Cultural Denial: What South Africa's Treatment of Witchcraft Says For The Future of Its Customary Law

Cultural Denial: What South Africa's
Treatment of Witchcraft Says for the

Future of Its Customary Law*
By
Hallie Ludsin**
I. Introduction ............................................... 63
II. Legal Pluralism In South Africa ............................. 65
A. What is Legal Pluralism? ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
B. Legal Pluralism in South Africa ......................... 65
1. The Development of Legal Pluralism ................ 65
2. Legal Pluralism Today ............................. 68
C. Customary Law ........................................ 70
III. W itchcraft ................................................ 73
A. The Belief in Witchcraft ................................ 73
1. Philosophy of W itchcraft ........................... 73
2. Witches and Their Powers .......................... 76
3. Smelling Out a W itch .............................. 78
B. Social Aspects of Witchcraft Accusations ................ 80
1. Witchcraft Accusations ............................. 80
2. Social Purpose of Witchcraft Accusations ............ 82
IV. Witchcraft Under the Law ............................... 83
A. Treatment of Witchcraft Under Customary Law .......... 83
1. Witchcraft Trials Before the Witchcraft Suppression
A ct 3 of 1957 ..................................... 83
2. Treatment of Witchcraft After the Witchcraft
Suppression Act 3 of 1957 .......................... 87
B. Treatment of Witchcraft Under the Common Law
S ystem ................................................ 89
1. W itchcraft Legislation .............................. 89
2. Witchcraft in the Common Law Courts .............. 91
a. W itch-Killings ................................. 91
b. Ritual and Medicine Murders ................... 96
c. Violations of the Witchcraft Suppression Act ..... 96
* I want to thank Marius Pieterse and Likhapha Mbatha for their invaluable advice, editing
and encouragement during the research and writing of this Article. I also want to thank Ravi
Nessman, Susan Ludsin and Stuart Ludsin for their love and support.
** Visiting Researcher, Centre for Applied Legal Studies of the University of the Witwaters-
rand (Johannesburg, South Africa).
CULTURAL DENIAL
d. C ivil C ases .................................... 99

3. Proposed Reforms to the Witchcraft Suppression
A ct ............................................... 102
V . Im plications ............................................... 104
A. A Repugnancy Clause .................................. 104
B. Distortion of Customary Law ........................... 109
V I. C onclusion ................................................ 110
I would like to make an earnest and humble request . .. to see to it that the
magistrate courts are given unlimited powers to try cases that are related to witch-
craft. It is undoubtedly true that witchcraft does exist and thousands of innocent
people have died and will continue to die unless drastic measures are taken to stop
this malpractice and senseless killing of the people ... I must admit that it was not
very easy for the magistrates to pass a sentence against the witch, the reason being
that the Constitution was biased and, as a result, the cultures and beliefs of the
Blacks were not taken into consideration. Witchcraft is a way of killing people.
Therefore, if killing is a crime as in the eyes of god, why should witchcraft, as a
way of killing in itself, be allowed to exist?? How many more people should die
before the Government can realize that witchcraft is a social evil?? As an Afri-
can, I am bound to view things from an African perspective.'
I.
INTRODUCTION
In the new era of democracy, South Africa and its Constitution formally
recognize customary law as a legal system that should run alongside and in
parity with the government-run common law legal system. 2 The official recog-
nition holds the promise of equality for a legal system dominated by Dutch and
then British colonists, and subordinated for years under successive white South
African governments and Apartheid. Whether this promise will be fulfilled de-
pends on how the South African government and its common law courts will
deal with cultural beliefs reflected in customary law that conflict with the West-
ern culture or norms that predominate the common law system. Whether these
conflicting beliefs will be recognized and respected will determine whether cus-
tomary law will in fact be equal to common law.
This Article will examine the treatment of witchcraft under customary law
and common law, both historically and under the new legal order, and will ana-
lyze the implications this comparison reveals. The first two parts of this Article
provide the background for the discussion and analysis. Part II, Section A de-
scribes the purpose of recognizing two systems of law in one country, along
with the development of legal pluralism in South Africa. This section highlights
the ideological and practical underpinnings of a dualist legal system. Section B
I. Letter from Bongani Siswana to the South African Constitutional Committee (Feb. 9,
1996), at http://cape.constitution.org.za/cgi-bin/catdoc.sh/data/dat/subs/14497.doc.
2. South Africa's government court system is a hybrid of the Roman-Dutch law instituted by
the Dutch when they colonized South Africa and the British common law system enforced once
Britain took over the colonies. For purposes of this Article, I will refer to the government court
system as the common law system.
64 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:62
of Part II briefly explains what customary law is, the problems it faced under
white rule, as well as the new problems it faces in complying with the Constitu-
tion. Part III explains the witchcraft belief and its role in social ordering. The
majority of South Africans believe in witchcraft, despite efforts by colonists and
3
the successive white governments to suppress this belief. Belief in witchcraft
prevails among the educated and uneducated and within both urban and rural
settings. 4 To understand the treatment of witchcraft under customary law and
common law, as well as the justices and injustices of such treatment, one must
first understand the belief.
The first half of Part IV describes the customary law mechanisms devel-
oped to handle the manifestations of witchcraft belief and related violence and
the changes to those mechanisms as a result of attempts to suppress the belief.
The second half of Part IV examines the common law efforts to deal with the
manifestations of the belief, including the Witchcraft Suppression Act, and
whether this treatment changed after the end of Apartheid. The analysis in Part
IV can be summed up with a quote:
There are two schools of thought in the area of witchcraft: those who say that
witches do not exist and those who say that witches do exist. This difference of
opinion extends to the present system of justice in the courts. Traditional courts
5
agree that witches exist, whilst formal courts say that witches do not exist.
As examined in Part V, there are two purposes for using witchcraft as the
basis of this discussion. The first is to use the common law treatment of the
manifestations of witchcraft belief to examine the cultural and ideological bias
of the common law system. The implication of this analysis is that the colonial
repugnancy clause, which made unlawful any customary law or practice deemed
by colonists as against public policy and natural justice, remains in force. This
places the true equality of customary and common law in doubt. The second
purpose is to show how common law principles superimposed on customary law
to solve customary law problems can result in distortions to customary law and
practices. These distortions show: (1) the inadequacies of the common law solu-
tions to problems arising from cultural beliefs it finds repugnant; and (2) the
effects of eliminating customary solutions to these same problems. This Article
concludes that, while it is important to develop customary law to comply with
the Constitution, unless development efforts gain the acceptance of the popula-
tion at whom it is targeted, these developments at best will exist only on paper
and at worst will distort customary law and practice to the detriment of society.
3. REP. OF THE COMM'N. OF INQUIRY INTO WITCHCRAFT VIOLENCE AND RITUAL MURDERS IN
THE N. PROVINCE OF THE REPUB. OF S. AFR. 12 [hereinafter COMM. OF INQUIRY REP.1 (1996).
4. Id. at 12, 57.
5. REP. OF THE NAT'L CONF. ON WITCHCRAFT VIOLENCE 15 [hereinafter NAT'L CONF. REP.]
(statement of Ralushai, Chairperson of Comm. of Inquiry into Witchcraft Violence and Ritual Mur-
der in the N. Province) (convened by the Comm. on Gender Equality, Sept. 6-10, 1998).
2003] CULTURAL DENIAL
II.
LEGAL PLURALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA
A. What is Legal Pluralism?

Legal pluralism is the recognition within any society that more than one
legal system exists to govern society and maintain the social order. 6 Perhaps a
more appropriate definition for South Africa is: "the recognition and legal pro-
tection of [differing or special] customs in situations where the legal system is
exported to a community different from that which gave it birth." 7 These defini-
tions do not suggest that each legal system is treated equally, rather legal plural-
ism merely accepts the existence of two or more legal systems in a society. In
many instances, one legal system is treated as subordinate, allowing for the other
to dominate a society. 8
Legal pluralism serves several purposes. First, and perhaps foremost, it
recognizes the different values and forms of social ordering of various cultures
within a society. Since legal systems are both a part of culture and a reflection
of culture, 9 recognition of the way a culture wishes to be governed contributes to
the culture's self-determination.' 0 Furthermore, legal pluralism provides mech-
anisms for dealing with cultural beliefs and practices not dealt with under the
other legal systems in the society."
As described below, South Africa's colonists and the successive white gov-
ernments recognized customary law for reasons unrelated to self-determination
or acknowledging the importance of cultural differences. Instead, they recog-
nized customary law to maintain their own power. 12
B. Legal Pluralism In South Africa

