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FINAL REPORT

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Sigma

I-64

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PREPARED BY
JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

CM-1325-64
15 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PARTICIPANTS IN SIGMA I-64

SUBJECT: Game Documentation

Enclosed is the final documentation of the politico-military game, SIGMA I-64. It is being provided to all participants in order that those who contributed to its development and execution may have a complete file of all memoranda published during the exercise as well as comments made at the Critique.

Maxwell D. Taylor
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY

SIGMA I-64

GAME DIRECTOR'S REMARKS

△ The Summary of SIGMA I-64 is the product of approximately 900 man-hours of discussions among participants during play of the game and in the two final critiques. (See transcript of Senior Critique.)

◁ These discussions highlight for further examination a number of questions, the most significant of which appear to be:

◁ Can the United States "sell" domestic/world opinion the premise that support of subversion/insurgency by one country within the territory of another country provides moral/legal grounds for overt military action by the United States against the offending country? Are there historic precedents? Future implications? Venezuela, Cuba, Indonesia, Angola?

◁ To what extent must the culpability of the offending country be established before the bar of public opinion in order to create necessary Congressional and public backing for overt or patently "transparent" military actions by the US?

◁ What will the relative impact be upon domestic/world opinion of the Jordan report and similar material compared to Communist propaganda exploiting a theme of "US aggression" against an innocent, defenseless country like the DRV if they pull all the plugs?

◁ Does US stress on the fact that the war in South Vietnam is primarily a South Vietnamese war rather than a Free World war handicap informational efforts to obtain strong popular backing for sanctions against North Vietnam? Has the time come, perhaps, to stop the spread of Communism in SEA, to establish South Vietnam's independence as a symbol of Free World determination, and to give the situation the same status as West Berlin? What dramatic evidence of such a resolve would be required? What commitments can be obtained in this

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connection from Australia, the UK, Japan and the Philippines? Should there be a new SEATO without France?

Will domestic and world pressures against US escalation of the war into North Vietnam be reduced in proportion to the amount of "cover" provided to military participation? Will actions which the United States can creditably disavow require far less defense than thinly disguised attacks by US aircraft. Have all practical means for providing such cover such as "Flying Tiger" or "Freedom Squadrons" (using US, Chinat, ROK and other volunteers) been explored?

Are present "indicators" (such as message traffic, incidents, weapons losses, etc.) sufficient to establish the dissemination of a Hanoi decision to slow or halt the VC insurgency? What is probable "time lag" in recognizing that decision has been made? What, in fact, are good "indicators"?

What steps can be taken to reduce the impact on the US position in the event of assassination of Gen Khanh or of other successful action to discredit or depose him? Can support of the RVN government be built less around an individual image and more on a collective leadership or popular government?

Are the courses of action explored in SIGMA I likely to overcome the insurgency in South Vietnam? Are there other, possibly better alternatives?

The purpose of SIGMA I as a study vehicle was to focus attention on contingencies and eventualities which might arise in the course of such operations. Discussion of the probability of such events revolves entirely around individual value judgments. Control inputs represented judgments on possible results of the interplay of strategies, and were not necessarily the most probable in order to further the purposes of the study.

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Sigma I-64

6 - 9 APRIL 1964

FINAL REPORT

PREPARED
BY
JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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SIGMA I-64

FINAL REPORT

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FOREWORD

During the period 6 through 9 April 1964, the Joint War Games Agency conducted a politico-military game entitled SIGMA I-64. The game was sponsored by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and centered on the insurgency situation in South Vietnam. It focused on the effects which might be produced if the RVN/US undertook a program of increased pressures against North Vietnam - pressures designed to force that government to cease its support and direction of the insurgency in Laos and South Vietnam.

Senior officials of the White House, Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the military services actively participated in the exercise.

This document constitutes the final game report.

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SIGMA I-64

GENERAL INFORMATION

1. SIGMA I-64 GAME SCHEDULE

a. Dates of Play:

Action Teams - 6, 7, 8, 9 April 1964
Senior Teams - 7, 8, 9, April 1964

b. Place:

Game Play - JWGA Game Area, Room 1D-965A, Pentagon
Critique - National Military Command Center
(NMCC) Room 2D-890, Pentagon

c. Daily Schedule:

6 April 1964 -

1300-1700 - Action Teams study in JWGA game rooms.

7, 8 April 1964 (Moves I & II)

1300-1600 - Action Teams developed strategy and
action recommendations.

1600-1700 - Team captains prepared to brief
respective Senior Policy Teams.

1700-1800 - Senior/Action Teams met. Control
audited discussions.

1800-1930 - Action Teams finalized and transmitted
action papers to Control Team.

1830-2100 - Control interfaced team actions and
wrote the scenario projections.

(NOTE: Control Team members stayed
later than 2100 on 7 April.)

9 April 1964 (Move III & Critique)

1300-1500 - Action Teams prepared for critique.

1500-1600 - Action Level Critique. Action and Control Teams only.

1700-1800 - Senior Level Critique. Attended by all participants.

2. SECURITY.

a. The over-all security classification of the game play was TOP SECRET. However, to ease administrative handling, written messages were held to the SECRET - NOFORN level. When required to refer to this game in an unsecured environment, the name SIGMA I-64 should be used. This title should not be related to the participants, departments, agencies or the areas under study. Special caution should be exercised against linking participants with the game theme and areas of play.

b. All documents generated during the play of the game were treated as classified working papers. None of these were to be removed from the game rooms. Complete documentation of the game is distributed to each participant in this report.

3. FACT BOOK.

Background data was furnished to the players to assist them in their deliberations. This was in the form of a Fact Book. Some of the Fact Book information is included in this Final Report. Data not considered germane to this report and omitted, includes short country summaries and treaty data.

B
PROCEDURES

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Sigma I-64

GAME ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES

BASIC SCHEME


SIGMA I-64 is a politico-military game involving a crisis situation in South Vietnam. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the game sponsor; the Joint War Games Agency is providing facilities and over-all supervision for the exercise. This game differs from a "war game" in that play is oriented toward the political, psychological, sociological and economic aspects of national interests in addition to purely military considerations. The central theme of the scenario and the basis for the game is the insurgency situation in South Vietnam. Also central to the game are the broader questions, applicable to the whole of Southeast Asia, which arise from that insurgency. The basic objectives of the game are to consider:

- a. The actions which the United States and/or the Republic of Vietnam can take against North Vietnam to force that government to cease its support and direction of insurgency operations in Laos and South Vietnam;
- b. The possible CHICOM and/or Soviet reaction to overt military action against the DRV by either the RVN or the US;
- c. The possible reaction of neutral and friendly countries to such operations; and
- d. The extent to which such operations would contribute to the successful prosecution of the war in South Vietnam.

The organization for play of the game is as indicated on the following chart:

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For game purposes the teams represent the following:

- a. BLUE - The United States Government
The Republic of Vietnam Government
- b. RED - The Democratic Republic of Vietnam Government
The Viet Cong
The Pathet Lao
- c. YELLOW - The Peoples Democratic Republic of China Government
- d. CONTROL - All countries other than those listed above
SEATO and the UN
Nature
Other representatives as required

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The starting "problem time" for the game is 15 June 1964. A scenario has been prepared depicting events which "happen" between 6 April 1964 and the starting problem time. These events are designed to establish a framework wherein plausible and challenging actions can be taken by each team. These actions, plus those injected by the Control Team, must achieve the game objectives. In addition to the initial scenario, Fact Books have been prepared to provide players with brief, pertinent information regarding the countries and geographic area wherein the game is being played. Players are also welcome to bring any papers, studies, or memoranda from their offices which they may desire to use during the game. Secure storage can be provided for such documents within the game rooms. Players are requested to be familiar with existing and proposed plans, policies and other directives which their respective agencies have that are applicable to the insurgency situation in South Vietnam. It is especially important that players be aware of the number and type of personnel that their agency is committing in Southeast Asia and the financial outlays that are being made in the area. Security level for the play of the game is TOP SECRET; however, it is hoped that written communications can be held to the SECRET level.

The success of the game depends, to a large extent, on the ability of the player teams to devise strategems and to take plausible realistic actions in the interest of the governments they represent. The Control Team is neutral. However, Control is vitally interested in insuring that game objectives are fulfilled. Therefore, Control will attempt to guide the game along lines which clearly contribute to game objectives.

Individual players on each team must be team players in the broadest sense. It is not intended that an individual player play the role of an agency head, or that he limit his expressions of opinion to the subject or the area in which he has particular "expertise." Instead, each player is expected to serve as a generalist, but to also give expert advice in those areas where he has special qualifications.

DOCUMENTATION OF GAME PLAY

Required reports from the action teams are held to a minimum in order that participants may have the maximum time in which to discuss the situation depicted in the scenario and, based on their analysis, to arrive at the

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specific actions which they believe the countries they represent would take under similar circumstances. It is not desired that the game become a "message writing exercise." Instead, it is desired that messages prepared by action teams and forwarded to the Control Team be limited to those necessary for accomplishment of game objectives. Three types of messages will be used during the exercise. They are:

a. Broad Objectives and General Strategy Message. On Tuesday, 7 April, as part of Move I each action team must turn in to the Control Team a "Broad Objective and General Strategy Message." This message states in succinct terms the broad objectives which the reporting country has with respect to the area of crisis and the general strategy which the country plans to follow in achieving its broad objectives. For example, the Red Team based on the initial scenario might include the following statements in its message:

"a. Broad Objectives:

(1) Unite the whole of Vietnam within the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

(2) * * * * *

"b. General Strategy:

(1) Provide covert assistance and direction to Viet Cong operations in South Vietnam.

(2) * * * * *

Subsequent to 7 April, player teams do not need to submit another "Broad Objectives and General Strategy Message" unless there are changes, additions, or deletions, to the original message. In such an instance, only the change need be reported. The purpose of the "Broad Objective and General Strategy Message" is to insure that the Control Team has a firm understanding of the team's objectives and strategy so that in evaluating opposing actions, it can provide a realistic assessment.

b. Move Message. A "Move Message" will be prepared by each action team on 7, 8 and 9 April. The "Move Message" is the medium through which each action team informs the Control Team of its short-term objectives and of the specific actions that it is taking with

respect to the crisis situation. In addition, it includes the actions that the team desires to have taken in the event that certain enumerated contingencies occur. Each action listed in the message must include information as to who, what, when, where, how, and why if the why of the action is not self-evident. When a team desires to take covert actions, such actions must be so identified to permit Control to properly handle the intelligence aspects of the action. An example of a specific action by the Blue Team is shown below:

"BLUE MOVE MESSAGE

* * * *

"a. Advise Premier Khanh that the US will initiate low level photo reconnaissance missions within Laos and North Vietnam on 1 July 1964."

"b. Instruct Ambassador Stevenson to request an immediate meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the DRV operations against the RVN. Objectives of the meeting is to focus world attention on the Communist insurgency efforts and to attempt to influence the CHICOMs to not move military forces into Southeast Asia."

* * * *"

c. Miscellaneous Message. This type message may be used by action teams to pose questions to Control and, in exceptional cases, to address other action teams. All "Miscellaneous Messages" will be processed through Control even though addressed to another team.

DETAILS OF GAME PLAY

The game will be conducted in the Pentagon. All play except the final critiques will be held in the area assigned to the Joint War Games Agency. Prior to 6 April entrance to the game area will be through Room 1D957; from 6 through 9 April entrance will be through Room 1D965A. The final critiques on 9 April will be held in Room 2D890, the National Military Command Center.

The action teams and the Control Team will assemble in their respective game rooms at 1300 on each day of the exercise, 6 through 9 April. The Senior Policy Teams will not meet on 6 April. On the remaining days,

7 through 9 April, they will meet at 1700. The general sequence of events, on a daily basis, is shown below:

a. Monday, 6 April. The action and control teams meet to study, discuss and exchange ideas with regard to the initial situation. There is no meeting with the Senior Policy Teams on this day and no requirement for written input from the action teams. The purpose of the Monday meeting is to permit the action level participants to study, in depth, the implications of the insurgency situation in South Vietnam; also, to ensure that action level participants have sufficient time, prior to the first meeting with the Senior Policy Teams, to discuss the existing plans and policies applicable to this situation and to arrive at sound recommendations with regard to broad objectives, general strategy and specific actions. Similarly, the Control Team does not have to prepare a scenario projection for 7 April. The Control Team will monitor action team discussions and exchange ideas with respect to the existing situation as depicted in the scenario.

b. Tuesday, 7 April. Move I.

Action teams, based on the situation as stated in the initial scenario, prepare their estimates and determine the broad objectives, general strategy and specific actions which they consider realistic and desirable. Prior to 1700 each action team will prepare in draft form a "Broad Objective and General Strategy Message" and a "Move Message." At 1700 each of the action teams will meet with their Senior Policy Team. At these meetings the Team Captains will brief the seniors on the situation and the objectives, strategy and specific actions which they recommend for adoption. The seniors, based on the Team Captain's briefing and their own discussion, should approve or modify the action team's recommendations and provide such guidance for future action as they consider advisable. After the action/senior meetings, the action teams finalize their "Broad Objective and General Strategy Message" and their "Move Message" and deliver them to Control. Ideally, these would be the only messages prepared by action teams during the day.

The Control Team monitors action team discussions during the day to include the action/senior meeting and answers such questions as arise. After the action/senior meetings the Control Team will start its deliberation of the effect and/or outcome of the action team's

opposing actions. The Control Team's discussions can start prior to receipt of the two formal messages from the action teams. However, the final interface and preparation of the scenario projection will depend on the content of the action teams' formal input.

c. Wednesday, 8 April. Move II.

Players follow the same schedule and procedure as on Tuesday. However, a "Broad Objective and General Strategy Message" is not required.

d. Thursday, 9 April. Move III and Critiques.

The action teams meet at 1300 and will have until 1430 to decide on their final actions and to prepare their final "Move Message." At 1430 all action teams turn in their final "Move Message" to Control and then assemble in Room 2D890 for the action level final critique. The period from 1430 to 1500 will be allocated to the Action Team Captains for a description and explanation of their final moves. From 1500 until 1600 all members of the action teams and the Control Team will participate in the Action Level Critique of game events. At 1600 all action level participants, other than the Team Captains, are free to leave. At 1700 the Senior Level Critique will begin in Room 2D890.

GAME ADMINISTRATION

Personnel from the Joint War Games Agency will be present throughout the play of the game to assist players and to provide administrative support. A JWGA officer will be present at each action team game room as a Monitor to provide information needed by players, to accept communications directed to Control or other teams, and to generally help the players in the mechanics of the game. All outgoing messages should be given to the respective Monitors to insure that they are properly logged and are expeditiously reproduced and distributed.

To facilitate documentation of the game, the following color code will be used with respect to written documents:

- White Paper - All communications from Control to include scenario projections.
- Blue Paper - Messages originated by the BLUE Team.
- Pink Paper - Messages originated by the RED Team.

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Yellow Paper - Messages originated by the YELLOW Team.

Message blanks in the above colors will be available in each game room. The blank forms are in sheafs of four carbon-prepared sheets to permit making an original and three copies of each message. Drafters of messages are requested to keep one copy of each message prepared and to immediately deliver the original and two copies to their JWGA Monitor. Typewriters are provided in game rooms. However, hand-written messages, if legible, are perfectly acceptable. During the play of the game players will receive copies of only those messages affecting their team. To prevent players from becoming inundated with papers, only two master files of messages will be maintained in each game room -- one for the Team Captain and one for the Monitor. An exception to this will be that each action player will receive a copy of each of his team's daily "Move Message" and a copy of the scenario projection.

Message blank headings should be filled in completely. The "FROM" and "TO" blanks should indicate the originating team and the team to whom the message is to be delivered. For example: BLUE to Control. The daily "Move Message" will incorporate in different paragraphs of the single message each of the actions, directives and queries that the team desires to announce to Control at the end of the day. The date shown should be the actual calendar date in April. The message numbers will run in sequence for each team for each move. For example, there will be for BLUE a Message No. 1 - Move I, Message No. 1 - Move II, etc. If continuation sheets are necessary, the message number should be entered on each continuation sheet followed by "(Cont'd.)." The "Reference" blank should be completed if the message is referring to a particular previously written query or statement. The reference should be identified by its message-move number.

Blackboards and easel type chart holders together with chart paper and colored flow pens (Magic Markers) will be available in each of the game rooms for use by participants. These items are valuable in recording ideas that arise during the discussions. In addition, they should be utilized by the Team Captains to prepare visual aids for use in briefing the Senior Policy Teams.

At the conclusion of the game, copies of all game-generated documents to include messages, scenario projections and such other memoranda which might have been

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prepared will be provided to each player as a package. A Final Report will be published which will include a complete game message section.

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SIGMA I-64

JWGA Game Staff

CONTROL Team: Rear Admiral C. J. Van Arsdall, Jr., USN
Game Director

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Lt Col Thomas J. McDonald, USA

BLUE Team Monitor: Cdr Russell E. Brown, USN

RED Team Monitor: Lt Col Paul J. McClure, Jr., USA

YELLOW Team Monitor: Lt Col Wm. Thane Minor, USAF
Cdr George O. Atkinson, USN - Alternate

Secretariat: Maj LeRoy A. Wenstrom, USAF
Maj Lawrence D. Pence, USA
MSgt Brady H. Bradford, USAF
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Ann James
Donna L. Reno
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D
GAME SUMMARY

SUMMARY OF SIGMA I-64

SIGMA I-64 was a four-day politico-military game in which fifty-six high level government officials explored questions involved in the application of pressures against North Vietnam. Three teams, each consisting of both senior and action level participants portrayed the governments of the United States/Republic of Vietnam (BLUE), The Democratic Republic of Vietnam/ the Viet Cong/ the Pathet Lao (RED), and The Chinese Peoples Republic (YELLOW).

A fourth group of officials served as a Control group, developing inputs from other international actors and influences such as the USSR, France and Cambodia. It also determined the pattern of world events resulting from team decisions.

The initial scenario assumed that direction and mounting support of the Viet Cong insurgency centered in North Vietnam and that a decision had been made by BLUE in Spring 1964, to apply diplomatic, psychological and military pressures against the North Vietnamese government to end support and direction of VC activities. The BLUE Team was attempting to "buy time" for important internal programs under way in South Vietnam, although only passing references were made to such programs.

BLUE recognized that it must create a climate of opinion conducive to escalation of military activities if its pressures were to be credible. It attempted to do this through a massive informational effort based on the Jordan Report. Concurrently, it increased RVN control measures along the Laotian border, backed up by US air reconnaissance, covert commando raids into North Vietnam and discreet demarches to the DRV, USSR and CPR that US/RVN had no political goals beyond forcing a halt to DRV support of the VC.

During March-June 1964, (as presented in the initial scenario) the DRV/VC responded by raising the tempo of attacks in South Vietnam, attacking US personnel including dependents, shooting down more American planes, while disavowing real connections between the DRV and VC.

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On 15 June, BLUE called for retaliating (tit-for-tat) military actions against North Vietnam beginning on 25 June and continuing until the "indicators" revealed a material reduction in DRV direction and support of the Viet Cong or until 15 July. These actions embraced overt reconnaissance by US or Farmgate aircraft; bomb strikes and commando raids by RVN forces against DRV military targets such as communication centers, training camps and infiltration routes; and aerial mining by RVN aircraft of major DRV ports. B-57s would not be used unless sophisticated DRV defense required their use or unless other operational requirements dictated their use. If these actions did not achieve the desired reduction in DRV direction and support, BLUE would initiate a program of graduated overt military pressures by RVN and US forces which would exceed the "tit-for-tat" principle and include air attacks against additional DRV military targets plus selected industrial targets. The combined resources of the RVN air force and Farmgate, augmented by B-57s, would be utilized until the "indicators" revealed a material reduction in DRV support or until 1 September, at which time BLUE would re-evaluate its position.

The DRV, on 15 June, determined that it could head off this impending course of US/RVN action using diplomatic-psychological pressures which pictured the United States as the real "aggressor" against an innocent, peace-loving DRV. While propagandizing this position it stepped up VC activities, attempted to assassinate Gen Khanh, and advocated seizing a provincial capital in South Vietnam; but it halted VC attacks against US personnel. The DRV sought UN action and a renewal of Geneva treaty discussions and asked Red China for a small Farmgate-type bombing force (initial scenario).

On 15 June, the RED Team requested YELLOW to declare that any attack on the DRV was an attack on the CPR and for "any other support" it could offer. YELLOW turned down the request for Farmgate bombers and the deterrent declaration but offered anti-aircraft and air defense fighters while encouraging gradual movement of the Pathet Lao toward the Thai border. The USSR, (portrayed by Control), warned the US that Russia could not stand idly by while a Socialist state was attacked, and offered qualified assistance to the DRV.

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From 25 June to 21 July, the conflict escalated in three arenas: militarily, in Vietnam and Laos; diplomatically, in the United Nations; and psychologically, before the bar of world public opinion.

The RVN Air Force supported by Farmgate retaliated against DRV military targets in North Vietnam for VC aggressive actions in South Vietnam. This was accomplished on a "tit-for-tat" basis, hitting training and communications centers and infiltration routes. The VC concurrently accelerated their attacks against military targets and shipping in the South. Meanwhile both the US and CPR prepared for force deployments to meet possible future developments.

World opinion was heavily influenced by "evidence" of US aggression. Atrocity material was widely circulated and the loss to mines of a British and a Soviet ship in early July was cited as an obvious violation of accepted rules of international law and principles of freedom of the seas. The capture of a US flyer downed in North Vietnam overshadowed less dramatic material in the Jordan Report and RED acted to depict the "Liberation Front" in South Vietnam as an independent, indigenous political faction. RED had no thought of "surrender" and indeed felt that a cessation of VC activities under pressure would be tantamount to admitting all US/RVN charges.

Faced with negative world reactions, American opinion was sharply split. A shaken Congress requested briefings by Defense officials and provided a somewhat reluctant go-ahead for continued military pressure.

Security Council action against the US was staved off through use of the veto by the United States and the Republic of China, backed by a negative vote from Brazil. The Soviet-backed condemnation action was then thrown in to the General Assembly.

On 15 July, the same day Ho Chi Minh made an impassioned speech to the Assembly deploring US/RVN air attacks "against defenseless women and children," BLUE initiated a program of graduated overt military pressures by RVN and US forces against additional DRV military targets as well as industrial targets.

Underlining Ambassador Stevenson's assertion in the UN that the US would not accept a cease-fire until VC attacks were halted, twelve Farmgate aircraft attacked

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DRV oil tanks at Vinh and four attacked one of the six hydro-electric plants in the Hanoi complex. These were successful "surgical" type operations which left nearby facilities untouched.

The initial RED move message dealt almost entirely with measures to deter RVN/US escalation. It did not clearly convey a RED Team desire to refuse a CPR offer of fighter aircraft. The RED Team actually elected to accept an air pummeling as part of its psychological campaign in the court of world opinion rather than CPR air defense assistance which they judged would be of dubious value. Consistent with previous Soviet and Chinese proposals, Control introduced Soviet SAMs and RED Chinese MIG 17s wearing DRV colors into the air defense of North Vietnam to obtain a US reaction to CHICOM and/or Soviet countermeasures against US or RVN overt military action in North Vietnam.

On 21 July, eight Farmgate aircraft attacking targets near Haiphong were engaged by Chinese-type MIGs as they emerged from a monsoonal squall. Three Farmgate planes were downed, two in North Vietnam.

BLUE intelligence now reported that SAM sites were appearing around DRV industrial areas and that MIGs were beginning to appear on airfields in North Vietnam, Cambodia and Hainan.

On 22 July, BLUE responded to this by having the President of the US request a joint Congressional resolution which would note DRV aggression against the RVN and the Chinese involvement with MIGs and SAMs; Note that the RVN program of retaliation was based on its inherent right of self-defense by taking action on a "tit-for-tat" basis; warn against intervention "by other Communist powers;" and authorize the President to use US armed forces to repel aggressive action "by any other Communist nations in Southeast Asia." BLUE intended to publicly admit "tit-for-tat" actions while actually hitting all appropriate targets as well.

To prepare for possible CPR intervention in response to the program of graduated overt military pressures, BLUE began moving CONUS reserve forces to advance staging areas in consonance with CINCPAC OPLAN while deploying naval forces into a higher readiness posture.

Up to this point the CPR had attempted to avoid the introduction of its own forces into SEA except in defense of its own frontiers, while increasing the responsiveness

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of the DRV and Pathet Lao to Chinese influence. Anxious to avoid a direct confrontation with US military power it nevertheless sought to warn the United States that US/RVN "aggression" would "be met by appropriate countermeasures."

On the diplomatic front both RED and YELLOW (which were not allowed to meet with one another to coordinate moves),* attempted to steer the case into a renewed Geneva Conference.

US strategy was to consistently avoid discussions or negotiations while maintaining military pressures, but there was little evidence that either the RED or YELLOW Teams gave serious thought to succumbing, although YELLOW recommended temporarily reducing VC pressures in the south.

BLUE expressed regret over loss of the Soviet ship and continued to try to influence the Soviets to discourage CPR/DRV efforts; the USSR had no such intention. The Soviets determined to maintain their position in the Socialist camp, offsetting CPR influence by providing support to the DRV. The CPR seemed willing to see Soviet assistance flow into the DRV but had no intention of "going to Moscow" for it.

Indeed, the CPR was quite content to see the DRV sustain severe damage under air attack on the theory that its own influence would be increased as the DRV became less independent. YELLOW encouraged the DRV and the Pathet Lao to expand their influence in Laos, and to initiate probes toward the Thai border while activating clandestine assets in northeast Thailand. The CPR also began to lay the ground work for action "against CHINATS" in Burma. The CPR also recommended preparations for introducing regular DRV forces to support the VC in South Vietnam and began preparing for possible offensive operations through Laos into Thailand and/or into Northern Burma. Joint military talks with officials of North Korea were contemplated for 1 August. The CPR was preparing for a meeting of "peace-loving" nations on 15 August to protest US/RVN aggression when the game ended.

In late July, the United States leaked the information that it was "reviewing" Chinat plans for landings on the mainland and that renewal of the war in Korea might require

* However, they were advised that they could write "diplomatic" messages to each other through Control. Neither elected to do this, however.

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use of "all weapons to counter the aggression."

The US and Red China were on a collision course in SEA with the US attacking military/economic targets in North Vietnam on "an ascending and calculated" basis while conducting high level recce over China and North Korea; the Red Chinese were preparing to support a ground invasion of SEA.

The RED and YELLOW Teams were showing no disposition to back down and felt they had a winning hand in the court of public opinion.

The BLUE Team apparently felt that it could "ride out" the adverse opinion reaction and force the DRV to give in.

