuto, LVI, 828, 870-871. It is more likely that these spectacular ceremonial objects of Ottoman workmanship date from the 1530's, when the numbers of court goldsmiths and jewelers reached a peak, and not to the second half of the 16th century when their numbers were drastically reduced; see n. 63.

several stops in Belgrade, the streets of which had been decorated with classical triumphal arches "in the manner of ancient Roman triumphs." Orders of foot soldiers and cavalry troops were followed by standard-bearers carrying flags with Ottoman crescents and the prophet Muhammad's name embroidered in pearls and jewels. Then rode one hundred select royal pages carrying damascened lances. Twelve of the sultan's favorite pages displayed costly helmets studded with dazzling jewels and pearls. The last one of these was reported to have been a special "Venetian helmet bearing a striking resemblance to a papal tiara," which İbrâhîm Pasha had presented as a gift to the sultan. Followed by his grand vizer, Süleymân rode on a magnificent horse, the saddle of which was estimated to be worth 70,000 ducats, while its chamfron, featuring a turquoise as large as an egg, was valued around 50,000 ducats. Dressed in a large turban and a fur-lined gold brocade caftan of royal purple embroidered with jewels, Süleymân wore around his neck an enormous gold chain, which attendants held on both sides to relieve the weight. Accompanied by martial musicians, the sultan rode in triumph under a costly silk brocade canopy, the four poles of which were carried by dignitaries of the city. The sultan's various triumphal parades along the route to Vienna approximated this spectacular entry into Belgrade, with only minor variations in detail.

For example, during his march into Nish, which the Hapsburg envoys were made to watch from a minaret, Süleymân wore a large turban set in a gold crown (*uno turbante grandissimo involtato con una corona d'oro*).³¹ Desperately

³¹For Süleymân's parades in 1532, see Sanuto, LVI, 828-831, 870-871. The German pamphlet of 1532 describes the twelve pages carrying helmets as follows: "Nach disen volgeten 100 die aller vorderisten und inneristen Camerdiener des Kayzers... under denen waren zwelff / der yeder hett ain kostlich helmlin auff / die waren mit Perlen und Edelstain gar unseglich geziert / also dass ain scheinbarlichen glast gab / under denen was ain sonderer helm / der gleychet sich fast ainer Bapst Kroa / den haben etlich Kauflewt auf iren aigen verlag in Venedig mit künstlicher arbeit / und Edlen eingesetzten gestain lassen machen / und darnach gen Constantinopel bracht / dem Abraym Bascho verkaufft umb hundert und vierzig tausent Ducaten / den er nachmals dem Türkischen Kayser geschenckt"; Anon., Copey, fol. 3v. The Italian text of 1532 reads: "Doppo questi venivano sopra bellissimi cavalli, cento pagi schiavi dela camera del Signore, ...fra quali xii, erano che portavano xii Celladoni, & tutti coperti di zoie de infinito valore, et l'ultimo era uno Celladone, che havevano fatto fare alchuni mercanti in Venetia, & Abrayim Bassa l'havea comprato da essi in Constantinopoli, & donato al signore, il quale dicono essere costato cento et quarana milia ducati"; Anon., Copia, fol. 2v. Sachs' song condenses this information, "Nach im folgeten hundert pfer, darauf des keisers kammerer ... / Zwölf waren aber unter in, die hetten auf köstlich helmlin mit perlein und edlem gesteine, das gab ein scheinbarlichen glast, die hoffart was nit kleine / Der türkisch keiser het auch ein, der gleichen findt man nindet kein, der gleichet einer bapstlichen kroone, İbrahim wascho der im den zu eer was schenken thune"; Sachs, quatrains 18-21, p. 56.

The triumphal arches of Belgrade and the sultan's canopy are described as follows: "Und es haben die inwonner und Oberisten der statt / durch die gassen wie der Kaiser zogen ist / herlich und künstlich gemacht gleich wie die Regenbogen / himmelspil und Spectackel / nach brauch der alten Römer gehalten / Und die fürnemesten der statt / haben ain sondern kostlichen hymel von silber und gold in seyden gestickt und gemacht / über den Kaiser gedeckt / mitt den vier orten des himels getragen / schön und prächlich / dass herlich zsehen ist"; Copey, fol. 5r. The Italian text reads: "El Turcho entro a disinare in Belgrado con tanto fausto, & pompa, & con tanti piffari, &

trying to conclude an armistice, the Austrian delegation was subsequently received by the sultan in a lavish tent at Nish. On Süleymân's canopied gold throne, royal emblems consisting of swords, bows and arrows were exhibited together with the Venetian helmet, which the ambassadors imagined to be the Turkish imperial crown:

Then were the two ambassadors conducted to the emperor's tent, and saw there the Turkish emperor sitting in majesty and pomp on a golden throne or seat with four columns. They also saw near him, on a small stool or standing on the same throne, the imperial crown (*Keyserliche kron*) which cost 115,000 ducats and had been made in Venice. They kissed his hand, and saw hanging on each of the front columns of the throne very beautiful bows and quivers full of arrows. The columns or supports of the throne were completely covered with jewels and costly pearls, like the scabbards of the swords and quivers. All of these were described to us by the ambassadors who saw them personally together with a great treasure more than twelve times 100,000 ducats, and the expensive vest worn by the Turkish emperor.³²

So powerful was the effect of this carefully staged reception ceremony that the Hapsburg ambassadors, stupefied by the abundance of jewels and gold, turned into "speechless corpses," according to a Venetian report. In his detailed account of this audience, and of a similar reception given to the French ambassador later in Belgrade, the contemporary court historian Celälzâde describes Süleymân's bejeweled gold throne on which such Ottoman symbols of sovereignty as swords, bows, arrows, daggers and shields were displayed. However, he fails to mention the Venetian helmet-crown, which was completely alien to the Ottoman imperial tradition. While foreign news pamphlets, Sachs's folksong, and various prints testify to the sensation this fantastic headgear created in the West, it is neither mentioned in Ottoman historical texts, nor shown in

suoni de instrumenti diversi, che miracolosa cosa era aremirare, & a lo entrare dentro, erano fati li archi triumphal, per le strade del suo pasaggio, dove secondo le antiqità de Romani vedeano giochi, & feste solenne, & egli era a cavallo sotto un baldachino ricchissimo, portato da i più nobili di quella Citta"; Copa, fol. 3r-v. Sachs's song again shortens this information: "Mit köstlichen triumph man hat in empfangen, wol in der stat, gar künstlich war gemacht von regenpogen ein himelspil, des im der keiser lachet / Da er dadurch aussreiten thet, die burgerschaft in der stat het, ein köstlichen himel, wiste, v on silber und gold in seiden gestückt auf den keiser gerüste / Den man ober dem keiser trug, die hoffart was des keisers lug, dass man im triumphieret, nach prauch der alter Römer art man im herrlich hofieret"; Sachs, quatrains 15-17, p. 56. Kurz cites a derivative description of this parade from Ben Meir's chronicle, 255-256.

³²B. Curipeschitz, *Wegrays Keyserlicher Maiestät Legation im 32. Jar zu dem Türcken geschickt*, Augsburg, 1533, fol. B iiv, repr. as an appendix to pt. 5 in A. von Gévay, *Urkunden und Actenstücke zur Geschichte der Verhältnisse zwischen Oesterreich, Ungarn und der Pforte*, I, Vienna, 1840; cited in Kurz, 256.

miniatures depicting Süleymân's tent reception (Figs. 9a-b).³³ This conspicuous omission confirms that the helmet's message was primarily directed to a European audience.

What sources did İbrâhîm Pasha draw upon as he was staging these receptions and triumphal processions with classical allusions? In a conversation with Pietro Zen, the grand vizier stated that he had acquired the helmet-crown from Italian merchants because it was a "trophy of Alexander the Great."³⁴ The sultan's processions in 1532 can be seen as a direct response to classical triumphs staged before and after the coronation of Charles V in Bologna as Holy Roman Emperor. Charles's entry to Bologna in 1529 was a formidable demonstration of imperial power, in which the emperor, accompanied by his whole court and musicians, rode under triumphal arches as people shouted "Cesare, Cesare, Carlo, Carlo, Imperio, Imperio!" Like the sultan's pages who carried ceremonial helmets, those of Charles are reported to have exhibited four plumed "helmets of Caesar" (*elmeti di Cesare*), one of which was surmounted by the Hapsburg eagle and another by a crown. These pseudo-Roman ceremonial helmets advertised the emperor's claim to be the triumphant Caesar of the Holy Roman Empire. Behind his pages, clad in complete armor with a golden eagle on his helmet, and holding a scepter in his hand, Charles rode on a horse with jewel-embroidered furnishings of gold cloth. Four knights carried a magnificent gold brocade canopy over his head as he paraded in triumph (Fig. 11). The emperor's joint procession with Pope Clement VII after the coronation in 1530 as a living embodiment of the dependence of *regnum* on *sacerdotium*, on the other hand, powerfully advertised the claim for a universal empire. Descriptions of this parade again refer to triumphal arches, richly caparisoned horses, a gold brocade canopy held by dignitaries, as well as banners embroidered with imperial and papal insignia, one of which was a Crusader's flag showing a cross with the figure of Christ. All of these elements, including the display of regalia held by dignitaries, find their echoes in Süleymân's parades, which are full of references to the spectacle of power staged by his rivals (Fig. 12-14).³⁵

³³Sanuto, LVI, 824-825; Celâzâde, fols. 210v-217v. For the diplomatic missions of the Austrian and French, ambassadors, see Setton, III, 362-364. The two miniatures are reproduced and described in E. Aul, Süleymanname: *The Illustrated History of Süleyman the Magnificent*, Washington, DC, and New York, 1986, 162-165.

³⁴İbrâhîm Pasha is quoted by Pietro Zen in reference to the helmet: "... lo l'ho comprato per esser quello un trofeo di Alexandro Magno, che era strana cosa che'l stesse in mano di mercadantî, ma doveva andar in man dil suo Signor, come è questo conveniente a lui, et quando Janus bei (i.e. Dragoman Yûnus Beg) mi dimando i precio risposi era bon mercato, e tanto li ditti che se havesseno dimandati ducati 300 milia tanto li haria datî per tuorlo di mano di mercadanti e darlo al Signor"; (Sanuto, LVIII, 634).

³⁵For the festivities in Bologna, see M. Bonner, *Italian Civic Pageantry in the High Renaissance, A Descriptive Bibliography of Triumphal Entries and Selected Other Festivals for State Occasions*, Florence, 1979, 19-25; Sanuto, LII, 142-145, 180-199, 205-206, 295-275, 604-619, 624-682; L. Gonzaga, *Cronaca del soggiorno di Carlo V in Italia*, ed. G. Romano, Milan, 1892, 113-236.

Marco di Niccolò's letter to Aretino of 5 May 1530, in which he refers to having shown the pope jewels obtained from Naples for artifacts that the Caorlini were preparing for Süleymân, indicates that the Ottoman parade accessories were conceived immediately after the Bologna coronation. İbrâhîm Pasha, who regularly collected intelligence about European monarchs, was kept well informed about the ceremonies in Bologna through Venetian reports. Widely circulated propagandistic prints of Charles's coronation must also have reached his hands. Inquiring about preparations for the coronation from Pietro Zen in 1529, he remarked indignantly: "How can there be an emperor other than my grand signor?"³⁶ In Istanbul, the emperor's coronation was far from popular. The historian Celâlzâde, very keen on titulature because of his career as chancellor, complained that after being invested with a jeweled crown (*korona*), Charles began to "claim the title of Caesar" (*çesar*).³⁷ Refusing to recognize this ambitious title in his official correspondence, Süleymân addressed his rival simply as "King of Spain."

Angered by Hapsburg claims to universal sovereignty implied by the title of Caesar, İbrâhîm asserted that there could be only one emperor in the world, and he threatened to ruin both Charles V and Pope Clement VII, who had joined forces in Bologna against the sultan.³⁸ During 1530 and 1531, word came from all quarters about Ottoman plans to advance both by sea and land to attack Italy and Austria simultaneously. During the anxious months preceding the awaited campaign, the Papacy anticipated that Süleymân's land army would invade Hapsburg domains in Austria-Hungary, while his fleet might attack "perhaps all Italy, and the state of the Church as well."³⁹ Francis I told the Venetian ambassador to the French court: "... the Turk will make some naval expedition... and will ravage Puglia, going perhaps as far as Rome, for Sultan Süleymân always says 'to Rome! to Rome!' and he detests the emperor and his title of Caesar, he, the Turk, causing himself to be called Caesar" (*facendosi lui Turco, appellar Cesare*).⁴⁰

This would have been a joint Franco-Turkish attack on the Hapsburgs, for which the grand vizier requested access to Venetian ports through Alvise Gritti. It was believed that after this coordinated attack, the sultan would take Italy under

³⁶Marco di Niccolò's letter is published in Landoni, I, pt. 1, 92-94. Doge Andrea Gritti asked Pietro Zen to keep İbrâhîm Pasha and Alvise Gritti well informed about the coronation; Setton, III, 336-338; Sanuto, XLIX, 443; LIII, 213; L, 175.

³⁷Celâlzâde, fols. 209v-210r.

³⁸Sanuto, LIII, 8, 173.

³⁹Setton, III, 340-355, Finlay, 92-95; Sanuto, LIII, 134. According to a contemporary Italian source, certain Christian princes, renegades from Naples and Florence, as well as the Christian merchants of Istanbul, had convinced İbrâhîm Pasha to undertake the conquest of Austria and Italy in 1532 (Anon., *Discorsi*, fols. 48v-55r).

⁴⁰R. Brown, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Venice*, V, London, 1873, 619-620.

his protection, making Francis the legitimate sovereign of north Italy, and appointing a vassal king to south Italy — a post thought to be destined for Alvise Gritti. İbrâhîm Pasha confidently told Pietro Zen that after conquering Rome, he would come to visit "the nobles of Venice who love the sultan so much." But owing to a lack of coordination with the ambivalent French and Venetian allies, the anticipated invasion of Italy by sea did not materialize. Süleymân did arrive with his land troops at Vienna in 1532, where he hoped to meet the emperor in a pitched battle, but his rival was nowhere to be found. Thus, the triumphal march during which the sultan theatrically publicized his power dwindled into an anticlimatic conclusion with the retreat of the Ottoman army.⁴¹

Clues to the iconography of Süleymân's helmet-crown must be sought within this particular historical context. Its form, which alluded to Charles's ceremonial helmets of Caesar (Fig. 17), is also reminiscent of plumed helmet-crowns worn by ancient Near Eastern monarchs and by Alexander the Great in Ottoman miniature painting. This might explain why İbrâhîm Pasha referred to it as a "trophy of Alexander the Great," in which case it would be tempting to interpret the bejeweled Venetian mirror that accompanied it as Alexander's legendary mirror, which was believed to reflect the whole world and therefore associated with universal sovereignty. This allusion would support Süleymân's claim to be the second Alexander, which, according to a contemporary Italian account, he wanted to announce to the world through his march to Vienna in 1532.⁴² Such a ceremonial plumed helmet-crown, reminiscent of the ones worn by ancient monarchs, is depicted in an early seventeenth-century Mughal painting where the emperor Jahângîr holds it as an emblem of sovereignty allegedly belonging to his ancestor Timur (Fig. 18). However, none of the royal helmets depicted in Islamic miniatures features multiple crowns. Despite its tapering Islamic form and its Ottomanizing crescent-shaped aigrette, Süleymân's helmet made an unmistakable reference to the papal tiara, as contemporary Western observers were quick to note. Its extra fourth crown added to the traditional three tiers of crowns could only be read as a statement of superiority to the two allied

⁴¹İbrâhîm trusted Alvise Gritti that Venice would block off the imperialists from the Adriatic, but Venice preferred to remain neutral (Finlay, 92-98; Setton, III, 340-360). For İbrâhîm's intention to visit Venice, see Sanuto, LV, 231. Süleymân advertised the main objective of this campaign to be a pitched battle with the arrogant "King of Spain" outside Vienna, or an offer of tribute from him. Perhaps the impressive parades that publicized his power were aimed to force Charles to accept the second alternative. Disappointed in both respects, Süleymân rationalized his retreat through his rival's absence from Vienna. The two emperors thus measured each other's military strength from a distance, and in 1533, the following year, the Hapsburgs sent an embassy to the sultan for peace negotiations. For details, see Finlay, 96-98; Setton, III, 361-366; H. İnalcık, "The Heyday and Decline of the Ottoman Empire," in Cambridge History of Islam, Cambridge, London, New York, etc., 1970, I, 326-327.

⁴²Anon., *Discorci*, fol. 49r. Contemporary Ottoman sources frequently refer to Süleymân as the Second Alexander or the Alexander of the Age; see Sevgi (as in n. 19), 11, 16; and A. Karahan, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Devri Şairlerinden Figani ve Divançesi*, İstanbul, 1966, 7.

heads of Christendom. It powerfully advertised the sultan's claims to universal sovereignty on the eve of a planned anti-Hapsburg / anti-papal military campaign that would have culminated in the conquest of Rome.

An allegorical anti-papal play published by Francesco Negri in 1546 indicates that Süleymân's headgear continued to invite a comparison with the pope's tiara more than a decade after its creation. Here, one of the characters comments on the deficiency of the papal tiara in symbolizing the pope's claim to rule over all regions of the world (*regnum mundi*). He suggests: "It were well done of the Pope in my opinion, to adde also to his diademe a fourth crowne, because there is a newe world found out in our dayes, & I would have him fashion it in forme of that diademe which the Venetians sent once to *Soliman* the seconde, emperor of the Turkes."⁴³ This proposal to improve the traditional form of the papal tiara by the addition of an extra crown reveals that the challenge of Süleymân's Venetian headgear, understood to signify a claim for world dominion, was transparent to contemporary European observers. Verses accompanying two of the seventeenth-century German prints of the equestrian sultan wearing the helmet-crown further support an interpretation of its message as a claim for *regnum mundi*: "Make a show with robbed crowns, you cursed World Tyrant" (Figs. 8a-b).

The generally accepted view that the four superimposed crowns represented different kingdoms over which Süleymân ruled is problematic. The three crowns of Byzantium, Trebizond, and Asia included in painted or medallic portraits of Mehmed II by Gentile Bellini had been augmented considerably through victories in Safavid Iran (1514), Mamluk Egypt (1517), Rhodes (1522), and Hungary (1526) (Figs. 19, 20). This unprecedented territorial expansion led Süleymân to increase the number of imperial standards from four to seven in 1526, in order to symbolize the seven defeated kingdoms or climes over which he ruled (fig. 10). It is therefore difficult to reduce the Ottoman empire to four separate Kingdoms, given the absence of a fourfold division of territories in contemporary sources. Instead of referring to four specific kingdoms, the crowns appear to have signified a general message of universal sovereignty through the symbolism of the four cardinal points, like the four aigrettes (*şorğuç*) seen on

⁴³I would like to express my gratitude to Dror Wahrman of the History Department of Princeton University for bringing this important reference to my attention: F.N. Bassanese, *A certayne Tragedie wrytten fyrst in Italian, by F.N.B. entitled, Freewyl*, London, 1589, 25. Some European historians erroneously refer to Süleymân I as Süleymân II, since they count the brief rule of Prince Süleymân (1402-11), which is omitted from official Ottoman histories. The Italian version reads: "Se quelle tre corone significano la signoria delle parti del mondo, essendosi a nostri giorni trovato un mondo nuovo, che è per una quarte parte aggiunta alle tre già dette, io direi esser ben fatto, che ei ne mettesse quatro delle corone sopra'l suo diadema, & l'ordinasse al modo di quel che fu mandato altre volte da Venetia a Solimano II Imperator de turchi"; *idem, Della tragedia di M. Francesco Negro Bassnese intitulata Libero Arbitrio*, 2nd ed., n. p., 1550, fol. D8v.

Süleymân's turban in a sixteenth-century miniature painting depicting the military parade to Baghdad in 1534 (Fig. 10).⁴⁴

One can therefore construct a reading of the helmet's design with its four superimposed crowns as a statement of world dominion meant to challenge the allied pope and emperor. The sultan's headgear not only makes an obvious allusion to the pope's tiara, but also to ceremonial Hapsburg helmets and to the emperor's mitre-crown displayed in Bologna (Figs. 12-16). The jewel-studded gold crowns of the pope and emperor had large pearls, which also constitute the most distinctive feature of Süleymân's headgear. Moreover, the sharply pointed, spiky diamonds seen on the headband of the emperor's crown present a striking parallel to those on the sultan's helmet (Figs. 15a-b). Charles's mitre-crown was sold by Philip II during an auction at Madrid in 1564 to raise cash, but an inventory of its jewels specifically mentions these large pearls and spiky diamonds. Echoes of its form can be found in the golden mitre-crown made in 1602 for the Hapsburg emperor Rudolf II, which also features distinctive large pearls (Figs. 21).⁴⁵

Süleymân's helmet substitutes the uppermost Christian cross of its models with a plumed aigrette set in a gold mount in the shape of a crescent, which was widely reconized in Europe as the emblem of the Ottoman sultan.⁴⁶ This aigrette must have been inspired by Ottoman turban ornaments (*sorğuç*) considered to be emblems of royalty. Curiously, Sanuto identifies the prominent

⁴⁴Kurz hypothesizes that the fourth crown added to the previous three shown on Mehmed II's portrait medals was presumably that of Egypt (Kurz, 251). Rogers and Ward (p. 53) state that the quadruple gold crown symbolized each of the kingdoms over which Süleymân ruled. For the three crowns on Mehmed II's portraits, see J. von Karabacek, "Abendlandische Künstler zu Konstantinopel im XV. und XVI. Jahrhunderts," *Kaiserliche Akademie der Wiss. in Wien, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, Denkschriften*, LXII, 1, 1916, 49. The adoption of seven standards in 1526 is mentioned by Celâlzâde, fol. 179r. An Italian observer wrote around 1537 that these standards symbolized the seven defeated kingdoms or realms: "Portano questi sette standardi a significare i sette Regni che hanno acquistati, & soggiugati in Asia"; Bassano, fol. 52r. A mid-17th-century traveler states that they signified the sultan's dominion over the seven climes: "Parce que selon les Turcs le Mond est divisé en sept parties ou sept climats, dont le Grand Seigneur est Maistre" (Tavernier, 8). This is confirmed by the late 16th-century court historian Ta'likizâde: "The Ottoman dynasty has seven standards (*sancağ*) which symbolize their rule over the seven climes (*yedi iklim*)"; C. Woodhead, ed., *Ta'likizâde's, Şehnâme-i hümayün: A history of the Ottoman Campaign into Hungary 1593-94*, Berlin 1983, 120

⁴⁵The inventory is published in P. de Madrazo, "Über Krönungsinsignien und Staatsgewänder Maximilian I. und Karl V. und ihr Schicksal in Spanien," *Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorischen Sammlungen des Oesterreichischen Kaiserhauses*, IX, 1889, 446-464. It refers to large pearls (*dicke Perle*) and pointed diamonds (*spitze Diamanten*), *ibid.*, 456-457. For Hapsburg mitre-crowns and papal tiaras, see E.F. Twining, *European Regalia*, London, 1967, 43-44, 113-116.

⁴⁶A contemporary observer notes that the Ottomans did not use emblemata, except for the sultan's crescent (*luna*), which was adopted after the conquest of Hungary in 1526: "Questa è honorata da ciaschuno per essere impresa del Signor loro"; Bassano, fol. 52a. A description of Süleymân's entry into Belgrade in 1532 refers to seven standards carrying the emblem of the crescent (*con le lune che è l'insegna della casa otomana*); Sanuto, LVI, 871.

cluster of plumage attached to the aigrette as the costly feathers of the Indian chameleon, which was believed to live constantly in the air: "On the aigrette has been put the plumage of an animal which stays and lives in the air, has very soft feathers of various colors, and comes from India; it is called chameleon and is worth a fortune." This implies a reference to the auspicious paradisiacal bird *humā*, traditionally associated in the Islamic world with royalty and believed to fly continually in the air. Firdawsī's *Book of Kings* frequently refers to royal crowns with such *humā* feathers. Indeed, two seventeenth-century German prints identify the Venetian helmet's feathers as those of a "paradise bird" (Fig. 8a-b).⁴⁷

It can be concluded, therefore, that Süleymân's composite crown — with its combined elements from the pope's tiara, the emperor's mitre-crown, and Hapsburg parade helmets with Islamic motifs — was an intelligible statement of Ottoman imperial claims. This idiosyncratic helmet disputed both the Holy Roman emperor's title of Caesar and the sanctioning power of the pope through its conspicuous departure from the established form of the papal tiara. "Difference" stressed through analogy turned the unexpected extra fourth crown into an indication of Ottoman supremacy, challenging Hapsburg-papal claims for universal rule. This challenge was the whole *raison d'être* of the military campaign of 1532, undertaken, according to a contemporary Italian source, to advertise the sultan's status as "imperator del mondo."⁴⁸ Specifically designed for this occasion as a joint "invention" of İbrâhîm Pasha and Alvisè Gritti, the principal agents of Süleymân's anti-Hapsburg / anti-papal diplomacy, the Venetian helmet exemplifies an Ottoman awareness of the legitimizing role of crowns in the West. This awareness had already been demonstrated in 1529 by Süleymân's investiture of his vassal in Hungary, John Zapolya, with the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen, after which the sultan began to use the proud title "Distributor of Crowns to the Monarchs of the World" in his correspondence with European rulers (Fig. 22). This event marked the beginning of an Ottoman preoccupation with Western emblems of sovereignty as a means to challenge European rivals, a concern that culminated in Süleymân's acquisition of the Venetian helmet-crown.⁴⁹

⁴⁷For feathers of the Indian chameleon, see Sanuto, LV, 634-635; cited in Kurz, 250. For the mythical birds of paradise, see C. Huart and H. Massé, "Humā," *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed. Leiden, London, 1971, III, 572. Costly plumages of the "bird of paradise" are also encountered in an inventory of Archduke Ferdinand I's *Kunstammer* at Ambras, while Queen Elizabeth wore a jewel-studded aigrette featuring feathers of the bird of paradise found only in the East; D.F. Lach, *Asia in the Making of Europe*, II, Bk. I. Chicago, London, 1970, 27, 102-103, 181-182.

⁴⁸The Italian source states that it was İbrâhîm Pasha who convinced Süleymân to undertake the campaign of 1532 in order to establish a world empire: "... Ti fara Signore et padrone ti tutta la Cristianità et della bella Italia... tale che ti fara monarcha del mondo" Anon... *Discorsi*, fols. 48r-56v.

⁴⁹Zapolya's coronation ceremony, which was organized by İbrâhîm and Gritti, is described in Celâlîzâde, fol. 193a; W.F.A. Behrner, ed. and trans., *Sulaiman des Gesetzgebers Tagebuch auf seinem Feldzuge nach Wien in Jahre 935-6/1529*, Vienna, 1858, 24-25. Süleymân's title as

The engraving published by Agostino Veneziano in 1535 revived the memory of Süleymân's spectacular helmet-crown three years after its creation (Fig. 4). The timing of Agostino's engraving, published together with portraits of Charles V, Francis I, and the Ottoman admiral Barbarossa, was not accidental (Figs. 23, 24). 1535 was the year when Francis sent an elaborate mission to Süleymân and Barbarossa, proposing to rekindle the plan for a joint Franco-Turkish attack on a Hapsburg port in Italy that would serve as the sultan's base to besiege Rome. Although this scheme never materialized, Agostino's portrait of Süleymân signals the revived iconographic charge of the tiara-like helmet on the eve of another anti-Hapsburg/anti-papal attempt to conquer Rome.⁵⁰

Dependent on context for its meaning, Süleymân's idiosyncratic headgear must have quickly lost its iconographic relevance. A drawing by Hans Mielich from ca. 1550, which depicts a parade helmet once belonging to the *Schatzkammer* of the Bavarian dukes, provides a clue about its ultimate fate (Fig. 25). The helmet in Mielich's drawing can almost certainly be identified as that of Süleymân, from which the four detachable crowns have been removed. While the plumed aigrette, the headband with spikly diamonds, and the neckguard with straps are unmistakably identical, ogival patterns with palmettes decorating the body of the gold helmet can be barely discerned underneath the four crowns in earlier prints (Fig. 1-4). Thus stripped of its specific royal references, Süleymân's crownless helmet seems to have been conveniently transformed into a noble diplomatic gift. It is tempting to hypothesize that this prestigious helmet was donated by Süleymân as a present on the occasion of a major Ottoman-Hapsburg truce signed in 1547 with the Hapsburg brothers Charles V and Ferdinand I, under the provisions of which Ferdinand was to pay an annual tribute for the Hungarian territory he held. In 1541, during the negotiations for peace initiated after Zapolya's death, Ferdinand had presented to the sultan a magnificent silver planetarium originally belonging to Maximilian I, which took twelve men to carry. If the Venetian helmet was a gift of Süleymân to his "vassal" Ferdinand, it could subsequently have entered the *Schatzkammer* in Munich through his daughter, Duchess Anna of Austria, who represented the House of Hapsburg in Bavaria as Duke Albrecht V's wife. It is suggestive that Mielich's helmet drawing is found in a picture album he prepared in the 1550's as court painter to

bestower of crowns appears in Gévy (as in n. 32), II, 114; and J. Matuz, *Das Kanzleiwesen Sultan Süleymans des Prächtigen*, Wiesbaden, 1974, 122.

⁵⁰Setton, III, 392-393. Inalcik notes that the joint Franco-Ottoman front of 1532 against the Hapsburg Emperor originated in Ottoman attempts to conquer Italy from 1480 onward, which continued well into 1537-38 until Francis I made peace with Charles V; H. Inalcik, "The Turkish Impact on the Development of Modern Europe," *The Ottoman State and Its Place in World History*, ed. K. Karpat, Leiden, 1974, 51-52. Agostino's prints of Charles V, Süleyman, and Barbarossa are dated 1535, while that of Francis I was issued in 1536; Bartsch XIV, 317, nos. 518, 519, 520, 524.

the Bavarian duke and duchess, to serve as a visual record or inventory of their jewelry collection.⁵¹

The detached crowns of Süleymân's helmet, which had little meaning in an Ottoman context, were probably melted down following a common practice, so that their jewels could be reused elsewhere. Without its spectacular crowns, the Venetian helmet depicted on Mielich's drawing is reminiscent of a parade helmet of Ottoman workmanship associated with Süleymân, which might well have been among those displayed in 1532 (Fig. 26). Even after it ceased to exist in its original form, the fame of Süleymân's spectacular headgear was perpetuated by widely circulating prints, of which only a few examples remain. One of the rare surviving woodcuts is scribbled with a marginal note that inflates the long forgotten price of the famous Venetian helmet to 500,000 ducats (Fig. 2; Appendix). The repetition of these inflated values in seventeenth-century German engravings testifies to the legendary reputation of Süleymân's Venetian helmet, whose fame had penetrated into such popular sixteenth-century plays as Pietro Aretino's *Il Marescalco* (1533) or Fr. Negri's *Liberio Arbitrio* (Figs. 8a-b).⁵²

THE PATRONAGE OF EUROPEAN ARTISTS DURING İBRAHİM PASHA'S GRAND VIZIERATE.

İbrâhîm Pasha's acquisition of the Venetian helmet together with a group of parade accessories encouraged Luigi Caorlini and his Venetian partners to venture into other Ottoman projects. Francesco Sansovino writes: "And wanting to make a canopy (*baldacchino*) or umbrella (*ombrella*) for sultan Süleymân after a design by (Jacopo) Sansovino who went into partnership with them, they faced

⁵¹ Mielich's drawing is published without reference to the Venetian helmet in M. Kopplin, "Turcica and Turquetien. Zur Entwicklung des Türkenbildes und Rezeption osmanischer Motive vom 16. bis 18. Jahrhundert," *Exotische Welten, Europäische Phantasien*, Stuttgart, 1987, 156, pl. 10. I would like to thank Dr. Peter Volk of the Bayerisches Nationalmuseum in Munich for answering my inquiry about the album in which it is found. Drawings of jewelry and regalia from this album once belonging to the duke of Bavaria and from Hans Mielich's *Jewel Book of the Duchess Anna* are reproduced in the catalogue, *Princely Magnificence, Court Jewels of the Renaissance 1500-1630*, Victoria and Albert Museum, London, 1980, 22-23, 122-123, and in Y. Hackenbroch, *Renaissance Jewellery*, New York, 1979, 140-145. Also see J. H. von Hefner-Alteneck, *Deutsche Goldschmiede-Werke des Sechzehnten Jahrhunderts*, Frankfurt, 1890. For the five-year peace treaty of 1547, which followed a one-year truce signed in 1545, see E. D. Petricsh, "Der habsburgisch-osmanische Friedensvertrag des Jahres 1547," *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs*, XXXVIII, 1985, 49-80. For Ferdinand's diplomatic gift of a planetarium, see Rogers and Ward, 34.

⁵² For the Ottoman-made helmet, see Kurz, 256; Atl, 148; Rogers and Ward, 150-151. A jeweler in *Il Marescalco* refers to Süleymân's Venetian helmet as follows: "Dalla qua, toccata su, buon pro, proficiat: io sapendo che per te si comperavano, gli ho dato due gioie, che rifarebbero l'elmo del Turco fatto a Viaegia da Luigi Cavorlino; oh che vivo, spirito, oh che galante gentiluomo, oh che perfetto sozio"; de Sanctis, 88. For Francesco Negri's play, see n. 43.

a misfortune with the death of İbrâhîm Pasha who had put them into favor with Süleymân.⁵³ This passage confirms the pivotal role of the grand vizier, whose execution in 1536 left several artistic projects unrealized. The grave financial losses of Luigi Caorlini and Vincenzo Levriero resulting from the sudden deaths of Alvise Gritti (1534) and İbrâhîm Pasha (1536) are recorded by Francesco della Valle. Addressed to his friend Luigi Caorlini in 1536, a letter of Pietro Aretino confirms that the Venetian goldsmiths had gone bankrupt after sending Süleymân objects worth 100,000 ducats, for which he received no payment in return. Aretino, who himself contemplated the possibility of entering into the services of Alvise Gritti and İbrâhîm Pasha as a viable alternative to serving European monarchs, was well informed about this sudden reversal of fortunes.⁵⁴

Such non-Ottoman regalia as crowns, scepters, and ceremonial canopies, intended to compete with those of the sultan's Western rivals, were freely adopted during İbrâhîm Pasha's culturally syncretistic grand vizierate (1523-36). Ultimately, it was such lavish objects destined for use in pompous ceremonial occasions that won Süleymân his title of "Magnificent" in Europe. There was, however, a strong opposition in more conservative circles to İbrâhîm's costly innovations, aimed at augmenting the magnificence of the Ottoman court. Immediately after his death, three bronze statues, which the grand vizier had carried as trophies from King Matthias Corvinus's palace in Buda and raised on a group of antique columns in front of his palace at the Hippodrome, were shattered to pieces by a reactionary crowd (Figs. 27, 28). This conservative reaction had already been foreshadowed in a critical stanza by the poet Figânî:

⁵³Sansovino, 134v; cited in Kurz, 250-251.

⁵⁴For the financial losses of Caorlini and Levriero, see Della Valle, 35; Camesasca, 29-30; Kurz, 251. Marco di Niccolò's financial difficulties after Alvise's death were discussed in 1534 by the Venetian Council of Ten, which decided to send Lorenzo Gritti to Istanbul to settle the matter, together with securing his dead brother's property; ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, Parti Segrete, R. 4 (1533-39), fol. 37r-v. A character in Aretino's play *Lo ipocrito* refers to İbrâhîm's death as follows: "... Nel sentire il fine, non dico di Ambrogio in Roma e di Carlo in Mantova, ma d'Imbraim in Costantinopoli e di Cramvello in Inghilterra, disse, la sorte non essere altro, che umori de i pianeti e capriccio dei Cieli, et il mondo isciagurato il pallone de le lor bagatelle"; De Sanctis, 285-286. A character in *La cortegiana* states that Aretino would have offered his services to Alvise Gritti if he had not been properly rewarded by Francis I or the Hapsburg governor of Milan, Antonio de Leyva: "... Se non fosse questo ne andava in Constantinopoli a servire il Signore Alvigi Gritti, nel quale s'e raccolta tutta la cortesia fuggita de i plebei Signori, che non hanno di prencipe altro che'l nome, appresso di cui se n'andava Pietro Aretino, se il Re Francesco non lo legava con le catene d'oro, e se il magnanimo Antonio da Leva non lo arrachiva con le coppe d'oro e con le pensioni"; *ibid.* 175. I am indebted to Professor André Chastel for informing me of a recently discovered letter by Pietro Aretino addressed to İbrâhîm Pasha on 2 Aug. 1531, in which he offers his services to the grand vizier, and through him to the sultan; P. Larivaille, "Pour l'Histoire des rapports de l'Arétin avec les puissants de son temps: Deux Lettres inédites au Pacha Ibrahim et au Roi François Ier," *Actes du Colloque International... Aix-en-Provence*, 1985-93.

"Two Abrahams (i.e., İbrâhîm) came into the world, / The one destroyed idols, the other set them up."⁵⁵

The iconoclastic bent of İbrâhîm's opponents might explain why a project involving tapestries for the sultan never came to be realized either. Carel van Mander (1604) states that the Islamic prohibition of figural representation had hindered the production of these royal tapestries, for which the Dermoyen tapestry firm at Brussels had sent Pieter Coecke van Aelst to İstanbul during 1533 in order to prepare cartoons (Fig. 28). It appears that the Dermoyen firm, which furnished tapestries to both Charles V and Francis I, was hoping to add Süleymân to its list of customers. During the same year that Coecke visited İstanbul, in August 1533, the Austrian merchant Jakob Rehlinger bought sample tapestries from the Dermoyen firm to be sent to the Ottoman sultan. His Venetian partner Marco di Niccolò was to show these to Süleymân, with the hope of attracting larger tapestry commissions. One of the two sample tapestries consisted of a scene from the seven-piece *Battle of Pavia* series depicting the defeat of Francis I by Charles V. The other one was a scene from the famous *Hunts of Maximilian* cycle representing the twelve months. The pro-Hapsburg subjects of these sample tapestries, whose designs have been recently attributed to Coecke van Aelst, might have been specifically chosen to provoke the sultan

⁵⁵The 17th-century English writer Knolles identifies these as statues of Hercules, Diana, and Apollo, which seems to find support in Coecke's drawing of the Hippodrome (Fig. 28). However, most contemporary sources only mention the figure of Hercules without identifying the others: Ramberti, 261; C.D. de Schepper, "Missions diplomatiques de Corneille Duplicius de Schepper (1533)," ed. Baron de St.-Genois and G.A.Y de Schepper, in *Mémoires de l'Académie Royale de Belgique*, xxx, 1857, 119. Although they agree that one of the statues represented Hercules, the other two appear to have been male figures, as late 16th-century Ottoman miniatures depicting the Hippodrome suggest (Fig. 27). Della Valle (1531-34) identifies them as three Hercules figures bound by a chain, "tre Herculi di bronzo posti sopra una pietra di marmo circondati tutti tre d'una grossa cattena di ferro, li quali herculi erano in Ongaria nell castella della città i Buda"; p. 18. Since these statues were conspicuously displayed as trophies on antique columns in front of İbrâhîm Pasha's palace at the Hippodrome after the victory of Buda in 1526, the chain appears to have signified the enslavement of Hungary. The historian Peçevi states that the larger one of the three statues represented a great Hungarian king (probably Mathias Corvinus), while the two smaller ones flanking it were his sons; Peçevi, *Tarih*, 2 vols., İstanbul, 1864, I, 99. This information also appears in the journal of Süleymân's Hungarian campaign of 1526, where the bronze statues removed from the forecourt of the Buda palace are identified as a man and his sons; A.C. Schaeudlinger, *Feldzugstagebücher des ersten und zweiten ungarischen Feldzugs Süleymân I*, Vienna, 1978, p. 87 (facsimile 54). For the argument that this group of statues, attributed to the Florentine-trained artist Giovanni Dalmata, represented Mars protecting Romulus and Remus in accordance with King Matthias's view of himself as the reviver of ancient Rome, see J. von Karabacek, *Zur orientalischen Altertumskunde IV. Muhammedanische Kunststudien*, Vienna, 1913, 82-102. About their destruction, Sanderson writes: "The said imagis, when the named Ebrim bassa was slaine, were by the fury of the people throwe to the ground"; W. Foster, ed., *The Travels of John Sanderson in the Levant 1584-1602*, London, 1931, 76. The French antiquarian Petrus Gyllius (Pierre Gilles) (1550's) reports that they were torn to pieces by Turks, "the most inveterate Enemies to Statuary, and the whole Vitruvian Art," *The Antiquities of Constantinople*, trans. J. Ball, London, 1729, 110. Fiğân's poem is cited in Karahan (as in n. 42), xx.

to commission rival tapestries for Ottoman propaganda, paralleling the case of the Venetian helmet-crown.⁵⁶

Rehlinger's documented transactions with the Caorlini brothers, who were in Istanbul at that time, closely link this tapestry project of 1533 to the Venetian artifacts produced just one year before Coecke's trip to the Ottoman capital. This connection is further supported by the fact that such merchants as Rehlinger's partner Marco di Niccolò and Pietro della Porta were connected both to the consortium of the bejeweled scepter presented to the sultan in 1532 and to the tapestry project of the following year. Aretino's play *La cortigiana* (1534) provides evidence concerning the presence at the Ottoman capital around 1532-33 of foreign sculptors and painters, who followed the Venetian goldsmith Luigi Caorlini and Marco di Niccolò to Istanbul under the protection of Alvise Gritti's generous patronage. This sudden influx of foreign talent in Istanbul appears to have been precipitated by an invitation that Alvise Gritti extended in 1532 to Pietro Aretino and his artistic circle, immediately after the humanist offered his services to Ibrahim Pasha and through him to the sultan in a letter dated 2 August 1531. Insistently inviting Aretino to Istanbul, Alvise urged him to bring along as many of his associates as he desired, including friends and servants, in return for lucrative pensions that no other prince could offer. Together with a group of unspecified artists, Aretino's friends Marco di Niccolò and Luigi Caorlini came to seek their fortune in Istanbul, where they appear to have received the unfortunate commission for a baldachin designed by Jacopo Sansovino.⁵⁷

⁵⁶Carel van Mander's statement is cited in G. Martier, *La Renaissance flamande: Pierre Coeck D'Alost*, Brussels, 1966, 26. A document about Rehlinger's tapestry enterprise in the summer of 1533 is published in Kellenbenz, 1965, 363-365, 371-374. Coecke's drawings, which were published by his widow in 1553, are reproduced in W.S. Stirling-Maxwell, *The Turks in MDXXXIII: A Series of Drawings Made in that Year at Constantinople by Peter Coeck of Aelst*, London and Edinburgh, 1873. For a recent attribution of the *Battle of Pavia* and the *Hunts of Maximilian* series to Coecke, who was the leading painter of High Renaissance tapestry cartoons, see S. Schneebalg-Perelman, *Les Classes de Maximilien: Les Enigmes d'un chef-d'oeuvre de la tapisserie*, Brussels, 1982, 182-183. However, the author's redating of the twelve hunting tapestries — previously dated around 1530-35 — to 1548-52 is untenable, since the Rehlinger document indicates they were completed by 1533; (*ibid.*, 189, 273-275).

⁵⁷Kellenbenz, 1965, 362-379. The passage in *La cortigiana* reads: "Ho trapassato la caterva de i pittori e de gli scultori che con il buon M. Simon Bianco ci sono, e di quella che ha menato seco il singolare Luigi Caorlini in Constantinopoli, di donde è ora tornato lo splendido Marco di Niccolò, nel cui animo è tanta magnificenzia quanta ne gli animi de i Re, e perciò l'altezza del fortunato Signor Luigi Gritti lo ha collocato nel seno del favore de la sua grazia ..."; de Sanctis, 173. This passage is cited by Klinger and Raby, with a reference to the painter Gian-Maria di Andrian Gian-Battista, who was one of the artists present in Istanbul at that time (as in n. 21), 9. For Pietro della Porta, see *ibid.*, 11. Aretino's letter to Ibrahim is published in Larivaille (as in n. 544), 55-93. For Alvise's invitation to Aretino in June 1532, see Landoni, I, Pt. 1, 222-223. In May 1533, Alvise sent another letter to Aretino via their common friend Marco di Niccolò, offering him a yearly pension equal to all his expenses, *ibid.*, 223-224. For Aretino's response to Alvise on 3 June 1533, see F. Flora, ed., *Tutte le opere di Pietro Aretino, Il primo e il secondo libro*, Milan, 1960, I, 42-43.

One must situate Coecke's trip to Istanbul in 1533 within this particularly favorable atmosphere, in which Alvise and İbrâhîm Pasha actively supported European talent. Since Georg Braun (1572) reports that Coecke was well received at the Ottoman court, where he was enthusiastically rewarded for his portrait of Süleymân, it can be hypothesized that the tapestry project for which he prepared drawings was only abandoned during the period of conservative reaction following İbrâhîm's death. Luigi Bassano da Zara, who was in Istanbul around 1537, observed that due to their strong opposition to figural representation the Ottomans did not appreciate figural tapestries. This is confirmed by the fate of a tapestry once owned by Süleymân, which depicted Charles V enthroned, with a crown on his head, a sword in one hand and an orb in the other, while dignitaries paid him homage. A former royal treasurer informed the mid-seventeenth-century French traveler Tavernier that this tapestry, embroidered with gold thread and Gothic inscriptions was stored at the Topkapı Palace's Inner Treasury next to a dusty pile of European books, maps, and globes as a relic of the past.⁵⁸

The grand vizierates of İbrâhîm Pasha's successors Ayas Pasha (1536-39), Luṭfî Pasha (1539-41) and Rüstem Pasha (1544-53/1556-61) were characterized by a consistent avoidance of conspicuous consumption at the Ottoman court. Lavish public festivities that İbrâhîm Pasha once organized in his palace at the Hippodrome, such as his wedding in 1524, and the circumcision of princes in 1530, were also discontinued after his execution. The historian Peçeви remarks that the subsequent circumcision of princes in 1539 was not as impressive as its predecessor, since the new grand vizier Luṭfî Pasha had tried to economize. *Relazioni* addressed to the Venetian Senate bitterly complain that the sale of such luxury goods as textiles, jewels, and precious artifacts was drastically reduced after İbrâhîm's death. According to the *bailo* Bernardo Navagero (1553), what Venetian merchants were previously able to sell to the Ottoman palace in one week during İbrâhîm's days was now barely sold in two years. Marino Cavalli (1560) and Daniele Barbarigo (1564) observe that all the profits were now made by the Jews of Istanbul who replaced Venetian merchants as the intermediaries of Levantine trade.⁵⁹

⁵⁸For Braun's statement, see Marlier (as in n. 56), 24. Bassano, fol. 45r, 51r; Tavernier, 1423-143.

⁵⁹Unlike the forty-day-long circumcision festival of 1530 for which İbrâhîm Pasha was responsible, the one planned by Luṭfî Pasha lasted only thirteen days; Peçeви (as in n. 55), I, 218; II, 74. Present at Istanbul before the circumcision of 1530, Ğazî observes that İbrâhîm Pasha was chiefly occupied with planning the festivities and that even council meetings were postponed; E. Kamil, "Ğazî-Mekki Seyahatnamesi" *Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Semineri Dergisi*, I, 2, 1937, 54-55. For festivities centering at İbrâhîm Pasha's palace, see N. Atasoy, *İbrahim Paşa Sarayı*, Istanbul, 1972. The decline of luxury trade with İbrâhîm Pasha's death is noted in B. Navagero, "Relazione (1553)," *Albèri*, Florence, 1842, I, 101; D. Trevisano, "Relazione (1554)," in *Albèri*, I, 183; M. Cavalli, "Relazione (1560)," *ibid.*, I, 274-275; D. Barbarigo, "Relazione (1564)," in *Albèri*, II, Florence, 1843, 53-54. This decline in Venetian

Venetian reports also reveal that in his old age Süleymân came to adopt a new religious humility, which curiously parallels the case of Charles V, who spent his last days as a recluse in a monastery. Both foreign and Ottoman sources agree that the sultan gave up the use of rich costumes, jewels, gold, wine, and music. A dispatch from Bernardo Navagero to the Venetian Senate in June 1551 establishes the exact date of this development by stating that the sultan had just ordered all musical instruments of his palace to be burned, and his royal residence to be stripped of gold, silver, and jewel-encrusted decorations. A few days after the execution of these orders, the sultan is reported to have visited the construction site of his new mosque, the Süleymaniye complex, built in Istanbul between 1550 and 1557. Süleymân's otherworldly preoccupations are reflected in his insistence on that visit to be shown the spot where he would eventually be buried: "Show it to me, for I know well that Death is common to all, and that I am already old." The Austrian ambassador Busbecq notes in the 1550's that the melancholic sultan, sunken in a "habitual gloom," began to wear modest vests of green camlet, following the Prophet's example, as demonstrated in Melchior Lorch's contemporary portrait from 1559 and a miniature executed by the Ottoman painter Nigâri some years later (Figs. 29, 30).⁶⁰ Imperial luxury was incompatible with Süleymân's growing concern for the ascetic prescriptions of the prophet's traditions, which opposed the conspicuous display of precious textiles, gold, and jewels. An awareness of this conflict is reflected in the foundation deed (*waqfiyya*) of the Süleymaniye mosque, which specifies that in decorating his mosque the sultan had consciously refrained from gilded and jewel-inlaid decorations in conformity with the Prophet's traditions (Fig. 29).⁶¹ This contrasts sharply with the sultan's earlier architectural patronage during İbrâhîm's grand vizierate, when the Topkapı Palace had undergone a lavish renovation in the second half of the 1520's. Sparkling with jewel-encrusted gilt wall decorations and gold brocade, furnishings, Süleymân's renovated palace

trade and the rise of Jewish intermediaries is also pointed out in U. Tucci, "Tra Venezia e mondo turco: I mercati," in *Venezia e i Turchi: contri e confronti di due civiltà*, Milan, 1985, 38-41. The prominent role of Jewish intermediaries coincided with the influence of Süleymân's physician Moshe Hamon, who was the primary channel of Jewish access to the sultan. For the Mendes-Nasi family of Iberian Jewish bankers, who left Venice in the 1550's for Ottoman territory under Hamon's intervention, see M. A. Epstein, *The Ottoman Jewish Communities and Their Role in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries*, Freiburg, 1980, 86-96.

⁶⁰For Süleymân's transformation in old age, see Navagero, 72; Cavalli, 274-275; D. Barbarigo (as in n. 59), 17; and N. Aykut, "Hasan Beyzade Tarihi," Ph. D. diss., Istanbul University, 1980, 59; ASV, Archivio Proprio Constantinopoli, Dispacci al Senato, Bernardo Navagero, B. 5, Pt. 3, fols. 130v-131r; C.T. Forster and B. Daniell, eds., *The Life and Letters of Oghier Ghiselin de Busbecq*, I. London, 1881, 144, 322, 331. The tall turban with which Süleymân is depicted in the portraits by Melchior Lorch and Nigâri was designed by the sultan and named after him as Süleymânî.

⁶¹K.E. Kürkcüoğlu, *Süleymaniye Vakfiyesi* Ankara, 1962, 22. For the building program of this mosque, see G. Necipoğlu-Kafadar, "The Süleymaniye Complex in Istanbul: An Interpretation," *Muqarnas*, III, 1985, 92-118.

exemplified the kind of ostentatious ceremonial setting for which the Venetian helmet-crown had been created.⁶²

While payroll registers indicate a sharp rise in the number of goldsmiths, gem-stone carvers, and gold inlayers at Süleymân's court around 1526, their number drops significantly in later registers from 1557-58.⁶³ This can be partly explained by Süleymân's personal transformation in old age, but it was also precipitated by a general change of climate after İbrâhîm Pasha's deposition, and by the rise to power of a different group of advisers. Bernardo Navagero perceptively writes in 1553 that Süleymân had always been under the influence of an advisor, first İbrâhîm, then Ayas, and now Rüstem, "who was so powerful that one could say he was the ruler of the whole empire." Rüstem Pasha, famed for his severe fiscal policy which resulted in filling up the Ottoman treasury, is reported to have advised the aging sultan to give up vanity and superfluous spending in order to accumulate wealth.⁶⁴ This radical change of policy contrasts sharply with the conspicuous consumption encouraged by İbrâhîm Pasha. Rüstem not only opposed the sale of Venetian textiles to the Ottoman court, but also that of jewels. Navagero states that the grand vizier "did not hold jewels in high esteem." In 1577, an official from Mecca was surprised to find out that Rüstem Pasha refused to accept jewels and gold as diplomatic gifts.⁶⁵ This new emphasis on the prescriptions of the Prophet's traditions reversed the trend of imperial luxury initiated by İbrâhîm Pasha, which had created a great demand for jewels and regalia during the early part of Süleymân's reign.

⁶²For renovations at the Topkapı Palace between 1526 and 1529, see G. Necipoğlu-Kafadar, "The Formation of an Ottoman Imperial Tradition: The Topkapı Palace in the 15th and 16th Centuries," Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1986, 273-280, 343-374. (Published in revised form as, *Architecture, Ceremonial, and Power: The Topkapı Palace in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries*, Cambridge MA, 1991.)

⁶³In 1526 there were ninety goldsmiths and jewelers, whose numbers were reduced to sixty-nine in 1557-58, and to thirty-nine in 1566; see Aul, 117. These figures lend support to the argument that the most spectacular ceremonial objects of Ottoman goldsmiths associated with Süleymân's reign are datable to İbrâhîm Pasha's grand vizierate; see n. 30.

⁶⁴Navagero, 74; Cavalli (as in n. 59), 295.

⁶⁵In a letter addressed to the sultan, Rüstem declares that "the infidels of Galata who used to make a fortune by selling textiles to the treasury through a number of tricks, have now been deprived of this"; T. Gökbilgin, "Rüstem Paşa ve hakkındaki ithamlar" *Tarih Dergisi*, VIII, 1955, 32-33. According to Navagero, unlike any of the former grand viziers, Rüstem was an enemy of Christians, whom he called "infidels/giaur"; Navagero (as in n. 59), 91, 93. For the pro-Jewish policy of Rüstem Pasha, with whose faction Süleymân's influential physician Moshe Hamon was allied, see Epstein (as in n. 59), 87. For Mekki's report (1557), see Kamil (as in n., 59), 68.

CONCLUSION: CULTURAL POLITICS AND THE REPRESENTATION OF POWER

The circumstances surrounding the production of the Venetian helmet-crown and of related projects demonstrate the important role of the grand vizier as an intermediary for specific interest groups involved in the Ottoman court's artistic patronage. Court ceremonial, which emphasized the sultan's seclusion, hardly allowed him direct contact with artisans or merchants. The sultan's artistic commissions were usually supervised through such liaisons as the grand vizier or the chief treasurer, who was at the head of the organization of royal artisans (*ehl-i hîref*).⁶⁶ Thus, the patronage of art in the Ottoman court involved a complex network of patron/client relations in which the sultan was not always the chief tastemaker, as is usually assumed. Neither did the impetus for these commissions necessarily come from the sultan. This has important implications for explaining changes of taste, for they reflect the influence of differing power groups controlling the Ottoman court's artistic patronage as political alliances and cultural orientations continually shifted. This observation finds support in the active role that later grand viziers like Şokollu Mehmed Pasha (1565-79) played in allocating royal commissions to architects and artists. Şokollu, for example, was instrumental in the production of a royal album of sultanic portraits for which he sought depictions from Venice. His agent, Rabbi Salomon, whose role can be compared to that of Alvise Gritti, exemplifies the replacement of Venetian middlemen by Jewish entrepreneurs in transactions of the Ottoman court with Europe from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards.⁶⁷

With the "classical" synthesis of Ottoman culture consolidated around 1550 and replacing the eclectic syncretism of İbrâhîm Pasha's period, the Ottoman court's enthusiastic patronage of European artists which had lasted up to the mid-1530's, stopped abruptly. This phenomenon coincided with the halt of Ottoman military expansion and a clear definition of geographical boundaries which came to act as a barrier to the flow of ideas between East and West. The

⁶⁶The chief treasurer, a leading eunuch in charge of the sultan's private inner treasury, commissioned court artisans at a building called Old Audience Hall in the second court of the Topkapı Palace; Abdullâh b. İbrâhîm Üsküdarî, Vâkı'ât, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, MS R. 1224, fols. 133r-134r.

⁶⁷Şokollu's search for portraits by European artists is mentioned in the introduction to the royal portrait album, the text of which was written by the court historian Lokmân; see N. Atasoy, "Nakkaş Osmanın Pađıřah Portreleri Albümü" *Türkiyemiz*, VI, 1972, 2-14. Bailo Niccolò Barbarigo's dispatch, sent from Istanbul to Venice on 20 Sept. 1578, indicates that Sokollu made his agent Rabbi Salomon dictate a letter, asking from Venice "ritratti delle Signori Ottomani, e di qualche Bassà ancora"; ASV- Dispacci al Senato, Constantinopoli 1578, Niccolò Barbarigo, F. 12, fol. 236r-v; cited in T. Bertelè, *Il palazzo degli ambasciatori di Venezia a Constantinopoli*, Bologna, 1932, 137, n. 88. Previously, on 3 Aug. 1578, Şokollu had personally inquired about "ritratti delle signori di casa ottomano" from Barbarigo; *ibid.*, fol. 167r.

outcome of a heightened awareness of fixed frontiers was the accentuation of the "otherness" of each realm. Ceasing to incorporate fresh elements into its international system, Ottoman-Islamic culture began to turn in upon itself in a defensive reaction.⁶⁸ It was this new context, accompanied by an attitude of unquestioning confidence in the superiority of Ottoman culture, that produced the "classical" masterpieces of art and architecture during the second half of the sixteenth century.

A series of lively cross-cultural artistic contacts had been initiated by Mehmed II (1444-46/1451-81) with invitations to such famous artists as Matteo de' Pasti, Gentile Bellini, and Costanzo da Ferrara, which were followed up by attempts to attract Leonardo's and Michelangelo's services to the Ottoman court, but these contacts came to a halt by the middle of Süleymân reign (1520-66).⁶⁹ Until that point, the Ottoman court had been an alternate source of patronage to European artists, who seem to have had no compunction about offering their services to a Muslim patron in return for lucrative rewards. Moreover, like their fifteenth-century predecessors who accepted Ottoman patronage, Luigi Caorlini, Jacopo Sansovino, and Pieter Coecke van Aelst were by no means minor artists forced to enter the sultan's service from lack of European patronage. There was nothing unusual in their readiness to work for the sultan in a cosmopolitan Mediterranean world where the Ottoman court's cultural horizons extended to both the East and West. As long as Ottoman cultural politics were oriented toward the accommodation of European talent, the sultan sought for and could afford the best artists available.

It is perhaps not entirely a coincidence that both Mehmed II and Süleymân I, who shared an ambition to revive the Roman Empire by uniting Constantinople with Rome, were important patrons of European artists. This patronage was initiated with the conquest of Constantinople, which placed the Ottoman state into the European political orbit, with an outlook focused on Italy and new imperial claims as successors of the Byzantine Empire. The patronage

⁶⁸N. Itzkowitz, *The Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition*, Chicago and London, 1972, 95-97.

⁶⁹Among the most recent studies of Mehmed II's patronage of European artists, see M. Andaloro, "Costanzo da Ferrara: Gli anni a Costantinopoli alla corte di Maometto II," *Storia dell'arte*, XXXVIII, 40, 1980, 185-212; J. Raby, "A Sultan of Paradox: Mehmed the Conqueror as a Patron of the Arts," *Oxford Art Journal*, V, 1, 1982, 3-8; *idem*, "Pride and Prejudice: Mehmed the Conqueror and the Portrait Medal," *Italian Medals*, ed. J.G. Pollard, Washington, DC, 1987, 171-194; J. M. zur Capellen, *Gentile Bellini*, Stuttgart, 1985, 9-39, 87-103. About the project of a bridge for the Golden Horn, for which both Leonardo and Michelangelo prepared designs for Sultan Bâyezîd II (1481-1512), see F. Babinger, "Vier Bauvorschlâge Lionardo da Vinci's am Sultan Bajezid II (1502/3)," *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen*, Philol.-hist. Klasse, I, 1952. A letter written in 1519 from Edirne by Tommaso di Tolfo to Michelangelo encourages the artist to join the court of Selîm I (1512-20), who had recently paid a large sum for an antique statue of a naked female, and was not opposed to figural representation, unlike his father Bâyezîd II; (F. Sarre, "Michelangelo und der Türkische Hof," *Reportorium für Kunstwissenschaft*, XXXII, 1909, 61-66).

exemplified a universalistic cultural program, which encouraged not only an openness to artistic ideas from the West but also from the East. Noting Mehmed's ambition to conquer Rome as early as 1453, contemporary European observers pointed out that the sultan, who took Alexander the Great as his model, was planning to join East and West by creating a world empire unified by a single faith and a single monarch.⁷⁰

This utopian ambition of bringing the whole Mediterranean basin under one power by reuniting Constantinople with Rome was also shared by the young Süleymân.⁷¹ However, as the ideal of creating a universal *imperium* became a distant dream around the middle of his reign, the previous international cultural orientation was replaced by a more "national" one. Such Western status symbols as official royal portraits, sultanic portrait medals with Latin inscriptions, crowns, scepters, baldachins or royal tapestries, appear to have been primarily useful in communicating Ottoman imperial claims to European rivals through an intelligible Western vocabulary. Their patronage, which involved a competitive drive for kingly status, can thus be seen as an extension of the endemic conflict between rival monarchs in the political sphere. Mehmed's Western-oriented artistic patronage focused mainly on the representation of power through the aristocratic medium of painted or medallic portraiture, which disseminated his image in European courts. However, that of Süleymân emphasized bejeweled parade accessories and "stage props" displayed in ostentations ceremonies, which became publicized to the world on the tidal wave of the printing industry, through the popular media of prints, news pamphlets, plays, and songs. Directed mainly to a European audience, these foreign artifacts had minimal impact on the mainstream developments of Ottoman-Islamic art. The elderly Süleymân's reinforcement of the Islamic imperial tradition signaled a change in cultural politics around the 1540's and 1550's, after which the Ottoman court ceased to seek out such European status symbols. This phenomenon coincided with the canonization of the "classical Ottoman style" in art and architecture, which resulted in the definition of a specifically Ottoman cultural identity. This new identity differentiated itself not only from European but also from Persianate

⁷⁰One year before his death, in the summer of 1480, Mehmed II conquered Otranto, in preparation for his grander plan to seize the rest of the Italian peninsula; (F. Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time*, trans. R. Manheim, ed. W.C. Hickman, Princeton, 1978, 390-392, 394-395). For Mehmed's ambition to conquer Rome and to unite East and West like Alexander, see the contemporary reports of Giacomo Languschi, Isidorus of Kiev, Jacopo Tedaldi, Nicola Sagundino, and Lauro Quirini, published in A. Pertusi, *La caduta di Constantinopoli*, 2 vols., Verona, 1976; and *idem*, *Testi inediti e poco noti sulla caduta di Constantinopoli*, ed. A. Carile, Bologna, 1983.

⁷¹About Süleyman's imperial pretensions, Giovio writes: "Per esser di natura cupido di gloria, et fattosi ardito, & audace per la tante vittorie sue, et grandezze dell'imperio, ho inteso da huomini degni di fede, che spesso dice, che à lui tocca di ragione l'imperio di Roma & di tutto Ponente per esser legitimo successore di Giacomino imperatore qual transfere l'imperio in Constantinopoli"; P. Giovio, *Commentari delle cose de' Turchi*, Venice, 1531, fol. 30r.

artistic models, which had been a predominant source of inspiration in shaping previous Ottoman patterns of taste.⁷² Süleymân's Venetian helmet-crown, and other European artistic projects related to it, therefore exemplify an internationalism that Ottoman art could have pursued, but consciously turned away from in an attempt to define its unique identity.

Despite this delineation of separate cultural zones, however, luxury trade with Europe continued in the post-Süleymânic age. The collection of *dispacci* from Istanbul preserved at the Venetian State Archives abounds with references to personal requests of sultans, sultanas, and leading Ottoman dignitaries for such luxury items as Murano lamps, stained-glass window panes, crystal spectacles, clocks, musical instruments, furnishings, and textiles with patterns based on drawings prepared in Istanbul. However, one would search in vain for any references to Ottoman patronage at the sultanic level of major European artists. This is true even for the last quarter of the sixteenth century when Ottoman mercantile contacts with Venice entered a lively phase, due to the influential position of the queen mother Nürbânü who descended from a Venetian family.⁷³ In 1587, encouraged by a renewed demand for jewels at the Ottoman Porte, the jeweler Paolo Studentolli wrote from Venice to Antonio Paruta, a merchant based in Istanbul, offering him an artifact that had taken four years to produce. Worth 100,000 scudi, it was a crown with detachable parts, featuring eight hundred diamonds and ten imitation pearls of twelve to fourteen carats. One doubts, however, that this otherwise unknown attempt to revive the memory of Süleymân's fantastic headgear ever succeeded.⁷⁴ Times and cultural orientations had changed.

⁷²For the increasing emphasis on Islam in the later 16th century, see H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600*, trans. N. Itzkowitz and C. Imber, New York, 1973, 179-185. For the Ottomanization of architectural tile decoration around 1550, which resulted in a rejection of Persianate models, see G. Necipoğlu, "From 'International Timurid' to Ottoman: A Change of Taste in Sixteenth-Century Ceramic Tile" *From International Timurid to Ottoman: A Change of Taste in Sixteenth-Century Ceramic Tiles* *Muqarnas* 7 (1990): 136-70.

⁷³The fashion for clocks and automata at the Ottoman court continued throughout the 16th century; see O. Kurz, *European Clocks and Watches in the Near East*, London, 1975; and G. Mraz, "The Role of Clock in the Imperial Honoraria for the Turks," in *The Clockwork Universe: German Clocks and Automata, 1550-1650*, ed. K. Maurice and O. Mayr, Washington, DC, and New York, 1980, 37-48. For the Venetian queen mother, who was believed to be a member of the Baffo family, see S.A. Skilliter, "The Letters of the Venetian 'Sultana' Nür Bânü and Her Kira to Venice," *Studia turcologica memoriae Alexii Bombaci dicata (Istituto Universitario Orientale)*, Naples, 1982, 515-536.

⁷⁴Cited in Tucci (as in n. 59), 41. This detachable crown could be adapted to multiple purposes: "... Pol servir a molti modi prima et principalmente serve per corona perfetta di tuto da tondo et si pol far quazi doi frontali et serve per gotzarin over colar perfetissimamente et benissimo per brazalati over manili et si pol desfar agevolmente in 40 pezzi per zoiclar ogni sorte de vestimento et li sono diamanti numero 800... et dieci coppie di perle da 12 et 14 carati l'uno" (ASV, Misc. Gregolin, b. 12 ter).

Appendix

List of Jewels on the Helmet and Their Value (Sanuto, Diarii, Diari, LVI, 10-11)

Fattura de le zogie sono ne l'elmo, con le sue stime.

Nel dreto de la luna, Diamanti N. 1,		
Rubini N. 2, Turchese N. 1	ducati	3000
Nel roverso de la ditta luna, Diamanti N. 1, Rubini N. 2, Ruosa con diamanti 8 et rubino 1	ducati	3800
Ne la cima, perle N. 5	ducati	2500
Smeraldo grande	ducati	15000
Diamanti N. 4	ducati	10000
Rubini N. 3	ducati	6000
Nel roverso de la cima, vado zogiato	ducati	1000
Rubini N. 3	ducati	800
Nel pomo de la cima, Rubini N. 3, Smeraldi N. 3	ducati	1000
Ne la prima corona, Perle N. 3	ducati	600
Diamanti N. 3	ducati	1000
Rubini N. 2	ducati	1000
Smeraldi N. 2	ducati	500
Ne la seconda corona, Perle N. 12	ducati	1200
Diamanti N. 4	ducati	4000
Rubini N. 4	ducati	4000
Smeraldi N. 4	ducati	3000
Ne la terza corona, Perle N. 12	ducati	5000
Diamanti N. 4	ducati	10000
Rubini N. 4	ducati	10000
Smeraldi N. 4	ducati	6000
Ne la quarta corona, Perle N. 12	ducati	8000
Diamanti N. 4	ducati	10000
Rubini N. 4	ducati	10000
Smeraldi N. 4	ducati	8000
Nel tulupante, Diamanti ponte N. 7	ducati	8000
Nel copin, Rubini N. 3	ducati	2000
Smeraldi N. 2	ducati	1000
Nel friso del copin, Diamanti N. 6	ducati	3000
Rubini N. 7	ducati	1000
Smeraldi N. 7	ducati	1000
Nel gorzerin, Diamanti N. 8, Rubini N. 8	ducati	600
Nel pè d'ebano, oro, veluto et fat-		

tura de la cassa	ducati	400
Nel oro et fatura de lo elmo, corone et panizuole	ducati	5000

Summa ducati 144400

In summa: Diamanti	numero	50
Rubini	numero	47
Smeraldi	numero	27
Perle	numero	49
Turchesa granda	numero.	1

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RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PAPACY, VENICE AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE AGE OF SÜLEYMÂN THE MAGNIFICENT

Paolo PRETO

The relations between the Papacy and the Ottoman Empire during the Renaissance period, and in particular during the reign of Süleymân the Magnificent, do not present that obvious linearity made up of hard and total religious and political contrasts that a sometimes discounted historiographic tradition often proposed. Until a few decades ago there were few historians who, in defining the attitude of the European states toward the Turks in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, did not set up the divisions, the uncertainties, the weaknesses or even the connivings and collaboration of other Western powers (see the example of France or Venice) against the firm and constant opposition of the Papacy to Islam and the Ottoman Empire. And yet the documentary sources and contemporary reports, not to mention the vivid reflections of some Renaissance historians, suggest some caution and certain hints for casting doubt on the assessment that the opposition of the popes to the Turks had always been so consistent.