1. The Development of Legal Pluralism
Colonial governments recognized customary law and the authority of tradi-
tional leaders and headmen to try customary law cases to varying degrees
6. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the 'Social Scientific' Concept of Legal Pluralism, 20
J.L. Soc'Y 192-93 (1993). See also, Alice Erh-Soon Tay, Legal Culture and Legal Pluralism in
Common Law, Customary Law, and Chinese Law, 26 HONG KONG L.J. 194-95 (1996). The sphere
within which legal pluralism may be considered depends on the purpose for which it is being ex-
amined-legal pluralism can be considered within the world as a whole, within a region, a country
or a section of society. For purposes of this Article, legal pluralism will be discussed within the
country of South Africa.
7. Tay, supra note 6, at 198.
8. Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative Law Sets Boundaries,
31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 737, 742-43 (1999).
9. Id. at 739-40.
10. David M. Bigge & Amelie von Briesen, Conflict in the Zimbabwean Courts: Women's
Rights and Indigenous Self-Determination in Magaya v. Magaya, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289, 305
(2000). Put differently, legal pluralism accepts that in reality a society is not governed by one
uniform conception of law. Tamanaha, supra note 6, at 195.
11. Bigge & von Briesen, supra note 10, at 305 (concluding that legal pluralism within
Zimbabwe is a mechanism used by the government to distribute power among traditional tribal
chiefs, and in doing so, to increase the government's legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens).
12. See AA Costa, Chieftaincy and Civilisation:African Structures of Government and Colo-
nial Administration in South Africa, 59 AFR. STUD. 13, 17 (2000).
throughout the regions that now make up South Africa. The amount of recogni-
tion typically depended on the number of indigenous people located in a region,
although eventually customary law was recognized everywhere. In each of the
regions, the Dutch and then British colonists implemented Roman-Dutch law,
forcing it on the indigenous populations. As the British consolidated power in
these regions and the indigenous populations under their control grew larger, the
British began to recognize customary law as necessary to maintain social or-
der.' 3 The British, however, would apply customary law only when customary
law did not clash with the "general principles of humanity observed throughout
the civilized world."' 4 This repugnancy clause was applied strictly in hopes of
'civilizing' the indigenous population.' 5
The colonial governments recognized customary law for pragmatic reasons.
First, the colonists feared that the majority of indigenous people would be un-
16
happy under Roman-Dutch law, which could threaten colonial power. The
British also recognized customary law because they believed that "English law
was too advanced to be applied to the indigenous peoples." 17 Even so, the ap-
plication of customary law was limited to areas considered "of marginal signifi-
cance to the colonial regime, namely, marriage, succession, delict and land
tenure."' 8 Despite these pragmatic reasons, the colonial governments believed
recognition of customary law was a privilege granted
9
to the indigenous popula-
tions-a privilege that could be taken away.'
When the territories of South Africa united in 1910, the white government
continued to recognize customary law and even increased recognition of tradi-
tional authority to control the social and political threat from the indigenous
population. 20 In 1927, South Africa passed the Native Administration Act,
13. In the Cape region, the Dutch and then the British instituted Roman-Dutch law without
regard to the law of the KhoiSan living in the region, as they were few in number. CONFLICTS OF
LAW, S. AFR. LEGAL COMM'N DISCUSSION PAPER 76 at §1.3.2 (June 30, 1998). Towards the late
1800s, Britain was forced to change this policy when it annexed the Transkein territories. No longer
was it practical for the colonists to force Roman-Dutch law on a large population living in a geo-
graphically remote region. Id. at § 1.3.3. In Natal, after taking over the territory from the Dutch,
Britain continued to impose Roman-Dutch law. By 1848, Britain changed its policy after signing
treaties with traditional leaders that allowed the traditional leaders to exercise judicial functions.
The Transvaal did not have specific legislation regarding customary law until 1877 when the British
took control of the region. Id. at § 1.3.7.
14. Id. at 1.3.4-1.3.5. These types of limitations are referred to as repugnancy clauses.
15. GJ van Niekerk, Indigenous Law, Public Policy And Narrative In The Courts, 63 THRHR
403-04 (2000).
16. NJJ OLIVIER, JC BEKKER, NJJ OLIVIER JR. & WH OLIVIER, INDIGENOUS LAW 197-98
(1995).
17. Id. at 197-98.
18. CONFLICTS OF LAW, supra note 13, at § 1.3.10.
19. Id.
20. Id. at § 1.4.2. After the colonies united, the new government developed a system of indi-
rect rule under which the indigenous populations were governed by a paramount chief. The para-
mount chief appointed by the South African government was responsible for keeping social order
within his area. Other chiefs aided in this process. See Costa, supra note 12, at 33. Ultimately, the
paramount chiefs were accountable to a "Native Administrator" from the white South African gov-
ernment, who essentially was the supreme chief. TW BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND AFRICAN CUS-
TOMARY LAW 68 (1999). This system of hierarchy between chiefs had not existed prior to the union
of the colonies. Costa, supra note 12, at 34. Nor had anything other than lineage ever determined
which eventually became the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. Under the
guise of safeguarding African tradition, the Act established segregation through-
out society, including by creating separate courts to hear disputes among the
indigenous populations.2z It also consolidated the colonial laws within the
22
territories.
Under the Black Administration Act, only the courts determined to be
courts of a chief or a headman or Commissioner's courts could hear customary
law cases. Certain ministers to the white government had the discretion to deter-
mine which traditional leaders' courts would be officially recognized as a
chief's or headman's court. 23 The jurisdiction of the approved courts was lim-
ited to "civil claims arising out of Black law and custom" and criminal suits
where the accused was a black person. 24 Under Section 11(1) Commissioners
courts had the authority to choose whether to apply customary law in customary
law cases brought before them. Customary law, however, was limited by a re-
pugnancy proviso. Decisions of the Commissioners' courts and the courts of
traditional leaders and headmen could be appealed to the Native Appeals Court,
later renamed the Bantu Appeals Court.
Eventually, the Special Courts for Blacks Abolition Act 32 of 1986 in large
part abolished the separate court system for the indigenous populations, while
retaining the jurisdiction of traditional leaders and headmen to hear customary
law cases. 25 In 1988, South Africa introduced the Law of Evidence Amendment
Act 45 of 1988. Section 1 of the law reads:
Any court may take judicial notice of the law of a foreign state and of indigenous
law in so far as such law can be ascertained readily and with sufficient certainty:
Provided that indigenous 26 law shall not be opposed to the principles of public
policy and natural justice.
Importantly, this section gave all South African courts jurisdiction over custom-
ary law matters. It also placed indigenous law in the same subordinate position
as foreign law and subjected it to a repugnancy clause. 27
who was chief. This system removed chiefs from accountability to their communities and, instead,
made them accountable to the Native Administrator. BENNETT, supra note 20, at 68. Bennett de-
scribes indirect rule as "provid[ing] future governments with the means necessary to restructure
African political institutions to suit the policies of the moment." Id. at 69.
21. CONFLICTS OF LAW, supra note 13, at § 1.4.4. See also Phenyo Keisent Rakate, The Status
of Traditional Courts Under The Final Constitution, 30 COMP. & INT'L L.J. OF S. AFR 175, 183
(1997).
22. van Niekerk, supra note 15, at 404.
23. § 12 Black Administration Act 38 of 1927.
24. Id. at §§ 12, 20.
25. OLIVIER, BEKKER, OLIVIER JR. & OLIVIER, supra note 16, at 200. Under the 1986 reforms
to the Magistrates Court Act 32 of 1944, which was subsequently repealed by the Law of Evidence
Amendment Act, Magistrates courts became the court of first instance for hearing customary law
claims. Customary law heard by the Magistrates courts was subject to a repugnancy clause.
26. The Law of Evidence Amendment Act immunizes certain customary law practices from
the application of the repugnancy clause, including the practice of lobola or the payment of a dowry
by the husband to the wife's family. This tolerance of certain practices may result from the recogni-
tion by the white government of the importance of lobola to customary marriage practices or may
result from an understanding of the practice itself, making it seem less repugnant.
27. The Law of Evidence Amendment Act no longer requires parties under customary law to
be black before applying customary law. This means that there may be circumstances where cus-
2. Legal Pluralism Today

During the negotiations that ended Apartheid, the African National Party,
the National Party and the other participants agreed to the continued recognition
of customary law in the new South Africa. The Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (Interim Constitution), drafted as part of the set-
tlement, contained Constitutional Principles to which the final Constitution
needed to adhere before it could be adopted. Under Constitutional Principle
XII:
Every court, including courts of traditional leaders, existing when the Constitution
took effect, continues to function and exercise jurisdiction in terms of the legisla-
tion applicable to it, and anyone holding office as a judicial officer continues to
hold office in terms of the legislation applicable to that office, subject to -
i. Any amendment or repeal of that legislation;
ii. Consistency with the new constitution.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 formally
recognizes customary law in Chapter 12 on Traditional Leaders. Section 211(3)
of this chapter states: "The courts must apply customary law when that law is
applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals
with customary law." By using the words "must apply customary law," the
Constitution equalized customary law and common law.2 8 The conditions the
Constitution places on the application of customary law by courts are no differ-
ent than those placed on the common law developed by courts. There are no
explicit provisions in the Bill of Rights providing for a right to be governed by
customary law, although arguably one could be inferred from sections 15, 30
and 32, which make up the right to culture and belief. Section 39(3) states: "The
Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that
are recognized or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the
extent that they are consistent with the Bill." While this provision does not
grant any affirmative right to be governed by customary law, it does allow peo-
ple to invoke rights granted by customary law to the extent those rights have not
been removed by legislation and are consistent with the Bill of Rights. 29 Sched-
ule 6, Section 2, however, states that all legislation in force at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution remains in force unless repealed. The Law of Evi-
dence Amendment Act has not yet been repealed, which means the repugnancy
clause remains in effect. Whether customary law in fact will be treated as equal
to common law will be discussed below.
Schedule 6, section 16(1) protects traditional courts in existence at the time
the Constitution took effect. These courts can continue "to function and to exer-
tomary law applies to whites. See C Himonga & C Bosch, The Application of African Customary
Law Under the Constitution of South Africa, S. AFR. L.J. 306-07 (2000).
28. Compare § t l(l) of the Black Administration Act, which gave Commissioners courts the
discretion whether to apply customary law to customary law issues.
29. § 39(2) further states: "When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the com-
mon law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights." This provision accepts that customary law will be a part of the new
South Africa and seems to expect that customary law will be developed, not simply replaced, when
otherwise inconsistent with the Constitution.
cise jurisdiction in terms of the legislation applicable to it" or until Parliament