It was felt more could be gained at this point by conduct of action level and senior level critiques (see transcripts) than by developing a further Control projection of the world scene.

A political/military game -- while useful in delineating certain problem areas, communications difficulties, possible bargaining ploys, and in fostering rapport between interested agencies -- is scarcely a conclusive medium for evaluating such things as North Vietnamese ability to withstand military pressures. However, both the RED and YELLOW Teams had reservations concerning the efficacy of air strikes in causing the DRV to cease direction and support of operations in RVN. DRV reaction to sustained air attack might better be addressed in a special study focused on weapons effects, plus economic, psychological and political responses to such a program.

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SIGMA I-64

GAME COMMENTARY

The following general comments dealing with material covered during the play of SIGMA I-64 are based upon team discussions, senior discussions, action and senior level critiques and individual comments of participants. The comments are presented for consideration in the belief that they may be useful to agencies receiving this report. No attempt has been made to present a critical analysis of this material.

This game did not address the "why" of the problem to any serious extent - it simply assumed that current programs were not sufficient to prevent the loss of SVN to Communism and that pressures on the North could get pressure off the South. Such a cause and effect relationship is widely accepted but there is an apparent difference of opinion as to its extent. Particularly, there are doubts about the degree of VC responsiveness to control of Hanoi. VC may take help but may prefer their own approach to accomplish their ambitions. If there is powerful influence from Hanoi (and there probably is) it is mainly psychological and disciplinary, not material.

Pressure on the DRV might take the heat off in South Vietnam; however, a small expenditure of iron bombs involves potential commitment of major US forces representing millions of dollars if the DRV doesn't fold up, or if the CPR comes in. Meanwhile, the problem of winning popular support in South Vietnam still goes on with less command attention and perhaps fewer resources available to cope with real RVN domestic problems.

Possibly the morale factor in RVN will be improved through this program by dispelling fears of US withdrawal, suggesting a chance of major US commitment and eventually more help of all kinds; sowing seeds of a "win" psychology among a tired disillusioned people; reducing VC morale.

Conversely, military retaliation from VC, DRV, CPR and USSR may take an unexpected turn and Southern morale might suffer.

If it is determined that deterring DRV support is critical and overshadows the conduct of internal programs going on in South, then the question arises of whether

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pressures on DRV will actually result in reduction of pressure on government of RVN. This points to the question of DRV vulnerability to the kind of pressures contemplated and US/RVN vulnerability to counter-pressures which can be initiated by VC, DRV, CPR, USSR, Bloc, neutrals, allies and US domestic opponents of escalation.

In addressing the vulnerability of the DRV internal situation, one finds a subsistence level agricultural economy operating on a marginal basis. There is a small economic infrastructure and only a modest (and highly valued) industrial capacity. The population is rigidly controlled, is largely rural and is already accustomed to an extremely austere living standard.

In spite of US assurances, DRV party leaders and cadres when under sustained air attacks might fear that a US/RVN success would not be limited but would aim to have the entire country reunited under Saigon.

Probably the DRV could absorb any quantity of punishment the RVN can currently deliver by air and commando type raids - overt or covert - while continuing to mount pressures in the RVN. Ascending pressures by Farmgate would hurt to a far greater degree especially if transport systems were effectively interdicted. The worst effect would be felt in urban areas, particularly Hanoi. The DRV have, however, a number of trained pilots and it can probably be assumed that they would use CPR provided aircraft (with CPR type Farmgate) for air defense and perhaps retaliatory bombing of the RVN.

During such an air effort against the DRV it may be expected that USSR, France, other allies and neutrals will exert strong pressures on RVN and the US to stop expanding the war. A significant vocal proportion of US opinion may join in the hue and cry. If the cover for US participation is thin-- so thin as to resemble cynical aggression-- we may encounter severe problems in the UN and before the bar of world public opinion. Possibly these problems could be reduced if we can do two very difficult things:

1. Convince the world (and more particularly the US Congress and public) that DRV support and direction controls the VC insurgency in the south and that the government in Saigon is truly preferable to a "Liberation Front" government, a Laos-type agreement, or some other solution.

2. Convince the same forum that direct attacks on the

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DRV by the US and/or RVN are no more immoral than DRV support of the insurgency in South Vietnam. (This would constitute a change in the frame of reference for fighting the cold war; it would be a shift from the tacitly accepted methods used to resist Communist subversion of countries and governments -- from use of internal counter-pressures within the threatened countries to covert/overt pressures on installations within countries providing the support for subversive operations.)

The same principle carried to greater lengths would lay a basis for direct US action against Cuba for its subversive activities in Bolivia, Venezuela, Columbia, etc. This question is fundamentally a point of US foreign policy which has divided opinion in the US since 1946. It is related to the disagreement between the Truman administration and Gen MacArthur, to differences between "hard" and "soft" line advocates of US policy. Its advocacy would probably meet some monumental objections on principle by prominent opinion leaders. The Soviets, CPR, and Bloc might be expected to oppose such an attempted change in the "ground rules" of Cold War with all the means at their disposal and with great tenacity. The principle might be more important to the USSR than the specifics of the struggle in SEA.

It appears necessary that strong backing by US public opinion and Congress be obtained for this concept. This may require a well-planned effort by all Agencies, and may be difficult. In addition to moral and legal questions surrounding undeclared war (which can be construed as aimed at "innocent populations") there are obvious difficulties in determining the extent of Communist involvement in "honest" revolutionary movements against despotic regimes; indeed the fact that the US occasionally supports such movements for its own purposes, and may wish to do so in the future, may be raised.

If it is US intention merely to make a carefully calculated effort to deter the DRV support of the VC, this is quite different from a massive political/psychological effort to change the whole climate of international opinion on how the Cold War should be fought. To succeed in any such ambitious undertaking will require a unity of US opinion which may build up but slowly. It may take as long as the time it took US opinion to coalesce against Naziism. This offers little immediate relief in South Vietnam, although if started in motion now it might have major impact at a later time in this or other areas ripe for Communist subversion.

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It appears that immediate US supported offensive-type actions against the DRV can best be conducted behind a reasonable cover of RVN or third nation action while conditioning world opinion to the links between these actions and DRV/VC terrorism. The DRV/VC must be linked together unequivocally in the public mind both at home and abroad using all informational media and the best evidence which can be produced. At the same time the US/RVN must stress the fact that it is actually the RVN which is struggling for independence from Communist domination and that they are as much a bastion of freedom against expanding Communism as West Berlin.

The Soviets have long recognized the extent of the Free World's commitment in West Berlin and subversive efforts within that city are readily identified with the Communists. South Vietnam might be given the same symbolic status if the US is willing to make this kind of commitment, but American public opinion regarding Asia is now about what it was toward Europe in 1937 and 1938.

To convert South Vietnam into the kind of success represented in West Berlin may require the sort of dramatic effort that turned the tide in Europe - something as dramatic as the Berlin Airlift - perhaps a bridge of ships bringing in the kind of assistance South Vietnam needs to achieve a major social-economic revolution. Technicians, administrators, information specialists, teachers, engineers, and business men are needed in greater numbers. The United States already has carried on such programs with fantastic success in two Asian countries - the Philippines and Japan.

It would appear that a "volunteer" type effort involving RVN, backed up by US, UK, Australian, Chinat (?), ROK and other pilots drawn from Free World nations might possibly provide an effective force for conducting graduated air strikes against North Vietnam in openly supplied US aircraft. A "Flying Tiger" or "Freedom Squadron" would provide a symbolic and highly effective force for deterring DRV aggression, and might help dramatize the Western stake in preserving South Vietnam and SEA.

It would appear that aerial mining of DRV coastal waters presents the enemy with a good opportunity to sow disunity between the US and its allies.

The game underlined the problem of communicating intent to an enemy in that the CPR interpreted US reposturing of fleet and other forces as indicative of more hostile

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intent than the US wished to express. Although the "discreet demarches" to the CPR, USSR and DRV stated only that the DRV should call off the Viet Cong attacks in the south, that the US had no territorial or other objectives, the force redeployments seemed to suggest something else, at least to suspicious "Chinese" minds.

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
1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 20, 1961. It is a message of inauguration and sets forth the President's goals and objectives for his administration. The President expresses his confidence in the American people and their ability to overcome the challenges of the world. He also outlines his plans for domestic and foreign policy, including the promotion of peace, the advancement of civil rights, and the strengthening of the national defense.

2. The second part of the document is a list of the President's appointments to the Cabinet and other key positions in his administration. This includes the names of the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and other high-ranking officials.

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SIGMA-I-64



**INITIAL
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SIGMA I-64

INITIAL BLUE SCENARIO

Depicting the Situation April - June 1964

The world situation is generally the same as it was in April although a number of major developments have occurred in Laos and in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

Following the March visit by Secretary McNamara, the Khanh government made a good beginning in revitalizing the counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam, instituting a dynamic program aimed at restoration of national morale.

Strengthened by US determination to support the struggle, senior RVN officials threw their loyalty behind the young General and fears of another Saigon coup diminished. Increased US assistance permitted rapid moves toward expansion of the RVN armed forces - particularly paramilitary units. A national conscription law was adopted and military pay and benefits increased. The Hamlet Program was restructured along "spreading oil drop" lines, gradually but more effectively extending control outward from areas already pacified; clearer command lines were established and greater emphasis was placed on police as opposed to military methods within government controlled areas.

An ambitious program to create a civil administrative corps was launched along with measures to bolster popular support for the regime. Under this program, top priority will be given to rural needs, to include land reform, loans to tenant farmers, health and welfare measures, economic development and improved status for ethnic minorities and paramilitary troops.

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USIS personnel were afforded greater access to RVN information agencies than was permitted under Diem and were better able to suggest useful measures for convincing the people, particularly the rural population, of the new government's sincere interest in their welfare and security. Important additions were made to troop education programs for RVN forces; increased emphasis was placed on portraying the Khanh regime in terms designed to broaden and encourage grass-roots support. The US Ambassador personally encouraged Khanh to initiate "fireside" type chats with the people over the radio, helping to convey a sympathetic and dedicated image of himself and of other government leaders.

The attitude of the American press covering the war in Vietnam was considerably less hostile toward the RVN government than it had been during the last days of the Diem regime and a number of effective stories dealing with positive social and economic progress received wide publicity.

Arrival of new M-113 personnel carriers and improved aircraft for RVN forces provided visible evidence that the RVN had major responsibility for fighting their own war. Announcements were made that US dependents were not being withdrawn from the country. However, the Viet Cong continued to infiltrate the Laotian and Cambodian borders to sabotage POL facilities and lines of communication. They also initiated acts of terrorism against US personnel. These aggressive actions continued to be encouraged by Hanoi radio and the government of North Vietnam.

The US Secretary of Defense, in a speech on 26 March, emphasized the importance of Southeast Asia and the nature of US objectives in the area. He pointed out that the ultimate goal of the US there, as in the rest of the world, is to help maintain free and independent nations which can be responsible members of the world community. He pointed out that Southeast Asia has great strategic significance in the forward defense of the US as it dominates the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. He stated, "In Communist hands, this area would pose a most serious threat to the security of the US and the family of Free World nations to which we belong" and "To defend Southeast Asia, we must meet the challenge in South Vietnam."

Shortly after the McNamara speech, the US and RVN governments agreed that a graduated program of diplomatic,

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military and psychological actions must be taken to induce the North Vietnamese government (DRV) to terminate support of the Viet Cong and to curtail Pathet Lao activities. Word was passed to the DRV through neutral consulates that while the US/RVN had no territorial aims and was not anxious to force Ho Chi Minh into further subservience to Peking, his support of the Viet Cong would no longer be tolerated. The Red Chinese and USSR were informed discreetly that there was no threat to China involved but that the United States would not look tolerantly at continued direction of the insurgency from Hanoi.

As a precautionary measure against enemy escalation, orders were issued to US defense forces in the Pacific to prepare on short notice to redeploy US land, sea and air units incident to the launching of covert strikes against North Vietnamese targets.

During April and May, several covert strike missions were conducted by RVN special forces into North Vietnam. Four of these enjoyed moderate success destroying gasoline storage tanks, a railroad bridge on a main line and a barge loaded with supplies. The others were not heard from and were presumed lost.

Twice during April and three times during May, RVN forces in battalion strength with their US advisors, crossed the Laotian border in pursuit of fleeing Viet Cong. The RVN forces destroyed a number of Viet Cong supply installations and captured over fifteen tons of explosives and a variety of crew served weapons. Air support for these operations was provided by RVNAF and Farmgate aircraft.

During the same period, two such crossings were made into Laos for the purpose of interdicting Viet Cong infiltrators moving across the border into South Vietnam. Fire fights ensued and several VC prisoners were taken along with a number of light antiaircraft weapons of Czech manufacture. Low level air reconnaissance for these interdiction missions was provided by US pilots in US aircraft. During the period several bases were established for interdiction of Viet Cong infiltrators and these bases contributed to the capture of Viet Cong personnel and equipment.

Sihanouk was aroused to bitter denunciation of Khanh's government and of the United States. On 12 June he formally requested United Nations intervention and announced

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that he was requesting Red China to provide a military advisory group in Phnom Penh. (Informal word through neutral sources indicates that Mao is seriously considering such a step.)

Criticism by the International Control Commission of these border crossings was publicized by Hanoi and Hsinhua but Souvanna Phouma made only a mild public statement and privately was alleged to have no strong feelings on the matter. There appeared to be a buildup in Pathet Lao strength and equipment in northern Laos.

The Viet Cong reacted strongly to the RVN initiative. During May the number and intensity of sabotage strikes against targets in South Vietnam were tripled. Gasoline storage tanks, railroads and bus transportation routes were subjected to attack after attack.

Shipping entering approaches to the harbor of Saigon was brought under harassing fire from hit-and-run gunners ashore using recoilless cannon. Losses began to mount among American advisors serving with RVN units.

Although the Viet Cong continued aggressive efforts through May, sometimes striking deep and occasionally inflicting painful defeats, there were increasing numbers of American confirmed Viet Cong KIAs and weapons losses. It was also noted that unprecedented numbers of Czech, Russian and Chinese-made weapons, including heavier mortars, recoilless cannon and anti-aircraft machine guns were being obtained from outside sources.

The increasingly deadly effect of VC anti-aircraft weapons was underscored by a sudden rise during June of RVN and US helicopter and fixed wing casualties. Army aircraft which had flown over 300,000 sorties with only a score of losses, were now being subjected to a quality of ground fire that could only result from the introduction of carefully trained and well-trained gunners. Sixteen US aircraft were downed within the RVN in one week with high personnel losses. US public reaction was one of outraged indignation; bipartisan support for strong action was forming in Congress.

In June, the French reported that although Ho was old and ailing and that differences existed between his principal heir apparents, there was something less than unanimity of resolve regarding the war in South Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh and Giap fear that expansion of the conflict may lead to increased domination by Peking.

However, to hints that increased pressure by the RVN/US might force the surrender of DRV independence to Peking, Giap said, "I have no great love for the Chinese as is well-known but rather Mao than the white imperialists."

To veiled suggestions that a more conciliatory policy toward the West might result in major trade and aid opportunities Truong Chinh, Ho's pro-Chinese advisor, was said to have laughed saying, "In ten years all the Western countries will be doing business with us and with the other Peoples' Republics in Southeast Asia -- and perhaps the Peoples' Republics of Indonesia, Japan and the Philippines."

In the second week of June the Viet Cong struck with a succession of bloody attacks against village administrators and their families and American dependents. The families of two American officers were brutally slaughtered in their quarters in Saigon by assassins who escaped, cutting the throats of three security soldiers. Eighteen village administrators were cut down in one day while going about their duties in pacified areas. Radio Hanoi asserted that the killing of American dependents had been a "brutality of the murderous Khanh regime intent on assuring a continuing flow of US gold, black market goods and limousines for their concubines." These broadcasts went on to point out that the rich landowners constituting the RVN leadership had everything to gain and little to lose by perpetuating the struggle with the Viet Cong but that inevitably the United States people would see the error of their government's Asian policy and leave Asia to be governed by Asians.

In spite of sincere efforts by the Khanh government to mobilize national morale, the program was not sufficiently mature by the end of May to be really effective. There were a number of serious weak spots. Many of the farmers in Viet Cong dominated areas had been given de facto ownership of their land by the insurgents and had ceased paying debts owed to the RVN. Some rural families owed back taxes and other debts which would be collected if the Viet Cong were driven out. Others feared loss of their land if the RVN government succeeded in clearing and securing their area.

Some farmers felt that prices of government rice were manipulated in a manner which deprived them of legitimate profits. There was also the problem of corruption at the lower levels of government; at higher levels in Saigon,

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ambitious programs to train thousands of civil administrators were in difficulty due to logistical problems and a shortage of really qualified instructors.

While USIS and RVN informational programs had been stepped up, actual shortcomings in programs to improve social and economic conditions limited their effect. Powerful radio transmitters broadcast material aimed at rural as well as urban workers dramatized military and other successes. Extensive motion picture programs were conducted using carefully prepared, locally produced films. Millions of magazines, newspapers and tactical leaflets were distributed-- massively outweighing the propaganda effort from Hanoi. However, formal and informal opinion polls indicated that the average farmer and his family still felt little loyalty toward the regime in Saigon. Although by consumer standards South Vietnam was far better off than the Northern regime, three governments in less than a year, the monsoon season, twenty years of almost continuous conflict and sheer ennui weighed down the morale of the people and the troops.

Social and economic progress as well as military victories were clearly needed.

On 8 June, General Khanh recommended to COMUSMACV that the following program of gradually ascending pressures be instituted against the government of North Vietnam:

a. Overt RVN airstrikes, backed up by Farmgate aircraft be directed against targets in North Vietnam such as troop installations, communications routes and centers involved in support of the war in South Vietnam. These strikes would be conducted on a "tit-for-tat" basis in retaliation for VC sabotage and terrorism in South Vietnam.

b. RVNAF and Farmgate aircraft be employed, backed up if necessary by the US Navy, to sow aerial mines in North Vietnamese waters to compensate for VC sabotage of ground communications lines in South Vietnam.

c. US aircraft begin overt low level reconnaissance of North Vietnam.

d. Three squadrons of B-57 aircraft be made available to reinforce Farmgate operations.

Further, if the above program is adopted, Khanh

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requested assurance that a program of joint GVN/US increased pressures would be undertaken against the DRV in the event of large-scale overt counteraction by that country or in the event the program of ascending pressures failed to arrest deterioration. This would include selective strikes against the North Vietnamese industrial base.

COMUSMACV, CINCPAC and the US Country Team conducted detailed discussions on the Khanh recommendations and agreed that they were sound and should be adopted. On 14 June CINCPAC and the US Ambassador, Saigon, advised Washington of their support of the Khanh proposals. In addition, CINCPAC recommended that preparatory measures be taken by the US to provide for further escalation. Measures recommended included redeployment of US ground, sea and air forces and provision for the air defense of South Vietnam.

A report has just been received in State through British diplomatic channels that a de facto Liberation Front government is about to be set up in South Vietnam operating in one of the VC sanctuaries or in Cambodia under the leadership of a "Liberation Council" which includes a former Saigon lawyer, a Buddhist Superior Bonze and a former noncommissioned officer in the French Union Forces.

The British, Australian, New Zealand, Thai, Philippine, and Japanese governments have expressed support of a continued American presence in South Vietnam as a primary bulwark against the spread of Communism throughout Southeast Asia.

It is now 15 June.

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1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions and activities. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for ensuring transparency and accountability in financial operations.

2. The second part of the document outlines the various methods and techniques used to collect and analyze data. It highlights the need for consistent and reliable data collection processes to support effective decision-making and strategic planning.

3. The third part of the document focuses on the implementation of internal controls and risk management strategies. It discusses how these measures can help organizations identify potential risks and implement safeguards to minimize their impact on the organization's operations and financial health.

4. The fourth part of the document addresses the role of technology in modern business operations. It explores how digital tools and platforms can streamline processes, improve efficiency, and provide valuable insights into organizational performance and market trends.

5. The final part of the document provides a summary of the key findings and recommendations. It reiterates the importance of continuous improvement and staying up-to-date with the latest industry trends and best practices.

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SIGMA I-64

INITIAL RED SCENARIO

It is 15 June 1964.

Since the Geneva agreements of 1954 a major struggle has been carried on within the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), to develop and to strengthen the industrial base, while concurrently integrating the country along Socialist lines. Natural agricultural limitations constitute a major obstacle to DRV economic development since North Vietnam has traditionally depended upon South Vietnamese rice to meet its deficit.

The people have been impressed with the irresistible might of the DRV Government. Ho Chi Minh's internal mobilization has been successfully carried out through elimination of the landlord class and suppression of other counter-revolutionary influences among peasants and intellectuals. Many peasants have been made more dependent upon the government by being given land abandoned by the 900,000 Catholics who emigrated south in 1954.

The movement of so large a dissident element from the country also helped to relieve internal control problems for the government. Other "minority problems" such as difficulties with the independent Thai-Meo were reduced by creation of ostensibly autonomous regions. The 90,000 South Vietnamese who came north in 1954 after fighting in the resistance, have been accorded special privileges. They work shorter hours and receive higher pay and other benefits. This group, although restive, provides a reservoir for reinforcement of operations in South Vietnam.

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The Communist regime in North Vietnam, operating behind a "Popular Front" is still sustained by the threat of force since it must cope with resentment from large, un-enlightened segments of the population. Peasants, who bear the main burden for industrializing the economy, are especially resistant. This is an understandable problem considering that prior to independence most farms in North Vietnam were small, comprising twelve acres or less (rather than the larger absentee-owned farms which predominate in South Vietnam).

The Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) stands loyally behind the regime, proud of its victories against France and confident in its new weapons. If the decadent ruling group in Saigon and their foreign supporters can be swept into the sea and the country reunified, the DRV will possess all the resources necessary for a viable, dynamic society -- a society capable of spreading its influence over all the neo-colonial countries of Southeast Asia.

Unfortunately, at this point in time it is still necessary to severely ration food, cloth and many other things in the DRV; it has been necessary to allow the peasants to withhold part of their production for sale in the booming black markets of Hanoi. Transport and medical service is short. It has been necessary to launch psychological campaigns to cut the use of tobacco and to curtail entertainment and other amenities. Party members fare somewhat better than the general population but living conditions are austere. Nevertheless, progress is being made in construction of the industrial base -- ironically along patterns evolved under the Fourth French Republic by the Frenchman Monnet. Meanwhile, important long-term assistance is being received from both the USSR and the Peoples Republic of China.

The equivalent of only two regular divisions are involved in the liberation effort in South Vietnam. They provide the hard core for a 100,000-man "Liberation Front" force consisting mainly of local and regional irregulars. Since April 1963 several thousand of these personnel, including some regulars, have defected to the enemy.

Following the March visit to South Vietnam by the American Secretary McNamara, the Khanh government instituted another "program" aimed at "restoration of national morale." Apparently strengthened by US determination, senior RVN officials threw their loyalty

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behind the young general and American fears of another Saigon coup seem to have diminished. Increased US assistance permitted rapid moves toward expansion of the RVN armed forces. A national conscription law was adopted; military pay and benefits increased. The Hamlet Program was again restructured along "spreading oil drop" lines, to gradually extend control outward from areas which the government controlled. Clearer command lines have been established to give greater emphasis to police as opposed to military methods within government controlled areas.

An ambitious program to create a civil administrative corps was advertised along with measures to bolster "popular support for the regime". The program included the usual talk of helping the farmers as well as a fertilizer program "to double the crops."

Arrival of some new US M-113 personnel carriers and improved aircraft for RVN forces were intended no doubt as evidence that the RVN had major responsibility for fighting their own war. However, announcements were made that US dependents were not being withdrawn from the country.

In March it was increasingly apparent that the governments of the RVN and the United States had decided to impose graduated sanctions by RVN forces against North Vietnam, to induce this government to terminate support of the "Liberation Front" and to curtail Pathet Lao activities. This gave the appearance of being part of a broader diplomatic, military and psychological program aimed at deterring the DRV and possibly to prepare world opinion for extension of the war.

Intelligence sources in Saigon indicated that consideration was being given to military escalation up the scale. "Liberation Front" attacks in South Vietnam were increased in tempo. Radio Hanoi has continued "moral support" for the "Liberation Front" in South Vietnam but the Government of the DRV has consistently denied that real support in terms of people or materiel are being provided.

The US and RVN governments advised the DRV in late March, through neutral consulates, that while they "had no territorial aims and were not anxious to force Ho Chi Minh into further subservience to Peking, his support of the Viet Cong would no longer be tolerated."

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Concurrently, the Red Chinese and USSR were informed through neutral countries that there was no threat to China involved but the United States was determined to halt direction of the South Vietnamese insurgency from Hanoi.

It is believed that orders have been issued to US defense forces in the Pacific to prepare on short notice to redeploy US land, sea and air units incident to the launching of air strikes against North Vietnamese industrial targets.

During April and May, several strike missions were conducted by RVN special forces into North Vietnam. Four of these enjoyed moderate success destroying gasoline storage tanks, a railroad bridge on a main line and a barge loaded with supplies. Five other teams were destroyed or captured. Under interrogation, captured personnel confirmed that the RVN plans to increase this form of warfare.

Twice during April and three times during May, RVN troops in battalion size pursued Viet Cong forces into Laos. They destroyed a number of supply installations and captured over fifteen tons of explosives and a variety of crew served weapons. The RVN/US have even established bases in Laos and launch attacks from these bases against our lines of infiltration. The US/RVN operations across the Laotian border were initially accompanied by RVN aircraft only. However, starting in late April and continuing to the present, US aircraft have conducted low-level flights over Laos. Criticism by the International Control Commission of these events was publicized by Hanoi and Hsinhua but Souvanna Phouma made only a mild public statement and privately was alleged to have no strong feelings in the matter.

In South Vietnam "Liberation Front" reaction to the stronger RVN initiative has been highly effective. During April and May the number and intensity of sabotage strikes against targets in South Vietnam were tripled. Gasoline storage tanks, railroads and bus transportation routes were subjected to attack after attack.

Shipping entering approaches to the harbor of Saigon was brought under fire from hit-and-run gunners ashore using recoilless cannon. Casualties began to mount among American advisors serving with RVN units.

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The stepped-up campaign of Viet Cong terrorism has been successful. However, by June RVN forces were making Viet Cong operations more difficult. The RVN was again carrying the war to the liberated strongholds as they had been doing immediately prior to the Minh coup in November.

Within the DRV government there is something less than unanimity of resolve regarding the struggle in South Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh and Giap have expressed fear that expansion of the conflict can only lead to increased domination by Peking. However, to hints that increased pressure by the RVN/US might force the surrender of DRV independence to Peking, Giap told a French diplomat, "I have no great love for the Chinese, as is well known, but rather Mao than the white imperialists."