Spiritual and temporal heirs to the medieval crusades, the Renaissance popes, it has been written for centuries, continued to preach the moral duty and the political necessity of the Christian reconquest of the Orient; the fall of Constantinople, a traumatic event symbolic of the powerful expanding thrust of the Ottoman Turks, gave a renewed impetus to Papal policies. Even though the popes' efforts to unite the Christian princes in a renewed anti-Turkish crusade all failed, this was the fault of, some still assert the increasing secularization of the European princes, of their exclusive interest in enlarging their own national territories, and of their indifference towards the religious entreaties from a Papacy that, for its part, precisely in the middle of the Renaissance, appointed markedly secularmen to the point of losing the pre-eminently religious role, as during the succession of worldly popes who only cared about political advantage for their own state, or even their own family. The figure of Pius II, the great humanist

pope who after the innocent irenic attempt to resolve the Turkish problem with the conversion of Sultan Mehmed II,¹ who dedicated body and soul to the promotion of a crusade, who saw himself and his efforts fade before the egotism of the European states and died soon after the heroic decision to face the impossible adventure almost alone, is emblematic of the reality of the isolation and the impotence into which the Renaissance popes had fallen by this time, faced with the problem of the confrontation with the Turks.

The hard reality of the weakness, foolish aspiration and isolation, in which the popes of the fifteenth century and the first ten years of the sixteenth century came to find themselves regarding the Turkish problem, clearly emerges from the learned pages of Pastor, to whom we owe an extremely detailed reconstruction of the countless crusade failures and of the incessant diplomatic actions of the Renaissance popes in order to renew the ties of politico-military solidarity among the European princes. Again Pastor, in his *History of the Popes*, written with the soul and passion of a Catholic but with the intellectual honesty of a great historian, admits that on some occasions, though limited and infrequent, even insignificant, the Renaissance popes had abandoned their traditional refusal to negotiate with the Turks and had even asked their help against political enemies in Europe.

A book by a Swiss historian, Hans Pffferfermann, published in 1946 with the controversial and provocative title, *Die Zusammenarbeit der Renaissance-papste mit den Türken*² (The collaboration between the Renaissance popes and the Turks), has raised great controversy. The theses of Pffferfermann are radical; there had been no frontal opposition between the Renaissance popes and the Turks; rather, the popes had more than once dealt with them, had asked for their military help against Spain, and had invited their intervention on Italian soil.

In his review of Pffferfermann's work, Giambattista Picotti, the Catholic historian, criticized it in a harsh but well-founded manner, for lacking adequate archival research, and for being seriously lacunose in bibliographical references (one thinks of the omission of the noted works of Babinger), full of errors,

¹G. Toffanin, *Pio II (Enea Silvio Piccolomini). Lettera a Maometto II (Epistula ad Mahumetum)* (Naples, 1953); R. Eysser, "Papst Pio II und der Kreuzzug gegen die Türken, in" *Mélanges d'histoire générale*, ed. C. Marinescu, II (Bucarest, 1938), pp. 1-134; E. Hocs, *Pius II und der Halbmond* (Freiburg, 1941); F. Babinger, in *Enea Silvio Piccolomini Papa Pio II. Atti del Convegno per il quinto centenario della morte e altri scritti raccolti da Domenico Maffei* (Siena, 1968), in pp. 1-13; id., *Maometto il Conquistatore e gli umanisti d'Italia, Venezia e l'Oriente fra tardo Medioevo e Rinascimento* (Firenze, 1966), pp. 433-449; F. Gaeta, "Sulla lettera a Maometto' di Pio II," *Bullettino dell'Istituto storico per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano*, 77 (1965), pp. 127-227; id., *Alcune osservazioni sulla prima redazione della 'lettera a Maometto'*, *Enea Silvio Piccolomini Papa Pio II*, pp. 177-186; R. Schwoebel, *The Shadow of the Crescent: the Renaissance Image of the Turk (1453-1517)* (Nieuwkoop, 1967), pp. 66-67.

²Wintherthur, 1946.

tendential and biased.³ In any case, Pfferfermann's book, though inaccurate and in the main, unreliable, together with Picotti's replica, once again raised the problem of the active politics of the popes regarding the Turks. Finally the capital work of Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*,⁴ drawing on an ample documentary and bibliographic basis, and philologically faultless, deals with the problem in a definite and persuasive manner.

Thus we have before us, the outline of what had been the basic attitudes and actions of the popes towards Süleyman the Magnificent, using as a guide Domenico Caccamo, who summed up the Papal politics of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in these words: "the Pontefices of the Renaissance, engaged in the secular interests of the territorial state, worried by the Spanish invasions that strangled ancient Italian freedom, did not find a political course in the real Catholic environment, applying towards the Muslim and schismatic Orient nothing but an episodal and uncertain action."⁵

When Süleyman became the Turkish sultan on 1 October 1520, after the death of Selim I one week earlier, Pope Leo X defined the news as "happy," because everyone believed the young sovereign to be peace-loving and "because nothing is to be had for the common good from the Christian princes other than vain hopes and empty promises."⁶ A few years were enough to disenchant the Pope, and with him many other Western politicians (one thinks of Giovio, Guicciardini, Sanuto); during the siege of Rhodes in 1521, a Papal secretary, in a letter to Sigismund I of Poland, remembered the faded illusions of the presumed pacifism of Süleymân: "*quem inbelem et quietum multi arbitrabandur*," and then he actually crossed out the phrase, because, observed Setton, "it seemed like a mockery of the erroneous judgment which had created so many false hopes in Europe concerning Süleymân."⁷

By the time Süleymân had occupied Belgrade and Rhodes, the successor to Leo X, Adrian VI, declared a three-year truce in Europe, comminated the interdict to whoever violated it, and wrote anxious letters to Charles V, Francis I and Henry VIII, but he did not manage to set up an anti-Turkish league. Instead, from Francis I, who by that time had begun an ostentatious friendship with the Ottomans, he received the caustic reply ("*non esser altro Turcho che li preti*") that "the priests were the real Turks" to be feared in Europe.⁸

³Rivista storica italiana, LXIII (1951), pp. 406-410.

⁴K. M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)* (Philadelphia, 1976-84).

⁵D. Caccamo, *La diplomazia della Controriforma e la crociata: olai piami del Possevino alla lunga guerra oli Clemente VIII*, "Archivio Storico italiano", CXXXVIII (1971), pp. 255-81: 255.

⁶L. von Pastor, *Storia dei papi dalla fine del Medio Evo*, IV/1 (Rome, 1945), p. 162, note 3.

⁷Setton, *The Papacy*, III, p. 198.

⁸Setton, *The Papacy*, III, p. 218.

The immediate successor Clement VII became fully involved in helping Louis II of Hungary, but the battle of Mohács (29 August 1526) and the subsequent alliance between John Zapolya and the Turks totally wrecked his efforts. Recovering from the terrible shock of the sack of Rome in 1527 and taking advantage of the Treaty of Barcelona on 29 June 1529, he resumed his efforts to contain the expansion of Süleymân ("lupus ille, rapax inimicissimus Turcha" as he defined it). He renewed the crusade and other aid to Charles V and Ferdinand, excommunicated Zapolya, put pressure on Charles V in order that he give Malta, Gozo and the Tripoli stronghold to the Hospitallers (already at Rhodes), but died on 25 September 1534 without having achieved any tangible results. Instead, in August 1534 just before he died, he had to witness in dismay the conquest of Tunisia by Hayreddin, known as Barbarossa.

On 21 July 1535, Paul III had the satisfaction of seeing the successful crusade of Charles V in Tunisia. Intoxicated by this victory, he indicated to the future Ecumenical Council, the opening of which was set for 23 May 1537 in Mantua, three objectives: a solution to the Protestant problem; reforms; and overall peace as promises of a Christian anti-Turkish alliance. The attempts to make peace between France and the Habsburg Empire proved useless, however. Paul III managed to convince Venice to join the war, but the Republic was defeated on 27 September 1538, and hurried to conclude a treaty with Süleymân on 20 October 1540; on 2 October 1541 peace would be officially declared. The year after, the disastrous crusade of Charles V in Algeria would follow. Even the bull of indiction of the Council of Trent, observes Setton, "is more pointedly directed at the Turks than at the Lutherans, a fact to which the historians of the Council have not always given proper emphasis."⁹ Nevertheless, it is of great interest to know that, during the days of the opening of the Council, Cardinal Cervini, relating the impressions of an envoy to Istanbul, maintained Süleymân to be *bellissimo principe et disposto*, and furthermore *benigno e savio più che niuno altro del suo consiglio*¹⁰ — expressions in which we hear the echo of the enthusiastic verdicts expressed in the West, a century earlier, on Mehmed II and the first impressions immediately after he ascended the throne.

Between 1547 and 1550 the Turkish problem did not seem to worry the Holy Seat and the Habsburgs much; instead, observes Pfferfermann, two weeks after the slaying of Pier Luigi Farnese, Paul III had wanted to turn to the Turks, but then see did nothing. In the years between 1550 and 1554, during the

⁹Setton, *The Papacy*, III, p. 463. On the connections between the "Turkish peril," the policy of the popes and the attitudes of Luther and Calvin toward the Turks, see J. Pannier, "Calvin et les Turcs," *Revue historique*, 62 (1937), pp. 268-286; K. M. Setton, "Lutheranism and the Turkish Peril," *Balkan Studies*, III (1962), pp. 133-168; and C. Göllner, "Die Türkenfrage im Spannungsfeld der Reformation," *Südost-Forschungen*, XXXIV (1975), pp. 61-78.

¹⁰Setton, *The Papacy*, III, p. 493.

meeting of the Council, the fear of Turkish landings in papal territory, the actual attack of the Ottoman fleet on Messina, Augusta, Gozo, Tripoli, Gerba, Gaeta, Puglia and fresh conquests in Hungary reasserted the dramatic reality of the Ottoman threat to Popes Julius III and Marcellus II.

Radically different is the attitude of Paul IV Carafa. During the first years of his Pontificate the Turkish attack against Civitavecchia, Port S. Stefano, Piombino, and Calvi (Corsica), caused a great sensation, yet he was more concerned with the progress of the Lutherans in Germany and the dangerous concessions granted them by Charles V in the interim in Augsburg in 1555. "If the Habsburgs had trouble with the Turks," observes Setton, "presumably they deserved it. On the whole the sources suggest that Paul was far more distressed by the activities of Charles, Ferdinand and Philip than by those of Süleymân, who was the close ally of his ally Henry II."¹¹

His ferocious hatred of Spain, above all after the invasion of the Papal State by the Duke of Alba, pushed him to seek relations with the Turks; in December 1556 his nephew, Cardinal Charles Carafa, was in Venice urging an alliance with the Republic against Spain, the last chance to avoid the Pope's resorting to Ottoman help. During the trial which he underwent after his dismissal, Charles Carafa did not deny having openly requested the help of the Turks. He confirmed that "many times in public His Holiness had said that he called the Turk to defend the Holy See when necessary' and, under the pressure of the questioning, even confessed: "I procured and urged the Turkish army to come to punish the enemies of our Lord at that time, by commission of the Pope..."¹² Pastor also admits of course that first Charles Carafa, and then, beginning in September 1556, the Pope himself urged Henry II of France to obtain the collaboration of the Ottoman fleet; he nevertheless underlines the fact that for Paul IV it was always a matter of indirect help and that no document proved a direct alliance with the Turks. In any case, "the rumour that Paul IV had asked for and obtained help from the Turks, spread widely and in no time."¹³ Moreover Paul IV had already established direct connections with Süleymân some months before, in March 1556, when the sultan had intervened with great vigor in favor of the Ottoman Jews in Ancona.

The express request for help from the age-old religious and political enemy of the Papacy is the fruit, as all the documentation makes evident, of the exasperating tension with Spain and the momentary outburst of rage on the part of Paul IV and his open-minded nephew. Peace with Spain during September 1557 was enough to bring the Pope back to a more prudent policy.

¹¹Setton, *The Papacy*, IV, p. 646.

¹²Setton, *The Papacy*, IV, p. 679, note 84.

¹³Pastor, *Storia dei Papi*, IV (Rome, 1944), pp. 399-400.

Both in 1557 and in 1558 the Ottoman fleet came back to threaten Southern Italy and the pope had to fortify Civitavecchia. Then, even if the Florentine ambassador to Rome was speaking the truth when he said that Paul IV waited for the Turkish fleet with the same nostalgia as the Jews waited for the Messiah, he was forced to recognize that the Spaniards were not harmed by the Ottoman military operations.¹⁴

The peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, the death of Paul IV and the ascension to the throne of Pope Pius IV, brought papal politics definitively back to the traditional line of uncompromising struggle with the Turks. The unfortunate North African crusade of Juan de la Cerda, vice-king of Sicily, that ended in disaster on the Island of Djerba (11-12 May 1560), highlighted the reality of Ottoman military supremacy. Pius VI was above all concerned with ending the Council while the Turks, on their part, observes Setton, "were suspicious of the church council, where the religious unity of Europe was likely to be preached as a necessary prelude to a crusade."¹⁵

At the conclusion of the Council the Turks resumed the offensive dramatically. Between 18 May and 12 September 1565, the assault on Malta, which concluded in victory for the Christians thanks to the decisive help of the Spaniards, threw Pius IV into a state of anxiety; he died on 9 December 1565, happy to have escaped the danger but very concerned because of the imminent campaign of Süleymân in 1566. His successor Pius V, a pope of strong religious tensions and unyielding tenacity, just elected and already confronted with the restoration of Malta, (half destroyed in the Ottoman assault), faced the renewed raids of the Ottoman fleet in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic Sea while he was also forced to send money and men to Hungary. All this while the heresies spread into Germany and France and rebellion broke out in the Netherlands.

It is well known that Süleymân died during the assault of Sziget, on the night of 5 September 1566. The Holy See did not have time to rejoice at the news, however, since intelligence reports from Istanbul already warned of a crusade against Vienna by his successor Selîm II for the following year. In a few years, Pius V himself was to be the creator of the Santa Lega after the Ottoman landing in Cyprus and to see the great Christian victory of Lepanto, but also new and successful Turkish campaigns in the Balkan peninsula. In any case, after him, papal politics remained firmly anchored in the traditional objectives of the struggle against the Turks, now prevailing in Europe.

¹⁴Pfiffermann, *Die Zusammenarbeit*, p. 227; Setton, *The Papacy*, IV, p. 701.

¹⁵Setton, *The Papacy*, IV, p. 701.

On the relations between Venice and the Ottomans throughout the modern era, and therefore also during the reign of Süleymân the Magnificent, the most recent historiography has contributed to discrediting some legends long believed in the West. A historiographic tradition which is rooted in contemporary apologetic journalism, enriched and reinforced by the wave of romantic nationalism during the Hellenic struggle for independence, had created the image of a Venetian Republic, favorite daughter of the Church and standard-bearer of "Western" civilization against Islam and the "Eastern" barbarism of the Turks. Although at some moments in her history, for tactical reasons, even the Venetian ruling class had identified herself with this image, the reality of the facts and concrete behaviour is radically different, and these very years of the reign of Süleymân the Magnificent offer us a significant example.¹⁶

The history of the centuries-old relationship between Venice and the Turks is certainly made up of numerous wars and of a perpetual expansive thrust on the part of the Ottomans at the expense of the Venetian dominions in the Levant. In reality, however, long periods of peace, peaceful collaboration and fruitful commercial understanding prevailed, and there were even specific, although limited, moments of politico-military alliance. For Venice it was of vital importance to keep open the Oriental markets from which they imported raw materials, (wax, oil, salted fish, wool, salt, cattle, skins) and to which they exported finished products (clothes, utensils, glassware, paper, soap). The commercial relations are attested by the various activities of numerous Venetian merchants on the Eastern markets, and the presence of an equally active colony of Ottoman merchants in Venice. There was practically no interruption in trade even during wars when it continued on a more or less reduced basis and under cover by means of Jewish mediators and the neutral Republic of Ragusa.¹⁷

Only a few years before Süleymân became sultan in 1520, Venice had enjoyed before direct collaboration with the Turks. After the defeat of Agnadello (14 May 1509) during the war of the Cambrai League, the Venetian ruling class, even amid doubts and conflicts, turned to the Ottomans for direct military help that actually arrived —though in a limited and more or less symbolic fashion. Once the danger was over, the Venetian nobles erased the

Turkish alliance from historical memory, but their political behavior during the following years showed how this episode was not isolated and uprooted from a tendency over a long period. In regard to the relations with Venice, the forty years of the reign of Süleymân the Magnificent, were substantially years of peace, of good, even though difficult, relations. Venetians took pains to avoid conflict with the Turks; at times, they even went out of their

¹⁶Setton, *The Papacy*, IV, p. 770.

¹⁷On the relations between Venice and Turks see my book *Venezia e i Turchi* (Florence, 1975).

way to congratulate the sultan on his military victories on land and sea; they withstood firmly the repeated solicitations of the popes to join the anti-Turkish leagues. In any case, had such leagues not always failed because of the paralyzing conflicts between Francis (close ally of the Turks) and Charles V? Only on one occasion, in 1537, did Venice let herself be convinced for a moment by Paul III to participate in a war against the Ottoman Empire, but the bitter naval defeat of the Prevesa (27 September 1538) induced her to make a new and rapid separate agreement with the Ottomans. Hurt by this confrontation, Venice hurried to re-establish good relations with the Turks, and clung to a rigorously neutral political ideal during the following years. The Venetian bailo in Constantinople sent the Ottoman government precious secret information on the political and military moves of the main European powers, in particular the Habsburgs.

The strong will to maintain positive relations with the Turks emerges clearly from a comparison with the efforts of Pius IV to end the Council. On the one hand, the bailo in Constantinople reassured the Turks, who actually wanted the Venetians not to participate in the Council, that the theological controversies divide rather than unite the Christians, therefore lengthening the time before an eventual crusade. On the other hand, the Republic tenaciously refused to accept a Venetian city (Vicenza was discussed) as headquarters of the last session, so as not to raise any Turkish suspicions as to their real intentions.¹⁸

In 1566 some suspicions were harboured in Venice regarding the real objectives of the Turkish naval campaign in the Mediterranean and Adriatic Sea, but the spring and summer passed without any acts of hostility. Besides, even during the preceding years, every time the Turkish fleet carried out the usual raids in the Mediterranean, Venice had put her naval units on guard as precaution.

When Süleymân died in 1566, Venice still enjoyed peaceful relations with the Turks and was firmly inclined to remain so in the future. It would be his successor, Selim II, who would draw her into war by attacking Cyprus, but even on this occasion, as we know, notwithstanding the temporary Christian solidarity of the Holy League and the victory of Lepanto, the Republic would soon turn to sign a separate peace agreement and would then continue for over seventy years to seek pacific, though difficult, relations of coexistence and collaboration with the Turks.

¹⁸J. Tadić, "Le commerce en Dalmatie et à Raguse et la décadence économique de Venise, in" *Aspetti e cause della decadenza economica veneziana nel secolo XVII. Atti del Covegno (Venice-Rome, 1961)*, in *Die Wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der Türkenkriege. Die Vorträge des I Internationales Grazer Symposions zur Wirtschafts-und-Sozialgeschichte Südosteuropas (5 bis 10 Oktober 1970)*, ed. O. Pickly (Graz, 1971), pp. 59-70.

SÜLEYMÂN AND IVAN: TWO AUTOCRATS OF EASTERN EUROPE

İlber ORTAYLI

Sultan Süleymân was born in 1495 in Trabzon as the son of prince-governor Selîm (the Grim) and Princess Hafsa, the last noble bride to the Ottoman court, daughter of the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray. On his accession he found himself in a position to head a well-established army and to lead a stable bureaucratic system. His brothers either had already died or had been executed. The fortunate man succeeded to the throne during the golden age of the Ottoman empire to rule over a Middle Eastern-Balkan empire whose territories had been expanded by his conqueror predecessors. Since he was an able commander and statesman himself, expansion continued during his reign.

In those years Ivan IV succeeded to the Muscovite throne to become the head of an emerging power as the reigning monarch of the divinely respected dynasty of the Rurikids. He was born in 1530 as the grandson of Ivan III. An atmosphere of interregnum and intrigue dominated his childhood. At the age of 17 in 1547 he was crowned as the "Czar of All Russias and Autocrator". But he was compelled to carry out drastic reforms in both the military and the administrative apparatuses. Ivan IV, the Czar, was the most successful conqueror of all of the rulers of sixteenth-century Russia. During his reign Kazan and Astrakhan were conquered and boundaries on the northeast stretched by Cossak chief Yermak to Siberia. This expansion attracted little attention in Europe, and he was defeated in his struggle with Poland and Livonia and died in disappointment and grief, whereas Süleymân, with his conquests, altered Europe's map and is, therefore, known to history as one of the great conquerors. The epithets by which Süleymân and Ivan are known in Europe, in fact, give some indication of their reputation in the eyes of their contemporaries. The former ruled over a multireligious empire in magnificence, the latter headed an emerging power.

Some Western European historians, who are specialists of neither the Ottoman nor the Slavic worlds, tend to evaluate the two eastern European empires according to specific criteria. These evaluations all too often identify the

term *autocracy*, in a derogatory sense, with the concepts of *tyranny* and *oriental despotism*. In an eighteenth century Austrian folk art print depicting the nations of Europe, the Turkish sovereign is shown as a tyrant whereas the Muscovite Czar appears as a "Freiwillige" (volunteer) a term which characterizes¹ someone who occupies a critical and dangerous position in a troubled and bloody time such as the late Rurikid period. It is difficult to claim that autocracy as a political institution has been properly understood ever since the Enlightenment. In fact, one cannot compare the Russian and the Ottoman empires of the XVIth century using the same criteria as one would in later centuries. Still, these two widely differing systems have certain things in common. The similarities are as striking as the differences. Therefore it is interesting to compare Süleymân with Ivan Groznij.

In the middle of the 15th century, many of the peoples who owed allegiance to the Eastern Orthodox Church lived under Ottoman rule; the second Orthodox state was Muscovite Russia. Mehmed II (the Conqueror) followed a deliberate policy of favoring unified rule in the Church. As Patriarch, he appointed Gennadios, virulent enemy of Rome, and displayed towards him a consideration greater than patriarchs had enjoyed during Byzantine times. The Patriarchs of Constantinople now enjoyed a choice rank in the official protocol. In addition, the Bulgarian and Serbian Churches had been deprived of their autocephaly, with spiritual, administrative, financial and judicial authority over all Balkan Orthodox devolving on the Patriarch in Constantinople.

The main theme in Russian political literature of that period is the Byzantine inheritance. The Rurikids were matrimonially allied to Byzantine dynasties since the time of Vladimir Monomakh. Ivan III was the last Muscovite ruler to take a bride from the Palaiologan family. He based on this link his claim to the title of "czar". This pretension was not acknowledged by the Ottomans and Western Europe before the seventeenth century. Popular tradition and official legends reported in the chronicles relate that the Byzantine cross and imperial sceptres which were thrown into the sea reappeared later in Russia. The attention of the Orthodox world focused on Russia ever since the sixteenth century and irredentist thoughts entertained by Balkan Slavs were focused on Russia. This is why Ivan Groznij's claim that Moscow was the Third Rome was not unfounded however early it may have been made. Still, it may be rash to talk of a Moscow-Constantinople rivalry as early as the sixteenth century. Likewise, the autocratic character ascribed to both rulers has to be evaluated differently in each case despite the obvious similarities.

¹ İ. Ortaylı, "Avrupada Bulunan Milletlerin Kısa Tasvirî" *Tarih ve Toplum* Nr: 8 (1984 August) pp. 36-39: description of a folk art print in Öst. Museum für Volkskunde in Vienna, Inv. 30905.

If we look at the external paraphernalia of the ruler and at the court life, the Kremlin appears to be as flamboyant in Ivan Groznij's time as Süleymân's palaces. This colorfulness which can be contrasted with the drabness of contemporary Western courts resulted from the importance of a pageantry created by, on the one hand, Russia's claim to be the center of the world, and on the other, Süleymân's *de facto* leadership of Islam. One can also find in the daily life and palace protocol of the two courts traces of a common past stemming from Asian traditions. These traditions are, if anything, more numerous in Moscow. The Russian crown stylistically comes from the Golden Horde; the Czars' clothes were auctioned off to the *Dvoriants*; the Czars gave away caftans instead of medals and decorations.

In Ivan Zabelin's work, *Domashnii Bi't Russkikh Zarei* one can find such traces². Reforms introduced by Ivan IV lasted until the reign of Peter the Great just as Süleymân's court protocol has survived till the middle of the eighteenth century. However, whereas Ivan IV had himself set up the rules governing court protocol, Süleymân had largely inherited them from his predecessors. At the time of Süleymân the simplicity of the earlier times was gone and the ruler faced his subjects surrounded with a glittering display of magnificence. Both the Sultan and his subjects took this magnificence for granted. No doubt, Russia at the time of Ivan Groznij had no inkling of the splendor of XVIIIth century Romanovs nor of the respect their country would then command in Europe. Furthermore, titles of Russian Czars such as *Gosudar*, *Tsar Vsiarusi*, *Samoderzhets*, *Velikii Kniaz* would only later be internationally recognized. A point raised by Novaselski has been thoroughly studied by Halil Inalcik. In the 1640's the Crimean Khan did not recognize the title of the Czar equivalent to '*âlempenâh* (refuge of the world). In spite of the insistence of the Muscovite ambassador, the Khan refused to use this special title reserved for the Ottoman Sultan, and instead used *Cümle Urusuñ Pâdişâhu* or *Uluğ ve Küçük ve Ak Rusuñ Penâhi*³.

Another similarity is in the system of inheritance. If the reigning monarch had two or more sons, the life of the Russian princes until their accession and the ensuing political instability was not very different from what prevailed in the Ottoman palace. Süleymân had the good fortune to be an only son. Ivan IV spent a harrowing childhood and youth before his accession to the throne. His life until then had been as bleak as that of an Ottoman *Şehzâde* in the *kafe* (cage). The real difference is structural. Ivan Groznij was forced to deal with landowning boyars of the *voitchina*. Süleymân, however, was at the head of a

²Ivan Zabelin: (Moscow, 1895) pp. 142-160; vol 2 (Moscow, 1915) p. 15.

³H. Inalcik, "Power Relationships between Russia, the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire as Reflected in Titulature" in *Passé Turco-Tatare et Présent Soviétique: Studies Presented to A. Bennigsen* (Paris, 1986) pp. 175, 189, 201-202.

different power structure. With the exception of a few provinces, the *kul* system was in force to rule the Empire.

Muştafâ 'Âlî in 1581 considers this as God's special favour to the Ottoman dynasty (*mevhibe*)⁴: In their rule, they are not hampered by relatives and surrounded only by devoted slaves (*kâr-ı sedesteki gevher-i yekâ gibi bir sarâyıñ içinde tek vü senhâ dururlar ve akrabâ ve ta'allukât 'alâkalarını bi'l-külliye bertaraf kılurlar*); they were also favored in that they always had enough men to govern outlying provinces and never had to resort to the local leaders. Their military power is unequalled, their finances are in good order. Taking the days of Süleymân as a perfect model, Muştafâ 'Âlî reveals his disagreement with the political structure of his own days. He mentions, therefore, that "justice and prosperity should reign, but this can only be, if the Sultan does not leave the affairs of the State to the vezirs;" furthermore, he does not fail to criticize the mistakes made by Sokoloviç Mehmed Paşa, the old Grand Vezir.

One can also find in the political literature of Ivan's times aspirations towards such a system.⁵ Muştafâ 'Âlî is convinced of the need for an elite group in an autocracy of the Byzantine and oriental type. As a principle; "The Sultan has to find a worthy *muşâhib*, who is able to tell the thing, what others do not dare to tell him... The Sultan has to use trustworthy spies to be informed of the state of the country and of the actions of the administrators. The Sultan has to appoint highly educated men to the high offices..."⁶ But, to be sure, neither wider public participation nor discussion by critics from the lower orders or the people at large was sought. As another principle he mentioned the suppression of demagogical preachers.

The transformation of Czardom into a monolithic rule is a special circumstance related to Ivan Grozñij's reign. Therefore, when one compares the reigns of Ivan and Süleymân in regard to administrative institutions, keeping in mind that the reign of Süleymân witnessed the institutionalization of Ottoman administration, to characterize these two systems as centralizing autocracies may be an overstatement. This could be all the more so in the case of Muscovite Russia; the title *Veliki Samoderzhets*, is the translation of the Byzantine "autocrat". This title should be viewed as the equivalent of the Latin "dictator" or Islam's *müstebidd*, but not as the contemporary *zulm* or tyranny with their negative connotations. To quote Bernard Lewis, "... traditional Islamic state may

⁴A. Tietze, *Muştafâ 'Âlî's Counsel for Sultans of 1581* part II, (Vienna, 1982) p. 289 (38/122, 123).

⁵A comparative study on the subject is done by Altan Aykut, "Ivan Peresvetov ve Sultan Mehmed Menkibesi" in *Bellelen* 46 (1982), pp. 861-882; see also the major work on the subject by A. A. Zimin, *I. S. Peresvetov i ego sovremenniki* (Izd. Akad. Nauk Moskva, 1958).

⁶Tietze, *Muştafâ 'Âlî's Counsel*, p. 290 (63/159).

be autocratic, it does not mean despotic".⁷ In this connection, one could mention the *fervâ* of Şeyhül-islâm Mehmed Ziyâeddîn Efendi, issued at the time of the dethronement of 'Abdülhamîd II, which never used the terms *istibdâd* and *müstebidd*. Ivan Groznij started his reign as a lawmaker and was responsible for some of the most striking achievements of pre-Petrine Russia during the Rurikid period, though one should not exaggerate the impact of this legislation. One can still compare it with that of Süleymân. The latter's laws and codes have had long-lasting effects whereas those of the former underwent many changes before finally disappearing into historians' collective memory. Regarding Süleymân's legislation we can refer to İnalcık who cites an '*adâletnâme* proclaimed by Süleymân's great grandson Mehmed III in 1595, upon his accession to the throne, which reads: "In the time of my great ancestor Sultan Süleymân a law-code (*kânûnnâme*) was composed and distributed to the provinces... then no one suffered any injustice or exaction... But now this law-code is discarded and forgotten...".⁸ Certainly popular culture as well as chronicles and political literature referred forcefully to the times of Süleymân as an ideal model of bureaucracy, land tenure, protocol etc. The age of Süleymân was considered a perfect model during later Ottoman centuries. Yet as İnalcık has pointed out, Süleymân's legislation did not bring about any radical innovation; it was rather an evolution and expansion of existing codes.⁹ Ivan Groznij, on the other hand, introduced what can be termed as important changes for Rurikid Russia, yet his code was destined to fall into disuse after having been heavily amended.

The *Tsarski Sudebnik*, issued in 1550, is a code embodying with amendments and changes, the basic institutions of old Russia. This did not prove to be successful and durable legislation. It was not to be valid over a long period as its predecessors such as *Pravda Yaroslava* had been. Ivan IV himself was not acclaimed as a Tsar of *Pravda*, the way his own grand-father Ivan III had been. The Russia of Ivan Groznij has been viewed both by historians and subsequent generations as an obsolescent system. However, it should be pointed out that the political interpretation of the *Pravda* concept by Rurikid Russia is akin to Ottoman thought. *Pravda* as such meant truth, justice and law. The "Russkaia Pravda" of Yaroslav and the fact that Ivan III was known as the "Czar of *Pravda*" reflect the adoption by Russia of a Byzantine theory. The Czar and his subjects must both abide by the *Pravda*. This is in conformity with Mustafâ 'Alî's late XVIth century description of what justice and imperial-rule should be: gaining the affection of one's subjects.

⁷B. Lewis, "On the Quietist and Activist Traditions in Islamic Political Writing" *BSOAS* 49 (1986); p. 1 on *istibdâd*, see idem., *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago, 1988), p. 156.

⁸H. İnalcık, "Adâletnâmeler" *T.T.K. Belgeler* 2 (1965), pp. 104-105 (The '*Adâletnâme* of 1595).

⁹H. İnalcık, "Süleymân the Lawgiver and Ottoman Law" *Archivum Ottomanicum* 1 (1969), p. 117.

Süleymân, known abroad as the Magnificent and at home as the Legislator, has been acclaimed by posterity as a sort of "Tsar of Pravda". During the Ottoman centuries, Süleymân had the reputation of being a *Nûşîrevân-i Âdil*, reflecting Sassanid Persia. Ivan Groznoj remained plain Ivan Groznoj. The translation of the epithet into European languages as "terrible" or "schrecklich" is inaccurate. Groznoj is an epithet handed over to Ivan by his grandfather Ivan III. Groznoj has no sadistical implications. Rumors that women fainted when faced with Ivan III's magnetic stare were widespread among the people. Ivan IV automatically took over this reputation and became Ivan Groznoj. *Groznoj* means not only "terrible" but at the same time "elevated, sublime, mighty, threatening; the related noun *groza* can mean "gewitter/thunderstorm" while the verb *ugrozit'* can be translated as "to frighten." Peresvetov, the theoretician of the Russian polity of the 1550's, describes Ivan IV's autocratic character as follows:¹⁰ "he frightened them off, he awed them with his cesarian strength and might."

In fact Ivan, while trying to suppress in a blood bath the boiars of old Russia, was, despite the exaggerated statements of later day's historians, largely unsuccessful. Süleymân did not have to face, in the central lands of the Empire, either in Anatolia and Rumelia, a provincial landed aristocracy. This was not the case in the peripheral lands such as Lebanon, Arabia, Crimea, Transylvania, and Moldavia; but in Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Anatolia, the magnate families had been wiped out long before his time.

Ivan Groznoj on the other hand, had to contend unsuccessfully with the boiar estates known as *votchina*. Even land-bound serfdom was not established before the time of his successor Boris Godunov.

The ordinances and decisions issued during Ivan's reign begin not with a clause "we order and want..." but with a formula such as: "by the direction of the sovereign (Gosudar) the boiars have decided..." It was pointed out earlier that Süleymân was not confronted with a group of magnates. It must be noted however, that *Bojarskoe Duma* which was opposed to Ivan Groznoj was not comparable to the Sejm of Poland. Kliuchevskij in his *Bojarskaia Duma drevnei Rusi*¹¹ mentions that this assembly in the mid-sixteenth century had 252

¹⁰Peresvetov's main tract consists of two parts under the title of "chelobit'naia" in the form of a petition submitted to the Czar, where he points some cases and striking examples from the life and attitudes of rulers and even makes some comparisons to foreign rulers. Uwe Halbach: "Milst' and Groza-Fürstengnade und Ungnade in der Begriffswelt Altrussischen Quellen" in *Geschichte Altusslands in der Begriffswelt ihrer Quellen* (Stuttgart 1986), p. 74. For Ivan Groznoj's time, Herbert Spliet: *Russland von der Autokratie der Zaren zur imperialen Grossmacht* (Lüneburg 1979), pp. 46, 59 and 65.

¹¹V. Kliuchevskij: *Bojarskaia Duma drevnei Rusi*, 4th ed. Moscow, 1910; and, A. A. Zimin: *Sostav Bojarskoi Dumy v XV-XVI vekakh* in *Arheograficheskij ezhegodnik* (Moscow, 1958), pp. 41-48. Thornton Anderson: *Russian Political Thought* (New York 1965), p. 86-87.

members in which the Suzdalian group was rather influential. We cannot say that each member of the Duma was an active participant in the debates. In fact some who were deaf, doty, or idiotic are reported to have attended the meetings, dozing off most of the time and occasionally making their presence known with the help of their secretaries who used to sit beside them, unable to comprehend the decisions made. They were not accorded veto rights. As a matter of fact, not only the personal conviction of Ivan Groznij, but also the political thinking of the day was opposed to the domination of magnates. Maxim Grek, the so-called humanist author of the era, does not discuss the Duma's role in public affairs, but rather notes that the Czar has to be the sovereign of right and perfect legislation: - *Tsar pravdaiu blagozakonyet*. Peresvetov, on the other hand, goes even further in criticizing the Boiars and argues that the "catastrophe of Byzantium had started with magnates". Speaking of the Czar, he used three epithets: threatening, strong and wise. The same idea prevails in Ivan's letter to Kurbskii in which the czar writes:¹² "God has given a task to Kurbskiis and other boiars, to serve my grandfather Ivan III... (*v rabotu*). Therefore, I cannot share my authority granted to us by God with the boiars," and adds, "we reward or punish our *Kholops* (he uses this very word) "the Czar has expressed his wrath and mercilessness for boiars (*opola*)..." In the 1930's it seemed exaggerated, when Soviet historians argued that centralization prevailed over the boiars with popular support, but in the *oprichnina* of the Czar there were hundred youngsters of boiar origin in 1565, and their numbers increased three fold within a decade.¹³ Ivan attempted to strengthen *d'iachestvo* in order to reduce the role of *dvorianstvo*. He granted them land called *pomest'e* in return for their services. Certain *votchinas* were confiscated, on behalf of the *oprichnina*. Though this process was exaggerated by some historians for a while, recent research has shown that the scope of his operations were far from creating such a centralized absolutism. However Ivan's maneuver to create a new class was an accomplishment that survived. Owing to the creation of a *noblesse de robe*, fresh blood would be pumped into the aristocracy throughout Russian history.

In fact the confiscation of some *votchinas* did not begin under the reign of Ivan Groznij. The process started with Ivan III after the conquest of Novgorod. In the 16th century it was a common practice to create a new courtly class. So Muscovite Russia was confronted with the emergence of this new class before Ivan Groznij. This process was also largely accepted by the political ideology of his age. Peresvetov pointed out that in order to limit the power of the hereditary boiars "the army and the government should not be left to the magnates, but

Ruslan Grigorevich Skrynnikov: "Der Begriff Samoderzavie (Selbstherrschaft) und die Entwicklung Staendisch-Representation vor Einrichtungen im Russland des 16. Jahr." in *Geschichte Altrusslands*, pp. 16-17.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 21. S. V. Utechin: *Geschichte der politischen Ideen in Russland* (Kohlhammer-Mainz 1966), pp. 30-31 and 37.

¹³R. G. Skrynnikov: *Rossia nakaznune smutnogo vremeni* (Moscow, 1980), pp. 40-46.

rather to the warriors, freely entering the service of the Czar... ." Peresvetov also clearly put a limit on the power of the aristocracy. This limit consisted of *starina* (tradition), divine laws, and the Czar's authority based on his own hereditary legitimacy.¹⁴

What were the limits on the potential of Süleymân's autocracy ? The Ottomans were representatives of Islam and rulers of this world. But they were not alone. They had to compete with Iran and India. This was a fact which strengthened the claims to omnipotence of the Caliph and Sultan but also put a limit on such claims. Within the empire, there were autonomous governments, like the Crimea, Transylvania, Wallachia, and Moldavia. Furthermore, in such a multireligious empire, every community had its own privileges, rights, judicial organizations which put another limit, a legal one, on the powers of the sultan, while Ivan Groznij, at the head of an Orthodox Christian czardom, did not tolerate any other belief.

Ivan Groznij is generally described negatively by modern historians whereas he was not always portrayed in the same light by his contemporaries; especially popular songs and *rassказы* described him not as a mentally ill figure but rather as a despotic though strong czar. Süleymân, on the other hand, was exalted with the golden descriptions of Ottoman prose as in the *Tabakâtü'l Memalik* of his own Head of the Chancery, Celâlzâde Muştafâ, and in many other works in later centuries.

¹⁴Spliet, p. 65 and Altan Aykut, p. 864.

EXPANSION IN THE SOUTHERN SEAS

Salih ÖZBARAN

Commenting on the Turco-Portuguese confrontation in the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth century, Denison Ross, the British Orientalist, wrote nearly half a century ago: "I would expressly hope that I have succeeded in showing how much still remains to be done in this engrossing field of research and how much care and labour will be required before the imperfect and often conflicting accounts of the Franks and Muslims can be weighed in the balance and reduced to something like historical fidelity."¹ Even though a number of studies have been completed ever since his time and our knowledge about the Ottoman expansion in the southern seas has progressed to a certain level, the state of the field is still far from being satisfactory in comparison with other parts of Ottoman or any part of European history.

What has kept Ottoman activities in the southern seas in obscurity? The relative silence in Ottoman historiography itself, lack of interest among native historians in Turkey, the Arab countries, Iran and the like, and the delay or neglect in using the rich archival material — particularly Portuguese and Turkish — can no doubt be counted among the main reasons which prevented the reader from a better understanding of the Ottoman policy in the southern seas in the time of Süleymân the Magnificent.

¹Denison Ross, "The Portuguese in India and Arabia between 1517-1538," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1922), p. 18.

Many historians like Frederic C. Lane², Fernand Braudel³, Magalhaes Godinho⁴, Meiliak Roelofs⁵, Charles R. Boxer⁶, Niels Steensgaard⁷ have recently been interested in the eastern trade and tried to prove that the trade routes through the Middle East regained their importance in the middle decades of the sixteenth century after the appearance of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and their effort to blockade the entrance to the Red Sea and the Gulf. Though incapable of using the original sources of Middle Eastern cultures and glancing at the Levant trade and societies primarily to illuminate, shall we say, a Eurocentric vision of the past, these scholars have made considerable pioneering and theoretical contributions to bring the topic to the historians' attention. And some other scholars like Halil İnalcık⁸, Andrew Hess⁹, Richard Blackburn¹⁰, Jon Mandaville¹¹ have tried to put the Ottoman southern policy into the world perspective, indicating that historians who work on the modern times should necessarily take the Ottoman view into consideration. Bernard Lewis was one of those who mentioned early on the importance of the Turkish archives for the study of the Arab lands whence the Ottoman authorities had directed their activities toward the south.¹²

I should like, however, to name here three particular scholars whose studies on the basis of native sources - both archival materials and chronicles —

²F. C. Lane, "The Mediterranean Spice Trade: Further Evidence of its Revival in the Sixteenth Century," *Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, ed. B. Pullan (London, 1968), pp. 47-58.

³F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, tr. S. Reynolds, vol. I (London, 1972), pp. 543-570.

⁴Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho, *Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial*, vol. I (Lisbon, 1965), pp. 111-72.

⁵M. A. P. Meiliak-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence* (The Hague, 1962) and "The Structures of Trade in Asia in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", *Mare Luso-Indicum* IV (Paris, 1980), pp. 1-43.

⁶Charles R. Boxer, "A Note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade and the Rise of the Aceh, 1540-1600," *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, X/3 (1969), pp. 415-428.

⁷N. Steensgaard, *Carracks, Caravans, and Companies: The Structural Crisis in the European-Asian Trade in the Early 17th Century* (Copenhagen, 1973).

⁸Among his various writings see, e.g., "The Ottoman Economic Mind," *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, ed. M. Cook (London, 1970), p. 212.

⁹A. Hess, "The Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborne Empire in the Age of the Oceanic Discoveries, 1453-1525," *American Historical Review*, LXXV/7 (Dec. 1970), pp. 1892-1919; and also "The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and the Beginning of the Sixteenth-Century War," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 4 (1973), pp. 55-76.

¹⁰J. R. Blackburn, "Arabic and Turkish Source Materials for the Early History of Ottoman Yemen, 945/1538-976/1568," *Source for the History of Arabia*, Part 2 (Riyadh, 1979), p. 197-209.

¹¹J. S. Mandaville, "The Ottoman Province of al-Hasa in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 90/3 (1970), pp. 488 ff.

¹²B. Lewis, "The Ottoman Archives as a Source for the History of the Arab Lands," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1951), p. 149.

enabled the Ottoman past to a certain extent to acquire its place in a more global historiography. Jean Aubin, the French scholar with an exceptional knowledge of languages, in the *Mare Luso-Indicum* and other studies,¹³ has tried to show both sides of the medallion as far as the history of the Indian Ocean is concerned. R. B. Serjeant accomplished a very useful task by translating some Ḥadramī chronicles into English, thus allowing us to view Ottoman history from the perspective of that part of Arabia in the sixteenth century.¹⁴ In his review of Serjeant's study, the Turkish historian Cengiz Orhonlu had to confess "what we learn from this book is that the Turkish administrators in Yemen did much more to establish the Ottoman rule in the coastlands of Arabia than is mentioned by the Ottoman chronicles."¹⁵ While conducting his own research on the 1559 campaign against Bahrain in the Gulf, Orhonlu again expressed his surprise in front of the fact that "it is not possible to learn about the Ottoman activities in the waters of the Gulf of Basra from the works of contemporaries like Celâlzâde Muştafâ, Peçuylu İbrâhîm or Gelibolulu Muştafâ 'Âlî. It is astonishing to see that even the most important events are not recorded by the above-mentioned historians."¹⁶ The third scholar I would like to name is indeed Cengiz Orhonlu himself who occupies a very distinctive career among the Turkish historians for he exploited the Turkish archives for this purpose. His work on the Ottoman province of Ḥabeş (Abyssinia) is still unique.¹⁷

Thanks to the leads of all these pioneers, it would be possible to gather information from what seem to be the most authentic sources of Ottoman policy in the southern seas in the sixteenth century: the Portuguese and Ottoman archival materials, and Portuguese chronicles. The Portuguese governors in India were always suspicious of the "Turcos" or "Rumes" who could any time set sail against their bases around the Indian Ocean, and therefore informed their king about the plans and activities of the Ottomans in the Red Sea, the Gulf and the Ocean. The most useful guide to these reports is to be found in George Schurhammer's summaries of what he collected from the official and personal writings kept in the Portuguese archives and libraries.¹⁸

No doubt, it would not be so easy to establish in detail the political, military and economic achievements of the Ottomans on such a wide frontier as the Indian Ocean; this will certainly take time. I can, however, point out in this

¹³See, e.g., his "Quelques Remarques sur l'Étude de l'Océan Indien au XVIème Siècle," in *Agrupamento de Estados de Cartografia Antiga*, LXXV (Coimbra, 1972), pp. 3-13.

¹⁴R. B. Serjeant, *The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast, Hadrami Chronicles* (Oxford, 1963).

¹⁵See *Tarih Dergisi*, XIV/19 (Istanbul, 1964), p. 17.

¹⁶C. Orhonlu, "1559 Bahreyn Seferine Ait bir Rapör," *Tarih Dergisi*, XVII/22 (1967), p. 1.

¹⁷C. Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Güney Siyaseti: Habeş Eyaleti* (Istanbul, 1974).

¹⁸G. Schurhammer, *Die Zeitgenössischen Quellen zur Geschichte Portugiesisch-Asiens und Seiner Nachbarländer zur Zeit des Hl. Franz Xaver (1538-1552)* (Rome, 1962).

limited space certain contours of a general picture of the Ottoman presence in the southern seas, in the time of Süleymân the Magnificent, in a traditional chronological description without considering theoretical models.

Let me begin with a few lines concerning the Portuguese intentions and achievements in the Indian Ocean before the coming of the Ottomans. "Many readers will be familiar with the well-authenticated story," says Boxer, "that when the first man from De Gama's crew reached Calicut he was accosted by two Spanish-speaking Tunisians. They asked him: 'What the devil has brought you here?' to which he replied: 'we have come to seek Christians and spices.'"¹⁹ *Vimos buscar cristaos e especiaria*.²⁰ Indeed, "*o advento do imperialismo da pimenta*" as Magalhaes Godinho calls it, namely the advent of spice imperialism, was achieved with an astonishing speed. Particularly after the year 1510, when Alfonso de Albuquerque became the governor of the Portuguese East, the plan to close the mouth of the Red Sea by the seizure of Hormuz affected the economies of the Levant and the European states. There was no naval power in the Indian Ocean to challenge the European visitors at that time, not forgetting the insufficient efforts of the Mamluks. When 3 *naus* (large ships) took nearly 500,000 kg. pepper and 450,000 kg. spices in 1513 and 6 *naus* more than 2,000,000 kg. pepper in 1517 to Lisbon, the Egyptian economy was undergoing a crisis.²¹

When the Ottomans succeeded the Mamluks in 1517, they faced the same challenge as the Mamluks did in their last years of sovereignty: "the establishment of a political sea power with an economic goal supported by a commercial organization."²² It is not the subject of this paper to comment on the factors which took the Ottomans to the Red Sea and the ocean. Halil İnalçık and Cengiz Orhonlu tell us that the Ottoman policy makers were aware of the political and commercial developments in the southern seas.²³ No doubt, behind the issues of political and military superiority can be seen commercial activities and economic links between Anatolia, the Arab countries and the southern seas as major concerns of the Palace. Muslim rulers around the ocean had often sought help from the Ottoman sultan against the Portuguese.²⁴

¹⁹C. R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborn Empire, 1415-1825* (London, 1969), p. 37.

²⁰Godinho, *Os Descobrimientos*, I, p. 487.

²¹Ibn Iyâs, *Journal d'un bourgeois du Caire*, tr. G. Wiet (Paris, 1955), vol. I, p. 391; Godinho, *Os Descobrimientos*, II, p. 115.

²²Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade*, p. 119.

²³See above, İnalçık's article, p. 212 Orhonlu's *Habeş*, pp. 5-6

²⁴The rulers of Hormuz, Shîr and Gujarat had sought Ottoman help in their struggle against the Portuguese. See, e.g., the letter of vezir Şaraf ad-Dîn of Hormuz in L. Ribeiro, "En Tornom do Primeiro Cerco de Diu," *Studia*, 13-14 (Lisbon, 1964), pp. 102-103.

The report of Selmân Re'îs, the Ottoman seaman who had previously served in the Mamluk navy, tells us that in 1525 there were 18 ships (başarde, kaçırğa, kalyote) guns of various types (badaluşka, yançopı, zarb-zen, şayka) stationed at Jidda, ready to go "to action to capture and hold all the fortresses and ports in India under Portuguese domination."²⁵ Selmân was not, however, content with his government's policy. "One cannot when one sees these [ships] and arms lying idly at Jidda," reported Selmân; "if they (i.e., the Portuguese) hear that these ships are not operational and lack crews, they will inevitably come with a big armada for, apart from these ships, there is nothing to deter these accursed Portuguese."²⁶ In this report it is possible to find indications of the Ottoman policy toward the south. The Istanbul government was not keen enough to take action as early as possible; and the lack of crew needed for naval action prevented them from large projects.

Economic factors must undoubtedly have worried the Palace. A certain, though limited, amount of revenue was coming from the trade activities in the Red Sea (despite the Portuguese blockade) as it is indicated in an Ottoman budget dated 1527/28.²⁷ We also learn that in the year 1530 about 2 million akçes were allotted by the Ottoman government to have ships built at Suez.²⁸ Pero Caraldo, the Portuguese ambassador in Venice, reported in the following year that "according to a man who had been in Suez and who came here from Alexandria, 40 small galleys, 10 big galleys, 20 big and 10 small vessels were being prepared at Suez.... As soon as the fleet became ready, Süleymân Paşa (the governor of Egypt) would set sail to look for the armada of the king."²⁹ But the Palace must have considered the events in the Mediterranean and the Safavid frontiers more important. While the guns and munitions were taken to the Mediterranean, Süleymân Paşa with the Egyptian treasury had to join the Sultan on his way to Iran.³⁰ The Ottoman naval campaign to widen the horizons in the southern seas was thus delayed.

The biggest naval attempt from the Ottoman side came in 1538. Süleymân Paşa set sail with 72 ships, took Aden and appeared in the waters of the ocean. This was certainly a challenge with powerful guns against the *Estado*

²⁵The report is in the Topkapı Palace Archives (Istanbul), E. 6455; See S. Özbaran, "A Turkish Report on the Red Sea and the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean (1525)," *Arabian Studies*, IV (1978), p. 82.

²⁶Ibid., p. 83.

²⁷Ö. L. Barkân, "H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Mâli Yılına ait bir Bütçe," *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, XV/1-4 (Istanbul, 1953), p. 291.

²⁸Başbakanlık Arşivi, Kamil Kepeci collection, Bahriye section, 5638.

²⁹Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (Lisbon), Gaveta, 20, Maço 7, Documento 15.

³⁰See A. Allouche, *The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict (906-962/1500-1555)* (Berlin, 1983), pp. 104 ff; Ş. Turan, "Süleymân Paşa (Hadım)," *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*; J. H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain 1496-1716* (London, 1962), p. 54.

da India of Portugal. No naval war took place, however, between the Oceanic maritime forces and the Mediterranean galleys. While it is generally said that this campaign against Diu had no result to Ottoman credit, it is often forgotten that during and just after this campaign Yemen was consolidated as an Ottoman province which would later play an important role in the empire's southern policy.³¹

In the aftermath of the Diu campaign, the Ottomans no doubt inspired fear in the Portuguese bases while leaving some artillery men in Muslim India to instruct the Indians on the use of firearms. They also left the feeling that they could at any time come to share the economic revenues of the Ocean. The Portuguese king had to draw his commanders and soldiers in India against the growing Turkish danger in the Indian Ocean. Because of these anxieties a Portuguese fleet under the command of Dom Estevão da Gama tried to burn the Ottoman galleys at Suez, but this attempt proved to be unsuccessful.³² The Ottomans seemed now to have been the masters of the Red Sea. Their help to Ahmed bin Ibrahim, a Muslim leader in Eastern Africa who was in conflict with the King of Abyssinia, was particularly significant since the Ottomans supplied the Muslims with guns and arquebuses in 1542.³³ The popularity of Turkish guns, gunmen and arquebuses was already known in the Muslim world.³⁴ As early as the late 1530's the Ottoman experts on firearms seem to have gone as far as the Atjehese Muslim state in Sumatra of Southeast Asia, where the warfare between Atjeh and the Bataks turned in favour of the former only after "there came to the Tyrant ('Alā'ad-din) 300 Turks, whom he had long expected from the Strait of Mecqua (i.e., the Red Sea), and for them had sent four vessels laden with pepper."³⁵

Economic considerations sometimes directed the two empires to come to make agreements on the southern frontier. The Ottomans wanted the trade routes open and wished to receive pepper and spices from that part of the world. The Portuguese needed grain from the south. We know through some documents preserved at the Torre de Tombo in Lisbon that the two empires exchanged envoys with royal instructions following the year of 1538.³⁶ The Ottoman

³¹On this event and its result see S. Özbaran, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Hindistan Yolu," *Tarih Dergisi*, 31 (1978), pp. 98-104.

³²E. Sanceau, "Una Narrative de Expedição Portuguesa de 1541 ao mar Roxo," *Studia*, 9 (1962), pp. 209 ff.

³³Almeida, *Historia de Aethiopiae*, Livro III, Capítulo X; Orhonlu, *Habeş*, pp. 26-27.

³⁴H. Inalcik, "The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-arms in the Middle East," *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, eds. V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (London, 1975), pp. 202 ff.

³⁵A. Reid, "Sixteenth Century Turkish Influence in Western Indonesia," *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, X/3, 1969, p. 401.

³⁶*Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Corpo Cronológico, Parte 1, Maço 69, Documento 40 (10 February 1541) and Documento 47 (15 February 1541): "Intrição que leva duarte catanho;"*

demand that the Muslim merchants should travel safely in the Ocean and the Shihr-Aden-Zeila line should mark the frontier between the two navies was not found practical by the Portuguese authorities.

At any rate, the middle decades of the sixteenth century witnessed the revival of spice trade through the Levant as the above-mentioned historians have tried to prove. The Ottoman government seems to have been concerned more and more with the developments in the southern seas. Before the conquest of Basra in 1546, Ayas Paşa wrote in a letter to the ruler of Cezâ'ir in the Shaṭṭ-al-'Arab region: "Few days ago my Sultan (i.e., Süleymân the Magnificent) instructed me to go against Basra, to take it, from there to Hormuz and India, and fight against the devious Portuguese."³⁷

The second and, in fact, the last Ottoman attempt occurred in 1552; this time, the target was Hormuz, one of the most important points from which the Portuguese were controlling the maritime traffic to and from the Gulf. This time Pîrî Re'îs, the famous Ottoman seaman and geographer, left Suez with 25 galleys and 4 galleons taking 850 soldiers on board.³⁸ He first sacked the city of Muscat and then besieged Hormuz. This campaign, too, failed to bring victory to the Ottoman side; instead, it marked the end of Pîrî, the author of the *Kitâb-i Bahriyye*. The attempts to bring the galleys back to Suez, now at Basra, were not successful. Seydî 'Alî Re'îs, one of the eminent sea captains, tells us about his fight in 1554, in fact the only serious naval confrontation in the Indian Ocean, in his *Mir'âtü'l-Memâlik*: "there happened such a fight of guns and arquebuses which it is not possible to describe."³⁹ The Ottomans lost their galleys at the end; the Mediterranean-type *kadırgas* were either taken by the Portuguese or wrecked in the Ocean. The southern seas were not to witness another organised large campaign in contrast to the Mediterranean front.

Despite these unsuccessful attempts at sea, the Ottomans were establishing themselves as a land-based empire on the southern frontier. They set up in 1555 two new *beylerbeyliks* (governorates): Laḥsâ (al-Hasa) in Eastern Arabia and Ḥabeş in Africa. While the coastal towns and cities like Basra, al-Katif, Aden, Mocha, Jidda, Suez, Sawakin and Masawwa were to carry out their

Corpo Cronológico, Parte 1, Maço 71, Documento 28 (6 December 1541); Corpo Cronológico, Parte 1, Maço 72, Documento 16: Sultan's instructions contrary to those of the Portuguese king; *Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo* Documentos Orientais, Maço 1, Documento 24, dated October 1544: Letter from Süleymân the Magnificent to D. Joao III. See also Özbaran, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Hindistan Yolu," pp. 105-11.

³⁷ *Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo. Coleção de Sao Lourenço*, IV, fol. 140b-141b: *De baixa q[ouvernada] or de bagadad p[er] aly bem alyom Rey de qyzayra*.

³⁸ Topkapı Palace Library, Koşular section, 888, fol. 488a; Corpo Cronológico, Parte 1, Maço 89, Documento 9, fol. 3b-5a; C. Orhonlu, "Hint Kaptanlığı ve Pîrî Re'îs," *Belleter*, XXXIV/134 (1970), pp. 235-236.

³⁹ Seydî 'Alî Re'îs, *Mir'âtü'l-Memâlik* (Istanbul, 1313/1895), p. 13.

trade activities and piracy in the southern seas, the provinces of Basra, al-Hassa, Yemen and Abyssinia became subjected to the *iltizam* system, in which the important parts of revenues were not distributed as *timâr* but reserved directly for the sultan's treasury, being collected by tax-farmers.⁴⁰ The budgets of Yemen, cadastral registers of Basra, copies of orders from the Sultan, *ru'ûs* registers and various other registers are first-hand sources which reflect the Ottoman administrative system in those southern provinces.

The budgets of Yemen for the years of 1560-62 reveal that a certain amount of revenue came from the landing places (*iskelehd*): In 969 (1561-62) 4,273,606 *pâres* were collected as the revenue of the *iskelehd* of Yemen, namely about 13% of the whole income.⁴¹ And F. C. Lane's study shows that between 1560 and 1564 the quantity of pepper which reached Venice from Alexandria was 1,310,454 pounds, well over the 1,150,000 pounds which had made the same journey before the Portuguese interference.⁴²

In the year of 1566, when Süleymân the Magnificent died at Szigetvar, there was in Istanbul an Atjehnese envoy waiting for the sultan to support his ruler with artillery and experts. Sultan Sefim II, Süleymân's successor, could send only three ships to Atjeh.⁴³ Tribal revolts in Arabia were then to keep the Ottoman government engaged. When one sees that the revenues collected from the southern provinces were barely enough to pay the salaries and wages of the state functionaries and soldiers kept in those far corners of the empire,⁴⁴ one is tempted to raise the following question: what was the benefit of the Ottoman expansion in the southern seas and lands?

40 S. Özbaran, "Some Notes on the Salyane System in the Ottoman Empire as Organised in Arabia in the Sixteenth Century," *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, VI (Istanbul, 1986), pp. 39-45; "A Note on the Ottoman Administration in Arabia in the Sixteenth Century," *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, III/1 (Wisconsin, 1984-85), pp. 93-99.

41 Topkapı Palace Archives, D. 314.

42 Lane, "The Mediterranean Spice Trade," p. 47.

43 Razañhâk Şah, "Açı Padışahu Alâaddin'in Kanuni Sultan Süleymân'a Mektubu," *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, V/8-9 (Ankara, 1967), pp. 373-409.

44 According to the Ottoman budget of Yemen dated 1008/1599-1600, the revenues were not even enough to meet the expenditures. H. Sahilliođlu, "Yemen'in 1599-1600 Yılı Bütçesi," *Yusuf Hikmet Bayur'a Armağan* (Ankara, 1985), pp. 287-319.

THE EASTERN POLICY
OF SÜLEYMÂN THE MAGNIFICENT
1520-1533

Jean-Louis BACQUÉ-GRAMMONT

The diplomatic position of the Ottoman Empire as inherited by Süleymân, when he succeeded his father Selîm I in September 1520, can without any risk of overschematization, be summarily described as:

- Relentless confrontation with the heterodox Safavid State founded in Iran by Shah Isma'îl;
- flexibility towards all other parties so long as the Safavids have not been utterly eliminated.

In a recent book,¹ I have gone into the grounds and the evolution of the well-known conflict which since 1514 openly existed between the Sultan and the Shah. In order to apprehend the totally different stand taken by Süleymân the moment he acceded to the throne, it would be fitting to outline briefly the main points of this confrontation and the issues it entailed.

Selîm, the only one amongst Bâyezîd II's sons whom nature had endowed with an innate political acumen, had perceived already when he was governor of Trebizond that the militant action exerted by the Shah's "missionaries" among the Türkmens of Anatolia meant, at a time when the Ottoman central administration was weakened, the most serious peril facing the empire since Timur's invasion: an internal gangrene of which the threatening eastern neighbour, gradually gathering strength, would benefit to the core. The fact that the religious precepts propagated by the Shah were openly heterodox, going beyond the theological rules acceptable to Islam, had certainly an impact on the violent hatred felt by Selîm towards the *Kızılbaş*. But the essential reason for it

¹[OS], *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins. Contribution à l'histoire des relations internationales dans l'Orient islamique de 1514 à 1524*, (The Dutch Institute of History and Archaeology in Istanbul, LVI, Istanbul, 1986).

was the danger of internal disruption within the Ottoman Empire which became fully apparent during the 1511-1512 crisis. However, the solution to this internal problem was to be found abroad: by crushing the charismatic leader of his own subjects of heterodox leanings the Sultan would overcome their dangerous unruliness. Once seated firmly on the throne, Selim devoted all efforts to reach this target. He could, however, not attain it despite an overwhelming superiority in men and weapons, and notwithstanding a diplomatic activity displaying one of the most remarkably gifted political minds in an era when there were quite a few. As far as political minds go, the Shah was certainly his equal and was able to detect the weak points of his opponent and prevent him from using his power. This is what happened: On the battlefield of Çaldıran, on August 23, 1514, the Sultan's guns mowed down the *Kızılbaş* who, themselves, inflicted very heavy losses upon an Ottoman army whose *corps d'élite*, the Janissaries, were not enthusiastic about fighting against the Shah who stirred in them a vague feeling of sympathy. Holding the ground but weary, the Sultan's men marched on to Tabriz but after a few weeks of drought, hunger, thirst and a trying early winter, they were bent on returning home to Anatolia. The memories of this campaign left their mark on Selim's army. However hard he tried, these men would not take the road to Azerbaijan once again.

But the Sultan was not in a hurry. Banished from the Islamic community following a *ferdâ* of the *Şeyhü'l-islâm*, the *Kızılbaş* were no more in a position to undertake military action in Anatolia. By imperial order all roads in Anatolia were closed to traffic with the Shah's dominions. With the conquest of Syria by Sultan Selim, Iran was to be cut off also from the West. It thus would gradually be deprived of its traditional commercial outlets, of food and other means of subsistence as well as of mineral ore supplies; asphyxia would gradually set in. Selim could thus afford to disregard the emissaries sent by the Shah to beg for peace and to throw them into prison as soon as they turned up.

As for Shah Isma'îl, he had no more manpower to resist a second Ottoman attack, which he dreaded. As reported by an Ottoman spy in July 1516 he had only 18,000 men, many of whom were engaged in defending Khorasan against Uzbek assaults. To ward off a possible Ottoman attack, the Shah attempted to drag into war against the Ottomans any potential enemies they could have had, whether in the Moslem world or in Christendom, but to no avail. Finally, an attempt of a different nature brought about unexpected but effective results. The Shah wanted to equip his armies with firearms, which they lacked till then. A few guns were laboriously made operational and a detachment of arquebus musketeers followed the Shah wherever he went. With these weapons, which would have looked ridiculous if used on a battlefield, as compared to the Ottoman firepower, the Shah contrived a means of psychological warfare. Rumor, as spread by the Shah's agents, multiplied the number of these arms beyond likelihood, and increased the fears of the Ottoman soldiers. Back

from Egypt, Selîm proclaimed that he would march on Iran. He confirmed this on his way from Damascus and Aleppo. Having reached the Euphrates in May 1518, he suddenly changed course and turned towards Istanbul, his army having obstinately refused to march on to Tabriz. It could well be that at that stage the Safavid state was saved, and perhaps it was due to the magnified image of these, in fact, rather few and mediocre firearms of the Shah. However, with the passing away of the Sultan two years later, this campaign plan was put off. When much later in 1533 the Ottoman army set out eastwards, it had to face a much less vulnerable enemy than at the time when they suddenly changed course at the banks of the Euphrates back in 1518.

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Indeed, Selîm left his successor an empire in a much better state than the one he had taken over. Its borders now reached upper Egypt, the Hijaz, the river Euphrates down to Hit and the river Tigris down to Takrit in a pincer threatening Baghdad. In eastern Anatolia a glacis-like territory grouping local principalities, which were given the status of Ottoman sanjaks, served as a buffer between the vast *beylerbeylik* (governorate) of Diyarbakır and the Shah's territories. This province of Diyarbakır was governed by Bıyıklı Mehmed Paşa, who was in the trust of Sultan Selîm and acted as a true proconsul of the eastern marches. This border area was adequately manned with good troops which could meet a Safavid attack, however remote such danger. On the other hand, a new revolt by heterodox Anatolians led by Şâh Velî b. Şeyh Celâl, brought about at the instigation of the Shah,² had been repressed the previous year. The Sublime Porte could thus consider that peace was restored in these regions for a long time ahead.

In other fields, eight years of total war against the Shah left their mark in the Ottoman Empire. The army always dreaded the possibility of the start of a new campaign in Iran. It can be gathered from Ottoman sources that some people took advantage of this uneasiness to poison the atmosphere and work up minds, but it is not quite clear in whose interest these people acted. There was a real risk of the Janissaries revolting. Such revolt could flare up at the least pretext. These troops, though led by Selîm to victory, never ceased to grumble. As regards the blockade clamped down on the Safavids, however hard it was on them, it also had repercussions on Ottoman merchants in their big business with the east. It was only fear of Selîm's notorious wrathful outbursts that made them refrain from giving vent to their deep discontent. Generally speaking, the war in the East and its consequences proved unpopular with large parts of the Ottoman population.

²See our "Études turco-safavides. III. Notes et documents sur la révolte de Şâh Velî b. Şeyh Celâl", *Archivum Ottomanicum*. VII, pp. 5-69.

Süleymân, probably upon the advice of the Grand Vezir Pîri Mehmed Paşa, whom he had wisely kept in office, took measures which many of his subjects awaited and welcomed. These measures are referred to favorably in most Ottoman records: in the first place, the revival of commercial traffic with Iran together with some provisions including the return of goods which had been abusively seized within the frame of the blockade during the preceding reign. Along with these measures of appeasement, there was an immediate change in military aims. Already in 1521 it was clear that the new Sultan set his eyes upon the Christian world which indeed represented a more obvious foe than the *Kızılbaş*, who, although heretics, could still be regarded as more or less members of the same faith. Also, the Balkan expeditions were more promising in terms of booty than Azerbaijan which had been made desolate by fire and the systematic devastation brought about by the retreating *Kızılbaş* before the advance of the Sultan's army.