amends or repeals such legislation and as long as the legislation is consistent
with the Constitution. 30 With respect to jurisdiction of such courts, Constitution
section 211(2) allows traditional leaders to "observe a system of customary law"
as long as Parliament has not repealed or amended its jurisdiction or the customs
they apply. Nothing in the Constitution, however, limits the power of Parlia-
ment to remove this jurisdiction. For now, the jurisdiction of traditional leaders
over customary law 31
remains intact but is under the review of the South African
Law Commission.
30. This provision comports with § 166(e) of the Constitution, which allows Parliament to
establish or recognize any other court.
31. THE HARMONISATION OF THE COMMON LAW AND INDIGENOUS LAW: TRADITIONAL COURTS
AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS, S. AFR. L. COMM'N. DISCUSSION PAPER 82
(May 1999) [hereinafter HARMONISATION]. In South African Law Commission's discussion of
whether to change this jurisdiction, SALC listed the reasons for continuing the role of customary
courts, as well as the problems with that role. Among the benefits of the traditional courts are: (I)
they protect the cultural heritage of the people whom they govern; (2) disputes are resolved much
more quickly; (3) they are more accessible and less expensive than the common law courts; (4) the
procedure is less complex; (5) because these courts regularly apply customary law, they know the
living customs, not the official interpretations of the customs; (6) they adapt to the changing needs of
society and can be adapted to the requirements of the Constitution; and (7) they reduce the workload
of magistrates. Id. §§ 2, 3.3.2.
The primary reasons for removing traditional courts from the legal process are that the tradi-
tional chiefs, who head the courts, act as the executive, legislature and judiciary, which may be a
violation of the constitutional requirement of independence of the judiciary and may be contrary to
basic tenets of democracy. Id. at § 4.2. But see Bangindawo v. Head of Nyanda Regional Authority,
1998 (3) SA 262, 273 (TK). Also, traditional leaders are not required to have any formal legal
training and their role as judge does not comport with the requirements of judges described in the
Constitution. Id. § 2.2.3. Finally, the system of primogeniture, which determines that only men may
inherit the chieftainship, also violates section 9 of the Constitution, the equality clause. HARMONISA-
TION, at § 2.2.3. Interestingly, SALC recommends that this inheritance scheme remain intact. S.
AFR. L. COMM'N. DISCUSSION PAPER 93 CUSTOMARY LAW OF SUCCESSION [hereinafter SUCCESSION]
§ 4.3. Finally, it is suggested that at a minimum criminal jurisdiction will need to be removed for
violating the right to a fair trial because there is no representation of an accused by a lawyer and
because there is no presumption of innocence or right to remain silent. Id. §§ 2.2.2, 6.6.1. See also,
Bangindawo, 1998 (3) SA at § 277 (holding the provision of Regional Authority Courts Act under
which defendants in criminal matters before customary courts cannot be represented by lawyers is a
violation of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Constitution) and Mhlekwa v. Head of Western
Tembuland Regional Authority, 2001 (1) SA 574, 619 (TK).
Another reason for removing the powers of traditional courts is that under Apartheid, the pow-
ers of chiefs were determined to a large extent by the Apartheid government. As described above, a
traditional court was allowed to operate only when granted permission by relevant officials. Be-
cause of the restriction on recognition of traditional courts, the traditional courts became accountable
to the Apartheid government rather than to the people. Janos Mihalik & Yusuf Cassim, Ritual
Murder and Witchcraft: A Political Weapon?, S. ApR. L. J. 127, 130 (1993). Many indigenous
people perceive traditional courts as functionaries of the government or otherwise favouring the
government in order to maintain power, delegitimizing the role of traditional leaders generally and
traditional courts particularly. Rakate, supra note 21, at 186.
C. Customary Law
Customary law potentially governs the majority of South Africa's citi-
zens.32 Although prior South African governments believed they would elimi-
nate customary law through the "process of acculturation" with Roman-Dutch
and common law,33 it remains vibrant.3 4
Customary law "consists of rules and customs of a particular group or com-
munity."' 35 At the heart of South African customary law is the family. 36 The
family is expected to provide "for all an individual's material, social and emo-
tional needs." 3 7 T.W. Bennett writes, "[b]ecause the family [is] the focus of
social concern, individual interests [are] inevitably submerged to the common
weal, and the normative system tend[s] to stress an individual's duties instead of
his or her rights." 38 Unlike most Western legal systems, customary law focuses
on the obligation of an individual to the family and collective, rather than on
individual personal rights.3 9
Customary law is non-specialized, meaning that it does not distinguish be-
tween varying areas of law. 4 0 For example, and important to this Article, cus-
tomary law blurs the lines between criminal and civil law. The blurring is a
recognition of the extent to which these areas of law are intertwined. Victims of
criminal acts not only want to see a perpetrator punished for his or her crime, but
also want to be compensated for the harm done. Rather than treat the civil and
criminal actions separately, as under the common law system, traditional courts
take a more holistic approach.
Traditional leaders use customary law to maintain harmony within the com-
munity.4 The main goal of traditional courts is to reconcile or mediate between
disputing parties, rather than to apply rules rigidly, finding one party right and
the other wrong. 42 Traditional courts derive customary law from an oral tradi-
tion, 43 and are not bound by the requirements of the Law of Evidence Amend-
32. R. Loenen, The Equality Clause in the South African Constitution:Some Remarks From a
Comparative Perspective, S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 122-23 (1994); TW Bennett, Human Rights and
African Customary Law, S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 678 (1996).
33. BENNEr, supra note 20, at 1.
34. R.B. MQEKE, BASIC APPROACHES TO PROBLEM SOLVING IN CUSTOMARY LAW: A STUDY OF
CONCILIATION AND CONSENSUS AMONG THE CAPE NGUNI 188 (1997) ("We know there are two
cultures in Southern Africa. These are the European culture and the indigenous African culture. By
legislation the European culture was made the general culture of Southern Africa. The indigenous
African culture remains, however, very much alive because it is difficult to legislate effectively for
people's private lives").
35. HARMONISATION, supra note 31, at § 2.1.3.
36. BENNETr, supra note 20, at 5.
37. Id.
38. Id.at 5.
39.WOMEN AND LAW IN SOUTHERN AFRICA RESEARCH PROJECT (WLSA), WIDOWHOOD, IN-
HERITANCE LAWS, CUSTOMS & PRACTICES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 25 (1995).
40. See infra note 54.
41. Van Niekerk, supra note 15, at 406.
42. GL Chavunduka, Witchcraft and Witch Hunts in Africa, in NAT'L CONF. REP., supra note
5, at 39; HARMONISATION, supra note 31, at § 6.4.5.
43. Ph J Thomas & DD Tladi, Legal Pluralism Or A New Repugnancy Clause, 32 CoMP. &
INT'L L.J. OF S. AFR. 354, 356 (1999).
ment Act.' Traditional courts are inquisitorial, not adversarial.4 5 Lawyers are
barred from traditional courts and the court is responsible for examination and
cross-examination of parties and witnesses. 46 The chief and his councilors, who
serve as advisors, question parties on the facts and evidence in each case.4 7 The
inquisitorial procedure is used in both civil and criminal cases. Decisions of
traditional courts are final unless appealed de novo to Magistrates Courts, whose
decisions can be appealed to the High Courts and Supreme Court of Appeal. 4 8
Traditional courts have jurisdiction over civil cases arising out of custom-
ary law, except where limited by law, as well as certain criminal matters also
recognized under customary law. 4 9 The former South African governments
respected the traditional courts' criminal jurisdiction because of the chief's role
in maintaining law and order in their communities. 5 0 Section 20 of the Black
Administration Act, however, limits the types of criminal cases a traditional
court may hear.5 ' Criminal sentences are limited to fines as traditional courts
have been prohibited from imposing sentences of "death, mutilation, grievous
bodily harm or imprisonment."'52 Traditional civil remedies include damages,
compensation and restitution. 53 Traditional courts often exceed their jurisdic-
tion, 54 to some extent, as a result of the blurred distinction between civil and
criminal law. 5
Today, there are two types of customary law practiced in South Africa: (1)
official customary law, and (2) living customary law. Official customary law is
customary law that has been recognized in anthropological studies, court judg-
ments, restatements and in legal codes. 56 Living customary law, in contrast, 57
"denote[s] the practices and customs of the people in their day-to-day lives."
Many consider the "official" customary law enforced by courts to be a dis-
tortion of customary law as practiced before colonialism. 58 Scholars argue that
44. GJ van Niekerk, DemocraticAspects Of Traditional Conflict Management: Unofficial Dis-

pute Resolution in Traditional Authority and Democracy, in SOUTH AFRICAN 84 (UNIV. OF
NABMIBIA CENTRE FOR APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE, ed. 1998).
45. Rakate, supra note 21, at 181.
46. HARMONISATION, supra note 3 1, at § 7.1.1. According to the South African Law Commis-
sion, participants at hearings in traditional courts also are allowed to ask parties questions.
47. Id. at § 2.2.2.
48. Id. at §§ 4.1, 5.1; see also Rakate, supra note 21, at 183-84.
49. HARMONISATION, supra note 31, at § 6.1. 1. Because of the oral tradition of customary law,
one may wonder how a person can live under it. Customary courts expect and assume that those
governed by customary law are aware of its rules. Id. at § 6.3.1.
50. Id. at § 6.3.3.
5 I. According to the South African Law Commission, "The excluded offences are mainly the
more serious offences such as treason, sedition, murder, culpable homicide, rape, arson, robbery.
However the list includes less serious offences but whose elements may be difficult to prove such as
indecent assault, receiving stolen property knowing it to have been stolen and breaking and entering
any premises with intent to commit a crime." Id. at § 6.5.1.
52. Id. at §§ 6.7.1, 6.7.4.
53. HARMONISATION, supra note 31, at §§ 6.4.4-6.4.5.
54. Id. at § 6.5.2; van Niekerk, supra note 44, at 84.
55. van Niekerk, supra note 44, at 84.
56. Himonga & C Bosch, supra note 27, at 328-329.
57. Id. at 319.
58. BENNETT, supra note 20, at 64; SUCCESSION, supra note 31, at § 4.2.1.
the colonists who dominated the common law system interpreted customary law
through their own belief systems and to the benefit of the colonial govern-
ment. 59 In determining customary law, courts often relied on studies by colo-
nists or on the testimony of traditional leaders. Typically, the studies and the
60
testimony reflected the interests of the older males within both societies.
Thus, these scholars argue that "the official version of customary law described
less what people previously did (or were actually doing) and more 61
what the
government and its chiefly rulers thought they ought to be doing."
Also, some scholars believe that the common law courts destroyed custom-
ary law by trying to fit a system based on group rights and conciliation into the
common law litigious system in which individual rights are supreme. Mistak-
enly believed to be a similar system of rules and laws, common law courts over-
looked the many considerations taken by traditional courts before applying a
customary rule or law. 62 The nuances of customary law could not be captured
in these studies, codes or restatements, thus rendering the official customary law
forever flawed. Attempts to codify or restate customary law removed its inher-
ent flexibility and ossified a system meant to evolve with the changes in the
community .63
In contrast to official customary law, researchers have found that living
customary law is "dynamic, adaptable, flexible and practical ... (and) devoid of
rigidity." 64 The purpose of the flexibility of living customary law is to "allow
for a maximum degree of latitude to achieve just and equitable results in each
59. BENNETT, supra note 20, at 63 ("[T]he tradition that the official version of customary law
is supposed to represent is now said to be 'invented'. This epithet is meant to warn us that custom-
ary rules owe less to an ancient practice than to the interests of European writers and officials.
Colonial occupation put settlers into a dominant position, one that allowed them to become arbiters
of the African cultural heritage: they documented it and they determined how it was to be
interpreted").
60. Customary Marriages,S. AFR. LEGAL COMM'N DiscusSION PAPER 74 § 2.3.6 (Aug. 1997)
[hereinafter Customary Marriages];Bigge & von Briesen, supra note 10, at 300.
61. Customary Marriages,supra note 60, at § 2.3.5. According to Bennett, "A critical issue in
any constitutional litigation about customary law will therefore be the question whether a particular
rule is a mythical stereotype, which has become ossified in the official code, or whether it continues
to enjoy social currency." BENNETT, supra note 20, at 64.
62. Rakate, supra note 21, at 181. See also A Nekam, Third Melville J. Herskovitz Memorial
Lecture for the Centre of African Studies at Edinburgh University (Feb. 28, 1966) ("What seems the
most misleading about these attempted codifications of customary law is not that the formulated
rules would, in themselves, be necessarily wrong, but that they are fatally incomplete. For every
'rule' assumed, there are hundreds overlooked, 'rules' which would qualify those stated, balance
them, enlarge them or narrow them down."); Thomas & Tladi, supra note 43, at 356.
63. Bigge & von Briesen, supra note 10, at 301. WLSA, supra note 39, at 122. The WLSA
researchers wrote, "The fact that customary law was written down in texts to be applied by the
courts, for example, means that it is expressed in terms of strict rules that cannot hope to reflect the
flexible processes of decision-making that typify a truly customary system." Id. at 24. The South
African Law Commission similarly noted that "Earlier codes and restatements are now disparagingly
called the "official version of customary law. Modern scholars have called this version into question
not only because it lags behind advances in community attitudes and behavior but also because it
reflects the preconceptions of the time in which it was written." CONFLICTS OF LAW, supra note 13,
at § 10.3.4.
64. WLSA, supra note 39, at 97; Customary Marriages,supra note 60, at § 2.3.1 ("The great-
est value of custom in Africa is its 'dynamism reflected in the spirit or tolerance, dialogue, and
consultation which bear out custom as a process whereby claims and disputes are negotiated'").
20031 CULTURAL DENIAL
case." 65 The fact that customary law has survived concerted efforts to suppress
it attests to the strength of living customary law, its ability to adapt and the ties
of the indigenous communities to it. 6 6 Because "living" customary law evolves
over time and is adapted to each individual situation, this type of customary law
does not pass the stringent test of being "readily ascertainable
67
and sufficiently
certain," and cannot be applied by common law courts.
Unfortunately, while living customary law grows and adapts with changes
in communities, it also develops from other influences, such as interaction with
the common law, urbanization, assimilation with Western norms and values, as 68
well as the changes that result from interaction with official customary law.
Such influences have led one scholar to conclude that customary law is nothing
more than a "myth." 69
WITCHCRAFT
To answer how South Africa treats customary law that is based on a cul-
tural belief or practice not accepted by Western values or norms that
predominate the common law system this Article will compare the treatment of
witchcraft under both the customary law system and the common law. To better
understand the concerns and dilemmas of both systems in dealing with witch-
craft, it is necessary first to describe the belief and practice itself.
A. The Belief in Witchcraft