To veiled western suggestions that a more conciliatory policy toward the West might result in major trade and aid opportunities, Truong Chinh laughed, saying, "In ten years all the Western countries will be doing business with us and with the other Peoples' Republics in Southeast Asia -- and perhaps the Peoples' Republics of Indonesia, Japan and the Philippines."

In the second week of June the "Liberation Front" struck with a succession of successful, bloody attacks against RVN village administrators and their families and American dependents. The families of two American officers were slaughtered in their quarters in Saigon by Viet Cong volunteers who escaped, cutting the throats of three security soldiers. Eighteen village administrators were cut down in one day while going about their duties in "RVN controlled" areas. Radio Hanoi, at Ho Chi Minh's direction, asserted that the killing of American dependents has been "a brutality of the murderous Khanh regime intent on assuring a continuing flow of US gold, black market goods and limousines for their concubines." These broadcasts went on to point out that the rich landowners constituting the RVN leadership had everything to gain and little to lose by perpetuating the struggle against the "Liberation Forces" but that inevitably the United States people would see the error of their government's Asian policy and leave Asia to be governed by Asians.

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Improved anti-aircraft capabilities recently provided to "Liberation Front" forces in South Vietnam have taken an increasing toll of enemy aircraft. In one week during early June sixteen US planes were downed.

The "Liberation Front" has negated efforts by the Khanh government to mobilize national morale. The Khanh program was not sufficiently mature by the end of May to be really effective. Many of the farmers in liberated areas have been given de facto ownership of their land by the Viet Cong and have ceased paying debts owed to the RVN. Many rural families owe back taxes and other debts which will be collected if the Viet Cong are driven out. Others fear loss of their land if the RVN government succeeds in regaining control of their area.

Some farmers believe that prices of government rice is manipulated in a manner which deprives them of legitimate profits. Khanh is also faced with the problem of corruption at the lower levels of government. Similarly, ambitious programs of the RVN to train thousands of civil administrators are in difficulty due to logistical problems and a shortage of really qualified instructors. Nevertheless, it is apparent that Khanh has made progress and while he has a long way to go to gain broad popular support, the "Liberation Front" must not relax its efforts.

On 10 June, the Viet Cong exploded a bomb in an American dependents' housing area in Saigon killing eight women and children. As a consequence, a number of US Service families decided to return home. Their departure was noted by Radio Hanoi as further evidence "of the willingness of the Americans to let the Khanh clique fight the war for them when things go badly."

Intelligence reports indicate that General Khanh and US officials in South Vietnam requested authority in early June for initiation of RVN air strikes against North Vietnamese military targets and for aerial mining of North Vietnamese waters. They also requested that contingency arrangements be made for the United States to provide additional air support for strikes against the North Vietnamese industrial base. It appears that reactionary Pentagon leaders are again toying with the Radford kind of solution considered at the time of Dien Bien Phu. There are certainly many Western leaders who will argue long and hard against the kind of US

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commitment which will force intervention by the Chinese Peoples' Republic. It is believed that the French can be relied upon to back an eventual non-military solution more in line with their vulnerable economic interests in Southeast Asia.

Discussions with Peking indicate that Mao is increasingly determined to wrest leadership of the world Communist movement from the Kremlin. It is Truong Chinh's opinion that the Chinese will provide military assistance if required because success in Vietnam will be regarded by Peking as vindication of the CPR views in the ideological struggle.

Sihanouk, since the Chantrea border incident, has become increasingly disenchanted with both the US and the RVN. He has, during the same period, become more friendly with the DRV and with the CPR regime. As a result of repeated violations of the Laotian border by the US and RVN, Sihanouk, on 12 June, demanded UN intervention to protect the Laotian and the Cambodian borders. At the same time he announced that he was inviting Peking to establish a Chinese military advisory group in Phnom Penh. The latest word from Peking indicates that a decision has not yet been made with regard to Sihanouk's request.

To bolster capabilities of the "Liberation Front" to deal with growing RVN/US air capabilities, special emphasis continues to be placed on the training of anti-aircraft gunners and the provision of light anti-aircraft weapons to forces operating in South Vietnam. Alert measures have been taken within the DRV to prepare the military and civilian populations for air attack. On 14 June representation was made to Peking for assistance in the development of a small DRV bombing force to be manned by DRV and "volunteer" Chinese pilots. To date, the tempo and scale of ground sabotage attacks in South Vietnam have been restrained by a reluctance to provoke US escalation. However, the "Liberation Front" has the capability to greatly expand its operations and the time for such expansion may well have arrived.

It is now 15 June.

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SIGMA I-64

INITIAL YELLOW SCENARIO

Depicting the Situation April - June 1964

It is now June 1964.

The year has seen progress by the Chinese Peoples' Republic (CPR), toward internal strength and undisputed leadership of Communist Asia. Increasingly, Communist parties of less developed nations around the world turn toward Peking as the focal point of proletarian strength. Diplomatic recognition by the French and expansion of trade with other Western powers has split the reactionary front. Prospects for UN entry, expectations of an early CPR nuclear capability and the growing US-Soviet detente all have magnified the image of Chinese world power. It is equally apparent that Peking is becoming the main target of the Wall Street imperialists -- that the main arena for a new contest has been selected in Southeast Asia (SEA).

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Since the Geneva agreements of 1954, a major struggle has been carried on within the DRV to develop and to strengthen the industrial base, while concurrently integrating the country along the Socialist lines. Natural agricultural limitations constitute a major obstacle to DRV economic development since North Vietnam has traditionally depended upon South Vietnamese rice to meet its deficit.

Under Ho Chi Minh internal mobilization has been successfully carried out through elimination of the landlord class and suppression of other counterrevolutionary influences among peasants and intellectuals. Many peasants have been made more dependent upon the government by being given land

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abandoned by the 900,000 Catholics who emigrated south in 1954.

The movement of so large a dissident element from the country also helped to relieve internal control problems for the government. Other "minority problems" such as difficulties with the independent Thai-Meo were reduced by creation of ostensibly autonomous regions. The 90,000 South Vietnamese who came north in 1954, after fighting in the resistance, have been accorded special privileges. They work shorter hours and receive higher pay and other benefits. This group, although restive, provides a reservoir for reinforcement of operations in South Vietnam.

The Communist regime in North Vietnam, operating behind a "Popular Front" is still sustained by the threat of force since it must cope with resentment from large, unenlightened segments of the population. Peasants, who must bear the main burden for industrializing the economy, are especially resistant. This is an understandable problem considering that prior to independence most farms in North Vietnam were small, comprising twelve acres or less (rather than the larger absentee-owned farms which predominate in South Vietnam).

The Peoples' Army of Vietnam (PAVN) stands loyally behind the regime, proud of its victories against France and confident in its new weapons. If the ruling group in Saigon and their foreign supporters can be swept into the sea and the country reunified, the DRV will possess all the resources necessary for a viable, dynamic society -- a society capable of spreading its influence over all the neo-colonial countries of Southeast Asia. A reunited Vietnam would of course be less dependent on the CPR and considerably less responsive to influence from Peking.

At this point in time it is still necessary in the DRV to severely ration food, cloth and many other things and to allow peasants to withhold part of their production for sale in the booming black markets of Hanoi. Transport and medical service is short. The DRV has been required to launch psychological campaigns to cut the use of tobacco and to curtail entertainment and other amenities. Cadre members fare somewhat better than the general population but living conditions are austere. Progress is nevertheless being made, slowly, in construction of the industrial base, ironically along patterns evolved under the Fourth

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French Republic by the Frenchman Monnet. Meanwhile, important long-term assistance is being received from both the USSR and the Peoples' Republic of China. The equivalent of only two DRV regular divisions are involved in the liberation effort in South Vietnam. They provide the hard core for a 100,000-man "Liberation Front" force consisting mainly of local and regional irregulars. Since April 1963, several thousand of these personnel, including some regulars, have defected to the enemy.

Republic of Vietnam

Following the March visit to South Vietnam by the American Secretary McNamara, the Khanh government instituted another "program" aimed at "restoration of national morale." Apparently strengthened by US determination, senior RVN officials threw their loyalty behind the young General and American fears of another Saigon coup seemed to have diminished. Increased US assistance permitted rapid moves toward expansion of the RVN armed forces. A national conscription law was adopted; military pay and benefits increased. The Hamlet Program was again restructured along "spreading oil drop" lines, to gradually extend control outward from areas which they already controlled. They created clearer command lines and gave greater emphasis to police as opposed to military methods within government controlled areas.

An ambitious program to create a civil administrative corps was advertised along with measures to bolster "popular support for the regime." These included the usual talk of an accelerated fertilizer program, a review of land, tax and price systems and more effective propaganda effort.

Arrival of some new US M-113 personnel carriers and improved aircraft for RVN forces were intended no doubt as evidence that the RVN had major responsibility for fighting their own war. However, announcements were made that US dependents were not being withdrawn from the country.

In March it was increasingly apparent that the governments of the RVN and the United States had decided to impose graduated sanctions by RVN forces against North Vietnam, obviously to induce that government to terminate support of the Liberation Front and to curtail Pathet Lao activities. This gave the appearance of being part of a broader diplomatic, military and psychological program aimed at deterring the DRV and possibly to prepare world

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opinion for extension of the war.

Intelligence sources in Saigon indicated that consideration was being given to military escalation up the scale. Liberation Front attacks in South Vietnam were increased in tempo. Radio Hanoi has continued "moral support" for the Liberation Front in South Vietnam but the government of the DRV has consistently denied that it was providing real support in terms of people or materiel.

The US and RVN governments advised the DRV in late March, through neutral consulates, that while they "had no territorial aims and were not anxious to force Ho Chi Minh into further subservience to Peking, his support of the Viet Cong would no longer be tolerated." Peking and the USSR were informed at the same time that there was no threat to China involved but the US would not view continued direction of the South Vietnamese insurgency from Hanoi with tolerance.

It is believed that orders have been issued to US defense forces in the Pacific to prepare on short notice to redeploy US land, sea and air units incident to the launching of air strikes against North Vietnamese industrial targets.

During April and May, several covert strike missions were conducted by RVN special forces into North Vietnam. Four of these enjoyed moderate success destroying gasoline storage tanks, a railroad bridge on a main line and a barge loaded with supplies. Five other teams were destroyed or captured. Under interrogation captured personnel confirmed that the RVN plans to increase this form of warfare.

Twice during April and three times during May, RVN troops in battalion size pursued Viet Cong forces into Laos. They destroyed a number of supply installations and captured over fifteen tons of explosives and a variety of crew served weapons. The RVN/US have even established bases in Laos and launch attacks from these bases against VC lines of infiltration. The US/RVN operations across the Laotian border were initially accompanied by RVN aircraft only. However, starting in late April and continuing to the present, US aircraft have conducted low-level reconnaissance flights over Laos. Criticism by the ICC of these border crossings was published by Hanoi and Hsinhua but Souvanna Phouma made only a mild public statement and privately was alleged to have no strong feelings in the matter.

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Liberation Front reaction in South Vietnam to stronger RVN initiative has been highly effective. During April and May the number and intensity of sabotage strikes against targets in South Vietnam were tripled. Gasoline storage tanks, railroads and bus transportation routes were subjected to attack after attack.

Shipping entering approaches to the harbor of Saigon was brought under fire from hit-and-run gunners ashore using recoilless cannon. Casualties began to mount among American advisors serving with RVN units.

The stepped-up campaign of Viet Cong terrorism has been successful. However, by June RVN forces were making Viet Cong operations more difficult. The GVN was again carrying the war to the liberated strongholds as they had been doing immediately prior to the Minh coup in November.

Within the DRV government there is something less than unanimity of resolve regarding South Vietnam. It is well known that Ho has sought to maintain a "middle position" between the USSR and CPR in current differences but both he and Giap are believed extremely reluctant to risk further extension of Chinese influence over North Vietnam -- an expected consequence of any expansion in the Vietnamese conflict. Truong Chinh and certain other leaders, aspiring to control of the Lao Dong movement have fewer reservations.

To veiled Western suggestions that a more conciliatory policy toward the West might result in major trade and aid opportunities, Truong Chinh is reported to have laughed, saying, "In ten years all the Western countries will be doing business with us and the other Peoples' Republics in Southeast Asia -- and perhaps the Peoples' Republics of Indonesia, Japan and the Philippines."

In the second week of June the Liberation Front struck with a succession of successful, bloody attacks against RVN village administrators and their families and American dependents. The families of two American officers were slaughtered in their quarters in Saigon by Viet Cong soldiers who escaped, cutting the throats of three security soldiers. Eighteen village administrators were cut down in one day while going about their duties in "RVN controlled" areas. Radio Hanoi asserted that the killing of American dependents had been "a brutality of the murderous Khanh regime intent on assuring a continuing flow of gold, black market goods and limousines for their

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Some farmers believe that prices of government rice are manipulated in a manner which deprives them of legitimate profits. Khanh is also faced with the problem of corruption at the lower levels of government. Similarly, ambitious programs of the GVN to train thousands of civil administrators are in difficulty due to logistical problems and a shortage of really qualified instructors. While it is apparent that Khanh has made progress and while he still has a long way to go to gain broad popular support, the Liberation Front must not relax its efforts if it is to succeed.

On 10 June, the Viet Cong exploded a bomb in an American dependents' housing area in Saigon killing eight women and children. As a consequence a number of US Service families decided to return home. Their departure was noted by Radio Hanoi as further evidence "of the willingness of the Americans to let the Khanh clique fight the war for them when things go badly."

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Sihanouk, since the Chantrea border incident, has become increasingly disenchanted with both the US and the RVN. He has during the same period, become more friendly with both the DRV and the government of the PRC. As a result of repeated violations of the Laotian border by the US and RVN, Sihanouk, on 12 June demanded UN intervention to protect the Laotian and the Cambodian borders. At the same time he invited Peking to establish a Chinese military advisory group in Phnom Penh. No action has yet been taken on Sihanouk's invitation.

To bolster capabilities of the Liberation Front to deal with growing RVN/US air capabilities, special emphasis continues to be placed on the training of antiaircraft gunners and the provision of light antiaircraft weapons to forces operating in South Vietnam. Alert measures have been taken within the DRV to prepare the military and civilian populations for air attack.

Due to the enemy air threat on 14 June, Ho Chi Minh asked Peking for assistance in the development of a small DRV bombing force to be manned by DRV and "volunteer" Chinese pilots. At the same time Ho pointed out that to date, the tempo and scale of ground sabotage attacks in South Vietnam have been restrained by a reluctance to provoke US escalation. Also, that the Liberation Front has the capability to greatly expand its operations and that the time for such expansion may well have arrived.

It is now 15 June.

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APPENDIX A
HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS - VIETNAM

- 111 B.C. Vietnam conquered by the Han begins a thousand years of Chinese Domination.
- 939 A.D. Chinese driven out.
- 1406 Vietnam conquered by the Ming.
- 1427 Chinese driven out. Formal suzerainty maintained with China.
- 1500 Beginning of period of Vietnamese conquest of the south overrunning the Kingdom of Champa and parts of Cambodia.
- 1615 First permanent Catholic mission established.
- 1630 Beginning of period that saw country divided along almost the same lines as at present the Trinh lords in the north, the Nguyen in the south. The Dutch backed the northern regime. The Portuguese backed the south with artillery and advisors.
- 1772 Tay-son rebellion leads to defeat of both Trinh and Nhuyen but begins period of bloody civil war. This ends when Nguyen Anh backed by superior French artillery opens era of European military and political intervention in Vietnamese affairs.
- 1800 Begins period of reunification, xenophobia and persecution of Christians.
- 1840 Extensive massacres of Catholic priests and followers.
- 1858 French capture Taurane.
- 1873 French capture Hanoi.
- 1884 French protectorate established.
- 1913 End of last effective Vietnamese resistance to France.

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- 1940 France surrenders to Nazi Germany. Request by French commander in Indochina to United States for release of aircraft and other equipment already purchased by French Government denied.
- 1941 Beginning of Allied assistance to Vietnamese nationalists and Vietminh in resistance against the Japanese.
- 1944 Vo Nguyen Giap's guerrillas cross from China into Vietnam.
- 1945 Japanese overrun Vichy French forces in Indochina with brutal effectiveness. Requests for American assistance were not met. Channault wrote "The American government was interested in seeing the French forcibly ejected from Indochina so the problem of post-war separation from their colony would be easier...while American transports in China avoided Indochina the British flew aerial supply missions for the French all the way from Calcutta..." Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai repudiates protectorate agreement with the French.
- 1945 Vietminh seize power in Vietnam after Japanese withdrawal. Arrive with victorious Chinese armies and American advisors and quickly collect large quantities of arms and ammunition. A "Peoples Democracy" is established while country is still occupied by Chinese Nationalist, British, and French forces as well as American observers.
- 1946 French and Vietminh negotiate fruitlessly. Fighting begins spurred by massacre of several thousand civilians by guns of French cruiser. Indochina war begins. "Oil Slick" method of pacification followed.
- 1947 Operation Lea launched to destroy Vietminh forces and capture Ho Chi Minh. Major military offensive is ineffective and exposes countryside to extensive infiltration by guerrillas.

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- 1949 Red China becomes important sanctuary for support of Vietminh forces.
- 1950 Major Vietminh offensive with well armed, trained forces leads to greatest colonial defeat for French since Montcalm died at Quebec.
- 1951 Series of tactical errors by Giap results in defeat by de Lattre and encourages US support of the French. Vietminh strategy shifts to capture of the highlands.
- 1952 Salan mounts largest offensive of the war at Giap's bases but fails.
- 1953 Giap invades Laos. Dulles promises major US aid and talks about breaking Communist aggression "by end of 1955 fighting season." French commander secretly informs his government that best that could be hoped for under circumstances was "a draw." End of Korean fighting releases CPR resources for commitment in South Vietnam.
- 1954 French commander in Indochina informs US government that defeat is likely unless massive US help is provided. Consideration given to committing US forces in air strikes but Congressional views are divided. Dien Bien Phu falls. Geneva agreement signed. Country divided along 17th parallel.
- 1955 United States agrees to provide aid to South Vietnam. SEATO organized. Economic crisis in North Vietnam leads to request for aid from USSR and CPR. Ngo Dinh Diem comes to power in RVN.
- 1956 French withdraw from Vietnam. North Vietnamese intellectuals purged in "Hundred Flowers Campaign." Peasants ruthlessly suppressed by DRV troops in Truong Chinh's home province.
- 1957 French trade with Vietnam has risen sharply since military withdrawal in 1956. In 1939 only 32.2% Vietnamese exports went to the

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1962

Aug Articles critical of Diem regime appear in US press.

Sep Viet Cong activities continue to expand in South Vietnam.

1963

Jan Top level US survey team recommends tightening of command structure in RVN, effort to improve relations between Diem regime and US press.

Feb Increasing Viet Cong willingness to stand and fight sometimes in battalion strength.

May RVN government forces fire volley into Buddhist crowd demonstrating in Hue against religious persecution.

Jul RVN forces inflict major defeat against VC 514th Bn in northern Delta area. 80 KIAs estimated.

Aug RVN Special Forces storm pagodas arresting Buddhist monks and students.

Sep President Kennedy makes TV reference to fact that Diem is losing touch with people.

Oct McNamara visit in South Vietnam.

Nov Diem government overthrown in coup by military junta headed by Maj Gen Duong Van Minh.

Dec Khrushchev predicts United States will be expelled from Vietnam "with even less ceremony than the French."

McNamara visits South Vietnam.

1964

Jan Ostensibly to head off a French instigated plot, coup by forces headed by Gen Nguyen Khanh. Defense Minister and Commander in Chief arrested, Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, the Head of the National Police and others.

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1964

Jan The NEW YORK TIMES asserts that a joint US-Vietnamese report warned that the government should stop relocating people into hamlets because of bitter resentment among the peasants.

Viet Cong reported to be better organized and equipped with foreign weapons, RVN troop morale low in wake of coups.

Mar US Congressmen Laird states that he favors step up in war effort to include accepting troops from nations willing to contribute and under same rules as used by North Vietnamese.

Khanh asserts that French agents are plotting to assassinate him, overthrow his government and obtain a neutralized settlement in Vietnam.

NEW YORK TIMES says "The political and military offensive during the last month has shown just how effectively the Viet Cong controls developments. In a series of battles during February, it inflicted defeat after defeat on the government despite Gen Khanh's urgent striving to achieve just one victory that would give his regime the lift in morale it so desperately needs...enemy propaganda is now calling for peace on basis of ill-defined neutralism." "Big Minh" the head of state is not wholly supporting Khanh's efforts.

NEW YORK TIMES article quoted Dean Rusk as saying "that if President de Gaulle's advocacy of 'neutralization' for Southeast Asia meant the eventual independence and security of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the United States could agree...Talk of neutralization which merely implies that the United States should withdraw its support from South Vietnam tends to undermine the morale of the South Vietnamese."

NEW YORK TIMES says, "US defense chiefs have agreed in principle to proposal by Khanh to extend guerrilla harassment to North Vietnam,

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1964

Mar

qualified sources said today. The degree to which the US will participate is to be decided by President Johnson. An informed source said that Mr. McNamara urged priority for (clear and hold) program in South Vietnam rather than letting enthusiasm be diverted to action against North Vietnam which he said would not decide the basic issue of the South Vietnamese insurgency."

NEW YORK TIMES says that, "Communist guerrilla movement in South Vietnam is striving to develop its own political identity and to give impression that it is operating a full-fledged government. High point was second Congress of South Vietnam National Liberation Front in January."

Saigon's DAILY NEWS states war will be won when the government is able to convince the Vietnamese peasant that it can give him a better deal and protect him against the Communists.

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The following information was obtained from a review of the files of the [redacted] and is being furnished to you for your information. It is to be understood that this information is confidential and should not be disseminated outside of your office.

[redacted] advised that [redacted] had been in contact with [redacted] and [redacted] on [redacted] and [redacted]. [redacted] stated that [redacted] had been in contact with [redacted] and [redacted] on [redacted] and [redacted]. [redacted] stated that [redacted] had been in contact with [redacted] and [redacted] on [redacted] and [redacted].

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APPENDIX B

Supplementary Information

Since the Agency for International Development and the United States Information Agency had limited representation on the Action teams, the following information regarding their activities was provided to action-level players.

VIETNAM
3/20/64

U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
(In millions of dollars)

| | Fiscal Years | | | |
|---|--------------|--------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 (Est) <u>a/</u> | 1965 (Est) <u>b/</u> |
| <u>A.I.D. (New Obligational Authority)</u> | <u>124.2</u> | <u>143.6</u> | <u>135.0</u> | <u>137.0</u> |
| <u>Supporting Assistance</u> | <u>112.8</u> | <u>133.1</u> | <u>129.0</u> | <u>130.0</u> |
| Commercial Import Program | 97.5 | 95.0 | 95.0 | 95.0 |
| Counterinsurgency Project | 15.3 | 38.1 | 34.0 | 35.0 |
| Project | (5.3) | (4.1) | (7.4) | (10.5) |
| Non-Project | (10.0) | (34.0) | (26.6) | (24.5) |
| Development Grants | <u>11.4</u> | <u>10.5</u> | <u>6.0</u> | <u>7.0</u> |
| Development Loans <u>c/</u> | | | | |
| <u>FOOD FOR PEACE (PL 480)</u> | <u>35.6</u> | <u>67.1</u> | <u>77.4</u> | <u>64.8</u> |
| Title I Sale Agreements - Export market value | 30.5 | 27.0 | 38.8 | 31.8 |
| Country Uses - 90% | (27.4) | (24.3) | (35.0) | (28.6) |
| Title II (CCC Cost) | <u>1.3</u> | <u>34.8</u> | <u>36.0</u> | <u>30.0</u> |
| (Export market value-ext.) | (1.1) | (16.5) | (17.0) | (14.0) |
| Sec. 201 | (1.3) | (32.1) | (30.0) | (25.0) |
| Sec. 202 | - | (2.7) | (6.0) | (5.0) |
| Title III (CCC Cost) | <u>3.8</u> | <u>5.3</u> | <u>2.6</u> | <u>3.0</u> |
| (Export market value-ext.) | (3.0) | (4.3) | (1.9) | (2.3) |
| <hr/> TOTAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE | <hr/> 159.8 | <hr/> 210.7 | <hr/> 212.4 | <hr/> 201.8 |
| MILITARY ASSISTANCE - | | | | |
| Programmed | 176.5 | 202.5 | 205.8 | 143.1 |

a/ Current programmed level

b/ Current budget proposal

c/ Total DL extent = \$39.9 million (authorizations)

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND WAR INFRASTRUCTURE

ACTION PLANS

(Obligations in thousands of dollars)

| | <u>FY 1963</u> (Actual) | <u>FY 1964</u> (Estimated) | <u>FY 1965</u> (Estimated) |
|--|----------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <u>Counterinsurgency</u> | <u>20,037^{a/}</u> | <u>28,258</u> | <u>29,025</u> |
| <u>11-990-257 Hamlet Plans</u> (Prov. Adm) | <u>2,387</u> | <u>3,459</u> | <u>2,835</u> |
| A-A-1 Hamlet Construction, Civic Action Teams | - | (Local Currency Only)- | |
| A-A-2 Subsidized Construction (Rice) | - | (Local Currency Only)- | |
| A-A-3 Hamlet Militia | - | (Local Currency Only)- | |
| A-A-4 Resettlement | 210 | 160 | |
| A-A-5 Hamlet Chief/Council Training | - | (Local Currency Only)- | |
| A-A-6 Self-Help | 1,664 | 1,406 | 500 |
| A-A-7 Hamlet Schools | 120 | 80 | 315 |
| A-A-8 Provincial Development Works | 194 | 1,803 | 1,500 |
| A-A-9 Fish Motors & Facilities | 30 | (Replaced by A-E-5) | |
| A-A-10 Local Windmills | 20 | - | 200 |
| A-A-11 Viet Cong Rehabilitation & Resettlement | 30 | 10 | 220 |
| A-A-13 Para-Military Dependent Support | - | (PL 480 Only) | - |
| A-A-14 Emergency Relief | 119 | | |
| A-A-15 Miscellaneous & Contingency | - | - | 100 |
| <u>11-990-259 Hamlet Plans</u> (Central Govt. Adm.) | <u>8,771</u> | <u>11,182</u> | <u>9,640</u> |
| A-C-1 Rural Wells (Drilled) | 163 | 2,705 | 3,000 |
| A-C-2 Hamlet Commedia | 756 | 638 | 320 |
| A-C-3 Special Livestock Development | 177 | 110 | 200 |

^{a/} Includes \$472 thousand allocated to DOD for Medical Civic Action not shown in FY 1965.