As a whole it can be safely said that the first months of Süleymân's reign brought marked appeasement. The only noteworthy attempt at revolt is that of the *beylerbeyi* of Damascus, Cânberdi Gazâlî. This revolt is worth noting because it is closely connected with Selîm's policy with regard to the Safavids.³ There is a series of documents all of which lead to the same conclusion: already at the beginning of 1520 Sultan Selîm could not have been unaware of Cânberdi's contacts with the Shah, which were carried out quite openly. Indeed, Selîm had grand vezirs executed for lesser crimes. That Selîm could have overlooked such an act of misdemeanour, which was no secret to anybody in Syria, would have been quite inconceivable were it not for a report on the question by Bıyıklı Mehmed Paşa. Bıyıklı Mehmed Paşa expresses an assumption which, to our mind, is a sound one: *We wonder whether the Sublime Porte had not given orders that this be so*. More than one conjecture leads us to assume that Selîm could himself have schemed such a connection for a definite purpose. In view of his dim past and his more than one act of treason, when he was at the service of the Mamluks, Cânberdi could well appear in the eyes of the Shah as prone to revolt against the Ottoman sovereign. This sham revolt, as devised by the Sultan, was a means of enticing Shah Isma'îl into Syria in order to support his partner. Thus, however much the Ottoman forces were averse to an attack in Iran, Selîm had all reasons to believe they would steadfastly go to war if the fight was to be on Ottoman soil. Everything had been prepared to ensnare the Shah, but the Sultan's sudden death upset the whole scheme. We believe that thereupon Cânberdi wanted to act on his own account and embarked on an untimely adventure. Such venture could perhaps have met with success a century earlier in the Mamluk empire, but he had not reckoned with the sound organization and the military might of the Ottomans. Cânberdi's men were defeated near Damascus and he himself lost his life there. According to

³See OS, pp. 275-293.

an Ottoman document, Shah İsmâ'il showed great distress when he heard the news.⁴

At this juncture Süleymân was master of the situation. He started preparations for an extensive military expedition the aim of which was formally declared a mere few days before he left Istanbul on May 18, 1521. Much to everyone's relief the target was the Hungarian border but the Sultan let doubt hover about the whole campaign as long as possible. Until then almost everyone had felt that the Ottoman army would again take the road to the east. Evidently, it was in the interest of the Sultan to keep the Shah guessing and perplexed, hence on the defensive.

We have discovered in the Ottoman archives a considerable number of spy reports covering Iran and dating back to the first months of 1521. These reports show that the Sublime Porte was intent on finding out as clearly as possible the Safavid opponent's intentions, the size of his forces and how operational they were. These reports distinctly lead to the conclusion that the Shah at the time was definitely not in a position to launch an attack on Anatolia. The Sultan could thus safely proceed to Belgrade. There was no serious danger threatening his eastern frontiers. Moreover, although there is no proof of any joint planning, the news of Süleymân's departure westwards coincided in Azerbaijan with a particularly fierce attack by Uzbeks on Herat. The relatively small number of men the Shah could enroll for intervention in Anatolia was still further diminished as part of them had to be held back ready to defend Khorasan against any possible threat.

But Süleymân had found a particularly effective way of dissuading the Shah from launching an offensive on Ottoman territory whilst he himself was busy in the Balkans. A series of documents so far unpublished, found here and there in the archives of the Topkapı Palace, enabled us to reconstruct an Ottoman diplomatic scheme of which nothing has been known so far, shrouded as it was in secrecy. Its primary short-term aim was to neutralize the Shah and eventually to embark on a gradual process of "disengagement" in the east.⁵

In the spring of 1521, just at the time when Süleymân was leaving Istanbul and news of the Uzbek threat was reaching Azerbaijan, three Ottoman spies were arrested in Tabriz. This is not extraordinary *per se*. Two of these were

⁴See our "Notes et documents sur les Ottomans, les Safavides et la Géorgie, 1516-1521. Études turco-safavides, VI", *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, XX/2, 1979, p. 262: (Report of Fâ'ik Beg, Spring 1521, Topkapı Palace Archives, E, 6678) "Avant d'apprendre que le rebelle Jânberdi a péri, Şah İsmâ'il avait résolu de marcher sur le pays de Rûm, mais, lorsqu'arriva la nouvelle de la déroute de celui-ci, sa raison s'égarâ et il fut dans le désarroi. Lorsque l'adite nouvelle arriva de la part du susdit Kôr Enîr, il fut complètement dérouter."

⁵See OS, p. 294 ff.

ordinary agents who apparently served as guides and had not been briefed about the real aim of the mission in which they were involved. One of the two was after a while released and sent back to Anatolia. The other one managed to escape in autumn. As for the third one, he was a notable figure, who seemed out of place next to the other two. He was Şöfi Mehmed Beg, previously a taster (*çâşnigir*) in the Imperial Palace and then deputy to the Bey of the Sanjak of Amasya.⁶

Immediately following his arrest, which everything leads to believe was made in order to delude the onlookers as well as his companions, he was separated from them. He was then led to the *vakilo-sa'lane* Mirzâ Shâh Hoseyn. This person ranked second only to the Shah himself. Şöfi Mehmed Beg appears to have stayed in the retinue of Mirzâ Shâh Hoseyn until the very end of his mission, about a year later.

During Şöfi Mehmed Beg's stay in Azerbaijan at least three messages were despatched by the Safavid officials to the Ottoman authorities. We have access to these documents and their date can easily be determined. They all purport to a resumption of direct diplomatic relations between the two states. In this exchange of notes a feature worth noting is that while the rank of the Safavid sender becomes higher in the hierarchy with every ensuing message, the rank of the Ottoman addressee of these messages gradually runs to a lower level. Moreover, the Safavid sender, getting more and more anxious to receive some sort of an answer from the Sublime Porte, prompts the Porte by promising more and more concessions.⁷ A close study of the contents of these documents and their circumstantial content leads to interesting conclusions.

As outlined above, since the end of 1514 the Shah exerted all efforts, though in vain, to secure from the Sultan, failing the restoration of normal diplomatic relations, at least a "modus vivendi" which would allow to ward off the threat of a renewed Ottoman offensive. We do not know following what bargaining Şöfi Mehmed Beg found himself back in Tabriz. There is no doubt, though, judging from indications gathered, that he was acting all along with full authority from the Ottoman seat of power at the highest level. This was apparently unknown to the last warring faction led by Bıyıklı Mehmed Paşa, who were still intent upon unrestrained war with the Shah. What is clearly apparent from the records is that, through his emissary, Süleymân was luring the

⁶He subsequently became Agha of the Janissaries and then *beylerbeyi* of various provinces including Bosnia and Budin, where he died round 1552.

⁷Messages, — from Şöfi Mehmed to Grand Vezir Piri Mehmed Paşa (Topkapı Arch., E. 11937, summer 1521, apparently dictated by Mirzâ Shâh Hoseyn) — from Hâje Ebrâhîm, Safavid governor of Adiljevaz, to Divâne Hüsrev Paşa, *beylerbey* of Diyâr Bekir (E. 8304, beginning 1522) — from Mirzâ Shâh Hoseyn to Fâ'ik Beg, *bey* of the Sanjak of Bayburt (E. 4256, spring 1522).

Shah with what he had been yearning for during seven years: a dialogue. As could be expected, Shah Isma'îl would not jeopardize such a prospect by inconsiderate military action.

Now the Sultan could just procrastinate. He knew his neighbour would not attempt any threatening move. As a matter of fact, when Şöfi Mehmed returned to Ottoman territory, in the spring of 1522, the Shah was still waiting for the longed-for reply. Süleymân was now quite confident. A few weeks later he left Istanbul for the Rhodes campaign. Şöfi Mehmed's mission thus ended with a double success: on the one hand, neutralizing a potential adversary, on the other, by launching the policy of disengagement in the east as we have discussed. When the Ottoman army returned from Rhodes early in 1523, the all-out struggle against the Shah was already for all parties a distant memory, eclipsed by the two great victories by which the Sultan inaugurated his reign, victories in places where his illustrious forerunner and grandfather Mehmed the Conqueror had not succeeded — at Belgrade where he opened the way for further conquest in Danubian Europe, and at Rhodes where he secured the hegemony of the Ottomans in the eastern Mediterranean and the safety of maritime communications with Egypt. Under these circumstances, the Sultan could condescend to grant the Shah that which he had long wanted. Sources studied so far say nothing regarding the dealings which took place in 1522 and 1523. In any case, the outcome is quite evident: Tâjo-ddîn Hasan Halife, Shah Isma'îl's ambassador, presented himself before Süleymân in September 1523. The letter he was carrying, the contents of which we know,⁸ contained nothing surprising — the Shah poured forth his protestations of goodwill and vows for the restoration of good relations. Condolences on the death of Selîm and best wishes for the good fortune of the Sultan were skillfully woven in. Anyone who didn't know the context in which this took place would be hard put to guess that this apparently insignificant and stilted message was to end a decade of ruthless conflict. Süleymân's response⁹ at first glance attracts scarcely more attention except that beneath the rhetorical flourishes, no less accomplished than those of his correspondent, one can easily sense condescension and a carefully contrived lack of concern.

Everything we have seen until now would lead us to believe that as soon as he had secured reestablishment of a minimum level of diplomatic intercourse the Shah would avoid compromising this result by any hostile intrigues against the Ottomans which the latter would notice. Nothing of the sort! In October 1523, no sooner had Tâjo-ddîn returned to Azerbaijan when Shah Isma'îl wrote to two of the Ottomans' most natural enemies in Europe, Charles the Fifth and Louis of Hungary, proposing an alliance and concerted military action, as part of

⁸ Ferîdûn Beg, *Münşe'âtü's selâsin*, I (Istanbul 1274/1858), pp. 525-526.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 526-527.

which he was supposed to launch an offensive into Anatolia in April 1524.¹⁰ Also, though one can scarcely prove this given the current state of the evidence, it is probable that he opened relations with Hâ'in Ahmed Paşa, the *beylerbeyi* of Egypt, who had proclaimed himself Sultan of Cairo in January, 1524. One of his counselors, Kâdî Şeyh Kebîr Erdebîlî, is known to have played a role in the Ottoman-Safavid negotiations of 1522.¹¹ However that may be, these two moves brought no result. The revolt of Ahmed Paşa was crushed in August 1524, and as for an effective alliance with European states, this proved illusory given the risks and uncertainties of communications across the Ottoman territories lying between them. In any event, Shah Isma'îl died in May 1524, a turning point in the history of the Safavid state. With the coming of the young Tahmâsb, just twelve years old, Iran was plunged into a long series of internal conflicts between rival *Kızılbaş* clan chiefs, who were incapable of seeing beyond the Safavid borders, much to the satisfaction of the Porte. It was only in 1534 that Tahmâsb was finally able to rid himself of the tutelage of the clan chiefs, in whose hands he had been until then no more than a toy. It was at this moment that the Ottomans reopened hostilities.¹²

Let us now consider briefly those essential elements in this scene of Ottoman-Safavid confrontation which were destined to persist or to be modified little by little during the reigns of Shah Isma'îl and Tahmâsb. First of all, though it is scarcely necessary to repeat it, the confrontation was at no time a matter of Turks vs. Iranians. Shah Isma'îl, his *Kızılbaş* warriors, and his Anatolian partisans were to the contrary more Turkic if anything than were the ruling circles of the Ottoman empire. This was to fade with time as the Iranian cultural influence took effect. But in this respect nothing had changed very much by 1530 relative to the earlier period — the *Kızılbaş* chiefs were the sons of those who had brought Shah Isma'îl to power and, from a social and cultural point of view, scarcely different from them.

¹⁰Barbara von Palombini, *Bündniswerben abendländischer Mächte um Persien. 1453-1600* (Freiburger Islamsstudien, I, Wiesbaden, 1968), pp. 62-64.

¹¹OS pp. 362 (and note 1169), 366, 377.

¹²In fact, such hostilities were implicit already at the beginning of Tahmâsb's reign, as can be gathered from a threatening letter Süleymân sent to him. In this letter Süleymân complained that he had not received condolences on Selîm's death nor congratulations on his own accession to the throne; cf. Ferîdûn Beg, *Münşe'ât*, pp. 541-543. This undated letter calls for further study. The one following it in Ferîdûn Beg's collection, pp. 543-544, is addressed to Hüsrev Paşa, *beylerbeyi* of Diyarbakur. It is dated beginning July 1525 and covers war preparations against the Shah, see our "Études turco-safavides, XV. Cinq lettres de Hüsrev Paşa, beylerbey du Diyar Bekir", *Journal Asiatique*, CCLXXDX/3-4, 1991. These two letters could be collated for due appraisal. It is possible that these merely verbal threats of the Sultan were expressed after having received confirmation of the ultimate plot prepared against him by Shah Isma'îl before he died. This was after the conciliatory mission of Tâjo-ddîn. In fact, such threats and the proclaiming of an Iran campaign could well cover up the underlying reason for the Sultan's war preparations which eventually led to the Hungarian campaign of 1526.

We have therefore taken care up to this point not to use the terms "Turk" or "Iranian" nor even "Shî'î," to which we prefer the expression "heterodox," which at least allows us to avoid the most serious misunderstandings. What is apparent from his *divân* in Turkish¹³ is that the doctrine of Shah Isma'îl is a kind of Turkish-Anatolian syncretism which only the right sort of varnish can help pass off as a form of Islam. This official religion of the *Kızılbaş* tribes was imposed upon an Iranian populace long accustomed to seeing their leaders behave in a more or less curious manner, and who themselves can be regarded either as Sunnî or as Shî'î so long as one does not try to define too precisely what was Sunnî and what was Shî'î in late-15th century Iran. As might be expected, the death of Shah Isma'îl as a doctrinaire figure inspired by his own religion, led to the progressive marginalization of that religion, even though the Iranian Shî'î theologians, whose intellectual education far exceeded that of the *Kızılbaş*, really saved the Safavid movement as an acceptable Islamic model, however heretical it may have seemed from the point of view of the Ottoman *ulema*. This subject, important as it undoubtedly is, has yet to be the focus of a study, although one can at least sketch the stages of this religious undertaking by Iranian intellectual circles. The consequences for our subject are far from negligible. On the one hand, from the time of the campaign of 1534-35, the Ottoman-Safavid conflict becomes a conflict between two states with different understandings of Islam, and no longer a conflict of Islam against pagans who are worse than *giaours*. On the other hand, the connections between the Safavid sovereign and the heterodox Anatolians started to loosen bit by bit.

Taken up with their own quarrels, the *Kızılbaş* chiefs evidently played no role in the heterodox rebellion which enveloped Anatolia in 1526-7 and which the Porte was able to put down only with great difficulty.¹⁴

The Porte continued to follow with care the situation in Iran as shown by various reports conserved at the Ottoman archives. The only event of note towards the end of the 1520's was the Zû-l-fekâr Beg incident at Baghdad with consequences which were far from negligible. According to Ottoman and Safavid narrative sources Zû-l-fekâr Beg (alias Noğud Beg), a nephew of the powerful Amîr Hân Mauşellu Turkman, was governor of Kalkurân. In 1528 he made a surprise attack upon his paternal uncle Ebrâhîm Hân, governor of Arab Iraq, had the latter put to death, took possession of Baghdad, and set himself up as its ruler. Called to Khorasan, where he defeated the Uzbeks at Jam, Tahmasb was unable to react until the following year, when Zû-l-Fekâr was put to death. Meanwhile Zû-l-Fekâr had thought he could save himself by making an act of submission to Süleymân. From that time on the Ottomans exploited this

¹³It is interesting to note that there is no translation or commentary in Persian of the said *divân*.

¹⁴See my "Un rapport inédit sur la révolte anatolienne de 1527", *Studia islamica*, LXII, 1985, pp. 155-171.

precedent in order to lay claim to rights over Baghdad, which in effect become the objective for their subsequent campaign to the east.

Another *Kızılbaş* deserter was able to tempt them still further. In 1530-1 *Ülâmâ Takalu*, governor of Azerbaijan, disappointed in his ambitions, passed over to Ottoman territory and presented himself at court. This intriguing personality, whose lack of ability was constantly demonstrated later, was able to mislead the vezirs and even the all powerful Grand Vezir *İbrâhim Paşa*. The hatred which he vowed towards *Şeref Bey*, the *emîr* of Bitlis, caused the latter's disgrace and led, under the circumstances, to his taking refuge with *Ṭahmâsb* and obtaining the Shah's support to rescue Bitlis, which his rival had besieged in his campaign for the emirate. The Shah gave him his support and went so far as to name him *beylerbeyi* of Kurdistan. In 1532 *Şeref* was killed in combat while trying to retake his province¹⁵. But the Shah was seriously compromised by this affair, which offered the Sultan yet another pretext for opening hostilities at precisely the moment when the satisfactory outcome of his conflict with the Habsburg empire left his hands free for the front in the East.

The campaign of the Two Iraqs was about to begin.

¹⁵See our "Études turco-safavides, XVI. Quinze lettres d'Uzun Süleymân Paşa, beylerbey du Diyar Bekir (1531-1535)". *Anatolia Moderna-Yeni Anadolu*, I, 1991, pp. 137-186.

SÜLEYMAN'S EASTERN POLICY

Rhoads MURPHEY

Any "original" sixteenth-century source — be it Ottoman or Safavid, Austrian or French — contains its own set of preconceptions and inbuilt biases. But, thanks to recent scholarly effort, we now have works from a broad spectrum of opinion in print on which to base our study of mid sixteenth-century Ottoman affairs. Through the texts of in-house government memoranda ('*arz*') from the time of İbrâhîm Pasha's vizierate, and denunciations (*işbârname*) and complaints (*şikâyet*) directed at Süleymân's sixth grand vizier Rüstem Pasha, the inner dimensions of Ottoman policy making begin to take much clearer shape.¹ In particular, two important new sources have recently been rediscovered and edited: the Ottoman *defterdâr* Seyfî Çelebi's history,² and the memoirs and observations of Me'mûn Beg of Şehrîzor (Shahrîzûr).³ J. Walsh's publication of correspondence sent to the refugee Safavid prince Elkâş Mîrzâ has opened up further new perspectives on that episode in Ottoman-Safavid relations,⁴ to say nothing of the numerous publications of Bacqué-Grammont.⁵ We are now able to undertake a more multidimensional approach to the establishment of the Ottoman regime in eastern Anatolia and northern Iraq. As Hammer was writing his account of Süleymân's eastern campaigns in the third volume of his *Geschichte* published in 1828, he could rely on only a few official chronicles and the distorted accounts of events presented in documents such as the *zafername* dispatched to King

¹ T. Gökbilgin, "Rüstem Paşa hakkındaki ithamlar," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi*, 8 (1955), pp. 11-50; T. Gökbilgin, "Arz ve raporlarına göre İbrahim Paşanın Irak'a seferindeki ilk tedbirleri ve fütûhatı," *Belleken*, 21 (1957), pp. 449-482.

² J. Matuz, *L'ouvrage de Seyfî Çelebi, historien ottoman du XVI^e siècle*, Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie d'Istanbul, No. 20 (Paris, 1968) [hereafter, *Tevârîh-i Pâdişâhân*].

³ I. Parmaksızoğlu, "Kuzey Irakta Osmanlı hakimiyetinin kuruluşu ve Memun Beyin hatıraları," *Belleken*, 37 (1973), pp. 191-230.

⁴ J.R. Walsh, "The Revolt of Alqas Mîrzâ," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, 68 (1976), pp. 61-78.

⁵ See in particular his account of the Safavid embassy to Süleymân's court in 1522 in *Birinci Milletlerarası Türkoloji Kongresi*, vol. 1, pp. 23-47 (cf., note 14 below) and the article entitled "Un rapport inédit sur la révolte anatolienne de 1527," *Studia Islamica*, 62 (1985), pp. 155-171.

Ferdinand of Hungary in 1548 at the conclusion of the second, and least successful, of Süleymân's three excursions.⁶ We can now draw on sources from a far broader range of the parties to the conflict. But the sources may still conspire to mislead us if we confine our attention to the public stance of the emperors or their personal beliefs. These sentiments rarely acted as the sole determinant of actual policy. As an example, if we tried to define the basis of Ottoman policy towards the Safavids through evidence collected from the poetry of Muhibbî (Sultan Süleymân's *nom de plume*) as he projected his claim to leadership over the entire Islamic world, we would conclude that he was so obsessed with the extermination of the Shî'î heretics as to be willing to abandon all other causes.⁷ Yet the record shows that of thirteen full-scale imperial campaigns carried out during his reign, only three were directed against Iran, and the remaining ten against Europe.

At various times during the Shah's reign, particularly during the years immediately following Tahmâsb's coronation in 1524, Süleymân sent *tehdîdnâmes*⁸ inviting the young ruler to renounce his adherence to Shî'î doctrine. Niewöhner-Eberhard's article⁹ has documented the use of polemics by both sides, while indicating the perhaps more extreme forms adopted by the Safavids, who regularized the practice known as *tebarrâ*¹⁰ or cursing the first three Muslim caliphs. But these outward expressions of disgust with one another were theatrically-staged events intended as much for internal audiences within each of their respective countries as for one another. The threat posed by the heterodox movement spearheaded by Molla Kâbiz and his followers in Istanbul¹¹ was handled in public rather calmly and discreetly through the invitation to Kâbiz to engage in debate in 1527 with the *Şeyhü'l-islâm* and to recant his beliefs in

⁶J. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*. 10 vols. (Pest, 1827-1835), III, p. 287, note d. In the *siegesschreiben* sent to Ferdinand in 1548 (i.e., after the mostly unsuccessful second Iranian campaign of 1547-1548) the sultan bragged of his capture of three cities, fourteen fortresses, and stated that 28 new fortresses had been built to secure the recently conquered territories. Hammer used the text in Latin preserved in the Vienna archives. Cf. the other versions cited by M.F. Kirzioğlu, *Osmanlıların Kafkas-Ellerini Fethi, 1451-1590* (Ankara, 1976), pp. 203-204, and the text of a copy of the same fetihnâme dispatched to the King of France in Ahmed Feridûn, *Mecmû'a-i münşe'ât-i selâtin* [1st printing, 2 vols., Istanbul, 1264-1265 AH; 2nd printing, Istanbul, 1274-1275 AH], 2nd printing, vol. 1, pp. 603-606. [Note: the two editions are hereafter cited as *Münşe'ât 1* and *Münşe'ât 2*].

⁷See the text of his poetry quoted in Kirzioğlu, *Kafkas-Elleri*, p. 141.

⁸E.g., Feridûn, *Münşe'ât 2*, I, pp. 541-543: "Niğâncı bulunan Celâlzâde inşâsiyle Tahmâsba gönderilen tehdîdnâmedür."

⁹E. Niewöhner-Eberhard, "Machtpolitische Aspekte des Osmanisch-Safawidischen Kampfes um Bagdad im 16/17. Jahrhundert," *Turcica*, 6 (1979), pp. 103-127.

¹⁰Ahmed Asrar, *Kanunî Sultan Süleymân Devrinde Osmanlı Devletinin Dini Siyaseti ve İslâm Alemi* (Istanbul, 1972), p. 160, note 149. Şemseddin Sâmî, *Kâmûs-i Türkî* (Istanbul, 1317 AH), p. 377.

¹¹See H. Algar, "Khümbesitü" in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. [hereafter, *EI2*], s.v.

front of an assemblage of Ottoman scholars and learned officials.¹² Behind the scene, however, a major crackdown was underway and scores of suspects were being rounded up and either executed or expelled from the city.¹³ What this pattern of public and non public behavior shows is not that stated ideology or policy was part of a massive disinformation campaign by the emperors to confuse their enemies —although there is a great deal of that element in them—, but rather that this propaganda was manufactured for specific purposes and that it should not be taken literally.¹⁴ The Sunnī Ottomans and the Shī'ī Safavids were enemies, it is true, but much of their enmity had its origin in non ideological issues.

CONDITIONS OF WARFARE IN THE EAST DURING THE 16TH CENTURY

Two principal factors hampered the Ottomans' conduct of war with the Safavids and explain in part why Süleymân directed only three of his thirteen imperial campaigns towards the east. The first was constraints placed on the conduct of war by the requirements of etiquette and custom which dictated the acceptable manner for waging war against a Muslim or even a lapsed Muslim foe. The second was limitations imposed by the physical environment and the difficulty of keeping men and horses supplied and fed while the army campaigned in remote areas, far removed from the imperial supply system or *menzilhâne* network.

Even in the context of an anti-Christian crusade, mutually accepted convention established certain rules for the conduct of warfare. Making war on a lapsed or heretical Muslim rival had to be justified by the edict (*fetvâ*) of excommunication. Ottoman official policy labelled the *kızılbaş* according to three overlapping categories as *mürtedd* (apostate), *râfi'î* (schismatic), and *mülhid* (atheist and heretic), but none of these states of conscience was considered irremediable, and before such lapsed believers could be condemned to eternal

¹²See H. Yurdaydın, "Kâbiž," *Eİ2*, s.v.; and R.C. Repp, *The Muftî of Istanbul: A Study in the Development of the Ottoman Learned Hierarchy* (London: Ithaca Press, 1986), pp. 234-236. The petition of the kadi of Istanbul, Sa'dî Sa'dullâh Çelebi (see M. Süreyya, *Sicill-i 'Osmanî* [4 vols. Istanbul, 1308-1311], vol. 3, p. 25), seeking an order for the execution of Molla Kâbiž is included in a *mecmû'a* found in the library of the University of California at Los Angeles, Collection 896, ms. 251.

¹³P. Kappert, *Geschichte Sultan Süleymân Kanunis von Celâlzâde Muştafa genannt Koca Niğancı* (Wiesbaden, 1981) [Verzeichnis der Orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, Supplementband 21; hereafter, Celâlzâde, *Tabakât*], f. 175b: "800 miqdâr levendi ü'me-i seyf idüp ... siyâseten katil eylediler."

¹⁴On the techniques employed by Shah İsmâ'il in waging his "war of dissuasion" against the Ottomans, see J.L. Bacqué-Grammont, "Une Mission Diplomatique Safavide auprès de la Porte Ottomane en 1522," *Birinci Milletlerarası Türkoloji Kongresi* (Istanbul, 1979), vol. 1, p. 24.

damnation it was the duty of every good Muslim to try to coax them back to the true faith. A formal opportunity to recant heretical beliefs was offered by convention as the obligatory prologue to each eastern campaign. Süleymân dutifully dispatched yet another *tehdîdnâme* to Tahmâsb in the spring of 1554,¹⁵ despite the fact that both sides had been openly preparing for war throughout the previous year. The text of Süleymân's exhortation to God to give Tahmâsb "right guidance" makes reference to the existence of a tradition of offering a foe the option of accepting Islam as an alternative to war.¹⁶ Even in the extirpation of *kızılbaş* the sultan was extremely wary of any action which might be construed in a way that would tarnish his image as a just and righteous ruler.¹⁷

Poor weather conditions, shortage of supplies, and unavailability of water and grazing land for the army pack animals figure prominently in the campaign diary of the 1534-1535 Baghdad expedition published in the Ferîdûn collection.¹⁸ These adverse conditions sometimes necessitated the premature cessation of military action before the usual end of the campaigning season in late fall, or forced a retreat at the height of the army's forward progress. On several occasions during eastern campaigns the otherwise inexplicable halts and reversals in the routes of march followed by the Ottoman armies can be understood only if we look beyond strategic to logistical concerns. The seemingly erratic movements of the army during the sultan's second Iranian campaign for example become intelligible if we interpret them as the army's search en masse for fodder for the cavalry's mounts. This interpretation is validated in the detailed descriptions of this campaign and of the Safavid counter-offensive of 1551-1552 recorded in Luţfî Pasha's history.¹⁹ The kind of warfare described by Luţfî Pasha closely resembles modern guerrilla warfare, where the defensive force's main preoccupation is interrupting the offensive force's supply lines, only rarely confronting them directly in open combat. When such direct confrontation did occur it was usually carried out by small contingents commanded by provincial

¹⁵See Ferîdûn, *Münşe'ât* 2, I, pp. 541-543. Cf. note 8 above, and Celâlîzâde, *Tabakât*, f. 457a ff.

¹⁶Celâlîzâde, *Tabakât*, f. 459b: *kablû's-seyf teklîf-i İslâm âyîn-i şer'-i seyidü'l-enâm olduğı ecilden, bu hük-m-i hümâyûn ... saha işdâr buyuruldu.*

¹⁷See Süleymân's communication to Hüseyin Paşa, the Beglerbeği of Diyarbakır, dated late June 1525 (Ramazân 931) in Ferîdûn, *Münşe'ât* 2, I, p. 543: "her huşûsda ahsen tedbîr olup, bir nâmûs eksikliği olmağdan dahı ziyâde ihtiyâş eyleyesin."

¹⁸Ferîdûn, *Münşe'ât* 2, I, pp. 584-598. See in particular the following entries which describe conditions during the march from Tabriz to Baghdad through İraq-i 'Acem: (1) 14 Rebî'ül-âhîr, "gice ile bir meretebe soğuk oldu ki vâsî olunmaz;" (2) 19 Rebî'ül-âhîr, "beglik davanı için şahınnan yem cem' olmak için oturağ olundu;" (3) Cemâziyül-evvel, "Nişancı Seyyidî Beg zahîre zahmetiaden fevt oldu. Erzurûmdan bu konağa gelince ağaç cinsinden aşlâ nesne bulunmayup, bu konağ meşe ve sağız ağacı vâfir idi ... Bu konağda aşlâ zahîre bulmağa dermân olmadı;" (4) 9 Cemâziyül-evvel, "Kaş-ı Şîrin havâlisinde ayrığ şenlik yokdur. Eîrâfı yâbisdür. Kat'an otu yokdur;" (5) 10 Cemâziyül-evvel, "Dünyâver konağundan bu menzile gelince aşlâ şenlik yokdur. ... konağda aşlâ ot yokdur... Anda dahı belâlar çekildi ki 'asker başına bir târîhde ma'lûm degildür ki gelmiş ola. Ne görülmüş, ve ne de işidilmişdür."

¹⁹Luţfî Paşa, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i 'Osmân* (Istanbul, 1341 AH), pp. 438-451.

governors and not the main corps of the standing army. Luţfî Pasha describes such combat as "dog fights" (*köpek savaşı*).²⁰ The tactical retreat employed by the defensive forces tended to prolong the campaign, which ultimately compelled the offensive forces into a forced retreat due to scarcity of provisions. That this is precisely what occurred during the 1548-1549 campaign is made clear in Luţfî Pasha's account.²¹

Ṭahmâşb's "scorched earth" tactic of burning whatever crops or forage lay in the attackers' way greatly exacerbated the effect of environmentally-caused shortages, but even without this the supply situation for the Ottoman armies operating in eastern Anatolia was far from easy. The problem of grazing the herds was perhaps the gravest among a number of problems of supply faced during operations in the sparsely vegetated, arid and remote terrain of eastern and southeastern Anatolia. The immobilization of the Ottoman army and its missing of many opportunities to strike back against the tantalizingly close forces of the *kızılbâş* during the late summer of 1548, for instance, is attributed by Luţfî Pasha to the forced retreat of large numbers of mounted forces to the pasture lands of Hoşova in the region of Diyarbakır.²² Under conditions such as those described above, war in the east may be said to have been waged as much against people as against set fortified or strategic positions. Burning of crops crippled the advance of the attacking armies but it also created major difficulties for civilian population who had to inhabit the territory after their retreat.

Thus sensitivity about the permissibility of attacks against Muslim adversaries, worries about logistics, and concern over the impact of guerrilla warfare on the civilian population all contributed to Ottoman hesitation about ordering mobilization for eastern campaigns. We can therefore view the outbreak of war in the east (in particular Süleymân's second and third Iranian offensives) as acts of last resort in retaliation for ongoing harassment, rather than as unprovoked aggression for the sole purpose of extending Ottoman territorial control.

One major cause of dispute which had already been removed by Süleymân early in his reign was the trade embargo which his predecessor Selîm I (r. 1512-

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 451.

²¹*Ibid.*, pp. 438-440. In describing this campaign, Luţfî Pasha speaks repeatedly of the natural disasters (*âfet-i semâvî*) which befell the Ottoman army.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 440: Hoşova'da leşker azıqlanup, amûâ atlara dermân idemediler. Nâ-çâr atsızlıkdân ötürü Diyarbekir'e... girdiler, tâ ki leşkeri atlanduralar." During this campaign, apparently even the luxuriant pastures of the Bingöl region (see Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyâhatnâme*, [10 vols., Istanbul, 1896-1938, (III, p. 234)] proved insufficient to meet the large scale demand of the army forces concentrated along the eastern Anatolian frontiers.

1520) had imposed against Iran and Iranian merchants.²³ While many issues remained to be settled before the two sides were ready to reach an agreement at Amasya in 1555, Süleymân's reign represents, even from its beginnings, a softening of the Ottoman position on relations with its eastern neighbors. While Selîm had pursued an all-out war against Iran with all means available to him—trade war, military confrontation, and psychological warfare—, Süleymân seems to have been more interested in healing than in widening the rifts opened by his father's policies. While not averse to seizing the opportunity offered by the internal confusion present in his rival's country during the so-called "kızılbaş interregnum" from 1524 to 1533 or even 1537,²⁴ Süleymân actually pursued a cautious policy aimed more at containment than conquest and anxious to avoid disruption of trade. The last thing Süleymân wanted to see was the erection of a Berlin wall between Sunni Anatolia and the *kızılbaş* in neighboring Safavid Azerbaijan, or the embroilment of Muslim states in a mutually destructive war in the Persian Gulf which would hasten the triumph of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean.

In contrast to his father's militant and exclusionist Sunnism aimed at permanently driving the heterodox Iranians from the Muslim fold, Süleymân gambled on the acceptability of an Ottoman-sponsored Sunni universalism like the one accomplished by his Oğuz progenitors who had founded the Great Seljukid empire in eleventh-century Iran. His dream of Islamic unity was in fact mostly realized, and the next phase of direct Ottoman-Safavid confrontation over control of the Caucasus was postponed until the late 1580s. Selîm's unrealistic and hardline view that the only proper resolution to the Ottomans' dispute with Iran would come with an Armageddon-style showdown between the forces of "good" and "evil" was discarded in favor of a more latitudinarian approach. The danger which would come from fostering splits in the Muslim camp must have been apparent to Süleymân, whose European policy had benefitted so decisively from the existence of just such an unbridgeable gap between the Catholic and Protestant powers. With the addition of Baghdad in 1535 to Cairo (captured by Selîm in 1517), the Ottomans controlled both former centers of the Islamic caliphate, but one of Süleymân's first acts after returning from the east in December of 1535 was to sign a treaty with the Christian ruler of France, François I, in February of 1536. The message conveyed by this symbolic agreement was that Ottoman leadership in the Islamic world was to be guided as much by worldly pragmatism as by ideological purity.

²³See J.L. Bacqué-Grammont, "Notes sur le blocus du commerce iranien par Selim I." *Turcica*, 6 (1979), pp. 68-88.

²⁴According to R. Savory, "Safavid Persia," *Cambridge History of Islam* (Cambridge, Engl., 1970), vol. 1, pp. 403-404, the interregnum lasted until 1534. H. Roemer, "The Safavid Period," *Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 6, pp. 239-240, prefers the later date.

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION AND ITS
INFLUENCE ON SÜLEYMAN'S EASTERN POLICY

Apart from the most visible forms of diplomacy and treaties, a continuous process of lower-level negotiation was being carried on — especially during periods which saw the outbreak of war — on both an official and an unofficial basis. Groundwork for the defection or rebellion of a major figure in the enemy camp — a member of the royal family or an important provincial governor — actively engaged both sides in a conflict. The agents of this kind of diplomacy were not necessarily ambassadors or even statesmen. It seems clear from evidence examined by Hans Roemer,²⁵ for instance, that while the plotting to destabilize the situation along the eastern frontiers of Iran was encouraged and perhaps even instigated by both the Uzbek khan 'Ubayd and by Süleymân, the rebellion of the Shah's brother Sâm Mîrzâ in 1534 which cleared the way for 'Ubayd's forces to capture Herat in 1535 should not be considered the outcome of any formal alliance but the independent achievement of a propaganda campaign executed and conceived at the tribal leadership level between 'Ubayd's Uzbek *amîrs* and their counterparts, the Türkmen *amîrs*, in the service of Shah Tahmâsb. All of both Safavid and Ottoman foreign policy cannot be covered in the survey treatment offered here which instead centers on the policymaking concerns of the "Great" powers or empires, and those which guided the "Lesser" powers or small states.

THE FOUR "GREAT" MUSLIM POWERS OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

There is little evidence for the early and middle parts of the sixteenth century that any of the three major Sunni powers, the Uzbeks, the Mughals, and the Ottomans, was driven by an evangelical spirit. There are a number of reasons why a grand Sunni Triple Alliance failed to materialize at this time, most importantly the internal weakness of the Mughal state in India and its uncertain dynastic history during the reigns of the first two emperors, Bâbur (r. 1526-1530) and Hümâyûn (r. 1530-1540) and, following the fifteen-year Suri interregnum, 1555-1556). The critical period of the Ottoman-Safavid battle for control over western Iran corresponded exactly with Hümâyûn's overthrow and exile. During a part of his exile Hümâyûn, while not espousing Tahmâsb's hardline Shî'î views (except perhaps outwardly through the practice of *taqiyye* or dissimulation), did nonetheless act in close cooperation with Tahmâsb. The period of closest cooperation seems to have been the years 1544-1546, but Mughal neutrality throughout most of the 1540s and 1550s in the Ottoman-Safavid and the Uzbek-Safavid conflicts along Iran's northwestern and eastern borders helped secure the

²⁵Roemer, "Safavid Persia," p. 238.

continuance of Shî'î Iran as one of the four great centers of power in the sixteenth-century Islamic world.

Concurrent with the collapse of Mughal authority in northern India, the Ottomans were pursuing their alliance with the Gujarati sultanate of India's western coast which was important for the Ottomans' naval and commercial empire in the east. Süleymân maintained close ties with the Gujarati sultanate, especially in the period after 1538, by which time the Ottomans had secured a foothold on the Persian Gulf at Basra.²⁶ It was only after the Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 1556-1605) had settled the internal affairs of his own country and, perhaps more significantly, succeeded in annexing Gujarat in 1573, that Ottoman-Mughal relations become very cordial. The convergence of interests which led to the formation of the Sunnî Triple Alliance was to take place only during the reign of Süleymân's grandson Sultan Murâd III (r. 1574-1595).²⁷

The Shaibanid Uzbek khans of Transoxania, representing the other major Muslim power of the sixteenth century, were plagued by similar if less severe internal problems. Martin Dickson's work on the khanate of 'Ubayd²⁸ reveals an empire which had reached a precarious stage in its dynastic history. The Uzbeks' relationship with the Ottomans under 'Ubayd (r. 1533-1539) and his immediate successors may be characterized as generally cordial, but inconsistent. Despite the diplomatic blitz being conducted by the Ottomans, an effort which can be well documented from Ferîdûn's collection of sultanic correspondence, there was a relatively low success rate in coordinating joint military manoeuvres. It is emblematic of their relationship during the early and middle decades of the sixteenth century that the 300 cannoniers and Janissaries sent to the Shaibanids by Süleymân during 1553 (960 A.H.) as part of his preparations for a campaign against ʿĀhmâsb arrived in Bukhara in the midst of a succession struggle and in

²⁶For details of this relationship, see N. Magrebi, "Ottoman-Gujarat Relations 1517-1566," in P.M. Joshi and M.A. Nayeem, eds., *Studies in the Foreign Relations of India: Professor H.K. Sherwani Felicitation Volume* (Hyderabad, 1975), pp. 184-193 [hereafter, *Sherwani Volume*].

²⁷The period of the 1580s which witnessed the unfolding of an "anti-Iranian" alliance between the three Turkic emperors 'Abdullâh Khân Uzbek (r. 1583-1598), the Ottoman Sultan Murâd III (r. 1574-1595), and the Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 1556-1605) is dealt with in an article by J.N. Sarkar, "Asian Balance of Power in the Light of Mughal-Persian Rivalry in the 16th and 17th Centuries," *Sherwani Volume*, pp. 195-216, esp. pp. 207-208. In the final realization of the anti-Iranian "Sunnî Crusade" political considerations played as great a role as the common religious conviction of the allies. There was also considerable jealousy between the allies, and Akbar was reluctant to acknowledge the Ottoman sultan's preeminence as *ḥalîfe-i râ-i zemîn*. See *Sherwani Volume*, p. 205, note 18. H. Inalcık ("The Ottomans and the Caliphate," *Cambridge History of Islam*, 1, pp. 320-323) also refers to this jealousy which, by the beginning of the 18th century, led the Mughals to adopt the idea of two separate but equal *imāms*, one for the western and the other for the eastern part of the Islamic world.

²⁸M. Dickson, "Shâh ʿĀhmâsb and the ʾUzbeks: The Duel for Khurâsân with 'Ubayd Khân: 930-946/1524-1540," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1958.

any case too late to be of any use in assisting the Ottoman attack against Nahcivan (Nakhjivân) in mid-summer 1554 (961 A.H.).²⁹

After Süleymân's death, succeeding Ottoman sultans were to gain recognition as "Caliph of the Muslims of the North," but in this case the context was not an anti-Safavid crusade; it rather reflects efforts to stem the tide of the Muscovite advance towards the Black Sea and the Caspian which had been underway for some time under the confident command of Czar Ivan IV (r. 1553-1584).³⁰ However, even this later rapprochement which resulted in the formation of grand alliances and put at the Ottomans' disposal tens of thousands of Nogay and Uzbek *aķıncı* raiders should not, as in the case of the Ottoman-Mughal alliance,³¹ be regarded as an unqualified love feast. Barely suppressed jealousies and rivalries inherent to these alliances affected Ottoman relations with their Crimean and Central Asian allies and supporters. Mostly acknowledging Ottoman superiority and their own subservient position, the Central Asian powers agreed to supply large numbers of auxiliary mounted forces to bolster the pride of the Ottomans' own army, the well-equipped and technically-proficient Janissaries and *topçus*. Notwithstanding, an awareness in the case of the Crimean khans of the Ghengizid genealogy and in the case of the Uzbeks of their direct succession from the world-conquering Timur was an ever-present source of friction. Aside from genealogy, differences in military technique and style of warfare also created an additional source of disputes. The steppe warriors, being of the old school, believed in the validity of the bard's maxim "*iufeng boldu, mertlik öldü*" (rifles came into existence, manliness disappeared), while the Janissaries and Ottoman arquebusiers were proud of their military prowess and strong defenders of their own quite different codes of honor and regimental loyalty.

THE ROLE OF THE "LESSER" MUSLIM POWERS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS DURING THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY: SMALL STATE SURVIVAL TECHNIQUES

The small independent and semi independent Muslim dynasties located at the fringes of the Iranian world included Gîlân and Shîrvân in the Caspian region, and Hormuz, geographically a part of Iran, dominated by the Portuguese, but ruled by a semi independent dynasty of Muslim monarchs. The economic and political survival of these kingdoms was dependent on peaceful coexistence with

²⁹See H. İnalcık, "The Origins of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal," *Annales de l'Université d'Ankara*, 1 (1947), p. 50, note 14, and Kirzioğlu, *Kafkas-Elleri* p. 220, note 290.

³⁰From the Ottoman perspective (as İnalcık also notes in "Don-Volga," p. 69 and *passim*), the Russian advance threatened not only the free passage of Muslim pilgrims from Central Asia, but also had grave implications for the viability of Muslim commerce with the North.

³¹See note 27 above.

the great powers of their immediate vicinity; Muslim or Christian, members of the same sect or "heretics." As a general rule, fixed religious affiliations and fixed political alliances were luxuries which these smaller states could not afford. Their primary anxiety was to avoid absorption and annexation by neighboring great powers, and their relative isolation made trading and even military alliances necessary with sometimes the oddest of partners. The following cases may be considered illustrative of some more general patterns: the Gujarati sultan's appeal to the "infidel" Portuguese for help in forestalling the invasion of his country by the Mughal emperor Hümâyûn in 1535,³² and the cooperation in pursuit of mutual economic gain between the Muslim sultans of Hormuz and the Portuguese traders, at a time when they supposedly held opposite sides in a Christian versus Muslim crusade in the Indian Ocean.

This general pattern is described for us in the account of the Ottoman *defterdâr* Seyfî Çelebi. In portraying the kingdom of Tûrân Shah, Hormuz's ruler in the late sixteenth century, Seyfî Çelebi reports that the Portuguese believed that it was to their advantage to grant quarter to the Muslim population of Hormuz in accordance with the following logic:

"If no Muslim remained [on the island] Muslim traders would cease calling at the port. Moreover, as a consequence of the island's location in the proximity of Shiraz, the majority of the merchants engaged in trade there were Muslims. For that reason, the Portuguese undertook not to interfere with the Muslim population. Furthermore, the island population depended for its survival on the agricultural produce of the province of Shiraz. [For these reasons] the [Muslim] ruler of Hormuz and the infidels came to an understanding whereby they agreed that whatsoever revenues are derived from customs dues on trade or from any other source shall be divided in equal parts between us both, and it is under this agreement and understanding that they presently [i.e. circa 1580 A.D.] order their relations with one another."³³

The arrangement described here seems to have little or no connection with doctrinal hairsplitting, sovereignty disputes, or any other ideological concern, but evidences rather a relationship based entirely on mutual self-interest.

³²See *Sherwani Volume*, p. 188, note 28.

³³The text in Turkish (Seyfî Çelebi, *Tevârîh-i Pâdişâhân*, pp. 143-145) reads as follows: Frenkler dahı gümrük hâşrı için [aman vermeyi] kabûl itdiler. ...Anuñ [i.e. Hormuz adasının] hâşılı hemîn gümrükdür. Ve içinde Müslümân olmayacak, Müslümân bâzergânı varmaz. Şirâzuñ kenârıdır, eke erî Müslümân bâzergânı varur, anuñ için ol Müslümânları kırmayup, kabûl itdiler. Bir de buña [i.e. Hormuz'a] yiyeceği dahı Şirâz vilâyetlerinden gider. ...Ve Hormuz pâdişâhu ile Frenkler bile kayl-i 'ahd itdiler ki gümrükden ve gayrinden her ne hâşıl olursa, usfı bizüm ve usfı sizün diyü. Şimdi ol garf birbiriyle geçiniyorlar."

Gilân, a small kingdom stretching along the southern coast of the Caspian, jealously guarded its Shî'î confession and its political independence but was confronted with the choice between absorption by the Safavid Empire and alliance with a Sunnî ruler, the Ottoman Sultan Süleymân. The rulers of Gilân offered their close cooperation to the Ottomans, the Sunnî superpower of the day, based on a calculation of two benefits: maintenance of market ties with the west via the trans-Anatolian routes for their principal export product of silk, and ability to resist or at least delay annexation by their coreligionist but hated political adversaries, the rulers of the Safavid dynasty whose capital-to-be Qazvin (that is after 1555)³⁴ was located at a distance of only two days march. Despite his presumably firm Shî'î convictions³⁵ the ruler of Gilân, Melik Muzaffer, is commended in the most reliable Ottoman sources for the invaluable assistance he provided to the Ottoman forces covering on Azerbaijan in 1534. He is given credit for sending accurate military intelligence about the Shah's position and situation in a campaign in which the Safavids were simultaneously embroiled against the Uzbeks in Khorasan.³⁶ Thanks to their reliance on the Ottoman connection and token recognition of Ottoman suzerainty, the kingdom of Gilân was able to stave off the much more serious threat to its sovereignty posed by the Safavid empire. It was not until the year of the *hicri* millenium, 1592 A.D., that the kingdom was incorporated into the Safavid realm.³⁷

The situation in the kingdom of Shîrwân along the western shores of the Caspian was similar. While not exactly eager to run from the grasp of one expansionist empire into the arms of another, the short-term political interests of the Shîrwân-shâhid dynasty in the mid-sixteenth century seemed best served by alliance with the Ottomans. The background of the persistent Safavid effort aimed at annexation of Shîrwân may be traced back to the days of the first Safavid ruler Isma'îl who by marriage diplomacy³⁸ and other means had tried to

³⁴The capital of the Safavid state was shifted twice during the course of the later sixteenth century, once in 1555 from Tabriz to Qazvin and again in 1597 from Qazvin to Isfahan. See Roemer, "The Safavid Period," p. 228 and *ET*, 4, p. 103.

³⁵Seyfi Çelebi, *Tevârîh-i Pâdişâhân*, p. 139: "bu Gîlânîüñ ve Mâzenderân halkınıñ mezhebi râfîzîdür."

³⁶The fact of Muzaffer Shah's cooperation is confirmed in a number of sources. See in particular, T. Gökbilgin, "Arz ve Rapor," pp. 472-473 and Celâlzâde, *Tabakât*, f. 252b. The latter source speaks of Muzaffer Shah's arrival in the Ottoman camp with 10,000 troops. The number is certainly an exaggeration, but as an indication of the level of cooperation it is not altogether out of place.

³⁷See *ET*, 2, pp. 1111-1112. Gilân did not accept its subservient status willingly, and on at least one occasion following its annexation attempted to reassert its independence. The rebellion of Ğarîb Shah after the death of Shah Abbâs I in 1629 is attested in a letter written by a certain Fra Dinós. See *Chronicle of the Cannelites in Persia*, 2 vols. (London, 1939), vol. 1, p. 307.

³⁸As evidence of the seriousness of Isma'îl's efforts one might cite the Ottoman historian İlayrullâh Efendi (d. 1866) who mentions, in *Hayrullâh Efendi Târîhi* (Istanbul, 1292 AH), vol. 11, p. 9, Shah Isma'îl's offer of one of his daughters in marriage to the Shîrwân-shâhid ruler Muzaffer Shah's son Shaykh Shah in 1521 (927 AH).

consolidate his control over the Shîrvân-shâhîds' territory. The rulers in Shîrvân resisted these encroachments on their sovereignty and, after the forced exile of the Shîrvân-shâhid ruler Burhân 'Alî beginning in 1540, tried to reclaim their patrimony through alliance with the Ottomans.

A short history of this dynasty's relationship with the Ottomans during the period of Süleymân's three eastern campaigns reveals an Ottoman policy which, outwardly at least, highlighted the Ottomans' role as guarantors and protectors of the sovereignty of Muslim rulers through an aggressive pursuit of their battle on many fronts against both *kâfirs* (i.e., the Christians of Georgia) and *mülhîds* (i.e., the *kızılbaş*). Shah Tahmâsb had used the latter both as shock troops for his invasion of Shîrvân in 1539 and as a force of occupation following the execution of the Shîrvân-shâhid ruler Shâh Rukh. In the short run, thanks to Ottoman military assistance Burhân 'Alî, the exiled heir to the Shîrvânîd throne, was able to reclaim independent rule over his country for a brief period in the years 1549-1550. However, upon Burhân 'Alî's death in 1551, the territory was immediately reoccupied by Tahmâsb and remained in Safavid hands until the resumption of the Ottoman-Safavid battle for Caucasia in 1578.³⁹

It would be unrealistic to assume that, despite their public protestations to the contrary, the Ottomans offered their assistance to or had traffic *only* with Muslim potentates whose kingdoms had been threatened by Shah Tahmâsb's Caucasian initiatives. The Ottomans also sought to enlist the support of Christian princes and exiled nobility of the *aznavur*⁴⁰ class whose military skills

³⁹At this time, while the Ottomans again assisted the exiled heir to the Shîrvân-shâhid throne Ebû Bekr Mîrzâ to reestablish himself in his homeland, he was not reinstated as independent ruler, but as Ottoman *beylerbeyi*. See *Hayrullâh Efendi Târîhi*, 13, p. 10. The Ottoman *beylerbeylik* of Shîrvân, although it survived only a quarter century from 1578-1604, functioned for a period as a vital corridor for Ottoman communication with its Central Asian allies. Ottoman-Uzbek relations were at their closest during the reign of 'Abdullâh Khan II (r. 1583-1598) and his immediate successors. See Halil Edhem, *Düvel-i Islâmîyye* (Istanbul, 1345 AH), pp. 431-432. See also the text of a letter addressed to "Abdül-bâkî Khân which is included in the Ferîdân collection (*Münşe'ât*, 2, pp. 73-74) with the correspondence of the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed III (r. 1595-1603). This indicates that the letter was actually sent to Bâkî Mehmed, Khan of Astrakhan between 1599-1605 (1007-1014 A.H.). See Edhem, *Düvel*, p. 433, note 1. The following passage demonstrates how Shîrvân acted as a bridge for transfers of men, material, and information between Ottoman domains and the khanates of Central Asia (*Münşe'ât*, 2, p. 74): "*Merhûm 'Abdullâh Khân'a [i.e., Abdullâh Khan II, r. 1583-1598] top ve tüfeng ile müsâ'ede ve ri'âyet-i merâsim-i mu'âhede olunmağa zamân-i sa'âdet-iiktirânımızda [i.e., Mehmed III zamânında] bir kaç 'aded top ve tüfeng irsâli murâd-i su'âdâtız olduğunı... mümkün olduğu müddet top-i düşmen-küb ve tüfeng-i şâ'ika-âhenk virilmek bâbında Şîrvân Beylerbegisine emr-i hümayûnumuz şâdir olmuştur. Anuñ gibi top ve tüfengin lâzım olduğda mûmâ'ileyhe [i.e., Şîrvan Beylerbegisine] haber gönderesiz ki işâlinde isti'câl eyleye.*"

The success of Ottoman-Uzbek diplomacy in the late sixteenth century may be explained by the role as intermediary played by the Ottoman *beylerbeylik* of Shîrvân. This link transformed always friendly ties into an uncharacteristically effective alliance.

⁴⁰During the fall of 1552 (959 A.H.) when the bulk of the Ottoman army was in Hungary engaged in the siege of Eger (Egri) Ottoman border forces under the command of the *beylerbeyi* of

had been sharpened by a centuries-long tradition of service to the various states which had held sway in the region since the first penetration of the Bâb al-Abwâb by the Muslim armies under the Caliph 'Umar ibn al-Khaţţâb.⁴¹ Süleymân was not to be outdone in the building of Christian alliances by his rival Tahmâsb, who had lavished attention on the creation of a reliable Georgian alliance especially during the period 1548-1553 which coincided with the second of Süleymân's three eastern campaigns and the vigorously pursued Safavid counter-offensive of 1551-1552. During the third Ottoman offensive usually called the Nakhjivan campaign of 1554-1555, Süleymân pursued a comparable strategy by promise of rewards including the offer of *ûmâr* assignments to Georgian Christian knights willing to fight and others willing to spy or otherwise cooperate with the Ottoman war effort. This seldom mentioned fact is well attested in reliable Ottoman sources.⁴²

Different as the philosophical perspectives of the two rival powers in the Caucasus and the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf may have been, the barriers which separated them were less insurmountable than that which separated all the lesser powers as a group from the greater powers. Diplomatic opportunism and political pragmatism were the universal international standard of the day. Preoccupation with doctrinal matters in the rather bombastic literary style of sixteenth-century diplomatic correspondence may well have been mostly confined to the pro forma rituals which signalled the initiation and conclusion of military campaigning. It would be a mistake to assume that these statements actually governed state actions or placed any constraint on the rulers exercise of those options which they perceived to be the most advantageous to their subjects' welfare.

THE INTERNAL DIMENSION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE FORMULATION OF SÜLEYMÂN'S EASTERN POLICY

In the first half century of Ottoman-Safavid relations military confrontation occurred only on a very intermittent basis. The interval between the Çaldıran campaign of 1514 and the Baghdad campaign of 1534 was fully two decades, and Süleymân's second Iranian campaign in 1548 followed the conclusion of the first only after twelve years. During these intervals, a great deal of activity and informal diplomacy was being conducted, as each side vied to win

faced an onslaught by a large Safavid force. See Luţfî Paşa's description of the composition of this force in the *Tevârîh-i Âl-i 'Osmân*, p. 450: Kızılbaşdan dört beş sultân gelüp, ve Gürcülerden nice Aznavur begleriyle hayli leşker cem' olup ...".

⁴¹See D.M. Dunlop, "Bâb al-Abwâb," *El2*, s.v.

⁴²See, for example, Kirzioğlu, *Kafkas-Elteri*, p. 223, note 326, and *passim*. Kirzioğlu draws heavily on the *Mühimme* series and contemporary correspondence preserved in the various *münşe'ât* collections as his evidentiary base.

the loyalty of the predominantly tribal populations along their mutual frontiers. Because of their itinerant habits, these tribal groups could submit to the overlordship of either state and their strategic situation made their cooperation a valuable asset to both. The stakes in the competition for the loyalty of the tribes were high, but activity aimed at securing the defection of high-ranking officials, in particular blood relations of the head of the ruling dynasty, had greater psychological value. Apart from their military use as auxiliary forces, the presence of dignitaries, VIPs, expatriates, hostages and defectors in the Ottoman camp added lustre to the sultan's reputation as a great monarch to whom all the world appealed for refuge and asylum. Occasionally, as in the case of the Shah's brother Elkâş Mirzâ who defected to the Ottomans, served in one campaign, and then redefected to the Safavids, these figures proved unreliable as military allies, but the propaganda value which both sides attached to the services of such traitors, opportunists, and mercenaries far outweighed the risks involved in their employment. I will limit my remarks here to the first group — the tribes — and leave aside consideration of the exiles and defectors, whose situation may be considered exceptional, for another occasion.

The territory over whose control the Ottomans and Safavids contended between 1514-1555 was called the "Two Iraqs," i.e., Iraq proper and Iraq-i 'Acem. The conflict coincided with an early expansionary phase in the development of each state. Tahmâsb was only second in succession to a newly-founded dynasty, and the Ottomans too were relative newcomers to the region. While both Erzurum (1515) and Diyarbakır (1516) had been annexed as Ottoman provinces shortly after Çaldıran, Zülkadriyye (1522) and Baghdad (1535) were added only in the early part of Süleymân's reign. Şehrîzor's joining the union had to await the outcome of the conflict with the Safavids in the two Iraqs which did not reach its culmination until 1552 at the conclusion of Shah Tahmâsb's counter offensive. The consolidation of Ottoman administration east of the Euphrates thus proceeded in piecemeal fashion over the first three decades of Süleymân's reign between 1522 and 1552. Because the outcome of the Ottomans' conflict with the Safavids still hung in the balance until the Treaty of Amasya in May 1555, the battle for control over the two Iraqs had also to be fought as a war of words and escalating offers of rewards and incentives. The Ottomans, who had developed techniques for winning the support of the local tribal and military leadership as a result of their experience in the fourteenth-century conquest of the Balkans,⁴³ were well aware of the fact that their ultimate success depended on far more than arms.

Of the two formulators of Süleymân's eastern policy, his two *alter egos*, first İbrâhîm Pasha and then Rüstem Pasha (both of whom had been invested with boundless authority as the sultan's *vezîr-i muflak*), İbrâhîm Pasha seems to

⁴³See İnalcık, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest," *Studia Islamica*, 2 (1954), pp. 103-129.

have been the more informed and skilled promoter of Ottoman interests, especially in cajoling the tribal emirs of the frontier and creating conditions favorable to Ottoman annexation. A few details (drawn in large part from Celâlzâde's history but also from the history of Luţfî Pasha and the reports and correspondence of İbrâhîm Pasha himself) may help to illustrate this facet of Ottoman strategy known in formal terms as the *istimâlet* policy. This consisted of measures aimed at attracting allies and enlisting supporters of the Ottoman cause among independent and semi-independent populations on either side of the line of demarcation dividing Ottoman territories in the *Dârü'l-İslâm* from the lands of indeterminate status not explicitly labelled "*Dârü'l-küfr*" but hardly considered as qualitatively different from such an imaginary land.

İBRAHİM PASHA'S CONCEPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF OTTOMAN İSTİMALET POLICY

İbrâhîm Pasha's tribal policy had its inception during the widespread unrest in central Anatolia during 1527, a generalized phenomenon which is usually referred to as the *Çalender* revolt. Rather than seeking a purely military solution to these disturbances and realizing that they had a strong social and economic as well as political basis, İbrâhîm decided to confront the problem by *istimâlet*. He was aware that the involvement in these uprisings of clans such as the Bişanlı who belonged to the *Zülkadırlu* confederation could be explained by the resentment they felt as a consequence of the sultan's order for the execution of one of their former leaders, Şehsuvâroğlı 'Alî Beg, and the subsequent Ottoman annexation of the *Zülkadırid* principality in 1522.⁴⁴ Instead of further punishment İbrâhîm recommended leniency towards the displaced tribesmen, and disbursement of benefactions (*in 'âmât*) and *tûmâr* assignments to secure their future cooperation.⁴⁵ As a general practice Ottoman military campaigns were begun with the offer of incentives and concluded with the divying up of rewards, appointments and promotions, but İbrâhîm had developed these techniques to a fine point.

For instance, after the defection of Şeref (Sharaf) Khan, the hereditary ruler of Bitlis, to the Shah in 1532 İbrâhîm refused to bow to pressure exerted by another Safavid defector, Ūlâmâ who had been the Shah's governor in Azerbaijan and who was waiting in expectation of an appointment of similar rank in Ottoman service. Instead İbrâhîm, carefully sensitive to tribal feelings, insisted

⁴⁴F. Siltner, *Safavi Devletinin Kuruluş ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü* (Ankara, 1976), p. 75 ff.

⁴⁵Celâlzâde, *Tabakât*, I. 167b: 'cümle *Zülkadırluya* kadîmî iktâ' ve *tûmârları* cümle dirlikleri muşkarret olsun. nevâ'ir-i fitnenüâ intifâsına sa'y-i mevâfır idûâ' diyü boy beglerini gönlerüp...

that the vacant office be settled on Şeref Khan's son Şemseddin.⁴⁶ But the efficacy of İbrâhîm's policies aimed at securing pro-Ottoman alignments (a translation of *istimâlet* itself whose root meaning is "to lean" or "incline in the direction of") among the tribes was most fully demonstrated during the course of the first campaign of the two Iraqs in 1534-1535. From his winter base at Aleppo in 1534 İbrâhîm pursued a vigorous diplomacy which resulted in the securing of the services of a number of frontier tribes. These groups functioned both as scouts (*kulavuz*) and travelling larderers for the Ottoman armies preparing to advance into unfamiliar and remote regions of Azerbaijan.⁴⁷

Enhancing the attractiveness of affiliation with the Ottoman regime formed another dimension of the *istimâlet* policy. This was accomplished in part by spelling out the terms of association with the Ottoman state in the imperial land survey which followed all Ottoman conquests: It may be assumed that İbrâhîm Pasha, even though he was not present in Baghdad following its capture in December of 1534, took a close interest in this aspect of his administrative duties. Number 1028 in the Imperial Surveys series shows the Ottomans' concern to be recognized as more just rulers than their Safavid predecessors. For example, while the Safavid governors had collected a tax called the [*chehâr-mâhe*] (i.e., the "tax of the four seasons") which had taken more than 17 percent of the harvest,⁴⁸ the Ottomans ended such abusive or extra-legal practices (*bid'at*) introduced by preceding regimes, an act which gave Ottoman lawmakers special pride.⁴⁹ In undertaking to establish their rule in Iraq the Ottomans were conscious of the responsibility which their claim to rule entailed.⁵⁰

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, f. 244b. Şemseddin's appointment was confirmed on 4 November 1533 (16 Rebî'ül-âhir 940).

⁴⁷On the surrender of keys to major fortresses along the frontier to İbrâhîm Pasha on the eve of the first campaign of the Two Iraqs. See Celâlzâde, *Tabakât*, ff. 247a-248b: "ser 'asker-i şâhib-ı ray ... ol hisârün eyâdi-i eşrârdan istihlâş husûşlarında hâdden efzûn bi-nihâye vâfir altun harc ve şarf idiler. Zamân-ı kalîde hüsn-i tedbîr ile cümlesini musahhar [...]"

⁴⁸Istanbul, Başbakanlık Arşivi, *Tapu ve Tahrir Defterleri* No. 1028, p. 11. The *chehâr-mâhe* due was calculated as follows: agricultural land divided into *tûmân* units capable of producing a yield of 2000 akçes was assessed a fixed payment of 216 akçes, 108 akçes as the cash equivalent of the peasant's annual obligation to provide 120 *batmans* of barley, and 30.5 akçes as the tithe (*deh yek*) payment, for a total of 354.5 akçes, or 17.7 percent.

⁴⁹In addition to eliminating "innovations," Ottoman sultans competed with former rulers of a conquered province in performing acts of royal largesse. Another paragraph in *Tapu Defteri* No. 1028 mentions the sultan's revival of the traditional tax-exemption for date palms in Baghdad, Hilleh, and the west bank of the Tigris. Trees in these localities constituted 28,885 of the province's total of 305,253 trees, or approximately 10 percent, and their tax-exempt status dated from at least the time of Karakoyunlu rule in Baghdad in the fifteenth century. The register refers to a *la'netnâme* issued by Pîr Budağ and directed at anyone who refused to honor the tradition. Pîr Budağ ruled the city jointly with his father Kara Yûsuf between 1407-1414. See Edhem, *Düvel-i Islâmiyye*, pp. 404-406.

⁵⁰See R. Murphey, "The Ottoman Centuries in Iraq: Legacy or Aftermath?", *Journal of Turkish Studies*, 10 (1986), pp. 17-29.

In contrast to his predecessor İbrâhîm, Rüstem's tenure as vizier is marked by controversy. Powerful men stimulate both sycophantic praise and bitter recrimination, but guided by the adage "where there is smoke there must be fire" we may assume that the persistent pattern of complaints about Rüstem is an indication that all was not well. We are fortunate to have two contemporary sources on Rüstem Pasha's role as policymaker, the texts of denunciations (*işbârname*) against him published by Tayyib Gökbilgin, and the memoirs of the Kurdish emir Me'mûn published by İsmet Parmaksızoğlu. The complaints voiced in these sources about Rüstem Pasha's cupidity and bribe-taking were still being echoed in reform tracts of the early seventeenth century, eighty years after the event.⁵¹ The allegations about misconduct during the Sultan's second Iranian campaign center around Rüstem Pasha's role in the Elkâş affair, which is treated in greatest detail in Me'mûn's memoirs.⁵² According to Me'mûn Beg's account of the events, matters reached a head after the return of Elkâş from his booty-raiding foray (*çapul*) deep into Safavid territory during the course of which he had raced through Hamadan, Dergezin, Kashan and Isfahan before turning back to his base in northern Iraq in the autumn of 1548.⁵³ Following this, disputes arose over the Sultan's intention to reward Elkâş for his military services and in recognition of the spoils which he presented to Süleymân, part of which consisted of objects highly valued by his adversary Shah Tahmâsb.⁵⁴

Unfounded rumours casting aspersions on Elkâş' loyalty are said by Me'mûn⁵⁵ to have been circulated by both the second vizier Şofu Melmed Pasha, and by Rüstem Pasha himself.⁵⁶ The upshot of this treatment was that Elkâş was forced to take flight, and eventually to redefect to the Shah. His own assessment sums up the situation nicely: "the viziers [through their actions] seek to force me into rebellion."⁵⁷ In addition to blaming Rüstem for Elkâş redefection to the Shah, Me'mûn Beg goes on to accuse Rüstem of personally

⁵¹In these sources Rüstem Pasha and his wife Mihrimâh Sultan are frequently mentioned as co-conspirators and initiators of Ottoman corruption (*irtisâ*). See in particular, Koçi Bey, *Risale* (Istanbul, 1939), p. 63 and passim, and R. Murphey, "The Veliyüddin Telhis," *Belleleten*, 43 (1979), pp. 563-564. While generally praising the reign of Süleymân for the excellence of its military and bureaucratic institutions, these authors express serious reservations about the viziers' boundless powers especially when they sensed that they were being exercised in pursuit of personal as opposed to communal gain.

⁵²Parmaksızoğlu, "Memun Beyin Hatıraları," p. 208 ff.

⁵³*Ibid.*, pp. 210-212; Luţfî Pasha, *Tevârîh*, p. 440 ff.

⁵⁴Luţfî Pasha (*Tevârîh*, p. 442) speaks of the capture of a tent commissioned by the first Safavid monarch Shah İsmâ'îl, said to have been one of Tahmâsb's most jealously guarded possessions. Me'mûn Bey (Parmaksızoğlu, "Hatıraları," p. 212) also mentions the rich spoils brought back from this foray: "nice kıtar deve yükü ile hediye ve tuhaf".

⁵⁵Parmaksızoğlu, "Memun Beyin Hatıraları," pp. 212-214.

⁵⁶Punning on the name of Elkâş' envoy to the Sultan called Aydoğmuş (*Ibid.*, p. 214), Me'mûn accuses the grand vizier of unwarranted brutality when ordering the envoy's detention and punishment: "çengele vurdurup anadan doğmana döndürüp..."