1. Philosophy of Witchcraft
A majority of South Africans believe in witchcraft. 70 While those beliefs
vary among South Africa's different indigenous cultures, there are many simi-
larities that run between them. This Article will describe the features of witch-
craft that predominate in most, if not all, of South Africa's indigenous cultures.
Significant differences in the beliefs will be described where necessary.
65. WLSA, supra note 39, at 97. According to the SALC, "unlike western-style courts, (tradi-
tional courts) do not feel constrained by pre-ordained rules. Their concern is with substantive jus-
tice." Customary Marriages, supra note 60, at § 2.3. I.
66. Van Niekerk, supra note 44, at 83. While living customary law represents the practices of
indigenous cultures, this does not mean living customary law solves all the problems of customary
law, such as the inequalities it perpetuates among men and women.
67. M Pieterse, Killing It Softly: Customary Law In The New Constitutional Order, DE JURE
35, 37 (2000).
68. For example, van Niekerk described how the white governments could manipulate chiefs'
courts, particularly after the institution of indirect rule, suggesting that many chiefs would do any-
thing to maintain their power. Van Niekerk, supra note 44, at 83. This suggests that, at least to
some extent, living customary law may not reflect the natural development of customary law, but
customary law as it has been manipulated by the white governments. While van Niekerk sees the
survival of customary law despite efforts to manipulate and destroy it as evidence of its strength,
Costa describes the result of such interactions with whites and the manipulation of customary law as
rendering customary law "so flawed as to be barely operational." AA Costa, The Myth of Customary
Law, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 525 (1998).
69. Costa, supra note 68, at 525.
70. COMM'N. OF INQUIRY REP., supra note 3, at 262.
The belief in witchcraft is premised on the doctrines of manism and dyna-

mism. Under manism, deceased ancestors continue to participate in the daily
lives of their families. 7 1 They provide guidance to their families and protect
their family members from misfortune by communicating with the gods on the
family's behalf.72 To receive this protection, family members participate in ritu-
als in recognition of the ancestors' power, continuing the connection between
the family and the ancestors. 7 3 Should the family forget the ancestors, this con-
nection to the spirit world will be broken. 74 Dynamism accepts that "there are
innumerable spiritual beings (including ancestral spirits) ... who not only cause
natural phenomena, but are also the vital forces behind animals, plants and inan-
imate objects in the world."75 These spirits can be good spirits or evil ones
capable of causing harm to people in the living world.7 6
Unlike in most Western beliefs, there is little differentiation between the
conscious, the unconscious and the supernatural. 77 What the Western world
perceives as supernatural, traditional culture considers part of the everyday
events of the natural world. Dreams and meditation, along with trance-like
states or other altered consciousness, are accepted as part of the reality of peo-
ple's lives. 7 8 What happens during these altered states actually happens to the
person. Spirits and ancestors use dreams 79 and altered states to enter a person's
body in order to communicate with them.
In practice, witchcraft provides an explanation for the misfortune that be-
falls individuals. While witchcraft believers accept that a person died of a heart
attack or their cattle died from a disease-which explains how the misfortune
happened - these cultures seek a metaphysical answer for why it occurred. 80
71. Mathole S. Motshekga, The Ideology behind Witchcraft and the Principle of Fault in
Criminal Low, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 149-50 (John Hund ed., 1988).
72. Id.; Credo Mutwa, The Sangoma's Lore of the Sole, 2 AnR. LEGAL STUD. 61-62 (2001).
73. Motshekga, supra note 71, at 150. Without this protection, one may suffer great harm. As
Howard Timmins described:
If life runs smoothly, the spirits are pleased with his (the member of the traditional
culture) conduct, but he knows, as every other human being does, that there will be
times when he will have to face days of anxiety. Troubles are bound to come sooner
or later, dangers will assail him, physical suffering may strike him down, or the hand
of death may take a dear one from his side - the spirits are then angry with him; in
some way or other he has violated their laws, roused their wrath, and the forces of
vengeance have been released against him.
HOWARD TIMMINS, THE WARRIOR PEOPLE ZULU ORIGINS, CUSTOMS AND WITCHCRAFT 299 (1974).
74. Mutwa, supra note 72, at 62.
75. Motshekga, supra note 71, at 150.
76. Id.
77. Interview with Edwin Ritchkin, (July 21, 2001).
78. John Hund, Witchcraft And Accusations Of Witchcraft In South Africa: Ontological Denial
and The Suppression Of African Justice, 33 COMP. & INT'L L.J. OF S. APR. 366, 372 (2000). Ac-
cording to Credo Mutua, a diviner, humans have twelve senses, not five. With these senses, humans
have psychic powers and the ability to change levels of consciousness. Mutwa, supra note 72, at 75.
80. Isak Arnold Niehaus, Witchcraft, Power and Politics: An Ethnographic Study of the South
African Lowveld, 17 (1997) (unpublished dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand) (on file
with the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg library); MAX GLUCKMAN, CUSTOM AND
CONFLICT IN AFRICA 83 (1955).
Under this belief system, misfortune results from one of two sources-the anger
of one's ancestors or the evil practices of a witch. 8 1 Evil spirits can enter the
body when the ancestors leave a person unprotected or when witches use their
connection with the spirit world to open a victim's body to the evil spirit. When
the harm results from the anger of the ancestors, those suffering accept the harm
as just. In a sense, one who incurs the wrath of the ancestors is believed to have
breached 82 the social contract established between family members and their
ancestors.
Viewed as unfair, however, are the practices of witches who use the evil
spirits to cause harm.8 3 Some witches practice their craft for revenge, others
because they are simply evil and still others in hopes of gaining luck through the
misfortune of another.84 The Venda culture offers one explanation of how harm
to one through witchcraft can benefit another. 85 The Venda believe in a "cos-
mic good" shared by all members of a community. 86 The size of each person's
share of that good depends on a person's status in the community. 87 Unfortu-
nately, this cosmic good is finite-for one person to increase his or her share,
another must lose some. 88 Witchcraft is one method of accomplishing this.
When each person accepts his or her share of the cosmic good without unnatural
alteration, the community lives in harmony. Once evil forces are used to alter
81. NAT'L. CONF. REP., supra note 5, at xiii; MICHAEL GELFAND, MEDICINE AND CUSTOM IN
AFRICA 28 (1964).
82. Ron Lawrence Anderson, Keeping the Myth Alive: Justice Witches and the Law in the
1986 Sekhukhune Killings, (unpublished thesis, University of the Witwatersrand) (on file with the
University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg library).
83. TW Bennett & WM Scholtz, Witchcraft: A Problem Of Fault And Causation, 12 COMp. &
INT'L L.J. OF S. AFR. 287, 296 (1979); Anthony Minnaar, Marie Wentzel & Catherine Payze, Witch
Killing With Specific Reference To the Northern Province of South Africa' in Elierea Bornman, Rene
van Eeden and Marie Wentzel, in VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 181 (1998); Sean Redding, Govern-
ment Witchcraft: Taration, the Supernatural, and the Mpondo Revolt in the Transkei, South Africa,
1955-1963, 95 AFR. AFFAIRS 555, 559-69 (1996).
84. According to one member of the Malawi Parliament, the reasons witches practice their
craft are "poverty, laziness, frustration, ignorance, jealousy and pleasure." Hon. Moses Dossi, Ad-
dress in NAT'L. CONF. REP., supra note 5, at 34. See also, Niehaus, supra note 80, at I1; GELFAND,
supra note 81, at 34-35; Hund, supra note 78, at 386; Minnaar, Wentzel & Payze, supra note 83,
182. In the National Conference Report, the Commission on Gender Equality provided an example
of a story of a person performing evil for no apparent reason:
A few years ago an old lady was caught in Vhufuli running away from her neigh-
bour's homestead. She was only partially dressed. When asked what she wanted at
the man's house so late at night, she replied as follows: We were going to a certain
place and rested at this man's gate, unfortunately I overslept and decided to enter this
man's homestead. The purpose of coming and entering this man's homestead was to
cause his highly pregnant wife to abort. I am very sorry. The husband of the preg-
nant woman then asked her: Why did you single out my wife for this evil deed? She
answered: I am very, very sorry, I can honestly assure you that I will not repeat this,
but remember it is beyond my control. As she had assured the family that she would
not cause mischief in the family again, the two families lived in peace again until the
old lady died.
NAT'L. CONF. REP., supra note 5, at 14.
85. Whether other South African cultures share this belief with Vendas is uncertain.
86. Minnaar, Wentzel & Payze, supra note 83, at 179.
87. Id.
88. Id.
the natural balance of cosmic good, this harmony is disrupted. 89 Keeping in

mind customary values are premised on working toward the good of the commu-
nity, witches or witchcraft powers must be destroyed to end any disruption in the
community.
2. Witches and Their Powers

There are at least two types of witches in traditional South African witch-
craft belief-the night witch and the day sorcerer. Night witches use evil spirits
to bewitch others, with or without any particular motive. 90 Night witches typi-
cally are women who inherit their powers from their mothers. 9 ' The day sor-
cerer uses magic formulas, spells, or medicines rather than "some unidentified
mystical power inherent in their personalities. 92 They are capable of learning
their powers from others. 93 The day sorcerer is considered more dangerous be-
cause his or her services can be bought, often in the form of charms or
medicines capable of causing harm.9 4 For purposes of this Article, both the day
sorcerer and night witch will be included under the term "witch."
Witches derive their powers through harnessing evil spirits. 95 With this
power, witches cast spells, curse individuals, or use charms or medicines, all of
which ultimately cause harm. 96 A person under a spell or curse is bewitched.
Evil spirits manipulated by the witch enter a person's body, forcing that person
to suffer the symptoms of the disease; 97presumably, witches can enter an
animal's body in the same manner. Witches can use these evil spirits to capture
the spirit of the newly dead; to create frightening ghosts; 9 8 to cause women 99
to
become infertile; to destroy crops and property; or to cause natural disasters.
They can cause accidents, illness, and death.' ° They are capable of turning the
dead into zombies who can be used for labour. 10 1 Witches can use animals and
89. Id. at 180.