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| | <u>FY 1963</u> (Actual) | <u>FY 1964</u> (Estimated) | <u>FY 1965</u> (Estimated) |
|--|----------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <u>Counterinsurgency (Cont'd)</u> | | | |
| <u>11-990-259 Hamlet Plans</u> (Central Govt. Adm.) (Cont'd) | | | |
| A-C-4 Fertilizer | 3,728 | 6,400 | 3,950 |
| A-C-5 Plant Protection | 1,390 | 832 | 1,400 |
| A-C-6 Village/Hamlet Radio | 557 | 497 | 770 |
| A-C-8 Accelerated Village Health | 2,000 | (Merged with A-G-1) | |
| <u>11-990-260 A-D-1 Military Civic Action</u> | <u>1,142^{a/}</u> | <u>340</u> | <u>500</u> |
| <u>11-100-261 Agricultural Production Support</u> | <u>634</u> | <u>362</u> | <u>1,320</u> |
| A-E-1 Agricultural Production Services | 253 | 130 | 105 |
| A-E-2 Rural Credit & Coops | 169 | - | 1,000 |
| A-E-3 Land Settlement & Ag. Equip. Maint. | 118 | 86 | 85 |
| A-E-4 Irrigation | 94 | 96 | 80 |
| A-E-5 Fishing Facilities | - | 50 | 50 |
| <u>11-610-262 A-F-1 Rural Trade & Agriculture Schools</u> | <u>145</u> | <u>120</u> | <u>120</u> |
| <u>11-500-263 A-G-1 Rural Health</u> | <u>2,404</u> | <u>4,000^{b/}</u> | <u>3,500</u> |

^{a/} Includes \$472 thousand allocated to DOD for Medical Civic Action not shown in FY 1965.

^{b/} Includes \$1.0 million for cholera epidemic program. However, most recent estimates indicate costs to be in excess of \$1.5 million.

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| | <u>FY 1963</u> (Actual) | <u>FY 1964</u> (Estimated) | <u>FY 1965</u> (Estimated) |
|---|----------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <u>Counterinsurgency (Cont'd)</u> | | | |
| <u>11-990-264 Operations Support</u> | <u>4,554</u> | <u>8,785</u> | <u>11,100</u> |
| A-I-1 Support of Rural Affairs | 687 | 1,525 | 2,765 |
| A-I-2 Support of Agriculture | 664 | 955 | 620 |
| A-I-3 Support of Public Works | 534 | 1,830 | 3,420 |
| A-I-4 Support of Public Health | 878 | 1,195 | 1,345 |
| A-I-5 Support of Communications Media | 97 | 170 | 125 |
| A-I-6 Support of Public Administration | - | 160 | 470 |
| A-I-7 Support of IVS | - | 315 | 315 |
| A-I-8 Support of Public Safety Commodities | 1,158 536 | 1,265 1,370 | 1,440 600 |
| <u>11-790-283 A-J-1 Improvement of Local Government</u> | - | <u>10</u> | <u>10</u> |
| <u>WAR INFRASTRUCTURE</u> | <u>7,975</u> | <u>6,709</u> | <u>5,975</u> |
| <u>11-990-266 Crucial Public Works</u> | <u>5,201</u> | <u>4,566</u> | <u>4,025</u> |
| B-A-1 Highways | 2,395 | 2,400 | 1,500 |
| B-A-2 Municipal Water Supply | 315 | 550 | 1,000 |
| B-A-3 Electric Power | 324 | 250 | 250 |
| B-A-4 Railway Sabotage Replacement | 1,497 | 1,040 | 1,000 |
| B-A-5 Dredging and Waterway Maintenance | 275 | 275 | 275 |
| B-A-6 Air Traffic Control | 395 | 51 | - |
| <u>12-960-267 National Radio & Information Programs</u> | <u>427</u> | <u>229</u> | - |
| B-B-1 National Information Program | 238 | 177 | - |
| B-B-2 National Radio Network | 189 | 52 | - |
| <u>11-690-268 B-C-1 National Instructional Materials</u> | <u>108</u> | <u>94</u> | <u>50</u> |

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E-B-5

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| | <u>FY 1963</u> (Actual) | <u>FY 1964</u> (Estimated) | <u>FY 1965</u> (Estimated) |
|--|----------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <u>11-540-269 B-D-1 Nursing</u> <u>Education</u> | <u>71</u> | <u>20</u> | - |
| <u>11-710-270 B-E-1 Public</u> <u>Safety Services</u> | <u>2,168</u> | <u>1,800</u> | <u>1,900</u> |
| <hr/> | | | |
| TOTAL - Counterinsurgency & War Infrastructure | 28,012 | 34,967 ^{a/} | 35,000 ^{b/} |

a/ Current estimate based on TOAID A-1612, which exceeds OYB planning level by \$5.0 million.

b/ Current budget amount based on FY 65 CAP with increases as estimated by AID/W.

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E-B-6

April 1, 1964

USIS VIETNAM

(Responses to Request for Information for P-M Exercise)

A. Personnel - The number of USIS personnel active in Vietnam, projected through June 1964, listed by broad category:

| | Actual | Authorized |
|-----------------------------------|------------|------------|
| 1. American personnel | | |
| a. Executive, secretarial | 5 | 6 |
| b. Information activities | 14 | 15 |
| c. Cultural activities | 4 | 4 |
| d. Bi-National Center Grantees | 6 | 7 |
| e. Branch Public Affairs Officers | 1 | 3 |
| f. Public Affairs Trainees | <u>2</u> | <u>2</u> |
| Sub Total | 32 | 37 |
| 2. Vietnamese Personnel | <u>236</u> | <u>241</u> |
| Total | <u>268</u> | <u>278</u> |

B. Grants - USIS administers the State Department exchange of persons program overseas. The value of grants, aid loans and other forms of financial assistance obligated under this program for FY-64 is: (1) for Vietnamese citizens, 40 grants valued at \$102,597; (2) for American citizens, 16 grants valued at \$183,750. The value of the total FY-64 program is \$286,347.

C. Other Assistance - The value and a description of other assistance provided in connection with the Vietnamese conflict, such as commodities or material (apart from B, above) during FY-64.

USIS support of the Vietnamese Government's counter-insurgency effort represents roughly two-thirds of the overall direct costs of its program for that country, or about \$1.5 million. This covers such items as radio programming; production and distribution of motion pictures, periodicals, pamphlets, leaflets and posters, and exhibits; equipment such as motion picture projectors, film raw stock, exhibit boards, paper, ink, radio recording equipment and tapes; salaries, allowances, and administrative expenses. It does not include a very large amount of indirect media support; for example, the cost of motion picture release prints produced by the Agency and sent to the post, and the cost of the Voice of America's Vietnamese language operation,

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involving research, salaries, rental of land lines for transmitting across the American continent, and a share of the construction and operation of Pacific Coast transmitters.

D. Training Outside Viet-Nam - The number of RVN citizens being trained outside Viet-Nam under programs initiated or sponsored by USIS during FY-64 was planned to be 41 persons. This number was distributed as follows: four leader grants, six specialist grants, ten student grants, twenty American Field Service grants for high school students, and one Cleveland Program grant in education. Difficulties in obtaining GVN consent have limited the number of leader grantees to date to two, both labor leaders. No specialist grants have been used so far. Nine of ten student grants have been filled as follows: one international and constitutional law, two psychology, one zoology, one education, one economics, two international relations and one city planning. The tenth student grantee is being processed.

E. Organizational Channels - USIS in Viet-Nam actually conducts two programs; one is the orthodox task of explaining and interpreting U.S. policies, actions and culture, and the other is support and assistance to the Vietnamese Information Service. For the latter task organizational channels have been established to assure co-ordination on both the planning and working levels.

1. The Psychological Operations Committee is organized as a sub-committee of the Mission Pacification Committee. It has one representative from each agency concerned, (USIS, USOM, MACV, CAS and Embassy), and meets as necessary under the chairmanship of the Public Affairs Officer. Contact with the GVN is through a parallel GVN Psy Ops Committee operating under the National Pacification Council, and having among its members the Psy War Directorate and the Minister of Information. Joint monthly meetings of these two committees seek to develop a co-ordinated, functional approach to psychological operations. The U.S. objective is, by training GVN personnel, to withdraw the United States from the operational and training aspects, to an advisory role.

2. To co-ordinate the U.S. effort, and to train GVN personnel, the U.S. agencies have established a Joint Field Service Center under the Psy Ops Committee. A gradual shift of responsibility to

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the GVN for the Service Center is anticipated. USIS field operations have recently been placed under the Center, and the duties of the Branch Public Affairs Officers at Hue (north), Can Tho (south), and Dalat (central), are now mainly cultural. Contacts with Province and District Chiefs and VIS personnel are still maintained by both Branch PAOs and field operations personnel. Most of the day-to-day field operations program is run by the Vietnamese USIS employees, who maintain a close working relationship with the local VIS employees. USIS Vietnamese employees, and occasionally American personnel, also staff the five mobile information teams in the delta.

F. Major Problems - Major problems expected to arise in the implementation of currently planned programs for calendar 1964 will be occasioned by the following:

1. The quality of VIS personnel is uneven, and will probably improve slowly in spite of all efforts.
2. Co-ordination with the Ministry of Information has been unpredictable in the past, will probably remain so in the near future, since generally the same people remain in the Ministry.
3. Constant fear of what the future may bring has been a prime cause for vacillation or inaction of GVN officialdom. Certainly the establishment of a firm program and strong leadership will help more than a lot of co-ordination with little action.

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April 1, 1964

USIS IN VIET-NAM

ORGANIZATION

USIS in Viet-Nam presently operates with a staff of 24 Americans and 236 foreign local employees, with authorized personnel ceilings of 28 Americans and 241 foreign local employees. There is also one American contract writer. The four American Officer positions now vacant are: Cultural Affairs Officer, Branch Public Affairs Officers in Can Tho and Dalat, and Press Attache, which is presently being filled by a Foreign Service Officer from the Embassy. There are positions for seven bi-national centers grantees. Six are currently filled. The remaining position was only recently approved.

In addition to USIS headquarters in Saigon, there are branch posts in Hue, Can Tho and Dalat, which focus their attention on operation of reading rooms, youth and cultural activities. Bi-national centers (Vietnamese-American Associations) in Saigon, Hue, Dalat and Nha Trang conduct varied cultural activities and have over 5,000 students of English. VAAs are planned for Can Tho, Qui Nhon and Cho Lon.

The Psychological Operations Committee, made up of one representative each from USIS, USOM, CAS, MACV, and Embassy, reports to the Mission Pacification Committee. It meets as necessary under the chairmanship of the Public Affairs Officer, and has joint meetings with the parallel GVN Psy Ops Committee monthly. To co-ordinate field operations among themselves, and with the GVN, the U.S. agencies concerned have established a Joint Field Service Center under the Psy Ops Committee. This Center now directs psychological operations in the field, including field support operations in 18 provinces and some USIS-manned mobile teams. The Center is also responsible for propaganda analysis and research.

Expenditures for the USIS program in Viet-Nam for FY-64, excluding indirect media support, will total an estimate \$2,251,148, of which \$920,645 is the post's GOE budget.

OBJECTIVES

The primary USIS objective is to engender support of the Vietnamese people for the government programs in the struggle against Viet Cong. This is done by stimulating pride in national accomplishment, undermining the morale

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of the Viet Cong and encouraging them to defect, and assisting and improving the various information operations of the Vietnamese Government. Since we are firmly committed in our support to the Republic of Vietnam, we have an interest in maintaining world-wide support for the GVN, as well as encouraging Vietnamese support for U.S. policies.

PROGRAM OPERATIONS

As the principal target of the communists is the peasant, it is the peasant who must be our major target also. The mechanism for getting USIS media products designed to support field operations directed towards this target is the Joint Field Service Center. For field operations, the territory of Viet-Nam is divided into five sections, each with an American and Vietnamese staff to maintain contact with the Vietnamese people, from the level of the Province Chief to the hamlet chief. To strengthen this program, and to facilitate distribution of films, publications, leaflets, posters and other USIS products, 18 sub-posts have been established throughout the country, staffed by USIS Vietnamese employees. More are anticipated. Extensive surveys of rural opinion have been undertaken, which have proven quite valuable in understanding VC motivation and operation. More such surveys have been requested.

Cultural and youth activities, including information center activities which explain American viewpoints and policies, are conducted by the cultural section in Saigon, and the three branch posts.

Among the publications produced to service the field program is a monthly magazine in simple language called Rural Spirit. Designed principally to support the New Rural Life Hamlet Program, it has proved the most successful USIS publication. Circulation is 250,000. Four small weekly news sheets titled Good Life, produced in co-operation with the GVN, are designed to support specific military clear-and-hold operations. Circulation of each edition is 30,000. Increase to five editions is anticipated. The Vietnamese edition of Free World has a monthly circulation of 160,000. Designed for a general audience, it contains articles about Viet-Nam, neighboring countries, and the United States.

Numerous posters, leaflets and pamphlets are also produced. This activity has been at a very high level for the past few months with the production of materials in

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support of the New Rural Life Hamlet (Strategic Hamlet) Program, the Surrender Program, and various tactical military operations.

The USIS film program is intended almost entirely for use by the Joint Field Service Center. Each month USIS produces a rural film magazine and two other films, including documentaries and melodramas with a message. USIS films are shown to an audience of two million monthly.

As may be expected in a country at war, USIS cultural activities have not received the same emphasis as counter-insurgency programs. Nevertheless, an active cultural program has continued, built around lectures, seminars, exhibits, and a modest exchange of persons program. The recent decision to remove field operations duties from Branch Public Affairs Officers should allow for significant expansion in cultural programs.

It has been the post's conviction that the emphasis in educational exchange should be upon Americans teaching in Viet-Nam rather than travel or study grants enabling Vietnamese to go to the U.S., since the American grantee-teacher in Viet-Nam can reach so many Vietnamese students and thereby provide a greater return on the investment. Even this effort, however, has been beset by problems of recruitment of American professors and teachers and their reluctance to teach in Vietnamese schools. To date, of six professors and six teachers programmed for the current fiscal year, only one professor and five teachers are actually in Viet-Nam.

The Embassy has proposed 41 grants for FY-65, which include, on the American side, ten teachers, eight professors and six specialists. For Vietnamese, six specialist grants, four leader grants, and only eight student grants are scheduled. Under the present regime, more student grants than presently scheduled seem practicable.

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SIGMA I-64

Game Messages

The game messages contained in this Tab are shown in chronological sequence by Move and by color team within each move. Before any team actually generated a message, each received a message from Control which could be considered an extension of the initial scenario. This message reflected a view or position taken by the USSR regarding the scenario events. This message is shown preceding the first message in Move I by each team.

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FROM CONTROL TO BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 1

MOVE NO. I

ACTUAL DATE 7 APRIL 1964

Ambassador Dobrynin requests an appointment with Sec. of State Rusk. Indicates he is under instructions to give following note to USG:

1. The Soviet Union notes the increasing indications of US intention to expand the war in SEA.

2. The S.U. cannot and does not accept that an expansion of hostilities in Vietnam could take place without direct US support.

3. Such an action by the US would be inconsistent with US pronouncements in favor of maintaining and expanding the detente.

4. Moreover, such an action by the US could not be tolerated by the USSR.

5. The US should be under no illusions on this score: The USSR supports the DRV politically and militarily.

6. Any major aggressive action supported by the US will result in an extension of support to the DRV. In fact, the USSR would not hesitate to invite its sister Socialist State to send representatives to Moscow to discuss specific steps which could be taken. In this connection, it would be noted that the USSR has the means to supply what is required for a successful fight for freedom against imperialist aggression.

7. The USSR advises the US not to rely upon differences within the Socialist Community of States to prevent effective assistance to the DRV. Such differences will not permit a sister state to be subject to imperialist aggression. Indeed, the US should be forewarned that all interested Socialist States will assist the DRV as required.

8. The USSR thus has instructed its representative in the UN to call for a Security Council action in the event there is an aggressive action against the DRV as the US has previously hinted might be the case. The USSR will

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denounce such US aggression. It will state, categorically, that the US is behind such action and believes the evidence to support such a contention will be overwhelming.

9. The USSR will accordingly request that the SC:
 - a. Brand the US as an aggressor;
 - b. Call for an immediate cease-fire and cessation of hostile acts;
 - c. Send observers to the scene to oversee a cease-fire;
 - d. Call for a Conference of Geneva Convention Powers.

10. The USSR hopes that the preceding line of action will not be required. Chairman Khrushchev has recently noted the wisdom displayed by US leaders in recognizing that the USSR has the rocket capability required to support its rightful interests; and this capability will support the friends and allies of the USSR, if necessary.

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE Msg. No. 1 from
CONTROL to BLUE

ACTUAL DATE 7 APRIL 1964

In response to the message from the Soviet Union the US makes the following points:

1. The US is committed to the support of the Sovereign Government of South Vietnam which is currently suffering aggressive attacks by North Vietnam with Chinese Communists support.

2. The US will not be deterred from continuing its support to the South Vietnamese Government. The vital interests of the US are involved in the war in SVN and while the US would deeply regret any damage to improving relations with the USSR, it will not be deterred from taking all necessary steps to maintain the freedom of SVN.

3. The US would welcome full debate in the Security Council of the UN of the war in SVN as this would clearly reveal that the aggression in SVN comes from NVN with the support of the Chinese Communists.

4. The US clearly recognizes that the bellicose policies of Communist China is the basic cause of the war in SVN and the tensions which it engenders. The US recognizes that the Soviet Union takes a more realistic

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view of the world situation and calls upon USSR to use its influence to restrain the aggressive policies of NVN and Communist China. The US has no desire to overthrow the government of NVN. Its objective is to create stability in Vietnam. This can be achieved only when North and South Vietnam live together as peaceful, but independent neighbors. When such a situation exists the possibility of peaceful relations between the two countries can be investigated.

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MESSAGE NO. 2

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE Initial Scenario

ACTUAL DATE 7 APRIL 1964

OBEJCTIVES AND CONCEPT AND STRATEGY

OBJECTIVE To mount a graduated program of diplomatic military and psychological actions to induce the North Vietnamese to reduce their activities in support of the Viet Cong to the point where our counterinsurgency operations in SVN can succeed.

We would not be attempting to conquer North Vietnam or overthrow its regime and would make this objective clear to all concerned.

CONCEPT-STRATEGY

To apply controlled mutually reinforcing military and political measures designed to:

a. Exploit Communist fear that DRV economic achievements might be wiped out or that they could be defended (if at all) only at the price of CHICOM Control of their country.

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MESSAGE NO. 3

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE Initial Scenario

ACTUAL DATE 7 APRIL 1964

PLAN OF ACTION

On 15 June the South Vietnamese (and/or the US Government) will produce a convincing case to the world (the Jordan report) that the North Vietnamese government is heavily involved in the support and direction of the Viet Cong activities in Vietnam.

World opinion through press media, diplomatic briefings discussions in UN etc. will be convinced of the true nature and extent of this involvement and a political base will be established for action against North Vietnam itself.

On 15 June CINCPAC is directed to initiate certain deployments necessary to (1) Undertake retaliatory actions (tit-for-tat) and expanded pressure actions as outlined below and; (2) Assume a strategic posture in Southeast Asia and elsewhere to the degree necessary to deter enemy reaction to operations to be undertaken against North Vietnam and to ensure a high level of readiness for expanded operations should the military situation escalate. At the same time B-57's will be moved into Vietnam for future use in a Farmgate role.

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On 22 June orders are issued to CINCPAC to initiate retaliating actions (TIT for TAT) against North Vietnam targets on 25 June.

The actions will embrace overt high and/or low level reconnaissance by US or Farmgate aircraft; retaliatory bombing strikes and commando raids by RVN forces against selected NVN military targets such as communications centers, training camps and infiltration routes, coupled with aerial mining by RVN aircraft of major NVN ports. The aerial mining may be conducted with US assistance. B-57 aircraft will be held in readiness within Vietnam for use in these operations if increasingly sophisticated North Vietnamese defenses require their use or if other operational requirements dictate their use.

These actions will be continued until:

a. Our indicators reveal a material reduction in North Vietnamese direction and support of the Viet Cong to the point where the war can be won in South Vietnam, or;

b. 15 July.

If the desired results are not obtained by 15 July we will initiate a program of graduated overt military pressures by GVN and US forces. These will go beyond the "TIT-for-TAT" operations and will include air attacks against NVN military, and possibly industrial, targets by utilizing the combined resources of the GVN Air Force, and Farmgate, augmented by B-57 aircraft. Prior to this action additional air defense will have been provided for the RVN and US forces in the Pacific will have been readied for escalation.

These expanded operations will be continued until:

a. Our indicators reveal a material reduction in North Vietnamese direction and support of the Viet Cong to the point where the war can be won in South Vietnam or;

b. 1 September, at which time our position will be re-evaluated in the light of the circumstances then existing.

CONCURRENT MILITARY ACTIONS WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM

Increase tempo of offensive operations to include continuous commitment of 75% of Bn's.

Step up percentage of night operations to minimum of 50% of total operations.

Increase security measures in urban areas and in military installations to insure against acts of and terrorism.

Utilize recently enlarged guerrilla forces in previously planned operations against known DRV supply concentrations in Laos. (Assuming previous coordination with Souvanna Phouma).

Establish "shoot on sight" policy in designated border areas.

Initiate and publicize a passive air defense program geared at clearly indicating a readiness to face possible escalation.

Develop more effective use of air, naval and river forces for control of inland waterways of the Delta and especially the Mekong.

Increase use of air cover over convoys and trains to keep lines of communication open.

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SUPPORTING POLITICAL ACTIONS

The US will be providing political support for what are putatively purely GVN military actions. Immediately prior to issuance of the new Jordan report we would make diplomatic demarches to all allies and selected neutrals in support of the case made by that report. To all, we would state that the GVN was being subjected to armed attack and could hardly be expected not to exercise its right to self-defense by taking action against the source of attack. Its initial reaction would be limited and in retaliation for actions against it. But we could not foreclose the possibility of more serious actions if necessary to demonstrate to the North the costs of continuation of its actions in Laos and SVN.

Thus we would seek to link the rationale for the tit-for-tat program of action with the rationale for a subsequent program of pressures.

We would brief SEATO and NATO along similar lines. In the UN our initial action would be limited to circulation of the new Jordan report and corridor diplomacy to make the US case.

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We would be prepared, if it seemed necessary, to offer assurances of defense against retaliation to SVN and Thailand and would, if desired by the two governments, move in air defense units. We would also be prepared to give assurances that we would not permit international action to inhibit our actions against the Communists in the absence of substantial action by them to comply with our demands. (We should not, however, commit ourselves to stay out of an international conference under all circumstances.)

To the DRV and Communist China we would communicate directly (through a covert channel in the case of the DRV or Warsaw for the CHICOMS) repeating our earlier warning (see scenario), making clear that more serious actions could now be expected, but that our objectives did not include territorial objectives in NVN. Also indicate US support for establishment of gradual economic ties between NVN and SVN once peace was restored.

To the UK make clear that we do not consider it desirable that Geneva Conference machinery be invoked.

As we move from tit-for-tat actions to a program of

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pressures we will de-emphasize the defensive character of the GVN actions and emphasize the need for a DRV decision to cease its activities in the South.

Pressures for a Conference

International negotiations as such are most unlikely to forward US objectives. It will therefore be in our interests to stall off a conference; to stall once we are in a conference; and in any event to avoid permitting either pressures for a conference or the conference itself from interfering either with our actions in SVN or against the North. At the same time we recognize that pressures for a conference are likely to become very great as we undertake the more serious levels of military action. A reconvening of the Geneva Conference is to be preferred to other conference alternatives. We should work with the British as co-chairman to seek to stall off any move for a conference. We should refuse to accept a cease-fire as a condition prior to negotiations. It is likely, however, that this will be the first objective of those pressing negotiations. We might stall in a conference by stating very high objectives as conditions to US acceptance of a cease-fire. We could stall through arguing general principles - in effect,

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about the definition of aggression. Meanwhile, we could continue military pressures, accepting the political costs. The probability is that such action would break up the conference. However, either during this initial effort at negotiations or later we would be placed under great pressure to define specific objectives that might be met through international agreement.

Our stated objectives would be clear-cut indications that the DRV was withdrawing its support to the VC and that GVN efforts to extend its control over its own population were being allowed to proceed in an increasingly peaceful manner.

POLITICAL CONTINGENCY PLANS - UN

With US actions as now planned, we are not anxious to go before the UN.

If a UN Security Council hearing is called, US will stress proof of DRV aggression and SVN's inherent right to defend itself against the DRV-supported attack which has been carried out against it.

If conference or cease-fire called for, US should stall by all means available, continuing to brand DRV as

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the aggressor. If use of veto in Security Council is needed, the US will use it.

If action against the US were taken to UN General Assembly, we make it clear we will adhere to GA resolutions only if our demands are met, i.e., that there be key indicators of a decreasing VC insurgency: e.g. A cessation of attacks against strategic hamlets.

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM CONTROL TO RED MOVE NO. I

ACTUAL DATE 7 April 1964

The DRV Ambassador to the Soviet Union has been assured by Premier Khrushchev that the USSR would provide political and military assistance for the defense of the DRV in the event the RVN/US escalate the SEA conflict by overt attacks against targets in North Vietnam. The exact nature of the military assistance will be worked out in a conference in MOSCOW, to which the DRV have been invited, on a contingent basis.

Information to this effect has been conveyed by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to the American Secretary of State.

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SIGMA I-64

FROM RED TO CONTROL Message No. 1

Move No. I

REFERENCE Initial Scenario Actual Date 7 APRIL 1964

BROAD OBJECTIVES AND GENERAL STRATEGY MESSAGE

1. Long-Range Objectives (not Public)

On the long-range, we want to bring about the victory of the revolution in all of Vietnam, all of Laos and Cambodia. The Worker's Party of Vietnam is in the vanguard of our victorious revolutionary struggle when we have obtained reunification in Vietnam and complete association with the friendly bourgeois democratic states in Laos and Cambodia, the long-range victory of our revolutionary struggle throughout all Indo-China and SEA is certainly assured.

2. Intermediate Objective

a. Our real objective in the intermediate period is to come as close as possible to the victory of the peoples' forces in the South of our country, to the expulsion of the imperialists, and to reunification of Vietnam - without jeopardizing our home-base and our relative independence within the socialist camp.

b. To improve our economic position both internally and externally.

c. Our announced objective in the intermediate period is to seek the correct implementation of the 1954 Geneva accords, the withdrawal of the US imperialists, and the establishment of contact between the peoples' forces and the authorities in SVN, and between SVN and NVN.