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p. 215: "vezirler güçle beni 'âşî itmek isterler."

profiting from his manipulation of royal favor, particularly in the assignment of provincial governorships. After the eastern campaign of 1548-1549, Me'mûn's father Bige had been appointed as Sancâkbegi of Kirkuk with a stipend fief worth 300,000 *ağçes* in recognition for his services during the campaign. Both he and Me'mûn, who had been offered the governorship of the soon-to-be-created province of Şehrîzor,⁵⁸ were later supplanted, allegedly as the result of Rüstem's conspiring with Hüseyn Beg, the hereditary ruler (*hâkim*) of İmadiye ('Amâdiya), a small principality located northeast of Mosul. Me'mûn openly accuses Rüstem of accepting bribes from Hüseyn Beg in return for his support for Hüseyn Beg's bid for preeminence over the other tribal chieftains of northern Iraq.⁵⁹ Ultimately, Me'mûn Beg himself was placated, or perhaps more exactly silenced, by Rüstem's offer of a palace appointment as *müteferrika* with a daily salary of 100 *ağçes*,⁶⁰ but the disruption caused to regular administration in those provinces was not so easily set right. A comparison of Süleymân's two main policy chiefs responsible for conducting war and diplomacy in the east leaves little doubt that Rüstem lacked both İbrâhîm's perspicacity and his consistency.

CONCLUSION

Süleymân was faced with two alternatives early in his reign. His state's resources in the aftermath of the victory at Mohacs in 1526 were sufficient either for a vigorous pursuit of the war in the Mediterranean and in Hungary, or for a fully elaborated eastern policy, but not for both. The Sultan by his march on Bosnia in 1527 and on Buda and Vienna in 1529 had clearly signalled his intentions, and the course was not abandoned at any time during the remainder of his long reign. The Ottoman war effort during the decade following the Treaty of Amasya was to be devoted unreservedly to the European theater, and it seems that the aim of Süleymân's eastern policy, even during its most active phases, was limited. It does not appear that the conquest of Iran was ever seriously intended during the sixteenth century, a period when on other fronts the Ottomans came closer than ever before to realizing their ambition for world rule. The consequences of continued confrontation between the Muslim powers were well understood by both Süleymân and Tahmâsb, as is shown in their mutual readiness to sign the Amasya Peace Treaty. Furthermore, just as the main Ottoman orientation after 1526 was shifted by Süleymân to the west, in the Safavid state there was a shift in the post-Çaldıran era away from Azerbaijan to

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 222, in the context of events which Me'mûn ascribes to the year 1551 (958 A.H.): "anı [i.e., Rüstem Paşayı] bu husûşda harîş itmişler, ve maksûd u murâdları üzre bir emr-i şerif almışlar."

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

the central Iranian highlands⁶¹ as well as a growing preoccupation with the Uzbek threat along its eastern frontier. Thus the territory over which the two states contended was in fact not the primary locus of concern for either state. Relations between the two empires in the period 1535-1555 were characterized by ambivalence on both sides. The Ottoman onslaught against Azerbaijan had forced the removal of the Safavid capital to Qazvin in 1555, but the Ottomans showed no intention of establishing a permanent presence or pressing for the annexation of Safavid Karabagh.⁶²

The main sources of the Ottomans' commercial and agricultural wealth lay in their western territories and the economic survival of the empire depended on control of the transportation nexus which linked Crimea and the Danubian lands with the capital and other population centers along the Marmara and Aegean littoral. Apart from strategic concerns, the government had a primary commitment to protect the economic viability and internal security of its western possessions. Just as in the east the *istimâlet* policy had been used to enlist the support of tribal proponents of the Ottoman cause, it served an equally critical function in the western lands helping to ensure durable acceptance of Ottoman rule, here not so much with tribal populations as with the mercantile and agricultural classes. In some areas, in particular the central Balkans, the predominant part of the population was neither Turkish nor Muslim. This presented a special challenge to Ottoman policy makers, who were compelled to abandon the old rhetoric of Muslim *cihâd* of the fourteenth and fifteenth-century conquest of the region. In the sober aftermath of battle these warlike attitudes were replaced with a less exclusionist basis for "citizenship" in the Ottoman polity. The development of an official policy of Ottoman latitudinarianism is the special achievement of Süleymân's reign. As an emerging world power the Ottomans were anxious to retain the affection of populations in their conquered territories and to attract new converts to the Ottoman way of life from among alienated or otherwise unattached groups, including religious nonconformists such as Calvinists from Hungary and displaced Jewish communities from all parts of Europe. Militant Shi'î ideology had served its purpose in Iran during the time of Shah Isma'îl (r. 1501-1524) by contributing to the unification of diverse ethnic and religious groups of Iran under a single banner born by the shah in his dual role as head of state and head of *tarîka*. The hardline Ottoman response to militant Shi'ism in Iran under Selîm I (r. 1512-1520) was perhaps equally appropriate under the special conditions and unusual threat to state security faced at that time. By the 1550s, though, these methods had been discredited and were replaced by different state creeds and diplomatic strategies better adapted to the

⁶¹Roemer, "The Safavid Period," p. 228.

⁶²Luîfî Paşa (*Tevârîh*, pp. 439 and 450) notes that in the 1540s the Ottoman frontier in eastern Anatolia extended between Pasin in the north and Erciş in the south. We may infer that points further east were considered disputed territory.

needs of the times. By the mid-sixteenth century the survival of the Ottoman state had come to depend on ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious ecumenism. The Safavids, while clearly not ready to abandon their own brand of religious particularism, were practical enough to realize the danger which all-out confrontation with Sunni orthodoxy defended by the military might of the Ottoman state would pose. On either side the fervor of religious conviction needed to be tempered by the demands of imperial administration, and neither could afford the folly of unbending devotion to ideals formulated, at least in part, for propaganda purposes.

THE IMAGE OF THE TURK IN EUROPEAN PERFORMING ARTS

Eve R. MEYER

One method of gaining an insight into the European image of the Turk in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is by examining the plots of the operas and theatrical entertainments that were popular at the time. Composers, along with philosophers, writers, and artists, were inspired by Orientalism, and for their operas, they frequently selected librettos based upon Oriental tales and the lives of Eastern emperors and sultans.

In most seventeenth-century productions, the Ottomans were presented as barbarians who were fierce in battle and who perpetrated unthinkable tortures; they were ruled by a murderous sultan who was dedicated to conquering Christian civilization — a man to be feared but also a man to be admired for his sexual prowess and martial skill. For audiences of that time, as well as for audiences of today, themes of sex and violence would have special appeal.

The most prominent of the Ottoman rulers to be the subject of opera plots was Süleymân the Magnificent. It was primarily the melodramatic events of his family life during the latter part of his reign and the manipulations of his wife, Roxelana, that inspired countless operatic settings in the Baroque era.¹ The librettos emphasized the human emotions of ambition, fear, and jealousy, and from the European viewpoint, Süleymân was regarded as the epitome of the cruel Turk when he ordered the death of his own son.

Although Süleymân and other Turkish sultans were presented as hostile enemies in the typical seventeenth-century production, there were a few exceptions, especially in countries that did not feel threatened by the Ottoman Empire. One example is a work written in 1656 that is generally believed to be

¹The first known European theatrical production about the sultan was a play, *Soliman*, by Prospero Bonarelli, 1619. Of the many operatic settings, two of the most successful were by Johann Hasse (*Solimano*, Dresden, 1753) and David Perez (*Solimano*, Lisbon, 1757).

the earliest English opera, *The Siege of Rhodes*;² in this work, Süleymân is portrayed as a benevolent ruler who spares the lives of his captives. Such a positive image may have been somewhat unusual in the mid-seventeenth century, but the European opinion of the Turks gradually improved after the final unsuccessful assault on Vienna in 1683 that marked the end of the Ottoman Empire's attempts to invade the West. As a result, Turkish sultans began to be presented a more charitable manner on the stage and in literature.

In addition to Süleymân, another popular figure in the Turkish operatic genre was Sultan Bâyezîd I, who was defeated by the great Tartar conqueror, Timur (Tamerlane), in the battle of Ankara in 1402. At least thirty-four composers created operas inspired by their conflict; the most famous of whom the composers was George Friderich Handel in 1724. One can easily understand why Europeans would glorify Timur, who provided a temporary block to the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, but in some of the librettos, it was Bâyezîd who was granted compassionate treatment. Handel's opera, for example, concentrates not on the battle and victory of Timur, but on Bâyezîd's captivity and the many humiliations that he and his family endured.

Although Handel and his librettist, Nicola Haym, chose to title the opera *Tamerlano*, they treated Bâyezîd as the noble hero. Bâyezîd is the dominant character in the opera, and he has the most memorable music. The high point and emotional climax of the entire work is his final scene in Act III when he sings his farewell and commits suicide by taking poison. Of course in an opera, a featured character never dies immediately, and this lengthy death scene has been described as one of the most powerful moments in all Baroque opera. His tragic action causes Tamerlano to have a complete change of heart: to become a generous and forgiving ruler and to free Bâyezîd's daughter, Asteria, and the man she loves, Andronico.³

One cannot glean much accurate information about Ottoman history by studying the librettos of operas on Turkish themes. In late Baroque opera, historic subjects, both Eastern and Western, were preferred, but the actual events were usually treated in a casual manner, with little concern for authenticity. Characters were freely inserted or omitted, and incidents were altered to suit the purposes of the drama. The historic events merely served as background for dramatic tales of love, jealousy, heroism, and passionate revenge.

²The libretto was by William Davenant; the music, which was written by several composers, has been lost. As was typical of the time, the siege provided merely a framework for a fictional romantic tale.

³See J. Merrill Knapp, "Handel's *Tamerlano*: The Creation of an Opera," *Musical Quarterly* 56 (July 1970) pp. 405-430, for a detailed discussion of the opera and its origins.

One major reason for the interest in Ottoman history was that it afforded so many opportunities for magnificent staging, with its elaborate scenic representations of the mosque and the seraglio court and gardens. In addition, exotic costumes could be worn. Male Turkish dress included the turban, sash, and long caftan, with a binding in rich material. Female costumes, however, tended to be less realistic, at least until the mid-eighteenth century; female performers normally appeared on stage in ornate versions of the latest European fashion, with only suggestions of foreign attire.⁴

Colorful staging and costuming led to the increasing popularity of Turkish themes in comic operas and ballets. By the second half of the eighteenth century, operas based on comic and romantic subject matter completely overshadowed those on more serious historic and heroic topics.⁵ Oriental tales, such as *Arabian Nights*, *Turkish Tales*, *Persian Tales*, and countless imitations, which pretended to be translations of Oriental manuscripts, were in great demand by the reading public. This world of magic, fantasy, and splendor provided colorful subject matter for the theater, along with the requisite spectacular stage effects. Interest in musical representations of Oriental fairy tales extended even into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Most of the eighteenth-century musical settings of these exotic fables were not operas in the strictest sense, if one defines an opera as a work with continuous music. These productions were most often done in the manner of our musical comedies, with spoken instead of sung dialogue. Vocal solos, ensemble numbers, and ballet would be featured elements.

The favorite theme of the comic or romantic Turkish theatrical genre was the harem. European audiences found the institution of the harem to be so fascinating and tantalizing that they never seemed to tire of seraglio plots. Variations on a few standard scenarios were set to music countless times. One basic plan centered around rivalry among the women in the harem for the love of the sultan. Among the best settings of this genre was *Soliman II ou Les trois sultanes*, a French opéra comique written by Charles-Simon Favart in 1761. The story concerns three European concubines who are rivals for the sultan's love: the Spanish Elmire, the Circassian Delia, and the French Roxelane. In the end, the witty Roxelane, who resists and even insults the sultan, triumphs and becomes sultana.

⁴Theodore Komisarjevsky, *The Costume of the Theatre* (New York, 1968), pp. 98-99.

⁵See Eve R. Meyer, "Turquerie and Eighteenth-Century Music," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 7 (Summer 1974), pp. 476-483, for a more detailed discussion of the Turk in comic operas. Also see W. Daniel Wilson, "Turks on the Eighteenth-Century Operatic Stage and European Political, Military, and Cultural History," *Eighteenth-Century Life* 2:9 (1985), pp. 79-92.

The opera was such a success that it was performed throughout the century and was also done on the stage as a play without music. It was soon translated into English and German, and in these languages, it was set to music by a number of composers.⁶ The good fortune of *Soliman II* led to many derivatives, in which the powerful sultan succumbs to the will of the European woman. In some versions she convinces him to release her from the harem, and in the more extreme versions, the sultan gives up his harem and converts to Christianity in order to marry her.

A seraglio comedy that was particularly favored for its pairing of exoticism with suspense was the rescue plot. The heroine is normally a European woman who was abducted either recently or as child. She is being held captive by the sultan and is in imminent danger of losing either her virtue or her life. A rescue attempt is made by her lover or a close relative, and in one humorous variant, the lover disguises himself as a female in order to penetrate the harem.

In some plots, the rescue is successful, but in the more complex situations, the rescue is foiled, and the hero and his accomplices are caught. In all versions, the various complications are unraveled by the end of the opera, and the sultan either is outwitted by the Europeans or demonstrates his magnanimity by releasing his captives.

The rescue-from-the-harem plot was so popular that it appeared in dramatic works on all levels of entertainment, from the crude improvised plays in the marketplace and village fair to theatrical and operatic productions throughout the major cities of Europe. The most artistic of the Turkish operas, and the only one from the eighteenth century that is still standard in the operatic repertoire, is Mozart's *Die Entführung aus dem Serail* (The Abduction from the Seraglio), written in Vienna in 1782. The basic plot offers nothing innovative, but Mozart's musical setting of the standard story is so humorous and imaginative that the work rises above the clichés of the harem-rescue theme, and the opera is considered one of the masterpieces of the late eighteenth century.

The story tells of a Spanish woman, Constanza, and her maid, Blonde, both of whom have been captured by pirates and are being held prisoners by the Turkish ruler, Pasha Selim. Constanza's lover, Belmonte, discovers her whereabouts through his former servant, Pedrillo, who has also been captured by the Turks and is serving as gardener for the Pasha. Belmonte tries to rescue them,

⁶Haydn is believed to have composed the incidental music when the play was performed at the Esterháza palace in 1777; he probably incorporated this music into his Symphony No. 63, which is subtitled "La Roxelane."

but of course he is caught, too. As expected, the opera ends happily, and all are finally released by the Pasha.

The conflicting European opinions of the Turk are revealed by an examination of the role of Pasha Selim.⁷ He is viewed first as the amorous Turk who is genuinely in love with Constanza and is reluctant to use force to overpower her. When she refuses his advances, he exhibits the characteristics of the cruel Turk, a tyrant whose orders must be obeyed under penalty of torture or death. Later, when Belmonte is captured, Selim recognizes that Belmonte is the son of his worst enemy, the man who stole all of his possessions and drove him into exile from his home in Spain. Selim relishes the pleasures of his intended vengeance. At the end of the opera, however, Pasha Selim shows still another side of his personality; he appears as a merciful and noble ruler when he reveals that he is above petty revenge. He frees the captives, and to show his generosity, he says in a message to Belmonte's father: "It gave me far greater pleasure to reward an injustice with justice than to keep on repaying evil with evil," and the opera ends with a hymn of praise to the pasha.

The image of the Turkish ruler as a man of high ethical standards, in this opera and other theatrical works, is a reflection of the humanistic ideals of the time and especially of the writings of Voltaire, who used pseudo-Oriental tales as vehicles for giving moral advice and for criticizing Western society, politics, and religion. In Voltaire's play *Zaire*, for example, Orosmane is presented as an enlightened monarch with Christian virtues. Orosmane is considered one of the most influential Grand Turks in Western literature, since he became a prototype for later versions of the generous Turk.⁸

Although the noble Turkish sultan or pasha was a common character in eighteenth-century theatrical productions, the villainous Turk did not entirely disappear. His part was usually as one of the ruler's underlings. In Mozart's *Abduction from the Seraglio*, he is Osmin, the overseer of the Pasha's country palace. In two letters to his father, Mozart vividly describes Osmin as "stupid, surly, [and] malicious,"⁹ a "rude churl" who "oversteps all the bounds of order, moderation, and propriety."¹⁰

⁷Prior to the start of the opera, the Pasha converted from Christianity to Islam. His role in the opera is most unusual because it is a speaking and not a singing part.

⁸Jack Rochford Vrooman, "Voltaire's Theatre: The Cycle from Oedipe to Merope," *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century*, vol. 75, ed. Theodore Besterman (Geneva, 1970), p. 86.

⁹Mozart to Leopold Mozart, 13 October 1781, *The Letters of Mozart and His Family*, vol. 2, 2nd ed., ed. and trans. Emily Anderson (London, 1966), no. 428, p. 772. Also see Thomas Bauman, W.A. Mozart: *Die Entführung aus dem Serail* (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 27-35, 62-71.

¹⁰Mozart to Leopold Mozart, 26 September 1781, no. 426, p. 769.

Mozart best illustrates the man's personality in Act I in Osmin's so-called "rage" aria, "Solche hergelauf'ne Laffen" (Such fops who come running in here). At this point in the opera, Osmin is furious with Pedrillo, and his anger gradually increases until, at the end of his aria, he says that he will not rest until Pedrillo is dead. In the climatic conclusion to this aria, he gleefully describes how Pedrillo will be killed: "First beheaded, then hanged, then impaled on red-hot spikes, then burned, then bound and drowned; finally flayed." The violence that he imagines is so excessive and unbelievable that Osmin is perceived as a crude, ill-tempered bully whose outbursts are more ludicrous than fearsome. Mozart explains that his "rage is rendered comical by the use of Turkish music."¹¹ Unlike Pasha Selim, Osmin is unforgiving; at the end of the opera he cannot comprehend the Pasha's generosity, and he refuses to participate in the general rejoicing. In this work and in others of the genre, audiences would always be delighted when Osmin and his counterparts were outwitted by the Western characters.

The Turk in a farcical role was common in theatrical works. He was a foreigner who would amuse audiences with his unusual language and quaint mannerisms. To heighten the humor of a play, scenes with one or more Turkish characters were frequently inserted in plots that had nothing whatever to do with Turkey. In France, for example, during the reigns of Louis XIV and his successors, the appetite for Turkish exoticism was so strong that there was hardly an entertainment without at least one.¹² The language for the Turkish characters was often a type of gibberish that was sure to elicit laughter from the audience.

Europeans dressed in Turkish disguise were also considered humorous, as in the comedy *Lo Speziale* (The Apothecary) by Carlo Goldoni, the eighteenth-century Italian dramatist. The drama was set as an opera by several composers, including Haydn in 1768. The climax of the opera is a marriage ceremony in the third act in which the entire cast is dressed *à la turque* to celebrate the wedding of the two leading ladies to their lovers who are disguised as Turks.¹³ This is just one of countless Turkish ceremonial scenes in comic and even serious eighteenth-century operas.

¹¹*Ibid.* Alfred Einstein, *Mozart: His Character, His Work* (New York, 1962), p. 458, considers Osmin to be Mozart's "greatest creation in this work," because Osmin is not a mere "caricature, but [is] as realistic a rogue as Falstaff: coarse, irascible, infinitely comical."

¹²The comic Turkish ceremonial scene in Molière's *Le bourgeois gentilhomme* (1670), with music by Lully, established a model for later works. See Miriam K. Whaples, "Exoticism in Dramatic Music, 1600-1800" (Ph. D. diss., Indiana University, 1958), pp. 95-124, for a discussion of the musical devices in this scene.

¹³Europeans also delighted in attending masked balls dressed in extravagant Turkish costumes. See Karl Ditters von Dittersdorf, *Autobiography*, trans. A. D. Coleridge (London, 1896, 1st ed. Leipzig, 1801), pp. 166-7, for a description of masqueraders in Turkish costumes accompanied by a "Turkish" band.

But, one may ask, did they use authentic Turkish dance or music in these productions? Of course not! Ethnic dances would have been too strange for the audiences, who preferred to watch the Turkish characters dance minuettes, gavottes, and similar stylish European court dances.

Turkish music was also ignored, although transcriptions of Turkish melodies and descriptions of Turkish performance practices were available. Mozart's remark that the composer should not offend the ear of the listener was typical. Europeans could more readily accept the visual arts and literature of the East than the music, which they considered to be primitive and unappealing.¹⁴ The few occasional hints of pseudo-Turkish music were used just to add a bit of color or humor to a composition.

There was, however, one aspect of Turkish music that exerted a strong impact on the West, and that was the military music of the Janissary band. By the end of the eighteenth century, almost all European rulers had their own Turkish bands. The first was Augustus II of Poland, who received his Turkish military band as a gift from the sultan in the early part of the century. In 1725 Empress Anne of Russia acquired her own band, soon to be followed by the Austrian and Prussian rulers. The Austrian "Turkish" military bands continued until World War I.¹⁵ Most of the original musicians in the bands were Turkish. The British, however, preferred to employ black musicians and dress them in splendid tunics with colorful sashes and high feathered turbans.¹⁶

The Janissary bands featured shrill wind instruments (such as the shawm and fife) and a large assortment of percussion instruments of the type that was never used in Western orchestral music. In eighteenth-century European orchestras, the only percussion instrument was the *timpani*. Composers soon realized that they could achieve new and unusual orchestral effects with the noisy Janissary instruments, and they began to introduce into some of their compositions the so-called *batterie turque*; that is, the bass drum, cymbals, and triangle.¹⁷ Occasionally, a *piccolo*, which simulated the high Turkish fife, was also used.

¹⁴See Philip V. Bohlman, "The European Discovery of Music in the Islamic World and the 'Non-Western' in 19th-Century Music History," *Journal of Musicology* 5 (Spring 1987), pp. 147-63, for an examination of the "discovery" of Islamic music by Western scholars.

¹⁵Eva Badura-Skoda, "Turca, alla," *New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, vol. 19 (London, 1980), p. 258.

¹⁶According to Henry George Farmer, *The Rise and Development of Military Music* (London, 1912), pp. 72-7, black "Turkish" musicians continued to perform in England until the reign of Queen Victoria.

¹⁷The cymbals were smaller than those used in modern symphony orchestras. Triangles were not authentic Turkish instruments, but they came to be associated with European "Turkish" music. Bells were also sometimes used in "Turkish" ensembles. The *batterie turque* became so stylish that it affected the manufacture of many fortepianos of the late eighteenth century; pedal

Among the more famous orchestral works that feature "Turkish" instruments are Haydn's Symphony No. 100 (the "Military") and three compositions by Beethoven: the final movement of his Symphony No. 9, his "Wellington's Victory" Symphony, and the "Turkish March" and "Chorus of Dervishes" from *The Ruins of Athens*.

Composers also began to employ the Janissary instruments in their Turkish operas for local color. In Mozart's *Abduction from the Seraglio*, he specifically describes particular sections of the opera as Turkish; for example, the loud music in the overture and in the grand entry march of the Pasha, with his Janissaries singing, "Raise songs to our great Pasha, lift your voices in acclaim."¹⁸ Another instance of Turkish music comes at the end of the opera when everybody honors the generous ruler and sings "Long live the Pasha Selim! Let honor be his due." The music at this point sounds as though it might have been inspired by the whirling dervishes, and it certainly provides what Mozart wanted: a noisy, exciting, and brilliant conclusion to the opera. No doubt the colorful pseudo-Turkish music contributed to the fact that this opera was Mozart's most successful during his lifetime.

In conclusion, we are aware that there was no single image of the Turk in the performing arts during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He was presented as both a fearful and a comic villain, as a ridiculous foreigner, and as a generous ruler to be admired and honored. Since Turkish operas had such wide popular appeal, and since composers and librettists catered to the taste of their audiences, and were careful not to offend their sensibilities or challenge their preconceived ideas, one must conclude that the image of the Turk as seen on the stage reflected the image of the Turk as perceived by the European public.

attachments were added to imitate the sounds of the bass drum, the clanging cymbals, and the jingling triangle and bells.

¹⁸Even without the "Turkish" instruments, certain musical features became associated with the *alla turca* style, such as strongly accented march rhythms in duple meter, repetitious rhythmic and melodic patterns (especially leaping thirds), static harmonies, melodic ornaments (grace notes), and rapid contrasts between major and minor keys. A well-known example is Mozart's Piano Sonata in A minor, K. 331 (K. 330j), in which the final movement is marked rondo "alla turca."

THE ARTS UNDER SÜLEYMÂN THE MAGNIFICENT

Michael ROGERS

INTRODUCTION

Any account of the arts in the reign of Süleymân the Magnificent must reflect his own military and naval achievements. For the Ottomans were great, if not always discriminating, collectors of luxuries — silks, Chinese porcelains, hardstones, clocks and watches, goldsmiths' work and jewels, as well as considerable patrons. Süleymân's conquests in Europe, Iran and the Eastern Mediterranean brought rich booty, while diplomacy and war against the Habsburgs stimulated trade and tribute to an extent unparalleled in Ottoman history. These gave the arts in his reign a certain eclectic character which brings them close in spirit, though not always in effect, to the arts at the Mannerist courts of Europe, Florence, Mantua, Fontainebleau and, slightly later, Prague. A common love for brilliance, polish and virtuosity did not always encourage imitation, but it was not for nothing that the Mannerist goldsmiths of Venice and South Germany found a ready market at the Ottoman court. As with contemporary Europe there is no easy distinction between the major and the minor arts, the decorative and the "serious": a cannon cast for Süleymân in 1524 is as boldly decorated as the minarets of the mosque of Şehzade (completed 1548) in Istanbul, and from the largest to the smallest there is an overriding concern with exquisitely worked detail, sometimes to the extent of obscuring the object or the building which bears it. The expense, in labour and materials, was correspondingly great: the richer the effect, the richer the patron. In this, Turkey under Süleymân, like the later Medici and the Habsburgs benefited initially from the flow of treasure into Europe from the New World. The catastrophic inflationary effects, which hit Spain in the 1550s, do not appear to have affected the Ottoman empire much before the final decades of the sixteenth century. Süleymân's reign was thus financially a halcyon period for the arts.

It has sometimes been claimed that Süleymân's achievement presupposed centralised production and design by court workshops, which were brought to the height of their efficiency, it is supposed, in his reign. There is, however, little

evidence to justify this. Islamic economies have traditionally been dominated by the idea of a centrally fixed just price which in sixteenth century Ottoman Turkey afforded a profit of about 10%. Some Ottoman craftsmen moreover were slaves; but the degree of central control of the court workshops varied considerably; by no means all manufactured luxuries were organized round the court; and, notably for costly silks or carpets, the authorities had constant recourse to the free market. A further important feature of the Ottoman art industry was the conscription of skilled labour, often from conquered capitals like Tabriz or Budapest, and in great building works like Süleymaniye (inaugurated 1557) it could be organised with military precision for maximum effect. Some of this labour was forced, convicts or prisoners of war, but principally for menial tasks; when the need was for virtuosity and talent the craftsmen were almost invariably free. The surviving documents do not tell the whole tale, but though the Ottoman authorities certainly wished to regulate supply and demand they do not appear actually to have done more than the courts of their European contemporaries to achieve it.

SÜLEYMÂN AS A COLLECTOR

Selîm I's victory at Çaldıran in 1514 and the ensuing sack of Tabriz, and his conquest of Aleppo, Damascus and Cairo were important because they gave the victorious armies the taste for spoils. A short account book in the Topkapı Palace archives (D. 10734) dated early October 1514 lists porcelains, rock-crystals, amber and jades taken from the Haşî Bihîşt palace at Tabriz. There is always, however, a certain indiscriminate element in collection by loot, and, for example, in the case of the Chinese porcelains confiscated, it has been cogently argued that there are few signs that the later Ottoman sultans had any active collecting policy. Süleymân and his viziers, however, show evidence of a confirmed taste in Chinese porcelains for Yuan or early Ming blue and white, and the Iznik dishes showing the direct influence of Chinese prototypes are all after models from these groups.

From Tabriz, Damascus and Cairo, Selîm and Süleymân also brought craftsmen: but the Ottomans had long patronised Persian artists and craftsmen. What in Süleymân's reign was new was an interest in late Renaissance and mannerist Europe, which the constant expeditions of his reign into Central and Eastern Europe had brought within his grasp. Their influence was vastly augmented by tribute from the Saxon goldsmiths of Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia and gifts from the Habsburg and Valois kings. Unfortunately the Ottoman biographers generally say too little to make it easy to evaluate these acquisitions but tribute doubtless explains an element of eclecticism in Ottoman court art in Süleymân's reign.

A particularly significant episode was Süleymân's capture of Buda in 1526 which still bore much of the fame of the humanist ruler and patron Matthias Corvinus (d. 1490). Not only did Italian merchants bring goldsmith's work from Venice and Naples; rich textiles from Florence, Venice and Milan: arms from Modena and Milan; glass from Venice; ceramics from Faenza, Urbino and Florence. There was also a maiolica workshop attached to the citadel; Venetian glassblowers were commissioned (1488-90) from the workshop of Giovanni Dalmata (from Traù, Trogir) who had won fame in Florence and at the Papal court in Rome. A contemporary description of the palace by Antonio Bonfini (1427-1503) is also evidence for bronze sculptures ordered from Florence by Matthias Corvinus, after designs by the Pollaiuolo workshop a Hercules in the first courtyard; heroic nudes with swords, battleaxes and shields to either side of the tower gate leading to Matthias's palace proper; statues of John Ladislas and Matthias Hunyadi over the main gateway; and, in the inner courtyard, a bronze Pallas surmounting a well.

The most famous of all Matthias's foundations was the library, the Bibliotheca Corviniana. Rich in Florentine humanist manuscripts illuminated in the workshops of Attavante degli Attavanti (1452-c. 1517) and other masters and in manuscripts and illuminated coats of arms (*Wappenmalerei*) executed for Matthias in the scriptorium he assembled in his palace at Buda it still evoked rapturous descriptions from many sixteenth century visitors. Süleymân must have gone round it soon after his occupation of the citadel of Buda in 1526 and certain manuscripts were removed to Istanbul. Those which are traceable are mostly literary and by late classical authors and some of them are scarcely collectors' items. But among the finer manuscripts which returned from Istanbul within decades of the occupation of Buda, is a Horace, with the Satires of Juvenal and Persius (British Library MSS Lansdowne 836) made in Florence c. 1450-70, which bears a note on the flyleaf that it was acquired by Anton Verancsics (Verantius, or Vrančić), bishop of Pécs (Fünfkirchen), who was in Istanbul on a diplomatic mission in 1556-7. How far did these reflect Süleymân's own literary and artistic taste? Few or none of the finest Florentine illuminated manuscripts may have been carried off, but the richness of Attavante's decoration, with its elaborate grotesque, its dazzling vignettes and its architectural fantasies is anyway very far from sixteenth century Ottoman painting and illumination. Nor does the "European" appearance of some of the illustrations to accounts of Süleymân's campaigns in Hungary owe anything to them or to other paintings from the Corviniana scriptorium.

The manuscripts were, however, by no means Süleymân's only booty from Buda. For foreign visitors to the Hippodrome in Istanbul in the 1530s noted a conspicuously displayed sculptural group on a column, variously identified as Mars, Diana, and Hercules or Apollo or else, more consonant with Matthias's own idea of himself as the reviver of the glories of ancient Rome, as

Mars protecting Romulus and Remus, the legendary founders of Rome. They also appear to have been Florentine work and represent a rare occasion when Süleyman may have shown interest in European sculpture. Evliyâ Çelebî, however, very possibly unreliably, also recounts that a fine image of St. George and the Dragon at Buda was saved, in the teeth of Ebüssu'üd's condemnation, by the personal intervention of Süleyman, who draped his own shawl over it. The figures do not appear to have survived the death and disgrace of his favourite, İbrâhîm Paşa in 1536. There is, however, a later reminiscence in the illustrations to Volume II of the *Şâhanshâhnâme* made for Murâd III, which is entirely devoted to Süleymân's exploits. In the scenes of the circumcision festivities for his sons held in the Hippodrome in 1530 there appears among the ancient monuments from the spina of the Byzantine building a column with a small sculptural group with a central figure protecting two smaller figures, evidently the infant Romulus and Remus. The pictorial reminiscence is rather astonishing, for we should not have expected statuary to have stood very long in a public place in Ottoman Istanbul. But the still standing Pharaonic obelisk with its hieroglyphs and the column of Theodosius with its heavily sculptured marble base show that if it was merely fanatical dislike of figural sculpture which prompted the removal of the Buda figures it was of a very selective nature.

Also associated with the sack of Buda is a pair of bronze lampstands at the mihrab of Ayasofya, each with two verse inscriptions dated 933/1526-7 commemorating their removal and referring to the destruction of the churches there: they are evidently therefore most probably from the cathedral of the Virgin on the citadel of Buda. The offering of such trophies to Ayasofya is an interesting, if unconscious, reminiscence of Justinian's original intention to make his church, Haghia Sophia, a physical embodiment of the triumph of Christianity over paganism by incorporating into it marbles and other precious materials from all the great monuments of the pagan past.

Much less is known of the trophies Süleymân collected from other European cities and fortresses, like the rare icon of the Virgin from Belgrade, which the Orthodox patriarch in Istanbul later acquired for 12,000 ducats. What became, for example, of the relics from the treasury of the Knights of Rhodes when they quitted their fortress in 1522 and their cathedral was turned into a mosque? Or were the frequent raids on the Adriatic and the Mediterranean coasts of Italy as productive of cultural spoils as of slaves, cargoes and specie? It would, however, seem that Süleymân, unlike his great-grandfather, Mehmed the Conquer, did not deliberately collect Christian relics.

TRADE AND TRIBUTE

Collection by booty in Süleymân's reign was far exceeded by tribute and the luxury trades, in manufactured objects as well as in raw materials. From Northwest Iran, despite periodic embargoes, the Ottomans imported raw silk in bulk, though much of it was immediately re-exported to Italy or to France from Aleppo or from Bursa. The India trade brought Chinese porcelains, diamonds, garnets and rubies (though not sapphires for which Ottoman Turkey seems to have had little esteem) to Basra or via Aden to Egypt: Egypt continued to be the main entrepot for the European spice trade, after a short-lived Portuguese attempt in the early sixteenth century to base a spice monopoly in Lisbon. Increasingly, spices were supplemented by coffee from the Yemen which rapidly conquered the initial doubts of the Ottoman *'ulemâ*, though the authorities were not always content. An order, for example, from the end of Süleymân's reign, shuts the coffee houses in Jerusalem on the grounds that they set a bad example of idleness and foster sedition.

From the North, Poland and Muscovy, came amber, fish tooth (walrus ivory) and enormous quantities of furs — an essential in Ottoman society, both for show and to mitigate the rigours of the beastly winter climate of Istanbul. A problem here was that with overtrapping Russian trappers had to move eastwards towards Siberia, which diverted the trade southwards to the Volga and the Caspian, so that the furs reached not the Ottomans but their inveterate enemy, Safavid Iran. And from Venice, Genoa, Leghorn, Ancona and Ragusa came the finest woollens, and considerable quantities of Venetian and Florentine velvets, brocades and other silk textiles. If Bursa silks were used for the robes of honour to reward those who had deserved Süleymân's favour and were thus the currency of the Ottoman honours system the sultans did not disdain to wear foreign silks themselves. From 1536, when François I was accorded special trading privileges by Süleymân, the share of Marseilles in this lucrative cloth trade was considerably augmented. By 1560 quite a lot of the emeralds used by Ottoman jewelers appear to have been Colombian: the inflationary effects of New World silver were not seriously felt in the empire till the end of the sixteenth century.

From South Germany, Transylvania, Ragusa and Venice came silver and goldsmiths' work, which was expected as a matter of course from any foreign diplomatic mission seeking peace, alliance or commercial privileges. Much of it was sent straight to the Mint to be melted down. Nevertheless, it encouraged European craftsmen to think that the Ottomans liked it and prompted works like the bizarre four-tiered gold crown, commissioned by a consortium of Venetian goldsmiths in 1532, which was ultimately sold to Süleymân for 116,000 ducats through the good offices of İbrâhîm Paşa and which is known to us from contemporary Venetian prints. There is no evidence, however, that they had any

real idea of Süleymân's tastes, which contemporary commentators like Pietro Aretino dismissed as a childish love of extravagance.

Under Selîm II (1566-74) and Murâd III (1574-95) the role of the state in bulk purchases of imported luxuries, particularly furs, seems to have increased. Under Süleymân foreign merchants dominated the luxury import trade, though, as in the case of the four-tiered crown, they depended heavily upon middle-men high in the sultan's favour. Many of them got no nearer to Süleymân than his viziers or even quite minor officials, but among his personal friends was Luigi (Venetian, *Alvise*) Gritti, the natural son of the Doge Andrea Gritti, who was excluded by his birth from high office in Venice and who chose to make his career in Istanbul. His magnificent place in Pera, commemorated by the modern name for Pera, *Beyoğlu*, was frequented by both İbrâhîm Paşa and Süleymân himself. On one occasion the sultan, curiously, accompanied him to the church of St. Francis and ordered a mass to be said, at which, says Gritti's biographer, he laughed excessively.

Gritti was particularly important as an intermediary in diplomatic negotiations with the European powers, though much of his influence was lost on the disgrace of İbrâhîm Paşa in 1536, and was the principal instrument of Süleymân's anti-Habsburg diplomacy in Hungary or Eastern Europe. In Hungary he was, successively or concurrently, bishop of Eger (Erlau), in which his son succeeded him; Governor General, Treasurer and Captain General of the Hungarian kingdom; a great fief holder, and a Muslim, which chiefly gave him his European reputation of being a renegade, though it little affected his influence in Venice. His brother, Lorenzo, with whom he remained on good terms, was an important commercial and cultural link, furnishing him with jewels, hounds and even a wonderful cat, and was evidently an important channel for luxury objects for the sultan and his court. But his position was unstable, since the professional renegade is inevitably at the mercy of every slightest slander and ultimately loses the confidence of all. His downfall and death were the result of factional politics in Hungary and Transylvania.

Competing with all these luxury imports were flourishing Ottoman luxury industries which, on the evidence of administrative documents of the later sixteenth century, the authorities sporadically attempted to concentrate in Istanbul, notably brocades and other silks, carpets and probably jewellery and goldsmiths' work too, though it is difficult to identify the products of these Istanbul workshops. Not, of course, that the authorities needed to interfere, for the great power of Istanbul as a consuming center also exercised considerable attractive force on able craftsmen from the provinces, even without the forms of conscription to which the authorities resorted for the major imperial works.

The luxury industries remained, however, essentially provincial: carpets in Cairo, Karaman (Aksaray had been praised for its carpets, or kilims, by Marco Polo), and the Uşak area (Southwest Anatolia); velvets, satins and brocades in Amasya, Aleppo, Damascus, Kaffa (Kefe) and Bursa; pottery at Iznik and Aleppo, though tiles were often fired at the site for which they were ordered; goldsmiths' work in Trabzon (Trebizond) and Diyarbakır, and mohair at Ankara and Tosya. Though, as Suraiya Faroqhi has shown, the authorities might restrict purchases of Angora wool by European merchants for strategic reasons, the court was generally content to compete with the Italian, Russian, Polish, Greek, Armenian, Syrian and Persian merchants who flocked to Aleppo, Bursa, Damascus and even Cairo. Even when demand for fine silks from Bursa, for robes of honour for the court, or Iznik tiles for the imperial foundations of the period 1557 onwards in Istanbul and Edirne, was met by a lag in production, all the authorities did was to issue orders, which doubtless were only temporarily effective, that the foreign merchants they evidently held to be responsible should go away: Central control was thus very far from complete.

The waves of craftsmen from Cairo, Aleppo, Tabriz, Central Europe and the Balkans who had accompanied the booty from Süleymân's victorious campaigns had in fact left the Ottoman authorities with little practical experience of a free labor market. Conscription, of skilled or semi-skilled labor, for minutely organised building works like Süleymaniye — of marble workers, carpenters, glaziers, masons and decorators — worked well enough, and the transformation in Süleymân's reign of carpet manufacture at Uşak from a nomad pursuit to a cottage industry and then to virtual mass production of enormous carpets, like those ordered for Süleymaniye and other imperial foundations, would not have been practicable without state interference. But with more specialised crafts like pottery or silk weaving, where the finish of the product was all-important, conscript craftsmen required long periods of training and constant supervision. Mass conscription, when credentials would have been virtually impossible to check, was not therefore the answer to recruitment to the luxury trades. The problem appears to have been appreciated by İbrâhîm Paşa, who sent slaves for specialised training at the Bursa looms, but there is little evidence that this was general policy at Bursa and no sign that anything comparable was undertaken at Iznik. Though the court assumed that the luxury industries were there to supply its needs without question it was essentially *laissez faire*.

In this the Ottoman authorities differed little from their European contemporaries, though in scale and variety the Ottoman luxury industries probably outclassed all but the largest city states of Northern Italy and South Germany. Nevertheless, the appearance in palace registers of the reigns of Bâyezîd II, Selîm I and Süleymân the Magnificent of groups (*cemâ'ât*) or workshops of artisans known as the *ehl-i hîref* ("tradespeople," "craftsmen," "artisans," possibly members of guilds but probably without either the restrictive

practices or the control of quality exercised by European guilds) has suggested to some recent writers that the Ottoman authorities were utterly devoted to the organisation of the luxury crafts. The craftsmen included goldsmiths and jewellers of all sorts (gem-cutters, engravers, chasers, casters), bow-makers, musket-makers, armourers and swordsmiths; tailors; embroiderers; and a staff occupied with the arts of the book — calligraphers, illuminators and binders. Apart from the fact that these positions tended to be hereditary, the registers tell us little of their organisation, and they are anyway exactly the craftsmen we should expect to find in attendance on a great court: some are entered in the registers as slaves, but others were no less free than Benvenuto Cellini. Their payments were of two sorts, a per diem; and gratuities or honoraria. The former, even for heads of workshops, were low, compared poorly with the dwarfs, entertainers, poets, astrologers and spies who also appear in them, and would scarcely have offered a living wage. The cash gratuities, which may not have been distributed more than twice a year, generally amounted to less than 100 days' per diem and bore no relation to their labor, the materials they used or the end product. Since court demand tended to be occasional and there was a large merchant and officer class in every great Ottoman city with the means and tastes for luxuries they would have had no difficulty in making ends meet by taking outside commissions. The per diem could therefore be understood as a retainer, rather than an honor, though the court might well have thought retainers to be quite unnecessary. It is curious, however, that there is little correlation between those appointed to these workshops and their production. For example, the workshop of carpet weavers, the *kaliçebâfân-ı Hâşşa*, appears in registers of Süleymân's reign but is not known to have woven a single carpet for him.

If this was *dirigisme*, it was extremely inefficient. But at this point, the studio for the production of books (sometimes called the *nakkaşhâne*, though the term has no technical sense) has been invoked as a paradigm for the organisation of these workshops. The production of illustrated or illuminated manuscripts, in Persia and in Renaissance Italy no less than sixteenth century Istanbul, was always expensive and required careful administration: it tended therefore to be associated with the patronage of a great and generous ruler. In Istanbul in Süleymân's reign a few fine manuscripts are known to have been copied or illustrated for viziers and for merchants, including the Christian community; but unlike, say, the palace gunsmiths, the staff of the scriptorium would have been fully occupied in the production of books and albums for the palace library or in the illumination of chancery documents.

It has nevertheless, been groundlessly claimed that the studio was also employed to make designs for circulation to Bursa for silks or to Iznik for tilework, which would have been artistic *dirigisme* on a scale unknown even in Ming China or the France of Colbert and Louis XIV. It would certainly not have been beyond the competence of the studio to produce a design or two, but the

high quality of the decorative arts in Süleymân's reign lies partly in the individuality of the designs well adapted to their particular media, not slavishly copying one another: this is particularly the case with silk designs, where the specialised requirements of silk weaving made silk designers largely autonomous. Archival documents indeed mention designs or drawings sent for execution at Iznik, but these were for Koranic inscriptions, something which the potters evidently could not master by themselves but which not only had to look grand and also had to be correct down to the minutest details of text and its pointing; an incorrect inscription on tilework could not have been corrected and would have been a public scandal. For other stencils for tiles, which, in the 1560s and 1570s when demand for them reached its peak, would have been virtually essential, the potters could well have done those by themselves. As for the cartoons which the large Uşak carpets made for Süleymaniye in the 1550s demanded, these have been shown to have been curiously old fashioned, being based upon designs for bindings made for the library of Mehmed the Conqueror (r. 1451-81). There are general resemblances, which reflect the importance of court fashion in the decorative arts of the time, but these have led commentators to postulate an administrative structure to explain them for which there is no real evidence at all.

An obvious rationale for any system of court workshops was any control of scarce or precious materials — gold, silver, gems, ivory, ebony, fish tooth or coral (Indian tortoiseshell was also used, Pierre Belon du Mans notes as early as the 1540s, but does not appear to have become popular till the end of Süleymân's reign). Not that control was necessarily an aid to production, for detailed account books for projects like the writing and illumination of Korans for the mosque of Süleymaniye show the authorities to have been restrictive: doubtless for fear of pilferage, they tended to keep the craftsmen short, nor could they do much to control how the materials they issued were used, for so much depends upon differences in technique. Occasional similarities in use, therefore, which might suggest some controlling hand, are much more probably to be attributed to the craftsmen themselves. Thus, tortoiseshell used as a veneer was, like gems, set over metal foil to give it fire and brilliance, and rock-crystal plaques, for similar reasons, are often set over paper illuminated in gold and lapis blue; and ivory carved for mirror backs uses similar designs and effects to marble carving for minbars of the great imperial mosques. On the other hand, the influence of illumination practised in the court scriptorium, where abstract scrollwork, often with a counterpoint of designs, would appear to lend itself well to experiment in design is negligible. Association with the court workshops by no means guaranteed, therefore, homogeneity of appearance, exactly as in the Ecole de Fontainebleau, which François I created to furnish his palaces and houses. Unhelpfully, moreover, much work of court quality is disregarded in the registers of court workshops. For example, that of the marble carvers who created the elaborate stalactite vaults, the crenellations, *minbars* and other mosque furniture of the great imperial foundations of Süleymân's reign is neither signed

nor recognised by any official reward. In such cases a more *dirigiste* system might have been fairer.

If it seems captious to dwell upon the lack of system in the organisation of the sumptuary arts under Süleymân, though it is in no way to detract from the brilliance of their achievement, this is necessary to combat the romantically false view that they owed their efficiency to court control. If anything the truth was the reverse, but interference seems to have been so sporadic that the court has little credit, or discredit, either way. However, if we compare the practice of the Ottoman court with sixteenth century Nuremberg or Augsburg, which were similarly there, in the eyes of the Habsburgs to furnish the demands of their court, we find that a strong guild system, or, in the case of the Jamnitzer family at Nuremberg, the supervision of the council of patricians of the city, and a system of demarcation lines gave the goldsmiths considerably more independence. They were as much designers as executants, learning and adapting from each other or from printed books of designs. Their principal problem was capitalization, for lavish imperial orders would normally have been paid for on completion and little or none of the cost would be advanced, while the preparation of a *masterpiece*, the essential preliminary to practice as a master goldsmith, was often prohibitively costly. Without convenient expedients like marriage into a master goldsmith's family an outsider would have found advancement financially impossible.

This shows that, up to a point, the court workshops in the reign of Süleymân the Magnificent, were a solution, though not necessarily the most efficient solution, to the capitalization of some luxury trades, with precious materials issued by the Treasurer (*Hazinedârbaşı*), to save the craftsmen the impossibility of a massive capital investment. This was, up to a point, enlightened, but the authorities do not appear ever to have wished to extend this system to localised industries well away from the court, like the Bursa silk industry. That was much more typical of their attitude: they considered their right to priority of supply unquestioned but did nothing to give the industry preferential treatment.

POETS

The surviving registers of court pensions, honoraria and seasonal gratuities from the reigns of Bâyezîd II, Selîm I and Süleymân the Magnificent show that the place of the poet, which did not exclude women, was also a position of some profit, though since the major rewards were for poems written and presented to the sultan, it was not necessarily a sinecure. Many of the poets of Süleymân's reign were also patronized by Ibrâhîm Paşa and suffered accordingly on his execution in 1536: Not, however, that he was an indulgent

patron. Figânî, one of his protégés, dared to make public a Persian couplet he had composed on the statues from Buda erected outside İbrâhîm Paşa's palace on the Hippodrome:

*Dû İbrâhîm âmad ba-dayr-i cihân:
Yeki putşikân şud, yeki putneşân*

("Two Abrahams came into the world: one the Patriarch broke idols, the other [İbrâhîm] Paşa put them up.")

For this indiscretion he was paraded round Istanbul on the back of an ass and hanged.

One of the most copious poets of Süleymân's reign was Süleymân himself, who wrote under the name Muhibbî. The many manuscripts of his works, which are still to be collated, make it difficult to say how much he wrote, but a manuscript in Hamburg dated 961/1553-4, twelve or thirteen years before his death, announces itself already as Volume III. Even quite minor Ottoman poets are credited with more than two thousand gazels (a verse form comparable in difficulty of rhyme and metre to the Renaissance sonnet), but it is somewhat surprising that Süleymân found the time to write so much. In fact, there is a report (Topkapı Palace Archives E. 738) that not only were his poems copied out in a fair hand by the historian Koca Nişancı, Celâlzâde Muştafâ; they were also "corrected" by Bâkî, one of his favorite poets, who also wrote *nağîres* on them, a difficult exercise which involves retaining the metre and rhyme scheme but using different words. This may suggest a greater debt to Celâlzâde Muştafâ and to Bâkî which a critical edition would make apparent.

Most of Süleymân's poems are lyrics, some of them in Persian, neatly balancing in Mannerist style artificiality of diction with novelty of thought. The subject matter and the images are, inevitably, somewhat repetitive, though if the effect is occasionally trite much the same could be said of English Elizabethan verse. As with many more famous poets the beauty of his verse consists more in isolated lines than in the perfect whole. Sometimes the images are strikingly felicitous, suggesting the Metaphysicals, like the daring oxymoron in which he describes himself as the salamander consumed in the fire of love: for reputedly the salamander could inhabit fire unscathed. The absence of gender in Persian and Ottoman Turkish and the imagery (which was, doubtless, not always mystical) — the drunkenness of wine, carousals on the coming of spring, as well as apostrophes to rose-cheeked, cypress-slender, moon-faced, raven-locked, ruby-lipped beauties loosing arrow-shafts which tear the poet's heart, or to downy-cheeked cup-bearers and others of the male sex — might appear at first glance scandalous. But such poetry is not autobiography, and the Mughal emperor, Bâbur, a better poet and certainly no prude, condemns an attempt by one of his

acquaintances to interpret such lyric poetry as homosexual. The problem of interpretation is not peculiar to Ottoman poetry, but the very abundance of Süleymân's lyrics scarcely suggests that he would have welcomed serious consideration of every image and turn of phrase.

Süleymân as a poet also had his serious side. Towards the end of his reign in the sad affair of his son Şehzâde Bâyezîd, who had quarrelled with his brother Şehzâde Selîm, threatened insurrection and was ultimately driven to take refuge at the Safavid court there was an extraordinary exchange between him and his father. For, at a stage when Süleymân had most probably already obtained a decree from the Şehülislâm that he could properly be put to death, he received a poem from Bâyezîd, who wrote under the name Şâhî, the refrain of each verse protesting his innocence. To this appeal Süleymân addressed a poem in sterner terms urging him in the refrain of each verse not to protest but to repent. It is difficult to believe that the exchange was merely an artificial literary exercise, and it certainly intensifies the atmosphere of high tragedy with which Western observers invested the disgrace of Şehzâde Bâyezîd. We do not know whether Süleymân regularly corresponded with his children in verse, but he may well have learned here from the similarly tragic episode of the execution of his son Şehzâde Muştafa in 1553, a much more popular figure, whose death was felt by many to be a serious injustice. Two laments, of considerable power and beauty, by Sâmi and by Taşlıcalı Yalyâ, sharply reproached him for the deed and are doubtless typical of a serious, and undervalued strain in classical Ottoman poetry. Their laments were surely not intended for his eyes and even circulation in private could have been dangerous: but they suggest possibilities of opposition in Ottoman culture which the apparently monolithic regime of the sultan and his administration could not suppress.

The Turkish poets patronised by Süleymân and his court were so numerous as to usurp the title of Tudor England as "a nest of singing birds." For the most part they were Anatolian, though Syria and Egypt furnished poets who wrote ably in Arabic as well as Ottoman. But there was also a constant movement from Persia and Central Asia to the Ottoman court, despite the Shi'î affiliations of many poets. Hanna Sohrweide who has studied their careers concludes, however, that their religion did them far less harm than association with a disgraced patron like İbrâhîm Paşa. Though some of them had Persian as their principal language most of them were bilingual and, very probably, they were as important to the largely Turkish verse annals of the reign of Murâd III as to the more Persian oriented literature of the reign of Süleymân.

The Ottoman practice of bringing back Persian poets and scholars may be traced back at least as far as Mehmed the Conqueror's defeat of the Akkoyunlu Turcoman at Ouluk Beli (Başkent) in 1473, but in the sixteenth century conscription was a less important factor, for the Ottoman court attracted religious

refugees, Shî'î poets attached to political refugees, as 'Ârifî and Eflâtûn were to Alkâş Mîrzâ, or poets whose wits were simply too sharp for their own good. However great the hostility between Ottoman and Safavids, moreover, the frontier was never closed, for the pilgrimage provided a pretext for travel which was as valid as it was neutral. The Safavid painter, Şâdikî Beg, ultimately the librarian of Shah 'Abbâs I, though detested by his contemporaries for his malicious tongue, was, for example, an admirer of Süleymân's own verse. As for Eastern Turkish or Chagatai, the undimmed prestige of 'Alî Shîr Nevâî, the Herat vizier and poet, and the admiration accorded to Ottoman poets like the traveller Seydî 'Alî Re'îs (Kâtibî-i Rûmî) who also wrote in Chagatai that also owes much to the traffic from Iran to Istanbul.

Many of the Persians who came to Süleymân's court were not refugees but restless. One of the most interesting of these was the poet Muhyî al-Dîn Lârî. He was Sunni, initially Shâfi'î but after his studies a Ḥanafî (the two schools were generally at daggers drawn). He went to India, where he became the tutor of the Mughal emperor Humâyûn, but on his death in 1556 he went on the pilgrimage and then set up as a merchant in Aleppo, moving later to Istanbul, where the Şeyhülislâm Ebûssu'ud made him *müderris* at a salary of 50 *ağçe* per diem (Sinân's per diem as court architect was only 5 *ağçe* more.) Dissatisfied with this, however, he moved to Diyarbakır in 1559-60, where he became the tutor of the vizier Hüsrev Paşa's sons, the *müderris* of the mosque he had built there and, before his death in 1572, the holder of several remunerative fiefs. Muhyî Lârî's career suggests that the movement of literary figures from Persia to Ottoman Turkey had certain features in common with brain drains from Europe to the United States, and that the émigrés concealed a basic restlessness with a high view of their intellectual and moral superiority.

Probably the most successful of the émigré poets who, being from Azerbaijan, upholds the general conclusion that the movement was not purely Persian but "Turco-Persian," was 'Ârifî. He arrived in the van of Alkâş Mîrzâ and, in the teeth of the opposition of his fellow emigrés and of those already established in Istanbul, won the post of *şehnâmecî* to Süleymân, writing for him the panegyric *Süleymânâme* (copied 1558), the first of the great Ottoman verse chronicles of the sixteenth century. Much of the criticism of him by his fellow poet Eflâtûn, who succeeded him a *şehnâmecî*, may be attributed to thwarted ambition, or, in the case of slanders by the painter and draughtsman, Şâhkuşî, who had been in Istanbul for most of his working life, to an evil tongue. But although 'Ârifî wrote acceptable Turkish and indeed had written on demand a 2,000 line epic on the Egyptian campaign of Süleymân Paşa of 1538-9, his Persian was seriously criticised by Persian literati — whose taste was for high flown Persian which probably did not especially appeal to the Ottoman court. There can be little doubt that he pleased Süleymân himself, but 'Ârifî's experience reminds us that the foreign literary or artistic figures received at the

Ottoman court were not always welcome in Istanbul. For when they arrived in the full glow of imperial favor they were met by the hostility of those already established there from whom they had attracted the all-important financial patronage. The work of E.J.W. Gibb and his successors on the literary history of Süleymân's reign shows how rich in incident and ill-feeling it was.

OTHER LITERARY PERSONALITIES

Though the position of court chronicler, *şehnâmeçi*, was not established till the 1550s, Süleymân and his viziers had long patronised historians and geographers. The scholars receive their due, and more, in the later sixteenth century historian, Muştafa 'Alî's *Künhü'l-Ahbâr*, but the achievements of eminent writers like Maṭrakçı Naşûh or Pîrî Re'îs, who were not scholars by training and whose birth made them outsiders to the Ottoman tradition of law and scholastic theology fostered by the great Istanbul medreses are also remarkable.

Maṭrakçı Naşûh was a *devşirme* boy from Bosnia trained in the palace school. As an officer under Selîm I's viceroy in Egypt, Hayrbek, he evidently learned Arabic well and acquired a knowledge of the exercises (*furûsiyya*) used in the training of the Mamluk cavalry and infantry, in which games with clubs or cudgels played a prominent part. His prowess in these gave him his sobriquet, Maṭrakçı. Some years after his return to Istanbul he embarked on the revision of an early exercise book of arithmetic, the '*Umdetü'l-Hisâb*, completed in 940/1553. Appropriately enough for a schoolbook it was copied often and one copy (Nuruosmaniye 2984) contains a transcript of a citation praising his skill in Mamluk war games, which were evidently a novelty at the Ottoman court. On these he had completed a transcript of a treatise, the *Tuhfetü'l-Guzât* in 1529 (Süleymaniye, Esat Efendî 2206), with sketches of manœuvres. It includes an account of mock sieges with cardboard castles, each with artillery and a garrison of 120 men. These attracted the attention of all those present at the circumcision festivities held by Süleymân for his sons on the Hippodrome in 1530 and evidently explain Maṭrakçı Naşûh's citation.

A much more ambitious project was Naşûh's translation and continuation of Tabarî's world history, *Târîh al-Rusûl wa'l-Mulûk*, from the Arabic, in a series of volumes, some of which remain to be identified. The first three volumes are extant, from the Creation beyond the death of the 'Abbasid caliph al-Muqtadir, at which point Tabarî's text ends, and up to the conquest of Karacahisar by Ertuğrul, the founder of the Ottoman dynasty. There is then a gap till the history of the reign of Bâyezid II (1481-1512), and then a series of works on the campaigns of Süleymân the Magnificent, in Iran (1533-5 and again 1548-9), and in Hungary and in the Mediterranean in 1543-4. There is, predictably, some overlap in the contents of these works, which seem to have been composed in an

irregular sequence, since the last in date relates to the reigns of Bâyezîd II and Selîm I (British Library Add. 23, 586). Though Naşûh may have lived till 1564 (Hâci Hâlifâ's biographical dictionary, *Keşfü'l-Zunûn*, wrongly states that he died in 940/1533-4) he does not appear to have written up the latter part of Süleymân's reign.

Of these works some exist only in draft, but a number contain illustrations by diverse hands, of the French and Italian ports bombarded, sacked or occupied by Barbarossa on his Mediterranean campaign of 1543-4 (Topkapı Palace Library H. 1608) and of the stages of Süleymân's campaign, which in fact was largely fought by İbrâhîm Paşa, of 1533-5 (Istanbul University Library T. 5964), drawn from the life or from faithfully exact topographical sketches made on campaigns, an important innovation in Muslim military practice. More will be said of these below, but the texts, though little indication that Naşûh was, as Muştafâ 'Alî claims, enough of a calligrapher to invent a specially legible form of *dîvânî* script, *ceb*, may well be in his own hand. Though his arithmetical work certainly does not justify the title of a second Abu Ma'shar (the famous astronomer and commentator on Ptolemy), which Mustafâ 'Alî also accords him, and although he does not appear to have achieved the highest rank, Naşûh's works speak well for the education and talents of Süleymân's officers.

The Ottoman navy equally contributed to the culture of Süleymân's reign. One of his captains, Haydar Re'îs, was an able portrait painter, under the sobriquet Nigârî. As for Pîrî Re'îs, the nephew of the famous sea captain and marauder, Kemâl Re'îs, at the time of his disgrace and execution in 1553 or 1554 he was admiral of the Ottoman fleet in the Red Sea. He spent his youth under his uncle, but on Kemâl Re'îs's death in 1511 joined Barbarossa and turned himself to cartography and naval handbooks. His first production was a world map, of which the Western half survives (Topkapı Palace Library R. 1633 *mük*), a unique document, for it is based on a Columbus map of which no original survives. This was presented to Selîm I in 1513. His source seems to have been one of Kemâl Re'îs's slaves who had made three voyages to America with Columbus, or possibly an original map seized on one of his corsair expeditions off the Spanish coast, episodes to which he alludes in his *Kitâbu'l-Baḥriye*, which he presented to Süleymân in 932/1525-6. The map follows the predominantly Catalan tradition in embellishing the land masses with monsters, savages and barbaric rulers and bears commentaries in his own hand: the islands of the New World are indebted to Columbus's discoveries on his third voyage, of which he is definitely known to have drawn a map, but various errors and ghost islands in Pîrî Re'îs's version are evidently incorporated from an earlier, highly conjectural map taken as a guide on Columbus's first voyage of 1492. Early European maps of the New World were subject to incessant revision in these years and the numerous unpurged errors even in Columbus's map of his third voyage must by the early sixteenth century have made it obsolete and no longer

worth copying. It is, therefore, scarcely surprising that no Columbus map should survive. Indeed, though Pîrî Re'îs's map is of prime documentary importance, only a cartographer unaware of the mania for discovery at the Spanish and Portuguese courts could have wished to copy a Columbus map as late as 1513. The Eastern half of Pîrî Re'îs's map was, it has been conjectured, heavily used by Selîm I, whose interest in Asia was considerable, and may well have been worn out and thrown away.

Pîrî Re'îs followed this early exercise in cartography with a practical nautical handbook to the islands and shores of the Mediterranean, the *Kitâbu'l-Bahriye*, which was probably complete by 1521. This was revised at the suggestion of Ibrâhîm Paşa, whom Pîrî Re'îs accompanied as pilot on his Egyptian campaign of 1524, and at his further suggestion a presentation copy was made for Süleymân in 1526. It contains 215 illustrations in black line and wash, with the coastlines further outlined in pricked gold, showing shallows, safe harbours or moorings, sources of good water, fortresses and towns, and even conspicuous ruins. Whereas the islands and coasts under Ottoman control are presented in more detail, his account of Venice and the drawing of the republic are, quite untypically, based on unreliable hearsay. Towns are in general sketched, without much concern for realistic detail, as in contemporary Italian portolans or island books (*isolarii*), from which, indeed, the *Kitâbu'l-Bahriye* takes its form. Most interesting, however, are his autobiographical notes, which make it clear how well he knew the Mediterranean, particularly his account of the Egyptian campaign of 1524, which gave him the opportunity to investigate the mouths of the Nile and gain detailed information on the plans and fortifications of Cairo and Bulaq. In addition to this presentation copy (Topkapı Palace Library H. 642) and later copies for presentation there are twenty or so extant manuscripts which were evidently for practical use, not always accurately copied but meant for correction as the mariners went along. Ottoman pilots, sailors and engineers must also have had numerous plans, maps and charts; but, as in contemporary Italy and Spain, their circulation would have been restricted to discourage espionage.

The *Kitâbu'l-Bahriye* has a long prologue with topics not germane to navigation in the Mediterranean, the Seven Seas; European voyages of discovery, including Columbus's; curiosities of newly discovered or explored regions, including the Americas, Africa, Indonesia and China; and nautical instruments and navigation techniques. Some of these, in marked contrast to the main body of the text, are compilations. There is also an autobiographical epilogue describing his encounter with Ibrâhîm Paşa and the circumstances of the revision of the handbook. These were versified by a poet with the sobriquet Murâdî, whose other works include a verse biography of the Ottoman admiral Barbarossa, the *Gazavât-i Hayrûddîn Paşa* (the copy in the Topkapı Palace Library, R. 1291, belonged to Şehzâde Mehmed, who died in 1543). That appears to be Murâdî's

own work, but the prologue and epilogue of the *Kiûbü'l-Bahriye* may well be no more than versifications of a prose text supplied by Pîri Re'îs.

Pîri Re'îs made a second world map, for Süleymân in 1528, a more modest affair. Thereafter his duties appear to have been with the fleet. He was ultimately put in charge of Ottoman operations against the Portuguese in the Gulf and the Red Sea. In 1552 the Ottoman fleet met with serious reverses at Suez and at Basra. He was held to be responsible and, notwithstanding his literary reputation, was put to death in 1553 or 1554.

More fortunate than Pîri Re'îs was his colleague Seydî 'Alî Re'îs, also known by his poetical sobriquet as Kâtibi-i Rûmî, from his verse in Eastern Turkish which was much admired. He was appointed commander to succeed Pîri Re'îs and bring the fleet back from Basra to Egypt. He repelled the Portuguese off Hurmuz but was later driven off course by storms towards India. Despite successes in Western India, where he allied himself with local rulers against the Portuguese and even the capture of the important trading port of Broach, mutiny, sickness, storms and further damage to the fleet forced him to abandon his command and make his way back to Istanbul overland with a small band of followers, via the court of Humâyûn at Delhi, to Lahore, Kabul, Samarkand and Bukhara into Safavid territory, across Khurasan to Qazvin and thence to Baghdad, Istanbul and Edirne, which he reached in 1557 having long been presumed dead. He was fortunate to receive Süleymân's pardon for the loss of the Suez fleet and wrote up his travels in an important autobiographical work, the *Mir'âtü'l-Memâlik*, which was highly relevant to current Ottoman attempts to bring in the Uzbek rulers of Bukhara to neutralise both Safavid Iran and Muscovite expansion north of the Caucasus and beyond the Volga. His ability was considerable, for he had to refuse offers of permanent employment both in Gujarat and from the Mughals at Delhi. And at Hyderabad in 1554 he began a great work, the *Kiûbü'l-Muhtâf fî 'Ilmü'l-Eflâk ve l-Ebhâr*, a comprehensive portolan, naval handbook and almanac for sailors on the Indian Ocean, largely compiled on the basis of his own observations, as well as supplementary chapters on the New World and on South East Asia, Ceylon, Java and Sumatra. His knowledge of navigational and astronomical instruments may have been, in the tradition of the Arab seafarers and pilots of the Indian Ocean, largely practical, but Seydî 'Alî Re'îs also revised, translated and made commentaries on astronomical works by 'Alî Kuşçî and Kâdizâde Rûmî, two of Uluğ Beg's Astronomers Royal at his observatory in Samarkand in the mid-fifteenth century. This suggests considerable theoretical ability too.

THE ARTS OF THE BOOK

The report of Ogier chislain de Busbecq, Habsburg ambassador in Turkey from 1554 to 1562, that the Turks considered it a sin to print religious books has sometimes been taken to indicate a degree of backwardness compared with Europe, in some way presaging the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the face of European scientific innovation. Even ambassadors as well informed or as curious as he, however, may not have been reliably informed and the *'ulemâ* in the time of Süleymân can scarcely have had consistent or reasoned views on the matter; but anyway the Ottoman concern with the manuscript transmission of texts is not particularly strange. Printing in sixteenth century France, Italy and Spain had still by no means superseded fine manuscript production, for brilliant effects of illumination and illustration simply could not be achieved by mechanical means; nor, from the Ottoman point of view, had early European Arabic type founts, like that of the *Tipografia Medicea* in Rome, overcome the many technical problems they raised. It is thus at least questionable whether the licence granted by Murâd III in 1590 to Orazio Rucellai to import books printed in Arabic into Istanbul would have found much of a public or have done much to encourage the establishment of printing presses there with Arabic type founts.

To prefer manuscript to the printed word looks reactionary for it restricts the number of copies in circulation. But the cheapness of copying and binding left Ottoman scholars at little disadvantage, while European scholars in the sixteenth century were often frustrated in their attempts to obtain printed books by inefficient distribution. As for chancery documents, Europe was just as wedded to scribes and illuminators. But, be that as it may any survey of the Ottoman arts must give primacy to the book — calligraphy, illumination, illustration and binding. Because of the expense of producing luxury manuscripts, patronage, as it had been in Italy, Hungary, France and Germany in the early sixteenth century, was essentially concentrated in palace scriptoria, and many manuscripts were made especially for presentation to the sultan. Among the arts of the book calligraphy has prime importance, not principally because, as is generally believed, of its quasi-sacred character in Islam but because, unlike type founts, good hands last only as long as their practitioners' health, and the chancery, as well as the palace scriptorium, needed calligraphers to provide for a vast demand for clear, legible, elegant or grand writing. This is not to say that calligraphers did not give their personal preference to religious works, the Koran, its exegesis (*tefsîr*) and Koranic tradition (*hadîth*). Indeed, the most famous calligraphers of Süleymân's reign, Ahmed Karahîşârî (d. 1556) and his adoptive son, Hasan Çelebî, owed their fame and their privileged position to the writing of Korans and the design of Koranic inscriptions. But without the chancery, which trained capable professional calligraphers, work in the palace library would have come to a total halt.