90. COMM'N. OF INQUIRY REP., supra note 3, at 13. GEOFFREY PARRINDER WITCHCRAFT: Eu-
ROPEAN AND AFRICAN 133 (1963).
91. PARRINDER, supra note 90, at 134, 143. Another way of looking at the inheritance of the
powers is that ancestral spirits of a witch, who themselves were witches, possess the body of the
living family member. Through this possession, the living person is able to practice witchcraft.
Chavunduka, supra note 42, at 40.
92. Anthony Minaar, Witchpurging and Muti Murder in South Africa, 2 AFRICAN LEGAL
STUDIES 1,17 (2001). Contra Hund, supra note 78, at 371.
93. Chavunduka, supra note 42, at 40.
94. PARRINDER, supra note 90, at 143. All medicines, whether used for good or evil, are
believed to work by magic. AC MYBURGH, INDIGENOUS CRIMINAL LAW IN BOPHUTHATSTWANA 9-
10 (1980). To the extent someone purchases charms or medicines to cause harm to another, he or
she also may be considered a witch. Chavunduka, supra note 42, at 40.
95. Motshekga, supra note 71, at 150; GELFAND, supra note 81, at 33.
97. GELFAND, supra note 81, at 28.
98. PARRINDER, supra note 90, at 133.
99. Id. at 141; P Mayer, Witches' Inaugural Lecture at Rhodes University (1954).
100. Minnaar, Wentzel & Payze, supra note 83, at 182; PARRINDER, supra note 90, at 143.
101. Witches use a spell to raise the dead and create zombies. The zombies are used as field
labour, to construct buildings or for any other work the witches need accomplish. Zombies appear
only at night. Minnaar, Wentzel & Payze, supra note 83, at 182.
lightning bolts to create accidents and injuries.' 0 2 A witch's powers are so vola- 10 3
tile he or she may bewitch someone unwittingly in a moment of anger.
Witches also can use medicines to prevent themselves from being discovered
during their mischief and can use medicines to keep their victims sleeping while
they bewitch them. 104 "Because witchcraft does not '0 5
respect the rules of society,
it is unpredictable, uncontrolled and frightening."'
Those who have not inherited witchcraft powers can locate a witch capable
of teaching them powers or of providing them with charms or medicines to cre-
ate a desired outcome. In many cases, people seeking charms or medicines are
believed to be using them to capture the fortune of those seen as more fortunate.
As one scholar explained, "a man's rival or someone jealous of him or desirous
of harming him, visits one of these sorcerers who is known to possess a secret
medicine injurious to others. He has to pay a price for10 6this medicine which he
plants on the path of his victim or even in his food."'
Medicine murder is one method used to increase one's fortune. It is the
practice of killing someone seen as successful and using his or her body parts in
a medicine to bring power or luck to the killer. Horrifically, the participants
remove the organs and body parts from the victim while he or she is alive in
order "to keep as much as possible of his/her vital energy."' 1 7 Another aspect of
witchcraft-related violence is ritual murder. Ritual murder involves the sacrifice
of a person to benefit the community.' 0 8 The sacrificial organs are used to
counter particularly strong evil.' 0 9
At one time, communities believed that chiefs had a special ability to com-
municate with ancestors. With this power, chiefs were able to protect the fertil-
ity of land and animals, to bring rain for crops, and to protect the community
against the evil practiced by witches. 10 A chief could sanction a ritual murder
if it would benefit the community by restoring order to the community.'' ' This
connection with the ancestors helped maintain the chiefs' power over the com-
munity. Chiefs also were believed to be able to access the power of witches for
their own benefit--either to increase their own wealth or to destroy their ene-

103. Because witchcraft can be practiced unwittingly, some people accused of witchcraft will
accept as true the accusations against them. Minnaar, Wentzel & Payze, supra note 83, at 183.
105. MFC BOURDILLON, WHERE ARE THE ANCESTORS 115 (1993).
106. GELFAND, supra note 81, at 34-35.
107. Veronique Faure, Notes on the Occult in the New South Africa, 2 African Legal Studies
170-71 (2001).
108. Minnaar, supra note 92, at 15.
109. Id. at 18.
110. Redding, supra note 83, 557; Mihalik & Cassim, supra note 31, at 130. The author has not
found information as to whether this belief still exists. One reason the spiritual basis of a chiefs
power may no longer exist is because of the interference of the colonial and then Apartheid govern-
ment in the powers of chiefs as well as the succession to the role of chief. Id.
mies. 12 Today, as in the past, it is accepted to at least some extent that chiefs
practice medicine murder to increase their power and wealth.11 3
3. Smelling Out a Witch

People who meet with misfortune turn to traditional healers and diviners to
help them determine whether their misfortune resulted from the anger of their
ancestors or from the evils of witchcraft. They also enlist diviners to cure them
of any physical illness.' 14 Under a strict division of services, diviners determine
the cause of the disease or misfortune while the traditional healers treat any
medical problems resulting from the ancestors or witchcraft." 15 If a diviner de-
termines witchcraft was involved, he or she then will determine who perpetrated
the witchcraft.' 16 In practice, the functions of the traditional healer and diviner
overlap.' For purposes of this article, I will refer to all traditional healers and
diviners capable of detecting and treating symptoms of witchcraft as diviners.
Diviners are believed to have the same powers as witches to access the
spiritual world, but, unlike witches, diviners use their powers for good.' 18 As
with many witches, a diviner is believed to inherit his or her powers, although
there is some suggestion that diviners learn how to harness the power of the
spirits from other diviners.' 19 Because the power of the witch and the diviner 20
are the same, the diviner is able to recognize another using the power for evil.1
Unfortunately, the identical nature of the power means that a diviner is capable
of becoming a witch and, in fact, will turn into one as soon as he or she 12 1
uses the
connection with the spirit world for evil or for his or her own gain.
There are at least three methods diviners use to determine who is responsi-
ble for bewitching, cursing or otherwise practicing witchcraft. Some diviners
112. Redding, supra note 83, at 557; Mihalik & Cassim, supra note 31, at 130.
113. Mihalik & Cassim, supra note 31, at 130. Chiefs have been convicted of medicine murder
in South Africa's courts. Rex v. Magundane, 1915 Native High Court 64 (Natal); Rex v. Chief
Butelezi, 1910 Native High Court 84 (Natal).
114. Minnaar, Wentzel & Payze, supra note 83, at 182; PARRINDER, supra note 90, at 169, 180-
81.
115. GELFAND, supra note 81, at 34. For a description of the differences between diviners,
traditional healers and sangomas in Zulu tradition, see Hund, supra note 78, at 370.
116. NAT'L. CONF. REP., supra note 5, at xiii.
117. GELFAND, supra note 8 1, at 34. Diviners and traditional healers also are able to use their
powers to protect a person's home and property from attempts at witchcraft. NAT'L. CONF. REP.
(statement of Ngoako Ramtlhodi ), supra note 5, at I.
118. INEKE VAN KESSEL, BEYOND OUR WILDEST DREAMS 132 (2000); Motshekga, supra note
71, at 150; GELFAND, supra note 81, at 37-38; PARRINDER, supra note 90, at 182. Traditional heal-
ers, whether or not they are diviners, also may have the same powers as those ascribed to the "sor-
cerers." Minnaar, supra note 92, at 17.
119. Hund, supra note 78, at 378-79; COMM'N. OF INQUIRY REP., supra note 3, at 16, 27. A
traditional healer or diviner discovers his or her powers typically after having fallen sick with an
illness Western medicine cannot cure. Ultimately, a traditional healer will tell the sick person that
there is no physical ailment, instead, the person's ancestors are communicating to the person their
desire that he or she become a traditional healer. During the course of dreams, and sometimes with
training from the traditional healer who made the diagnosis, the person will learn the art of healing.
Id. at 27.
120. PARRINDER, supra note 90, at 182-83.
121. Id. at 183.
use divination, others a trial by ordeal and yet others are able to "smell out"
witches. Divination covers many practices. The diviner must enter a trance to
discover the witch and interpret the messages from the ancestors. ' 22 The actual
practices range from throwing bones or other objects that can be interpreted
through the help of the ancestors 23
to looking at a mirror or television screen until
the image of the witch appears.'
To detect witches through a trial by ordeal, a diviner prepares a special
medicine for community members or accused witches to drink.' 24 Those inno-
cent of practicing witchcraft will vomit the concoction, while witches will retain
the drink and develop diarrhea.' 25 In another version of trial by ordeal, the 26
diviner draws a line on the ground and sprinkles medicine along the line.'
Members of the community are asked to127walk across the line. Witches are una-
ble to cross and instead fall paralyzed.
Smelling out a witch is based on the belief that witches carry a terrible
smell that diviners can detect. 128 Diviners can walk through the victim's prop-
erty smelling out the objects used by the witch to cause the harm.' 29 Often,
diviners will not provide the name of the witch alleged to have caused the mis-
fortune, but instead will 30describe the witch, leaving it to the person seeking help
to determine the name.'
Diviners are expected to counteract or destroy the witchcraft used to create
a person's misfortune.' 3 1 To fight the bewitching, diviners need to reach the
ancestors in the spirit world.1 32 Diviners typically charge a substantial fee for
their work. 1 3 3 They further seek to find witches in hopes of curing them of evil
or removing their powers.' 34 One possible method of removing witchcraft pow-
ers simply is to expose the activities of the witch. 135 Religious leaders
13 6
also may
be capable of fighting witchcraft through prayer and exorcism.
122. GELFAND, supra note 81, at 48.

123. Id. at 48; FREDERICK KAIGH, WITCHCRAFT AND MAGIC OF AFRICA 40 (1947). The diviner
who uses bones receives them from a ceremony in which a calf or goat is slaughtered and burned
over a fire. Once four intact bones are found from the ashes, they are presented to the diviner for
future use. Mutwa, supra note 72, at 70.
125. Id. Professor Chavunduka explained that there are real problems with this method because
if a diviner prepared the wrong combination of medicines, innocent people could be determined as
witches, while actual witches may go undetected. Id.
126. Id. at 42.
127. Id.
128. KAIGH, supra note 123, at 40.
129. Chavunduka, supra note 42, at 41-42.
130. AEB Bhlodhio, Some Views On Belief In Witchcraft As A Mitigating Factor, DE REBUS
409 (1984). PARRINDER, supra note 90, at 168.
131. Hund, supra note 78, at 386.
132. Id.
134. COMM'N. OF INQUIRY REP., supra note 3, at 51; TIMMINS, supra note 73, at 250; PAR-
RINDER, supra note 90, at 187-88.
135. PARRINDER, supra note 90, at 170, 191-92.
136. Id. at 180 (describing the practices of Basuto Christian priests and Zulu Zionist prophets).
B. Social Aspects of Witchcraft Accusations