3. Immediate Objective

a. Our real immediate objective is to bring such world-wide psychological pressure to bear on the Americans, and hence on their SVN puppets, that they will not dare take military action against our country in the face of world-wide opposition and fear of war.

b. To use our liberation forces in the South to maintain pressure which will bring about the collapse of the puppet

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government, and its replacement by a government including NLF representatives committed to peace and reunification.

c. Our announced objective in the present and immediate future, is to bring to an end foreign intervention in the struggle of the South Vietnamese people to achieve freedom from oppressive US - dominated regimes.

GENERAL STRATEGY

1. Our general strategy is to make maximum use of the fact that we are in a favorable position with respect to the political convictions of the majority of the people of the SVN thus forcing the enemy to continue his dangerously drastic moves upon which we can capitalize to turn world opinion against him and thus force a retroaction of his effort and an open field for us to continue our war of liberation in SVN, and ultimately all of SEA, by military and political means.

In pursuit of our (genuine) immediate objective, our strategy will be to prevent destruction of our transport and industrial system by:

a. Stimulating world-wide fear of a major war between the US and the CHICOMS by getting a public statement from the CHICOMS that they will come to our assistance if we are attacked from any source.

b. Bringing world opinion to bear on the US by immediately taking to the UN Security Council (and, informally, other world forums), and by publicizing in the world press, US/GVN threats against the DRV. This will be done in such a way as to maximize world condemnation of the US and GVN if they dare to carry out their expressed intention to attack us. Our strategy will be to emphasize to the world that:

(1) Aggression against us is being planned;

(2) We desire genuine implementation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements including the provisions for reunification of Vietnam thru elections;

(3) The struggle of the people of SVN for freedom from a military dictatorship should not be a matter for foreign intervention.

2. Our strategy in pursuit of our (genuine) intermediate objective will be to:

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a. Continue our campaign in the SVN at a level necessary to prevent the populace from achieving the conviction that the other side can turn the tide in their direction, and to continue to improve our potential for even more aggressive and decisive action.

b. Arrange covertly for a loud and widespread demand for an International Conference to re-establish peace in SEA; be prepared, if the time seems ripe, to allow ourselves to be persuaded to attend such a conference despite the fact that we are really the aggrieved party and are entitled to apology and redress before agreeing to attend.

c. Achieve from such a conference the following minimum arrangements:

(1) Legalization of the National Liberation Front (NLF) as a legally recognized political faction in SVN.

(2) Withdrawal of US military personnel from SVN.

Our initial position will also call for:

(1) Immediate return to the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreement including elections;

(2) Cessation of US military assistance to SVN;

(3) Nullification of SEATO responsibility for SVN;

(4) Linking of all SEA countries in pacts of neutrality and non-aggression;

but after an adequate period of propaganda we will be prepared, in the face of strong pressure, to yield the latter 4 points in order to gain the essential first 2.

As the DRV, we are not willing to accept responsibility for, or to negotiate on a cease-fire concerning, the NLF. As the NLF, we will agree to come to the conference to negotiate a cease-fire in return for guaranteed acceptance of our legal political status.

If a conference is not achieved, or if we are successful in achieving our conference objectives, we will continue our campaign of subversion and insurgency (modified as may be applicable to circumvent any conference-approved inspection machinery), blending subversion and insurgency as the situation dictates.

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In any event, we will make maximum effort to assure immediate and powerful appeals for a quick cessation of military operations if we are attacked at any time.

3. In line with our long range objective, our strategy is to:

a. Continue without relaxation, our political and military efforts to bring to power People's Democratic Governments in all of SEA. We will continue to support the cadres currently carrying on the struggle and to block efforts by the imperialists to establish or maintain a position of power in SEA.

b. In Laos, we will continue our present tactics without pushing sufficiently far with our military forces to trigger US intervention in that area. We will maintain sufficient pressure there to force the US to continue to spend some \$60 million per year without tangible results; and to aggravate the tensions between the Phoumi rightists and the neutralists until internal chaos is complete.

c. In Cambodia, we will continue our policies of restraint, sympathy, and limited assistance for Sihanouk until we are able to assure complete domination of the Cambodian Government. We may find it useful to use Sihanouk as a puppet once he fully recognizes our complete control of SEA and the need for subservience if Cambodia is to have any semblance of autonomy.

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SIGMA I-64

FROM RED TO CONTROL Message No. 2

Move No. I

REFERENCE Initial Scenario Actual Date 7 April 1964

RED MOVE MESSAGE

To USSR

1. We have your message of support. Gratitude and fraternal greetings. Vietnam counts on all members of Socialist camp.

2. We request that you take such immediate repeat immediate steps as you consider appropriate to bring to world attention announced intention of US imperialists to carry out aggressive attacks against home territory DRV.

3. We request this matter be brought before Security Council and/or General Assembly of United Nations at earliest possible moment. We hope you will sponsor in Security Council. President Ho is prepared to travel to New York to present our case to UN and world and US public opinion.

4. Point out that DRV, which has always abided by '54 Geneva Accords, prohibited from procuring even defensive arms, is defenseless before provocations of warmongering imperialists.

To INDONESIA, CEYLON, MALI

In view imminent US-GVN air attacks and recent US-GVN commando raids request you, in conjunction other AFRO-ASIAN colleagues, bring our well documented case to special session UN General Assembly.

To PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

1. In view of announced US intention to bomb and/or otherwise carry out offensive action against our country, it is requested that a public statement be made immediately to the effect that an attack by the warmongering imperialists against the defenseless homeland of the DRV could be considered as an attack against the homeland of the PRC itself and be dealt with accordingly.

2. This and any other support for our position will be appreciated.

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To INDONESIA

1. Request you seek Macapagal assurances that he will not allow US bombers use Philippino bases for air strikes against peace loving and innocent people of DRV as this would be intolerable act imperialist aggression.

2. Confrontation policy in Malaysia most helpful in splitting US-British imperialist solidarity in SEA and may assist in reducing or removing British support for GVN-US imperialist actions in Vietnam.

3. NVN Liaison Mission to ICC Vietnam provides full documentation of forthcoming US-GVN attack to ICC, with separate notes to UK and USSR as Geneva Co-Chairman. Case specifies US introducing various categories prohibited material into SVN and is about to undertake massive violation 17th parallel demarcation line -- DRV requests immediate communications by Co-Chairman to all Geneva participants.

INTERNAL NVN

1. Intensify propaganda campaign to publicize peaceful aims of DRV and terms of Geneva Accords.

2. Repeatedly deny thru available world news media any support of or association with VC in RVN -- presenting problem as one of internal civil disorder.

3. Exploit theme "White man's colonial designs in SEA."

4. Mobilize population to defend against US/GVN attacks against NVN. This to provide full time watch along coastal areas and at key installations. All persons -- men, women and children -- are to participate in the defense of their homeland

5. President Ho Chi Minh to travel to US in connection with appeal to UN and to issue major appeal to world conscience on arrival in New York.

6. Step up training and infiltrations of VC cadre especially suited for AA operations in SVN.

7. Increase flow of propaganda material to VC to keep up their morale and increase their effectiveness.

8. Increase flow of propaganda material to VC for use against RVN and US. Theme should be VC victories and US/GVN weaknesses.

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9. Trials with publicity of captured GVN commandos.

LAOS

1. Encourage Laotian leaders to visit Bloc countries and propagandize as peace missions.
2. Create situations of tension to divert attention from Vietnam -- but sufficiently, low-key to avoid direct U.S. participation and not disturb Laotian Sanctuary/LOC's.
3. Intensify efforts to broaden political base in Laos to create conditions favorable to long term objective confederation/association of States under DRV leadership.

CAMBODIA

1. Approach Cambodia on providing support in the UN in getting our case heard in either the General Assembly or Security Council in case the subject of US/RVN attack or threat of attack is presented to these forums.
2. Get Cambodia to increase propaganda against US/RVN invasion at Cambodian soil and killing of Cambodian citizens.
3. Get trade agreements with Cambodia so as to increase DRV food supply as a step toward long term friendship.
4. Increase efforts by VC to covertly provoke GVN into chasing VC units into Cambodia.
5. Increase use of Vietnamese language press (Trung Lap Newspaper) to propagandize against US-GVN acts against RKG and DRV.
6. Continue support of Sihanouk demands for Geneva Conference to achieve neutralization Cambodia.

SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Plan for and carry out the assassination of General Khahn coupled with the formation of a "Popular Movement" for the release and restoration of Generals Kim, Don, Dinh and XOAN. This to be done at such a time and in such a manner that the Generals Group would be blamed.
2. Derogate the characters of senior GVN officials.

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3. Immediately cease assassinations of US personnel, particularly women and children, and announce that VC do not engage in such acts.
4. For contingency planning, prepare for temporary take over of a Provincial capital - Quang Ngai appears to be most suitable.
5. Promote mass popular peace demonstrations in SAIGON-HUE and other cities.
6. Continue to infiltrate GVN administrative elements with VC agents with objective of locating potential political leadership in case of Coop.
7. Promote disaffection and confusion in the Highland Tribes, but also seek their support for VC, where possible promote conflict between the Catholics and Buddhists.
8. Stimulate feeling of war-weariness among population and stir support for "Neutrality".

OTHER COUNTRY SUPPORT - PROPAGANDA

1. Seek appropriate third country propaganda support for cessation of aggressive GVN - US attacks against DRV. These to include support from AFRO-Asian countries, the Japanese Socialist Party, the Bandung Conferencees and other non-aligned countries.
2. Have DRV Ambassadors (France, Burma, Mali, etc) seek moral support, issue press releases and give speeches denouncing U.S. - GVN attacks.
3. Seek French Communist party aid in publishing articles and mailing brochures to US groups and other groups such as ministers, teachers, peace movements, etc. Solicit support for DRV position and paint GVN-U.S. in bad light.
4. Seek propaganda support from non-aligned, or any other country for having USSR and Indonesia take DRV case respectively to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the UN.
5. Have DRV agent assets stir up public opinion where possible. Particularly, put out rumor in Hong Kong that Sino-Soviet split breached in common desire to assist DRV.

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM CONTROL TO YELLOW MOVE NO. I

ACTUAL DATE 7 April 1964

The DRV Ambassador to the Soviet Union has been assured by Premier Khrushchev that the USSR would provide political and military assistance for the defense of the DRV in the event the RVN/US escalate the SEA conflict by overt attacks against targets in North Vietnam.

The exact nature of the military assistance will be worked out in a conference in Moscow, to which the DRV have been invited, on a contingent basis. The USSR has also made it clear that differences within the Socialist community will not be permitted to stand in the way of aiding a sister state.

Information to this effect has been conveyed by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to the American Secretary of State.

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FROM YELLOW TO CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 1

REFERENCE Initial Scenario

MOVE NO. I

ACTUAL DATE 7 APRIL 1964

BROAD OBJECTIVES AND GENERAL STRATEGY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

PART I OBJECTIVES:

1. Ensure the security of Mainland China.
2. Eliminate US presence and influence from Southeast Asia.
3. Bring all of Southeast Asia under the control of Communist governments responsive to Peking.
4. Avoid a direct confrontation with US military power.
5. Demonstrate in Southeast Asia, and in South Vietnam in particular, the superiority of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Doctrine as opposed to the revisionist-capitulationist doctrine of Khrushchev.

PART II GENERAL STRATEGY

1. Support the VC and DRV in their prosecution of the national liberation struggle in SVN.
2. Deter and avoid provoking:
 - a. Further military intervention by the US with combat units in SEA;
 - b. Expansion of the war to NVN by the GVN and/or the US.
3. Seek to avoid the open introduction of PLA combat units, into SEA except in defense of China's borders or to prevent the destruction or surrender of the DRV.
4. Increase the responsiveness of the DRV, the VC, and the Pathet Lao to our influence and direction.
5. In Laos promote and support gradual expansion of the area of Pathet Lao control especially in the South,

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6. Exploit and exacerbate Cambodia's differences with the US, the GVN and Thailand.

7. Encourage neutralist sentiment in Bangkok and, through the DRV, continue to develop resistance assets in NE Thailand.

8. Exploit diplomatic and psychological openings created by DeGaulle's neutralization formula.

9. Exploit US concern over the possibility that military escalation in Vietnam would bring Peking's and Moscow's policies together.

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FROM YELLOW TO CONTROL MESSAGE NO. 2

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE Initial Scenario ACTUAL DATE 7 April 1964

SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION:

1. The CPR Ministry of National Defense has been directed by the National Defense Council to commence the following deployments as expeditiously as possible:

a. Two fighter regiments, one bomber regiment and one army into the Kunming military region.

b. One fighter regiment, one bomber regiment and one army into the Canton military region.

c. Eight fighter regiments and two armies into the Foochow military region.

d. Elements of one army now in the Mukden military region to engage in maneuvers on the Chinese side of the Yalu.

Reason: To improve our defensive posture and arouse US concern for the security of Northern Laos, the Kuomintang-occupied offshore islands and South Korea.

2. The CPR Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been directed by Chairman Mao to:

a. Propose to the DRV that it dispatch notes to all participants in the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, pointing out the imminent threat of US and GVN aggression against the DRV and calling for immediate reconvening of the Conference to consider means of carrying out the 1954 agreements.

b. Consult privately with the Soviet, French, Cambodian, and Laotian governments and endeavor to get their support for reconvening the Geneva Conference.

c. Issue a public statement informing the world at large of our reasons for supporting reconvening the Geneva Conference. Publicly expose the threats communicated by the US to the PRC and the DRV in late March.

d. Seek the support of both Socialist and non-aligned

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governments for our position. Particularly exploit the desire of Afro-Asian governments for peace.

e. Ask the French Ambassador to inform the US Government that US or GVN aggression against the DRV will not be tolerated and will be met by appropriate countermeasures.

Reason: To force the US to reconsider its aggressive plans and, in any event, to mobilize world opinion against the US.

3. The CCP Central Committee has directed appropriate subordinate party and government organs to:

a. Initiate an extensive propaganda effort, both foreign and domestic, accusing the United States and its lackeys of sustained aggressive moves against the peace-loving peoples of the Peoples' Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

b. Arrange spontaneous mass demonstrations in our major cities to protest the aggressive moves of the imperialist aggressors.

4. The Prime Minister of the CPR has replied to the recent message of the Chief of State of Cambodia in the following terms:

a. We are pleased to respond favorably to your request that we send a military advisory group to Phnom Penh. A military mission which will leave shortly for Hanoi will continue to Phnom Penh to consult further on this matter with you. The mission should arrive about June 20th.

b. We have serious doubts concerning your proposal that the UN undertake to protect the Cambodian and Laotian borders. We believe that this problem might best be discussed at a reconvened Geneva conference. We are supporting the DRV proposal that the conference be reconvened and also count on your support.

5. The Central Committee of the CCP has requested friendly Communist Parties around the world to initiate popular agitation against US aggressive policies in Southeast Asia. Emphasis is to be placed on demonstrations around US military bases, particularly in Japan.

6. The CPR Foreign Ministry has instructed its Embassy in Paris to leak to the press on an unattributable basis the fact of the recent Soviet offer to provide political and military support to the defense of the DRV.

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Reason: To smoke out Soviet intentions.

7. The following message is to be transmitted to the RED Team:

a. We now estimate that US/GVN air attacks and other aggressive actions against the DRV are imminent.

b. You have our renewed assurance of support in the face of this expected aggression. Your concurrence is requested for our dispatching a high-level military mission to arrive in Hanoi June 17th to discuss common defense problems, including your request for bombers.

c. Our general strategy in the present situation is to avoid giving the imperialists any pretext for their planned aggression and to mobilize international opinion against them, thereby forcing them to reconsider. Specifically, we plan to take a number of military and diplomatic moves.

(Note to Control: Inform RED of the substance of our first five specific courses of action (para 1 thru 5, SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION).

d. In keeping with our general strategy, you are strongly urged to direct the VC to cease attacks on non-combatant American personnel for the time being and to maintain the current level of military and other counter-government actions.

e. At the same time, we propose that Vietnam and Pathet Lao forces, supported by Vietnam units and Chinese cadres as required, move to take complete control over Phong Saly and Northwest Luang Prabang provinces in Laos and that limited patrols probe toward the Thai border. We anticipate that this move would:

(1) Instruct the US on the possibilities of an outflanking move by Communist forces in an area relatively inaccessible to the US.

(2) Impel the imperialists toward desiring a conference on both Vietnam and Laos, and

(3) Shake the Western alignment of Thailand.

f. With reference to the recent approach of the Soviet Union to your Ambassador in Moscow, we suggest that you explore more thoroughly the true seriousness of Russian intentions to give you support in the face of

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threatening US/GVN aggression.

g. In light of the apparent crucial role given General Khanh by the Americans and the possibility that his removal would lead to early collapse of the puppet GVN regime, your views are requested on the feasibility of assassinating him.

CONTINGENCIES

1. Air Attacks

If the GVN, the US or both launched air strikes against military, industrial or transportation targets in the DRV, possibly combined with mining of coastal waters, the PRC would assist in the air defense of the DRV by taking one or more of the following measures in approximately the order listed:

a. Provide fighter planes for DRV pilots now completing training in mainland China.

b. Deploy volunteer antiaircraft units to the DRV.

c. Deploy volunteer PLA jet fighter units to the DRV.

d. Provide two mine sweepers to clear the entrance to Haiphong.

e. Deploy PLA jet fighter units openly to the DRV. The extent to which the PRC would move up this ascending scale of actions would depend in large part on the material and psychological impact of the US/GVN air actions. In any event, the DRV would be urged to instruct the VC to step up the level of its national liberation struggle.

2. Ground Actions

If the GVN stepped up command/ guerrilla operations in the DRV and/or Laos, the PRC would not need to make a military response except in the unlikely event that the GVN actions exceeded the DRV's ability to defend against them.

3. Weakening of the DRV Resolve.

If the DRV resolve to prosecute the national liberation struggle in SVN were to weaken in the face of imperialist attacks, the PRC would:

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a. Endeavor to use its influence within the Lao Dong Party to overcome those favoring defeatist policies.

b. Offer the DRV material inducements and additional defensive military support.

c. Try to establish a PLA military presence in Hanoi of sufficient strength to block any move toward capitulation.

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FROM CONTROL TO BLUE MESSAGE NO. 1
MOVE NO. II
ACTUAL DATE 8 Apr 64

BLUE SCENARIO PROJECTION

It is now 22 July 1964.

On 15 June the RVN, using material contained in the Jordan report, made a highly effective presentation to the world press linking the DRV to Viet Cong activities in South Vietnam. First hand accounts of VC defectors who had completed the long trek through staging camps in Laos, captured weapons, documents, statements from official DRV organs and newspapers and a variety of creditable material were introduced in evidence. A well organized press campaign based on the RVN case stressing a rationale for self-defense by actions against the source of support for Communist subversion was launched in the free world press. Articles by Alsop, Baldwin and others stressed the psychological impact of Hanoi's leadership and support for the insurgency even though VC terrorists were far from dependent on the north for weapons or logistical support. AP, UP, Reuters and important Western informational media picked up the theme and for a few days considerable attention centered on it. Lacking the dramatic impact of other events on the world scene, however, it had short front page value.

It was countered on 18 June by massive press attacks in USSR, CPR and other Bloc countries and by Communist and left leaning elements in neutral and western nations. The sensational nature of this propaganda effort captured headlines all around the world. Charging the United States and "the lackey Khanh regime in Saigon is intent on unleashing World War III through unprovoked military aggression in North Vietnam," Tass, Hsinhua and left-leaning information media asserted that the United States had covertly warned the USSR, CPR and DRV that it was about to begin a concerted air war against North Vietnam.

General Khanh issued a statement in Saigon pointing out that this RVN effort was going to be continued on a tit-for-tat basis against military targets in North Vietnam until sabotage and terrorism by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam abated and it was clear that Hanoi had discontinued its support of the communist insurgents.

Concurrently Khanh stated that in retaliation for

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destruction of transportation and other communications facilities by VC terrorists, the RVN intended to begin aerial mining of North Vietnamese coastal waters and that the shipping of any country entering DRV harbours would do so at its own peril. While he regretted the necessity for such measures he stated that the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians of many nationalities in VC train blowings, etc., could not be ignored.

CINCPAC began force deployments during late June to prepare for possible escalation of the war. This included beefing up of US marine and air units in Thailand and the introduction of improved radar and antiaircraft elements into South Vietnam.

On 25 June, three squadrons of B-57's were shifted to South Vietnam and prepared for use in support of Farmgate operations if DRV air defense buildup required such commitment.

Amid a flurry of diplomatic maneuverings involving requests for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference for SEA, Soviet demands for Security Council action in the UN and worried checks by British, French and other diplomats with the State Department, actual tit-for-tat operations began on 25 June with RVN/Farmgate bombing strikes against communication centers, training camps and infiltration routes in North Vietnam. Aerial mines were laid at night in the approaches to all North Vietnamese ports by Farmgate aircraft assisted by US navy elements.

In a few days the reaction to these attacks had taken over the front pages of newspapers throughout the world. Photographs of dead and wounded women and children, victims of "fiendish Fascist atrocities" received a big play not only in Soviet, Bloc and CPR-DRV media but also in Western and US press. Unrelenting Communist insistence that the aircraft engaged in these attacks were piloted by US Air Force personnel were reinforced on 28 June when a fighter bomber downed in North Vietnam was captured more or less intact and a wounded American Lieutenant was dragged out under the cameras.

A storm of discussion began in the American press with Alsop pressing "for vigorous US support as a last chance to save Asia," Lippman arguing that the US "is bound to get bogged down in a SEA adventure which would drain our resources while driving the Soviets and the Chinese closer together." He said that it would end the US-Soviet detente which was just beginning to bear fruit and called for a solution through diplomacy and a try for neutralization.

The rest of the press and public sentiment crystallized pretty much along these lines although the New York Daily News was calling for nuclear weapons if "the CHICOMs come in!"

Meanwhile, inside South Vietnam the RVN stepped up military actions to the highest level of effectiveness ever achieved. Some 75% of all battalions were actively engaged in operations intended to clear and hold additional areas. Saigon was safer than it had been for years and border control operations into Laos continued on a fairly effective basis. Care was taken to avoid crossing into Cambodia although it was apparent that support continued to reach the VC from sanctuaries in that country.

In Washington an aroused Congress had demanded and received classified briefings by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS and individual Service Chiefs of Staff. With national opinion strongly divided on the desirability of US involvement in the SEA conflict a similar division was apparent in Congress; however, the consensus appeared to favor "riding out the early stages of this thing anyway and lets see where it gets us!" Obviously, a number of Senators and Congressmen had serious reservations. Some liberals feared the country was being dragged down the path toward war. Some conservatives favored more stringent action including overt commitment of US air and naval forces immediately. A GOP contender told reporters that if South Vietnam should go under, "the creeping communism in that part of the world would go into a gallop and the whole of Southeast Asia would be lost."

On the VC side the pattern of incidents in South Vietnam actually increased beginning in late June following the same pattern as in recent months. There was a significant difference however. Attacks against Americans and particularly American civilians ceased entirely. Two attempts to assassinate Gen. Khanh failed as did an abortive attempt to free some generals who had been confined after the Khanh coup.

Stepped-up RVN actions met some determined and organized resistance by VC, and the loss in helos and fixed wing planes to increasingly heavy and effective antiaircraft fire became serious. Further, in an obvious demonstration of strength, the VC in greater than battalion strength seized the provincial capitol Quang-Ngai on 28 June, held it in the face of reinforcements on 29 June, and withdrew during the night.

On 1 July, a British ship emerging from Haiphong after discharging its cargo was blown up by a mine and sunk with fourteen casualties. On 3 July, a Soviet ship was sunk in almost the identical location without loss but the hue and cry in Moscow and London was tremendous. This was significant in advancing a move already initiated to bring the question of US aggression up for discussion in an emergency meeting of the Security Council, an action which the US was frantically trying to stall.

(Please turn to next page)

The Security Council finally was convened on 5 July and the USSR accused the US of direct involvement in the aggression against the DRV, mining the harbours of a nation at peace, violating all the laws of freedom of the seas; it asked that the US be branded an aggressor that a ceasefire be enforced and that a UN supervisory team be introduced into the area. Ambassador Stevenson argued that US was only supporting RVN, that Communists would not honor ceasefire and UN team couldn't effectively monitor it anyway. He asked that DRV actions in support of the VC be halted indicating that the RVN attacks would also cease. World opinion was lined up strongly against the US. The Afro-Asians denounced the US position. In the SC vote France, the UK, Norway and Bolivia abstained. The Soviet Union, Morocco, Czechoslovakia and the Ivory Coast voted for the Soviet proposal. The United States, Brazil and the Republic of China voted against the proposal.

The Soviets announced that the issue would be carried directly to the General Assembly which was called to convene on the 14th of July in New York.

Ho Chi Minh flew into Idlewild wearing a simple peasant costume which he also wore when he addressed the delegates in fluent French on 15 July. With pictures and a disarmingly impressive manner the benign looking old gentlemen painted a sordid picture of mangled civilian corpses, women and children, who had fallen victim to US terror bombing. Millions were impressed and shocked although it was evident to experts that the pictures were in some cases rigged and faked.

It was clear that world opinion was swinging heavily toward the DRV. Nevertheless the RVN/Farmgate operations were continued against North Vietnam in the face of monsoonal rains. At least there was little if any anti-aircraft fire and no fighter defense to contend with. This was a military advantage in sweeping low over the jungles, strafing rail lines, blowing storage depots, but the psychological impact was unexpected.

The fact that no air defenses existed to speak of in North Vietnam and that the Chicoms did not as expected introduce fighters, simply added to the world image of the United States attacking a poor, defenseless, aggrieved country. Although many of the strikes were effective in the sense that personnel were killed and wounded and supplies destroyed, the impact on VC operations was negligible.

They were capable of fighting off the country for months and were still capturing US arms and equipment from the RVN.

Intelligence reports from SEA indicated in July that the DRV had asked the Chinese to announce that any attack against the DRV would be dealt with as an attack on China itself but been turned down, and that the DRV had itself turned down Chinese offers of fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery. Apparently there was reluctance in Hanoi to accept the kind of strings and influence over their affairs which would accompany that kind of generosity. Also it was felt that they preferred to appear defenseless and take some bombing rather than bring in Chinese forces (of questionable value militarily) and furnish the US with an excuse to "up the ante".

Actually, reports from North Vietnam indicate that in some respects the people are drawn more closely together in support of their authoritarian government. Living as they have been for years at a marginal subsistence level the bombing of military type targets had had little direct effect on them. Furthermore, rail lines and bridges knocked out by sporadic air strikes were almost immediately restored by thousands of peasants forced into labor teams for that purpose.