Manuscript illumination has been of great importance in the later cultures of Islam, both because of its essential role as a complement to fine calligraphy and as an adornment to the text of the Koran, and because the sumptuous elaboration of abstract, foliate or floral motifs has been a traditional element in the sensibility of the Muslim craftsman. Under Süleymân the Magnificent illumination reached heights of delicacy and luxuriousness in the work of *Ğara Mehmed Çelebi* (*Ğara Memi*) who from 1556 appears in registers of the court craftsmen as head of the *naĥkâşân* and whose signed works include both Korans and secular works, like a copy of the *Divân-i Muĥibbî* (Istanbul University Library T. 5647) completed only a few months before Süleymân's death in 1566. Though the term *naĥkâş* was certainly used in later decades to mean "illustrator" *Ğara Memî* seems to have been exclusively occupied with illumination, or with providing designs for painted woodwork or plaster, provision for which is made in, for example, the building accounts for the mosque of Süleymaniye. The little of this which survives is actually quite close to manuscript illumination, which, on the whole, is of inconsiderable importance for Ottoman design, even when cartoons were obviously necessary, as for Uşak carpets, the Ottoman court carpets associated with Cairo in the later sixteenth century or tile panels in the mosque of Rüstem Paşa in Istanbul, inaugurated in 1561.

In fact, though illuminated Korans and manuscripts from the palace library tend to be the best evidence for the work of the *naĥkâşân* the association of illumination with secular works is no accident. For the real demand for it, as for calligraphy, came from the Chancery which, as in earlier periods, was charged with producing splendid documents of state, written in distinctive scripts to discourage forgery and clearly indicate the chancery from which they had emanated, and with rich decoration appropriate to the majesty of the monarch in whose name they were issued. The chancery of Süleymân the Magnificent was no exception and although the names of the scribes are only sporadically recorded in the palace register they were responsible for the issue of hundreds of thousands of documents of state. They were not signed by the sultan but on completion and verification were headed, as was the Ottoman tradition, with the imperial monogram (*tugra*), consisting of Süleymân's name, brief titles and patronymics with wishes for his eternal victory, in a highly standardised form and with appropriate illumination. The affixing of the *tugra* was the duty of the *nişancı* and later documents show the basic form was stamped from a block, which was then concealed by elaborate inking in gold black or royal blue, together with illumination inside the loops of the letters, above the monogram or even all round it: documents from Süleymân's reign show, however, considerable variation. The refinement and delicacy of this illumination in gold, blue and black, occasionally also with crimson accents, shows that only illuminators of the highest calibre were employed on the work which, because of the irregularity of the contours, was perforce executed freehand. The basic forms are spiral scrolls with stylised lotus or Prunus blossoms, with coiling split palmettes often

superimposed to give a counterpoint of colors or motifs, with a background often of triple spots or cloud scrolls. None of the illuminators of these *tugras* executed for Süleymân is identified, and the vast number of edicts presupposes a vast number of illuminators on the *nişancı*'s staff. But it is evident that without such expertise similar scrollwork and marginal ornament in manuscripts of the end of Süleymân's reign could never have been taken for granted.

Ottoman illumination occasionally introduced or developed certain motifs exploited or simplified in other media, notably tilework, though it did not provide the actual patterns for them. On the whole the reverse seems to have been the case. Kara Memî's splendid floral illumination of the *Dîvân-ı Muhibbî* mentioned above exploits an already well-developed and widespread taste for naturalistic flowers in Iznik tilework and pottery, in textiles, in paper cuts and on lacquer bindings. His appointment as head of Süleymân's studio required virtuoso adaptation rather than wholesale innovation: with such an exalted patron, as at the European Mannerist courts, successful effect demanded a careful balance between novelty and familiarity.

At Süleymân's accession Ottoman book illustration was mostly a matter of adding genre scenes of princes enthroned, hunting or court entertainments to books of verse. Selîm I's booty from the libraries of Tabriz, Damascus and Cairo had little immediate effect, but among illustrated manuscripts which aroused Süleymân's interest in the 1520s were the works of the famous Eastern Turkish poet 'Alî Shîr Nevâî. These had mostly been written, and partly illuminated, at Herat in the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century but had been carried off by the Safavid Shah Ismâ'îl to Tabriz in 1510, where genre scenes of high quality, often decidedly Heratî in style, were added to them. Following Selîm I's victory at Çaldıran in 1514 many of these reached Istanbul. Not all were complete and further illustrations and illumination were added there, some doubtless at the hands of painters conscripted from Tabriz. The works of Persian poets, notably, Jâmî, were also illustrated in similar style, and even a *Shâhnâme*, the Persian national epic, datable to the 1530s, in which elements of early sixteenth century Ottoman painting appear more or less fused with the styles of Herat and Tabriz. This *Shâhnâme* cannot, however, compare with the brilliance of that executed for Shah Tahmâsb (the "Houghton" *Shâhnâme*) at Tabriz in the same years, most probably because for the Safavids the *Shâhnâme* was of crucial importance as a symbol of the Iranian national tradition for which, not entirely appropriately, they stood as champions but which had little meaning for Süleymân and his court.

The Safavid tradition may also have influenced the practice of portraiture at Süleymân's court. Though the Ottoman taste for portraiture goes back to Mehmed the Conqueror and his commissions from Italian painters Süleymân does not appear either to have commissioned or to have collected European

paintings, and the Italian portraits of him, like those known to have been done by Titian, cannot have been done from the life. On the other hand, the Safavid albums which reached the Ottoman court contain numerous sharply drawn studies of courtiers, dwarfs, pages, cooks, and even exquisite girls whose social status is more difficult to determine. To Süleymân's portraitist, the sailor Haydar Re'îs (Nigârî), are attributed larger format studies of him as an elderly man (hence probably of the 1550s), Barbarossa (d. 1548) as an old man, and Selîm II, most probably before his accession in 1566. His studies are more relaxed than their Safavid counterparts and are composed as figures against a background, sometimes curiously reminiscent of the work of Bronzino or other Mannerist portraitists: the resemblance may, of course, arise from the fact that Nigârî and Bronzino both owed their effects to a high technical finish.

Portraiture was certainly more widely practised than these few surviving paintings might suggest. The engraved portrait of Süleymân by Melchior Lorichs done in 1557-8 must, for example, be after an Ottoman original. Loĸmân, the *şehnâmeçi* of Murâd III, who executed a portrait book of the Ottoman sultans for him (the *Kıyâfetü'l-İnsâniye* or *Şemâilnâme*), states that the illustrations are based on originals; and the illustrated chronicles of Süleymân's reign made for Murâd III in the late 1570s and 1580s were clearly aware of his appearance both in youth and in old age. Interestingly, such attention to Süleymân's personal appearance is not characteristic of the illustrations to 'Ârifî's panegyric *Süleymânname* of 1558.

Probably the most innovative feature of Ottoman painting under Süleymân the Magnificent was its concern with topography. The *Beyân-i Menâzil-i Sefer-i İraķeyn-i Sultân Süleymân Hân* by Maṭrakçı Naşûh, a graphic and highly illustrated record of Süleymân's campaign against the Safavids in 1533-5, is in some respects in advance of European topographical illustration of the period. According to a colophon, now lost, it was completed in 944/1537-8. The illustrations are by diverse hands, some being in a tradition of illustrated pious treatises, like Muhyî Lârî's *Futûḥ al-Ḥarameyn*, on Mecca and Medina or Najaf and Kerbela; but practically all show evidence of having been drawn on the spot, and some views, of Baghdad, Tabriz, Sultaniye and Aleppo, are now important archaeological documents. The views are mostly bird's eye, though without the deceptively homogeneous projection which Jacopo de' Barbari's view of Venice (c. 1500) made so popular in the sixteenth century Italian perspective views: but even if to the Western eye the effect is less convincing than these Italianate views Maṭrakçı Naşûh's concern with accuracy unquestionably puts his work in the Renaissance tradition of empirical science. The amateurish execution of many of the illustrations, which may well be from sketches made by him on the spot, suggest, however, that the work was not executed for presentation to Süleymân. The illustrations of the campaign books of the 1540s, now reliably attributed to him, notably of the Mediterranean campaign of Barbarossa in 1543-

4, when at the invitation of François I he wintered at Toulon and ravaged the coasts of the Riviera and Italy and of Süleymân's own campaign of 1544 in Hungary are in a very different style. The former are strikingly similar to sketches made by Jérôme Maurand d'Antibes, the chaplain of the French fleet which accompanied Barbarossa back to Istanbul in 1544 and may well be the work of a French prisoner; the latter are increasingly indebted to German or Venetian topographical or military prints. Indeed, in Ahmed Ferîdûn's account of Süleymân's last campaign against Szigetvár in Hungary, completed in January 1569 (Topkapı Palace Library H. 1339), some of the views of that fortress are simply colored up versions of Venetian prints of it which had been published with journalistic rapidity within a few weeks of its fall in 1566.

As illustrated history, however, the *Süleymânnâme* of 'Ârifî (1558) is much more typical of the taste of Süleymân's scriptorium. Lavishly illustrated by painters from his studio and sumptuously bound, it is markedly indebted to the Tabriz tradition of the first two decades of his reign. Some of the more debatable of his actions, like the disgrace of İbrâhîm Paşa and the execution of Şehzâde Muştafâ are discreetly omitted. Conspicuously the *Süleymânnâme* illustrations ignore Matrakçı Naşûh's innovations, in spite of the prominence they give to the Persian campaign of 1533-5. This could conceivably have been sheer jealousy on the part of 'Ârifî and the anonymous team of illustrators he employed; or they may not have had access to his works. As a genre, however, the *Süleymânnâme* was pioneering work, though its innovations were only to be fully exploited under Murâd III, when lapse of time made it appropriate to present Süleymân's deeds as a whole with less prevarication.

Yet another important category of illustrated works was the palace albums specially compiled for presentation to the sultan, with fine calligraphy, decorated papers and line drawings and paintings, both genre scenes and narrative. The Timurid and Turcoman paintings from Tabriz and Herat which may well have been in albums even before they reached Istanbul in 1514 and which are now reckoned one of the chief treasures of the Topkapı Palace library (H. 2152-3 and H. 2160) were of negligible importance in Süleymân's reign. Later gifts, however, from Shah Tahmâsb, like an album with Safavid portraits and pages from a marvellous *Kalîla wa Dimnâ* manuscript of c. 1370 (Istanbul University Library F. 1422) and an album compiled in 1544 for the Safavid prince Bahrâm Mîrzâ by the librarian Dûst Muḥammad (Topkapı Palace Library H. 2154), with Timurid and chinoiserie painting and even a reduced copy of a Florentine portrait of the school of Bronzino, kept the great tradition of Muslim painting before Süleymân's eyes.

One of the finest Ottoman albums (Istanbul University Library F. 1426), which may well have been made for Süleymân, contains calligraphy by Şâh Maḥmûd and other famous Safavid calligraphers, with exquisite background

illumination added by his studio; a series of line drawings of fantastic foliage; and a marvellous paper collage, of a type attributed by Muşafâ 'Âlî to Fahrî of Bursa and held by European contemporaries to be an Ottoman invention, set under talc, of a spring garden, with flowering trees and climbers, herbaceous plants and bulbs. The binding is of tortoiseshell plaques set over metal foil. The line drawings are a clear indication of Süleymân's and his artists' taste. Drawings of monsters, dragons or phoenixes in combat, of peris and of fantastic foliage had been an established Timurid and Turcoman tradition, but the court style of Süleymân's reign was moulded by a Tabrizi, Şâhkulî, whose name appears in a list of craftsmen conscripted from Tabriz in 1514 and in palace registers from 1525 onwards. Of disagreeable disposition - he is said to have circulated bad Persian verses under the *şehnâme*ci 'Ârifî's name in order to discredit him in Süleymân's esteem - he was, to judge from the drawings attributed to him, the creator of a baroque style, in which stylised chinoiserie lotuses are worked up with feathery leaves into heavily modelled, intricately interlacing compositions sometimes almost animate in appearance even when utterly abstract. Such compositions appear simultaneously on tilework (blue and white tile panels on the facade of the *Sünnet Odası* in the Topkapı Palace), on a small group of brocade kaftans and on numerous stamped and gilt leather bindings, but, like the peris also attributed to him, Şâhkulî's compositions are essentially virtuoso: their peculiar effect depends entirely upon brilliance of line which neither could be nor was intended to be in any other medium.

CARPETS

From the later thirteenth century onwards travellers all remark that fine carpets were sold at Aksaray, Akşehir, Antalya and other Anatolian towns. By the later fifteenth century Turkish pile carpets (mostly for covering tables not floors) appear regularly both in Italian household inventories and customs schedules and in Italian paintings. It is also highly probable that certain star or medallion Uşak designs in paintings by Lotto and Holbein, though their appearance is not restricted to these two painters, were made principally for export. The industry must have been a cottage industry and the finished carpets were very probably sold to Italian merchants at ports like Ephesus (Altoluogo, Selçuk) or Izmir.

The earliest mentions of carpets at the Ottoman court are in the 1505 treasury inventory of Bâyezid II, where both prayer rugs (*seccâde*) and larger rugs (*kâlîce*, modern Turkish *halı*) are described as from Menemen (the old Ottoman province which includes Uşak), 'Acem (Eastern Anatolia but possibly from Persia) and from Karaman. Not only, however, were Persian carpets rather unfashionable at the Ottoman court; at least before the seventeenth century, floor carpets took second place to decorated felts from the Balkans or from Salonica

and to heavily embroidered silks which were the traditional covering of the sultan's audience hall (the *'Arz Odası*) or which were strewn before him as he walked in festival processions.

A radical change seems to have come with large carpets ordered by the authorities documented in the building accounts of Süleymaniye in 1550-7. These are associated with orders to Cairo for a series of exceptionally large (*gâyet büyük*) carpets, which, in the light of the recently published "Mamluk" carpet in the Palazzo Pitti in Florence datable to 1541, we can see to have been in "Mamluk" style, and an order to the kadi of Güre (a small village outside Uşak) for large carpets to be woven there. These are evidently the enormous Uşak medallion carpets which are now the glory of the Türk ve İslam Eserleri Müzesi in Istanbul and which, to judge from the illustrated Ottoman chronicles of the 1570s and 1580s, were also for the palace. It has recently been ingeniously demonstrated by Julian Raby that the designs of the small medallions, the ground of trailing chinoiserie lotus stems and the large central medallions are all to be traced to illumination and stamped leather bindings made by the studio of Mehmed the Conqueror, possibly from c. 1460 onwards. This suggests that by 1550 their design was no novelty, and their appearance in Italian paintings from the 1530s onwards indicates that they were reaching Italy some decades earlier at least.

Though carpets of "Mamluk" design had traditionally been large, the vast size of the carpets commissioned for Süleymaniye evidently raised special problems, for they presupposed not only larger looms but also a new organisation of labour, the transformation of a cottage industry into virtual mass production. It also doubtless implied a greater degree of centralised control so that foreigners could not preempt court orders for large carpets. Simultaneously, probably under similarly controlled conditions, the smaller Cairene carpets were evolving more elaborate designs with feathery leaves (*sâz*) and with distinct resemblances to the Iznik tile panels made for the mosque of Rüstem Paşa and other buildings of the 1560s.

There are, moreover, letters from an Ottoman correspondence with the Safavid Shah Tahmâsb, probably beginning in 1556, in which he also offered very large carpets for Süleymaniye and asked for details of sizes, border patterns and the central designs required. If the offer was accepted, they must have taken more than a decade to weave and must be those, therefore, which Verantius (Vrančić) lists among the presents offered by Shah Tahmâsb in 1567 to Selim II on his accession: they were too large even for seven men to carry.

POTTERY AND TILES

In the thirteenth century the tilework of Anatolia was in the forefront of innovation in the Middle East, though the fall of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm in 1308 was followed by a virtually complete break. Its revival was under foreign stimulus: the magnificent tilework of the Green Mosque at Bursa (dated 1421), in *cuerda seca* with opaque glazes in a colour range of green, yellow, turquoise, cobalt blue and manganese purple, was signed by craftsmen from Tabriz. Such tiles, which remained popular right up to the 1540s, when they were used for the mausoleum of Şehzâde Mehmed, unlike pottery, which in Islam is generally associated with fixed kiln sites, were often fired on the spot by gangs of itinerant artisans, and these may well have continued to come from Tabriz.

The most important Ottoman pottery was Iznik, the wares of which are first mentioned in the kitchen accounts of Mehmed the Conqueror for 1469-73 as *çini-i Iznik*, evidently blue and white pottery, though confusingly *çini* is the standard modern Turkish for tiles. In the late fifteenth century Iznik had no monopoly, for recent archaeological work at Kütahya and analysis of dated blue and white wares show that potters were active there into the early sixteenth century, and this activity may well have continued at other potteries in Anatolia and Northern Syria. By the later sixteenth century, however, the authorities thought of Iznik as the only court pottery and sent all their orders, and complaints, to the *kadı* of Iznik, their financial representative there.

The rich designs of the early blue and white wares bear out the view that it was made to supply a demand from the Ottoman court for Chinese blue and white porcelains which, like all their contemporaries, the Ottomans prized highly but found difficult to obtain. The situation was reversed by Selim I's sack of Tabriz in 1514 and by his conquest of Egypt and Syria in 1516-7, followed by Süleymân the Magnificent's victorious campaigns in Persia and Iraq, notably of 1533-5 and 1548-9. The booty from these victories released a flood of fine Chinese blue and white, much of it Yuan and early Ming and much of it of monumental size. The manufacture of Kütahya or Iznik blue and white was doubtless not abandoned, for blue and white tiles appear in the complex of Çoban Muştafa Paşa at Gebze (datable c. 1522); but it is also probable that from then on it was no longer made with the court in mind. By the late 1520s, in any case, a group decorated with spiral scrolls in greenish black or cobalt blue, reminiscent remotely of the illuminated *tugras* of the period, for no compelling reason known as "Golden Horn" ware had come to the fore. This may have been largely made for the Italian export market, for whereas had come to the fore Venetian maiolicas of the 1520s show indebtedness to its designs its shapes are strikingly indebted to Italian prototypes. Practically no tiles of this design are known.

Other groups of blue and white pottery are much more closely connected with Chinese originals, most early Ming. These may have been court commissions, to make up services or replace broken porcelains, but the Iznik versions are scarcely ever exact copies. They often incorporate additional underglaze colors and may well have been for a wider market, for those with a taste for Ming decoration but without the means or the opportunity to acquire the porcelains.

The earliest evidence that the Iznik potteries were once again being patronised by the Ottoman court is a dated mosque lamp in the British Museum (Cumādā I 956/June 1549) from the dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. Additional evidence of court patronage is the finely proportioned and displayed Koranic inscription it bears, something which the Iznik potters could not execute without guidance and which must be after a cartoon sent from Istanbul. The commission is particularly important in that it belongs to the so-called Damascus group (because such pieces were originally thought to have been made there) and which had sometimes been alleged to be a transitional style, made between 1530 and 1560. Technically it is superb, with one of the widest ranges of underglaze colourants ever used by the potter, all wonderfully controlled and sharp and with a decorative range of motifs from abstract foliate compositions, and chinoiserie (*hatâyî*) cloud scrolls, to a wide range of naturalistic flowers, strongly drawn and brilliantly executed. If the Jerusalem mosque lamp was good enough for the palace these other polychrome vessels must also have been for the sultan's table. They have nothing at all transitional about them and very probably date from the latter part of Süleymân's reign. Although pottery of the "Damascus" group seems to fall into sets there is little evidence that services of it were made, nor are repeats at all common. Equally surprising is the virtual absence of tilework in this style. One exception may be the panels with rich foliage and pheasants and qilins on the facade of the Circumcision Pavilion (*Sünnet Odası*) in the Topkapı Palace, brilliantly executed in tones of cobalt and turquoise, which are most plausibly to be assigned to the later 1550s, when the Iznik potters were turning their production to tiles for the Ottoman court. It is evidently significant that the earliest imperial foundation for which Iznik underglaze painted tiles are known to have been ordered is Süleymaniye (inaugurated 1557): and these are associated with what is commonly regarded as a revolution in color tones. Underglaze red in ceramic technology has always been problematic. In the thirteenth century pottery of Syria and, sporadically, of fourteenth-fifteenth century Mamluk Egypt, a rather dull red sometimes appears, obtained by the use of an insoluble slip or earth color, and it may have been these experiments which led to the Ottoman discovery that Armenian bole (*kil-i ermenî*), a fine ferric red earth much used as a base for gilding (and also, to judge from royal kitchen registers, as a cure for indigestion) when thickly applied under a lead glaze could give a brilliant tomato red colour. With it, most probably because of altered firing conditions, went a markedly different range of colors.

The reasons why Iznik tiles were ordered for the mosque of Süleymaniye are unknown but the sequel was dramatic. They became high fashion and appear prominently in mosques, tombs and palaces of the 1560s to 1580s, practically all of them erected for Süleymân and his successors or for grand viziers like Rüstem Paşa or Sokollu Mehmed Paşa who were related to them by marriage. The tiles on these splendid Ottoman buildings are used in enormous numbers, which could not have occurred unless the potters had turned virtually exclusively to their manufacture. Iznik thus became for practical purposes a palace tileworks and the Ottoman authorities frequently complained in these years that because of the insistence of potters on making pottery "for strangers" tile quotas were not being kept up. Numerous sherd finds at Aleppo, Cairo-Fustat, Budapest, Belgrade, in the Crimea and in the Venetian lagoon show that some of this was bought by provincial governors; that some of the "strangers" were foreigners, who exported it in some quantity to Venice, whence it percolated to Northern Europe.

The quality of the tilework was, very strictly controlled indeed. The tiles themselves often show the use of stencils, an essential for mass production, and it is probable that some of these, notably for the floral panels in the mosque of Rüstem Paşa in Istanbul, were drawn up by professional draughtsmen. The documentary evidence suggests, however, that this was exceptional. Such cases would have included panels, *mihrabs*, or, for example, the pendentives of the mosque of Sokollu Mehmed Paşa at Kadırga Limanı (completed 979/1571-2), all of which required precise measurements of the space into which they must fit and which therefore must have been to scale. This presupposes that the architect, Sinân, carefully supervised the orders and their execution. But if sketches of motifs or single tiles were also made these almost certainly underwent considerable modification at the kilns, particularly with repeating designs, where cloud-scrolls, arabesques or feathery *sâz*-leaves might well require ingenious rearrangement or simplification to produce an overall repeating design which avoided dullness, heaviness or even incoherence.

ARCHITECTURE

John Hale has remarked that though playing a musical instrument, even composition, and poetry were part of the Renaissance gentleman's education it is noteworthy that no princes are known to have been architects or are at all known as painters. This is as true of Süleymân the Magnificent as it is of the Medici or the Gonzagas. But whereas the effects of patronage of the sumptuary arts were felt principally in the palace or only very indirectly upon the economy as a whole, Süleymân's architectural patronage transformed the great cities of the Ottoman Empire. The present appearance of the Topkapı Palace owes most to his immediate successors, Selim II and Murâd III, though the palace at Edirne is

ruined and there is no trace of the hunting pavilions at Plovdiv (Filibe) or on the outskirts of Istanbul (one of which, according to Busbecq, had doors on which was depicted the defeat of the Safavids at Çaldıran) in which he amused himself. The palace he built for İbrâhîm Paşa soon after his accession, however, now the Museum of Turkish and Islamic Art, gives a good idea of the grandeur of the great stone houses of Istanbul and Galata in the sixteenth century. But palace architecture in general is flimsy and subject to rulers' whims and it is to Süleymân's pious foundations, the rich endowments of which guaranteed their survival, that we must look for a proper idea of Süleymân's architectural patronage.

One of the first buildings Süleymân commissioned was the mosque of Selimiye in Istanbul for his late father, Selîm I. He then turned his attention to Mecca, where he restored the Harem and commissioned waterworks, and to Jerusalem, where he set to restore the Harem al-Sharîf. The earliest inscription of his reign on the Dome of the Rock is dated 1529, evidently just before his departure on the Hungarian campaign which culminated in the siege of Vienna; this is followed by a series of inscriptions commemorating works on the building, mostly of the 1540s, though they continue up to the 1560s, relating notably to the revetment of the exterior drum and the octagon with tiles made by craftsmen from Tabriz. Meanwhile, in a mere six months in 1536-7 a reservoir and a system of fountains were built inside the city; and between 1537 and 1540 the walls were restored, though there was little danger to Jerusalem except from marauding bands of Bedouins. The Crusader walls, contrary to general belief, seem only to have been partially dismantled in 1229, following the treaty between the Ayyubid ruler, al-Malik al-Mu'azzam 'Îsâ and Frederick of Hohenstaufen, and Süleymân's impressively florid inscriptions relate in fact to quite minor, piecemeal works. Part of the explanation why works at Jerusalem continued so long may be that, as later administrative documents show, men and building materials could not be had locally but had to be brought from Damascus.

More important, however, Sinân, the greatest of Ottoman architects and an administrative genius, was yet to appear on the scene. He entered the Janissaries in 1521 and had a distinguished career in the cavalry and the musketeers (*tuşençiyân*), though interestingly, in view of his appointment as court architect (*hâşşa mi'mâr*) in 1538, not in the engineers. His architectural experience seems to have been gained entirely from amateur projects, like the wooden bridge he erected over the River Pruth on Süleymân's Moldavian campaign of 1531. Lack of practical engineering experience must only have been a minor disadvantage, however, partly because ground plans were often stereotyped and architectural elements like vaults, squinches and arch profiles were well on the way to being standardised; and partly because safety factors in building were extravagantly high. Much of the building operations could

therefore be safely let to the masons and jobbing builders the authorities employed while Sinân exercised his essential responsibilities, organising and costing the labour for the larger works and conscripting and training staff or experimenting with new forms of spatial organisation. His achievement was immense: 477 buildings are reliably attributed to him, many of them still standing.

Among his earliest buildings in Istanbul was a complex ordered by Süleymân's beloved wife, Hürrem Sultan (945/1538-9), with a medrese, a soup kitchen and a Koran school for orphans, to which he later added a hospital: there is no evidence in its foundation charter that she intended this as a women's hospital, though by the seventeenth century, Evliyâ Çelebî reports, it had become partly a hospice for destitute women. In 948/1538-9 he built the tomb of Barbarossa at Beşiktaş and in 950-1/1543-4 work was begun on the funerary mosque of Şehzâde Mehmed, Süleymân's chosen heir. The mosque, which was completed in 1548, is, like many of the major mosques of Istanbul, fronted by a courtyard: Sinân for the first time accords its front and side entrances the status of facades and decorates them as such.

A series of smaller buildings for viziers and the royal ladies, notably for Mihrimâh, one of Hürrem's daughters, at Üsküdar (late 945/early 1548) was then followed by Sinân's greatest foundation, Süleymaniye, in the grounds of the Old Palace which up to its serious damage by fire in the late 1540s had been the private residence of the royal ladies and their households. Following the fire, Hürrem and her attendants moved across to the Topkapı Palace where she was installed in what was to become the Harem apartments, leaving the Old Palace as lodgings for ladies out of favour. Work began in 1550 and continued till after the inauguration of the mosque in 1557. A vast area was levelled, men and materials were collected from all over the Ottoman Empire, and the detailed account books have been brilliantly analysed by the late Ömer Lütfî Barkan to give a graphic picture of the labor force, pay and recruitment and the day to day progress of works. Architecturally the mosque is at the center of a complex of medreses and other institutions of learning, hospitals with provision for teaching as well as treatment, a bath and a well - endowed soup kitchen, all supplied with water from a complex of dams and collection points in the forest of Belgrade flowing across the aqueduct of Valens. These Kırkçeşme waterworks were in the eyes of Süleymân's successors one of the greatest achievements of his reign. The effect, partly determined by the lie of the land, which falls steeply from a central esplanade, is to emphasize the great mass of the mosque with its piled up domes, entirely without visual obstruction.

The foundation inscription was composed by the Şeyhülislâm, Ebüssu'ûd and executed by the calligrapher Hasan Çelebî, the adopted son of Ahmed Karahîşârî. For the first time in the history of Ottoman architecture Iznik tiles

were ordered to decorate the qibla wall. "Specially large" carpets for the mosque were ordered from Cairo and the Uşak area. And, as the account books and extant court orders reveal, the Janissaries were organised to mount a vast archaeological operation to locate and transport fine coloured marbles for the paving, door and window jambs and other architectural details of the interior. This operation was all the more necessary in that although the Ottoman sultans were fond of marble, the quarries on the island of Marmara which had provided most of the marble for the Eastern Mediterranean in the ancient world do not appear to have been worked between the death of Justinian and the late sixteenth century.

Possibly the most instructive episode in this search was for four great columns of pink Aswan granite for the mosque, which were first located at Alexandria in 1550, where a special landing stage had been built to take their weight. Orders were given for ships to bring them to Istanbul but it was summer 1552 before they actually left, during which time the four columns had dwindled to two; worse, only one of these arrived in Istanbul. Evidently before this the bad news reached the authorities and it was decided that the other pair of columns would be found at Baalbek: these were to be transported across the Lebanon on wooden sleds and loaded at Tripoli, but again there was a delay and Barkan calculates that the earliest they could have arrived in Istanbul would have been at the end of 1553. But again instead of the pair ordered only one arrived: The other could have been left behind at Tripoli, or it may have sunk in a winter storm. By this time the columns were urgently needed, so one was hauled from the Kızıtaşı in Istanbul (confusingly, the quarter took its name from the famous, though not always reliable, Byzantine Column of Virginity, which was porphyry). Puzzlingly, however, the columns used in Süleymaniye are not disparate but four of a set.

This progress, as reconstructed from the account books, the dispatches and the complaints which went back and forth across the Mediterranean, sounds most disorganised and scarcely creditable to Sinân; but we learn about it the wrong way round. A different complexion is put upon the search by the initial stipulation, right at the outset in 1550, of very exact specifications for the columns required from Alexandria, at a time when building works proper had barely begun. This must be because there was a specimen column available in the imperial stores: hence the initial order for *four* columns from Alexandria. When only one column arrived, the rethought plan, to order two columns from Baalbek, also needed to be revised. When only one of these arrived, further readaptations were necessary, for the Ottomans found granite too hard to work, and their conspicuous position in the mosque made it out of the question to conceal differences in height by using capitals or bases of varying heights. These heterogenous columns must therefore have been tacitly replaced by a matching set which must fortuitously have become available: this would not appear in the

accounts since they would have been replaced in the stores by the peripatetic columns which had caused so much trouble and delay.

Among Sinân's other major buildings in Istanbul are two mosques famous for their Iznik tilework, that of Rüstem Paşa (d. 1561), probably completed after his death, and that of another grand vizier, Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, completed in 979/1571-2, where the latter is approached dramatically by a steep stair from the basement. Though both rather small, with considerable standardisation of architectural elements and even materials (timber and blocks of stone of standard dimensions and cut are already prescribed in the Süleymaniye account books) they exhibit Sinân's genius in adapting basic plans to difficult or cramped sites. In the latter case the mosque and its appurtenances are on a terrace cut from the steep hill which dominates the Kadirga Limanı: the elevation is almost exaggeratedly tall, as if to match the steep slope behind the building. A third Istanbul mosque, for Mihrimâh Sultân, the widow of Rüstem Paşa, built at the Edirnekapı between 1562 and 1565, is an experiment in another direction, carrying the use of glass in an Ottoman building almost to its architectural limits.

Sinân's activity in planning and supervising building all over the Ottoman Empire was immense. On the royal road to Edirne, the summer capital of the sultans, he built, for example, a chain of bridges across the lagoons at Büyükçekmece (completed 975/1567-8) following a flood which caught Süleymân there in September 1563, and transformed the town of Lüleburgaz in 977/1569-70 with a large covered market, baths and a caravansaray large enough to accommodate, travellers stated, 1000 men and their beasts. At Edirne itself, between 1569 and 1572 he erected what he regarded as his masterpiece, the mosque of Selîm II. Like the buildings at Lüleburgaz, the ampleness of its scale demonstrates that his highly compressed foundations at Istanbul were prompted by the need to use space to maximum effect.

Throughout his long career Sinân had shown a preoccupation with the structure and plan of Haghia Sophia which, Aptullah Kuran has perspicaciously observed, was more of an inspiration to Ottoman architects than it was to be Byzantines. In 1573 he was called upon to strengthen the fabric, and the result of these works was the two minarets on the southwest and the northwest. This commission was as difficult as any major building project, calling for considerable experience in statics, without much guarantee of success. It had an interesting, if not wholly successful, sequel, the mosque of Kılıç (Uluç) 'Alî Paşa on the Bosphorus below Tophane (988/1580-1), which is very much a miniature Haghia Sophia: but despite the abundance of windows the dome seems to be just too low to let the light in. This exemplifies a tendency that was widespread in fifteenth century Mamluk Cairo, to ignore the fact that smaller versions even to scale are rarely as effective as the larger buildings they copy.

Even before his death at an advanced age (his tomb at Süleymaniye is dated 996/1587-8) Sinân was a famous personality and was held even by his contemporaries as the nonpareil of Ottoman architects. The sheer number of buildings he erected, which did more than any builder to give Istanbul its present aspect, and his many spatial experiments which left little room to his successors, more than justify their encomia and his European reputation. It is more difficult to determine how much of a theoretician he was, for he left no treatises and his biographers give few judgements on his aesthetic principles. Even with the greatest of his piles like Süleymaniye or Selimiye at Edirne he was evidently primarily concerned with the need to create a single interior space without visual barriers, and his boldest experiments are less structural than spatial. He was less of a Brunelleschi therefore, than an Alberti or Palladio.

As for Sinân's actual responsibility for the buildings attributed to him, he had a staff of junior architects and contractors, and in a few cases the sole contribution of the court architect's office may have been a plan, the realization of which could be left to the builders on the spot. As court architect, his prime responsibility was for the sultan's works, so that, for example, during the building of Süleymaniye his constant presence was required to supervise the works. For the works at Selimiye he resided at Edirne, leaving a deputy in charge of current works at Istanbul. He was, therefore, very probably personally responsible for the renovations and repairs for Selîm II in the Topkapı Palace following the fire of 972/1574, when the kitchens were rebuilt and a substantial bath was added adjoining the Treasury apartments, and again when Murâd III refurbished and extended the Harem quarters (1578). The considerable scope of these alterations makes it difficult to determine what Süleymân himself built inside the palace walls, but it was in his reign that the Topkapı Palace was transformed from an administrative center, treasury and armory into the sultan's residence and that of his ladies.

By no means all the pious foundations attributed to Sinân were state works, at least in the sense that some were for viziers. Was he paid for these over and above the per diem of 55 *akçe* he received from the sultan? It is conceivable that in the gaps between imperial works he was accorded freedom to take on private commissions. But so many viziers were allied by marriage to sultans that their works may have counted virtually as the sultan's, not as private commissions at all. For they also received special grants of land for the endowment of pious foundations and with these doubtless came the services of the sultan's architect too.

TECHNOLOGY

Any survey of technology in the reign of Süleymân the Magnificent must take account of the passion of his court for European clocks and watches. They were less timepieces than elaborate automata, planetaria or mechanical organs, often to the detriment of their accuracy, and as the sixteenth century progressed they were collected all over Europe, from England to Muscovy. Among early pieces designed specifically for the Ottoman market, Marino Sanuto in 1531 records a gold ring with a minute watch set in the bezel. In 1541 the embassy from Ferdinand of Austria suing for peace presented to Süleymân a magnificent silver planetarium which had been made regardless of cost for Maximilian I. In 1543-4 François I presented Barbarossa, who was wintering at Toulon, with a clock which was also a terrestrial globe and in 1547 he sent to Süleymân a combined table fountain and clock made at Lyons. In this same year the Ottoman treaty with Austria included a stipulation that the annual tribute (euphemistically described as *Türkenverehrung*) should be partly in clocks, which must all be novelties: four such clocks were sent the following year, with a clockmaker to ensure that they were all in working order when they arrived.

By the end of Süleymân's reign clockmakers were probably resident in Istanbul, but the regularity with which new clocks arrived from Europe left little incentive to repair broken pieces. Not only was their mechanism elaborate; their decoration and manufacture involved the collaboration of goldsmiths, enamellers and jewellers as well, and in the latter decades of the sixteenth century the effects they employed - elephants with rolling eyes, dancing figures in Turkish costume, singing birds and other conceits in rather dubious taste - show little regard for Ottoman sensibilities. There are drawings from the early 1570s for comparatively sober clocks for the grand vizier, Soğollu Mehmed Paşa and those destined for the sultan may have been deliberately restrained in their effects: for the rest we have to reconstruct their appearance from contemporary European inventories or chronicles, for even in the great European collections very few of them survive.

What was the reason for their extraordinary popularity at the courts of Süleymân and his successors? As Busbecq noted, the *'ulemâ* calculated the times of prayer astronomically and instead of the 24 equal hours which were standard practice in European clockmaking they divided each day and each night into 12 hours, so that a European clock would only have told Turkish time properly on the equinoxes. Accurate timekeeping for short periods would, moreover, have been quite adequately catered for by the Ottoman hourglasses in everyday use. They must therefore have admired their rich decoration, their elaborate mechanisms and, sometimes, even their jokes, but as toys, not Renaissance machines demonstrating the principles of physics. Their influence upon Ottoman technology was thus somewhat limited, though their popularity at the court certainly stimulated a wider demand for simpler or cheaper watches in Istanbul.

Among the pioneers of this movement was a Syrian astronomer, Takīūddīn (1525-85), who ultimately became the director of Murād III's short-lived observatory at Tophane and who wrote the only known sixteenth century treatise in Europe on the making of weight-driven or spring-driven clocks. Suggestions that in his youth he studied in Rome have not been substantiated and he must have learned to make his clocks by experimenting on broken European clocks in the palace. By 971/1563-4, he reports, he fulfilled an order to build a clock showing the Islamic prayer times and the Western months, an enterprise of considerable mechanical sophistication. He exploited his theoretical treatise in the instruments he made for the Tophane observatory designed for the calculation of new star tables to correct those made for Ulugh Beg in Samarkand in the mid-fifteenth century. The sad episode of the destruction of the observatory in 1579 on the orders of the *Şeyhülislām*, possibly a panic reaction to the appearance of a comet in 1577-8 which sowed terror in the Ottoman dominions, lies outside the scope of the present survey. But the result was the suppression of Takīūddīn's treatise and his experimental works.

It is still far too soon, however, to conclude that he was the only astronomer of note in Süleymân's reign, and in other branches of sciences we still know very little of the herbalists or botanists, pharmacists and surgeons who were appointed to the teaching school at Süleymaniye, to the hospital endowed by Hürrem Sultan in Istanbul or to the great hospitals of Damascus and Cairo. Study of their careers and their works would do much to correct the current impression that scientific activity in Süleymân's reign was negligible. As an example one may cite a recently published innovative treatise on dentistry, with additional information on curing colds and embalming a corpse, written in Turkish and with an Arabic preface by Süleymân's chief physician, Moses Hamon (c. 1480-1554) in the Institute for Medical History at Cerrahpaşa in Istanbul. Moses Hamon was the son of a Jewish physician from Granada who came into the service of Bâyezîd II and who then accompanied Selîm I on his Egyptian campaign of 1516-7. He certainly wrote Ottoman Turkish and Aramaic and the present manuscript is probably autograph; he also knew Spanish, Persian and Hebrew. His treatise is the oldest manual of dentistry in Islam, depending partly upon European works, partly on clinical experience and partly upon classical Islamic medical treatises, including those of al-Râzî, Ibn Sîna and Abû'l-Qâsim.

Moses Hamon's distinction aroused much envy. Eventually he was forced into a public disputation with Muslim doctors on the correctness of his treatment of Süleymân's chronic gout with opium, was defeated, disgraced and soon afterwards died. His considerable library which on his death was valued at more than 5,000 ducats was then dispersed. It contained numerous rarities, including an illustrated *Materia Medica* of Dioscorides made in 512 AD for the Byzantine princess, Juliana Anicia. Though Busbecq complains in his letters that it was too

expensive for him to buy, it found its way into the Habsburg collections and is now one of the jewels of the Nationalbibliothek in Vienna.

The theological sciences also flourished in the reign of Süleymân the Magnificent, most probably under the stimulus of opposition to the militant Shi'ism of Safavid Iran, though that may ultimately have hardened the attitude of the 'ulemâ to secular innovation. Conspicuous among the theologians was Ebûssu'ûd Efendî, the *seyhülislâm* of Süleymân for almost thirty years. His efforts to harmonise Ottoman administrative law (*kânûn*) with the teaching of the *shari'a*, a considerable achievement which is discussed elsewhere in the present volume, are an interesting demonstration of the openmindedness of certain of the Ottoman 'ulemâ in this period. He was a competent poet, particularly in Arabic and did important services to Ottoman popular culture in declaring officially that the Karagöz theatre with its shadow puppets and the *Dîvân* of Hâfiz were both consistent with the practice of orthodox Islam.

FLORICULTURE

A significant feature of culture in the reign of Süleymân the Magnificent, noted by most Europeans and even in some official documents of his reign, is the importance of flowers in gardens, in poetry and in art. The floral vocabulary of Ottoman poetry—roses, hyacinths, lilies, violets, jasmine, peonies, tulips with its rich symbolism was held in common with Persian literature and doubtless is heavily indebted to it; but there is little evidence for advanced floriculture in contemporary Safavid Iran.

There is a well known letter in Ferîdûn's *Münşedî* ordering half a million hyacinth bulbs from the hills behind 'Azâz in North Syria for the imperial gardens (Would they all have been of the same kind? Perhaps that did not matter.), and orders from the Ottoman archives relate to the planting of rose bushes and fruit trees in the palace gardens at Edirne; but there is no surviving sixteenth-century Ottoman manual of gardening. We must therefore look elsewhere for information, to European travellers and to the representation of flowers in Ottoman art. Of the travellers Pierre Belon du Mans (in Turkey in the 1540s) and Busbecq, the Austrian ambassador in the 1550s and early 1560s, are the most valuable. The former has a short chapter in his *Observations de plusieurs singularitez* on the Turks' favourite flowers, iris, carnation, tulip, lily (*Lilium pomponium*, the red Turk's cap lily) and *Prunus*, which he noted were sold as cut flowers and which indeed appear on the float drawn by the florists of Istanbul in their procession in the Hippodrome before Murâd III in 1582 depicted in the *Sâr-nâme*. Belon also describes the flower markets, where hawkers sold bulbs or rare plants from remote parts of the Ottoman Empire, many of which were introduced into Western Europe in the sixteenth century and cultivated as

florists' flowers, though, probably, few of them were already of cultivated varieties.

Ottoman Turkey is particularly associated with the history of the tulip. The word derives from *dülbend* ("turban"), which suggests large oval double flowers, as with the modern garden Turban *Ranunculus*, themselves originally forms of *Ranunculus asiaticus* cultivated in Ottoman Turkey.

The source of the report that Busbecq introduced the tulip to Europe is not his letters but the *Rariorum Plantarum Historia* of Charles de l'Escluse (Carolus Clusius) (Antwerp 1601), who states that seed and small bulbs of *Tulipa "praecox"* (Clusius' species are not, of course, Linnaean) were brought or sent from Istanbul and left with him by Busbecq in 1569, when he had been away from Turkey for almost seven years. It was intensely cultivated from 1575 onwards and five years or so later, when the bulbs had been brought to flowering, a spectacular variety of colors had been raised. They were evidently hybrids, which gives an indication that in Turkey they were cultivars, not from the wild, since Clusius notes some forms were closer to *Tulipa "serotina"* or to *T. "dubia"*, the latter possibly the modern *Tulipa praestans*. But of course, Clusius and his contemporaries were already familiar with the genus *Tulipa*. His attention had been drawn to it many years previously by the Italian naturalist, Ulysse Aldrovandini, who had sent him *Tulipa appenina* from Bologna and *T. narbonnensis* from the Cévennes. In the 1570s and 1580s Clusius introduced yet other kinds of tulip from Istanbul, mostly sent at his request by the Habsburg ambassador, David Ungnad, as well as double narcissi, double anemones, double ranunculi, giant fritillaries, Turk's cap lilies, irises, hyacinths, *Crocus vernus* and the quaintly misnamed *Scilla peruviana*, which came not from Peru but from Turkey or Persia (*pervâne* in Ottoman Turkish and in Persian means "moth" or "elegant young man"). Although some of these must have been new species most were not botanical but commercial innovations, showing both the extent of Ottoman floriculture and the vigorous reaction of the Istanbul market to increased demand from European naturalists.

As for the naturalistic flowers in art it is scarcely a coincidence that in Europe the period 1550-70 saw the rise of printed illustrated botanical works, the illustrations of which circulated widely. Clusius' own *Historia plantarum rariorum* gives particular attention to bulbous species and in spite of the plants flooding into Europe from the New World and the Indies is far more interested in Asian and Near Eastern species. Though for the moment it must remain conjecture the occurrence of, for example, naturalistic Gentian stems on Iznik wares and of other plants of greater botanical than horticultural interest in illumination may well derive from published European engravings of them. In illumination this naturalism is most striking in two manuscripts of Süleymân's verse, the *Divân-ı Muhibbî*, both dated 1566, one with waxed stencilled marginal

ornament (Topkapı Palace Library R. 738 mük), including violets, tulips, narcissi, irises, Turk's cap lilies, Dianthus, roses, hollyhocks, Prunus, Centaurea (Sweet Sultan) or some other composite, Lychnis chalconica, hyacinths and primroses. The latter (Istanbul University Library T 5467), even more sumptuously illuminated, by Kara Memî, at this point the chief of Süleymân's decorators (*sernakkâşân*), has comparable marginal decoration more elaborately executed, and exquisite floral vignettes between each poem.

None of even this rich variety, however, can compare with paper collages in two albums (Istanbul University Library F. 1426; Vienna, Nationalbibliothek, Cod. mixt. 313), the latter made for Murâd III in 1572 before his accession as sultan and the former conceivably made for Süleymân. They represent gardens in spring or early summer, with flowering trees, flowering vines and a rich undergrowth of bulbous and herbaceous plants, of both the standard varieties and species like cyclamen, crocuses or colchicums, Ranunculus, Judas trees, columbines, delphiniums or larkspurs, lilacs, anemones and Muscari, which are rarely depicted elsewhere in Ottoman painting. Practically all those shown are spring flowering, and are doubtless the pictorial equivalent of the celebration of spring in lyric poetry. What did an Ottoman garden look like in autumn? It is probably no accident that by the reign of Süleymân the art of paper flowers was also highly developed, making it possible to have lilacs, tulips and hyacinths all the year around.

CONCLUSION

Süleymân the Magnificent may not have been more devoted to the arts than his predecessors and, for example, Murâd III's commissions for the imperial library were on a far greater scale. But his reign was distinguished by unlimited means and by the fact that his conquests tapped a far larger reservoir of skilled craftsmanship.

Colossal expenditure on war, politics or the arts has always brought out the censoriousness of historians. Süleymân has suffered no less than the eighteenth century European monarchs conventionally called "the Great," who perhaps merited the title less than he, and has been charged with being ultimately the cause of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. But the drain in money and men to the Ottoman Empire in the 1560s was still more than balanced by the *devşirme*, by prisoners or conscripts, by tribute and by colossal booty from victorious campaigns. The social structure was systematized, the bureaucracy was powerful, and if it did not always perfectly respond to the needs of the Ottoman administration of what other system can better be said? Süleymân's successors were of lesser stature, but it would be absurd to argue that his prodigality, rather than their errors, was directly responsible for disasters like that of Lepanto in

1571. Süleymân's reign marks the cultural apogee of the classical age of the Ottoman Empire. To suggest that his expenditure on patronage of the arts would have been better diverted to reinforcement of the Ottoman army or navy amounts to historical impertinence.

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ART AND CREATIVE THINKING IN THE REIGN OF SÜLEYMÂN THE LAWGIVER

Godfrey GOODWIN

This paper is concerned with creative thinking in the art and architecture of the Ottoman court and with the role of *Ķânûnî* (the Lawgiver) Süleyman as a patron. In this context it is to be stressed that a great patron cannot influence the culture of his state single-handed any more than he can codify and establish new laws without the work of sophisticated jurists or achieve victories on the battle field without generals. What matters is his example and what also mattered in the 16th century was the accumulation of wealth and its dispersal without which costly albums and monuments cannot be achieved.¹

These considerations are relevant to any assessment of the creative importance of Süleymân, but not because he may be denigrated or belittled, as an individual of singular energy and intellectual enterprise for the greater part of his reign. Yet the florescence of the arts in his time and after should be recognized to be product of previous decades. Nor was this renaissance fully achieved before his death since both the greater Ottoman miniatures and the ultimate achievement of Ottoman architecture were to come after he had died in 1566, far from home in his royal tent.

Or was it far from home? During his reign of 46 years more than ten were spent on campaign or in winter quarters² while we have no clear idea how much time he spent on short visits to here or there including the minimal week of hunting along the road to Edirne to stay at the palace there which was in effect a magnificent hunting lodge infinitely preferable as a residence to the old palace or the new one (now called Topkapı Sarayı) in the capital. Yet for better or for

¹Even Peter the Great encouraged his wealthier subjects to imitate his building program and, whatever the nobility may have done, *nouveaux riches* under Louis XIV were patrons in their own right if on a more modest scale.

²At least 20 months on the Persian expedition of 1548-9 and 23 months including two winters on that of 1553-5. See D. E. Pitcher, *A Historical Geography of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1972), pp. 111-2.

worse the huge cosmopolis of *Ḳoṣṭanṭīniyye*, erstwhile Byzantium or Constantinopolis and today Istanbul,³ was the heart of his dominions, the mouth of the dragon in the opinion of his enemies but of a gentler creature when viewed from within, one that grazed the meadows of learning and poetry and established universal justice. Contemplating the thronged lanes and markets one is brusquely aware of the struggle for power between the various social forces of a plethora of people bound by their strictly regulated station in life: the ruling elite divided between the fading aristocracy of long free Moslems and those products of the "Enderûn College" and other royal schools from which the ruling majority, culled by the *devşirme* system at first from the Balkans but later from Anatolia too, emerged triumphantly after the conquest in 1453;⁴ the judiciary and teachers who were for a time divided between the usual fundamentalists and the more liberal group of mathematicians and physicians in the budding; the guilds with their essentially conservative function;⁵ foreign merchants now not only Venetian or Genoese; and, not least, widows and orphans. And above all these like yeast, yet kept under most of the time, was the sometimes bloody mob such as the dung scavengers of Yedikule who threatened the peace of the city as late as 1826.

It was a city all too self-sufficient at times with its orchards and market gardens and the produce of the sea, retaining a contempt for Anatolia which had been traditional from Byzantine times as long ago as the Fathers of the Church, who wrote of it as a land of mud and dust from which to escape: just as the swollen population of the great cities of modern Turkey testify nowadays.

But as with 19th century Paris, in this conglomeration of disparate influences power was forged while rights were preserved — or more or less — for the sultan's diversity of subjects,⁶ and sultans were pretty diverse themselves if one treats maternal origins with their due respect — diversity of trades and skills of talents and training, because of the disparate religions and sects within religions, not to count the arrivals and departures of dervishes, European envoys and traders and the farrago of seamen in a port greater than Marseilles in its commercial importance. Such diversity, however, was seen as a whole by the administration which was also concerned for Anatolia and the whole empire in a way that the citizen in his selfishness was not. It was not just, say, that the office of chief architect kept a register of villages with skilled craftsmen on

³The last offices of government had been removed there in the reign of his father, Selim I.

⁴S. Şihaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1976), p. 58.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁶The sultan's *re'dyâ* or flock. See H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age, 1300-1600* (London, 1973), p. 67.

whom to call⁷ and also where supplies of marble might be had:⁸ the keeping of registers was the outward expression of an inward conviction that a unified vision of the empire was essential. Istanbul, therefore, for so long as economic prosperity sustained it — and even in times of recession the city had some of its own momentum to bolster the depression — contributed to the intellectual achievements of the age. There were the students who went to the colleges on their merits and broke down the rigid hereditary barriers put up by the wealthiest judicial families and there was the populace who enjoyed that popular art and the festivities⁹ which were the essential undergrowth out of which the great plane trees of court artists and architects were to grow.

One aspect of the unity between court and populace was to be maintained during Süleymân's reign. On his accession, he lived across the city from Topkapı Sarayı. Although he had many pavilions there in which to pass the night including the grand Çinili Köşk built by Mehmed II, nonetheless he rode to and from his residence to the seat of government four or five days in a week. The Ottoman House's right to the sultanate grew from popular support in the 14th century and some vestiges of those days of brotherhood and of the sultan walking among his people remained.¹⁰ Any subject still had the right to petition his sultan at his stirrup and this right was exercised during the 16th century whenever the monarch rode in public. There is the well-known miniature of the old woman complaining to Süleymân, when he was hunting in the Balkans, of his soldiers robbing her.¹¹ It was significant acknowledgement recorded in the royal records that this right had not been abrogated. The right was, however, highly inconvenient as the late Susan Skilliter demonstrated in her account of the ladies-in-waiting to Catherine of Medici¹² when their mother pestered sultan and grand vezir morning and night to bring back her daughters who were happily married into the French nobility after having had the luck, as it proved, to be captured and sold by Christian pirates.¹³ The mother persisted day after day, both

⁷Ö. L. Barkan, *Süleymaniye Camii ve İnşaatı*, 2 vols. (Ankara, 1972-9) for a full account.

⁸See also J. M. Rogers, "The State and the Arts in Ottoman Turkey," in *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 14 (1982): 283-313.

⁹Never more so than with circumcision festivals from the humble to the sultan, or with the guild processions. See Evliyâ Çelebi, tr. J. von Hammer, *Narrative of Travels in Europe, Asia and Africa*, (London, 1834), I: 104-250.

¹⁰See the anonymous Ottoman Chronicle quoted in B. Lewis, *Islam*, Vol. I (New York, 1974), pp. 135-6.

¹¹Woman complaining to Süleymân when hunting, *Süleymânâme*. Also see Çelebi Sultan Mehmed punishing thieves for stealing honey on the way to the Wallachia campaign in Nakkaş 'Osman's *Hünernâme*.

¹²S. A. Skilliter, "Catherine de Medici's Turkish ladies-in-waiting: a dilemma in Franco-Ottoman diplomatic relations," in *Turcica*, VII (1975): 188-204.

¹³R. Hatton, *George I* (London, 1978), p. 100. Mehmed was made Baron Königstreu in the peerage of Hanover in 1716 and Muştafa was his personal valet. Both appear in the fresco on the grand staircase at Kensington Palace, London.

French and Ottoman governments were perplexed and embarrassed and the grand vezir was driven to have a postern gate made by which he could leave and enter the palace unaccosted.

A considerable fire at the Old Palace enabled Hürrem to achieve the transfer of the sultan's harem to the Topkapı Palace and enabled women to hold that position of power and patronage which they were to maintain into the 19th century.¹⁴ With this the jigsaw is complete for it cannot be doubted that Hürrem, the wife of the sovereign, Mihrimâh, his daughter, and later,— since Hürrem predeceased her husband—the predominant female figure during the reign of her brother, Sefim II, and many others to come were women of determined character who had opinions about art just as much as they had political ambitions and the will to achieve their aims. There is no reason to suppose that the hospital and mosque built for Hürrem, her complex at Avretpazarı, or her noble bath complex at Ayasofya was built for this remarkable woman without her being consulted or without her journeying to inspect the work.¹⁵ And this would be true of Mihrimâh who built two mosque complexes in Istanbul and another for her husband, Rüstern Pasha, apart from various endowments outside the capital.¹⁶ This is also true of the beautiful mosque of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha at Kadırga where his wife, Esmâ Gevher Sultân,¹⁷ was not likely to have shown no interest.¹⁸

It only remains to descend the scale. Grand vezirs like Frenk İbrâhîm Pasha or Rüstern Pasha were men of great wealth.¹⁹ The first brought back a fortune from his successful viceroyalty of Egypt, where it should be noted he set taxation and judicial procedures on an acceptable course; the second achieved his fortune through a venality that was to rot the structure of the Ottoman state. All grand vezirs and lesser officers of state were endowed with widespread lands with revenues that could maintain them in the dignity of their office, indeed in splendour, and to a lesser degree this system descended rank by rank to the humble timar of a retired army officer. These estates were not hereditary but reverted to the crown which was an incitement to the temporary trustee to spend

¹⁴İncelik, op. cit., p. 78 et seq. N. M. Penzer, *The Harem* (London, 1936), plausibly suggests (on p. 135) c. 1541 as the date when the Harem moved from the Old to the Topkapı Palace.

¹⁵Haseki Complex, Avretpazarı, completed by Sinân 1539. Her splendid bath complex at Ayasofya built by Sinân (1556/7) has been the subject of a long and painstaking restoration.

¹⁶Mihrimah Mosque at Üsküdar, 1548, Rüstern Pasha Mosque, 1561-2, Mihrimah Mosque at Edirnekapi, c. 1562-5: all by Sinân.

¹⁷Sokollu Mehmed Pasha complex, Kadırga, 1571-2, Sinân.

¹⁸Married 1564. See A. Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty* (Ann Arbor and Oxford, 1956), Table XXXI.

¹⁹See Shaw, *History*, p. 90; H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* (Oxford, 1950) p. 178, n. 2.

the revenues and not husband capital for their improvement. Spending, alas, is beneficial to the arts.

This was a society which included artists and craftsmen escaping devastation or impoverished courts, where for so long as victories brought in booty and tribute it was almost impossible for art not to flourish. There was a natural impetus which was difficult to slow down even later when wits were sharpened and standards achieved through informed criticism built up little by little during Süleymân's reign.

It is said that of all the arts calligraphy is the most respected among Moslems. This respect is due to a skill which was dedicated to recording the ordinances of God, but this is not to limit its importance in secular times for it followed as the night the day that only the finest work was acceptable to the patron or more significantly to the calligrapher himself. Fine works fetched great sums but they were only fine because tradition had no mercy on the student who did not possess, firstly, aptitude and, secondly, devotion. Nor was it conceivable that there could be such a booby, not even if he were a sultan like Bâyezîd²⁰ II or Süleymân himself²¹ or Murâd III.²² In an aesthetic sense, calligraphy was hereditary with an ancestral tree of great masters just as the laying on of hands carried the papacy back to St. Peter. The Ottoman school traced its line back to Yâkûb who himself had his own ancestry. Among the greatest of these descendents was Hâmdullâh whom Bâyezîd I brought from Amasya when he came to the throne in 1481 and whose inkwell he was proud to hold.²³ Hâmdullâh was to die in 1519 but he left excellent pupils to succeed him.²⁴ Foremost was Aḥmed Kâraḥîşârî who lived on until the age of 90 in 1556. Although the great calligraphic roundels in the Süleymaniye mosque once attributed to him were probably the work of his students and, in any case have been several times restored, there seems to doubt that the designs were worked out by him. His influence is best preserved in the pounced İznik panels on the mihrab wall of the same mosque and, later on, on the fabulous waterfall of brilliant ceramic which is the mihrab wall of the mosque of Soḡollu Mehmed Pasha at Kadırğa. The inventiveness lies in the creation of large wheels of words where the name of God acts as if it were the spokes that make the wheel of fortune possible, achieving an inscription of unprecedented vitality. Not that Ottoman calligraphy was not and did not continue down into this century to be remarkable for its vigor. It is manifest in the panels over the windows of the

²⁰A. Schimmel, *Calligraphy and Islamic Culture* (New York, 1984), p. 71.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 72.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 72.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 23.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 24.

major mosques of the 16th century such as those of Süleymaniye, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, Rüstem Pasha and, in particular, of the Selimiye at Edirne.

Calligraphers created new forms of script during Süleymân's reign or at least variations on old forms²⁵ but the art had been long established in the Ottoman manner and the manuscripts written before Süleymân came to the throne were already of the finest quality. There was new excellence to achieve with the *tughras*, the embellished signatures of the monarchs, equivalent to the great seals of European monarchs. The issuing of firmans or edicts in councils of great importance developed two aspects of interest.²⁶ The divan or court script evolved because words had to crowd one upon the other in order to avoid insertions by the unscrupulous.²⁷ This resulted in lines of words like enchanted canoes travelling from one margin to the other. The *tughra* grew until it could assume majestic proportions which needed several sheets of vellum to be joined expertly together. These would then be embellished with floral designs of an exquisite refinement to cradle to forceful design the imperial name and titles with capitals in full sails resulting in very real works of art.

Because it was the most significant of the arts, calligraphy pervaded every material and surface in Moslem life. Helmets and swords, magical talismanic garments, crockery and all walls and windows were as liable to inscription as western streets are liable to graffiti. In earlier periods an illiterate potter might inscribe gibberish *faut-de-mieux*. In the 16th century, inlaid Koran boxes represent an emerging design with Italianate echoes which also spread to thrones and other furniture. They were margined by inscriptive bands which were unusually small and elegant but still vigorous. It could not be otherwise as we have seen when the all-pervading necessity for calligraphic excellence could never dull the significance of the word of God: an attitude totally opposed to the interest in typographic design and other qualities — which most readers of newspapers in the western world do not think to observe. News is transitory; decoration fades: but the name of God is everlasting and never decorative any more than the fierce countenance of a Byzantine Pantocrator or any other icon was decorative even at its most imitative since imitation was the aorta of its purpose which was the transmission of faith. So with a chosen Islamic script imitation of the greatest models was imperative. Materialist preoccupation with forgery was meaningless in both forms of art since in the eyes of God there is no bastardy.

The *alif* that proclaims the actuality of Allah is a formidable, if it is not terrible in the sense of *terribilitá*, statement of the Alpha and Omega, time past

²⁵Ibid, p. 71 and p. 15 for the example of *icâzet*.

²⁶*Osmanlı Padişah Firmanları*, (London, 1986), pp. 2-3.

²⁷Ibid, No. 14, pp. 52-3.

and present and to come. Any elegance in the lettering, and perfection of balance in the design were subordinate to this overriding force. It can hardly be by accident that the *alif* is a dramatic letter as is evident in Karahîşârî's wheels of the universe and this makes it a weapon in the armory of aesthetics as well as a spade in the garden of the Moslem soul. It is not necessary to be a believer to feel how strongly the white wording on panels of Iznik tiles runs across the blue ground²⁸ and how much of the force of the design is due to the divine nature of the message, known by heart or not, made palpable by the thrust of the *alifs*.

The form of the calligraphic styles had been established before Süleymân came to the throne but ideas continued to develop even with this most conservative of art forms. They were to modify these forms and continue to vitalize the art which was never to lose its inventiveness under the Ottomans. In other arts there was to be much more than this because theirs was the far greater freedom from fundamental constraints.

For here the claim is made that during Süleymân's reign individuals emerged as they had not emerged even under Mehmed II, the most westward looking of all the sultans. That they could never reach that freedom of thought prerequisite for the emergence of great individuals is witnessed by the scantiness of the personal records such as letters or diaries left behind them. Nonetheless, it was a period, however brief, when it was possible for a mind to shrug its shoulders and look around in a manner that religion and its absolutes had not permitted before.

In painting this meant the emergence of a clear-cut Ottoman style out of a matrix compounded of Herat and other schools. With ceramics and textiles it followed that designs were created that had digested past influences from China to Byzantine lands. Fabrics, for example, permitted the use of ever bolder and more self-confident displays producing sun-spanned symbolic robes²⁹ for ceremonial occasions quite other than the handsome patterns deriving from Sassanian and Byzantine eagles, the vine spirals of the universal Golden Horn type, cintamani waves and globes and so on; a dozen of which can be catalogued as routine from an inspection of the kaftans in the *Süleymânname*³⁰ along with the interesting uniform gold embroidered blue and red of the royal court or the luscious watered silk of the *Şeyh-ü'l-İslâm* and the *kâdî'askers*.

²⁸Or less frequently blue letters on a white ground. Both examples were often sparkling with flowers. The connection between calligraphy and the garden of Paradise was important.

²⁹H. Tezcan and S. Delibaş, tr. M. R. Rogers, *The Topkapı Palace Museum: costumes, Embroideries and Textiles* (London, 1986), Plate 20 and p. 48. Probably reign of Selim II. But No. 14 of giant velvet tulips on gold lame may be from Süleymân's period.

³⁰E. Atıl, *Süleymanname, the Illustrated History of Süleyman the Magnificent* (New York, 1986).

When Süleymân came to the throne Ottoman miniature painting had still to create its own image although portraiture was never to be forgotten as an element nor the integral importance of people and event as opposed to what must have seemed to be the increasingly decadent elegance and sweetness of the limp colors of the Persian schools. The painters were a motley lot as listed by Dr. Atıl or elsewhere³¹ arriving from the west as well as from the east and possibly at some time kept apart.³² The digestion of these disparate influences was to last the whole reign long and Süleymân was not to see the synthesis eventually achieved. His *Süleymânname* was an impressive essay in the visual sense but only truly Ottoman with respect to its marginal decoration. It was not a work to compare with those of such masters as Lokman³³ and his history of Sultan Süleymân nor with the *Nuşretname* of Muşafâ 'Âli that were to come later in the century.³⁴

There are elements deliberately copied or, rather, learnt by rote and even passages added by apprentices who, one hopes, were employed on painting monotonous rows of tufts of grass which are the braille of Persian miniatures but which, alas, have nothing to say. This grass must surely have been mechanically stippled on by oddly unobservant subordinates, to boot, for it can climb up towers and castle walls, confusing hills with architecture, and in some instances grow on doors.³⁵ People, however, the life blood of the Ottoman miniaturist revolution that they are, seem as if painted by someone quite apart, almost as if cutouts pasted on.³⁶ This is also true of some of the details of river banks and flowers sheared by whoever silvered the water by which they grow. Sometimes courtiers can float like somewhat solid spooks because tile floors and dados merge because they were not understood in architectural terms.³⁷

Here, again, set patterns derivative from Persian traditions are imperfectly applied and again one is driven to believe that these monotonous details, whether copied or not, were delegated to junior painters. This is not simply a problem of different concepts of perspective nor even of weak training in handling Islamic

³¹I. Stchoukine. *La peinture turque*, part I (Paris, 1966), pp. 25-26. At Süleymân's accession ten masters were working in the saray studios since the reign of his grandfather, Bâyezîd II. Six more and six students joined it under Selim I and 13 new masters were recruited between 1520 and 1525. Several were Persian including three from Tabriz. Four were sons of Persians, from Isfahan. Two Rumis had worked first in Amasya. There were also two Albanians, a Circassian, a Moldavian and 14 Turks. The students included a Hungarian. In 1558 there were 28 Turks led by Kara Memi, the best student of Şâhşûli, seven Persians mostly from Tabriz, one Hungarian and one Frank.

³²Possibly rightly judging by the internecine squabbles of art historians today.

³³Chester Beatty library, No 413, Folio 10.

³⁴TPL, H. 1365, 33 b.

³⁵Atıl, nos 13 and 30: The siege of Rhodes and the Divan meeting, for examples among several.

³⁶Ibid. See Süleymân's accession (No. 1) or receiving the ruby cup (No. 57) among several scenes.

³⁷Which casts doubts on the authenticity of any of the architectural details in palace scenes.

perspective nor of undigested influences from similar Byzantine concepts which were readily understood and applied when artists needed to cope with birds' eye views of towns. If Byzantine perspective were out of tune with that of the emerging Florentine vision of the later 14th century and after it was never weak in aim or in the geometrics required to achieve that particular all-embracing oversight of events, events that need not be simultaneous. In the *Süleymânâme* the artist often selected as if by spotlight that central action round which peripheral events could occur and it is noteworthy that due to Persian influence lesser figures are often as unobservant of the central event as were our apprentices with their tufts of grass. This aloofness was eliminated when Ottoman miniatures came to maturity.

While some of the scenes in the *Süleymânâme* fail to create a sense of buildings being three-dimensional, in particular when depicting castles, others do: most often when showing a town³⁸ proving that some of the painting team were aware of compacted and solid form. For this reason it has been long a very reasonable deduction that a scene such as that showing the recruitment by boys for the devşirme in a Balkan village with its grassy platform and also its faithfully recorded background village, each decidedly three-dimensional, was the work of an artist with western roots.³⁹ But it must be remembered that Christian art in Istanbul and the Balkans as opposed to Italy was still Byzantine, a fact of which painters in Istanbul could hardly have been unaware unless blinded by an improbable and universal degree of pigheadedness.

It is also notable that the *Süleymânâme* has traces of that sense of humor or of the comic which, along with the *Karagöz* and the *Orta Oyunu*, fireworks and buffoonery, were lively elements in Ottoman society. In this context it is permissible to study the simple curve of a character's lips, the inflection of an eyebrow or a tell-tale gesture. Nor should a magnifying-glass be applied simply to human features or fingers. It should also survey the heads of a large number of horses, often the most alert among the spectators of a scene, and also other animals even if they are the victims of a hunt.⁴⁰

Less amusingly, there is also a concern for detail so that the historian can establish who carried a mace or the importance of headgear rather than any pattern on a robe as distinction of rank:⁴¹ whereas flora had no relation to the scene but

³⁸ *Atl.* Not at Estónibelgrad (No. 45) nor Buda (No. 26), but all the rest. The one castle which has three-dimensional strength is the only Persian example (No. 37).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, no. 3. The frescoes on exterior walls are well recorded as are the shingles on the roofs.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 210. J. M. Rogers, *op. cit.*, when writing of the miniature of Louis II in council remarks that some figures are shown as grotesques.