1. Witchcraft Accusations
While accusations of witchcraft could be leveled at any person within a
community, certain patterns emerge in the literature. Women seem to be the
37
most common targets of witchcraft accusations.' Part of this lies in the belief
that a daughter inherits her witch's powers from her mother. According to the
Lovendu from the Transvaal, children "drink in witchcraft with their mother's
milk."' 13 8 The Basuto describe witches as "women (and a few men) on sticks or
on fleas, [who] meet in assemblies, and dance stark naked in39various places" and
who use their "perverted sense of humour" to harm men.'
Jealousy often underlies these accusations, particularly with regard to wo-
men. Anthropologists believe women are more likely to be targets of accusa-
tions because of what is considered the typically poor and often jealous
40
relationship between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law.' They sometimes
vent their frustrations with each other through such accusations. Women also
may be targeted because of cultural practice of polygyny. Having multiple
wives creates the possibility that one will accuse another of witchcraft. 141 Simi-
larly, the cultural practice of bringing women from their fathers' families into
their husbands' leaves them vulnerable to attacks on their loyalty to their new
42
family. '
Wealth plays an important role in accusations as well. Poorer members of
the community are thought to use witchcraft in hopes of gaining the fortune of a
wealthy person or simply out of jealousy.14 3 As a result, wealthier people fear
44
the poor will use witchcraft to force a redistribution of wealth." That is not to
say wealthy people are immune from such accusations, as they often are be-
137. Greg Brack & Michele Hill Carson, Witch Persecution in Modern South Africa, in NAT'L.
CONF. REP, supra note 5, at 48. The Commission of Inquiry Report notes that while traditionally
women are the targets of witch-killings, men also are victims of such purges. Id. at 14.
138. PARRINDER, supra note 90, at 143. See also, NAT'L. CONF. REP., supra note 5, at xiii.
139. PARRINDER, supra note 90, at 133, 143.
140. Id. at 98.
141. Id.
142. GLUCKMAN, supra note 80, at 98; Mayer, supra note 99, at 9. Other reasons suggested for
why women are more often the targets of witchcraft accusations include:
" As women generally outnumber males, there are more female than male witches.
" Many males argued that women kill men once their sons have reached adulthood, so that
they (women) would remain in control of the family.
" They further argued that there are very few cases in which husbands kill their wives as
polygamy allows them to marry as many women as they can maintain.
" Jealousy, not only concerning love affairs, but jealousy concerning material possessions
of the neighbour: If children are performing better than the children of the neighbour, the
mother of those children who are performing poorly is believed to be more envious than
the father of her children.
COMM'N. OF INQUIRY REP., supra note 3, at 15.
143. Chavunduka, supra note 42, at 39; Greg Brack & Michele Hill Carson, Witch Persecution
in Modern South Africa, in NAT'L. CONF. REP., supra note 5, at 47; Niehaus, supra note 80, at 22;
COMM'N. OF INQUIRY REP., supra note 3, at 14-15; GELFAND, supra note 81, at 34-35.
144. Cyprian Fisiy & Peter Geschiere, Witchcraft, Violence And Identity: Different Trajectories
In Postcolonial Cameroon, in PosTCoLONIAL IDENTITIES IN AFRICA 194 (Richard Werbner & Ter-
ence Ranger eds., 1996).
lieved to have used witchcraft to gain their fortunes. However, this seems to be
quietly condoned.' 4 5
Another common target of witchcraft accusations is the elderly.' 4 6 One
scholar reported a pattern in which the victims of alleged witchcraft typically are
young and the accused witches middle-aged or older: "The association of elders
with witchcraft is ... based on the perception that their active power of adult-
hood slips away into infertility and infirmity, and that their status rests purely on
their control of esoteric knowledge."' 147 For older women accusations are even
more likely: "If they are women living alone they are feared as were the old
wise women of Europe. Why have they lived so long? Clearly they must have
obtained new soul-vitality, most likely from devouring the soul of a tender
48 '
child."'
When illness or hardship falls on a person, the first to be considered as a
likely witch are those with whom the victim has had a conflict. 149 In many
cases, accusations are aimed at family members or other people with whom they
share a close relationship. One scholar explains this phenomenon: "As those we
know best are the ones with whom there may be the greatest friction ... [accu-
sations are] rarely against those who livtat a distance. The latter have not suffi-
cient social contacts to make them feel hatred."' 50
The last categories of people likely to be targeted by witchcraft accusations
are anti-social, individualistic or otherwise "odd" people.' 5' Bearing in mind
that traditional cultures value the community and are concerned with the contri-
butions of the individual to the community, anti-social, morose or difficult peo-
ple seem to contribute less to the community. When the community's
suspicions of witchcraft arise, these people are the easiest targets for an
accusation. 152
145. Niehaus, supra note 80, at 359-60; Fisiy, supra note 144; Redding, supra note 83, at 559-
60.
146. PARRINDER, note 90, at 196.
147. Isak Niehaus, Witchcraft in the New South Africa, 2 AiR. LEGAL STUD. 116, 136 (2001).
149. Niehaus, supra note 80, at 123.
150. PARRINDER, supra note 90, at 168. See also, Chavunduka, supra note 42, at 39; Redding,
supra note 83, at 559-560.
151. Chavunduka, supra note 42 , at 39; PARRINDER, supra note 90, at 198.
152.
As TW Bennett and WM Scholtz describe:
The witch is commonly one who is, in one way or another, a disturbing factor within
the close-knit African community in that he infringes the norms and mores of that
community .. .he may, for instance, merely be habitually miserly or inhospitable.
He may of course, be a more obviously disturbing factor as, for example, if he is
aggressive, sullen, morose or withdrawn. Whether he departs from the norms of the
community to a minor or major degree, the point should be made that, within the
confines of a small-scale African community, closely linked by kinship, any degree of
aberration is naturally magnified by proximity and the expectations which arise from
such proximity.
Bennett & Scholtz, supra note 83, at 290. See also, Brack & Carson, supra note 143, at 47; PAR-
RINDER, supra note 90, at 198.
2. Social Purpose of Witchcraft Accusations
Accusations of witchcraft and subsequent punishment of witches seem to

serve social purposes beyond just stopping witchcraft. 153 On a societal level,
witchcraft beliefs help maintain social control within the community. First,
witchcraft accusations bring tensions within the community into the open, often
allowing for a traditional leader to mediate conflicts.' 54 Second, fear of being
accused of witchcraft or of angering a witch is an incentive for individuals to 56
treat each other well.'
5
Witchcraft accusations also curb antisocial behavior,'
or remove antisocial people from the community.' 57 Finally, witchcraft accusa- 58
tions set the boundaries of who belongs in the community and who does not.'
Individuals seem to receive many social benefits from a belief in witch-
craft. Such belief allocates responsibility for misfortune to either the ancestors
or witches.' 59 To the extent responsibility is allocated to witches, afflicted indi- 60
viduals can avoid personal responsibility and have a target for their anger.'
As an extension of this purpose, witch-killings provide a catharsis to the com-
munity. "They ha[ve] found the public enemy who made things go wrong 'for 6
all of them; they ha[ve] destroyed him; they could all breathe more freely."' '
Witchcraft beliefs also provide a methotI of explaining random events like natu-
ral disasters.' 62 Dangerously, witchcraft may ' 63
be "a banner under which people
hate, denounce and even kill one another."'
Some see witchcraft belief and accusations as a manner of controlling
changes within society.' 64 As one scholar described in 1955:
Conflicts between old and new social principles produce new animosities, which
are not controlled by custom, and these open way to new forms of accusation.
.. The system of witchcraft beliefs, originally tied to certain social relations, can
be adapted to new situations of conflict-to competition for jobs in towns, to the
rising standard of living made possible by new goods, which breaches the egali-
tarianism and so forth. In response to this situation there have arisen in Africa
153. It is difficult to present the social purposes without appearing to make judgments as to
whether witchcraft actually exists. The author does not intend for this section to cast judgment upon
witchcraft believers or to express an opinion about the existence of witchcraft itself. This section,
however, is important for understanding the role witchcraft plays in South Africa's indigenous
cultures.
154. Chavunduka, supra note 42, at 39; Brack & Carson, supra note 137, at 47; Niehaus, supra
note 80, at 24. See also, Mayer, supra note 99, at 13 (arguing that witchcraft accusations provide "a
pretext for quarreling").
155. Adrieene van Blerk, Sorcery and Crime, 11 CoMP,. & Irr'L L.J. OF S. AFR. 333 (1978);
PARRINDER, supra note 90, at 169.
156. GLUCKMAN, supra note 80, at 98.
157. Bennett & Scholtz, supra note 83, at 291. While stated mildly, removing anti-social peo-
ple from a community ranges from banishing them, to burning their huts and personal goods, to
killing them.
159. Id.
160. Bennett & Scholtz, supra note 83, at 292.
161. Mayer, supra note 99, at 13.
162. Niehaus, supra note 80, at 287; Mayer, supra note 99, at 20.
163. Mayer, supra note 99, at 11.
164. Chavunduka, supra note 42, at 39; Fisiy & Geschiere, supra note 144, at 194; PARRINDER,
supra note 90, at 201.
movements designed to cleanse the country of witches, held responsible for social
disintegration, for falling yields on over-cultivated lands, for new diseases. The
philosophy of these movements against witchcraft is that if Africans would 6 5 cease
to hate one another and would love each other, misfortune would pass.1
Finally, witchcraft and witchcraft accusations help those in power to retain
power and those not in power to elevate their status. Acting against witches
elevates a person's status or helps them to retain authority as it "dramatizels]
their capacity to punish the perpetrators of misfortune, and to assist those who
sought compensation for the crimes that had been committed against them by
witches."'1 66 More cynically, witchcraft accusations can be used to rid oneself
of opponents.1 67 A person able to convince the community of the truth of the
accusation gains status, while the accused loses his or her status.' 68 This ele-
vated status, however, only exists as long as the community accepts the accusa-
tion-where an accusation fails to gain currency the accuser could lose
69
status.'
Unfortunately, the manifestation of witchcraft belief can lead to violence.
Customary law offered its own mechanisms to control the belief, which were
ultimately shut down by the successive white governments. The next section
describes the historical customary law mechanisms and the common law mecha-
nisms for controlling manifestations of witchcraft belief, as well as the results of
the common law efforts.
IV.
WITCHCRAFT UNDER THE LAW
A. Treatment of Witchcraft Under Customary Law