Ambassador Stevenson defending the US position in an increasingly hostile General Assembly asserted that the US would not agree to a ceasefire until the DRV had clearly discontinued support of the war in South Vietnam. If they would discontinue their efforts to subvert the country the RVN attacks would cease and there were possibilities that limited economic ties could be established between the two countries.

On 15 July (while the General Assembly was engaged in debate of a condemnation resolution against the US) the US/RVN decided to escalate the program to higher levels including direct attacks on some selected industrial type targets. The first strikes by 12 RVN/farmgate a/c were launched against oil tanks at Vinh, and by 4 a/c against one of the six hydro-electric facilities in the Hanoi complex. These raids were highly successful knocking out portions of the plants with precision while leaving other facilities untouched in a clear warning that they would be destroyed on another raid.

On 14 July it became clear through intelligence sources that major Chinese troop movements were in progress. It appeared that one army had been shifted into the Kunming Region, one into Canton and two into Foochow with accompanying fighter and bomber regiments.

Elements of one army in the Mukden region moved for joint maneuvers with the DPRK north of the Yalu.

A Chinese military mission was reported to have arrived in Phnom Penh and there were rumors that high level CPR and Soviet officials were meeting with the DRV in Hanoi.

By 18 July reports from reliable French sources in Laos indicate that the Pathet Lao are in the process of taking complete control of Phong Saly and Northwest Luang Prabang provinces in Laos and that limited probes are being made toward the Thai border.

It appears to DIA that the Chinese may be building up forces for action in less accessible areas west of Vietnam where the US would have considerable difficulty bringing the full brunt of its air and naval power to bear.

On 21 July a flight of 8 RVN/farmgate attacking targets near Haiphong emerged from a monsoonal squall into a hail of machine gun and cannon fire from ten MIG 17s. Two were forced down over North Vietnam, and one ditched at sea. The fighter aircraft wore DRV markings but were clearly CPR types.

Apparently the CPR has moved MIGs into strips in North Vietnam, Cambodia and Hainan. Photo recce on 22 July indicates that SAM sites are appearing around Hanoi and the industrial complex on the Red River Delta.

On 21 July Gen DeGaulle made a TV statement to the effect that a ceasefire between RVN and VC forces should be declared, followed by an immediate international conference to guarantee the neutrality of SEA nations. Both the UK and USSR informally indicated a willingness to conduct such a conference as a continuation of the 14 nation 1954 Geneva discussions.

It is now 22 July 1964.

SECRET - NOFORN

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL MESSAGE NO. 1

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE Scenario Projection ACTUAL DATE 8 April 1964

22 July to 27 July - Specific Courses of Action

1. Introduce B-57's in Farmgate combat operations in South and North Vietnam if they had not already been employed under previous authority.

2. Within twenty-four hours of the MIG attack on the Farmgate aircraft the President addresses a joint session of Congress requesting a joint Congressional resolution which would:

a. Note the DRV aggression against SVN and Chinese involvement with SAMs and MIGs.

b. Note that the GVN has exercised its inherent right of self-defense by taking action on a tit-for-tat basis against the North.

c. Warn against intervention by other Communist powers in the war - specifically against CHICOM involvement.

d. Authorize the President to take all necessary measures, including use of US armed forces to repel aggressive action by any other Communist nations in South-east Asia, especially Vietnam.

Publicly we would take the position that the US actions would be limited to support of the program of tit-for-tat actions by the GVN; that otherwise US forces would become involved only as necessary to deal with CHICOM actions. In actuality, US air action would not be restricted to action against CHICOM forces but would be directed against all appropriate targets under our plan of action.

3. Direct movement of ground forces, called for in the CINCPAC OPLAN to forward staging areas to the extent permitted by facility capability. Move Infantry Brigade to Thailand to marry up with equipment already prepositioned. Load CONUS Division equipment for sea movement and begin movement toward objective area.

4. CINCPAC positions Naval forces for maximum readiness to implement Phase IV of CINCPAC OPLAN.

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5. Move air units called for in Phase IV of CINCPAC OPLAN, including CONUS augmentation into their deployment positions.

6. Other US Commands go to alert called for in CINCPAC OPLAN.

7. US informs Chinese that any resumption of hostilities in Korea would result in positive US military action against the aggressor which may not be confined to Korea and which could include all weapons required to counter the aggression.

8. Message is permitted to leak which requests review of Chinat plans for landings on mainland. Training activity for amphibious operations is intensified and made apparent.

9. Messages dispatched to Russia outlining US position, also message to Cambodia calling for withdrawal of MIGs.

10. Informs principal Allies of US intent to conduct overt combat air operations against N. Vietnam.

11. 27 July. Commence overt US air operations against targets in North Vietnam. Targets to include airfields in DRV and Pathet Lao area with emphasis on MIG bases, SAM sites and interdiction of CHICOM/DRV LOC's to CHICOM border. In addition, LOC's supporting the insurgency effort, other appropriate military targets and economic resources on an ascending and calculated basis (23 industrial and POL). Conduct intensified armed recce over all major LOC between DRV and Laos and CHICOM borders and over PL controlled areas of Laos. Conduct U-2 and/or A-11 operations over North Korea, Manchuria and the Southern Provinces of China.

POLITICAL ACTIONS

1. In UN propose alternative resolution which would contain declaration of principle with respect to the importance of defending small states against indirect aggression. Appeal to Latin American countries on basis of their interest in protection against activities of Cuba. Similarly with African countries in re Ghana, Zanzibar, etc.

2. If our nose count indicates, however, that vote will go against us, indicate that we are prepared to

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discuss the modalities for reconvening of the Geneva Conference to consider the situation in Vietnam, but not on the terms proposed by de Gaulle. Then seek to get UNGA to adopt innocuous resolution expressing its concern and noting intention of relevant powers to reconvene Geneva Conference.

3. Stall by prolonging negotiations over modalities for convening conference, taking stiff position on terms of reference. Throughout make clear we will accept no cease-fire until DRV has stopped its activities in Laos and SVN.

4. Once in a Geneva conference put forward very stiff demands, the core of which would be that there must be substantial DRV performance before we agree to stop attacks against the North. Continue attacks during the conference.

5. Give continuing reassurances to allies with respect to the limited character of US objectives and the carefully controlled nature of the US military actions. Such reassurance to be given, as appropriate through SEATO and NATO.

6. Emphasize that mining operations were in retaliation for mining of roads by the Communists in South Vietnam. Cite statistics as to number of innocent persons killed by such Communist mining Ops. Express regret to British for sinking of their ship. Indicate that we are prepared to sweep the mines if the Communists stop their mining activities in the South.

7. Intensify information activities with particular emphasis upon the limited character of the US objectives and the responsive character of the US action.

Political Maneuvers in Support of Continuing Actions
Against the DRV

1. Message to the USSR through diplomatic channels:
Reiteration of fact that US has no quarrel with the USSR in SEA. Appropriate expression of regret over sinking of Russian ship. Expression of hope that in future, the USSR would refrain from sending its shipping into DRV territorial waters until the DRV had taken such actions as would cause the threat to shipping (mines) to be removed. Expression of concern over continued DRV aggression in SVN supported by CPR. Expression of hope that CPR will take no aggressive moves into sovereign territories of other countries in SEA which would force the US to retaliate directly against China. Request USSR to counsel a course of moderation, seeking to influence the DRV to stop its support of the subversive war in SVN, which would pave the way for establishment of two independent Vietnamese Republics which could

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live as peaceful neighbors.

2. Message to Cambodia through diplomatic channels:

Warn Sihanouk that unless he causes the Chinese jets to be removed from Cambodian airfields that the US will remove all restrictions from operations near the Cambodian-SVN border, and that direct air strikes against the Chinese jets will be launched.

Make clear the fact that once the Chinese jets are removed, the US has no intention of violating Cambodian neutrality, which it has respected and sought to protect in the past. Cite the fact that US actions against the DRV have been taken in order to protect the sovereignty of SVN against covert attack by the Communist Bloc. These actions prove US intention to protect its friends and allies against attacks from any hostile source, and underline US determination not to abandon the Indochinese Peninsula to eventual Communist domination.

3. Message to Burma via diplomatic channels:

State clearly US respect for Burma's neutral status, and the hope that Burma will not become involved in the current heightening of tensions related to the Communist aggression in SVN.

A carefully phrased warning to Burma that the US would view with grave concern any use of Burmese territory by CPR military units, and that such actions, if permitted by the Burmese government, would make doubtful its continued non-involvement in the developments centering around Vietnam.

4. Message to Souvanna in Laos, via diplomatic channels:

Expression of hope that Laotian neutrality can be preserved through cessation of aggressive Communist actions within its borders.

Statement of continued US support of Laotian neutrality.

State the desire of the US to support the Laotian Government's efforts to maintain its sovereignty. In this vein, request Souvanna's permission for the US to launch air strikes against identified NVN military units which are operating within Laotian borders in violation of the Geneva accords. This permission sought in advance as US fears that Communists may make a major move in Laos in

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in order to increase the amount of territory under their domination. Air strikes would be taken only against units and facilities known to be a part of such an effort.

5. Message to the Thais.

A restatement of the US full support of Thai sovereignty. Stress US willingness to commit military units to the defense of Thailand should the Communists make moves in Laos which pose a threat to Thai security.

Discussions within SEATO.

The US will conduct discussions of its actions against the DRV within SEATO. On the basis of the attitudes displayed in these talks, the US will approach bilaterally those nations, probably Australia and the Philippines, who demonstrated willingness to support the US position seeking political and military assistance. No SEATO action as such would be sought unless or until overt aggression had been committed by either the DRV or the CPR.

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM CONTROL TO RED

MOVE NO. II

ACTUAL DATE 8 April 1964

RED SCENARIO PROJECTION

It is now 22 July 1964.

On 15 June the RVN, using material contained in a so-called "Jordan report," made a damaging presentation to the world press linking the DRV to Viet Cong activities in South Vietnam. First hand accounts of VC defectors who had completed the long trek through staging camps in Laos, captured weapons, documents, statements from official DRV organs and newspapers and a variety of apparently creditable material were introduced as evidence. A well organized US press campaign stressing its rationale for self-defense by actions against the source of support for Communist subversion, based on the RVN case, was launched in the Western press. Articles by Alsop, Baldwin and others stressed the psychological impact of Hanoi's leadership and support for the insurgency even though VC terrorists were far from dependent on the north for weapons or logistical support. AP, UP, Reuters and important Western informational media picked up the theme and for a few days considerable attention centered on it. Lacking the dramatic impact of other events on the world scene however it had short front page value.

It was countered on 18 June by a massive counter attack by USSR, CPR and other Bloc countries and by Communist and other friendly elements in neutral and western nations. The sensational nature of this propaganda effort captured headlines all around the world. Charging the United States and "the lackey Khanh regime in Saigon" is intent to unleash World War III through unprovoked military aggression in North Vietnam," Tass, Hsinhua and other information media asserted that the United States had covertly warned the USSR, CPR and DRV that it was about to begin a concerted airwar against North Vietnam.

Amid a flurry of diplomatic manueverings involving requests for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference for SEA, Soviet demands for Security Council action in the UN, and

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worried checks by British, French and other diplomats with the State Department, the US/RVN proceeded on 15 June to initiate air and commando blows by RVN and so-called Farmgate aircraft against North Vietnam, assisted by US reconnaissance aircraft.

General Khanh issued a statement in Saigon in which he asserted that this RVN effort was going to be continued on a tit-for-tat basis against military targets in North Vietnam until sabotage and terrorism by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam abated and it was clear that Hanoi had discontinued its support of the communist insurgents.

Concurrently Khanh stated that in retaliation for terrorist attacks and destruction of transportation and other communications facilities by the Viet Cong the RVN intended to begin the aerial mining of North Vietnamese coastal waters and that the shipping of any country entering DRV harbors would do so at its own peril. He stated that while he regretted the necessity for such measures that the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians of many nationalities in VC train blowings etc, could not be ignored. The mining was in retaliation for VC terrorism in the south.

CINCPAC began force deployments during June to deter enemy reaction to operations undertaken in North Vietnam and to ensure a high-level of readiness for expanded operations should situation escalate. This included beefing up of US marine and air units in Thailand and the introduction of improved radar and anti-aircraft elements into South Vietnam.

On 25 June three squadrons of B-57's were shifted to South Vietnam and it is believed they are now prepared for use in support of Farmgate operations.

Actual RVN offensive operations began on 22 June with bombing strikes against communications centers, training camps and infiltration routes. Aerial mines were laid at night in the approaches to all North Vietnamese ports by Farmgate aircraft assisted by US navy elements.

In a few days the reaction to these attacks had taken over the front pages of newspapers throughout the world. Photographs of dead and wounded women and children, victims of "fiendish Fascist atrocities" received a big play not only

in Soviet, Bloc and CPR-DRV media but also in the Western and US press. Unrelenting Communist insistence that the aircraft engaged in these attacks were piloted by US Air Force personnel were reinforced on 28 June when a fighter-bomber downed in North Vietnam was captured more or less intact and a wounded American lieutenant was dragged out under the cameras.

A storm of discussion began in the American press with Alsop pressing "for vigorous US support as a last chance to save Asia," Lippman arguing that the US "is bound to get bogged down in a SEA adventure which would drain our resources while driving the Soviets and the Chinese closer together." He said that it would end the US-Soviet detente which was just beginning to bear fruit and called for a solution through diplomacy and a try for neutralization.

The rest of the press and public sentiment crystallized pretty much along these lines although the New York Daily News was calling for nuclear weapons if "the CHICOMs come in!"

Japanese Communists joined by the socialists demonstrated on 27 June following the first air strikes against North Vietnam. The Japanese Government issued a routine announcement of assurance by the US that no US forces in Japan were to be used in any combat operations.

On 27 June the USSR publicly announced its intent to move one battery of SAMs to North Vietnam to assist in providing air defense. Following negotiations in early July, construction of SAM sites was started around Hanoi and the industrial complex in the Red River Delta.

Meanwhile inside South Vietnam the RVN stepped up military actions to the highest level of effectiveness ever achieved. Many troops were actively engaged in operations intended to clear and hold additional areas. Viet Cong operations within Saigon became most difficult.

In Washington an aroused Congress had demanded and received classified briefings by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS and individual Service Chiefs of Staff. With national opinion strongly divided on the desirability of US involvement in the SEA conflict a similar division was apparent in Congress, however the

consensus appeared to favor "riding out the early stages of this thing anyway and let's see where it gets us!" Obviously, a number of Senators and Congressmen had serious reservations. Some liberals feared the country was being dragged down the path toward war. Some conservatives favored more stringent action including overt commitment of US air and naval forces immediately.

On the VC side the pattern of incidents in South Vietnam were increased beginning in late June following the same pattern as in recent months. In accordance with instructions, attacks against Americans and particularly American civilians ceased entirely. Two attempts to assassinate Gen. Khanh failed, however, as did an abortive attempt to free four RVN generals who had been confined after the Khanh coup.

On 1 July, a British ship emerging from Haiphong after discharging its cargo was blown up by a mine and sunk with fourteen casualties. On 3 July, a Soviet ship was sunk in almost the identical location without loss but the hue and cry in Moscow and London was tremendous. This was significant in advancing a move already initiated to bring the question of US aggression up for discussion in an

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emergency meeting of the Security Council, an action which the US was frantically trying to stall.

The Security Council finally was convened on 5 July and the USSR accused the US of direct involvement in the aggression against the DRV, mining the harbors of a nation at peace, violating all the laws of freedom of the seas; it asked that the US be branded an aggressor that a cease-fire be enforced and that a UN supervisory team be introduced into the area. Ambassador Stevenson argued that US was only supporting the RVN, that Communists would not honor a cease-fire and that a UN team couldn't effectively monitor it anyway. He asked that DRV actions in support of the VC be halted indicating that the RVN attacks would also cease. World opinion was lined up strongly against the US. The Afro-Asians denounced the US position. In the SC vote France, the UK, Norway and Bolivia abstained. The Soviet Union, Morocco, Czechoslovakia, and the Ivory Coast voted for the Soviet proposal. The United States, Brazil and the Republic of China voted against the proposal.

The Soviets announced that the issue would be carried directly to the General Assembly which was convened on the 14th of July in New York.

Ho Chi Minh flew into Idlewild wearing a simple peasant costume which he also wore when he addressed the delegates in fluent French on 15 July. With pictures and a disarmingly impressive manner the benign looking old gentlemen painted a sordid picture of mangled civilian corpses, women and children who had fallen victim to US terror bombing. Millions were impressed and shocked although it was evident to some that the pictures were in some cases rigged and faked.

The US Ambassador, Stevenson, defending the US position in an increasingly hostile General Assembly asserted that the US would not agree to a cease-fire until the DRV had clearly discontinued support of the war in South Vietnam. He added that if the DRV would discontinue efforts to subvert the country the RVN attacks in the north would cease and that there were possibilities that limited economic ties could be stabilized between the two countries.

It was clear that world opinion was swinging heavily toward the DRV, nevertheless the RVN/Farmgate operations were continued against North Vietnam in the face of monsoonal rains. Since there was little, if any anti-aircraft fire and no fighter defense to contend with which was a

military advantage in sweeping low over the jungles, strafing rail lines, blowing storage depots but the psychological impact was unexpected.

The fact that no air defenses existed to speak of in North Vietnam and that the CHICOMS did not as expected introduce fighters simply added to the world image of the United States attacking a poor, defenseless, aggrieved country. Although many of the strikes were effective in the sense that personnel were killed and wounded and supplies destroyed, the impact on VC operations was negligible.

They are capable of fighting off the country for months and are still capturing US arms and equipment from the RVN. The DRV request to the Chinese to announce that any attack against the DRV would be dealt with as an attack on China itself was turned down.

However, Mao announced that he was redeploying some major CHICOM troop units in the direction of NW Laos in an attempt to put pressure on the US and to bring world opinion against that country to have it cease its offensive operations against North Vietnam. Mao stated that one army has been shifted into the Kunming Region, one into Canton and two into Foochow with accompanying fighter bomber regiments. He also stated that the CHICOMS are providing support to the Pathet Lao operating in the Phong Saly Province and that limited probes are being made toward the Thai border.

Reports indicate that Souphannouvong is agreeable to the CHICOM plan but that he expects Phoumi Nosavran to attempt to rally neutralist and western powers in opposition.

The bombing of North Vietnam has in some respects drawn the people more closely together in support of the government. Living as they have been for years at a marginal subsistence level the bombing of military type targets has had little direct effect on them. Furthermore, rail lines and bridges knocked out by sporadic air strikes were almost immediately restored by thousands of peasants drafted into labor teams for that purpose.

On 15 July (while the General Assembly was engaged in debate of a condemnation resolution against the US) the US/RVN is reported to have decided to escalate the program to higher levels including direct attacks on some selected industrial type targets. The first strikes by 12 RVN aircraft were launched against oil tanks at Vinh and by 4 aircraft against hydro-electric facilities in the Hanoi complex.

These raids were highly successful, knocking out portions of the plants with precision while leaving other facilities untouched. This was apparently a warning that they would be destroyed on another raid.

Representation to Sukarno in an attempt to have him influence Macapagal to deny the use of Philippine bases has not produced positive results. To date, Macapagal is non-committal as to his intentions.

Since 15 June Sihanouk has increased his border control troops and concurrently the GVN/US have instituted stringent control measures to keep from violating the Cambodian border. Therefore, efforts by the VC to cause the RVN to cross the border in pursuit of the VC have not been successful.

The training of VC cadre for use in the AA role in South Vietnam has been stepped up and they have been successfully infiltrated into the RVN.

On 19 July, the CPR delivered 10 MIG 17 aircraft to the DRV together with DRV pilots who have been trained in the CPR. These aircraft on their first combat mission on 21 July intercepted a flight of RVN aircraft attacking targets near Haiphong. Two of the attacking aircraft were destroyed by the MIGs and a third was ditched in the sea.

The CHICOMs during the past week have moved MIGs onto strips in Cambodia and Hainan island.

It is now 22 July 1964.

FROM Red TO Control MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE Red Scenario Projection ACTUAL DATE 8 April 1964

RED MOVE MESSAGE

1. In the General Assembly

a. Backup speeches accusing US of adhering to principles of UN only when it favors U. S.

b. Speech by another nation proposing conference to consider restoration of peace in SEA and re-instituting Geneva accords.

c. Sponsorship by 3rd nation of Lawyer Tho or other high ranking VC to spell out NFL position - which is to establish NFL as political party and independent from DRV - and to call for peaceful solution, Government representation and Geneva accords.

d. Speech by Ho - must have credibility - states that some returnees from NVN rejoin families in SVN - DRV has no control - war in south is independent - should be settled between adversaries - shows proof of US bombings - Release of US pilot to ICC. Ho tells world that the people of NVN are behind him - He states that thousands of women and children are deploying themselves over the targets to sacrifice themselves in case of further bombings.

2. We anticipate that the result of the GA meeting will be the introduction of a resolution, with many sponsors, calling for a conference to re-establish peace in Southeast Asia and an immediate cease-fire pending the opening of the Conference. We anticipate that the resolution will gain overwhelming support and that we (the DRV) and we (the NLF) would agree to attend.

3. North Vietnam internal actions:

a. Ask Khrushchev to write letter to President Johnson, Home and DeGaulle pointing out dangers of present situations vis-a-vis WW III and nuclear

war. Those countries providing facilities in same danger as U.S., e.g., Philippines, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, etc. Frenzied call for sanity and reason. Let there be no mistake that all socialist countries united in this critical period.

b. Plea for non-aligned world leaders for a cessation of bombings.

c. All communist and sympathetic front groups to instigate peace demonstrations, call for boycotts, etc.

d. Appeal to church groups worldwide to condemn US actions blaming President Johnson.

e. Demonstrations in Indonesia to end with sackin of U. S. Embassy.

f. Ho Chi Minh appeals to USSR, Communist China, UK, France and others for minesweepers to be used by NVN in clearing harbor channels.

g. Request Soviet Union to provide fighter aircraft and crews for air defense of NVN.

h. Mobilize shallow draft lighter capability to move supplies through minefields.

i. Disperse unneeded personnel to agricultural areas.

j. Reinforce morale of people

k. Proporgandize large numbers of women and children into volunteering to place themselves between bombs and targets.

l. Continue contingency planning for military moves and war if all other gambits fail to halt bombing to include worldwide broadcast by Ho stating reluctantly that DRV forced to declare war on SVN to protect home land.

4. Political Heat

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Heat up to various degrees, but in relatively low key, through requests to bloc, areas such as Berlin, Laos, Central America, Korea and Africa. Object is to present to world a picture of restiveness on the part of the bloc as well as a picture of communist girding of loins should war be necessary.

5. Requests to CHICOMs:

a. Request political and economic assistance and also request extensive publicity of this support.

b. Request additional troop movements to but short of Burma-Laos borders.

c. Request active assistance in air defense.

d. Request high level military advisory team.

6. Actions in South Vietnam:

a. Increase VC pressure generally

b. Mount major new effort to assassinate Khanh, combined with attack to release Kim and Dan from Dalat to be used as fronts for appeals to people. Mount major sabotage attack against Danang Airfield, staging base for US and GVN bombers. Also, knock out large river bridge at Danang which just repaired.

c. Mount major campaign to kidnap several U.S. military for propaganda purposes.

d. Try to get one of three major SVN Buddhist leaders to come out against bombings and for peace.

7. Actions in Thailand:

a. Increase recruiting activity among Vietnamese to build communist strength.

b. Spread rumors about dangers of support to U.S.

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM Control TO YELLOW

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE NONE

ACTUAL DATE 8 Apr 64

YELLOW SCENARIO PROJECTION

It is now 22 July 1964.

On 15 June the RVN made a highly effective presentation to the world press linking the DRV to Viet Cong activities in South Vietnam. First hand accounts of VC defectors who had completed the long trek through staging camps in Laos, captured weapons, documents, statements from official DRV organs and newspapers and a variety of creditable material were introduced in evidence. A well organized U.S. press campaign based on the RVN case was launched in the free world press stressing the rationale for self defense by action against the source of insurgency. Articles by Alsop, Baldwin and others stressed the psychological impact of Hanoi's leadership and support for the insurgency even though VC terrorists were far from dependent on the north for weapons or logistical support. AP, UP, Reuters and important Western informational media picked up the theme and for a few days considerable attention centered on it. Lacking the dramatic impact of other events on the world scene however it had short front-page value.

It was countered on 18 June by a massive counter attack by USSR, CPR and other Bloc countries and by Communist and left-leaning elements in neutral and western nations. The sensational nature of this propaganda effort captured headlines all around the world. Charging the United States and "the lackey Khanh regime in Saigon is intent to unleash World War III through unprovoked military aggression in North Vietnam", Tass, Hsinhua and left-leaning information media asserted that the United States had covertly warned the USSR, CPR and DRV that it was about to begin a concerted air war against North Vietnam.

The U.S. began visible force deployments during June. This included beefing up of US marine and air units in Thailand and the introduction of improved radar and anti-aircraft elements into South Vietnam. SEVENTH Fleet center of gravity shifted south and most units were at sea on 23 June.

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On 25 June three squadrons of B-57's were reported as landing in South Vietnam with U.S. markings.

On 25 June, Hanoi reported bombing strikes by small groups of RVN marked planes against three training camps and some communication routes. Aerial mines were reported laid at night in the approaches to all North Vietnamese ports.

General Khanh issued a statement in Saigon pointing out that this RVN effort was going to be continued against military targets in North Vietnam in retaliation for VC actions in SVN until sabotage and terrorism by the Viet Cong abated and it was clear that Hanoi had discontinued its support of the Communist insurgents.

Concurrently Khanh stated that in retaliation for destruction of transportation and other communications facilities by terrorists the RVN had mined North Vietnamese coastal waters and that the shipping of any country entering DRV harbors would do so at its own peril. While he regretted the necessity for such measures he stated that the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians of many nationalities in VC train blowings, etc., could not be ignored.

In a few days the reaction to these attacks had taken over the front pages of newspapers throughout the world. Photographs of dead and wounded women and children, victims of fiendish Fascist atrocities received a big play not only in Soviet Bloc and CPR-DRV media but also in Western and US press. Unrelenting Communist insistence that the aircraft engaged in these attacks were piloted by US air Force personnel were reinforced on 28 June when a fighter-bomber downed in North Vietnam was captured more or less intact and a wounded American lieutenant was dragged out under the cameras.