⁴¹ Rogers, *op. cit.*, for a full discussion of this robe, p. 48.

were copied from Persian tradition down to the streams worn like ribbons of orders of chivalry over the shoulders of hills.

The tooling of the cover of the *Süleymânname* is an early example of the *sâz* style.⁴² Refined by Şâhkulî and by Kara Memî, his foremost student, this style of the magic wood where the fanciful dragons dwell to the great glory of Ottoman drawing, as it proved, suited the Ottoman taste for colour and free movement. That the freedom was illusory can be seen in any medium where the style appears. The fabulous robe of Prince Bâyezîd, for example, is not an entanglement of flowers and leaves in darkness but a carefully evolved composition. The style transformed Iznik pottery and kindred centres at an ideal moment. It rid itself of the rigorous Islamic patterns richly used under the Seljuqs and digested the influence of Chinese blue and white porcelain (with the exception of the vine). It had abandoned the slim lines of the spinning circles of the Golden Horn style which was to linger on in the decoration of firmans, for example. Large flowers had been used dramatically on plates. Now at the end of Süleymân's reign, it adopted the *sâz* style along with that red for which Iznik was envied.

It was not just that reds and greens in themselves gave a new dynamic to the Iznik palette nor that designs in the new style were slavishly copied for they were modified to fill the round shape of a dish or the cylindrical body of a jug. It was that there was a new liveliness in the elements of the design that endowed leaves or tulips with a vitality which was inspiring. Indeed, there was a fertile recklessness in the snapping of a stem so that it might fit a composition. It was during Süleymân's reign that panels of tiles were created to adorn the wall of his mosque. There red flourishes and the work is of excellent quality but the floral patterns are small in comparison with the area that must be covered whereas the inscriptive panels and, above all, the roundels, ride triumphantly. In the memorial mosque of Rüstem Pasha the cladding of piers and gallery walls created a series of related panels sometimes curiously like dress lengths and always interesting in the particular. But the interior of an important mosque requires a grander sense of unity and bolder designs. Once again, the flowering of Iznik panels was to follow after the death of the sultan⁴³ but this is not to rob him of his importance as the sower of the seed.

To turn to architecture is to turn to Sinân about whom some very basic facts are known or partly known. Fortunately his major monuments are still

⁴²For a full discussion of this style in Ottoman art see W. Denny, "Dating Ottoman Turkish Works in the Sâz Style," *Muqarnas*, 1 (1983).

⁴³The great mihrab wall of the Sokollu Mehmed Pasha Mosque, Kadırga, Istanbul; the garden seen through arches outside the pavilion of Murâd III at Topkapı Palace; the panels in the türbe of Süleymân himself. All these are some examples among many.

standing together with many lesser works which, although inevitably altered in the course of 400 years, have only suffered superficially. It is therefore possible to perceive the development of his mind through his buildings in a way which is impossible with a host of lesser artists and architects.

A brief survey of Ottoman architecture before Sinân is intended to show how logically and almost implacably Ottoman architecture developed for the 250 years which were to culminate in the great university complex of the Süleymaniye in Istanbul. Without this introduction it is difficult to understand the extent and scale of the revolution which Sinân carried out in the second half of the 16th century or how his genius emerged from the chrysalis of the classical style which he himself had perfected with Şüleymân's complex. Yet the monumental dome of that mosque round which the colleges and charitable buildings were set was no more and no less clear in its symbolism than the first cubes surmounted by hemispheres which were the first Ottoman mosques and which were no bigger than rooms. Of the mosque of Ertogrul at Söğüt nothing but the foundations and the well remain that are original but this was the earliest Ottoman mosque which we know.⁴⁴ The prayer hall is so small that it must have been difficult for more than twenty men to assemble and perform their devotions all at the same time there. Such was the intimate nature of the emirate at its inception. But the meaning of the four-square room that is the world and of the dome that for all religions can only mean the sky, heaven, eternity or any approximation or combination of these is obvious.

The early Ottomans were to build innumerable village mosques which have either vanished or been rebuilt because the simple materials perished but a sufficient number of monuments erected with good quality brick or fine limestone survive to show that however the theme may have varied, recesses created within the thickness of wall as with the mosque of Orhan at Bilecik, for example, this symbolic unit was invariable until the 16th century.

It was therefore logical to suppose if a single unit with as wide a span of dome as local craftsmen could achieve was not large enough to contain a growing Moslem congregation at noon on Friday — and by the 15th century the builders' abilities had been stretched as far as they could go without risking a collapse such as had happened often enough in Europe — then the logical step was to add a second domed unit of similar size and this indeed happened with early mosques in Bursa and later that of Gedik Ahmed Pasha at Afyon,⁴⁵ of Mahmûd Pasha at Istanbul,⁴⁶ or Bâyezîd II at Amasya.⁴⁷ With the Ulu Cami or Great Mosque at

⁴⁴Totally rebuilt by Sultan 'Abdül'azîz with a lead instead of a tile roof.

⁴⁵Completed H891/1486.

⁴⁶H877/1472.

⁴⁷H869/1464.

Bursa⁴⁸ which was built before these three, no less a total than 24 domed units were assembled. The effect is one of great strength because of the proportion of space to supporting piers characteristic of Ottoman architecture. It was not at all related to the mystical and poetic flood of vistas that open up, say, at the Umayyad mosque at Cordova with its columns and multiple columns.

The sense of strength is important because it is one that neither Sinân in the 16th century nor his successors were to relinquish. It was the result of that great tradition of stonemasonry in the territories under Ottoman rule. The conquest of Anatolia by the Seljuks and Danişmends and other leading clans — in opposition to the Turkmen nomads who scavenged but did not sow — meant the absorption of large numbers of the existing settled inhabitants of the region⁴⁹ and the inevitable employment of their skills as builders particularly in stone about which the conquerors coming from a brick architectural region knew little.⁵⁰ It is not therefore surprising that elements of Armenian, Georgian or Byzantine architecture, for these styles vary to some degree, recurred under Moslem rule but it is remarkable how the Ottoman domed unit made a mark so that it is difficult if not impossible to mistake an early Ottoman building for a Seljuk predecessor although both served the same functions.

The governing factor could only be the mathematics of span. Initially this was of arches carried from pier to pier or simply from corner to corner of a simple square building. Later, and much more subtly, the arches rode from freestanding column to freestanding column. A monolithic shaft such as the Byzantines used, and which the Ottomans reused, controls the width of an arch proportionately to its own height and diameter. If the span is too wide then the columns cave in even when tiebeams are used as they were by both Byzantines and Ottomans. The precision of the engineering based on the established Platonic and later Greek mathematics meant that the thickness of the walls was predetermined by the size of the columns available. It would indeed be foolhardy, which Ottoman builders were not, to start building before the available columns had been assembled.

Load sustaining piers were ribbed to express the springing of each subordinate arch just as the piers of Chartres Cathedral are compounds of shafts, each with its function. This becomes evident when the rib springs free of its pier at the proper height. Whether masonry is stone or brick or a combination of both, such an engineering system has to be used and, as always with architecture, the greater intellects disciplined the inherent limitations in order to express new

⁴⁸H802/1399-1400.

⁴⁹S. Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor* (Berkeley, 1971), p. 182.

⁵⁰Rogers, "The Çifte Minare Medrese, Erzerum and the Gök Medrese at Sivas," *Journal of Anatolian Studies*, 15 (1965): 76.

ideas and new conceptions of interior space. This is exactly what Sinân was to do with the four massive central piers of the mosque of Süleymân where the arches rise from their appropriate support like so many stalks in a tightly bound bunch of asparagus. If this geometry were to be successful, it was not simply that the support elements had to be of the correct proportions and therefore strength but that they had never to exceed those dimensions else the effect would be aesthetically disturbing. The piers would look clumsy as they do with the elephant feet, however frilled round with little curves though they are, of the mosque of Sultan Ahmed I in Istanbul.⁵¹

The extraordinary success of early Ottoman architecture was partly due to logic and the establishment of proportions which gave it cardinal strength: for what is seen from outside expresses what exists inside and this harmony of exterior and interior gives all Ottoman architecture that psychological sense of balance and calm which is also supported by the knowledge that its solution of the structural equation is perfect: not one stone less nor one more.

It is not simply that religious or domestic buildings can be read from the outside so that the function of each section is clear even before one enters in: it is the clarity and integrity of the forms that puts one at one's ease. The masking façades of North Italy, for example, would have appeared as an affront to an Ottoman architect just as much as the Hellenic period temple or those of South India which externalize all that they have to say would have been equally foreign to him.⁵² In short, the roots had the advantage of a long evolution through experience rather than by reading any texts or manuals. Without these no Sinân could have achieved a major work.

The mosque as such was not the common monument of early Ottoman architecture. Much more important were the mosque and *zâviye* combined, the latter being the meeting house of the *ahî* popular brotherhood which together with the dervishes was so important at first in establishing Ottoman rule. Since a mosque was the focal point of town or village life it was natural that these wanderers, along with more purposeful travellers proceeding step by step towards more definite destinations such as centers of learning or of political power,⁵³ should seek shelter at it and indeed mosques like the churches of Iceland had always been shelters. Raised on a platform with two or three steps the square unit of the prayer hall with its superior dome was dominant. In front of it was a court of the same dimensions domed against the inclement weather of Anatolia or the Balkans but with an oculus over its small central pool and sometimes

⁵¹H1018-25/1609-16.

⁵²Or the reverse with cave temples.

⁵³H. A. R. Gibb, *The Travels of Ibn Battuta, 1325-54* (London, 1959-61), p. 419.

fountain. On each flank of the court square alcoves also sat under their domes which were always lower than that of the mosque.

From these areas for daytime use opened retiring rooms with fitted shelves where travellers could retire at nightfall. Instead of a façade this group of six units was bounded by a portico which was a social center on warm days. It was at the northwest end of this portico that the minaret was more and more frequently built but originally its position was not fixed and it might even be freestanding if there were a minaret at all.⁵⁴ The mosque built by Fîrîz Bey at Milas⁵⁵ very logically took its minaret into its complex to erect it at the courtyard. This was exceptional.⁵⁶

The possibility of variations on a simple theme were almost limitless and not only because the size of the buildings naturally varied according to the wealth and size of the population and the inclination of the local emir or bey. That built by the powerful vezir Bâyezîd Pasha at Amasya⁵⁷ by the bridge across the river which was used for ablutions is very grand indeed with a noble central door behind an unusually massive portico sustained on piers and incorporating two hermit cells at vault level each side of the central portal while inside the arrangement of the rooms is also more complicated than usual.

But at the beginning of the 15th century the *zâviye*-mosque had achieved its apogee although the beautiful example built at Edirne and associated with Murâd II and the Mevlevî order of dervishes was yet to come. The need for such center declined because the power of the *aḥîs* was dying and the function of the *zâviye* rooms became, more and more as hostels for itinerant dervishes, better served by being set apart with cells and loggias round their own open courtyard.

The growth of wealth and of populations meant that interest was now fixed on the creation of larger and grander domes. At Edirne, for example, the early Eski Cami (Old Mosque)⁵⁸ was replaced for its nine dome echo of the Ulu Cami at Bursa was out-of-date. Instead Murâd II had the mosque of the Three Balconies, Üç Şerefeli Cami, built.⁵⁹ This masterpiece achieved a dome 24

⁵⁴The royal mosques at Bursa did not have minarets because they were royal chapels. When minarets were added eventually at the Yeşil (Green) mosque, for example, they were perched inconspicuously on the corners of the façade because the portico of this mosque was never completed.

⁵⁵H797/1394.

⁵⁶The Yeşil (Green) mosque at Iznik (H780-94/1378-91) is one example of a minaret set behind the portico as with the Çandarlı İsmâ'il Bey complex at Kastamonu dating from the mid-15th century among several others.

⁵⁷H822/1419.

⁵⁸H805-16/1403-14.

⁵⁹H841-51/1438-47.

metres in diameter sustained by four massive piers engaged in the mihrab and portico walls and two freestanding to create a hexagon. Wing areas were maintained as part of the plan both there and in other mosques but the mosques of Bâyezîd II at his famous hospital at Edirne⁶⁰ and that of his son Selîm I in Istanbul,⁶¹ built in fact by his own son Süleymân, took the conception of the unique domed square of massive proportions to its ultimate conclusion. Both are splendidly pure and lofty spaces with the supporting pendentives springing dramatically from the corners of the great prayer halls. Given the unavoidable limitations of masonry, it is difficult to see how the single domed unit could find anything more to say.

Meanwhile, with the mosque of Bâyezîd II⁶² in Istanbul the first important influence of the great church of Hagia Sophia, which Mehmed II had made the Friday Mosque of his new capital hard upon the conquest on 29th May, 1453. The dome of the Bâyezîd Mosque was flanked by two semidomes to create a rectilinear central area for prayer but still with four small domes on each flank, equal in size to each other. It was with this mosque that the classical grid of sixteen squares was worked out with four allocated to the area under the central dome and two each under the semidomes leaving aisles of four squares each on either flank.

The proportions were not precisely Byzantine since the mosque was built with that traditional Ottoman demand for exactitude that the great church never possessed, neither when it was built nor remotely after a millenium of vicissitudes. It never was truthful in the Ottoman sense because its mammoth piers were disguised as walls, areas were curtained off, glimpses everywhere added mystery. The semidomes at the mosque of Bâyezîd failed to unify the compartmentalized spaces fore and aft of the main dome and this was due to the inability of the architect to break free from the discipline of structural engineering that had worked so well since, he might suppose, Eden.

Either he did not see in the sense of understanding the liberating spaces created by the use of exedras in Hagia Sophia or he had not the skill or courage to insert them. Nonetheless, he had done better by far than the architect of the first mosque of Mehmed II who, like a bather, had dipped his toes in the cold spume and had drawn back. He only achieved a single semidome.

This was the culmination of Ottoman architecture before the appointment of Sinân as chief architect. Clearly he had two tasks. First he had to rationalize

⁶⁰H815/1488.

⁶¹H924/1522.

⁶²Built between 1501-6 by İjâyrüddîn or by Yakûb-Şâh bin Sultân-Şâh, clearly from Persia; or both.

the classical Ottoman building, sort out the use of semidome and great dome, enhance the lateral areas under their four small domes and thus make the prayer hall an entity while preserving that sense of union between exterior mass and interior space which, it cannot be emphasized enough, created that magisterial calm without which Ottoman architect would have had no soul. Second he had to extend the limits of his intellect beyond the didactic bylaws of the past and by so doing become himself a man of his time and of the Renaissance.

Sinân's first career is not important in the context of this paper. The decision of Selîm I to trawl the Christian villages in Anatolia for the first time for the *devşirme*⁶³ levy of 1512 suggests the Balkan provinces had been overfished, that he foresaw the cost in casualties likely to arise from his projected campaigns against the Persians and the Mamluks and the consequent need to recruit replacements. It could therefore explain why the youths who were enrolled in the Kayseri region were older than usual: at least in the person of Sinân who may have been approaching 20 years old.⁶⁴ If so, this explains why he could not be sent to the palace school but joined the Janissary corps where he was to serve with distinction and for which he had such pride. Under Süleymân men of distinction were rapidly promoted and Sinân's military career was varied and distinguished. Moreover, he was to gain invaluable experience as an engineer. In particular he appears to have built bridges and causeways which, at the time, may be seen as the foundation course in structural understanding that was the bone and sinew of Ottoman architecture. He also served in the household brigade and thus must have been noticed by his sovereign. Nonetheless, it was fortunate that the post of chief architect was vacant just when Sinân had reached retiring age and that he had an admirer in Lutfî Pasha when in 1538 he was briefly Grand Vezir.

The first important commission Sinân had to execute was the building of a tomb and complex as a memorial to Şehzade Mehmed, Süleymân's eldest and

⁶³Like their Seljuq predecessors, the Ottomans took Christian boys into their army. The regular culling of the sons of peasants established in the 14th century because prisoners-of-war had become too few to maintain the standing army was the motive. Regulations prevented the taking of only sons as well as craftsmen, Jews, Gypsies and many other categories. Some boys joined willingly and one suspects that this was true of Sinân, eager to seek a rewarding career instead of sinking in the mud of Anatolia. A distinction should be made between recruits selected for the palace school and those who were simply enrolled as '*acemioglan, Yeniçeri* (Janissary) recruits. Sinân is proof that under Süleymân as with other rulers the latter could achieve preferment had they the abilities. The subject is disputed, but see H. İnalcık, 'Ghulam', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, II; Gibb and Bowen, *op. cit.*; Shaw, *op. cit.*; Marsigli, L. de F., *Stato Militare dell'Impero Ottomano*, The Hague, 1732. For a romantic view see Koçu, R.E., *Yeniçeriler*, Istanbul, 1964. Also Vryonis, *op. cit.*

⁶⁴Selîm I needed recruits foreseeing casualties during his prodigious campaigns ahead. Whereas there were 800,000 Christian inhabitants of the Balkans, in Anatolia west of Eskişehir there were only 8500. Although there would be more in Central Anatolia many of these would be Armenians who were exempted from the levy. Figures taken from Barkan, 'Essai sur les données statistiques de registres de recensement dans l'empire ottoman aux XVe et XVIe siècles, in *JESHO* I (1957): 30.

favorite son. He chose a quattrofoil plan which was not new to Ottoman architecture, based on the established grid of 16 squares: a grid which was mirrored in the courtyard. The dome over the four central squares was to be lofty but not exceptional and the four halfdomes set on each side of it, covering two squares, strictly followed logical rules. What was revolutionary was the introduction of exedrae which give the interior volumes a fluidity that no Ottoman building had ever achieved before. This has been discussed in relation to the Bayezid Mosque built 40 years before.⁶⁵ If this were not sufficient for a first essay in the grand manner, Sinân introduced single storey loggias along the flanks of the mosque to bring life and purpose to areas which had previously been obscured by lateral pavilions or hostels as at Bâyezîd's mosques at the Edirne hospital or in Istanbul or with the latest imperial mosque built in the city, that of Selîm I. The hostel or *tâbhâne* was exiled from the mosque to the other side of the outer enclosure, rather than court, along with the medrese.

Because experience is not only addition but subtraction, it is important to note that Sinân did not repeat the somewhat elaborate cresting of walls or the decorative elements of the minarets which are superimposed on the shafts and so intrinsic to their structure. This was an architect who was a purist but not a puritan for he was later to use panels of Iznik tiles with élan. Self-criticism, out of which all creative genius grows, also extended to the courtyard for Sinân did not build such massive portico domes on all four sides again since they certainly cramp the courtyard space even if the canopy which stands over the fountain was added by Murâd IV.

The time was ripe for his major work in Istanbul and for Süleymân. The planning of the vast complex was masterly and there is much in its details that was new but only two can detain us here. First, and perhaps the least remarked, is the use of columns of the same dimensions as the rest of those of the cavalcade of arches flanking the open court of the *tâbhâne*. This gives to the rectangle a sense of continuing almost circular movement that the architects of Renaissance Italy would have envied.

Second, Sinân had a great plateau dug for the complex but did not extend it to the colleges on the Golden Horn flank of the mosque. Instead these buildings go down the hillside step by step. As always with a simple solution it is simple to see after the event: but never so before. From Galata not only does the silhouette of the great mosque ride across the crest of the hill but so do the royal tombs. Had the two colleges ridden on the same levelled ground as the mosque it would have been masked and the monumental impact lost.

⁶⁵But it must be remembered that Hâyrüddîn, if he were the builder, had worked for Bâyezîd II in the provinces and had not been in the position to make a study of the concepts underlying the astonishingly mystical interior spaces of the Megala Ecclesia or Hagia Sophia.

With the mosque itself, Sinân was faced as all Ottoman builders had been with the inescapable fact that a courtyard defeats any attempt to give a monument a façade in the Italian manner. He did create an imposing gatehouse to the courtyard itself but this had unsatisfactory results inside where arches had to join columns of differing heights with the result that capitals were mutilated. And here again Sinân did not repeat this feature: I would suggest significantly. What he did do was to remove the washing faucets from the courtyard, incidentally rectangular and not square in plan like the mosque, to the flanking walls. Above them he elevated two-storey arcaded loggias which through related proportions carry the eye up to the first domes at roof level and through them to the great dome itself. Thus Sinân did indeed introduce façades which he set between the principal doors into the mosque to give it, in a sense, three fronts. That of the courtyard was still grand but secluded. By setting the doorways at the four corners of the building Sinân gave light and life to the four corner areas of the interior. These now had a purpose which had not been so before and were now full of life and movement to give emotive force to all the interior space.

Moreover, the arcades were functional, extensions laterally of the side galleries of the interior which were thus withdrawn from the four great central piers and the area under the dome to liberate the aisles and enrich the light. The monotony of four domes of equal emphasis was necessarily modified and a modulation of larger and smaller domes created. And by extending the internal galleries over the external arcades Sinân developed that psychological power of Ottoman architecture which is the balanced unity of interior and exterior to which we will return later.

It would surely be churlish to deny the evidence of the creative thinking of an architect who ranks with those of the Renaissance across the Mediterranean from Süleymân's city. It was to be visible again in the variety of his grand vezirial mosques and complexes, the memorable phalanx of kitchen domes and chimneys on the Marmara side of the palace of Topkapı, bath-houses and much else. With the placing of a handsome stairway under the central hall of the medrese flanking the court of the mosque of Soğollu Mehmed Pasha at Kadırga in Istanbul,⁶⁶ for example, he solved the problem of how to remain a main entry to the mosque court upon a hillside to arrive appropriately centrally while the main dome of the college was also central. Indeed, difficulties of terrain inspired Sinân in a way that provincial projects carried out by his pupils on level ground could not. The exception to this is the mosque of Murâd III at Manisa.⁶⁷

⁶⁶The famous wall of tiles which made the *mihrab* garden so radiant can distract from the appreciation of the intellectual problems which Sinân solved so felicitously.

⁶⁷The mosque of Murâd III, H994/1586, at Manisa is worthy of study in depth. Were it not for the grids of bottle glass that filter the light through the windows it would with its sloping upper windows have been a unique stone greenhouse. The feeling of a plaisance rather than a mosque is awakened by superb Iznik panels and the surviving original paintwork under the sultan's gallery

This paper can only concern itself with major works. Once again Süleymân was not to see the culmination of work which he conjured into being. Sinân had achieved the Ottoman classical mosque and a complex with 500 domes that were never to be surpassed. When his son Selîm II succeeded there was no room for another complex of these dimensions and it was therefore at Edirne that this ruler's imperial mosque and its modest complex were built. There was to be nothing modest about the mosque itself for faced with the challenge of excelling excellence Sinân rejected the perfected classical form and went beyond all Ottoman precedent.

At Edirne he rejected semidomes but retained the exedrae. He had therefore to concentrate interior space under the dome which rivalled that of Hagia Sophia in dimensions. To do this he abolished the four elephant feet which Mehmed Agha was to revive for the mosque of Sultan Ahmed I after the death of his master.⁶⁸ Instead he carried the dome on eight magnificent piers which were concave at springing level and together with the exedrae create a marked circular rhythm below the dome. To emphasize the sense of the circle a low but spacious gallery is raised above a fountain in the middle of this highly poetic, indeed emotional, space. The concept of the portico or loggia along the flank of the mosque is modified for at ground level the doors are set back almost beside the piers leaving but little lateral areas and further emphasizing the central character of the mosque. The porches rather than arcades are so deep that little light is let into the mosque at ground level and this too is surely intentional.

Instead, at upper level the galleries ride out over the porches and their large casements admit a flood of light which joins that of the upper walls and the windows ringing the foot of the dome. The impression is therefore of space lit from the sky.

And that the sky and all its divine symbolism was very much on Sinân's mind when he built the Selimiye is to be found in the sultan's private gallery where the mihrab turns out to be shutters which open onto the skyscape. To use light was not new for Sinân. It was he who enlarged the windows of Hagia Sophia in pursuit of it as opposed to the Byzantine search for mystery. At the

inside and the flanking arcades without. It must also be remarked that the squat T-plan, cluttered with tribunes as it is, show how little the mind of Sinân had to do with the solution to the problems of this particular hillside site. Ahmed Refik believed that Sinân visited the site in 1583 according to the *Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, iii, IV, Ankara, 1951, p. 235. It is true that the stepping of the great arch spanning the portico derives from Sinân's treatment of the flanking arches of the Süleymaniye and of all sides of the later mosque of Mihrimâh at Edirnekapi, Istanbul. Be that as it may, the site architects were one Mahmûd who died on the job and then Mehmed Agha who built the imperial mosque of Ahmed I.

⁶⁸H1018/1609-H1025/1616. But he did add a third central exedra to each of the lateral half-domes and also to that above the great door from the courtyard. The roofscape is therefore more impressive than that of the Şehzade Mosque which was built more than 60 years before.

mosque of Mihrimâh at Edirnekapi⁶⁹ in the lifetime of Süleymân he had taken stone architecture to its ultimate lengths before walls collapse: he replaced stone with glass to the limit of its loadbearing capacity. But this was to go too far. Light in itself is uninteresting and uncreative as the Sahara desert proves. It is when light is modulated by intelligence that it becomes interesting and, in the hands of illustrious architects like Bernini, magical.

The light inside the Selimiye does achieve this magical quality. It is moreover enhanced by Sinân's large apse which is a garden of flowering Iznik tiles divided by large casements. Not as large as those that he had invented for the portico walls of the mosque of Ahmed Pasha and, later, of Rüstem Pasha in Istanbul, they were equally light enhancing. The apsidal form, which had made tentative appearances in Ottoman architecture before as it did at the mosque of Dâvûd Pasha in Istanbul,⁷⁰ must surely had its most important influence on Sinân when he was superintending the repairs at Hagia Sophia. He even enlarged the apsidal windows there to prove this point. But what was even more important in his establishment of a room not so much apart as a focal point was to solve the dichotomy of the classical Ottoman mosque. For there is a conflict of attractions between the celestial dome and the emphasis of the mihrab flanked by an elaborate minbar and the direction of Mecca and therefore of all prayer and hope.

Now, the faithful were assembled under a truly heavenly illumination, a setting fit for the concentration of the mind on the paradisaical garden illustrated by the gorgeous Iznik tiles of the mihrab area.

Externally, the four minarets are so drawn into the body of the mosque that from afar the courtyard cupolas count for very little beneath the massed emphasis of all masonry forms on the great dome which is doubly powerful because it stands alone. This was indeed a revolution. The Selimiye takes Ottoman architecture into a new experience of form and void. And it would be difficult to doubt that Sinân knew⁷¹ what we are told he knew that he had achieved his masterpiece, one among the few great buildings which astonish the world.

Space and material are the passive and active components of architecture which is therefore about their relationships. Space is existential in an interior, functional in an exterior and western buildings are space positive or material

⁶⁹Built probably between 1562 and 1565. See Eyice. S., *Istanbul*, (Istanbul, 1955), p. 70, Section 100.

⁷⁰H890/1485.

⁷¹Reported by his friend, Muşrafâ Sâ'î. Nonetheless, I think this should be reported as *hadîth* rather than the recorded word of the master.

positive according to the predominance of verticality or of horizontality. This paper has argued how Ottoman architecture keeps interior and exterior completely balanced or fused. Nodally pure, it is the cumulation of formal relationships so that quasi-sculpturally space survives the material and material the space. Its apotheosis was the achievement of objective and subjective realizations. The difference is between passive space and active material. But space is positive in relation to content and so is material in relation to enclosed form.

Ottoman architecture expresses the beauty of every detail of a building and of a complex of buildings which cohere into a sum of positivity and so cannot be considered on their own account. Hence the shaving off of the decorative elements of the Şehzade mosque where they were not structural.⁷² Although restricted to permutations of the square and circle, the result was wonderful and unique and this inevitably meant that the summation was to be the work of a single man and that it would never be repeated.

That said, no man is born without a parent and no architecture ever emerged without a past which is why the mosque of Ertogrul where we began was important. Beginnings are important and much of what was best, due to the patronage of Süleymân, was to flourish after he himself was dead.

⁷²It is said that the importation of numbers of craftsmen from Tabriz and elsewhere, the proceeds of his conquests, fertilized Ottoman architecture. Their only likely living influence was precisely that which Sinân discarded. The Cairene influence suffered equally short shrift after the adornment of Çoban Mustafa Pasha Mosque at Gebze in the mid-1520's and the cladding of the chambers assigned to receive the relics of the Prophet at Topkapı Palace. It was not surprising: the influence was indeed skin deep.

ARCHITECTURE: THE CLASSICAL OTTOMAN ACHIEVEMENT

Aptullah KURAN

Ottoman architecture evolved in Bursa and Iznik during the fourteenth century. In appearance, the early Ottoman buildings possessed little of the intricate ornamentation of the Anatolian Seljuk works. The simple domical forms set on walls constructed of alternating stone and brick courses marked a new beginning. This new beginning combined traditional Turkish and Islamic themes with the structural lexicon of Byzantine architecture.

The steady development of the Early Ottoman Period reached a turning point during the second half of the fifteenth century when the conquest of Istanbul widened the Ottoman cultural perspective. With the transformation of a frontier state into a world empire the conceptual outlook of the Ottoman architect underwent a critical change. This change manifested itself in three significant areas in Ottoman architectural design — especially in the design of mosques.

1. **Spatial Integrity.** The uninterrupted interior space in a mosque was brought together more and more under a single dome.
2. **Exteriority.** The unassuming outer appearance of the Early Ottoman mosque was supplanted by expressive, articulated façades.
3. **Axiality and Centrality.** The mosque began to occupy a central or a focal position on the qibla axis of an imperial building complex.

In this paper, these innovative principles, which give the Ottoman classical style a distinct place in Islamic architecture in particular and in world architecture in general, will first be studied individually in order to demonstrate their pattern of development, and then they will be considered as a whole so as to portray a clearer picture of Ottoman architecture in the sixteenth century.

1. SPATIAL INTEGRITY

The Anatolian Seljuk architects, like their colleagues elsewhere in the Islamic world, aspired to express a sense of eternity in the semi-darkness of the low columnar halls of their mosques. They created an illusion of infinity through the repetition of columns or pillars and by suggesting that the interior place flowed horizontally in all directions. Only in the fifteenth century did this traditional horizontality give way to verticality which evolved as a result of the new understanding of centrality and the integration of inner space.

In this developmental pattern, the Üç Şerefeli Mosque in Edirne (1447/851) constituted a milestone, for it is in this mosque that the integration of space under a central dome was first realized. The Üç Şerefeli has an interior organization of two compartments placed on either side of a large central space extending the whole depth of the hexagonal prayer hall. In terms of roof formation this spatial arrangement generated a sizable central dome towering above a pair of smaller domes that flank it on the east and west. Unlike the mihrâb domes in medieval mosques that never influenced the height of columnar halls¹, centralization of the prayer hall brought about not only larger but also loftier spaces by the simple expedient of proportioning. It also produced a totally different expression from those of the early Ottoman great mosques that were surmounted by domes of equal size and had little or no sense of verticality.

In the evolutionary progression towards spatial integrity, another important stage was reached in Istanbul with the Mosque of Bâyezîd II (1505-6/911). In this mosque, the central dome, enhanced by halfdomes in front and in back, is flanked by four smaller domes on the sides. Since a halfdome eliminates the compartmentation produced by domed units, spatial integrity is fully achieved in the Bayezîd Mosque along the qibla axis, although on the two sides flanking the integrated central area, space remains divided into modular units.

A further step toward spatial integrity was taken by the sixteenth century architect Sinân in the Şehzade Mehmed Mosque (1548/955). The Şehzade Mehmed exhibits a strong sense of centrality by its symmetrical, well balanced design. Four halfdomes, skirted by two conches each, augment the central dome in four directions while the four corners are covered by smaller domes. The sense of centrality is further accentuated by the pyramidal formation of the quadriform roofing arrangement. Sinân reveals in the Şehzade Mehmed the spherical form of the pendentives within and counters the lateral thrust of the dome by means of

¹For noteworthy examples of the mihrâb dome, see my "Anatolian-Seljuk Architecture," in Ekrem Akurgal, ed., *The Art and Architecture of Turkey* (Oxford, New York, Toronto, Melbourne, 1980), pp. 83-85.

cylindrical weight towers. These weight towers not only help integrate the central dome with the rest of the structure, but along with the small corner domes, give the superstructure its hierarchical appearance.

The Şehzade Mehmed marks a high point in Sinân's architectural career. When it was completed however, Sinân still had before him a long and active life in which he produced a number of equally interesting centralized schemes. Two such innovative schemes belonged to the Mosques of Mihrimah Sultan in Edirnekapı (c. 1565) and of Şokollu Mehmed Paşa in Kadırga (1571-2/979). The first is especially noteworthy for its lofty central dome dominating the prayer hall; the second for its striking interior, freed completely of any internal supports.

The laterally-set rectangular prayer hall of the Mihrimah Sultan consists of a central area surmounted by a great dome flanked by two-storied side spaces each covered by three domes. Triple arcades on two granite columns open into side aisles with galleries above them; but as the side wings are kept low, the central area of the mosque gives a sense of enormous space with light pouring into it from four sides above the level of the arch springs.

In the Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, Sinân achieves the ultimate solution for the hexagonal scheme that had been used in the Üç Şerefeli Mosque in Edirne. Like the Mihrimah Sultan, the Sokollu too comprises a laterally-set rectangular prayer hall. But its interior is not broken up into three sections. Covered by a central dome and four halfdomes — two on either side placed at sixty degree angles to the mihrab wall — the prayer hall possesses a spatial totality. Only a self-supporting gallery on slender columns runs around three sides of the hall to give it scale, but there are no side or back spaces under their own domes or vaults. For this reason, with its prayer hall free of any free-standing structural supports, the Sokollu Mehmed Paşa comes closest to the ideal Ottoman classical mosque.

It was obviously easier to create ideal forms in small vizierial mosques than in the monumental sultan's mosques. The small building did not require elaborate structural systems to support the central dome. As illustrated by its repetitious use after his death, Sinân's totally symmetrical and centralized Şehzade Mehmed scheme became the prototype for the sultan's mosques in the Ottoman Empire². But Sinân himself preferred to experiment with new ideas — or with variations on old themes — so that he never used the same scheme twice in a major work. In his second important sultan's mosque, the Süleymaniye (1557/964), instead of continuing with the symmetrical scheme of the Şehzade

²E.g., the Sultan Ahmed Mosque (1609-1616), the Hadice Turhan Sultan Mosque — known as Yeni Cami — (1598-1603 and 1661-1663), and the new Fatih Mosque (1767-1771).

Mehmed, he altered his course to try his hand on a new, Islamic version of the Haghia Sophia.

The Süleymaniye consists of a laterally-oriented courtyard and a square prayer hall covered in the middle by a great dome and two halfdomes that are flanked by five low-set domes on either side. As in the Şehzade Mehmed, the great central dome of the Süleymaniye sits on four corner piers that shoot out of the roof to become octagonal weight towers. The outer rims of the great side arches trace the curvature of the pendentives in stepped sequences; bulky buttresses built in three levels visually seem lighter; three-bay porticoes and double galleries on each side soften the heavy stone mass of the mosque.

The Süleymaniye, with its longitudinally oriented prayer hall, uneven arrangement of halfdomes and side domes, and minarets of two different heights, produces externally a sense of asymmetrical harmony with a strong directional expression. But this axiality of the prayer hall in the qibla direction is counterbalanced by the five-bay long and seven-bay wide fountain court which is oriented in the opposite direction. More importantly, unlike the Haghia Sophia in which the side aisles and galleries are distinctly separated by colonnades from the axial nave, the space in the Süleymaniye flows freely under the domed side wings so that the various parts of the interior are amalgamated in a total spatial statement.

The strong sense of spatial totality is felt even more strongly in Sinân's third important sultan's mosque, the Selimiye in Edirne (1575/983). Interestingly, despite its rectangular plan formation, the Selimiye has a totally symmetrical and centralized appearance. Crowning a plateau in the city³, the Selimiye outshines all other sultan's mosques and justifies Sinân's biographer Sâ'î's assessment that it was Sinân's "work of mastership."

The Selimiye is covered by a central dome slightly larger in size than that of the Haghia Sophia⁴. It rises on top of eight cylindrical pillars that pierce the roof to become weight towers. Circumventing its drum, the octagonal weight towers reinforce the central dome while they themselves are bolstered by heavy flying buttresses that spring from massive abutments. The central dome rests on four halfdomes in the diagonals, and a fifth halfdome covers the mihrab recess.

A unique feature of the Selimiye is the location of the *müezzins'* tribune immediately under the dome's crown. This platform raised above a token

³This plateau, known as *Kavak Meydanı* (Poplar Square), was the site of the first Ottoman palace in Edirne built by Yıldırım Bâyezîd. See Osman Peremeci, *Edirne Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1939), p. 62.

⁴The 31.28 meter central dome of the Selimiye is slightly larger than — or about the same as — the elliptical dome of the Haghia Sophia whose diameter ranges between 30.90 and 31.80.

fountain⁵ increases, in a curious way, the sense of spatial integrity. It creates a point of reference in the vast prayer hall at its geometric center.

Equally important are the four minarets on the four corners of the mosque⁶. They not only bolster the structure's vertical posture, but also strengthen the visual effect of the dome. Furthermore, the inner architecture of the mosque is faithfully reflected on its external form which embodies striking contrasts of horizontals and verticals, curvilinear and straight lines, solids and voids, in addition to the subtle differentiation of the load-bearing structural elements and screen walls. Thus, in the Selimiye Sinân achieves, externally as well as internally, a far more intriguing manifestation of centrality than in any other of his previous mosques.

The key to Ottoman classical architecture was its compatibility with the Ottoman ideals. The great architects of the classical period in general, and Sinân in particular, were able to transform Ottoman intellectual aspirations into the art of building. In spite of certain regional practices that persisted, centrality in Ottoman mosques was a function of unifying the inner space under a huge single dome. The great dome conveyed a dual message: on the religious plane, it symbolized the oneness of Allâh; at the temporal level, it portrayed an image of the absolute centralism in the Ottoman State.

The style Sinân formulated represented two centuries of Ottoman architectural experience, and it continued for another hundred and fifty years after his death, as exemplified by the Mosque of Sultan Ahmed and the Yeni Cami (New Mosque) in Istanbul.

This was an innovative style in which the external form of the mosque was overly stressed. Interestingly, however, it retained its traditional, unassuming box-like cubic character at the ground level where the containment of space by four simple walls remained unchanged. Instead of a columnar hall which compartmentalized the interior and emphasized the horizontal dimension, Sinân sought to integrate the space. He did this by eliminating as many vertical supports as the structural technology of his day would permit in order to achieve an expression of spatial integrity under a single lofty dome.

⁵The fountain below the elevated *mi'ezzins'* tribune suggests that Sinân had revived symbolically the Anatolian Seljuk practice of the internal fountain court. This feature was borrowed by the early Ottoman architects who used it in *eyvân*-mosques as well as the multi-domed great mosques. With the revival of the forecourt in the middle of the fifteenth century, the token inner court disappeared from Ottoman architecture. Other than this single occurrence in the Selimiye, it is not seen during the Classical Period.

⁶All four minarets of the Selimiye rise to a height of 70.89 meters from the ground to the ends of their finials. All four have three balconies, and the pair on the northern corners of the prayer hall have three separate staircases each leading to a different balcony.

2. EXTERIORITY

One of the principal traits of early Islamic architecture was its basically introverted character. This trait manifested itself in terms of a contrast between the plain, monotonous outer shell of a mosque and the rhythmic interior — or the inner facades. The early mosque did not require a complex architectural scheme. They consisted of a covered hall preceded by a courtyard. The covered hall protected the faithful from the strong Arabian sun. The courtyard opened the building to the sky. As Hassan Fathy observed, in hot, arid climates "... men try to bring down the serenity and holiness of the sky into the (building), and at the same time to shut out the desert with its blinding, suffocating sand and inhospitable demons."⁷

Contained within blind, windowless walls which mask it from the world outside, the introverted mosque was the exact opposite of a Greek temple whose interior, which housed the statue of a deity, mattered infinitely less than its exterior⁸. Since it functioned as a piece of monumental sculpture, the Greek temple had an intricate external form generated by subtle rhythms of the colonnades, the friezes, and the pediments.

This kind of ornamental exterior form had no place in early Islamic architecture. Not only was the exterior form of early mosques unadorned, it was of so little importance that the outer walls of a mosque were often concealed behind other buildings that leaned against them. The outer walls did not possess and identity of their own. Nor did they function as reflectors of the structure's inner life. They were crude containers of space, nothing else.

A good example is the Masjid-i Jum'a of Isfahan, which replaced an Abbasid mosque built during the time of Caliph al-Manşūr (754-775). According to inscriptions, the large mihrāb dome of the Masjid-i Jum'a, as well as the small domed sanctuary, the Gumbad-i Khaki, across the courtyard from it, are dated 1080-1/473 and 1088-9/481 respectively. Owing to the numerous additions and extensions, the mosque now has an amorphous external form. But this formlessness bothers no one because, although it was redecorated later⁹, the rectangular four-eyvan courtyard dating from the reign of the Seljuk Sultan Malikshāh still retains its original contours, providing the mosque with its essential geometric framework.

⁷Hassan Fathy, *Architecture for the Poor* (Chicago and London, 1973), p. 56.

⁸See Nikolaus Pevsner, *An Outline of European Architecture* (New York, 1948), p. 1.

⁹The glazed faience tile facing of the eyvāns and arcades surrounding the courtyard of the Masjid-i Jum'a in Isfahan dates from the Safavid Period.

The Islamic characteristic of interiority was transmitted by the Seljuks to Anatolia where the columnar great mosque prayer halls comprised internal support systems of stone piers, marble columns or oak pillars sandwiched between a floor of colorful rugs and a flat ceiling of wooden beams. Sometimes, the flatness of the ceiling was broken by a mihrâb dome decorated with geometric designs in glazed bricks. At other times, triple domes and vaulted ceilings enriched the spatial quality of the prayer hall.

Triple domes are first seen in the Niğde Alaeddin Mosque (1223/620). Here they take place along the qibla wall. In the Burmalı Minare Mosque in Amasya (bet. 1237-1246) the three domes are longitudinally arranged over the central aisle. But the most significant example of the triple dome is found in the Gök Medrese Mosque in Amasya, built by the Seljuks in the third quarter of the 13th century. Here the superstructure consists of a series of triple domes united placed longitudinally and laterally with vaulted bays in between.

The Gök Medrese mosque is obviously the link between the Anatolian Seljuk great mosque and its early Ottoman counterpart with prayer halls divided by pillars into similar domed square units. Such a link is the Ulucami (Great Mosque) of Bursa (1308-9/801). It constitutes a milestone in Ottoman architecture since it was in this mosque that the systematic display of the inner building through the modulations of the roof formation was first realized¹⁰. This development marked an important step toward externalization.

On the other hand, the huge marble basin with brass ablution faucets under an open-top dome of the Bursa Great Mosque clearly points to an inward disposition. As illustrated by similar ablution fountains inside stone-paved domed halls¹¹, the Seljuk tradition of the token court continues through the early Ottoman period. It was not until the multi-unit mosque evolved into the mosque with a large central space and this transformation was complimented with the articulation of the outer walls that the process of externalization was completed.

From the beginning the Ottomans were intrigued by the spatial potential of the dome. In an era when domes in Anatolia hardly exceeded 10 meters in diameter, the Yıldırım Mosque in Mudurnu (1382-3/784) was surmounted by a 19.65 meter dome. But this dome sat heavily on thick, low walls. In the Üç Şerefeli Mosque in Edirne (1447-8/851), however, the 24-meter dome in the center is flanked by a pair of smaller domes. This arrangement evokes a stronger

¹⁰For a detailed analysis of the cellular Early Ottoman mosque, see my *The Mosque in Early Ottoman Architecture* (Chicago and London, 1968).

¹¹E.g., The Mosques of Murâd Hüdâvendigâr in Çekirge (1385/787) and Mehmed I (the Green Mosque) in Bursa (1419/822).

architectonic expression than the earlier Seljuk and Ottoman great mosque schemes with their single, triple, and multi-domed super-structures.

It is clear that the articulation of the domical superstructure began with the Üç Şerefeli. But the most significant attempt toward externalization was made by Sinân in his Şehzade Mehmed Mosque (1548/955) which displays both an articulated superstructure and a well modulated mass.

Composed of a square arcaded courtyard in front of a square prayer hall, the Şehzade Mehmed attracts attention by its symmetrical, well-balanced hierarchical superstructure that has already been discussed above.

Equally significant is the plastic quality of the Şehzade Mehmed's external appearance; not only are the three outer walls of the mosque's courtyard enlivened by decorative two-tier windows, but also the colonnaded galleries fronting the east and west of the prayer hall provide the Şehzade Mehmed with light, rhythmic side elevations.

The side galleries are an innovative feature Sinân employed for the first time in the Şehzade Mehmed. In his next great sultan's mosque in Istanbul, the Süleymaniye (1557/964), Sinân accentuated the east and west wall by using a three-bay portico on each side of the lengthy façades and two-story galleries with broad projecting eaves between the buttresses that shoulder the central dome. The side galleries of the Şehzade Mehmed have only the function of softening the great mass of masonry and giving it scale. In the Süleymaniye, the upper galleries become an extension of the inner galleries so that they cease to be merely decorative features with an esthetic function and relate architecturally to the building.

More important from my view point is the removal of ablution facilities from the center of the courtyard¹² to the two sides of the prayer hall. Protected by the broad projecting eaves over the galleries, the rows of ablution faucets running between the side buttresses must be considered as a bold step in the externalization process of the Ottoman classical mosque.

In this respect, the other Sinân mosques must be mentioned: the Mihrimah Sultan in Edirnekapi (c. 1565) and the Rüstem Paşa in Istanbul (c. 1562). The first has a laterally-set rectangular prayer hall consisting of a central area with a great dome flanked by two-storied side spaces each covered by three domes. Triple arcades on two granite columns open into side aisles with galleries above, but as the side wings are kept low, the central area of the mosque has a

¹²The rectangular structure in the middle of the Süleymaniye courtyard is a water basin with no faucets for ablutionary purposes.

sence of enormous space with light pouring into it from four sides above the level of arch springs. Sinân achieves in the Mihrimah Sultan Mosque a singularly effective architectonic expression by piercing the side walls of the lofty central area with nineteen windows each and by pushing them back from the outer surface of the great arches in order to distinguish the load-bearing baldachin from the lacelike screen walls.

The second, the Rüstem Paşa, is particularly noteworthy for the exquisite Iznik tiles that face its inner walls and pillars, as well as its mihrâb and minbar. But the tiles with floral and foliate designs that cover the elevated mosque's portico wall are of more importance because they constitute a reversal of the traditional external modesty of the mosque. They represent yet another innovative attempt on the part of Sinân who tried to find an affinity between the interior and the exterior of a building. True, the portico of the Rüstem Paşa Mosque does not face the street. It faces the elevated platform above the street which is considered a private section of the mosque. Even then, the decorative enrichment of the portico wall, as well as the ceramic discs in the spandrels of the outer portico¹³, are among the ventures of externalizing the Ottoman classical mosque.

The use of tiles on the façades of buildings goes back to the pre-Sinân period. In the *türbe* (tomb) of Selîm I (1522-3/929), for instance, the entrance is emphasized by two tile panels on either side of the door. Sinân used similar tile panels in his Şehzade Mehmed *Türbe* (1543-4/950). He further accentuated the exterior of this octagonal *türbe* by slender engaged columns at the corners, verd-antique and terra cotta frames around the two-level double windows, and two tiers of stalactites crowned by palmettes below the fluted dome.

The Süleymaniye *Türbe* (1567-8/975) must also be viewed as another important Sinân work in which exteriority was stressed. In this octagonal *türbe*, the corners are truncated and, other than the one holding the door, all its facets have five windows: two below, agrandized by molded frames, and three above, set inside polychrome arches with a rosette in each spandrel. These are finely carved pieces of sculptured ornamentation. Along with the corner plates of marble fretwork and the elegant stalactite cornice created with a row of palmettes, they help enliven the heavy mass.

Equally important in this respect is the covered gallery which surrounds the octagonal buildings. Supported on slender columns with chevron capitals, the outer gallery links with the conventional triple-arched portico to provide the external entity of the Süleymaniye *Türbe*.

¹³On these discs, from right to left, the names of Allâh, Muḥammed, the first four caliphs, and Ḥasan and Ḥüseyn are written in white letters on a dark blue ground.

3. AXIALITY AND CENTRALITY

From the beginning, Ottoman towns followed a distinct pattern of development: residential quarters grew around building complexes called *'imârets*. The *'imâret* was a *vakıf* institution. It was established by a foundation deed supported by an endowment and comprising numerous buildings clustered about a mosque. During the early Ottoman period, *'imârets* in Bursa had irregular layouts. In the Yıldırım Bayezid (1395-1399), for instance, the buildings conform to the topography instead of to the geometric requisites. A similar disregard for orderly site planning can be seen in the *'imârets* of Mehmed I (1412-1421) and Murâd II (1424-1426).¹⁴

By the second half of the fifteenth century however, geometric relationships among the buildings of an *'imâret* grew stronger as exemplified by the Fatih Complex in Istanbul (1463-1470). In this complex, the monumental mosque occupied the center of a vast square plaza, 210 meters on the side a row of four madrasas flanked the plaza on the east and west, while two small buildings — a *mekteb* and a library — and two large ones — a *dârü's-sifâ* and a *jabhâne* — stood side by side respectively on the north and south.¹⁵

Centrality and triple grouping also played a key role in the design of the Amasya and Edirne Bayezid II Complexes. Consisting of mosque, a madrasa, and a *dârü'l-i-âdâm*, the three buildings of the Amasya Bayezid Complex (1481-1486) make a row facing the Yeşilirmak, with the mosque in the center, the madrasa on the west, and the *dârü'l-i-âdâm* on the east. In the Edirne Bayezid Complex (1484-1488), the mosque again has the central position, and double buildings take place to its right and left: the medical madrasa and a hospital adjoining it on the west side; the culinary facilities in two separate sections — the kitchens and refectory in one, the bakery and storerooms in the other — on the east.

Interestingly, the very first complexes that Sinân designed after being appointed Chief Court Architect in 1538 lacked the harmonious organization that evolved during the Fatih and Bayezid periods. The Haseki Hürrem Complex in Istanbul, consisting of a mosque (1538-9/945), madrasa and *mekteb* (1540-

¹⁴The early Ottoman building complexes in Bursa were composed of an *eyvân*-mosque, the *türbe* of the founder, a madrasa, a *dârü'l-i-âdâm*, and a *hammâm*. The mosque occupied a central position between the madrasa and the *dârü'l-i-âdâm*; the *türbe* generally was placed on the south side of the mosque; the *hammâm* stood a short distance away from the other buildings.

¹⁵The *dârü's-sifâ* of the Fatih Complex has not survived. After collapsing in the earthquake of 1766, it remained a ruin for close to sixty years before its debris was removed in 1824/1239 to free the lot it occupied for new construction. For more information on this building, see Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi, *Osmanlı Mi'marisinde Fâtih Devri* (Istanbul, 1973), pp. 391-395.

1/947), *dârü'l-i-â'm* (1550/957)¹⁶ and a *dârü's-sifâ'* (c. 1550), possesses neither a strong focal accent nor a triple axial formation. Located on the two sides of a curving street, the site planning of this 'imâret seems to have been influenced more by cadastral constraints than by geometric considerations¹⁷. It is also possible, of course, that Sinân preferred the flexible planning of the Bursa 'imârets to the rigid symmetry of the Fatih Complex. Though Sinân's attitude changed in the 1550's, the uneven layout of the Haseki Hürrem, as well as those of the Üsküdar Mihrimah Sultan and Şehzade Mehmed, clearly indicate that he was quite satisfied with asymmetrical imaret designs in his formative years as Chief Court Architect.

Composed of a mosque, a madrasa, and a *mekteb* now, the Üsküdar Mihrimah Sultan Complex (1541-1548) formerly incorporated a large caravanserai which was destroyed by fire in 1722/1134¹⁸. The exact location of the caravanserai is not known, but it must have been somewhere to the west of the mosque, counterbalancing the madrasa which stands on the east. It must also have had the same kind of off-axial orientation in relation to the mosque as the madrasa has.

Unlike the Üsküdar Mihrimah Sultan, the Şehzade Mehmed Complex (1543-1548) has survived intact. In this complex the mosque and tomb constitute a group, while the madrasa, caravanserai, and *dârü'l-i-â'm* form a parallel row to the east of these across a spacious courtyard. Such an arrangement produces an imbalanced layout design because the low-walled small-domed auxiliary buildings on the east do not have the same visual weight to match the immense mass of the mosque on the west.

The most balanced and totally symmetrical building complex Sinan designed is the Süleymaniye Complex in Damascus which took its present form in two stages. The first of these, consisting of the mosque, *dârü'l-i-â'm*, caravanserai, and *şahâne*, was completed in 1554-5/962; the second, comprising a madrasa and *arasta*, was added onto the first group in 1566-7/974¹⁹. What

¹⁶The Haseki Sultan *Dârü'l-i-â'm* is not registered in any of the manuscripts listing Sinân's works. Therefore, while I ascribe the other buildings of the Haseki Complex to Sinân, I believe that the *dârü'l-i-â'm* was designed and built by another architect whom Süleymân the magnificent assigned personally for the work, most probably because Sinân was busy at the time with the planning of the Damascus and Istanbul Süleymaniye Complexes.

¹⁷In the Haseki Sultan Complex, one finds neither the centralized plan of the Istanbul Fatih Complex, nor the triple-axial layout of the Amasya and Edirne Bayezid Complexes. It looks as if, in the absence of an overall site plan, the designs of the madrasa and *mekteb*, as well as the *dârü's-sifâ'* and *dârü'l-i-â'm*, were affected by the physical constraints of the lots they occupied.

¹⁸See Mustafa Cezar, "Osmanlı Devrinde İstanbul Yapılarında Tahribat Yapan Yangınlar ve Tabii Âfetler," in *Türk San'atı Tarihi Araştırma ve İncelemeleri I* (Istanbul, 1963), p. 350.

¹⁹Although the mosque and 'imâret are registered in all three manuscripts listing Sinân's works, the madrasa is mentioned in only one of them. This indicates that Sinân's involvement with the

interests us in the Damascus Süleymaniye Complex is the first group of buildings that surrounds the central plaza: the mosque and *dârü'l-îf'âm* facing each other on the south and north, respectively, and the twin *şahhânes* and caravanserais blocking the plaza's east and west — the first in front of the mosque and the second on either side of the *dârü'l-îf'âm*.

The Süleymaniye Complex in Damascus was designed as a staging post for pilgrims. Its buildings offered lodging and dining services. By contrast, the Istanbul Süleymaniye Complex (1550-1557), incorporating seven madrasas, was planned primarily as a center for higher education. Also, while the layout of the Damascus Complex, executed on a flat plot of land, is two-dimensional in concept, the Istanbul Süleymaniye displays a three-dimensional composition set on a slope overlooking the Golden Horn.

With its spacious central plaza emphasized by the founder's mosque and two tombs behind it, and flanked by madrasas on the sides, the Istanbul Süleymaniye Complex recalls the Faüh Complex. Unlike it, the madrasas here sit on terraces at different elevations to fit the contours of a hillside.

The monumental Süleymaniye Mosque rises at the center of a rectangular plaza. Inside the traditional cemetery garden on the south, stand the octagonal tombs of Süleymân the Magnificent and his wife Hürrem Sultan. Behind these, placed on the longitudinal axis of the mosque at the far end of the cemetery garden, is the *Dârü'l-kurrâ'* — a domed structure elevated above a cistern and reached by double stairs on the south, outside the cemetery wall.

On the west side of the plaza, over a row of shops²⁰, are the First and Second Madrasas and the *Dârü'l-ıbb*. On the east side, across the street from another row of shops placed under the plaza²¹, are the second pair of madrasas which have a unique arrangement with stepped rooms and arcades that fit the contours of the slope. Placed under the Third and Fourth Madrasas are a string of eighteen more rooms for graduate students (the *mülâzımîn*).

second stage of the complex was superficial. It probably did not go beyond sending a court architect to Damascus. Another possibility is that the madrasa and *arasta* were executed by a local architect selected by Sinân.

²⁰There are altogether 35 shops. Called the *Tiryâk* (Theriac) Bâzâr, they extend from one end of the street to the other.

²¹Now known by Sinân's name, the street that runs from north to south below the mosque plaza on the east was the *Bakırcılar* (Coppersmiths') *Arasta*. The shops on the east side of the *arasta* have not fully survived, but those tucked under the plaza on the opposite side are intact and are occupied by craftsmen who make and sell metal utensils.

The last higher educational building in the complex, the *Dârü'l-ḥadîş*,²² extends at an angle to the *qibla* axis on the southeast corner of the precinct. It perches on top of another row of shops (eighteen in all) across from the single *hammâm* and has a charming elevated classroom with an open loggia at one end.

On the north side of the plaza, from west to east, the *Dârüş-şifâ*, *Dârü'z-ziyâfe*, and *Tabḥâne* line up in a row, with a caravanserai and some shops tucked under them — the latter being accessible from the street at the back.

In terms of three-dimensional planning, even more striking an example is the Atik Valide Complex built by Selim II's wife and Murâd III's, mother Nûrbânû Vâlide Sultan. Begun in the early 1570s, this complex in Üsküdar was completed in 1583.²³ Like the Süleymaniye in Istanbul, the Atik Valide is built on terraces cut into the gentle slopes of a hillside. The mosque occupies the highest terrace. One level below it, preceded by a spacious courtyard on the north and a cemetery garden on the south, a *ḥânḳâh*, a *dârü'l-kurrâ'*, a madrasa, and a *dârü'l-ḥadîş* surround the mosque on four sides. The last extends from north to south across the street from the mosque on the west and constitutes the upper part of a mammoth rectangular building. Here the *dârü'l-i-â'm*, the *tabḥâne*, and the *dârü'ş-şifâ'* are each organized around its own courtyard. A fourth courtyard in the center is linked by a wide staircase to the domed entrance hall of the two-winged caravanserai one level below it.²⁴

In the Süleymaniye Complex, Sinân made use of the slope effectively by arranging the subsidiary buildings along three longitudinal axes at different levels within a framework of subtle geometric relationships. The disposition of the Atik Valide is more sophisticated. Here the terracing of the hillside was utilized

²²The *Dârü'l-ḥadîş*, named after the celebrated scholar Şeyhü'l-islâm Ebû's-Su'ûd Efendi, is the sole wooden-roofed building in the entire Süleymaniye Complex.

²³The Atik Valide Mosque took its present form in two stages. Ground was broken for the mosque in 1570-1/978 and the first stage, consisting of a domed prayer hall flanked by a pair of half-domes on either side, was completed before 1579. Some years later, the single-domed mosque was extended by the addition of two-domed wings to the left and right. This dedicatory inscription over the mosque's door, dated 1583/991, was placed after the completion of the second stage. For a detailed account of the mosque's two-stage construction, see my "Üsküdar Atik Valide Külliyesinin Yerleşme Düzeni ve Yapım Tarihi Üzerine," in *Snuis Kemal Yetkin'e Armağan* (Ankara, 1984), pp. 231-248.

²⁴The mammoth rectangular building which embodies the caravanserai, *tabḥâne*, *dârü'l-i-â'm*, *dârü'ş-şifâ'*, and *dârü'l-ḥadîş* is much altered. At the end of the eighteenth century it was assigned by Selim III to the cavalry troops of the Nizâm-ı Cedîd. In 1808 it was given to the 'Asâkir-i Nizâmîye Cavalry. Mahmûd II enlarged the building by adding a second floor above the caravanserai, *dârü'ş-şifâ'*, and *dârü'l-ḥadîş* in 1834-5/1250. The two-story building functioned as a barracks until 1865 when it became an asylum for the insane and remained as such until the founding of the Bakırköy Hospital for Mental and Nervous Diseases in 1927. Seven years later it became a tobacco curing plant. Although it reverted to the Directorate General of Pious Foundations in 1976, it has not been freed of ill-suited functions.

not only as a means of relating architecture to topography but also as a tool of displaying the hierarchical order among the various buildings of the complex.

At the lowest level of the scale is the caravanserai — a service facility. Above this are the welfare functions: the *ṭabhāne*, *dârü'l-i-âdîm*, and *dârü's-sifâ*. These are followed by the educational and monastic buildings. And on top of them all is the all-embracing focal edifice: the mosque.

The Atik Valide in Üsküdar was planned not as an urban complex but as an intercity complex. For this reason, it has a small mosque and a vast *'imâret*. Yet its overall design, by its hierarchical formation, stresses the centralized composition of an urban imperial complex rather than the axial organization of an intercity complex.

A good example of the latter is the Sultan Selim Complex in Karapınar (Sultaniye) on the Konya-Adana road. This imperial staging post, ordered by Şehzâde (Prince) Selim while he was Governor of Karaman Province, was completed after his accession to the throne in 1566²⁵. It consisted of a mosque, a *ṭabhāne*, a caravanserai, an *arasta*, a *ḥammâm*, and a fountain. Only the mosque and fountain remain in good condition. The *ṭabhāne* and *ḥammâm* are now in ruins, a few walls of the caravanserai's central hall still stand erect, and the *arasta* has completely disappeared. However, what can be seen above ground provides a fairly good picture of the original disposition of the buildings.

The mosque and fountain marked the two ends of an axis that cut through the *ṭabhāne* and caravanserai — the first consisted of two ells in front of the mosque while the two-winged caravanserai had a barrel-vaulted vestibule in the middle. Since no traces have survived, it is difficult to tell the exact location of the shops.²⁶ Similar complexes with *arastas*, such as those of Şoğollu Mehmed Paşa in Lüleburgaz (1569-70/977) and Yakacık (formerly Payas) (1574-5/982), strongly suggest that they were probably in between the caravanserai and the *ṭabhāne*.

In general terms we may conclude that Sinân's building complexes exhibit two distinct phases in their evolutionary pattern.

²⁵The chronogram of the inscription over the mosque's door gives the date 971 (1563-4) while the fountain is dated 977 (1569-70). Bearing in mind that the fountain was usually the last building to be put up in a complex, I place the construction dates of the Karapınar Sultan Selim Complex between 1563 and 1570.

²⁶A reference in a foundation register states that there were "thirty-nine shops and two mills" in the Karapınar Sultan Selim Complex. See, Ömer L. Barkan, "Vakıfların bir İskân ve Kolonizasyon Metodu Olarak Kullanılmasında Diğer Şekiller," in *Vakıflar Dergisi*, Vol. II (1942).

In the first phase during the 1530s and 1540s, the buildings comprising his complexes were placed arbitrarily without regard to the geometric relationships among them.

In the second phase covering the next thirty years from the 1550s through the 1570s, on the other hand, the buildings of a complex often stood at right angles to each other and the site plan had a symmetrical and well-balanced organization.

During this second phase, not only axuality and centrality in site planning reached their zenith, but also the most mature examples of spatial integrity and exteriority were produced.

CONCLUSION

In a sense the story of Ottoman Classical architecture closed with the Selimiye Complex in Edirne. In the monumental Selimiye Mosque, Sinân was successful in surmounting the prayer hall by a mammoth dome; in transposing the interior space and the structural formation of the mosque onto its external form; and in achieving a superb sense of centrality.

In another sense, during his last ten years, along with his closest associates, Sinân guided Ottoman architecture into a new phase which slightly altered the course of the Classical style by deviating from its accepted rules and norms. During the 1580s, the rules began to mutate in a show of mannerism.

In the tiny Şemsi Ahmed Paşa Complex located on the Bosphorus in Üsküdar (1580-1/988), for instance, Sinân built the *türbe* of the founder against the east wall of the mosque and extended the mosque's portico to cover its west wall. Then, too, instead of placing the ell-shaped madrasa at right angles to the mosque, he placed its main arm perpendicular to the shore, creating an oddly shaped courtyard which fanned out towards the water.

In the Kılıç Ali Paşa Mosque in Tophane (1580-1/988), rather than stressing the centralization of space, Sinân — or one of his fellow architects — emphasized the longitudinal axis in a manner not unlike that of the Hagia Sophia.

He — or Dâvûd Ağa — disregarded the unwritten convention that a forecourt was an imperial prerogative and built one in the Mosque of Grand Vizier Mesîh Mehmed Paşa (1585-6/994) in Istanbul. By eliminating the traditional fountain in the center of its forecourt and by putting in its place the founder's open tomb, Sinân — or Dâvûd Ağa — broke another cardinal rule.

More important was the destruction of the external cube, the revival of the Early Ottoman side rooms, and the transformation of the interior into a cruciform space in Dâvûd Ağa's Nişancı Mehmed Paşa Mosque in Karagümriük (1588-9/997).

Had Sinân become bored with a too-long career so that he felt the need for a fresh new start? Or were the mutations instigated by Sinan's talented colleagues who had stayed for too many decades in the shadow of a domineering master? Whatever it was, the outcome was intriguing. By its liberalizing attitude, Ottoman mannerism strengthened the Ottoman Classical style. The flexibility it provided enabled the architects of future generations to adjust the Ottoman Classical style to the taste and aspirations of the time for almost four centuries after the death of its grand master, Sinân.

Of all the Ottoman art forms, architecture was unquestionably the most significant, not only because it incorporated other art forms — such as ceramic tile, stained glass, woodwork inlaid with ivory and mother-of-pearl — but also because it addressed itself to the people as well as to the Ottoman elite. Ottoman architects strove to achieve a dual expression that symbolized the glory of Islam and the power of the state. With their hierarchical formation, the domical mosques displayed, on the one hand, the oneness of Allâh and, on the other hand, the absolute authority of the Sultan. As with all imperial architecture, Sinân's work reflected a cultural synthesis which incorporated religion, social order, and the hierarchy of state.

The principal contribution of Ottoman culture to the world was a universal architecture.

THE IMAGE OF SÜLEYMÂN IN OTTOMAN ART

Esin ATIL

Süleymân (r. 1520-66) was not only the most celebrated Ottoman ruler but also the most frequently portrayed sultan in illustrated histories produced in the court during his lifetime and shortly after his death. His representations appear in several manuscripts devoted to the events of his reign — such as the *Süleymânname*, dated 1558; *Nüzhettü'l-Esrârü'l-Ahbar der Sefer-i Sigetvar*, dated 1568/69; *Târîh-i Sulân Süleymân*, dated 1579/80; and the second volume of the *Hünernâme*, dated 1587/88 — as well as in several copies of the genealogies of the Ottoman dynasty and universal histories — including the *Kıyâfetü'l-İnsâniye fi Şemâ'ilü'l-'Osmâniye* of 1579 and *Zübdetü'l-Tevârîh* of 1583.¹ In addition, the sultan was the subject of a unique study made by Hâyardar Re'îs know as Nigârî.

Before discussing representations of Süleymân, the concept of Ottoman portraiture must be defined. An extension of the Islamic tradition of book illustration, Ottoman painting provided a visual commentary on the text. In Islamic manuscripts the identification of the persons depicted in the illustrations generally relied on two essential factors: the placement of the figures within the compositions and the textual references. The figure seated in the center of an enthronement scene and accentuated by a variety of compositional and iconographic devices is immediately recognized as a ruler or of a ruler type; if a personal name is given in the text or on the painting itself, he then becomes a specific ruler. This specific ruler can be a fictional character or a historic personage, with little or no physical resemblance to a known individual. Needless to say, these attributes do not make the image a true portrait. A portrait or realistic likeness represents a specific individual, with unique facial features and physical peculiarities and reveals a mental or psychological state.

¹The first work is published in Esin Atıl, *Süleymanname: The Illustrated History of Süleyman the Magnificent* (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art; New York: Abrams, 1986); references to the other manuscripts are given on pp. 48-49 and notes cited on p. 53. A facsimile of an undated and later copy of the 1579 genealogy with English commentary was published by the Minister of Culture and Tourism of the Turkish Republic, *Kıyâfetü'l-İnsâniyye fi Şemâ'ilü'l-'Osmâniyye* (Istanbul: Historical Research Publishing, 1987).

Although representation of historic personages had a long history in Islamic art, there existed an ambivalence towards making a true likeness of an individual. An image was considered a "reflection" of the person, devoid of his soul. This ambivalence is clearly evident in Nizāmī's discourses on painting found in his *Ḥamse* composed toward the end of twelfth century.² Similar to other Asian traditions, Islamic portraiture combined a real and ideal image of the person, frequently stressing official status while attempting to capture physical characteristics.³

The interest in individualizing members of the ruling elite as well as those of the more humble classes began with the Timurids in Iran and Transoxiana during the fifteenth century. Revitalized at the end of the sixteenth century in Safavid Iran, portraiture became a distinct feature of Mughal and Rajput court painting in India during the following centuries. Some painting schools reflect the impact of central and eastern Asian traditions (as with the Timurids); while others exhibit European influences, at least superficially (as with the Mughals).