1. Witchcraft Trials Before the Witchcraft Suppression Act 3 of 1957
Witchcraft believers take for granted that "witchcraft is an 'objective' fea-
' 70
ture of reality which invites an appropriate response from the community."'
In the past, "an appropriate response was an institutional response in accordance
with accepted African understandings of reality under the auspices of sangomas
and chiefs."' 17 1 Traditional courts developed several mechanisms to deal with
the manifestations of witchcraft. They punished the practice of witchcraft, me-
diated conflicts blamed on witchcraft, compensated for false accusations of
witchcraft and granted divorces when a husband had his wife smelled out as a
witch. The most interesting for those who do not believe in witchcraft is to learn
how customary courts and traditional leaders set about determining the guilt of
an alleged witch. What will be described below is the procedure commonly
165. GLUCKMAN, supra note 80, at 101. See also Diane Ciekawy & Peter Geshiere, Containing
Witchcraft: Conflicting Scenarios in Post Colonial Africa, 41 AFR. STUD. REv. 1, 3 (1998) (discuss-
ing the relationship between witchcraft and modernity).
166. Niehaus, supra note 80, at 260; Redding, supra note 83, at 559-60.
168. Anderson, supra note 82, at 16.
169. Consider the customary court's treatment of defamation described below.
170. John Hund, African Witchcraft and Western Law, 2 AFR. LEGAL STUD. 22, 49 (2001).
171. Id. A "sangoma" is a commonly used word for "diviner."
followed by customary courts prior to the introduction of the Witchcraft Sup-

pression Act. These procedures may be practiced covertly today. Changes in
the ways indigenous cultures deal with witchcraft due to the adoption of the
Witchcraft Suppression Act will be described separately below.
A trial to determine whether someone is a witch began when the alleged
victim of witchcraft approached a traditional leader to complain of some harm
that resulted from witchcraft. 172 Where the complainant alleged that a particular
person was a witch, the chief tried to determine whether there was a legitimate
claim of witchcraft or whether there was some other dispute underlying the alle-
gation.173 When a chief determined a dispute unrelated to witchcraft underlay
the claim, he mediated between the parties to reach a solution or understanding,
eliminating the allegation. 174 If the chief agreed that witchcraft might have been
involved in the alleged harm, typically the chief sent the victim with his
councilors to a diviner. 175 The diviner would then determine whether the harm
resulted from witchcraft or the anger of the ancestors. If the diviner believed
witchcraft was involved, he or she would divine or smell out the witch.1 76 The
complainant and councilors would report the diviner's findings to the chief. In
some communities, a diviner identified the witch in the presence of the commu-
nity and the chief.
There were several procedural protections in place to guard against false
accusations of witchcraft by the complainant or the diviner. The first protection
involved the chief choosing a diviner who lived significantly far from the com-
munity so that he or she would be unaware of the everyday happenings in the
community and would be unfamiliar with the actors involved.' 77 This protec-
tion was intended to stop diviners from proclaiming the guilt of a person be-
cause of influence from community members, knowledge of community
relations, or because of any dislike of a community member.' 78 Sending
councilors with the accuser was another procedural protection. The chief sent
his councilors to prevent the accuser from suggesting to the diviner the possible
perpetrator and to stop the complainant from otherwise influencing the out-
172. Hund, supra note 78, at 368; Niehaus, supra note 80, at 259; Bhlodhio, supra note 130, at
409. Among the Shona in Zimbabwe, there is some conflict as to whether the victim will approach
the chief directly. While some choose to do so, others use a procedure that begins with a victim
requesting a diviner to determine whether witchcraft was involved with the harm and, if so, identify-
ing the perpetrator. On returning to the village, the victim would place ash at the doorstep of the
alleged witch. The chief then is informed of the allegation, typically by the accused witch. GEL-
FAND, supra note 81, at 74-75.
174. Id. at 39.
175. COMM'N. OF INQUIRY REP., supra note 3, at 16; Minnaar, Wentzel & Payze, supra note 83,
at 183; Bhlodhio, supra note 130, at 409.
176. In the Green Valley of South Africa, diviners from Phunda Malia were frequently called
upon to perform divinations. Where they determined an accused was a witch, they would cut holes
into the witch's clothes and shave his or her hair. Niehaus, supra note 80, at 259. If the diviner
deemed the alleged witch innocent, the accused would blow a goat's hom upon returning to the
village. Id.
177. Bhlodhio, supra note 130, at 409.
178. Id.
come. 179 Where a diviner proclaimed the witch before the chief, the chief deter-
mined for himself, with the aid of councilors, whether the complainant made any
improper suggestions to the diviner. If the chief or his councilors felt something
was suspect in the diviner's procedures, the chief would order a consultation
with a different diviner. 180 A last protection emanated from the diviner. Divin-
ers, at least in the past, refused to consult with complainants without the chief's
permission.' 8 ' In the Green Valley, in the Northern Province of South Africa,
chiefs further required complainants to place a deposit of cattle with the court 82
that would be used to compensate the alleged witch for a false allegation.'
The chief similarly required the alleged witch183
to deposit cattle for payment to
the victim should he convict the accused.
Once a diviner pointed out a witch, whether by name or description, the
customary court would begin a trial. Among certain indigenous cultures in
southern Africa, if the complainant alleged that the accused used "poison or a
potent cathartic, emetic, intoxicant, or narcotic with the intent to harm," the ac-
cused could be charged with both witchcraft and assault.' 84 Other types of
witchcraft that could be prosecuted by chiefs included using
85
body parts for any
purposes, including participation in medicine murder.'
The trial required the complainant and councilors to report back to the chief
on the meeting with the diviner. Chiefs often did not rely on the evidence of the
diviner alone to find someone guilty of practicing witchcraft. Instead, chiefs
looked for other objective evidence such as statements by the alleged witch
threatening the complainant, evidence of charms, poison or other witchcraft
medicine in the home of the alleged witch, or evidence of witchcraft charms or
medicines found on the complainant's property.87186 In common law terms, this
could be described as an effort to prove fault.'
Divination was not necessarily required where an accused threatened the
complainant with some type of harm and the harm actually occurred. In the
Northern Province, an older man was convicted of witchcraft on evidence of a
verbal threat and proof that the harm occurred as threatened.' 88 The accused
had warned the complainant that lightning would strike him on 9 November
1995. On that night, lightning struck the complainant's hut. He managed to
escape, finding a place to stay with a friend. Two nights later, lightning struck
the friend's hut. The complainant and his friend escaped the burning hut. With
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Niehaus, supra note 80, at 259. While this was a successful procedural protection, the
main reason the diviners refused to identify witches without a chiefs permission was out of fear of
reprisals from the alleged witch's family. Id.
182. Id. at 258.
183. Id.
184. MYBURGH, supra note 94, at 81.
185. Id. at 99.
186. Id. at 99; Bennett & Scholtz, supra note 83, at 299.
187. Bennett & Scholtz, supra note 83, at 294-97.
188. COMM'N oF INQUiRY REP., supra note 3, at 13.
evidence of both a threat and the threat coming true, the chief ordered the older
man to leave the village. 189
On a conviction, the chief would punish the witch. Except in certain emer-
gencies, only the chief had this right.' 90 For a conviction of bewitching a per-
son, punishment ranged from ostracism to payment of a fine to death. In the
Green Valley, the chief imposed a fine paid as a deposit before trial.1 9' An
elder in the community described: "In the past witches were not killed. Their
punishment was to be exposed."' 92 Other communities simply shunned the
witch.1 93 In some regions, the chief ordered the convicted witch to cure the
victim.' 94 Banishment was another 19 6
form of punishment for witchcraft, 195 as
was burning of the witch's hut.
While some scholars protest that chiefs did not put witches to death and
that this was a phenomenon that developed after the Witchcraft Suppression Act
came into affect, 197 there is significant evidence to the contrary.' 9 8 In a book
published in 1947, common forms of punishment for witchcraft included "beat-
ing, spearing or burning to death."' 99 Similarly, the Commission of Inquiry Re-
port stated that chiefs commonly ordered the death penalty against convicted
witches. 2° ° A death sentence also was common among the Pedi in the Northern
Province. 2° '
Two other causes of action relevant to witchcraft are defamation and di-
vorce. Where a person accused another of witchcraft without evidence, the ac-
cuser could be charged under the customary law of defamation. Throughout
South Africa, a false accusation of witchcraft resulted in a fine to the accuser,
which was used to pay damages to the accused.202 If a wife accused her hus-
band of witchcraft, her biological family could be required to pay damages to
her husband in the form of cattle.20 3
As described below, as a part of "official" customary law, a husband who
has his wife smelled out as a witch essentially instituted a divorce. Under living
189. Id.
190. Bhlodhio, supra note 130, at 409; AC MYBURGH, PAPERS ON INDIGENOUS LAW INSOUTH-
ERN AFRICA 106 (1985).
192. Id. at 259-60.
193. Minnaar, Wentzel & Payze, supra note 83, at 183; COMM'N OF INQUIRY REP. supra note 3,
at 51.
194. MYOURGH, supra note 94, at 31. Myburgh reported that some chiefs would torture the
witch until he or she cured the victim. Where the witch's attempts to cure were particularly inept,
the conviction for witchcraft was reversed. Id.
195. COMM'N OF INQUIRY REP., supra note 3, at 51; MYBURGH, supra note 94, at 49. In some
cases, family members of the witch would negotiate with another village for the witch to be accepted
in the other village. Minnaar, Wentzel & Payze, supra note 83, at 183.
196. COMM'N OF INQUIRY REP., supra note 3, at 51; MYBURGH, supra note 94, at 50.
199. KAIOH, supra note 123, at 40.
200. COMM'N OF INQUIRY REP., supra note 3, at 51.
202. Hund, supra note 78, at 368; Niehaus, supra note 80, at 259.
customary law, a husband could dissolve the marriage because he believed her
to be a witch. 2° Whether a wife received a divorce for being smelled out by her
husband is unclear.
With the enactment of the Witchcraft Suppression Act, customary law re-
garding witchcraft either came to an abrupt halt, was practiced covertly, or
changed drastically. The next section details the changes that resulted from the
act.
2. Treatment of Witchcraft After the Witchcraft Suppression Act 3 of