The level of RVN actions indicates an attempt to put all available military units in action. Clearing actions become daily occurrences. Police control in and around Saigon made ineffective and very dangerous all attempts at liquidation of political and military leaders. Two attempts to assassinate Gen. Khanh failed. The VC have obeyed instructions to cease attacks on Americans in the Saigon area.

US national opinion appears sharply divided on the desirability of US involvement in the SEA conflict. A similar division is apparent in Congress. However, the consensus appears to favor "riding out the early states of this thing anyway and lets see where it gets us!"

On 28 June, to further indicate the inability of the RVN to control the Liberation Front, two battalions of VC occupied the provincial capitol of Quang-Ngai and held it throughout 29 June against reinforcements flown in by helio. VC disengaged during the night.

On 1 July a British ship emerging from Haiphong after discharging its cargo was blown up by a mine and sunk with fourteen casualties. On 3 July a Soviet ship was sunk in almost the identical location without loss but the hue and cry in Moscow and London was tremendous. This was significant in advancing a move already initiated to bring the question of US aggression up for discussion in an emergency meeting of the Security Council, an action which the US was frantically trying to stall.

The Security Council finally was convened on 5 July and the USSR accused the US of direct involvement in the aggression against the DRV, mining the harbors of a nation at peace, violating all the laws of freedom of the seas; conducting unprovoked attacks against innocent citizens; it asked that the US be branded an aggressor, that a ceasefire be enforced, and that a UN supervisory team be introduced into the area. Ambassador Stevenson argued that US was only supporting RVN, that Communists' would not honor ceasefire and UN team couldn't effectively monitor it anyway. He asked that DRV actions in support of the VC be halted in which case the RVN attacks would also cease. World opinion was lined up strongly against the US. The Afro-Asians denounced the US position. In the SC vote France, the UK, Norway and Bolivia abstained. The Soviet Union, Morocco, Czechoslovakia and the Ivory Coast for the Soviet proposal. The United States, Brazil and the Republic of China voted against the proposal.

The Soviets announced that the issue would be carried directly to the General Assembly which was called to convene on the 14th of July in New York.

Ho Chi Minh flew into Idlewild wearing a simple peasant costume which he also wore when he addressed the delegates in fluent French on 15 July. With pictures and in an impressive manner the forceful leader painted a sordid picture of mangled civilian corpses, women and children, who had fallen victim to US terror bombing.

It was clear that world opinion was swinging heavily toward the DRV. Nevertheless the bombing operations were continued against North Vietnam in the face of monsoonal rains.

Hanoi requested that AA and fighters be held in readiness for quick deployment to the Hanoi complex, but not moved in until maximum effect had been gained from offering no defense to unwarranted bombings.

The impact of initial strikes was apparently minor. Discipline was maintained in the military and panic in civilians was prevented. The required manpower to repair damage was quickly mobilized.

VC cadres were immediately moved out of training areas and put enroute to staging points.

On 5 July, upon receiving word of the US veto in Security Council and calling of General Assembly, Hanoi requested that AA units be moved in. Action was initiated. Estimate readiness for action about 15 July.

On 15 July the POL storage at Vinh was completely destroyed by a strike of 8-12 aircraft, and one of the six hydro-electric facilities near Hanoi was struck by two bombs from an attack by 4 planes.

On 18 July Hanoi requested fighters to protect the Hanoi-Haiphong complex. Plans were implemented to move 20 fighters with trained NVN pilots augmented by volunteers from our fighter forces to fields near Hanoi.

On 21 July these fighters successfully met an incoming attack and destroyed three bombers.

Following USSR public announcement on 27 June that it intended to move one battery of SAM's to North Vietnam, their offer was accepted and SAM sites are under construction around Hanoi and the industrial complex on the Red River Delta.

Movements of Yellow ground and air forces have proceeded as scheduled.

Hanoi concurred in proposed action of Pathet Lao in Phong Daly province, but indicated no forces or advisors were immediately available to be sent there.

Souphannouvong considers Souvanna Phouma will be unable to rally any sort of effective support and may leave the country, designating Phoumi as Prime Minister. Phoumi is reported requesting reassurances from Thailand and US in event Pathet Lao or Yellow forces continue their movements.

The demonstrations and protests of Communists and Socialists in Japan on 27 June produced no concrete results. The government announced assurances of US that no forces from Japan were to be used in combat operations.

It is now 22 July 1964.

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Message No. 1

FROM Yellow TO Control Move No. II
Yellow Scenario
REFERENCE Projection Actual Date 8 April 1964

SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION:

1. The editorial staffs of Red Flag and the Peoples Daily have been instructed to prepare an article calling for unity of all Socialist governments and peoples in the face of clearcut imperialist aggression against the DRV. This editorial will appear July 25. Simultaneously, party-to-party and government-to-government discussions have been initiated with the Russians with the view to concerting actions related to the defense of North Vietnam, as well as diplomatic and progaganda efforts throughout the world on the Vietnam issue.

2. The Politbureau has instructed the Foreign Ministry to:

a. Call in the French and Cuban Ambassadors and request their governments to sponsor a resolution in the VNGA condemning US/GVN aggression and calling for US withdrawal from Vietnam.

b. Write the UN Secretary General requesting that a representative of PRC be admitted to the current debate on Vietnam and be permitted to speak for China.

c. Instruct PRC embassies in friendly and neutral capitals to solicit support for a. and b. above.

3. Appropriate agencies of the PRC have been directed by the Central Committee to continue and intensify, in concert with other Socialist governments, an all-out campaign publicizing the atrocities being committed by the US and its puppets against the defenseless women and children of Vietnam. Efforts are being made to organize expeditions by friendly journalists, including Americans, to view the destruction caused by bombing attacks against North Vietnam. The Chinese Red Cross has offered large-scale assistance to the victims of these attacks.

4. The following message is to be transmitted to the RED Team:

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a. Your attention is called to the additional measures which we propose to take in the interest of the common struggle against the American imperialists and their South Vietnam puppets. (Note to Control: Inform RED of the substance of the three preceding specific courses of action.)

b. We recognize the problems you face in carrying out the proposed operation into Phong Saly and Northwest Luang Prabang Provinces in Laos. We are therefore prepared to supply such cadres, technical personnel, and logistic support as may be needed for this operation. We now propose that this operation be expanded to embrace occupation of as much as possible of Sam Neun and Xieng Khouang Provinces, along with additional territory in the direction Savannakhet and Attopew. We should not let pass this favorable moment to occupy as large a part of Laos as possible. Our military mission in Hanoi is prepared to concert planning for this operation with you with a view to initiating it no later than August 1.

In this connection and for related purposes, we also propose that we activate our common clandestine assets in Northeast Thailand in order to increase political pressures on the Thai authorities.

c. We are prepared to supply, on your request, any military personnel or units needed to protect communication lines from China into North Vietnam in order to facilitate the movement of supplies and materiel from China and other friendly countries.

d. Our minesweepers are ready to assist yours in restoring access to your harbors through imperialist mine fields or to assist in establishing defensive mine fields if considered appropriate.

e. We believe that you should move now to augment the strength of the VC in the South, in order to be prepared to exploit to the maximum the psychological opportunity for achieving victory when the US/GVN aggression against the DRV fails as we are confident it will. We do not believe, however, that the time is ripe for further stepping up the intensity of the liberation struggle.

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f. In the event that the US/GVN persist in their aggression, we suggest that you be prepared to move with your regular forces against the imperialist base in SVN. Our mission in Hanoi is prepared to assist you in preparing contingency plans for such an operation.

5. NCNA has been directed by the Central Committee to initiate a publicity campaign - the threat to public order in China, as well as in Burma, posed by the presence of remnant KMT bandit groups along the China-Burma border.

6. The CPR Embassy in Phnom Penh has been instructed to tell the Cambodian Government that the PRC is prepared to send a permanent military mission to Cambodia and to supply a few fighter planes.

7. The Ministry of Defense has alerted selected ground forces in South China to be prepared to move on short notice into North Vietnam and occupy designated administrative and communication centers.

8. The Ministry of Defense has issued orders to appropriate commanders in the Kunming and Canton Military Regions to be prepared to execute cross-border offensive operations through Laos into Thailand and/or into northern Burma on order. PRC troops would enter Burma only on invitation.

The Foreign Ministry is leaking the above instructions to neutral Embassies in Peking.

9. The Ministry of Defense has been directed by the National Defense Council to conduct defensive military maneuvers involving all forces on Hainan for a period of one week beginning August 1.

10. The PRC has asked the DPRK whether it would be convenient for a high-level military mission to come to Pyongyang to conduct discussions on common defense problems beginning about August 1.

11. The Prime Minister has directed appropriate subordinate agencies to prepare for a meeting of peace-loving nations and peoples to convene in Peking on

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August 15 to protest against US/GVN aggression against the DRV. The Foreign Ministry and various popular front organizations have been instructed to issue appropriate invitations to governments and organizations in all socialist and neutralist countries.

CONTINGENCIES

1. The contingent actions noted in Message No. 2, Move No. 1, remain valid.

2. If the air attacks against the DRV continue, and even if (a) US forces participate directly, (b) bombers are escorted by fighters and (c) bombing attacks are launched against airfields in NVN, we would continue to augment our assistance in the air defense of the DRV. We would, if necessary, use airfields in South China to fly defensive sorties into NVN.

If all defensive measures fail, we would endeavor to have the DRV invade SVN with its regular forces.

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FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

(RED Move II, Action 3, requested Khrushchev to write letter to President Johnson, De Gaulle, and Home.) Following is text of letter to President:

Dear Mr. President:

The serious trend of events in SEA leads me to utilize this technique of direct communication which has proven so valuable to both of us in the past.

Mr. President, it is clear that you and I can never reach agreement on the fundamental question of equity in the struggle of the peoples of SEA. The position of the SU is clear: that the people of an area have a right to freely determine the system of government under which they live. We believe this to be the essence of the problem in Vietnam. I recognize your view is a different one and my purpose here is not to engage in a polemic on this matter. Rather, my purpose is to appeal to your wisdom, which is based upon a knowledge which only we two share, of how thinly the fate of the world hangs in balance if madmen rather than statesmen determine events.

Mr. President, actions by forces receiving direct US support are bombing the people and peaceful industry of the struggling population of the DR of V. Women and children are dying. Productive resources required for a better way of life are being destroyed. Ships of third countries who are in no way involved in this struggle have been sunk as a result of your country's efforts; this being an unprecedented effort in time of peace.

Mr. President, it is not the SU who is supporting bombing and destruction of GVN. It is not the SU who is sinking US shipping.

Mr. President, it is not the SU who has been branded an aggressor in the SC of the UN and who will shortly be so branded by the GA. Nor, Mr. President, is it the SU who is threatening still a further expansion of the war. Great fleets of men and weapons of the US are now moving into position for an obvious aggressive action in SEA. Veiled threats have been made to expand the war, to bomb the PR China and even to employ nuclear weapons. Mr. President, these are grave, grave steps whose possible consequences are unpredictable in detail, but highly ominous in general.

Though I have said we are separated on matters of

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fundamental belief, I believe I am correct in saying that you and I are not separated on the question of the importance of avoiding a world conflagration and nuclear holocaust. Though neither you nor I can or will abandon our principles nor our allies, we have an obligation to do what we can to resolve differences peacefully, through negotiation, not force.

To fail to exhaust this course of action is foreboding. Should attacks on Soviet shipping be met by attacks on US shipping? Should attacks on the sanctuaries of the PR of C be met by attacks on Japan, on Philippines or South Korea? And most importantly, should the barrier to the use of nuclear weapons be destroyed without thought for the ultimate consequences of such action? I say, Mr. President, such actions are not in the interest of the US nor of the SU nor of all peaceloving peoples throughout the world. I cannot believe that the American people, in the midst of an election campaign, believe they are supporting a government pledged to such a dangerous course of action.

Mr. President, we have an obligation, you and I, to guard the peace of the world. The position of the US has suffered grievously in the eyes of almost all the world's populations and governments. Look at what has happened in the UN. But Mr. President, there is still time. There is still an opportunity to reverse the dangerous direction of events. There is still an opportunity to demonstrate to the people of the world that the US stands behind its professed belief in peace. There is still time for you, Mr. President, to lead your country in this direction.

The action which we must take, Mr. President, is to meet at once to discuss the serious problems before us. I am prepared to travel to any point to make the supreme effort for peace. One thing and one thing only is required for such a meeting to take place: the aggressive action, the bombing of people and cities, the destruction of neutral shipping, the movement of masses of troops and the threats of expansion of war should cease. Surely all the people of the world must recognize these as just and reasonable preconditions. They should not be beclouded by other demands, such as the USG has previously made, for cessation of the just civil war in Southeast Asia, a situation which neither you nor we can control. It is however, possible for you to control US forces.

Mr. President, all the nations of the world call for

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you to act. You cannot ignore this call and continue to purport to stand for peace and justice. Most importantly, Mr. President, you cannot ignore the fate of humanity which rests upon you, and only your decision.

Your buddy,

K.

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SIGMA I-64

CRITIQUE

The senior level critique, attended by all participants, was held at 1700 on Thursday, 9 April 1964. As a basis for critique discussion, the Game Director provided all present with a series of "Items for Consideration." These are outlined below. A verbatim record of the critique follows the discussion items. It is noted that no attribution is made to specific critique participants. The speakers are identified merely by the color of the team to which they were assigned.

ITEMS FOR CONSIDERATION - 9 APRIL 1964

1. FOCUS.

Game Objectives

To Consider:

(1) Actions which US and/or RVN can take against NVN to force that government to cease support and direction of insurgency ops in LAOS and SVN.

(2) Possible CHICOM and/or SOVIET reaction to overt military action against DRV by either RVN or US.

(3) Possible reaction of neutral and friendly countries to such ops.

(4) Extent to which such ops would contribute to successful prosecution of the war in SVN.

2. IMPLIED ASSUMPTIONS.

(a) Basic scenario assumes that the programs and actions inside SVN, civil and military, plus the limited scale of cross border operations into LAOS and covert operations into NVN aren't enough.

(b) Proposed strategy of BLUE appears to be based on these implied assumptions.

(1) VC actions are responsive to directions of HANOI.

(2) VC insurgency could be eventually controlled if direction and support from HANOI ceased.

3. MILITARY ACTIONS - BLUE.

(a) How does one measure the effectiveness--

--will it be in reduction in capability to support VC?

--will it be in reduction of NVN economic base?

--will it be primarily to influence the decisions of Ho Chi Minh?

--just how much might the proposed operation contribute to successful prosecution of the war in SVN?

(b) There is a lack of concensus on time lag or even a correlation between a decision in HANOI and the evidence of this decision in SVN.

--are our present indicators valid?

--are there any other indicators we can identify?

--should BLUE specify to HANOI, e.g., no more attacks on hamlets, no more rail and road cuts, etc.?

(c) Once embarked on overt actions as proposed, should there be (or can there be) an announced cessation in specific provisional terms, i.e., "We have ceased action against the base of support of the insurgents. But unless insurgent actions show positive indications of cessation, we are prepared to take further measures as we deem necessary."

4. POLITICAL.

(a) The BLUE strategy, in the view of CONTROL, appears to follow a concept at variance with the internationally "tacitly accepted" methods of combating insurgency as used in GREECE, MALAYA and the PHILIPPINES. Meeting aggression "at points of own choosing by methods of own choosing" (with "aggression" roughly defined as support of insurgency) puts BLUE in the position of having to sell this to many reluctant customers, friend and foe.

--Apparently critical to BLUE position is ability to sell allies/friends/uncommitted nations report, or something like it. Should general reaction to this campaign be weighed (and can it be?) before timing of overt military action is set? Or does BLUE go on schedule, ready to take on the possible repercussions?

--Can BLUE spell out, for bargaining or for its own purposes, a maximum and a minimum position (or condition) for withdrawal of US military down to MAAG ceiling permitted under the Convention?

(b) RED has traditional but widely accepted "cover" in their support of VC insurgency. BLUE has tacitly accepted but fairly transparent "cover" in its combat support activities. All public statements by BLUE officials, have emphasized that this is a RVN struggle to be won by Vietnamese. Yet BLUE actions and world reaction seem to have made this a "BLUE war" in diplomatic exchanges and at the conference table.

--Is this unavoidable?

--Is it acceptable?

--At what point can BLUE most favorably "take over"?

5. On balance, if BLUE at the end of our game play had ceased actions, taken criticisms in stride, and stepped up actions within SVN,

--would the "lesson" to RED have been worthwhile?

--would chances for success in SVN be improved?

SIGMA I-64 CRITIQUE

DIRECTOR: In the action level critique held earlier this afternoon, while we thought it would be interesting to explore the various things in the United Nations and Geneva, we considered that a little bit beyond us since there were some closer items that we would like to look at. To get the meeting and the game in focus we did have objectives of the game which would consider actions that the United States or South Vietnam can take against the North Vietnamese to force that government to cease support and direction of insurgency operations. The possible CHICOM and/or Soviet reaction to overt military actions against the DRV by either the South Vietnamese or the United States; possible reaction of neutral and friendly countries and the extent to which such operations would contribute to the successful prosecution of the war in South Vietnam. I think it's fairly clear as to what the possible actions of the CHICOM's and Soviets might have been. These are open to question, just depending on the scope of actions that were taken by BLUE. However, the extent to which the proposed operations would contribute to the successful prosecution of the war in South Vietnam was open to some question; and the game, you will notice, had a basic assumption in the initial scenario which we must recognize. This assumed that the programs and actions inside Vietnam, civil and military, plus the limited scale of cross-border operations into Laos and covert operations into North Vietnam just aren't enough to prevent the loss of South Vietnam to Communism. That was the name of the game this time so we had to do something. Now the proposed strategy of BLUE appears to be based on two implied assumptions, and this is that the Viet Cong actions are actually responsible to the directions of Hanoi, and that the Viet Cong insurgency could be eventually controlled if direction and support from Hanoi ceased. Do I find any dissension to these two basic assumptions that we figure are implied in this? Then the next question, really is, "Using military actions to stop either the direction or the support, or both, how does one measure the effectiveness?" Is it going to be a reduction in the capability to support the Viet Cong, that is, knock out the capability to support them? Would it be by a reduction in the economic base which will knock down the support? Or is this primarily to influence the decision of Ho Chi Minh? And if so, is our prime indicator some announcement from Ho Chi Minh or a spokesman of the government? Is it going to be from indicators that we now have, and how valid are these? Are there other

indicators which we can identify or should we state definite actions in South Vietnam that we want stopped? If these stop, we'll stop. The action teams "came a cropper" for about thirty minutes of discussions of how long it would take to recognize such a thing. Even if you had an intercepted message which says, "STOP EVERYTHING," can you believe it? And what are the indicators in South Vietnam - how can you gauge that the other side has complied with our demands, let's say? Are we satisfied that we could determine that Ho Chi Minh or the direction up there had actually complied with the demands so that we could call off our acts or not?

BLUE: Are you asking for an answer?

DIRECTOR: If anyone has one, I'd like to hear it.

BLUE: I'd say yes, you can tell. It would be by reduced activity of the Viet Cong in the South, and very marked reduced activity if they were issued orders to do so. Certainly, there would be some that don't get the word, there are probably some down there that are in the game for what they can steal anyway, who probably won't pay any attention to it. But by and large, if the word goes from Hanoi down to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, they are going to stop. Certainly you can measure it.

DIRECTOR: The program as laid out was on a fairly fast time base it looked like. Should there be a group of actions for a week - ten days, and then stop in order to see indicators or do we continue actions waiting for them?

BLUE: My impression is that our time base was too fast on this. I don't think that it's a fact that you would move within the same time frame as we moved in the game - that in fact, you would move with a slower and more paced time frame.

DIRECTOR: Well, would we try to keep these as non-attributable actions as long as possible, or perhaps during the whole time. The question in here was really that the cover that the Communists have been able to get accepted world-wide is pretty good. They do all these things, people recognize it, and say, "Oh, all right."

BLUE: It's no good - it's just that we accept it by habit.

DIRECTOR: ...and our own cover is somewhat less accepted.

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BLUE: It's as good as their's but people aren't accustomed to it.

BLUE: Yes, but they are not using North Vietnamese or CHICOM aircraft in South Vietnam.

BLUE: They are using their ground weapons down there ... they aren't using any aircraft, but they are using their other weapons down there ... I can't see the difference between a gun and aircraft

BLUE: I know, but as far as acceptance, in general opinion, there is a difference between

BLUE: There is a great educational program obviously necessary in this whole business, that's part of the job. I personally feel it can be done or could be done if we would marshal all our resources.

DIRECTOR: Control, of course, has come in for a great deal of criticism because we gave something less than full support to the actions of the United States to sell the idea that through pictures or reports or anything, that what was going on actually was bad, because this has been going on all the time - now why are you so excited about it now - this sort of an approach. Possibly we were wrong on this one. We thought that it would be a darn hard thing to sell.

BLUE: It would certainly take a much higher level of effort than we ever put into it before.

DIRECTOR: Do you think it's necessary, to have some success in this, a measurable one - and again how do you measure it - before this schedule of military operations should be initiated.

YELLOW: Success in what?

DIRECTOR: Success in convincing ourselves in this country and our allies, anyway, that this indirect aggression is actually aggression and you have a reason to meet it outside of the borders.

BLUE: I don't think that Control's reaction was excessive to the political base that we laid. I don't think that BLUE, speaking for BLUE, laid a sufficient political base for us to go through the actions that we did.

BLUE: Your question is, "Should we have held up the

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military action until we were satisfied ... ?"

BLUE: Yes, that goes back to what I was saying previously about the time frame under which we were operating.

BLUE: We didn't have much time - things were deteriorating pretty fast.

RED: With respect to time, what is the game date today?

DIRECTOR: The game date today is about the 27th of July.

(UNKNOWN): What was it yesterday?

DIRECTOR: About the 22nd of July.

DIRECTOR: We actually did not try to do an interface and make a value judgment on exactly what happened here. We threw the RED action team a curve ball because they wanted to go right forward with the strategy that was going, to take this and rely on world opinion to make the United States back down. They considered that everything in the history as far as they could look at with regard to the bombing of people who were not really defending themselves or anything else, indicated that the United States would back down. That was their basic strategy and they didn't want those MIG's and antiaircraft in there. But since again the mechanics of this and with the short period of time we wanted to see, as part of the objectives, what CHICOM action would mean, Control threw those MIG's up there to shoot them down. Today there was a great deal of discussion at the action level - had RED persisted in such a strategy what would have happened? I couldn't tell you on that one.

RED: Well, as a matter of fact, when we discussed this yesterday afternoon, the question of the introduction of CHICOM aircraft and surface-to-air missiles and what not, we concluded it wouldn't have been a bad idea to have some in there recognizing that you are not going to get any level of air defense that's worth a damn. In other words, you're not going to stake your industrial base against the types of attack that the Imperialists would be able to put on, you would lose the base. So in essence, whether you have the defensive forces in there or not, you are relying on world sympathy or world opinion to force the imperialist to cease and desist. That's what it comes down to unless you go and get a confrontation between the Soviets and the United States which would have greater benefits, we thought, in making the Imperialists stop and think a little bit.

YELLOW: Viewed from the Yellow perspective, one of the things we couldn't really understand about the RED was that we didn't know what degree of damage they were taking; what their capability to sustain their operation was. We had no assessment given to us as to whether or not these people were hurting or not in this operation. And I think this goes back to the question of the assessment of, looking at it from BLUE's viewpoint, when do you know when you have had some success in the South. I should think one of the things would be when the Viet Cong starts surrendering, voluntarily turning themselves in. Then you know that they are probably hurting because they are not getting what they need and they are a little worried about the support behind them and whether that support is going to hold up. But we had no assessment looked at from the point of view of the YELLOW who were trying to assist these people - whether or not the REDS were suffering in a way that was tolerable or whether it was intolerable.

DIRECTOR: The action teams could come to no firm ideas since it was impossible for any of them to think exactly like a North Vietnamese leader as to just how much they could take when all they had to do to stop this stuff was to tell the people down south to lay low which was a reasonable Communist tactic.

BLUE: I agree with you, I think that's far more plausible than being willing just to sit by and have the country returned to a peasant economy by the destruction of everything. That to pretend to acquiesce - present us with all the problems we recognize of finding out are they really desisting or not. This would certainly seem more appealing to me if I were Ho Chi Minh than to have my country destroyed.

YELLOW: This was YELLOW's viewpoint and one of the reasons we put the pressure on North Vietnam to slow the tempo of operations by the Viet Cong. But whether this could be done quickly enough so that it would become evident enough early enough to stop the BLUE, is something else.

RED: We leadership in the DRV did not want to be liberated by you CHICOMs.

YELLOW: We weren't coming in there very fast either.

RED: We'd lose just about as badly as we would with the savage Americans. In fact, we'd also thought that if we lost we would probably be in the happy state of being

the largest recipients of AID in the history of the world.
(Laughter)

YELLOW: Well, you probably noticed the YELLOW wasn't too anxious to come in there either.

DIRECTOR: Looks as if it did get up to where there was some involvement at the scale that it was getting to, that the position of the USSR becomes quite interesting. You almost could take it either way you want to as to what would happen on this one. There was a great deal of feeling amongst the action teams that it would probably be the actions of the USSR that would bring this to a close one way or another. And possibly they wanted it to quit, wanted it stopped. There was a differing side on that too that nothing they'd like much more than something that they saw could be limited to that area over there. But that a combination of the UK, France and the USSR on the diplomatic front might try - I won't say that the UK and France might try to embarrass us - but that the Russians would try to embarrass the United States and the others would be in here trying to come to some sort of agreement. We fell down flat on our face in Control on this one because we just couldn't figure out just what the USSR might be doing in this other than talking. Yet they are not losing, (we played it this way), they are not losing a Communist satellite by this action because if they could believe the United States, or the BLUES, in this case, all that they are doing, all that we're demanding is cease activities down in the south -- we've no idea of going up; and North Vietnam will still be Communist after all our actions are over so it's not deserting a friendly Communist government. They can lend support to a liberalization front, to a liberation front, but they don't have to do it now, it doesn't have to be very active. So there are ways that they can weasel out of giving any support if they wanted to.

BLUE: They do have to accept the Communist government though, taking a defeat?

DIRECTOR: Yes.

YELLOW: Why did the Soviets go into the United Nations? Why didn't they use the Geneva mechanism where they'd have a much more direct measure of control rather than throwing into the United Nations where they ran up against a veto and what not? Is this a Soviet decision or a RED decision?

CONTROL: No, this is a Soviet decision and I think the object here is to permit the Soviets to maximize the

political benefit. After all, this is a rather unique position here in the United States, for the first time in the history of the UN being put before the United Nations in the role of an aggressor. As a matter of fact, having for the first time to use its veto in order to get out of this only to be thrown back into the General Assembly where world opinion is coalescing against them. This would be very tempting for the Soviets to play out a little - it's not costing them very much.