The concept of portraiture executed from life in which the subject sat or posed for the artist was alien to Islamic art until the nineteenth century.⁴ All representations of rulers were executed from memory and based on accepted models of an ideal type; they depicted the subject's official image, even those based on observation and made by contemporary painters.

In Ottoman art an additional factor existed that made the representations of specific types closer to portraits of individuals: the consistent recurrence of the physical characteristics of the subject that had been carefully researched and documented. This factor became a feature of Ottoman court painting after the mid-sixteenth century and survived to the end of the empire.⁵

²See Priscilla P. Soucek, "Nizami on Painters and Painting," in *Islamic Art in the Metropolitan Museum of Art*, ed. Richard Ettinghausen (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1972), pp. 9-21.

³For a recent publication on the concept of portraiture in Asian cultures see Vishakha N. Desai and Denise Patry Leidy, *Faces of Asia: Portraits from the Permanent Collection* (Boston: Museum of Fine Arts, 1989).

⁴The idealized official image of the rulers existed even in nineteenth-century Iran. See Basil W. Robinson, "Persian Royal Portraiture and the Qajars," in *Qajar Iran: Political and Social Change, 1800-1925*, ed. Edmund Bosworth and Caroline Hillenbrand (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983), pp. 291-310.

⁵For a survey of Turkish painting, including portraiture, see *A History of Turkish Painting*, ed. Selman Pinar et al. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1989).

Portraiture in the Ottoman court was initiated in the 1480's by Mehmed II, who invited several Italian painters to the capital.⁶ Although the stylistic impact of European arts was short-lived and Ottoman painting soon followed the course of Islamic manuscript illustration, the genre of portraiture was established. Portraiture evolved within the tradition of Ottoman book painting, strongly influenced by the royal demand for illustrated histories, which preoccupied the *naqqâşhâne* (imperial painting studio) after the 1550s. These histories, written and illustrated by contemporary or near contemporary authors and painters, documented events and depicted actual settings and participants, with some degree of artistic liberty.

The interest in producing general histories of the Ottoman dynasty, biographies of the sultans, and descriptions of specific campaigns and even of festive occasions, necessitated accurate representation of the protagonists to clearly identify them in the scenes.

An important work for the understanding of Ottoman portraiture is a genealogical book on the first twelve sultans (from 'Osmân I to Murâd III). Entitled the *Ḳıyâfetü'l-İnsânîye fî Semâ'ili'l-'Osmânîye*, it was written in 1579 by Loqmân, who held the post of the *şehnâmeçi* (official biographer) between 1569 and 1596/97. The most prolific of all Ottoman *şehnâmeçis*, Loqmân composed his texts in Persian and Turkish verse, working primarily with 'Osmân, a renowned painter employed in the *naqqâşhâne* from the 1560s to the 1590s. Loqmân and 'Osmân collaborated on several historical manuscripts produced for Selîm II (r. 1566-74) and Murâd III (r. 1574-95), including the *Târîh-i Sulţân Süleymân*, *Şâhnâme-i Selîm Hân*, *Şâhînsâhnâme*, *Hünernâme*, *Zübdetü'l-Tevârîh*, and *Sûrnâme*.⁷

The *Ḳıyâfetü'l-İnsânîye* was the product of serious research, utilizing written and visual sources. In the introduction to the volume Loqmân writes that he and 'Osmân conducted a search of portraits of the sultans and found several examples. They also consulted past histories to determine the physical appearances and dispositions of the subjects.

The introduction also discusses the word *ḳıyâfet* (which is used simultaneously with *ferâset*), meaning physiognomy, that is, the art of determining an individual's personality through the analysis of appearances. Build, size, and coloring; shape of face, eyebrows, nose, and mouth; end even

⁶This subject is discussed in Esin Aul, "Ottoman Miniature Painting under Sultan Mehmed II," *Ars Orientalis* 9 (1973): 103-20.

⁷For references to these works see Aul, *Süleymanname* p. 72 and notes cited on pp. 50 and 53. On the office of the *şehnâmeçi*, see C. Woodhead, "An Experiment in Official Historiography: The Post of *Şehnâmeçi* in the Ottoman Empire, c. 1555-1605," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 75 (1983), pp. 157-182.

voice, smile, and clothes were considered to reflect personal traits. It was, therefore, essential to obtain a precise physical description of the subject in order to identify his temperament.

The *Kıyâfetü'l-İnsânîye* is composed of twelve chapters, each containing a portrait of a sultan, summary of his reign, and description of his personality and appearance. The section on Süleymân, the tenth sultan, begins with his biography, discusses the major events of his reign, and describes his personality and physical characteristics:

In addition to being a skillful ruler and statesman he was benevolent and modest... devoid of pride and vanity... He was pious and devoted to mysticism. ...He was tall and majestic-looking with strong limbs and broad shoulders; he had an elegant and handsome face, aquiline nose, furrowed brows, and deep hazel-colored eyes... He wore a *mücevveze* (tall and voluminous turban that became fashionable during his reign).

Loqmân describes the next sultan, Selîm II:

He was of average height and robust with a thick neck... His complexion was pale... He had ruddy cheeks, small nose and mouth, slightly furrowed brows, blue eyes, and pale blond beard. His turban was like that of his father but larger; his garments resembled those of the Iranians and were woven with gold...⁸

Osman's portraits of Süleymân (fig. 1) and Selîm II (fig. 2) capture these physical characteristics. The artist, who had entered the *nakkâşhâne* during Süleymân's reign, must have personally observed the two sultans and studied their appearances. His portraits also reveal the dispositions of the subjects: Süleymân is an intense-looking majestic figure with a slight build and refined, sensitive face; Selîm II is less impressive in appearance with half-closed dreamy eyes and he is considerably heavier. Süleymân appears as an ascetic compared to Selîm, whose weakness for earthly pleasures was well known.

The accuracy of Selîm II's physical attributes can be determined by comparing several portraits of the same sultan made earlier by Haydar Re'îs, or Nigârî (1492[?]-1572), a naval captain who painted and wrote poetry. Nigârî is mentioned as an expert portraitist in Muştafâ Âlî's 1586 *Menâkıb-ı Hünerverân*, biography of artists:

⁸The texts used here are from the ca. 1579-80 copy in İstanbul, Topkapı Palace Museum, H. 1563. This work was popularly copied up to the nineteenth century, with additional texts and portraits added to the end of the manuscripts by later historians and painters.

Haydar Re'is, who in the time of Selîm Hân, the son of Süleymân Hân, held the post of the supervisor of the dockyards and occasionally was honored to be admitted to the noble assemblies during Selîm's days as prince; he is also known as Nakkâş Haydar and no one can adequately describe his ability in *şebih yazma* [portraiture], especially of the late Sultan Selîm.⁹

Two portraits of Selîm II attributed to Nigârî (figs. 3-4) were originally made as individual studies on single sheets and later incorporated into imperial albums. Although the main figures are not identified by inscriptions, they undoubtedly represent Selîm II. The physical characteristics of the sitter are consistent in both versions: a large, slightly overweight man with a pale blond beard is attired in richly brocaded garments and pursues leisurely activities (target shooting in one, feasting in the other). The features of the sultan are remarkably similar to those in 'Oşmân's rendition. Although Nigârî's paintings are not as technically refined as those of the court artist, they display a spontaneity as well as a greater knowledge of, and even intimacy with, his subject. Nigârî belonged to the administration and was thus privileged to see Selîm during non-ceremonial and social functions, a fact mentioned by Muştafâ 'Alî.

A well-known portrait of a sultan attended by two officials also bears no inscriptions (fig. 5). Once again attributed to Nigârî, the subject is identified as Süleymân, based on his physical characteristics. Nigârî depicts the sultan as a frail old man dressed in unpretentious clothes, strolling in a garden. Although he is accompanied by attendants, Süleymân stands alone, lost in thought. His back is bent and his face lined and gaunt. The painting is compositionally static yet emotionally moving, portraying a lonely ruler burdened by age, ill health, and responsibilities — contemplating the events of his long and exhausting reign. It is one of Süleymân's rare images representing both his physical characteristic and mental state. The painting must have been made near the end of Süleymân's life or even after his death.

Nigârî's portraits are exceptional in that he was not a professional painter but an amateur who made studies of the individuals with whom he was associated. 'Oşmân, on the other hand, was a product of the *nakkâşhâne* who worked under the supervision of the *şehdameci*, adhering to his predetermined guidelines and composing the scenes to correspond with or supplement the text. In addition, he was not the first painter to illustrate the activities of Süleymân's reign.

That task fell on a group of painters assigned to work on the *Süleymânname*, the biography of the sultan written by 'Arîfî. The author, who

⁹I am grateful to Wheeler M. Thackston for providing me with this translation.

originated from Shirvan, had arrived at the court in 1547. Appointed *şehnâmeçi* soon after, he remained at that post until his death in 1561/62. The *Süleymânnâme*, completed in 1558, contains the earliest representations of the sultan. The work begins with the accession of Süleymân and terminates with the events of 1556, a decade before his death. Most illustrations reveal the hands of two anonymous artists, Painters A and B, each of whom displays a different approach to portraiture.

Painter A, who was employed in the *nakkâşhâne* in the late 1550's, was a remarkably innovative artist whose depictions of court ceremonies, fortress sieges, and battle scenes became the prototypes for later historical illustrations, including those by 'Oşmân. Painter A attempted to portray as accurately as possible the physical characteristics of the sultan and was responsible for the five scenes reproduced here (figs. 6-10).

The first scene in the *Süleymânnâme* represents the accession of the sultan, who was enthroned in 1520 at age twenty-six. Süleymân is shown as a youthful monarch with an oval face, arched eyebrows, aquiline nose, and thin moustache (fig. 6). The same figure appears in the siege of Belgrade, undertaken a year later (fig. 7). In these two scenes the sultan is not only identified by his placement in the composition and textual references but also by the recurrence of his physical features.

A later scene, narrating the festival organized for the circumcisions of two princes, Bâyezîd and Cihângîr, in 1539, when Süleymân was forty-five years old, portrays a mature man who now sports a brownish beard (fig. 8). Enthroned in the *Hâşş Odu* (Throne Room), he is represented in majesty, surrounded by the splendors of his court.

The formality of this hierarchic composition contrasts with a more casual setting in which Süleymân observes his son Selîm hunting with his companions (fig. 9). The episode takes place in 1554, when the sultan was sixty years old. Here the sultan's expression is solemn and pensive. He had lost three sons — Mehmed, Muştafâ, and Cihângîr — and the throne was to be fought over by his remaining two sons, Bâyezîd and Selîm. Selîm, who eventually won and became sultan, is portrayed as a young man with a round face and drooping mustache (he is identified as the figure with a plume in his turban, riding a black steed on the left).

In one of the last paintings in the manuscript, which depicts Süleymân inspecting his Rumelian forces in the field, his advanced age is apparent (fig. 10). The sultan was now over sixty. Despite his heavy ceremonial garments, he looks frail; he has developed a slouch and his beard is graying.



1 Portrait of Süleymân
 Attributed to 'Osmân
 From the *Ḳıyâfetü'l-İnsâniye fi Şemâili l-'Osmâniye* of Loqmân,
 c. 1579-80
 (Istanbul, Topkapı Palace
 Museum, H. 1563, fol. 61a)



2 Portrait of Selim II
 Attributed to 'Osmân
 From the *Ḳıyâfetü'l-İnsâniye fi Şemâili l-'Osmâniye* of Loqmân,
 ca. 1579-80
 (Istanbul, Topkapı Palace
 Museum, H. 1563, fol. 66b)



3 Portrait of Selim II
 Attributed to Nigârî, ca. 1570
 (Istanbul, Topkapı Palace
 Museum, H. 2134/3)




4 Portrait of Selim II
 Attributed to Nigârî, ca. 1570
 (Geneva, Sadruddin Aga Khan
 Collection)



5 Portrait of Süleymân
 Attributed to Nigârî, mid-1560's
 (Istanbul, Topkapı Palace
 Museum, H. 2134/8)



7 Siege of Belgrade
 Attributed to Painter A
 From the *Süleymännâme* of 'Ârifî
 dated 1558
 (Istanbul, Topkapı Palace
 Museum, H. 1517, fol. 109a)



6 Accession of Süleymân (detail)
 Attributed to Painter A
 From the *Süleymännâme* of 'Ârifî, dated 1558
 (Istanbul, Topkapı Palace Museum, H. 1517, fol. 17b)




8 Circumcision Festival for Princes
Bayezid and Cihangir
Attributed to Painter A
From the *Süleymânnâme* of 'Ârifî
dated 1558
(Istanbul, Topkapı Palace
Museum, H. 1517, fol. 412a)



9 Süleymân Watching (then Prince)
Selim Hunt
Attributed to Painter A
From the *Süleymânnâme* of 'Ârifî
dated 1558
(Istanbul, Topkapı Palace
Museum, H. 1517, fol. 576a)



10 Süleymân with His Rumelian
Army (detail)
Attributed to Painter A
From the *Süleymânnâme* of 'Ârifî
dated 1558
(H. 1517, fol. 592a)



11 Süleymân Hunting
Attributed to Painter B
From the *Süleymânnâme* of 'Ârifî
dated 1558
(Istanbul, Topkapı Palace
Museum, H. 1517, fol. 132a)



12 Süleymân Conversing with Prince Muştafâ (detail)
 Attributed to Painter B
 From the *Süleymânâme* of 'Ârifî dated 1558
 (Istanbul, Topkapı Palace Museum, H. 1517, fol. 477b)



13 Süleymân Receiving St. Zpolya
 Attributed to 'Osmân
 From the *Nezhetü'l-Esrârü'l-Ahbâr der Sefer-i Sigetvar* of Ahmed Ferîdü'n Paşa, dated 1568/69
 (Istanbul, Topkapı Palace Museum, H. 1339, fol. 16b)



14 Süleymân Praying at the Mausoleum of Eyûb Enşârî
 Attributed to 'Osmân
 From the *Târîh-i Sulţân Süleymân* of Lokman, dated 1579/80 S
 (Dublin, Chester Beatty Library, MS 413, fol. 38a)



15 Süleymân Hunting
 Attributed to 'Osmân
 From the *Hünernâme*, volume, 2,
 dated 1587/88
 (Istanbul, Topkapı Palace
 Museum, H. 1524, fol. 56a)



16 Süleymân Listening to the Case
 of the Kadı of Kayseri
 Attributed to 'Osmân
 From the *Hünernâme* of Loqmân,
 volume 2, dated 1587/88
 (Istanbul, Topkapı Palace
 Museum, H. 1524, fol 237b)



17 Süleymân Marching toward Szigetvar

Attributed to 'Osmân

From the *Hünernâme* of Loqmân, volume 2, dated 1587/88 S (Istanbul, Topkapı Palace Museum, H. 1524, fol. 276a)

As observed in these illustrations, Painter A attempts to portray Süleymân in consecutive stages of life — as a youthful monarch, mature man, and elderly leader — while retaining the official image of the sultan.

Painter B, an established master of the studio who flourished between the 1520s and 1550s, worked in the traditional manner. His protagonists are generally identified by their placement in the composition and textual references. Although his images of the sultan are symbolic, the artist at times succeeds in capturing the emotions and moods of his subjects (figs. 11-12).

A typical painting depicts a royal hunt with the sultan in the center (fig. 11). The protagonist is a slender man with an aquiline nose and dark beard. According to the text, this event occurred en route to Rhodes in 1522, when Süleymân was twenty-eight years old.

Two similar figures appear in a more intimate setting, seated in a pavilion overlooking a garden (fig. 12). The text states that on the way to the Iranian frontier Süleymân met with his eldest son, Muştafâ, in Kayseri, where they were entertained in rose gardens. This episode took place in 1548, when Süleymân was fifty-four and Muştafâ was thirty-three. The more prominent, older figure is identified as Süleymân. Muştafâ is shown as a mature man with a dark beard and countenance resembling that of his father. Süleymân, with graying beard and a more distinctive nose, looks preoccupied. He has turned his back on his son and holds weapons of destruction — a bow and arrow — while listening absentmindedly to the music. Despite his decorative style, Painter B has captured the emotions of the sultan, setting a pensive mood that foretells the future. Five years later Süleymân was to order the execution of Muştafâ for treason.

The paintings of the *Süleymânname*, particularly those made by Painter A, had a strong impact on the *nakkâşhâne* artists. Painter A might have trained 'Oşmân, who perfected the documentary painting style established in the court.

Although 'Oşmân worked primarily with Lokmân, his first commission was to illustrate the description of Süleymân's 1566 campaign to Szigetvar written by Ahmed Feridûn Paşa in 1568/69. One painting in this volume depicts the sultan stopping outside Belgrade to receive Stephen Zapolya, his vassal king of Hungary (fig. 13). 'Oşmân portrays Süleymân as an ailing old man; his complexion is sallow, his face deeply lined. The sultan was seventy-two years old at the time and suffering from poor health.

Each figure in the composition is individualized; the imperial attendants, vezirs, and Hungarian delegation have distinct features and garments. An aura of solemnity, even pathos permeates the scene. It is almost as if the participants had a premonition that this was Süleymân's last campaign. The image is both

ceremonial and intimate. The hierarchic stillness is charged with emotions. With stoic fortitude, the majestic old sultan is determined to die in the field like a true soldier; his retinue looks on the scene with sadness for they are moved by the sultan's last valiant effort. 'Osmân has created a remarkable painting which not only describes the physical characteristics and psychological states of the participants but also evokes an emotional reaction on the part of the viewer.

'Osmân's outstanding talent must have attracted Lokmân's attention since the *şehnâmeçi* chose him to illustrate the *Kıyâfetü'l-İnsânîye* discussed earlier. 'Osmân also worked with Lokmân on the *Târîh-i Sulţân Süleymân* of 1579/1580, which was composed as the conclusion to the *Süleymânâme*.

The first illustration, showing Süleymân seated in a pavilion in the Topkapı Palace, recalls the image in the *Kıyâfetü'l-İnsânîye* and is similarly conceived as an official portrait of the protagonist at his prime. The other scenes are narrative and describe specific events such as Süleymân praying at the mausoleum of Eyûb Enşârî in İstanbul before starting his Szigetvar campaign (fig. 14). True to his age, it represents the sultan as an older man with a gray beard.

'Osmân and members of his studio also illustrated Lokmân's universal and dynastic histories, such as the two-volume *Hünernâme*. The history of the Ottoman dynasty appears in the first volume, while the life of Süleymân is narrated in the second.

The second volume of the *Hünernâme*, completed in 1587/88, reemploys some of the themes and compositions seen in the earlier works. A number of scenes narrate Süleymân's outstanding feats in hunting (fig. 15) or commemorate his achievements as a lawmaker. One depicts the sultan observing a legal case from the hidden chamber in the ' *Adâlet Kulesi* (Tower of Justice) that overlooks the *Kubbealtı*, the pavilion where the council of ministers met in the second courtyard of the Topkapı Palace (fig. 16). This painting is full of fascinating details, recreating the activities and settings of the age. Finally the *Hünernâme* closes with Süleymân's last campaign and depicts the march to Szigetvar, a scene used earlier in the *Târîh-i Sulţân Süleymân*: Süleymân rides in the center of his forces, supported by his grand vezir, Şokollu Mehmed Paşa (fig. 17). The sultan almost winces in pain. The carriage in which he rode most of the route is in the foreground — an ominous reminder that it will later be used as a hearse.

The image of Süleymân was first devised during his lifetime by the artists of the *nakkaşhâne* and became fully established a decade after his death. Artists concentrated on his physical appearance and depicted him in various stages of life — from a young ruler to an aging warrior — at times capturing his moods and emotions.

Süleymân's long and glorious reign was the subject of several illustrated histories. These manuscripts were produced by court writers and painters for an elite group. Kept in the *Hazine* (Treasury) or in one of the imperial libraries of the Topkapı Palace, the volumes were seen only by descendants of the sultan or high-ranking administrative officials. This was an educated audience who were familiar with the legend of Süleymân. His representations, therefore, were visual reminders of a man whose physical characteristics, temperament, and achievements were well known. They were not public images of the sultan but illustrations for private family records, which preserved the dynasty's past and present history.

Süleymân did not have a public image and neither did any other Ottoman sultan until the end of the nineteenth century. The Ottoman world was very impersonal and valued the office of the sultanate, which combined religious and secular authority, over the individual. The public image of Süleymân, the protector of Muslims and the caliph of Islam, was the Süleymaniye Mosque, the renowned edifice built by Sinân between 1550 and 1557; and the image of Süleyman, the sultan, was the Tower of Justice in the Topkapı Palace. Today both structures continue to dominate the skyline of Istanbul, visual reminders of a great legacy.

PİRİ RE'İS

Svat SOUCEK

When in 1517 the Ottoman sultan Selim I was in Cairo at the conclusion of his conquest of Egypt, one of the Turkish fleet's captains, Piri Re'is, presented him with a map of the world he had made. Only the "western" half of that map is extant; fortunately, for us, it is on this half that the author revealed his identity and recorded where and when he made the map: at Gallipoli, in March/April 1513.

We do not know what happened to the other, "eastern" portion of the map, nor do we know the subsequent fortunes of the extant part until 1929 when it attracted the attention of two scholars, a Turk (Halil Edhem, director of the Topkapı Palace museum) and a German Orientalist, Paul Kahle. The map quickly became an international sensation, and for several reasons: it turned out to be one of the earliest cartographic representations of the New World; it had been made by a Muslim; and above all, people were told that it probably reflected the earliest but lost map made by Columbus. Internal evidence, comparative examinations, and three explicit statements by Piri Re'is led scholars to this conclusion.¹ Two of these statements are on the map itself:

- 1) "The coasts and islands on this map have been copied from a map made by Columbus."
- 2) "... [This world map] was produced on the basis of several maps by bringing them to one scale: one of these maps had been made by Columbus..."

¹Half-a-century of interest in the subject has produced a sizeable body of literature, but P. Kahle's *Die verschollene Columbus-Karte von 1498 in einer türkischen Weltkarte von 1513* (Berlin, 1933) still remains the most thorough and reliable analysis. The excellent facsimile edition issued by the Türk Tarih Kurumu is accompanied by a separate pamphlet (Yusuf Akçura, *Piri Reis Haritası*, Ankara, 1935) containing a description in Turkish, German, French, English and Italian. The map has also generated a fair amount of eccentric interpretation, such as the theory that it goes back to an advanced civilization of the Ice Age; see Ch. Hapgood, *Maps of the Ancient Sea Kings* (Philadelphia, 1966).

The third statement is in the introduction Pîrî Re'îs wrote to the *Kitâb-ı bahriye*, a book of sailing directions and charts for the Mediterranean which he completed in 1526 in order to present it to Sultan Süleymân:

- 3) [facs. ed.: Pîrî Re'îs, *Kitâb-ı bahriye* (Ankara, 1935) p. 82 line 5:]
"A map of the West Indies made by Columbus fell into our hands...."

Moreover, in another place of the map Pîrî Re'îs states that he benefited from the oral testimony of a Spaniard who had participated in the first three of Columbus' four voyages:

- 4) "The late Kemâl Re'îs had a Spanish slave who told him: 'I have sailed three times with Columbus to those regions ...'."

All these statements are plausible, for Pîrî Re'îs spent much of his early career as one of the Turkish corsairs who had the opportunity of capturing Spanish ships at sea or prisoners and booty in the coastal areas of Western Mediterranean. There are many instances of this in the *Kitâb-ı bahriye*, such as the following:

- 5) [facs. ed., p. 596 lines 12-14:] "At one point the late Kemâl Re'îs and I captured seven ships off the coast of Valencia...."

A few words about the map itself. The more correct term would be sea-chart, and one of the late medieval, "portolan" type: a map made to serve the needs of seamen, for it shows primarily the coastlines and islands, and is marked by windroses, rhumb lines and distance scales in order to facilitate navigation.² At the same time it belongs to the "presentation" category of these maps—those made less for practical use at sea than as works of the graphic arts made to please wealthy or important customers. This is demonstrated by the esthetic qualities and amusing digressions on the map: pictures of various types of ships, animals, plants, and people, as well as stories such as that about St. Brendan, the curiosities of Brazil, or allusions to the voyages of discovery.

I now want to dwell on Pîrî Re'îs's importance in the context of Süleymân and his time. Both the cartographer and the sultan lived in an age when prodigious geographical as well as scientific discoveries were beginning to change the course of history. The Turkish captain possessed the qualities characteristic of the men who were the architects of this revolution: An open, receptive mind unencumbered by the bonds of conventional tradition, scientific curiosity, and an urge to formulate his own version of the exciting new

²Michel Mollat, *Sea Charts of the Early Explorers: 13th to 17th Century* (New York, 1984) p. 218-19. The volume includes a good reproduction on plate 28.

knowledge — in short, the mind of a Renaissance man. The map under discussion is revealing: Pīrī Re'īs tells us how he had been collecting maps made by Westerners and Easterners alike — and how he had used all this information in order to produce a world map that was unique:³

Here is show this map was made:

This is a unique map such as no one else has ever produced, and I am its author. I have used twenty [regional] maps and world maps - the latter derive from a prototype that goes back to Zūlkarneyn's time and that comprises the entire inhabited world-Arabs call such maps "ca'feriye"⁴ - I have used eight such "ca'feriyes"; then I have used an Arab map of [the] India [n ocean],⁵ as well as maps made by four Portuguese who applied mathematical methods to represent India and China;⁶ finally, I have also used a map of the Western regions drawn by Columbus. I have brought all these sources to one scale and this is the result: In other words, just as the sailors of the Mediterranean have reliable and well-tested charts at their disposal, this [new] map of the world oceans [lit. "Seven Seas"] too is reliable and worthy of recognition.

Pīrī Re'īs's complete world map may thus have been a synthesis of both Renaissance Western and indigenous Eastern cartography, and in this respect truly unique.⁷ With this imaginative and lucid work he took an honorable but

³Text located in the south-western corner of the map (no. VI in the above-mentioned pamphlet published with the facsimile reproduction of 1935).

⁴Pīrī Re'īs may be referring here to world maps made by the Arab geographers of the classical period (9th to 10th centuries) which were partly inspired by Ptolemy. Zūlkarneyn, mentioned in the Koran (sura 18), came to represent a mythical personage credited with many wondrous feats; Muslim commentators identified him with Alexander the Great, who too acquired legendary powers in Islamic lore. "Ca'feriye" has so far baffled commentators; it may be a distortion of the word "coğrafiyā," Arabic for "geography" not in our sense but in that of "sūrat al-arḍ," "depiction of the world" also in the cartographic sense; see J. H. Kramers, "Djuğhrāfiya", *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 1st ed., suppl. p. 62.

⁵Rather than representing India itself, this map was more probably a sea chart of the Indian ocean made by such Arab mariners as Ibn Mājid and Sulaymān al-Mahrī (D. Sourdel, "Ibn Mājid," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., iii 858; G. R. Tibbets, *Arab navigation in the Indian ocean before the coming of the Portuguese* (London, 1971) p. xii, 4. and bibliography on pp. xix-xxvi).

⁶The comment in note 4 applies here as well: the maps made by the Portuguese must have been of the portolan chart type, and contours of continents with their ports were the extent of their interest in depicting land. The existence of such maps from the years 1498-1513 can be only inferred, on the basis of those believed incorporated in the world maps that have come down to us. The earliest Portuguese specimen is the so-called Cantino planisphere dated 1502; see for example Bois Perrose, *Travel and discovery in the Renaissance: 1420-1620* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952) p. 245; Mollat, *op. cit.*, #25.

⁷It is this uniqueness that makes this map so precious — alas, only if we take the cartographer's word for it, since the eastern portion has not survived: As a map of the New World, it is neither the earliest nor the most advanced type (although it may be the most appealing one esthetically):

also special place in the ranks of his western fellow-mapmakers. Nor was the world map the only example of his modern and original vision. The long versified introduction to the *Kitáb-ı bahriye* also tells about the progress of the Portuguese and Spanish voyages of discovery; this account is presented in a remarkably lucid way, within a structure that informs the reader about the sphericity of the earth and chief navigational methods and challenges in the Atlantic and Indian oceans.

In Europe, princes, merchants and publishers were competing for such maps and reports that would enable their fleets and traders to accede to overseas sources and consequently increase their own wealth and power, or that would give their printing presses materials they knew would sell well. The ferment of interest in the new discoveries was gaining momentum at a prodigious rate, and it would be difficult to decide who or what played the most catalytic role: whether it was monarchs and governments from Estevao of Portugal and Elizabeth of England to the popes themselves; or merchant interests in Lisbon, Venice, London, or Amsterdam; or religious milieux such as the Jesuits eager to tackle new areas for proselytizing; or editors-publishers like Ramusio in Venice or Hakluyt in London or Plantin in Antwerp, or again cartographers-publishers like Ortelius and Mercator. The medium of printing gave this spread of new knowledge an unprecedented dimension whose importance could hardly be overemphasized.

In Turkey, Pîrî Re'îs must have been hoping that his works, which he had been so devotedly presenting to his two sovereigns, would be recognized as important and worthy of recompense; he may also have expected to be encouraged to produce still more of the fascinating new body of information, perhaps to head a whole workshop of experts employed by a government bent on challenging the Europeans in this new area.⁸

It appears, however, that nothing of the sort happened. Pîrî Re'îs remained an isolated case in the Ottoman empire and, indeed, in the Islamic world.

several earlier maps made by the Spanish, Portuguese or Italians have an edge there. The oldest extant specimen is the world map by the Spaniard Juan de la Cosa, Columbus's erstwhile pilot, dated 1500 (Penrose, *op. cit.*, p. 244; Mollat, *op. cit.*, #22). While all of these are "manuscript" maps, by 1508 the first specimen showing also the new world was included in an edition of Ptolemy's *Geography* printed in Rome (on fols. 125-26). Despite its later date, Pîrî Re'îs's map is more archaic; this aspect, far from being a drawback, can be viewed as an asset — reflecting as it probably does Columbus's first trial, which in turn may have owed as much to Behaim's globe as to direct observations. Only later voyages revealed the true nature of the new discoveries, hence the more "correct" map of Juan de la Cosa. One frequent misconception is that Pîrî Re'îs drew the map according to a projection which took account of the curvature of the earth. This belief is due to the confusion of windroses and rhumbines with genuine projections.

⁸Suffice it to mention the case of Turkey's principal maritime adversary in the Mediterranean, Spain, and the *Casa de Contratacion* (a sort of Board of Trade) in Seville, one of whose duties was continuous updating of the "*padron real*," the set of classified master sea-charts kept there.

Exception could be made - up to a point - for Seydî 'Alî Re'îs who wrote a quarter of a century later,⁹ and for the unknown author of the *Tâ'rîh-i Hind-i Garbi*¹⁰ who compiled his work yet another generation later, or again for the occasional mappamundi appearing in a few Turkish portolan atlases of the Mediterranean;¹¹ none of these, however, approach Pîrî Re'îs work in importance, nor do they even remotely match the constantly improving body of geographical information proliferating in Europe. Perhaps nothing could illustrate more dramatically the disparity between the Ottoman and European views of the world in Süleymân's time than a comparison of the respective sums total of contemporary literature, published and unpublished, on the subject - whether in quality, quantity, or variety. Moreover, even the little the Ottomans noticed and wrote down remained barred from wider circulation and thus possible ignition of greater interest by the persistent refusal to adopt the printing medium. Meanwhile in Europe, editions upon editions, and not only in the original languages but also in manifold translations, kept fuelling official as well as private curiosity and thereby generating further energy to conceive ever more imaginative and daring projects.

The new vistas Pîrî Re'îs and the other two authors tried to open of course do not exhaust the list of sixteenth century Ottoman geographers. Their maps and books only stand apart from a steady stream of geographical and cosmographical works whose type and scope range from the traditional Islamic to the locally innovative. The former was the more standard feature, and it was based on the time-honoured and famous names and methods of Arabo-Persian geography: The names of Istakhri (fl. beg. tenth century) and Abulfida (fl. early fourteenth century) bracket, chronologically as well as intrinsically, a roster familiar to all students of Islamic civilization. Turkish authors simply translated them, or wrote adaptations and compilations. Three aspects are characteristic of this school of sixteenth century Ottoman geography: One is a belief that information supplied by Islamic authors of several centuries back still retained its validity; another, a consequential one, that there was no need for further investigation; and the third, a corollary of the second but compounded by

⁹His *Muhtâf* ("The Encompassing Sea") is a volume of sailing directions for the Indian ocean (so far unpublished in its entirety), translated into Turkish from Arabic texts which Seydî 'Alî collected while in charge of the Ottoman fleet in those waters. The text includes a brief mention of Magellan's voyage around the world in 1519-22. See M. Bittner, *Die topographischen Capitel des indischen Seespiegels Mohit* (Wien, 1897) p. 75-76.

¹⁰A composite volume of both original passages and translations chiefly from Spanish and Italian publications made in 1580. See the facsimile editions of MS. Revan 1488 of the Topkapı Library: *Tarih-i Hind-i Garbi veya Hadîs-i Nev*, Istanbul, 1987; and the translation enriched with a thorough analysis and commentary by T. D. Goodrich, *The Ottoman Turks and the New World: a study of Tarih-i Hind-i Garbi and sixteenth-century Ottoman Americana*, Wiesbaden, 1990.

¹¹Thomas D. Goodrich, "Ottoman portolans," *The Portolan*, 7 (September 1986) pp. 6-11.

religious considerations, was a total neglect of contemporary European sources.¹² Two names can serve as examples. Muştafâ 'Âlî of Gallipoli included in the first part of his great historical work, *Künhü'l-ahbâr*, which he wrote in the 1580's, a geography based chiefly on Istakhri and Abulfida. 'Âlî's younger contemporary Mehmed 'Âşîk of Trabzon, who compiled his world geography *Menâzırü'l'avâlim* by 1598, acted similarly, but he enriched his book by expanding its topographical parts that deal with the Ottoman provinces. In order to gather information, he travelled a great deal and especially in the Balkan provinces less familiar to him. This was a praiseworthy innovation, but its limitations too are significant: he made no effort to explore Europe beyond the limits of the Ottoman empire, or at least to use contemporary written — or oral, for that matter — European sources.

The contrast is especially striking when we remember that a century earlier the intellectual climate had been different and potentially promising. To begin with, Turkish geographers did use a type of source that also inspired the Europeans of the Renaissance: the works of classical antiquity, in particular Ptolemy's *Geography*. On the Turkish side, it was through the filter of classical Arabo-Persian science, in particular Hwarizmî's (fl. ninth century) *Kitâb şîrat al-arḍ*, and its post-classical adaptors such as Kazwinî (fl. thirteenth century). In Europe, both the Islamic channel and, with the coming of the Renaissance, the direct Graeco-Roman channel were utilized. The latter, in fact, was part of the process toward the genesis of the Renaissance itself; the Byzantine E. Chrysoloras brought a Greek copy of the *Geography* to Italy in the very first years of the fifteenth century, whereupon the Florentine Jacopo Angiolo made a Latin translation and dedicated it to Pope Alexander VI in 1409. This Latin version had an immediate and universal impact: there are some 50 known manuscripts, and in the fifteenth century alone — between 1475 and 1500 — it appeared in 7 printed editions. Its popularity continued well into the sixteenth century, but the original became ever more transformed into hybrid cosmographies where the Ptolemaic maps were supplemented by contemporary ones showing the world as it was being discovered — and thus partly contradicting the older maps, as for example the above-mentioned edition of 1508.

This popularity of Ptolemy-inspired cosmographies was both a stimulus and a symptom of the tremendous appeal the geographical discoveries had in Europe, and by the time this genre began to cede the scene, in the last decades of the century, to the still far more advanced achievements of the northern school — at first represented by the atlases and cosmographies of Ortelius and Mercator — it had fulfilled a historical role. It is this case of the resurrected Ptolemy that

¹²F. Taeschner, "Die geographische Literatur der Osmanen," ZDMG 77/2 (1923) pp. 31-80; and its Turkish version: "Osmanlılarda coğrafya," *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, 2 (1928) pp. 271-314.

reminds us of a brief period at the dawn of the Renaissance, when Ottoman Turkey stood close to taking a decisive step in the same direction - the reign of Mehmed Fâtiḥ. The conqueror of Constantinople had on various occasions demonstrated his unconventional spirit and scientific curiosity, and surrounded himself with scholars some of whom were Greeks such as the Amirutzes (father and son) from Trebizond. In 1465 the sultan ordered them to make an Arabic translation of the Greek original of Ptolemy's *Geography*. It took two centuries before another Turkish sultan stirred enough to issue a similar order - Mehmed IV who in 1675 ordered a Turkish translation of Blaeu's *Atlas major*.¹³ As for mathematical and astronomical geography, and the exact sciences in general, there, too, Ottoman scholars of the Süleymânic age preferred the traditional to the innovative, the Arabo-Persian heritage to what Renaissance Europe was creating. The already familiar Seydî 'Alî wrote in 1554 an astronomical treatise, and the type of encouragement he had received from a teacher in Aleppo in characteristic: "There are many books on astronomy and mathematics in Arabic and Persian, so why shouldn't there be any in Turkish? 'Alî Kuşçu's work is one of the best, you should translate it." So Seydî 'Alî did, while in Europe Copernicus's treatise was already spreading in printed form. As in the case of Ottoman geography, the contrast between the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries in the field of the exact sciences is striking. 'Alî Kuşçu's *Fethiye* as well as other works remind us of the area where Islamic science was at its best in the classical period, and where it continued to maintain a level of excellence even in the later Middle Age — mathematics and astronomy.

We can almost speak of an Indian summer of Islamic astronomy that marked the fifteenth century, when Ulug Beg and his entourage built the famous observatory at Samarkand and taught and studied at the medrese the enlightened Timurid prince had founded. His court attracted some of the best minds of the Islamic world such as Kâdîzâde Rûmî, a Turk from Bursa. 'Alî Kuşçu in turn was one of the products of that milieu. He left Samarkand after Ulug Beg's assassination, settling at first in Tabriz. Characteristically, Mehmed the Conqueror made a great and ultimately successful effort to attract him to Istanbul. In Mehmed's time, Turco-Islamic astronomy as represented by 'Alî Kuşçu and even more by other disciples of Ulug Beg may still have been superior to that of contemporary Europe, especially in the field of the theory of Planetary motions. However, by Kânûnî's time, the High Renaissance in Europe was also marked by the stirrings of modern science — including mathematics and astronomy — that with the seventeenth century ushered in the modern era; in astronomy, Tycho de Brahe, Galileo, and Kepler came to revolutionize the view of the world and established the one that is still valid today. Meanwhile in Turkey, the clinging to the traditional assumptions — such as the geocentricity

¹³ Adnan Adıvar, *Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim* (Istanbul, 1970), p. 137; the atlas was printed at Amsterdam in 1662; in 1668 the Dutch ambassador Justin Collier presented it to the sultan.

of the universe — and the concomitant neglect of the new ideas fermenting in Europe locked the scientific elite in a hopelessly losing position. Indeed, Süleymân's reign loomed in the intervening period as the apogee of Ottoman power, and the very awesomeness of Kânûnî's might and prestige tends to obscure the fact that the empire was giving up the race where it would matter the most — scientific and technological progress, and commercial-colonial expansion.

To return to the main theme of my essay: Pîrî Re'îs's life was intimately intertwined with Ottoman history under three sultans — Bâyezîd II, Selîm I, and Süleymân — and it is the poignant story of a man who made repeated efforts to catch the ear of the mighty in the hope of showing them the usefulness of his work. What, for example, was his reward when he presented the world map to Selîm in Cairo? We'll never know, but we have no evidence of an action that would have led to the establishment of an Ottoman cartographic office in view of entering the race with the Europeans; yet the time was ripe, the Ottoman state and society still had the means,¹⁴ and Pîrî Re'îs was the ideal man to head such an office, a counterpart to similar institutions in Lisbon and Seville for example. Or what was Pîrî Re'îs's recompense when he tried to present Süleymân with the now famous longer version of the *Kitâb-ı bahriye* in 1526 - a time that coincide with the commission placed in Venice by the sultan for the expensive "triple crown"?¹⁵ Again, we do not know how — or if — it was received by the sovereign, but once more there is no evidence of an appreciation that would have fostered a "Pîrî Re'îs school of Ottoman oceanography and cartography." True, the Ottoman government did not leave him idle as a captain. His command of the Suez fleet in the late 1540's and early 1550's is proof of that. But in that function his talents and knowledge were wasted; no luckier than Hâdım Süleymân Paşa and 'Alî Re'îs, he was more unfortunate than they. His Persian Gulf campaign ended in failure - in a manner that presents striking analogies with Hâdım Süleymân Paşa's failure before Diu in 1538 - and he returned to Cairo. The Ottoman government then issued an order that Pîrî Re'îs be executed, and the verdict was carried out some time in 1554.¹⁶

¹⁴The story that the "eastern" half of Pîrî Re'îs's map has not survived because the sultan tore it in the middle in order to use that portion for a possible campaign in the East may be apocryphal, but it correctly suggests the direction in which Turkey stood a chance of successfully competing with the Europeans - the Indian ocean, its spice trade, and its predominantly Muslim shipping. Selîm I died soon afterward, however, and Süleymân left no doubt in anybody's mind where his priorities lay - the *gaza* in the Balkans and war against the Safavids.

¹⁵See the article by Gülrü Necipoğlu-Kafadar in this book.

¹⁶The contrast between the harshness with which the authorities treated Pîrî Re'îs and the leniency shown toward Hâdım Süleymân Paşa and Seydî 'Alî Re'îs is indeed striking, especially if we remember how the former handled the campaign of 1538: Hâdım Süleymân bungled it to a degree that assaults common sense, for he had the ruler of Aden, who had come aboard of his own accord to pay him a visit, hanged on the ship's mast — a measure that guaranteed the subsequent uncooperativeness of the ruler of Gujerat and the resulting failure of the expedition. Meanwhile the execution of Pîrî Re'îs was the final and most dramatic demonstration of the waste of his

If we chose to assess the legacy of Kânûnî's rule through the prism of the manner in which Piri Re'îs' work was received and how this cartographer himself was treated, our verdict might thus be severe. Moreover, this verdict would also have to bear on the Ottoman elite from the sultan's viziers down to such gadflies as 'Âlî, all of whom displayed a similar degree of incomprehension of Piri Re'îs' message.¹⁷ But that in turn would be a partial and narrow-minded judgment. The

talent that had trailed much of his life. A perhaps not irrelevant coincidence is the fact that this tragedy followed by a few months the strangling of Muşafâ, Süleymân's eldest and ablest son — a measure that furthered the succession of mediocre sovereigns and one already deplored by the contemporary historian Muşafa 'Âli; see C. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: the historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)*, Princeton UP, 1986, p. 258. Neither man received what we might call a fair hearing; this fact is pointed out, in the case of Piri Re'îs, by C. Orhonlu in his article "Hiat Kaptanlığı ve Piri Reis," *Bellekten*, no. 134 (April 1970), p. 247.

¹⁷Orhonlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-47, surveys the attitude of contemporary commentators: Mehmed Efendi (*İbrihâcu'l-tevârih*, fol. 149b), Celâlzâde Muşafa (*Tabakâtu'l-memâlik*, fol. 392a), and Muşafa 'Âli (*Künhü'l-ahbâr*, fol. 303a), all approve of the execution on the unproven assumption that Hormuz would have surrendered if Piri Re'îs had not lifted the siege, while never mentioning any of the merits of the unfortunate cartographer; Kâtib Çelebi (*Tuhfetü'l-kibâr*, 1329/1911 ed., p. 61) and İbrâhîm Peçuyî (1:352) withhold any comment. It may also be instructive to glance at the manner in which Piri Re'îs's European counterparts fared. The Venetian Ramusio became a high official in the Republic's government; the Fleming Ortelius was appointed "cartographer to the king" (Philip II); the Englishman Hakluyt was given a rich prebend and is buried in Westminster Abbey; and the roster could continue. One could widen these reflections and ask how contemporary observers of the Ottoman empire's decline tried to identify its problems and propose solutions; while this would be outside the scope of my topic, one legitimate connection could be admitted. If my thesis is correct and part of the problem was ignorance of the widening horizons (meant literally as well as figuratively - from geographical discoveries to the scientific and technological ones) on the other side of the religious divide, then were there people who grasped this challenge and tried to alert their countrymen to the new reality? Judging from the best known critics of the period, the answer would be negative: They all, from 'Âli to Koçi Beg, yearned for a return to traditional values, and voices such as that quoted by B. Lewis in his article "Some reflections on the decline of the Ottoman empire," (*Studia Islamica*, 9 [1958] p. 118) were exceptions. Even Kâtib Çelebi, a man of broad vision who did so much to spread the news about a world the Ottomans still knew so little about, took a dim view in his *Cihânnâmâ* (Istanbul, 1731, pp. 88-91) of the advice offered by the author of the *Tâ'rih-i Hind-i Garbi* (this and related aspects surveyed by Zeki Velidi Togan, *Bugünkü Türkîli (Türkistan) ve yakın tarihi* (Istanbul, 1981) pp. 126-30): namely that the Ottomans should pursue a more active policy in the Indian ocean. Kâtib Çelebi cites the disasters that befell Piri Re'îs and Seydi 'Âli Re'îs in those waters as warnings against any further adventures beyond the Suez; moreover, he points to the naval difficulties of the ongoing Cretan campaign with the implication that maritime matters should better be left to others. The great polyhistorian may of course have been right if the traditional order of priorities had to be preserved (especially when we realize that both the required capital and an entrepreneurial-mercantile class, although not absent, may have lacked the magnitude necessary for affecting the decisions made at the center of the empire). A truly fresh vision seems to have appeared only in the later decades of the 17th century, with the historian Hezârfen Hüseyn Efendi as one of the harbingers; the real revolution, however, occurred only with the founder of the first printing press, İbrâhîm Müteferrika; this personage was not only a printer but also a publisher and propagator of modern science, geography among them; in fact, in his *Uşûlü'l-hikem fi nizâmî'l-ümem* ("Foundations of wisdom concerning the order of nations"), an essay which he printed at his press in 1732, he stresses the usefulness of what we might call political geography, justifying it among other things by the need of Ottoman statesmen to better know the territories and government systems of other countries in order to successfully compete with the infidels (Selim Nüzhet Gerçek, *Türk Matbaacılığı* (Istanbul, 1939 p. 75). Overall, Müteferrika's views and efforts were in certain respects not unlike those of Piri Re'îs, and they achieved what was overdue by two centuries. As Adnan Adavar (*op. cit.*, p. 155) states, "With the

values and achievements which Ottoman society cherished lay elsewhere, and some of them were admirable indeed. However, they were traditional values, whose ideals aimed at further perfecting what was known and was considered good. Mi'mâr Sinan and Ottoman architecture are among the most eloquent examples of the Ottoman genius. Often masterpieces inspired by religious as well as imperial zeal, organization, art and - in this case - science (architectural mathematics), they also performed an exemplary public service. We can visualize Kânûnî and the people of İstanbul eagerly following the progress of the construction of the Süleymâniye mosque, while almost irritably brushing aside those who had the audacity to remind of the inventions and discoveries among the infidels of this or that persuasion taking place in Europe or beyond the Seven Seas.

It is a comforting thought, though, that the great founder of the Turkish Republic came to value what the greatest of Ottoman sultans failed to appreciate. Instructing the Turkish Historical Society to produce a facsimile edition of Pîrî Re'îs's map, Kemal Atatürk underscored the significance of this masterpiece as a proof of the potential the Turkish people had long had to become a modern nation.

founding of the first Turkish printing press. İbrâhîm Müteferrika's role, assisted by the position and influence of Saîr Çelebi, did not remain limited to printing; ... by writing works and [adding] appendices [to translations] that were introducing the basic features of the exact sciences — a novelty in our country — he was a [latter-day] harbinger of the Renaissance in Turkey."

LITERARY ART OF THE GOLDEN AGE: THE AGE OF SÜLEYMÂN

Walter G. ANDREWS

In his preface to Montesquieu's *Persian Letters*, Paul Valéry says the following about society:

The social structure seems to us as natural as nature, even though it is only held together by magic. It is not, in reality, an edifice of spells, this system which is based on writing, on words obeyed, on promises kept, on effectual images, on observed habits and conventions, — all of which are pure fiction?¹

We often grow accustomed to thinking of societies as constituted by the nature of their great institutions—the army, the church, the bureaucracy, for example—and to seeing art, including literary art, as something that societies, once constituted, *do*. However, for students of art it soon begins to seem obvious, as it did for Valéry, that the essential power relations within a society; even the great institutions themselves exist as a result of a general agreement that they have value and purpose and meaning. This agreement, the particular notions of value, purpose, meaning that constitute a society are a magic conjured up by words and images that creates out of nothing the "natural order of things." Those times at which the "natural" social order seems to be operating most successfully, at which the magic of meaning is most fully engaged in all the activities of society, these are the periods that we are accustomed to characterize as "golden ages".

The Age of Süleymân the Lawgiver, the heart of the sixteenth century, is without doubt a golden age for Turkish culture; it is arguably a golden age for late Islamic culture, and is even, perhaps, the last of the classical golden ages of the world. Too often, however, we are beguiled by lists of battles won, by domination measured on maps, by laws and policies and organization—beguiled into overlooking the fact that the lasting and gilding achievements of this age

¹Paul Valéry, *Selected Writings of Paul Valéry*, [English translation], (New York 1964), p. 209.

were not military victories but triumphs of language, of imagery, of meaning. The golden age is a confluence, a synthesis that combines power, an ethos supporting a particular exercising of power, and the means to effectively articulate that ethos. The Age of Süleyman is certainly an age of great wealth and great power but it is also a moment at which one of the most highly developed literary languages the world has ever seen intersects with a sense of spiritual and intellectual mastery to create a total and consistent world view that bestows meaning on every aspect of experience.²

How does the cultural vision of this golden age express itself in language? In one sense it expresses itself through the conservation and revivification of the conventional. When the panegyrist says of Süleymân, for example,

King of Kings of sea and land, Lord of East and West
Darius returned, the king, Süleymân the bless'd
Of equity and justness' realm that royal rider who,
Before his horse, and rightly so, the other rulers flew.³

phrases used for centuries in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish to describe any and every ruler—some of quite limited power and dominion—are reanimated here simply by circumstances. Süleymân is indeed and to a seldom matched degree, a ruler of rulers with a realm stretching far to the east and west extending to both land and sea, ruler noted for attention to law and justice. As the poem continues in the usual hyperbolic style, the ruler's power is then extended to the heavens.

It seems the leopard of the wheel resisted his command
The sky's Straw-Carriers brought him chained, obedient to
land.⁴

The wheel here is the revolving dome of the heavens, spotted like a leopard with stars and, like the leopard also, cruel, vengeful, unpredictable in the changing and often unpleasant fate it visits upon human beings. It is the command of Süleymân that everyone in his dominion live safe and secure from those vicissitudes of fortune that the turning heavens are wont to bring. And should fate not comply with this order, then the straw-carriers tame it by binding it with a chain. Straw-carriers are literally those who carry the chopped straw used for making mud-brick in the dry lands—a very lowly occupation. "The Straw-Carriers" is also the name for what English-speakers call the Milky Way, its band of stars being compared to a path of straw-bits dropped in the course of

²For a more complete discussion of how the Ottoman world view is worked out in poetry see, Walter G. Andrews, *Poetry's Voice Society's Song*, (Seattle and London 1985).

³Fahir İz, ed., *Eski Türk Edebiyatında Nazım* vol. I, (Istanbul 1966), p. 64, 1.15-16.

⁴Ibid p. 64, 1.17.

hauling straw. It is this band of stars, then, that is likened to a chain about the neck of the heavenly dome. Thus too, it is intimated that in the age of Süleymân even the lowliest of porters would be brave and powerful enough to tame a wild leopard in the service of the sultan.

This small snatch of poetry symbolizes the totalizing scope of the literary vision. It expresses a consistent exercising of power—the power of kingship paralleling the power of words—from land and sea to the dome of heaven. Thus, imbued with meaning by the literary tradition, the imagery of the heavenly dome is also replacated architecturally throughout the empire in mosques and public buildings—domes consistently decorated with stylized stars and great suns of circular calligraphy. This sun, which is by convention the ruler of the heavens, is compared in a myriad ways to the earthly ruler. For example,

Your beauty's rays illuminate the world like the sun,
Your love's echoes fill the sphere of "Be and it was done."⁵

The sultan's influence not only fills the world intangibly like light from the sun and even constitutes the physical world as the world was constituted by the Divine Command but that influence is also portrayed as engendering an irresistible love or affection. The power of rulership, relationships of dominance and submission, relationships of authority and obedience are all ultimately subsumed in the imagery of love and interpreted by it.⁶ In the midst of his panegyric our poet breaks into a lyric mode, singing the beauty of his beloved:

Were that mouth not life itself, coquettish heart's delight,
Why would it then like life or soul be hidden from our sight?⁷

Beyond their surface relation to the imagery of passionate love, these lines also demonstrate the inescapable and uncompromising intertextuality of this particular poetic tradition, its tendency to base its logic and meaning on access to a common fund of information unavailable to outsiders. If one does not know from experience that the mouth of the beloved is supposed to be as small as possible even to the point of invisibility, if one is not familiar with thousands of fanciful descriptions of the tiny mouth, then the logic of comparing the mouth to the soul or spirit of life seems unfathomable. When the proper information is available, however, endless possibilities emerge: I live for your mouth. Your mouth (that is, the sultan's mouth) has the power of life or death over me. For those who are in your service having contact with you, hearing you speak (considering the mouth as a *synecdoche*) is the very stuff of life and you

⁵Ibid., p. 65, 1.13.

⁶Sec. Andrews, *Poetry's Voice*, chapter 5.

⁷Iz, *Nazım*, p. 65, 1.6.

tend to be coy and remain hidden or aloof from public affairs. This latter form of reticence is said to have been a characteristic of Sultan Süleymân and may account for the popularity of the coy, shy, hidden beloved image in this period.

The next couplet is even more clearly an example of the rhetorical complexity made possible by a grounding in a stable set of conventions.

Upon your cheek in gnarly knots lie your curly strands,
Damascenes all girt to march upon the Holy Lands.⁸

How, we might ask, are curls on the beloved's cheeks like Damascenes setting out for the holy lands (in the original, the Hijaz)? The couplet gives us not a clue, nor would anything but familiarity with other poems of the tradition, for example, a line of a fellow poet of this age:

Your curly locks like Damascenes have clad themselves in mail⁹

Being aware of the comparison between tight curls and rings of chain-mail both clarifies the use of the word Damascenes and allows us to savor an intentional balancing between the Arabic word *Şâmî* or "Damascene" and the Persian *şâmî* which refers to night and the darkness of night which is an expected feature of the hair of the beloved. Moreover, the cheek of the beloved is mentioned in the context of the holy cities of the Hijaz by which it is understood that the cheek is like the Kaaba with lovers circling about it like pilgrims. However, the cheek is also compared to the white garment that pilgrims wear, the cheek with black curls on it being like the white garment covered by mail.

This presupposition that the audience of poetry will have an encyclopedic familiarity with the tropes of the tradition and the lore that accompanies them continues to be evidenced throughout our sample poem. For example, the lips of the beloved or ruler are thus described:

The image of your ruby lip lies boxed in memory
Yet mines do not for rubies make a proper place to be.¹⁰

The reference here is to an ancient and popular myth that rubies are simply black stones when under the ground and become precious stones only when exposed to the light of the sun which they capture. Other jewels are created under the influence of other heavenly bodies. Hence each jewel in an extensively bejeweled age is imbued with astrological significance. In addition, the

⁸ Ibid., p. 65, 1.7.

⁹ Abdülkadir Karahan, ed., *Figânlı ve Divânçesi*, (Istanbul 1966), p. 139, stanza 4, 1.5.

¹⁰ Iz, *Nazım*, p. 65, 1.9.

admonition here is similar to that in the couplet about the mouth. The beloved/sultan is urged to emerge, to expose his ruby (lip) to the light of day. The sultan's mouth is a jewel and, at the same time, brings jewels out of the jewel case of the treasury and bestows them on worthy lovers. The poet is also pointing out that remembered images of the sultan actually become more precious when they are made public especially in the bejeweled language of poetry.

We can read, for example, in the official Registry of Beneficences of Sultan Süleymân that on the ninth of the month of Şevvâl in the year of the Hijra 939 among the awards given out for panegyrics on the Feast of Sacrifice, the poet Hayâlî Chelebi received one thousand *akçes*, the poet Mes'ûd received five hundred, Keşfi was presented with an embroidered robe, and so on.¹¹ Beyond receiving such official gifts, a talented man of words could, with some fortune, be granted a position in the government from which he might rise to a state of great eminence. The author of the poem from which we have thus far taken our examples, the century's most prominent poet, known by the penname, Bâkî, began life as the son of a poor *mü'ezzin* (caller-to-prayer) and died at the end of the century having held several important positions including the second highest religious/legal office in the land. The beloved of the panegyrics was indeed a source of wealth and power.

The sultan, however, was but one of many beloveds. The tradition of mystical religion that by this time permeated the spiritual ethos of Islam, allegorized the passionate yearning of the soul separated by physical existence from unity with the ultimately real as a deep and burning passion obsession with a coy, cruel, inaccessible beloved. It is this Divine beloved as much as his beloved Hürrem that Süleymân, himself, evokes in his often melancholy and world-weary lyrics.

The light come from my burning sighs is a royal crown to me;
The tears poured from my weeping eyes are a noble gown to
me.

The ocean of events may roil and yet I will not flee;
The galleon of your love, praise God, is a refuge sure for me.

I covet not Cambyses' throne nor Cyrus's treasury,
So long as service at your gate is possible for me.

You may, one time, be just and true then turn to cruelty;
Beloved, that which comes from you is all the same to me.

¹¹ İsmail E. Erünsal, "Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Devrine Ait Bir İn'amat Defteri," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* IV, p. 15.

The mountains tall could never bear my heartfelt misery;
No wonder that the love-wise grant a hero's name to me.

Overhead my flaming sigh's a banner, Muhibbî,
My tears are soldiers, lord of love, left and right to me.¹²

The true mystics, according to the poetry, lived out their love obsessions in the midst of life rather than in the solitude of the dervish cloister (*tekke*). They are the "People of Love" who interpret the Divine Command through the symbolism of love just as they are also the "People of the Tavern" whose experience of ecstatic, irrational apperception of ultimate unity is acted out in drunkenness.

The people of the tavern have attained a revelry
The pious in their dreaming can never hope to see.

When bitter is the wine oft they reach an ecstasy
That serves for revelation to love's community.¹³

So sings Ḥayâlî, one of the favorite poets of the court of Süleymân. Ḥayâlî, himself has an interesting life story. He was born in the European provinces, in the town of Vardar Yenicesi, where as a youth of a rather tender age he encountered a wandering KâleNDERî dervish, called Father 'Alî the Persian Drunkard, and his band of followers. Ḥayâlî, who for some reason had no father to care for him, was taken with the dervish as the dervish was taken with him and so, when the band departed, Ḥayâlî accompanied them. The dervish acted as a father to the youth and educated him with special attention to the arts of poetry. When, after a time, the band made its way to Istanbul, those responsible for maintaining order and propriety in the city spotted the handsome youth in the company of a group of rather scruffy and debauched dervishes and brought him before the judge, Nûreddîn Efendi of the Yellow Mace. The judge found the association unacceptable and turned Ḥayâlî over to the care of the city *muhtesib* (or inspector of business practices and public morality). The *muhtesib*, one 'Alî the Tall, saw to the continuance of Ḥayâlî's education, in the course of which his poetry was brought to the attention of the then minister of the treasury, İskender Çelebi, who took him into his circle. Thence he was introduced to the Grand Vizier, İbrâhîm Pasha, who in time brought him to the attention of Sultan Süleymân, which assured his fame and fortune.

Thus Ḥayâlî moved from a circle focused on a beloved dervish adept whose holiness transmuted the adoration of his companions into a love of the

¹²*Divân-i Muhibbî*, Istanbul 1308 AH.), p. 4.

¹³Ali Nihat Tarlan, ed., *Ḥayâlî Bey Divânî*, (Istanbul 1945), p. 113, no. 3, 1.1; see also the introduction VII-XVII for information on Ḥayâlî's life.

Divine, to circles surrounding the highest officials of the state—beloveds who, to increasing degrees of generality, symbolized the ordering of the Divinely Guided Community. This sense of completeness and consistency—the sense that from the religious to the political, from the cosmic to the mundane there is a seamless unity of meaning and purpose—this is, in large part, what constitutes the ethos of the golden age.

All the themes of selfless love, of the powerful, fatally attractive beloved, of wine, of intoxication, of art, literature, music, of mystical religion and the esoteric interpretation of the physical world—all of these themes are subsumed and synthesized poetically in the pervasive allegory of an elegant entertainment for a circle of close friends in a garden. This concatenation of imagery is rather completely included in the following lines from a lyric in quatrains by the Bektāshī dervish poet, Hayretī.

It is a chat with ruddy wine or highest garden of the skies?
 Perhaps the Garden of Irem or rosy mead of Paradise?
 Or gathering of fairy fair, of heaven's maids with coal-black
 eyes?
 Hurrah! And praise a thousand times this party that revivifies!

Here the poet mentions the wine, the beloveds, and the garden, which is compared both to the garden of paradise and the garden of Irem, a legendary garden built by a king who in this pride sought to rival heaven. The poet goes on:

Some party-goers like Hüsrev, some of them Ferhâts forlorn,
 Some lovers true and others still beloveds of the Houris born,
 The blue-steel cup passed round therein is from the domes of
 heaven torn.
 Hurrah! And praise a thousand times this party that revivifies!

From transitory earth they take their vintage pleasures constantly;
 To one another full they raise their cups of healing chemistry,
 Yet not a word that's said therein offends against propriety.
 Hurrah! And praise a thousand times this party that revivifies!

Musicians catch the fevered mood where e'er their tuneful anthems
 start;
 Each like a nightingale to each in unison performs his part;
 The long-necked lutes play endlessly and sing the language of the
 heart.
 Hurrah! And praise a thousand times this party that revivifies!

Who once observes this revelry is freed from taint of grief and
 woes,

His soul released, though sad of eye, his heart a joyful fullness
 knows,
 And from the ruins of his breast, a stately, spacious mansion
 grows.
 Hurrah! And praise a thousand times this party that revivifies!¹⁴

This party and especially the visual imagery of the garden in which it takes place becomes perhaps the central, linking symbol in the Ottoman synthesis of later Islamic culture. In it the characters of the great romantic narrative poems are acted out—Hüsrev, the royal lover, and his subject-counterpart, Ferhâd, who sacrifices his life for a hopeless love. In the garden are gathered both the powerful and the seekers after power enacting dramas of dominance and submission in an agreed upon interpretive context that can be extended to interpret similar dramas played out in the world of public affairs. Likewise, the artists and artisans of visual art churn out every manner of garden, in paint and ink and tile and plaster, in thread and glaze and dye and glass—gardens to which literary art fully and consistently appends meaning: here a tiny rosebud like the beloved's mouth, here a rose or carnation with its layers of petals like layers of meaning concealing the true mystical reality, here the hyacinth that is her hair, the tulip goblet filled with the wine of love, here the stately cypress that is her body and the slender, cypress-like "elifs" of calligraphy that mean the same; here the cypress embraced by the flowering branch, lover and beloved entwined.

In its highest expression, the symbolism of the garden also becomes a vehicle for the exercising of an unparalleled literary language. At this point, Ottoman Turkish takes into its lexicon the developed vocabularies and literary conventions of the Eastern and Western Turkic languages, of Persian and of Arabic, enabling the poet to manipulate his language with a technical mastery that in an age of less refinement and duller tools might to us seem artificial and over-done. For example, in Bâkî's panegyric to Süleymân, the garden is evoked in the following lines:

Your sapling-cypress-swaying gait, let him but one time know
 The gardener in his lawn would lay the graceful willow low

Before your cheek prostrate themselves, the jessamine in rows,
 The garden cypress stands erect before your upright pose¹⁵

¹⁴Mehmed Çavuşoğlu and Ali Tanyeri eds., *Hayrett: Divân*, (Istanbul, 1981), pp. 99-100, no. 16, stanzas I, II, III, V, VI.

¹⁵Iz, *Nazım*, p. 65, 1.8 and 11. (The Iz text reads "gül ü semen" in line 11, the more likely reading (confirmed by Prof. Çavuşoğlu) is "gül-i semen" reflected in the translation.)

The first couplet rather crudely represents the typical alliterative musicality of Ottoman verse and a rhyming tour de force employed by the poet. Beyond the fact that the actual poem is in monorhyme—it uses the same rhyme at the end of all forty two couplets—Bâkî also uses a large number of echoing rhymes wherein the rhyming syllable echoes the previous syllable as in the "willow low" rhyme. In the second line the interior symbolism of the garden-with-beloved is metaphorically extended to an image of public religion. The jessamine, which shares its whiteness with the beloved's cheek, when in full bloom, inclines its blossoms towards the ground — a situation that the poet compares to worshipers prostrating themselves before the beloved. In the same way the erect stance of the cypress is interpreted as worship also. The word that is translated "upright pose" is also commonly used as an abbreviation of the phrase "standing up for prayer". Hence the cypress is depicted as saying "rise for prayer", calling the faithful lovers to worship of the beloved. Thus, taken as a whole the couplet points out that, bowing or erect, all parts of the garden are engaged in veneration of the beloved.

A different extension of garden imagery is performed by the famous Janissary poet, Yahyâ, who evokes another important concern of the Ottoman elites.

The cypress gone to holy war with the sultan of the world,
Its banner in the meadow for the flower-troops unfurled.

The champion, spring then took the field all panoplied for war,
Violet his weighty mace, red-rose his shield before.

Iris prayed his sword-verse, then girt his blade, away!
To join the holy warriors' cause on the battle day.¹⁶

We must also remember that at the pinnacles of verse, which were produced at and for the pinnacles of society, the garden was closed and private, both actually and structurally. Behavior at the party is contained within the garden and the ignorant, the common, jealous enemies, and religious bigots were excluded. There is an implicit tension between the free, open unrestrained love and wine-drinking celebrated in Hayretî's party poem and the line translated as, "Yet not a word that's said therein offends against propriety." This is a tension that extends itself to the public arena. In the İstanbul of Süleymân, order and propriety were important public concerns. For example, we might recall the story of Hayâlî, in which the judge would not tolerate the impropriety of a young man running with a band of itinerant dervishes. Nonetheless, just as the cosmic and garden imagery of the poetry are reflected in decorative art and

¹⁶Mehmed Çavuşoğlu, ed., *Yahyâ Bey: Divân*, (İstanbul 1977), p. 58, l. 1-3.

architecture, so did party behavior spill out of the gardens of the wealthy and highly-placed into the society at large. The wine-shops of the Christian sector of Galata and its churches, near which young Christian women could be seen unveiled, became the haunts of devotees of love and wine and the setting of stories about famous local characters. For example, the biographer of poets, 'Âşık Çelebi, gives the following account of Molla Mañşûr, a poet and logic teacher originally from Iran.

In age he was greying, or on the verge of greying. But withal, his residence of choice was the tavern and his favorite haunts were the temples of Christians and idolaters in Galata.

He used to teach logic and philosophy to the sons of Jewish physicians but the gold or silver piece he received in exchange for his services, he would immediately turn over to the tavern-keeper. He would to such an extent enjoy himself in the tavern that when the proprietor would beg to remark that the silver piece was all spent, he would nonetheless stay and go into debt for a like amount.

He took no pleasure from the pure wines and marbled meats of his student's homes. As soon as he was no longer passed out at the foot of a wine cask, as soon as he was not drowned like the dregs in wine, when his unwashed turban cloth was not stained by drink and his filthy face was not befouled by vomit, as soon as he was not hidden like a dung beetle in dirt and ordure and he was not sharing tongues with the dogs of the wine-temple, who came to lick his mouth, in short, as soon as he might become aware of himself, his burning sighs of heart-felt agony would block the paths of the Cherubim with their black smoke. He would weep so to recall the sins he had committed, his corrupt state, his evil fate, that the wine-boats of the gathering would swirl like ships in the ocean of his tears and the tavern would be turned, by the smoke of his sighs, into a four-arched windmill spinning like the spheres. The candle of the gathering would burn its inner part lit by the fires of his breast, and the cloud of smoke sent up by his moans would extinguish the lamp of the moon. With a cracked wine-bowl in his hand and himself deeply intoxicated, he would, in apropos couplets with clever references to legend and proverb, relate the strange turnings of fortune and complain of his inauspicious fate.¹⁷

In the area of love also, the literary formula seems to have actual applications outside the privacy of the elite literary circle. For example, poets of the high culture would turn their skills with the manipulation of language to

¹⁷G. M. Meredith-Owens, ed., *Meşâ'irü's-Sû'erâ or Tezkire of 'Âşık Çelebi*, (London 1971), fols. 126b-127a.

collections of ditties memorializing the names and fame of attractive youths from the common soldier and artisan classes. In his "city-thriller"—as these collections were called—for the city of Istanbul, the poet Yahyâ includes the following description:

That fair one they call Şafer Bali

The Janissary Şafer too is one.
His brow the moon his face the world's sun.

If golden head-dress be this moon's attire,
Its sun-like glow would set the earth afire.

Wherefore is that distinguished eyebrow double?
Two first nights to one moon's head is trouble.¹⁸

In the manner of this kind of verse, the sense is a bit obscure and generally untranslatable. It must be pointed out that the name Şafer is also the name of month and, likewise, the word for "moon" is also the word for "month." Thus, in the last line, for example, the "moon's head"—"moon" being a common trope for the face of the beloved—should also be read as "the beginning of the month" and, therefore, the eyebrows, which are thick and black, are compared to nights and especially to the first night of the month, which is the darkest night.

It also seems evident that, at least in some cases, the kind of behaviour implied by the existence of the "city-thrillers" was observable in practice. The biographer of poets, Laţîfi, gives the following description of the poet Nâlişî, who apparently was to love what Molla Manşûr was to wine:

...He was one of the mad ones of Rumelia, pained and bewildered by love, overcome by his ardor and confusion, a humble worshipper of the beloved and a devoted lover. Whenever he might see a pleasant youth he would inevitably fall in love and compose lyrics to him based on allusions to his name. In the throes of his passion he would abandon the needs and necessities of life and at times appropriate and inappropriate, would visit his neighborhood with the intention of seeing him. He would constantly parade himself, bewailing his love, before his beloved's other admirers and if he were to encounter his darling he would offend him by engaging him in conversation and reciting couplets to him.

The beloved's defenders would be ever on guard for him and would way-lay him as he approached. After falling into their hands,

¹⁸Yahyâ Bey, p. 255, l. 133-135.

he would suffer from violent blows and kicks as they would pound him like a weaver's bar. In consequence of defeats at the hands of his adversaries, he would regularly be injured, galled in face and eye and lathered with mummy-extract salve to treat an abundance and profusion of bruises. Yet he was to such an extent a pure and unashamed lover that he would pay no heed to his myriad wounds or to his sufferings for the sake of the beloved and would disdain to protect himself from the beloved's gang of defenders or from the vengefulness of the jealous.¹⁹

This sort of vigilante defense of propriety against the excesses of those who took the poetic prescription as a license for behavior outside private "gardens" is echoed by official attempts to curb such offenses against public morality. For example, in the summer of 1562, Süleymân ordered the burning of ships carrying wine off Galata, to which act the poet Bâkî responded:

The wine-shop road it firmly barred, the Sultan's sword of wrath,
Tween Istanbul and Galata, like water cut the path.²⁰

Counterbalancing the concern for public propriety, there seems to have been a rather wide latitude for such cheeky comments on the part of poets. Certainly the poetry is harsh in its condemnation of pious bigotry and ignorance of the mystical interpretation of the party, as in the following couplet by Zâîf, who was known both for his love of the party and his singular lack of ambition:

Bigot! We're the troops of love, our province that of selflessness;
Uncomprehending one, be gone! Our language sound and
letterless.²¹

It may be that no one, not even a sultan, would want to be accused of persecuting poets out of ignorance of the true and esoteric meaning of their behavior; or it might just be, as one scholar suggests, that the action of poets like those of dervishes, drunks, and madmen were intrinsically forgivable. As Sehâ says:

If wine of passion for your lips should make the heart grow warm
and sigh,

¹⁹Laîfî, *Tezkire-i Şu'arâ*, Süleymaniye Lib., Halet Efendi 342, fols. 171a-171b. [This entry together with other interesting material, some of which is cited below, does not appear in the Ceydet edition.]

²⁰The couplet is cited from Mehmed Çavuşoğlu's, *Divanlar Arasında*, (Ankara 1981), p. 41. The two chapters of this book "Galatada ayak seyri" I and II and the whole book are an excellent introduction to the world of Ottoman poetry.

²¹Ali Nihat Tarlan, ed., *Zâîf Divânî* Vol. II, (Istanbul, 1970), p. 1, no. 497, l. 1.

Don't censure, love, for drunkards' acts will be forgiven bye and
bye.²²

Nonetheless, in this age poets' words were considered important. Fear of being labeled a bigot might stay an angry sultan's hand or mastery of poetic language might be a key to wealth and high office, but also an ill-chosen word, a misattributed or misinterpreted couplet might have disastrous consequences. For example, it is told that, following the great victory at Mohács in 1526, the grand vizier İbrâhîm Pasha brought back as symbols of victory bronze statues of Hercules, Apollo, and Diana which he set up on marble stands in front of his palace. Although seemingly at the height of his powers, İbrâhîm, by this act, offended the simple piety of the populace which took to calling him İbrâhîm the Frank. As the gossip heated up, there circulated in Istanbul a Persian couplet attributed to the poet Figânî, who while still quite young had become a popular figure in the circles of the sultan and grand vizier.

Two Abrahams have in this world appeared,
One idols smashed, the other idols reared.²³

Quite without warning, the hapless Figânî was one day arrested and taken to a public place where he was whipped, displayed and finally executed by hanging.

It seems ironic that this sorry incident occurred to tarnish the memory of İbrâhîm Pasha who was, in all ways, the model patron of the arts. He was a cultured, talented individual who seems to have understood the language of power and the powerful magic of language and who shared that understanding with the sultan for whom he was at once first servant and boon companion. His home was a material manifestation of the poetic garden wherein the talented and beautiful gathered in celebrations of love, wine, music, and cultured conversation. Through him and his generosity passed the power of the state, as the poet-biographer Laîfî says:

He was a man of exalted vision and high-flown concern such that through the auspiciousness of his influence and the virtue of his protection many a wretched and helpless soul was raised from a state of humble servitude to the heights of power and preferment, and many a fallen or orphaned one was transported like a pearl of dew from the earth to the sky by a beam from the sun of his attention.²⁴

If the reign of Süleymân is a golden age for the Ottoman state, the vizierate of İbrâhîm Pasha was the golden moment of that golden age. After his

²²Çavuşoğlu, *Divânlar Arasında*, p. 41.

²³Karahan, *Figânî*, p. XX.

²⁴Laîfî, *Tezkire*, fols. 85a-85b.

murdered body was brought back from the palace under mysterious circumstances, things were never quite the same. In Laṣfī's words:

He would also show preference to those of (poetic) talent and use his influence on behalf of those who possessed a fullness of learning and skill, and during his happy age and blessed time this group flourished. From the time of (Sultan) Murād Hân the Holy Warrior to (Ibrâhîm's) time, poets used to receive yearly stipends from the royal treasury and used to partake of kingly rewards and gifts. After the aforementioned passed away, the stipends were cut off, the respect and authority of the masters of verse departed, and their company was broken.²⁵

Even in the midst of the Süleymanic golden age, the feeling is expressed that something magical had occurred, even though it might have since been lost. This would seem to be an indication that, during this time, people found it possible to believe that human beings could impose an ideal order on a chaotic universe, that the perfection of society was truly imaginable. Laṣfī, for example, is quite harsh in his assessment of the latter part of Süleymân's reign. Speaking of the state of both literature and government he says:

Today those books which were once sought after by kings are now neglected and abandoned. With their fine calligraphy, illuminated pages, and covers bound in gilt, they languish in nooks in the abodes of forgetfulness and the webs of spiders enclose them about. By this I mean that the various writings and collections of writings by the talented are to such an extent distant and estranged from the circles of acceptance that if they were found in a person's path he would neither stoop to pick them up nor would he even give them a sidelong glance. For, in these days, if something is far from popularity none pay attention to it and goods that at any particular time are not in demand find no buyer at all. Our time is a time of ignorance and the era of evil and shame. Demand and popularity is for adornment with baubles, not for talent and wisdom.

Gold has become their sole delight
Gold their only appetite

The point is this, that according to the saying "The dissolute state is a calamity for the people" the disgraceful, the evil, the ungodly and dissolute have come into high place.

When the worst of men achieve acclaim

²⁵ Laṣfī, *Tezkire*, fols. 85a-86b. [A shortened version of this entry is found in the *Cevdet* edition (Istanbul 1314 A.H.) under the entry for the poet Şükri, pp. 204-205.]

The best of men withdraw in shame.²⁶

The historian Muṣṭafā 'Alī makes quite similar complaints in very similar language in several places in his works.²⁷ Where Laṭīf most often harks back to a Golden Age in Persia, 'Alī seems to see the reign of Bāyezīd II as a model. This age is his referent in the following couplets:

What an age it was of loveliness
With filth distinct from cleanliness

This age stumbles at discerning
Perfect dolt from man of learning

True nobles go unrecognized
Unless reviled and despised²⁸

The fact that in this age a number of writers — not only Laṭīf and 'Alī but several of their contemporaries — express dismay at the societal decay they see around them is a sign, not so much of actual decay, but of the sense that things could and should be perfect.

This clear sense of the ideal — even where it is a lost or unfulfilled — ideal is a symptom of the golden age. It is no coincidence that four of the major Ottoman biographies of poets were composed during the reign of Süleymân. The impetus behind such biographical/critical compositions is a general understanding that the Turkish language had, at last, developed the resources to stand on an artistic level with Arabic and Persian and that it was time to articulate the sense of a critical model for Ottoman Turkish literature. The burgeoning of writing about literature is paralleled by a tremendous amount of historical writing as well as compilations of data in many fields. The whole cultural aura of the time is permeated by a confident assurance that at this particular moment, Ottoman society had achieved a superior standpoint from which it could understand, synthesize, and criticize its past and present in a global context.

Thus the golden age of Süleymân is manifestation of a general sense of cultural maturity created, in large part, out of the magic of art, of language, of building, of decoration and representation, of lore and legend, all exerting the power of perception over a chaotic and disintegrative reality. This glimpse of

²⁶Laṭīf, *Tezkire*, fol. 164b.

²⁷Muṣṭafā 'Alī's golden age thinking is mentioned in several places in Cornell H. Fleischer's excellent study *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali* (Princeton 1986).

²⁸Muṣṭafā 'Alī, *Künhü'l-ahbâr Süleymaniye Lib.*, Fatih 4225, fol. 183b. Cited in Fleischer, *Intellectual*, p. 205.

power, this instant in which everything seems to fit together will reverberate down through centuries of Ottoman experience. On the one hand, it will help the center hold when it seems that Ottoman society must collapse from within or be torn apart from without. On the other hand, it will raise walls about the ideal garden of Ottoman culture that both for good and for ill shut out the forces of change and disintegration.

CEMŞÂH U 'ALEMŞÂH: A MEŞNEVÎ OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Gönül TEKİN

The author of the *meşnevî* entitled *Cemşâh u 'Alemşâh*, Ramazân Behiştî, is one of the poets of sixteenth-century classical Ottoman literature. He was born in Vize, but, according to Laîfî, 'Âşık Çelebi and Kınalızâde Hasan Çelebi, later settled in Çorlu where he served as a preacher¹. On account of this, Laîfî refers to him as Behiştî-i Vâ'iz. Although there is little information about Behiştî in Laîfî's *Tezkîre*, 'Âşık Çelebi and Kınalızâde Hasan Çelebi discuss him in some detail and indicate that he at first entered the service of the previous muftî, Sa'dî Efendi. Later, however, he attached himself to Şeyh Merkez Efendi, "renounced the world and entered a dervish order, while occupied with the office of preacher in Çorlu, and with admonishing and advising the people."² Also, Behiştî himself clearly states, in the section titled "Hâtîmetü'l-Kitâb" at the end of the *Cemşâh u 'Alemşâh*, that he learned "the knowledge of the mysteries of God and the true nature of things" from Merkez Efendi, of whom he says:

*Gönli Merkez misâl alçakdur
Kadri kutb-i felek disem hakdur (Cemşâh u 'Alemşâh, 117a)*

A couplet by Kınalızâde Hasan Çelebi indicates the date of Behiştî's death as 977/1570 and adds that he died when he was about seventy years old³. The *Kesfu'z-Zunûn* also gives 977 as the date of his death⁴. However, Agâh Sırı Levend, following the *Sicill-i 'Osmânî*, gives 979/1572 as the date of Ramazân Behiştî's death⁵. If we accept 977 as the date of his death, and that he lived

¹ Laîfî, *Tezkîre-i Laîfî* (Istanbul, 1314 A. H.), pp. 104-5; 'Âşık Çelebi, *Meşâ'ir üs-su'arâ*, ed. in facsimile by G. M. Meredith-Owens (London, 1971), p. 58a; Kınalızâde Hasan Çelebi, *Tezkîretü'z-şu'arâ*, ed. İbrahim Kutluk, 2 vols. (Ankara, 1978), vol. 1, pp. 225-226.

² Kınalızâde Hasan Çelebi, p. 226.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

⁴ Kâtib Çelebi, *Kesfu'z-Zunûn*, 6 vols. (Istanbul, 2nd ed., 1971), vol. 1, p. 594.

⁵ A.S. Levend, *Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi* (Ankara, 1973), vol. 135; Mehmed Süreyyâ, *Sicill-i 'Osmânî*, vol. p.

seventy years as Kınalızâde Hasan Çelebi suggests, the poet must have been born ca. 906-907 A.H.

Both 'Âşık Çelebi and Hasan Çelebi, after indicating that Behiştî's literary works included religious letters and commentaries on the Koran, agree that he wrote good poetry as well, and specifically mention a *meşnevî* of his called *Cemşâh u 'Alemşâh* while each biographer attributes a different meter to this work⁶. In particular, Kınalızâde Hasan Çelebi's praises of Behiştî's poetry are more noteworthy and admiring than 'Âşık Çelebi's statements.

II.

This study is an examination of the *Cemşâh u 'Alemşâh* attributed to Behiştî.

I. Extant manuscripts:

We presently know only two manuscripts of this *meşnevî* to be extant. One is found on leaves 9a-118a of ms. 2614 of the Süleymaniye Esat Efendi Library. Leaves 119b-162a of the same manuscripts contain a religious work, *Heşt Bihişt*, also by Ramazan Behiştî. According to a scribal notation at the end of the *Cemşâh u 'Alemşâh*, this work was copied "in the first ten days of the blessed month of Ramazân" in the year 996/1589, i.e., nineteen years after the death of the poet. A gloss written in the hand of the copyist at the top of leaf 9a states that the author of this story was "a poet named Behiştî in the days of Sultan Murâd." The Sultan Murâd named here must be Murâd III (1574-1595), who was the ruler in 996/1589 when the work was copied. Thus the word *te'lif* in the gloss actually refers to the date of copying, 996, which is given at the end of the work. Besides, in the eulogy to the ruler at the beginning of the *Cemşâh u 'Alemşâh*, Süleymân the Magnificent (d. 1566) is addressed as the sovereign to whom Behiştî presents his work, making it obvious that 1589 cannot be the year the work was written.

As the result of a mistake in binding, the first eight leaves of this manuscript have been placed between leaves 118b and 127b of ms. 1858 of the Süleymaniye Tirmovalı Library. In the Esat Efendi manuscript, the story is written in two columns. Only the second of two *beyts* which are repeated at the end of every *meclis* and before the *gazel* appears in a single column. Headings were written, all of them in Persian and in the same ink as the text; only starting from the section eulogizing the current ruler. In the first part of the text, leaves

⁶The meter was *hâfil* according to 'Âşık Çelebi (58b) and *serf* according to Kınalızâde Hasan Çelebi (vol. 1, pp. 227-228).

1b-8b in the Tirmovah manuscript, blank spaces have been left for headings which have not been written in. Thirteen *beyts* appear on each leaf. Where the are *gazels* and headings, there are ten *beyts* to the page. On pages where only *gazels* appear, without headings, there are eleven *beyts* to the page. The *meşnevi* spread over 118 leaves in this manuscript⁷.

The second manuscripts of the *Cemşâh u 'Alemşâh* is in the Bursa Genel Kitaphk. This manuscript of 92 leaves is written in a cramped *sülüş* script in two columns. Because the paper is very thin, the ink has come through to the other side of the page, making many pages impossible to read. Exposure to moisture has caused the ink to run on some pages, leaving smears and washed-out sections. Headings are written up to 18b where the basic story begins; thereafter, the spaces reserved for this function are left blank but still separate the *gazels* from the basic text. There are fifteen lines of writing to a page. In the section where there are headings this decreases to fourteen or thirteen lines to a page. The Bursa manuscript has no copying date, but the name of the copyist is given as *fakîr Ahmed*. There is a copyist's note on the leaf which follows 92a, the last leaf of the text. Under the heading, "This poem is composed by Behişî Efendi and called *Cemşâh u 'Alemşâh*," the information given in *Kesfu'z-Zunûn* is copied verbatim.⁸

2. The contents of the *Cemşâh u 'Alemşâh*:

The order of the contents is as follows:

- I. 1b-2b Introduction
- II. 2b-4b Prayer
- III. 5b-5b The conditions of the time and the virtues of writing
- IV. 5b-6b Eulogy for the Prophet, upon whom be benediction and praise
- V. 6b-8a Qasidah of the Prophet
- VI. 8a-8b On His Excellency the Caliph Ebu Bekir the True
- VII. 8b. His Excellency the Commander of the Faithful 'Ömer the Just, may God the Highest be pleased with him
- VIII. 8b-9a Qasidah of the Commander of the Faithful 'Osmân the Possessor of the Two Glories, may God be well pleased with him.

⁷For further information on this version, see M.Ş. Örnek, *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Türkçe Mesnevi Yazmaları Kataloğu*, Süleymaniye Yeni Eserler, No. 2406 (Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Bölümü Mezuniyet Tezi, 1974).

⁸See note 5 above.

- IX. 9a-10a His Excellency the Commander of the Faithful 'Alî, may the kindness of God be upon him and may God be well pleased with him.⁹

After these traditional headings, Part X is "In Eulogy of the Islamic Sovereign" (9b-12b). Part XI is "In Completion of the Eulogy of the Islamic Sovereign" (12b-13a), and Part XII, titled *Nuşh-âbbâd*, is devoted to the eulogy of Süleymân the Magnificent, who was the ruler at that time. While the name of the sovereign is not specified in Parts X and XI, one comes across some *beyts* which reveal, if only indirectly, that Süleymân is intended. More than anything else, the fact that Part X of the work is devoted to a ruler who is not even mentioned by name previously but referred to as the tenth ruler of the Ottoman Empire renders obvious the poet's intention. For example in the following *beyt* it is clearly stated that he is the tenth ruler:

'Aşr-i mâşûl-i salânatdûr o şâh
Fukârâyâ virûpdûr anı Allâh (b. 255)

In the very next *beyt* it appears that the sovereign has built a mosque:

Ka'beler oldu yapıdığı câmi'
Kubbesi üzre nârlar lâmi' (b. 256)

We know that Süleymân the Magnificent built two mosques in Istanbul. The first, the Şehzade, was constructed between 1543 and 1548. The second was the famous Süleymaniye, built between 1550 and 1557 by the architect Sinân¹⁰. Since the poet mentions only one mosque here, and the Şehzade was built first, we can safely conclude that this work was written between 1548, the year this mosque was completed, and 1550, when construction of the other one was begun.

It is also significant evidence in support of this conclusion that, although Laîfî, writing his *Tezkire* in 1546-1547, included a brief biography of Ramazân Behişî, he did not mention the *Cemşâh u 'Aleşâh*. Therefore, this *meşnevî* must have been written between 1548 and 1550, or no later than the time when construction of the Süleymaniye was still in its inception.

Apart from these considerations, other events and facts discussed in Parts X and XI indicate that the still unnamed ruler is Süleymân the Magnificent. For

⁹Since titles belonging to fols. 1b-10a do not exist in the Süleymaniye Tirmovalı ms., I have quoted them from the Bursa ms.

¹⁰For both of these mosques, see Tahsin Öz, *Istanbul Camileri* (Ankara, 1962), vol. 1, pp. 9-14 and passim.

example, another *beyt* makes it clear that the sovereign being eulogized produced works in the fields of poetry and literature.

Luaf-i şab'ı suhân-serâ-yı zamân
Hâsn-i nazmı belâğata 'unvân (264)

Basically, we understand Süleymân the Magnificent to be the sovereign, feared by rulers of Iran, in the *beyt* which uses allusion and artful ambiguity:

Hüdmätinden mülûk-i rây-i zemîn
Vahşet itmez ola meger 'Acemî (11b, 260)

Even more explicitly, there is a reference to the same sovereign as the one who captured Baghdad from the Shah of Iran in this way:

Aldı Bağdâd'ı ol şeh-i ervend
Kıldı yaşın Kızılbaşuñ ervend (274)

The sovereign whose name is omitted in this poem can only be Süleymân, since we know that from the time of his father, Yavûz Selim (r. 1512-1520), the efforts of the Safavids to incite the Shi'î Kızılbaş in Anatolia against the Ottomans persisted into Süleymân's own time (d. 1566) and it was he who he took Baghdad from the Safavids in 1534. In the same way, the poet reveals the king to be Süleymân in this *beyt* from the *Nuşh-âbâd* Qasida (Part XII), where he refers to the seal of the Prophet Solomon:

Teshîr-i memâlik-i cihân için olupdur
Tevkî'-i hümayûnı anuñ mühr-i Süleymân (326)

The *Nuşh-âbâd* Qasida is interesting from many viewpoints. It indicates, for instance, through allusions in the *beyts* in the sections about Süleymân, that he supported architectural activities and that these activities were characteristic of this period:

Kaşr-i feleke sâye sala kadr-i bilendüñ
Mi'mâr-i tedâbirüñ iderse aña bünyân (319)

or:

Tebdîl-i zemâyim ideğir bâtınuñ olsun
Ma'mûr vilâyet nitekim milket-i 'Osmân
Hakkâ bu diyârı ne 'aceb kıldı 'imâret
Sultân-i cihân devlet ile olalı mihmân (323-324)

Also noteworthy is the mention in the *Nuş-âbâd* Qasida that there was a military band in the service of Süleymân:

Gül-zâre döner zînine bindikçe 'asâkir
Ol gülşene mehterler olur mürğ-i hâş-elhân
Mehterlerüññ zemzemesi ceng güninde
Kuffârüñ ider işlerini nâle vü efgân (350-351)

Although we know with certainty that the military band had been organized by the end of the sixteenth century, it is of great interest to see that this institution was already established before 1550. Moreover, the Qasida discusses the implements of war, such as the cannon and the gun, which were spreading fire like a terrible dragon, and describes Süleymân's palace and the Audience Hall where the meetings of the Council of State were held.

After the eulogy for Süleymân comes Part XIII (on 16a), entitled "On the Purpose of Composing the Book, and a History of the Path of Virtue." In this section the poet, following the traditions of *meşnevî* writing, explains why, when and how he wrote the work in this manner: One evening a messenger with sweet words comes to the poet's house and says, "A friend of yours invites you to visit his house this evening. Let us go there. This is a special invitation. All your friends are waiting for you there." Upon hearing this proposition, the poet sets out, full of desire to go to this gathering. They come to a decorated mansion built in a high place. All the notables of the city are gathered in it. Some of them are moths and some are candles. When the people in this assembly see the poet, they rise to their feet and show him respect, and they seat him on cushions in a place of honor. Trays are set up immediately, displaying many kinds of food. Once supper is finished, many of the guests go home while the very closest and best friends remain behind. Those who are left behind decide to pass the time pleasantly by taking turns to tell stories. All the stories which are told in this assembly are beautiful and interesting (17a). However, one of them strikes the poet as extremely fascinating and unusual, and he decides to put this story into verse. But somehow, because of worldly concerns, he is unable to carry out his decision until at last, after a long time has passed, he finds an opportunity to accomplish this objective (17b).

With Part XIV, which is entitled "Beginning of the Tale," the poet begins to tell the main story, namely the adventures which befall the princes Cemşâh and 'Alemsâh, the sons, respectively, of Nezîr, the king of Hamadan, and his vizier Beşîr. Because of the slanders of Cemşâh's stepmother, who is in love with him, these two young men leave their homeland and come to the city of Mah on the Indian Ocean. Just at that moment the infidel ruler of China wants the daughter of King Numan, the ruler of Mah, for his son. Fearing the power of the ruler of China, King Numan feels compelled to give his daughter to the son of this infidel ruler. Therefore, the princess of Mah is obliged to go as an

unwilling bride to China within three days. After his arrival in that city, however, Cemşâh falls in love with the princess, and 'Alemşâh, in order to help Cemşâh, disguises himself as the princess who is being forced to go to China as a bride and goes to China in her place. The princess and Cemşâh hide together in Mah. In China, 'Alemşâh falls in love with the daughter of the Chinese ruler. He tells her who he is. Since the girl is also in love with 'Alemşâh, she becomes a Muslim, and they decide to run away together. Before he escapes from China, 'Alemşâh kills the son of the Chinese ruler and his men in the middle of the night while they are sleeping in the palace and cuts off their heads. With the severed heads in his bag, he returns to Mah, the city of King Numan, gives the king an account of his exploits and reveals the contents of the bag. Thereupon, King Numan decides to marry the two princesses to Cemşâh and 'Alemşâh. However, 'Alemşâh proposes that he first lead a campaign against China which he has left without a ruler; he vows to take part in the wedding celebrations only after rescuing this country from the infidels. In the end, he conquers not only China ("Chin" in Turkish) but also Machin. Returning in victory to Mah, Cemşâh and 'Alemşâh marry their beloved princesses. At last Nezîr the king of Hamadan and Beşîr his vizier come to Mah and find their sons. Cemşâh forgives his stepmother, the queen of Hamadan, who comes with Nezîr, and says to her, "If you had not been the cause, one of these things would have happened. Your only role was to be the instrument of these events."

Even if the poet by these last words endows the story with a certain measure of metaphysical significance, we are faced with a narrative that as a whole relates a love adventure. With his religious cultural upbringing, however, the poet avoids slipping totally into a profane sphere and constantly tries to give the story a religious air. These reflections scattered throughout the story provide an atmosphere of religiosity: 1. The daughter of King Numan, in order not to marry the son of the Chinese ruler who is an infidel, decides to run away with Cemşâh who is a Muslim, since it is not proper for the daughter of a Muslim to marry an infidel. (At the same time, however, the story also states that the princess runs away with Cemşâh because she has fallen in love with him.) 2. The infidel daughter of the Chinese ruler becomes a Muslim in order to marry 'Alemşâh, because Islam is the most perfect of all religions. 3. Cemşâh and 'Alemşâh decide to marry their beloved princesses after taking China, converting the temples into mosques and making the population Muslim, because a military expedition on behalf of religion must come before any kind of worldly pleasure or enjoyment or personal happiness. 4. Cemşâh does not blame his stepmother for slandering him; on the contrary, he forgives her because, according to Islamic belief, God is ultimately responsible for everything. God has preordained our destinies; there is a reason for the coming into existence of everything which is.

The poet is not content with these ideas scattered throughout his work. At the end of the work, in the section entitled "On the Interpretation of the Legend Which is Full of Lessons" (Sül. Esat Ef. 2164 vv. 114b-116b), he advances the

view that the story bears a symbolic significance and argues that Cemşâh is a symbol of the Sufi concept of the *maḥbûb* (beloved), and 'Alemşâh is a symbol of the *muḥibb* (sympathetic friend). According to the poet, the *maḥbûb* is someone chosen by God: thus, in order for such a person to find God it is not necessary to enter a religious order or to expend great efforts. However, the *muḥibb* is a person who finds God by entering an order and making great efforts on the path to God. Because of this reason, the *maḥbûb*/Cemşâh is the one who attains a worldly kingdom. In this situation, we must necessarily add Cemşâh to the type of ruler created by an understanding which had endured in the Near East since the times of ancient Sumer, Egypt, Akkad and Assyria and with time extended its influence over much wider areas, i.e., the series of sacred or divine rulers chosen by gods or goddesses. Similarly, the name of our hero, Cemşâh, is reminiscent of the mythological figure Jamshid (Cemşid). As for the *muḥibb*, represented by 'Alemşâh, he is in the position of the vizier of this worldly kingdom. Thus the poet says: "Cem was a model for them" (Sül. Esat Ef. 2164, 1166).

However, despite the religious and mystical explanations the poet makes at the end of the work and the reason put forward by Cemşâh for his pardon of his stepmother, the heroes do not make any statements demonstrating or arguing that they are meant to symbolize ideas. Rather, events and situations which evoke orthodox Islamic responses, such as the ones we pointed out above, are much more striking than mystic Sufi reflections.

Why did the poet add such a religious mystical interpretation at the end of his work? We can only answer that Behiştî, being very strong Islamic culture and religious feeling and basically a preacher himself, possibly provided such an interpretation of his work in order to offer an excuse for himself: would a man of religion versify a love story purely because he liked it? As for the political situation in the work as a whole, Cemşâh is the powerful and holy ruler who conquers countries, and 'Alemşâh represents his 'alem or flag, which is a symbol of his power. Almost everywhere in this story of two people who were born the same day, married the same day, and died the same day, one finds the exaltation of feelings of victory, and expressions full of hope that non-Muslim countries will be brought to Islam. From this point of view, the work perfectly reflects the feelings of expansion and of overflowing boundaries characteristic of Süleymân's time as well as the grandiose ambitions and majesty of that period. In this respect, the work perhaps bears a greater historical and social, rather than literary, importance.

On the other hand, we can observe that with the story of Cemşâh and 'Alemşâh the type of the romantic mesnevî enters quite a different phase of development in the time of Süleymân, which compels us to give the *Cemşâh u 'Alemşâh* a special place in *mesnevî* literature.

Before beginning the story, Behiştî states that he had heard it told at a gathering of friends and committed it to writing since he liked it very much. This suggests an interesting novelty since a product of "folk literature," i.e., subject matter which did not come from written sources and was not created in the imagination of the poet, became the core of a *meşnevî* belonging to Divân literature. According to what we knew up until now, the imaginative romantic *meşnevîs* of Divân literature developed their subject matter entirely from high culture and written sources. We may classify the subjects of these romantic *meşnevîs* on the basis of their main sources of inspiration in this way:

1. Historical subjects which are based on some more or less historical facts and on written sources: e.g., *Leylî vü Mecnûn*, *Hüsrev ü Şîrin*.

2. Stories which come from large collections of tales such as the *Thousand and one Nights*, the *Thousand and One Days*, the *Tûsinâme*, and *El-ferec ba'de'ş-şidde*, which are set down in the early Islamic period or even before, but whose roots stretch back to more ancient times: e.g., *Câmâsb-nâme*, *Seyfe'l-Malûk*.

3. Stories developed under the inspiration of symbols formed around Sufi viewpoints and ideas: e.g., *Gül ü Bulbul*, *Sem'ü Pervâne*, *Gây u Çevgân*, *Deh-Mürğ*, *Gülşen-âbâd*, *Manîku'î-Tayr*.

4. *Meşnevîs* which take the form of a disputation, which can be traced back to Sumerian-Akkadian, Babylonian and Assyrian texts written in ancient Mesopotamia, e.g., *Bahâr u Sitâ*, *Seyf ü Kalem*, *Oğ ve Yaynîñ Münâzarası*, *Sazlar Münâzarası*, *Beng ü Bâde*, *Çengnâme*, etc.

Here we can name a few disputation texts written in Sumerian and Babylonian, e.g., *The Disputation between the Tamarisk and the Date Palm* in Babylonian and *The Disputation between the Farmer and the Shepherd* in Sumerian, *The Disputation between Summer and Winter* also in Sumerian etc.¹¹

5. Stories based on the tales of *Yûsuf and Zeliha* and *Ahikâr*, which are based on subject matter set down in sacred scripture as well as in texts of ancient Sumer-Akkad, Babylonia, Assyria and Egypt.

6. Works which passed into Turkish literature after being developed in Iranian literature in the time of the Sassanians, or even earlier, under the Achaemenids, and which involve subject matter of tales and adventures that preserve symbols embodied in ancient understandings of the world, the cosmos

¹¹W.G. Lambert, *Babylonian Wisdom Literature* (Oxford, 1960), pp. 153-62; B. Landsberger, *The Date Palm and Its By products according to the Cuneiform Sources* (Graz, 1967), pp. 10-23; S.N. Kramer, *History Begins at Sumer* (Philadelphia, 1981), pp. 132-140.

and existence, e.g., the *Şâhnâme*, *Vis u Râmin*, *Hüma ve Hümayûn*, *Mihr u Mesterî*, *Mihr u Mâh*, *Ḥursidnâme*, *Süheyl u Nevbahâr*, *Cemsid u Ḥursid*.

7. Works of the *meşnevî* type which relate the poet's own adventures (*Sergüzeşinâme*), a topic which we may regard as modern, dating only from the fifteenth century, and *meşnevîs* which include stories created by the poet in imagination, although with inspiration from many sources, e.g., the *Ḥayrâbâd* of Nâbî (d. 1712).

In the light of this information, the conclusions which we have reached in regard to the *Cemşâh u 'Alemşâh* lead us to ask the question: is the story of *Cemşâh u 'Alemşâh* really folk literature, or is it based on written sources? Was this story set down in writing, then read or recited by heart in a popular environment until at last, while being retold in oral transmission, its source was forgotten and it became a folk tale? We know that there are examples of this type of development. For instance, the story of *Câmâsbnâme* was found in the *Thousand and One Nights* and became part of popular oral tradition. In this way, alongside the *meşnevî* known as the *Câmâsbnâme* (1429) written by 'Abdî in the fifteenth century as a representative of classical *Dîvân* literature, this story circulated among the people under the name of the story of *Sâhmarân* and was printed several times as a folk tale.¹² One of these is a printed version in prose called the *Münîdzâtü'l Esmâşil Şâhmarân Hikâyesi* (1911). This story is based on another prose manuscript copied in 1780. Both contain *beyts* and expressions taken from 'Abdî's work. In this case, the subject first became part of *Dîvân* literature, the literature of the upper class, through 'Abdî's *meşnevî* in the fifteenth century, then later moved into folk literature.¹³ The same situation occurs with the story of Seyfe'l-mülûk. The story of Seyfe'l-mülûk appeared in written sources as *El-ferec ba 'de's-sidde* as well as the *Thousand and One Nights* and the *Thousand and One Days*, and in the sixteenth century, the Chagatay poet Meclîşî made it part of classical Turkish-Chagatay literature.¹⁴ However, at the same time it came to be a story widely known among the people, and since the nineteenth century it has been printed several times, in both the Arabic and Latin alphabets, as a folk tale.¹⁵ In the same way, the *meşnevî* entitled *Süheyl u Nevbahâr*, translated into Turkish verse from Persian by Ḥoca Mes'ud in 1350, was copied in 1730, and it became an anonymous folk tale in prose.¹⁶ As we have seen, none of the stories mentioned were folk stories originating in the ordinary life of the people of Anatolia. They came from older written sources, and the great majority belonged to literature first developed in high cultural circles. Later, as they spread gradually among the people, they became anonymous products of Turkish folk literature.

¹²*Hikâye-i Şâhmerân* (n.p., n.d., lithograph).

¹³V.M. Kocatürk, *Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi* (Ankara, 1970), pp. 216-220.

¹⁴See E. Blochet, *Catalogue des manuscrits turcs* (Paris, 1933), vol. 2, pp. 123-124, suppl. turc 998.

¹⁵Muharrem Zeki, *Seyfilmülûk Hikâyesi* (Istanbul, 1938); *Seyfe'l mülûk bin Pâdişâh 'Âşım bin Şafvân Hikâyesi* (1307 A.H., lithograph).

¹⁶Kocatürk, p. 115.

For *Cemşâh u 'Alemşâh*, the situation is somewhat different. According to the information given us by Behiştî, this story was known and told among the people before becoming a part of the *Dîvân* literature of the high cultural circles in the sixteenth century. Behiştî heard it and appropriated it for *Dîvân* literature. We know that the same story continued to be told as a folk tale in the lands where the Ottoman Empire had expanded and where Turkish was spoken until the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. In the materials compiled by Ignaz Kúnos there is a story called *Şabur Şahy ile Buhara Şahy*, which is a shortened version of the story of *Cemşâh u 'alemşâh*.¹⁷ In this case it is necessary to sift through all the old story collections thoroughly in order to be able to say whether this story is really a product of folk literature, or whether it first came from an old story collection, then came into Turkish folk literature, and later, in the sixteenth century, entered classical *Dîvân* literature. However, apart from this matter, we can at present determine the following points brought to light by Behiştî's *Cemşâh u 'Alemşâh*:

1. In the sixteenth century, romantic stories relating love adventures alongside religio-epic tales in verse were still told in various gathering places, or were read from a written work.

2. Whether the basic subject matter is a product of folk literature or whether an underlying written source can be found, Behiştî's work bears certain characteristics of the folk tales which we know were read or told in coffeehouses or other similar gathering places. It is divided into sessions and, after each session and before the *ğazel*, two *beys* addressed to the *ğazleştân* (singer or reciter) indicate the presence of an audience listening to the work. Namely, Behiştî remained under the influence of this manner of narration which belongs to folk tales, so much so that he perhaps even preserved the original form and sessions of the story as he had heard it. He may have emphasized the purely Islamic ideals and the observations about conquest later himself.

3. By writing a *meşnevî* in this form in the field of *Dîvân* literature, Behiştî must have intended to ensure that the work would be read in a manner similar to a folk tale, that is, in the form which was widespread among the people in the coffeehouses and other gathering places. Moreover, in joining the storytelling technique of folk literature with the classical forms of *Dîvân* literature such as the *meşnevî* form and *'arûz* prosody, Behiştî brought to the *meşnevî* literature of the time of Süleymân the Magnificent a new spirit and a changed appreciation and energy which in fact reflected the ethos of expansion created by the period: in form, an openness to folk literature, and in content, a reflection of the ideological aspirations of the period.

¹⁷Ignaz Kúnos, *Materialien zur Kenntnis des Rumelischen Türkisch*, Teil I: Türkische Volksmärchen aus Adakale (Leipzig-New York, 1907), pp. 5, 25-31.

IDEOLOGY AND LITERATURE DURING THE EXPANSION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Orhan Şaik GÖKYAY

The literature of this age was, for the most part, devoted to celebrating conquests and raising the heroic deeds which made the conquests possible. It was the literature of a people who aimed at no less than world domination. The Ottomans called Rome "Kızıl Elma" ("The Red Apple") — the ripe prize of empire. They pursued their imperial goals according to their literature, not, because of a simple lust for land and booty, but for "Nizâm-ı Âlem" (Universal Order). 'Âşikpaşazade openly declares this:

Bular birlikte bitti oldu bu işler
(All of these things were done together and completed.)
Safalar sürdüler yaz u kışlar
(They made merry in the summer and in the winter)
Dürüşdüler Nizam-ı Alem için
(They fought for the Universal Order)
Akıttılar kan ve kestiler başlar
(They spilled blood and cut off heads)
Nice zahm urdular, uruldular hem
(They inflicted wounds, and received them too)
Niceler didiler. Kanı kardaşlar
(Many asked: Where are the brothers ?)
Esir aluban hem satmadılar
(They took prisoners, but did not sell them)
Olunmadı esir için savaşlar
(Their wars were not fought to take prisoners)
Cihana hod gelmek gitmek içündür
(One enters the world, only to leave it)
Ne yapsan âlobet yıkmak içündür
(All that you create here will ultimately perish)
Amel ki idersin iy karındaş
(O brother, the deeds you do)
Ya Tamu ola, ya Uçmak içündür
(will send you either to Hell or to Heaven)

İkisinden fâriğ ol, Hakk'a dön
 (Forget about both and draw near to God)
 Yaradılanlar Hakk'a dönmek içündür
 (Because human beings were created that they might return to God)

In a similar vein, Yavuz Sultan Selim considered himself commanded by God to work towards "Nizam-i 'Alem". The Ottomans believed that they were fighting for God and the glory of Islam, not to win land and booty.

'Osmân Gâzî's meager bequest suggest that the early Ottoman sultans were sincere in such beliefs, "The eminent men of that time gathered together to take stock of 'Osmân's wealth in order to divide it between the two brothers (i.e. his two son). There was only the territory which had been conquered; there was no silver or gold whatsoever, 'Osmân Gâzî did leave a fairly new saddlecloth, a piece of armor for the flanks of a horse, a salt container, a spoon holder, and a boot. He also left several flocks of sheep. The sheep which are today to be found in the Bursa area are descended from these flocks. He also had fleet-footed mares and a good many teams of oxen in Sultanönü. Apart from these things, there was nothing else to be found."

Kânûnî Sultan Süleymân wrote:

Halk içinde mu'teber bir nesne yok devlet gibi
 (Nothing among people is more esteemed than the state)
 Olmaya devlet cihânda bir nefes sıhhat gibi
 (Yet there is no state (= good fortune) in the world like a breath of health)

This ideal of fighting for God has been the subject for many poems and stories throughout the Islamic world ever since the time of the Prophet Muḥammad. The martial exploits of the Prophet's son-in-law, 'Alî, and his comrades were ideally suited to illustrate this ideal, as were deeds of figures such as Baḥâ'î Gâzî, Ḥamza, and Şarı Şaltuk. The Ottomans were to add heroes of their own to this list, as the following examples will show. Their poems and stories portrayed the miraculous events that befell those fighters whose faith was strong.

For example, 'Aşıkpaşazâde linked the capture of Aydos Fortress to a dream of the infidel ruler's daughter. She first saw Muḥammad in her dream. He was followed by a person with a handsome face who pulled her out of a pit, stripped off her clothes and threw them away. He washed her body and then dressed her in silk. The girl woke up very upset, and could not take the dream image out of her mind. When the Turks were besieging Aydos Fortress, the girl saw that the man commanding the army was the same person who had taken her out of the pit. She wrote a message about her dream, tied it to a stone, and hurled it over the fortress wall. The stone fell on Gâzî Rahnâm. That night, the warrior

and some companions came to a place designated by the girl in her message. When the girl saw *Gâzî Rahmân*, she lowered a rope to him who then climbed into the fortress and captured it.

In a section of his book entitled "On the Miracles of the *Gâzîs*" the Ottoman historian *Peçevî* recounts the tale of *Deli Mehmed* an Ottoman soldier beheaded in the siege of *Szigetvar*. The story is actually contained in verses composed by a *kadi* from *Grijgal Palanka* who had participated in the siege and who had heard the story of *Deli Mehmed* from a *gâzî* named *Deli Hüsrev*. *Peçevî* writes that "If *gâzîs* such as these had not existed it would have been impossible even to embark on such a war, much less establish a line of siege so close to *Szigetvar*, a place that the infidels had carefully fortified. The *kadi's* verses are as follows:

Kutuna dir aceb hal oldu vâki

(A very strange insight has befallen this servant of God)

Değildir vâkıa, hak bu ki vâki

(This incident is not a dream but indeed took place)

Değülüm Hak bilür bu sözde kezâb

(God knows that I am not lying about it)

Bi-Hakk-ı Mustafa ve âlû eshâb

(I swear by the Prophet and His Companions that this is true)

Şehit olan delüyü gördüm andan

(I saw the fearless fighter who was martyred)

Kesildi başı ve ayrıldı tenden

(His head had been cut off and severed from his body)

Kesen kâfir başın alup eline

(The infidel who had beheaded him had picked up the severed head)

Gettre ya'ni kim kendü iline

(That he might take it back with him to his own country)

Delü-Hüsrev görüp haykırdı, didi

(When *Deli Hüsrev* saw this, he cried out, saying)

Ne yatarsın, başın aldı gitti

("Why are you lying there? He's made off with your head!")

Revadır canı verdin, kıyma başa

("You can give up the soul, but don't give up your head.")

Acep hal oldu ve özge temaşa

(A most amazing thing happened, a strange sight to behold)

Peçevî then concludes the story as follows: "The *gâzî* whose head had been cut off got up from the spot where he had fallen and smote the accursed infidel and beheaded him. The infidel fell from his horse and the head fell from his hand. The *gâzî* picked up his head and then fell dead upon the ground. No one but *Deli Hüsrev* witnessed this. The *kadi* was dumbfounded by the whole affair."

Genç 'Osmân, a soldier who participated in Murâd IV's Baghdad campaign, was another *gâzî* who, after being beheaded, refused to allow the enemy to make off with his head. His story was put into verse by a Janissary named Kayıkçı Kul Muştafâ. The story of Genç 'Osmân is a folktale among the Turcomans of Adana and the nomads who live in the vicinity of Konya and Karaman. His tomb bears this inscription: "Let it be known that God's trusted servants are absolutely fearless; nothing will grieve them." The inscription is dated 1133 A. H.

As the spirits of slain *gâzîs* were thought to be capable of performing miracles, their graves often became places of pilgrimage. One example is the grave of 'Osmân Gâzî's brother, Şaruyatı, in Söğüt. In addition, at the spot where he acutally fell, a pine tree grew that is called the "Kandilli" pine, since flickering light has been seen emerging from it from time to time.

At this point, it seems appropriate to mention the legends associated with horses, whom Turks often seemed to value more than their own brothers. Evliyâ Çelebi recounted one such story; the "Temâşâ-yı Garîbe-i Küheylân" ("The Strange Spectacle of the Arabian Horse"), as follows: "Some stablehands had brought a horse as a gift for the Austrian Emperor. As they were turning it over to the black-hatted infidels, the horse, who was named Ta'rifî and who was wearing only a silk cloth, noticed that none of the people to whom he was being delivered were wearing Muslim dress. At that very moment, he reared up and struck several blows on the hats of the two infidels who were holding his reins, dashing out their brains and sending them straight to Hell. Some other infidels rushed after the horse to grab his reins and thus show their bravery in front of the Emperor. They, too, were struck by the horse and joined their companions in the other world. For half an hour, the gift horse went on a rampage and wounded so many infidels that they still talk about him in Austria. Finally a horseman wearing a white cap called forth to him saying, "Come Ceyhûn !" With tears of blood flowing from his eyes, the horse came whinnying. When the horseman had tied his reins, I said to the ambassador: "Sir this is a *gâzî* horse who was ridden by the Ottoman sultan himself. We will bring another horse in his place. He was not worried and replied, "No; let's just see about this one." When the horseman had put the horse in the king's stable and gone, the horse immediately broke free. He shot out of the Palace Square like a bolt of lightning. While wandering about the city, he suddenly smelled the carcass of a Circassian's horse. This caused him to fall down dead, giving awasome neighs. They brought a silk cloth (to cover the dead horse). The whole army of Islam was astonished at what the horse had done. The stablehands came and buried the horse in a hole that they had dug in front of the martyred Circassian's horse.

The tomb of Süleymân Paşa, the first Ottoman commander to cross into Europe, overlooks the sea from both sides of the Gallipoli peninsula. In this

tomb, he, his horse, and his tutor lie side by side in majestic simplicity. One almost has the impression that they will once again set out on campaign.

When a horse of 'Osmân II (r. 1618-22) named Sisli Kır died, the sultan buried had it in Üsküdar in a tomb in Kavak Palace inscribed with the date of the horse's death.

The following anecdotes also relate to the role of faith and religious belief in the Turkish conquests. When Hayrüddin Paşa (Barbarossa) was conquering Minorca, the infidels rallied behind their leaders and put up a strong resistance to the Turks. However, they would not fight against Hayrüddin Paşa, even though they were many in number. This was, reportedly, because it was written in their books that he who fights and is killed when he could have been taken captive and retained his health, will not go to heaven. The infidel leaders agreed with this counsel. It is said that when Andrea Doria asked a knowledgeable Turkish prisoner, "Why are you Muslims heroes?" he replied, "It is the miracle of our prophet, that whoever enters his faith becomes a hero." Andrea asked, "Why is that?" He responded, "That's as much as we know." Andrea said, "Doesn't your book say that he who shuns war goes to hell, and that he who is afraid to fight two infidels will not enter Paradise. Now those are the words that make the Muslims heroes. In our book, if a thousand Christians know that they will die if they do battle with just one Muslim, then they will not fight, since it is written that he who dies in battle will not enter heaven. These words have made cowards of us."

Hayrüddin Paşa saw that Andrea Doria was preparing to enter the Gulf of Lepanto during a campaign. When the Ottoman admiral arrived in Başılar he stationed some men atop the ships' masts. The enemy's masts could be seen in front of Leukas and İncir Limanı. All at once, they changed course and made ready for battle. When the infidels saw this they set out, and the Muslims grew worried since the wind was blowing in the infidels' favor. In such a situation, the Ottomans *kadirğas* (galley) could not stand up to the infidel *barças* (large warships). Gâzî Paşa, at this point, prayed and wrote out two Quranic verses and lowered them over the two sides of his ship. By God's will, the wind died down and the *barças* (large warships) could not sail.

Although Hayrüddin Paşa does not explain which verses he wrote, we can guess that they were probably these: "O believers, remember these blessings that God has set down to you, when the enemy has sent his army against you and we have sent against them a wind and the army that you do not see" and "God sees to your every wish, with His Justice. If God wills, he can stop the wind and ships will not sail over the surface of the sea."

These examples, in my opinion, show that when Evliyâ Çelebi gives a horse the characteristics of a *gâzî* and martyr, it is not because the horse has shared the suffering of men and fought alongside them. The horse must be seen as a representative of his own ideology — his own belief system.

I would like to end this section with the following story reported from the Çanakkale (Dardanelles) campaign of the First World War. A Turkish soldier lost his way and came across an English encampment. The English brought him to their dugout. They had every imaginable food there: coffee sugar, chocolate, oil, and rice ...; in short, everything that could not be found among the Turks at that time.

To lead him on, the English said: "You can see, we have everything here. No wounding and no death. Convince your friends and bring them here; you can stay for the rest of the war here, safe and sound. When peace comes, you can return to your village ..." The soldier's response illustrates in itself the morale of an entire army: "We did not come here to eat, we came here to fight."

Such an ideology is expressed by the word "jihâd", which originally meant the Prophet's confrontation with the world of idolatry. The Quran is filled with such "jihâd" verses. The shelves of libraries are full of explanations and commentaries on this concept. These books played a basic role in the dissemination of this ideology and in the existence of the Ottoman Empire.

LITERATURE IN THE PERIOD OF OTTOMAN EXPANSION

First of all one must keep in mind the Turkish people's deep love of poetry. People of all classes, from the sultan to illiterate peasants, composed poetry. From the beginning, warfare occupied a prominent position in this literature. Wars were enterprises of the society as a whole, not of individuals alone. Stories of military adventure have been put into writing for centuries, such as the accounts of wars from the time of Murâd II until the accession of Muştafâ II. Some were *Ğazavât-nâmes* such as the *Fetiĥnâme*, the *Şehnâme* the *Kutubnâme*, the *Selîmnâme*, and the *Cevâhirü'l-Mendâkıb*, while others were named after the forts that had been captured such as the *Rodos Fetiĥnâmesi* and the *Budin Fetiĥnâmesi*. Most of these wee works were written in verse. Their authors often started them with descriptions of nature, not connected with the battles that they would describe, yet these opening descriptions often portrayed nature using battle field imagery:

Works about sea battles often bore the name of the commanding admiral, such as the *Ğazavât-ı Ĥayrüddîn Paşa*. Some of these military books were

different accounts of the same event written by different writers. The literary value of these works varied according to the author's skill. Some of them were penned by writers able to harness the power of classical stylistic devices and language.

Many of these works seem to have been intended for a fairly general audience, judging by how they employed a more ordinary and common style. It goes without saying, though, that these sorts of works have kept the excitement of the Ottoman conquests alive through the centuries.

In addition to the great historical verse accounts, we must not forget the tales, songs, and laments of the common soldier. This latter group enjoyed popularity among a broad range of people and played an important role in the dissemination of the imperial ideology discussed above.

We can call the *gazels* and quatrains written in the classical style by such poets as Mahremî, Yetûmî, and Nigârî the maritime echoes of terrestrial conflict. Here is a sample:

Ey gaza kânı, yürü, binbir diyar-ı düşmen aç
(O fought of martial vigor, go forth, conquer a thousand enemy countries)
Toplarla kal'a-i küffara yer yer revzen aç
(With the cannons knock holes in the infidels' forts)
Emr-i şâhiyle donanma zeyn için mahzen aç
(By the sultan's order, open the storehouse to adorn the fleet)
Vaktür hey Gazi Hayreddin Paşa yelken aç
(It is time, O Gazi Hayretin Paşa, to open the sails)
Allah Allah deyü engine donanma salalum
(Let us send forth the fleet on the high seas with an "Allah, Allah")
Portakal memleketin Sedde'ye varup alalum
(And head for Ceuta in the kingdom of Portugal)
Feth ü nusretler olup tabl-ı beşaret calalum
(Let us be victorious and sound the drum of good news)
Gel donanmaya girüp azm-i Frenk eyleyelüm
(Come join the fleet and let us defeat the Europeans)
Dümen doğrulup İspanya denen bidin mel'una
(We set a course for accursed Spain)
Yine şavk eyleyüp girdik donanma-yı hümayuna
(We redoubled our zeal and joined the Imperial fleet)
Yine başardalar başdan atup toplarını güm güm
(The small galleys' cannon boomed forth)
Salındı sayhalar birle zelâzil rub'-ı meskâna
(The noise shook the inhabited quarter of the globe)
Elinde cenkçü gazilerin şemşir-i uryanı

(The fighters with gleaming swords in hand)
 Kara kâfirleri koydu seraser kırmızı tona
 (The black infidels all turned crimson)
 Yetim, emvacile her uğ olup bir mevc-i zerdûdi
 (O Yetim, with the waves, every blade became a single towering wave)
 Selâmet sahiline Efrenc'e göstermez bu furtuna
 (This storm did not show the refuge of the coast to the Europeans)

Among the Turks, the literature and poetry of heroism has continued to the present day, on the one hand, it lives in the memory of conquests; and on the other it continues to dwell in the enthusiasms aroused by enmities that have not yet been concluded. The plays and poetry of Nâmık Kemâl are redolent of the gunpowder smoke of his turbulent times. It can also be found in 'Abdülhâk Hâmid's two works, the "Yâdâr-ı Harb" (Memory of War) and the "İlhâm-ı Vatan" (Inspiration of the Nation). While visiting Mehmed the Conqueror's tomb he muses:

Sensin ki ol şebirşeh bu ümmet-i necîbe
 (Your such a sultan that to this noble people)
 Emsâr bahşışındır, ebbar yadgârın
 (Realms are your gifts and seas your presents.)

When he visits the tomb of Selîm I, he writes;

Ki irühaldedir nezdinizde her saat
 (He is long dead, but we fell that he is with us as though he were dying at this very moment) to suggest that although Selîm has departed this world, we still feel his living presence. When he declaims,

İkinci himmete mutlak düşerdi Hind ile Çin
 (India and China would certainly have fallen with a second effort)
 Yetiştî Mısır ile İran'ı fethi bir himmet"
 (One effort sufficed to conquer Egypt and Iran),

he is referring to Yavuz Sultan Selîm, who strove for "Nizâm-ı 'Âlem".

In Ziyâ Gökâlp's book of poetry entitled *Kızıl Elma* and in the following from Yahya Kemal Beyath's *gazel* to Gedik Ahmed Paşa we see verses which reflect this heroic tradition:

Çıktı Otranto'ya pür-velvele Ahmet Paşa
 (Ahmet Paşa landed in Otranto with a flourish)
 Tuğlar varsa gerektir Kızıl Elma'ya kadar
 (Then battle standards will surely reach Kızıl Elma).

Yahya Kemal's "*Gazal* to the soul of Alp Arslan," "*Gazal* to the Janissaries who Conquered Istanbul", "Ezân-ı Muhammedi," and "Song of Mohacs" also radiate the reflected light of bygone heroes. Bâkî's elegy for Kânîni Sultan Süleymân, as well as Gâzi Giray's famous *gazal* about the horse are also examples of this genre.

When we examine the biographies of Turkish poets, we see that poetry was as important to the Turks as bread and water. When for example, a Turk is born in Prezrin, he is given a poetic pseudonym even before he is given his real name. Among the poets listed in the *tezkires* (biographies of poets), there are some who were illiterate. They were born poets. Even though they might take to heart the empty criticisms of their friends, they could still compose perfect verses without knowing what was meant by "perfect poetry". We find all sorts of occupations listed for the poets included in those anthologies. They were, among other things, quiltmakers, tailors, confectioners, and soldiers. This however, is a subject for another study.

We learn that Turkish works were written (in the earliest period of Turkish history in Anatolia) on a variety of subjects, in such towns as Konya, Niğde, Sinop, and Kastamonu. Most of these early works have been lost, but some have been preserved. Many of them concerned religious themes (commentaries on the Ihlâs verse of the Quran, stories about Hasan and Hüseyin, and historico-legendary accounts of the exploits of 'Alî). Works were written in a refined style based on popular stories of a heroic and religious nature. Among these works, biographies of the Prophet, Hasan, Faṭma, Hüseyin, as well as the account of the battle of Kerbelâ must not be overlooked. The commemoration of the Prophet's birthday written by Süleymân Çelebi entitled *Vestletü'n-Necât* should be considered along with the *mevlids* (poems commemorating the Prophet's birthday) of later eras.

Such religious works as the Aḫmediye and the Muḫammediye have enjoyed great popularity and have been translated into many Muslim languages through the centuries. The writers of these works were not motivated by any desire to be rewarded by their patrons for being exemplars of religion, nor did they simply want to create works of art; they wrote in a language that people could understand in expectation of a heavenly reward. Some of them did not even care to sign their names to what they wrote.

Beginning in the fifteenth century, we start to see a gradual increase in the amount of Turkish literature being produced. Both in Anatolia and Rumelia, the trends of Islamization and Turkification that started as early as in the fourteenth century gained strength. The resettlement of part of the population of Anatolia along the roads that would be travelled by the army was also an important development during this era.

There were three great dynastic families which encouraged and patronized intellectual and literary life in this century: the Karaman dynasty of Konya, the Ottomans in Bursa and Edirne, and the Candaroğulları in Kastamonu and Sinop. Works that have survived from the 15th century show strong Iranian influence. In this period, Ottoman poets and prosodists strove with considerable success to imitate Persian models.

The brilliant victories of the 16th century had important consequences for Turkish literature and language. Strong new cultural centers emerged, especially in Rumelia. Primary schools established in the remote corners of the Empire succeeded in spreading Islam and the Turkish language among the urban population. Rumelia began to produce a considerable number of outstanding Turkish poets.

Such established centers of literary life as Baghdad, Diyarbekir, Konya, Kastamonu, Bursa, and Üsküp (Skopje) also witnessed great artistic developments. However, the greatest amount of literary activity occurred in Istanbul. Poets could be found in all the palaces of the rulers and great men of state. They also frequented lesser establishments such as Bahşi's garden in Beşiktaş and the famed taverns of Galata (the "EFE" was frequently mentioned) as well as *tekkes* (dervish lodges) such as the Ca'ferâbâd *tekke* in Sütlüce. The palatial residences of some rich scholars statesmen, or the houses of poets such as Kâtibi, Niğârî, and their patrons were the places where poets would regularly congregate. When coffehouses appeared in the city, the famous coffehouses of Tahtakale became important literary rendezvous.

Bâyezîd II retained poets on his payroll, but these poets' salaries did not require them to write panegyrics to the ruler. Beginning with Murâd II all Ottoman sultans wrote poetry. The *divans* of Şehzâde Cem, Yavuz Sultan Selim, and Kânûnî Sultan Süleymân can all be favorably compared with those of well-known poets.

It seems that Sultan Süleymân considered the discovery of a poet like Bâkî to be one of the great coups of his life. We know from a letter of Bâkî that Süleymân retained close literary ties with this poet and his circle. Bâkî in fact wrote two imitations of a *gazel* by Süleymân. When asked why he had written two, he replied, "Yenilen doymaz" (He who has been bested will not be satisfied). The poet stated, in these imitations, that it was impossible for him to imitate Kânûnî's poetry.

Another characteristic of this century was the emergence of the "Türkî-i Basî" ("Simple Turkish") movement, in opposition to the gradually increasing influence of Arabic and Persian on Turkish. Two of its proponents were Mahremî and Nazmî of Edirne. It is known that Mahremî wrote a work entitled

the *Başıñdame*, which used words, figures, and images particular to the Turks, but only one strophe survives:

Gördüm seğirdir ol ala gözlü geyik gibi
 (I saw my gray-blue eyed sweetheart leap like a deer)
 Düştim saç tuzığına ben üveyik gibi
 (I, like a dove, fell into the trap of her hair)

This work is very important both for Turkish literature and language. Nevertheless, after this movement had won recognition, other writers did not follow in its path. The compilers of poetic biographies of that era did not even see fit to include the "Türkî-i Basî" ("Simple Turkish") movement in their works.

In this century, Turkish literature approached its zenith. Several writers emerged as masters of panegyric and *gazel*. Some of the greatest poets of the era were Hâyâlî, Fuzûlî, and Bâkî, to name only a few of the many who flourished then.

We must recall, in our discussion, that poetry's appeal is quite different from other forms of literature (Only love can explain the feelings and emotions that poetry arouses in a person). For this reason, there is almost no trace of their military exploits in the poetic collections of such great military leaders as Mehmed II, Selim I, and Süleymân; their collections contain mostly love poems. The exception, in Mehmed's divan, is the following strophe:

Bizimle Saltanat lafın edermiş ol Karamani
 (That Karamani talked empty words about the Sultanate with us)
 Hüda fırsat verirse ger kar yere karam anı
 (If God gives me the chance, I'll put him into the ground)

In the divan of Kânûnî Sultan Süleymân, we find the following martial *gazel*:

Allah Allah diyelim Sancak-ı Sahi çekelim
 (Let us raise the Sultan's flags with an "Allah Allah")
 Yürüyüp her yanadan şarka sipahi çekelim
 (Let us attack from every side and take the army to the east)
 İki yerden kuşanalım gayret kuşağın
 (Let us send the army from both sides)
 Bulaşup toz ile toprağa bu râhı çekelim
 (Daubed with dirt and dust let us take to the road)
 Paymal eyleyelim kişverini sürh-serin
 (Let us destroy the redhead's [Kızılbaş] territory)
 Gözüne sürme deyü düd-ı siyahı çekelim

(Let us raise the black smoke as kohl to his eye)
 Bize farz olmuş iken olmazız İslama zahir
 (Since it is God's command to help Islamic faith let us not be
 Nice, bir oturalım bunca günahı çekelim
 (Why commit a deadly sin by being neglectful of it
 Umarım rehber ola bize Ebubekr ü Ömer
 (Let our guides be Abu Bakr and Umar)
 Ey Mubibbi yürüyüp şarka sipahi çekelim
 (O Mubibbi, let us go and take the army to the east)

In another of Kanuni's *gazel*, the final strophe is:

Kalb-i a'dayı Mubibbi sıya ger ahen ise
 (Mubibbi shatters the enemy's heart even if it is made of iron)
 Fazl-ı hakkıyla kaçan kuşana sadak
 (When he takes bow and arrow with the grace of God)

Apart from poets famous for their *gazels* and panegyrics, others were distinguished for works in *muhammes* (five-line stanza), *müseddes* (six-line stanza), *hezel* (joke), and *mizah* (humor) forms. Treatises were also composed on *mu'ammâcılık* (the art of poetic riddles and puzzles). There were also attempts made to write (chronograms). However, the most important poetic form, after the panegyric and *gazel*, was the basic *meşnevî*. Among *meşnevîs*, the works praising a particular city constituted a particular type. Another important type of *meşnevî* was the "hamse" (from Arabic "five," as in the Persian "Hamsah" of Nizâmî), actually a series of five poems on five different subjects.

Religious, Sufi, and didactic works were composed during this century in *meşnevî* form. Among these were books of saints' lives, works pertaining to sufi life, and dictionaries in verse. Although many of these works have no literary value, they are still useful for investigating the history of the era.

Among the most important didactic works were the "Forty Hadîth" books and Hâkânî's *Hilye* about the characteristics and qualities of the Prophet. With the popularity of Süleymân Çelebi's *mevlid* (see above), Akşemseddînzâde Hamdî wrote several of his own *mevlids* in verse. Several classics of Bektâşî poetry also date from this period. Still other poets wrote simple Sufi poems. During this period, *meşnevîs* about Ottoman history were written as well.

Literary prose, starting in the 15th century, became gradually more ornate and elaborate. Nevertheless, since it would have been very cumbersome to write an entire work in such a style only the introductory part of this type of book was written in a heavy style, while for the rest of these work the author used simple language.

In contrast to these prose works, official state documents such as *emirnâmes* and *kânûnnâmes* maintained very clear and plain style. In the religious tracts that circulated among the people, care was also taken to write in simple language that everyone could understand.

Such prose works as Fuzûlî's *Hadîkatu's-Su'adâ*, Lâmi'î's *Maḳtel-i Huseyn*, and 'Aşîk Çelebi's *Ravzatü's-Şüheddâ* show the importance of prose during the 16th century. Other important prose works included Alf's *Künhü'l-Ahbâr*, the *Naşihatü's-Seldâtin* and the *Ḳavâ'idü'l-Mecâlis*.

Another great work dating from this century was Taşköprüzâde's exhaustive collective biography of the Ottoman ulema, the *Şakâyîku'n-Nu'mânîye* which was translated into Turkish and expanded by Mecdî and continued by Hâkî of Belgrade. The writing of continuations to such works can be traced down to the present day.

Among works concerning literary history, the biographical compendia of Şehî, Laîfî, 'Aşîk Çelebi, Bağdadlı 'Ahdî, and Ḥasan Çelebi are well-known sources. 'Aşîk Çelebi's artistic and humorous work is full of detail on his contemporaries' lives; it succeeds in painting a striking portrait of both their material and spiritual characteristics. This work is an ideal source for the social history of this era. *The Câmî'ü'n-Nazâ'ir* of Hâcî Kemâl, Edirneli Nazmî's *Mecmû'atü'n-Nazâ'ir* and the *Muntehâbât* collections of Pervâne b. 'Abdullâh are all useful sources for literary history.

Important information can be found in the *Râznâme* of Kefevî (a collection of stories about consulting the divan of Ḥafîz for fortune-telling) as well as the anecdotal collections (lağ'if) of Lâmi'î and Zâtî.

Geographical and travel works — Sipâhizâde rendered Ebûlfidâ's *Taḳvîmü'l-Buldân* into Turkish, while Şerîf Efendi did the same for İstahîrî. Other works of this genre include 'Alî Ekber Hâtâ'î's *Çin Seydâhatnâmesi* (a China travelogue in Persian), Pîrî Re'îs's *Bahrîye*, Matrakçı Naşûh's *'Irakeyn seferi* (travelogue of the two Iraqs), and Seydî 'Alî Re'îs's *Muhîṭ* and *Mir'âtü'l-Memâlik*. İbrâhîmoğlu Ahmed of Tokat wrote a verse travelogue describing his trip to India via Kabul and his return through Basra. Trabzonlu Mehmed 'Aşîk's *Manâzir'ül-'Avâlim*, written at the end of the century, also deserves consideration. Heratlı Mehmed Yûsuf's *Târiḫ-i Hind-i Garbî* (*History of the West Indies*) is also useful, from a different perspective.

Popular stories circulated widely among the general public in this century. We know that from the palaces to the coffeehouses and barracks, the storytellers, bards, shadow puppeteers, and musicians enjoyed great popularity.

Most of the great classical poets were also famous for composing simple and basic songs to be recited among the people. These songs, written in quatrains and called "şarkı"s ("song"s), were heard in towns and rural areas by aristocrats and the masses alike. In the barracks, the coffeeshouses, and other places where people gathered, such works as the *Hamzanâme*, the *Bağdâlnâme* and the *Süleymânnâme* were generally popular.

In the palace of Murâd III, (r. 1574-95) storytellers like Nuţkî of Shirvan, Muştafâ Baba of Bursa, Eğlence, and Derviş Hasan collected stories of Iranian and other Islamic origin along with local tales such as the story of Bursalı Hoca 'Abdurrauf. Bursalı Cenânî, far from being a literary stylist, penned little tales written in a simple language. They are stories which reflect various facets of the life of that century.

There was also folk poetry being composed by ordinary people in army barracks, in taverns, in coffeehouses or at fairs, weddings, and on battlefields. This was essentially love poetry which was written in syllabic meter and which utilized folk poetry. It was also a poetry that celebrated heroism and great historical events, such as the loss of certain cities, for which laments were composed. Among the artists in this genre were Bahşî, Kul Mehmed, Öksüz Dede, Hayâlî, Çirpanlı, Armutlu, Kul Çulha, and Geda Muşlu.

The special poems recited among the dervishes and written by founders of the Sufi orders form a different genre. Among these 'Ümmî Sinân, the founder of a branch of the Halvetiye, Ahmed Serban of the Melâmetiye-i Bayrâmîye, and Kul Himmet and his disciple Pîr Sultan Abdal stand out. Such works as the Hasanoğlu songs, the Karaoğlan song and the Deer Legend are anonymous products of folk literature.