BLUE: Who says world opinion is going to go against us? I admit we have been trying in the last several years to alienate every friend we've got but we haven't alienated them all yet.

CONTROL: No, but I don't think that you would have very many of them on your side. Not with overt US Farmgate attacks...

BLUE: That's your opinion; I've got another opinion.

CONTROL: I know, I'm just giving you mine.

BLUE: We won't have many people on our side if we lose here either. When you look at the unpleasant things that are happening to us, we are definitely unpopular. The alternative is losing South Vietnam.

BLUE: I never thought that BLUE expected to win its case in the General Assembly, did you? We just had to take our lumps on that one.

BLUE: I think that if we would have prepared things right, we'd win in the General Assembly because right is on our side. But the whole atmosphere of this thing I find unacceptable because the whole answer seems to be that we can't win against Communism. We can't even win against North Vietnam. It's a war that we've launched against them or just using force to exert our will on North Vietnam and apparently, with all of our strength we can't enforce our will on North Vietnam.

BLUE: That's a different question. I'm inclined to think that there is a question to be raised there, but I wouldn't expect that because we are right we are going to get 55 votes in the General Assembly. The General Assembly just doesn't operate that way.

BLUE: If we prepare our case properly.

BLUE: I think Control is getting a guilt complex over...
(Laughter)

BLUE: I think RED behaved in a very un-North Vietnamese fashion.

YELLOW: Ho Chi Minh would never have come to New York. Who put him in New York?

BLUE: ... nor would he have amassed his women and children around his industrial installations.

RED: He just said he was going to do that.

RED: No, I think it runs into something of this time frame problem though. The RED Team's effort was to go all-out in this question of world public opinion for what it was worth. But obviously you would go into another phase later on if it doesn't work. The more that's destroyed, the less you have to protect, possibly you are more willing to take more punishment under those circumstances. To answer YELLOW's question about public opinion, I think the second day's script showed that public opinion was taking it in North Vietnam - in fact it was rallying behind the government so that this wasn't a particular problem. It wasn't just a question of world opinion either. We were thinking of US opinion, too, and what the reactions would be domestically here if we struck this pose. One more thing I think is relevant too and that is that if the VC should suddenly scale down their degree of activity would not that in fact prove the point that they were controlled by North Vietnam. So, this again is one of the things that we wouldn't want to go into in the first stage.

RED: That's right, we discussed this at great length, because in effect you're proving that we are lying when we say we don't control the VC... (All talking) ... lying never bothered you before!... No, I was going to say that's an uncharacteristic worry ...

RED: I think it was for that reason that part of the RED strategy was to try to give the VC a political identity of trying to make them a party in political negotiations.

DIRECTOR: Well, since there was question about the reaction and getting castigated in the world court and so forth, the question came up of the possibility of this gradual build-up as to who this was helping and who this was hurting. Was it building up pressure on the United States faster than it was on the North Vietnamese? And whether or not it might not have been better to take a quick "bang" action which would have some effect because you are

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going to get the same castigation from one as the other.

BLUE: What do you mean by a quick "bang" action?

DIRECTOR: I mean instead of sending up a tit-for-tat operation; to go up and let it be a rather massive one the first time against all types of military and industrial targets.

BLUE: By United States forces?

DIRECTOR: Never. We thought that the idea here would be to maintain a posture all along of unattributable ...

BLUE: Don't ever use that word unattributable -- it's going to be attributed to us ... (All talking) ... That's right... Well, quote, unquote ... Let's not be fooled by this thing ... disavowed ... What we're doing, we're keeping a facade that leaves some face for the Chinese and the Soviets. To me that's the whole merit of it.

RED: Don't forget that American Lieutenant we pulled out of a plane now ...

BLUE: Well, that's all right now. We should have announced that in our pre-war propaganda campaign that we are indeed going to assist these lads...

BLUE: That's right - fighting volunteers.

BLUE: Yes! Volunteers. I think that's an important point that we probably ought to get around to here; whether under the situation presented we were justified or needed to move into an overt US phase. You heard us argue that in our room yesterday; many of us. I for one don't think we were justified; and certainly if we'd have used our Blue chips earlier as my colleague suggested yesterday, there'd be no question in my mind as to the adequacy of the Air Force available to knock out all the targets we were interested in, in North Vietnam without overt ...

BLUE: What was your feeling in RED as your industrial base began to get hit - did losses start bothering you up there?

RED: Yes, it was bothering us but we thought there was nothing we could do.

RED: We don't have much to protect up there.

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BLUE: Why sure you could say, "Let's have a cease-fire and let's talk this thing over."

RED: We thought we had you fellows pretty much in a box on the political level, and we wanted to give you one more turn of the screw and to see whether you'd let go or not.

BLUE: We were starting to like it ... (Laughter)

YELLOW: Well, that's about the way YELLOW looked at it too, that BLUE was beginning to take a little bit of a beating and looking back in history they weren't too anxious to get world opinion against them. Looking at it from a military point of view we could see that if we came to a confrontation with BLUE in the narrow land front and North Vietnam accessible to the sea where we had both naval and air power against us we couldn't win a military victory in North Vietnam.

BLUE: Well, you could lay off for awhile and campaign in the South.

YELLOW: That's what we did.

YELLOW: The one thing that surprised us though, in YELLOW, was the gung ho spirit that the Soviets showed in all this. In fact, I think that perhaps the whole Soviet posture in this was the thing that was most surprising to us on the YELLOW Team all the way throughout. They were much more forthcoming than we expected them to be in any event.

BLUE: Wasn't it because they weren't really doing anything?

YELLOW: Well, they were around and they had SAMs in there by the time - I don't know how they got them in there - ... (All talking) ... they had to do an awful lot to get them in there ...

UNKNOWN: Yes, and how did they get the MIGs into Cambodia? ...

BLUE: I don't think that was a very realistic part of the scenario putting those SAMs in there - they never put them anyplace else. I don't see how they could get those SAMs in there. It would seem to me that one of the principles of a thing like this is to do the things that are reasonably possible. SAMs don't grow overnight you know.

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DIRECTOR: Well, we thought we had taken care of it time-wise by an announcement that they were ready to do it some two or three weeks beforehand and that they showed up construction of SAM sites. They never did actually shoot anything.

BLUE: Wouldn't you political gentlemen share the view that the United States got out in front too fast in this business; we never got brother Khanh out there to take the rap, making speeches - that sort of thing.

BLUE: Very much so. This was my comment on BLUE. I don't think that the Control reactions to what we had done were excessive. I don't think that we laid the political base on this. I think that the lesson I draw from it is the importance of doing a better job on that.

BLUE: When you get into the business of efficient bombing, I think that we were given a choice between a 70 to 75 percent job as against a standard of 100 of what we could do. Then my own personal guess was that that was conservative that probably it made quite a lot of difference to do it right. When you take the framework of "tit-for-tat" and you want, in fact, to communicate them reasonably clear, it would seem to me that there was a good deal to be said for doing it right. Now, Farmgate can probably be generated a little more effectively with nothing but loyal and valiant Americans' assistance to embattled South Vietnamese who are themselves making these decisions. But I don't believe myself, that with all the effort in the world we are going to get a complete picture of the independent and strong and freedom-loving government of South Vietnam just turning to the Americans for help. It is too obvious that the decision to move north has to be an American decision. We are not going to fool ourselves. We are not going to fool the entire American press. We are not going to fool the American Congress. Therefore, I think we have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that BLUE is out front on this.

BLUE: I don't quarrel with this. I think it fits in with what I was saying - we hadn't laid a base for it.

BLUE: The problem is really the one that which I think the answer is hard and I wish it were easy.

BLUE: Well, why shouldn't we be out in front on this? Everybody knows that we are at war with Communism. For a number of years we've been building up our strength, trying to build up our NATO strength, against a Communist attack.

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Well, there hasn't been an attack for one reason alone, and that is that there is no chance of it succeeding. We've had the preponderance of strength. We still have it. So they've been trying these other things. While we've had the preponderance of strength, we've lost Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, China and all the rest; while we've had the preponderance of strength this has happened to us. It's happened in this classical example of a Communist takeover - the last example right down here at Cuba. Now, while we've got the preponderance of strength, if this is the way we are going to attack them, we ought to make this pretty expensive for somebody.

BLUE: I'm just talking about whether people would regard us ... the problem is not what you think or what I think in terms of world opinion. It's what other people think.

BLUE: That's right. But maybe they don't think exactly that way.

BLUE: They don't think, for example, that we lost Lithuania - they don't think we ever had it.

BLUE: Lots of people do ... we had Czechoslovakia ...

UNKNOWN: We had Czechoslovakia? ...

BLUE: Yes, it was a free and independent country.

BLUE: You have to be a little careful, I think, of equating our opinions with world opinions, that's the problem. I'm not clear at all though, that either RED or Control are right in putting all this weight on world opinion. That seems to me to be the interesting question.

BLUE: And our friends up North were sure we would buckle under it.

BLUE: I think there is a failure here in not building up the North Vietnamese direction of the Viet Cong ...

BLUE: If we back off, like this looks like we should, we've lost Vietnam. We've got to use some other type of tactics and my suggestion is that we've got to make it expensive for somebody to take on these excursions. Now, we could make it expensive in the case of North Vietnam. We could put North Vietnam into the stone age. Now does Ho Chi Minh want to do that or not? If you start out so that there is no doubt in his mind that this is what is

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going to happen to him if he persists, he's got a choice to make and it's a pretty hard one.

BLUE: It's not clear though that if you put him into the Stone Age as to what degree you've solved your problem in the South. This is what underlies this.

BLUE: That's why I suggest that with the "Stone Age" certainly there's not going to be any support going into the South from there anyway.

BLUE: No, that's true. But take the case of Malaya. Malaya, without any outside support existed on its own internal strength for a long time. It's not clear at all in South Vietnam that this could not exist.

BLUE: When you fight a war you have to have bullets. You have to get them from some place. And you have to have some help from outside if nobody inside can give them to you.

BLUE: But you capture them. A lot of that is going on.

BLUE: You can't capture enough to keep yourself going.

BLUE: Malayas did ... The Red Chinese did.

BLUE: These things do happen. That doesn't mean that we wouldn't get a lot of a leg forward if we can change Ho Chi Minh's mind as to how fast he's going into failure. This is why our RED friend over here seems to be more softer about letting his country go down the drain than I'm inclined to think Ho would have been.

RED: The leadership took a long look at this one. (Laughter) We were placing a great deal of reliance on world or public opinion.

BLUE: Yes, but this takes time. We are going to destroy you before that can be ...

YELLOW: I think we can go back to one of the BLUE's statements on this; that of the degree of tolerance that Control gave to the idea of public opinion. I don't think that public opinion even in the Neutralist part of the world has any illusions about who is running the war in South Vietnam. I think that the general opinion accepted in the Neutralist part of the world and certainly in the United States, in fact, I just saw a 70 percent statistic on this today - that it is run from the North. And the

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question is whether Control did, as you suggest, give a proper tolerance to this. I think they over-reacted.

BLUE: I don't think that losing a vote in the General Assembly, ... My difference with my BLUE colleague, is how that vote will go, not how important it is - it doesn't make that much difference.

DIRECTOR: Well, we in Control will take the blame for possibly going too far on this. But we did it for one reason - and this is that this is the first time that it's attributable to the United States - you just said that everybody knows we are doing this - this is the first time in all of this stuff that you have gone outside the country where the combat is and started hitting at the source. This is something new. I will say that personally I think that it probably would be a good idea to have something new, and let's do this, but ...

BLUE: We are losing under the old rules; maybe we better have some new ones.

DIRECTOR: Absolutely, but we thought that this would raise one horrible hue and cry of the United States doing this. Now, let's carry it a little further. There is a movement of insurgency of sorts in Venezuela that has received an arms shipment from Cuba. Are we going to hit Cuba? It can be parlayed that far, in our little committee it was, and I was faced with the same thing ... (All talking) Let's war game it ... and see what happens ... I'd enjoy playing that in another arena...

BLUE: What has not been emphasized here is the degree of control and direction from North Vietnam. At some point it may be necessary to expose that. It may be that the indicator that you are looking for is to knock off and to send, as was pointed out, clear text messages - to knock off coded messages and so forth. Now this is getting into an area that you don't like to even talk about. But maybe you have to demonstrate the case against North Vietnam more clearly than is demonstrated by the Jordan report. This, I think is one of the failures of the operation.

DIRECTOR: This matter of indications, not of indicators, of what's happening down here, but transferring the idea from what the BLUEs actually have in mind over to Ho Chi Minh came in for some discussion too. That when they found out of the rather massive movement of BLUE; in other words BLUE was getting ready for the works. Then they began to

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have some wonder about the announced, "We don't want to take any of your territory, we're not trying to do anything big, all we want you to do is stop this." But then when they see divisions, troops, actually going into Thailand and movements of forces are reported all over, then they begin to question the motives of BLUE - did they really mean what they said?

BLUE: It didn't happen until the Chinese divisions moved.

BLUE: I don't think that we talked about these military movements by the way ... (All talking) ... we didn't move any divisions ... Yes, you did ...

BLUE: I think it's quite true that the BLUE Team - only those who were familiar with CINCPAC's contingency planning knew exactly what they were doing the first night of the war. I think that would certainly have been looked at in a very different way in real life and we would have had to calculate that.

BLUE: And I think that it would have had a very great international impact - just the preliminary moves, before any bomb was ever put down. I think North Vietnam would have seen very clearly that this is the business this time, this isn't just a demonstration.

YELLOW: One of the things that occurred to some of us on the YELLOW Team, our North Vietnamese counterparts didn't seem to be quite as tough as we Chinese had expected them to be. After all, they had been fighting "Stone Age" wars of a sort for some time and we didn't quite understand their reluctance, for example, to move very rapidly and occupy all of the areas that they could, taking advantage of this period of American hostilities to move in and take over territory that was relatively invulnerable to American counterforce - Laos, North Thailand and those central areas of Southeast Asia, on the assumption that when this thing stopped, as it inevitably would have to stop someday, either by a simulated cessation of Viet Cong activity in the South or a conference or some other gimmick, we the Chinese would still be in a position together with the North Vietnamese to continue expanding our guerrilla base throughout the center of Southeast Asia.

BLUE: You forget one thing though, that no Armies are going to rush out to capture something when there is nothing from behind coming to support them. That's probably the reason they didn't move out.

YELLOW: We kept telling them that we would support them but maybe they didn't believe us... (We didn't believe you!)

RED: We took a pretty hard look at the various counteractions that could be ginned up. We wanted, at this particular stage of the game which was phase two as we looked at it, to keep this sort of scattered so it wouldn't look as though there was a massive Communist plot jelling all over the world leading to a World War. We wanted to keep this with poor little Vietnam, haked to the assaults of the Imperialists, standing alone, you might say, except for the support of right-minded people everywhere. I'd like to add one footnote here and this reverts to the matter of world opinion. If this game brings out nothing more, in my opinion it's been valuable, because I've heard the group at this table rather low-rate the value of world opinion and this is contrary to what I've heard elsewhere at other times on the same subject. In other words, you tend to say, "What if we do get a vote against us in the General Assembly - the hell with it!" I hope I've heard correctly.

BLUE: Well, I don't want to be bound in any way ... (Much Laughter) ... by my gamesmanship. But, I would like to go back to YELLOW's question because one of the things we constantly asked ourselves in the days when the Soviets had land supremacy and we had nuclear supremacy in the European theater was what we did about a hypothetical war situation in which we might bomb the heartland; and they could help themselves to Western Europe. In a small way it does seem to me that this problem arises in this North Vietnamese case. I don't quite share my teammate's view that they would be so readily restricted from the notion of just getting in a little Viet Minh in Laos and really thickening their position. In a way it would be quite hard for us to cope with.

BLUE: I quite agree. Under the guidance we've been giving in some recent planning in that case we would not go into Laos. We would hold on the Mekong until this thing settles down and the effect of the bombing really takes the starch out and then decide what to do about Laos.

YELLOW: But the fact is, they did not move. We kept on persuading them to move and they didn't move ... (All talking) ... they behaved in such an interesting manner ... it doesn't seem to me that they behaved very much like a North Vietnamese government ... I'm insulted at this ... we thought we were damn clever.

RED: First of all, YELLOW said we aren't good Stone Age

men. It's been because we are willing to absorb this kind of punishment - our whole life has been one of struggle.

BLUE: Why didn't you thicken your position in Northern Laos?

RED: We had some movement into Laos, I believe in our position paper. We were trying to still maintain this first stage, though, of public opinion, etc. Then we were really going to hot it up in Laos. One of the reasons for "hotting" it up in Laos was to bring the Chinese down in there, not into our own country. Also, we thought the terrain was more suitable for our purposes.

RED: There were two dangers that we had to worry about. On the one hand, we might have tried to ease off in the south. Send the word in to ease off, not do as much. The principal problem here is that we just might lose a lot of ground in the South. This might be unfortunate - it would set us back quite a long way. The other was by moving vigorously into Laos or North Vietnam or Thailand. That the Americans who just might be on the verge of not being able to keep this up might feel that, "We just have to move. We might move in on the ground. We might not limit it to South Vietnam, either." Here are these two alternatives ... Some said we could have done both of them at a certain level with relatively small forces, but in terms of major reactions on either side it just seemed to us to be too damn dangerous. We tried to see if we could wait it out. Sit and hope that - not with great expectations by the way, at least for some of us, that the Americans just wouldn't be able to keep it up.

YELLOW: Why shouldn't they be able to keep it up; public opinion?

RED: That they just couldn't stay in the government.

RED: That's the only thing you Americans are fighting, it seems to me.

BLUE: Well, we don't know, of course, what levels of a different kind of public opinion were the kind we're now talking about. The public opinion that you were relying on was condemnation. The public opinion that we haven't examined is what happens if you get a very high sense of a danger level. YELLOW behaved so cautiously. War didn't go on long enough one or the other for us to come against that kind of a question.

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RED: If it kept up, in fact we were talking about starting to invite the Chinese in to make it just look more dangerous. Bring the Russians in if possible to get a US-USSR confrontation. But not yet, it hadn't gone on that long.

YELLOW: We wanted the Soviets to get it. We would have conspired with you to get the Soviets...

BLUE: One thing about this letter to the President, it's much to "pallsy," in fact it ends up "Your Pal" but my concept of the Khrushchev message would be very much the one you remember at the time of the off-shore islands crisis. He'd be coming in with a thunderous denunciation and warnings of nuclear holocaust and he'd pinpoint his targets like Bangkok and Tokyo and so forth, any place where they were sustaining American support. This is the kind of letter... there wouldn't be any tone of friendship in this thing.

BLUE: I don't know about that last sentence there ... (All talking) ... I thought it was a pretty good letter ... I don't know if "Your Buddy" is the right signature or not ... No, I don't think it was ... it was patterned after the Cuban letter ...

BLUE: Our RED friend over here indicated what his primary impression was, but the impression I'm carrying away is the tremendous amount of homework to be done in this government to get into a position of doing anything like this. I didn't like the way the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman had to go back after bombs were down explaining to Congress what this is all about. The preliminaries involved in preparing domestic opinion, world opinion, military preparation which we need to get entirely ready. There is a great deal of additional planning to be done in all departments and I hope that that will be the lasting effect of this - for us all to go back and take a look at what we are doing and see whether it is adequate or not and I personally doubt that it is.

BLUE: I think it is quite obvious that information to the world as to what our policies are and what we are doing, and why we are doing it must be more clearly and succinctly and positively projected.

BLUE: Related to all this is the building up of the GVN also. If we are going to base our actions on the GVN you've got to build up in opinion, a picture of a GVN that merits popular support.

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BLUE: Somebody should be charged personally with the responsibility for watching everything that takes place in point of view of public opinion. We captured a line-crosser a couple of weeks ago. That was a very interesting story but I had to read it in one of our BLUE friend's Top Secret papers.

BLUE: Well, he's the enemy of public opinion - he camps on all our good stuff!

BLUE: Well, after this discussion, I might relax.
(Laughter)

DIRECTOR: Gentlemen, we are nearing the end of our regular time and frankly this hits just about all of the major points that we had to discuss here. As you know there were many others and we could argue, at least it looked like, this afternoon that the action level teams could have argued on to midnight, but some of those other things really were not the basic issues and I think we hit those of importance...

BLUE: May I suggest one thing that I would add to our agenda of thinking. I agree with the remark about the more intensive planning and I agree with the comment that in the end public opinion is the only decisive factor here, that's not terribly interesting. Is there a way we can find out more or ask ourselves whether the North Vietnamese would really be like the REDS thought or whether they would be a little bit different? I would like to see a study of that if we could get it.

BLUE: We could certainly war game our air attack. That's what we do with our air attack in other context and we get a pretty good picture of how these things will go.

BLUE: We really are talking about how some kind of divided Communist mentality will react to a specific kind of pressure. I think we ought to know more about that ...
(UNK): Yes, the psychology of it.

BLUE: I'd like to support that very strongly because whether or not we accept the penalty ...

BLUE: We all have ideas in our heads and we have heard very different views expressed as to how they would go.

BLUE: And the world opinion is the question you come to second. The first one is this one, "What are you going to make them do?" If you're going to win this way then you can take the penalty of world opinion without blinking an eye ...

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UNKNOWN: You don't have a penalty in world opinion because you have won.

BLUE: Yes, that's right, but if you're going to do all this and not achieve your objectives, then world opinion is just an added burden on your shoulders, but the point is you haven't achieved what you set out to do.

BLUE: The trouble is we are doing something which we think at least we must do in order to win but we can't say if we do it we will win.

BLUE: What this question he is asking is, "Can we analyze anymore precisely, anymore accurately, what might happen up there?"

BLUE: We know, for example, that we ourselves would not be responsive to this type of treatment.

YELLOW: We don't know whether BLUE held out any carrots to the RED - they gave them a hell of a lot of sticks but did they ever hold out any carrots? Was that ever in the scenario, I never did see it. Did they offer them food...

BLUE: No, we weren't bright there ...

RED: Only five hundred pounds bombs and napalm ... (laughter) ... the largest postwar aid program.

YELLOW: It seems to me that's an element of what BLUE did not do that I should think would have been a psychologically important aspect.

DIRECTOR: There was one mentioned somewhere in here, that if you stop this that we can get these countries together for trade and that's about all ...

RED: Yes, that was in Khanh's speech.

YELLOW: Then in this study that was suggested by BLUE, there is a point of departure, I think, that is beyond just the start of military action because there is no doubt whatever in my mind that from Hanoi southward, we can do anything we want militarily. Destroy all the lines of communication so there will be virtually no movement of forces to the south. Out of the concentration of forces we can destroy Hanoi. To the northward it is a little harder. But what happens if you start on the assumption this has been destroyed, what would be the reaction of the North Vietnamese to shorten ...

BLUE: Well, you've got to play it very intensively not as a game but as an analytical process of what different kinds of things would do. You've got a real problem which is, I think, to speak a moment about it -- the people who know the most about North Vietnam - and in my experience there aren't very many of them - they aren't thinking in these hard power terms of what in fact a man with this power responsibility will do. I think that there is a good deal of force in the notion which I know my colleague feels that if you put the heat to this fellow he's just going to stop because it's in his interest to stop. But, I don't know that and I don't have any clear sense of ...

RED: Also as he says repeatedly though we haven't done this right along down the line. So, when we start down this road we could perfectly well expect in Hanoi that they wouldn't go that far, therefore, we take this first phase ...

BLUE: We've got to do enough the first time to convince him that we really mean business ... it may take a couple of bites to convince him.

BLUE: Well, I think that even though he doesn't desist willingly, if we can impose enough destruction on him physically that the amount of aid he can continue to give is negligible.

BLUE: That's clear to me because what he's giving is peanuts in terms of substance.

YELLOW: What he's giving is confidence, though. He seems to be the wave of the future and if you can clobber his confidence and demonstrate that they can't defend themselves then a lot of these "gung ho" boys who went south and feel that they're riding the wave of the future, begin to wonder whether they are.

BLUE: I would be very much surprised if air power in conventional terms, no matter how well applied, is going to eliminate communications from north to south.

BLUE: We haven't captured many radios in that respect.

BLUE: But also you'll take out all his economic strength, whatever he has left he'll have to have to keep his own home, in order to feed his own population. He will not have any excess to transfer to the South. So, in effect we will have accomplished, in a de facto way the cessation of aid from the North.

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BLUE: You can do this without any great loss of life if you want to do it that way. You can even do like we did in Japan - drop pamphlets over and tell them that we're going to destroy this target and to get away from there. We did that on certain Japanese cities up there and it worked - they left.

YELLOW: I've seen an awful lot of orientals leave those cities and towns, when they were going to be bombed, in other words, even in Japan or in China, and I don't know how you would get them to do that.....(All talking).....Father Ho just said they were going to do that.....Said they were going to do that.....we volunteered them for it.....(Laughing)

YELLOW: I don't think you'd have to hurt very many people to do a surgical job of taking out every target in the whole area, if this is the object of the exercise.

YELLOW: It would be fun to see or try to get some analysis of what the country would look like to a North Vietnamese if every single target that could be taken out by whatever means we have to take them out were, in fact, taken out; because I suppose there weren't many targets when the French were fighting the Viet Minh.

BLUE: That was the point, they had no stake at that time, now he's given us hostage support.....

BLUE: That's right. But we don't know how important that stake is to him. What really does it mean to him politically?

BLUE: Well it represents years and years of hard work.

BLUE: I think one of the previous Yellow speakers has got the key. It's not the physical, it's the confidence..... in the South anyway. I think it's more the key in the South than supplies and communication because I think these people are motivated in the South and they are motivated by assumption that they are going to win.

BLUE: Sure and they're spreading their doctrine. There is just as much political action as there is guerrilla warfare.....more so.

YELLOW: Don't forget the long march.

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BLUE: We've destroyed their tower of strength.....yes, but that saves you twenty years.....(Laughter)

BLUE: If we could get these people to go on a long march, that would be helpful.....(Laughter).....(UNK): Right back to Yellowland.

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, Gentlemen, we have reached the end of our time. I first want to thank all the people who put these shows on for the rest of us. I want to thank all the rest of you people who have come to the Pentagon and are willing to join in this kind of operation. I wish we'd all think about this - is there any follow on in this particular problem that would be useful to continue under this kind of technique? I'm not sure whether there is, but if you'll pass to me any suggestions along this line, I would certainly be very much interested in carrying this a step farther if, indeed, we think it's worthwhile. Meanwhile if you have any other current problems that you think we might tackle by this approach, I'd appreciate suggestions.

End of Critique

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