1957
The Witchcraft Suppression Act 3 of 1957 made it an offense to accuse
someone of witchcraft, to indicate someone as a witch, to pretend or profess a
knowledge of witchcraft, to ask a diviner to point out a witch, or to pay someone
to use "pretended" witchcraft. While details of the act will be described more
fully below, it is important at this stage to describe how traditional cultures dealt
with witchcraft in light of the act.
Many scholars and law enforcement personnel believe that as a direct result
of the Witchcraft Suppression Act: (1) chiefs and customary law lost some of
their legitimacy in their communities; and (2) people began taking justice
against witchcraft into their own hands.20 5 By law, the chiefs were bound to
comply with the Witchcraft Suppression Act. Also, by law, the authority of
chiefs and their capacity to run traditional courts depended on the permission of
the "relevant authority" on "Native Affairs" under the Black Administration
Act. 2° Many chiefs complied with the Witchcraft Suppression Act for fear of
losing their power. The Apartheid government's consolidation of power pres-
sured chiefs to comply with this act more strongly than in the past under the
variety of colonial laws suppressing witchcraft.20 7 Some chiefs covertly heard
witchcraft cases and mediated in witchcraft accusations. 20 8 Most, however,
turned away the accusers of witchcraft, which eventually led communities to
20 9
feel that chiefs were protecting witches and siding with the government. Ul-
timately, the act undermined the chiefs' authority and the community's faith in
customary law.
To many members of traditional cultures, the Witchcraft Suppression Act
punished the victims of witchcraft and allowed witches to run free. 21 0 The act
essentially forced community members to create alternative routes to justice.
204. I. Schapera, ed. THE BANTU-SPEAKING TRIBES OF SOUTH AFRICA 204 (I. Schapera ed.,
1937).
205. Minnaar, supra note 92, at 1; Niehaus, supra note 147, at 132; Niehaus, supra note 80, at
359; Hund, supra note 78, at 366.
206. See supra Chapter 1, Section 1(A).
207. Niehaus, supra note 80, at 265. Reports in the 1930s suggest that the colonial and white
governments condoned witchcraft trials because they wanted to avoid "unnecessary conflicts" with
the indigenous populations. Johannes Harnischfeger, Witchcraft and the State in South Africa, 2
AFR. LEGAL STUD. 78, 83 (2001).
208. Niehaus, supra note 80, at 127; Ralushai, supra note 5, at 15.
210. COMM'N OF INQUmy REP., supra note 3, at 54.
Under customary law, accusers had an opportunity to have their witchcraft accu-
sations heard in a court and the chiefs had an opportunity to mediate any under-
lying dispute or provide compensation for misfortune linked to witchcraft. By
removing the authority of traditional courts to hear witchcraft cases, the Witch-
craft Suppression Act blocked community members' access to the justice to
which they had been accustomed. 2 1'
Without the support and structure for handling witchcraft accusations pro-
vided by the customary courts and customary law, community members resorted
to informal trials. Many of the procedural protections built into the traditional
system disappeared. No longer did complainants of witchcraft bring their accu-
sations to chiefs before acting, erasing the opportunity chiefs had to control the
manifestations of witchcraft belief.2 12 In many cases, accusers chose disreputa-
ble diviners or ones who came from within the community or nearby. This
eliminated the impartial nature of and the faith people had in the traditional
system. 213 No longer were advisors sent to watch over the divination process to
ensure complainants did not influence the diviners. People became more vulner-
able to witchcraft accusations and accused witches lost any chance they had for
a fair trial under customary law. As one scholar reported:
By criminalizing these judicial remedies on the ground that they were repugnant
to the 'civilizing mission' of the white, eurocentric apartheid government the
seeds of chaos were sown. In the wake of this confusion unfounded witchcraft
accusations have proliferated and are frequently used as pretexts for personal ani-
mosity, vendettas, 2 inter-generational
14 and domestic rivalry, agendas for political
action, and so on.
Nor was there any control over sentences meted out to witches. Sparked by
the inaction of the government and chiefs, feeling defenseless, alleged victims of
witchcraft turned to vigilantism. In S v. Ndlovu, the defendant explained that he
had killed the witch who had killed his son after his accusations had been re-
jected by both the traditional leader and the police. 1 5 The resort to vigilante
justice often is condoned within a community because it is seen as public ser-
vice, an act of protecting the community, making heroes of the participants.2 16

212. Bhlodhio, supra note 130, at 409.
213. Id. at 409. In many instances during the 1980s and 1990s, diviners were forced against
their will by community members to determine who was a witch. Additionally, the community
members, typically the youth, forced other community members to contribute money for the divina-
tion ceremony on the threat of violence.
214. Hund, supra note 78, at 368. Witchcraft violence increased significantly in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. Minnaar, supranote 92, at 1. These witch murders have led many family members
of accused witches to flee their homes for fear of being accused of witchcraft because of the associa-
tion. Id.
215. 1979 (1) SA 430, 432 (A).
216. COMM'N OF INQUIRY REP., supra note 3, at 15 and 31; Niehaus, supra note 80, at 287. At
least one scholar reports that even the police treat accused witch-killers as heroes. Minnaar, supra
note 92, at 9.
There are members of communities who condemn vigilante justice prima-

21 7
rily because the accusations are not proved in a traditional court. Unfortu-
nately, there is little they can do to protest these changes. As described in
Section III (C) of this Part, the South African government recognizes the prob-
lem of witchcraft related violence and has begun to consider how to handle
vigilante justice, but no reforms have been formulated.
B. Treatment of Witchcraft Under the Common Law System
This section describes how the government officially deals with witchcraft
and witchcraft accusations. The contrast between the approaches is stark and
serves as a basis for analyzing how the common law system treats customary
beliefs that do not underlie the common law system.
1. Witchcraft Legislation
For over a century, South African governments have made every effort to
suppress witchcraft belief through legislation. 21 8 To the colonial and white
South African state courts, it was impossible to convict a person of witchcraft
when there was no empirical link between the alleged witchcraft and the
harm.2 19 Such difficulties made witchcraft trials incompatible with the rule of
22 °
law and all the more repugnant to a "civilized" society. Over time, the suc-
cessive white governments expected that their cultural influence, combined with
legislation, would civilize the indigenous population, eradicating witchcraft be-
liefs. Until such "civilizing" occurred, the South African governments hoped
legislation would protect innocent persons from superstitious accusations that
22 1 of such legislation for the white governments
lead to death. An added benefit
was that it removed more power from chiefs.222
The earliest enactments targeting witchcraft belief included the Cape of
Good Hope Act 24 of 1886, the Black Territories' Penal Code Chapter XI Act 2
of 1895, The Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1895, the Natal Law 19 of 1891,
and the Transvaal Ordinance 26 of 1904. These laws were enforced to varying
degrees. 2 3 The Apartheid government unified the colonial laws under the Sup-
pression of Witchcraft Act, hoping to standardize the harsh response to the be-
lief. Once Apartheid began, the South African government increased the
217. NAT'L. CONF. REP., supra note 5, at 25. Some community members feel that the older
people in the community and the traditional healers are using the breakdown in witchcraft justice
and the willingness of the youths to fight witches to destroy enemies and opposition. Id.
218. Niehaus, supra note 80, at 339-40; Redding, supra note 83, at 558.
219. Hund, supra note 78, at 368; COMM'N OF INQUIRY REP., supra note 3, at 57; Bennett &
Scholtz, supra note 83, at 300.
221. S v. Mafunisa, 1986 (3) SA 495, 497 (Venda Supreme Court); van Blerk, supra note 155,
at 332.
222. Niehaus, supra note 80, at 339. "Colonial Officials also saw the customary court prosecu-
tion of witches as a challenge to their authority." Niehaus, supra note 147, at 118.
pressure on traditional leaders to stop hearing witchcraft cases, finding the cases
"repugnant, baseless, and even diabolic." 224
The Witchcraft Suppression Act, as amended in 1970 and 1999, remains in
force in South Africa's new democracy. The provisions of the act create of-
fences for:
Section 1: Any person who:
(a) Imputes to any other person the causing, by supernatural means, of any
disease in or injury or damage to any person or thing, or who names or indi-
cates any other person as a wizard;
(b) In circumstances indicating that he professes or pretends to use any super-
natural power, witchcraft, sorcery, enchantment or conjuration, imputes the
cause of death, injury or grief to, disease in, damage to or disappearances of
any person or thing to any other person;
(c) Employs or solicits any witchdoctor, witch-finder or any other person to
name or indicate any person as a wizard;
(d) Professes a knowledge of witchcraft, or the use of charms, and advises any
person how to bewitch, injure or damage any person or thing, or supplies any
person with any pretended means of witchcraft;
(e) On the advice of any witchdoctor, witch-finder or other person or on the
ground of any pretended knowledge of witchcraft, uses or causes to be put into
operation any means or process which, in accordance with such advice or his
own belief, is calculated to injure or damage any person or thing;
(f) For gain pretends to exercise or use any supernatural power, witchcraft,
sorcery, enchantment or conjuration, or undertakes to tell fortunes, or pretends
from his skill in or knowledge of any occult science to discover where and in
what manner anything supposed to have been stolen or lost may be found.
Section 1(a) aims to punish accusations of witchcraft leveled at individuals.
Section 1(b) targets diviners or traditional healers who 'smell out' witches,
while 1(c) criminalizes efforts to hire diviners or traditional healers to find a
witch. Anyone claiming to be a witch or who sells or advises in the use of
charms, medicines or other tools of witchcraft can be punished under sections
1(d) and (e). Finally, section 1(f) targets persons who use "supernatural" powers
to locate missing or stolen property upon payment.
The Act allows punishment of a fine or imprisonment under any offense
listed in Section 1.225 Anyone convicted under 1(a) or (b) whose accusation or
smelling out is found to have resulted in the death of the alleged witch can be
sentenced to twenty years imprisonment.22 6 The Act also creates a rebuttable
presumption that when the accuser has been convicted under 1(a) or (b) and the
alleged witch was killed, the death was the direct result of the accusation. 227
The Witchcraft Suppression Act criminalizes all aspects of witchcraft and
witchcraft accusations except the actual practice of witchcraft. The statute pros-
224. Id. at 339. There is some suggestion that the colonial governments accepted witchcraft
belief to a certain extent because of its popularity and strength, finding it more disruptive to eradi-
cate the belief. Redding, supra note 83, at 556.
225. § l(iii) limits fines to R500 or no more than five years imprisonment for violations of
§§ l(c)-(e). § (f) incurs a fine of no more than R200 or imprisonment no longer than two years.
§ l(iv).
226. § l(i).
227. § 2(a).
ecutes "pretended" witchcraft as though it is a fraud, and not a harmful act. To

the believers in witchcraft, this Act punishes attempts
2 28
to stop witches and it
allows witches to continue causing harm at will.
Despite the hopes that the Witchcraft Suppression Act would be a tool to
eradicate witchcraft belief, the common law courts seem to have decided more
cases of witchcraft related violence or civil cases arising from witchcraft accusa-
tions than prosecutions under the Act. As described in the next section, com-
mon law courts were forced to develop their own mechanisms for dealing with
witchcraft violence and accusations beyond the Witchcraft Suppression Act.
2. Witchcraft in the Common Law Courts

The common law courts use their criminal law jurisdiction to handle cases
of witchcraft-related violence and violations of the Witchcraft Suppression Act.
With their civil law jurisdiction, the common law courts determine divorce and
defamation cases that have some relationship to witchcraft and witchcraft accu-
sations. Judicial decisions on divorce and defamation related to witchcraft accu-
sations depend heavily on the customary treatment of witchcraft, while criminal
law decisions treat witchcraft belief as wholly unreasonable.
a. Witch-Killings
The treatment of witch-killings offers the clearest view of how common
law courts value cultural beliefs they do not share. From the earliest court cases
the author could locate, witch-killing is treated as a murder the sentence for
which may be mitigated by cultural belief under the doctrines of diminished
capacity-including insanity, provocation, involuntary reaction or emotion-in-
duced diminished capacity. Courts throughout the last century continually have
refused to recognize witch-killing as a form of self-defense. As time passes and
judges conclude that South Africa has been 'civilized,' the decisions reflect a
growing impatience with and intolerance of witchcraft beliefs.
South African courts are unwilling to accept self-defense as a justification
for witch-killings. In S v. Mokonto, the defendant alleged that the deceased had
told his brothers and him "they would all die."'229 Both of the defendant's broth-
ers died shortly after the threat. Carrying a cane knife, the defendant confronted
the deceased, who allegedly repeated that the defendant would soon die. The
defendant killed the deceased. The court refused a plea of self-defence because
the deceased posed no immediate threat to the defendant, as she did not have a
weapon or suggest she was going to kill him at that moment. 230 The court also
refused the plea because the defendant's belief that he was in danger was not
reasonable: "the beknighted belief in the blight of witchcraft cannot be regarded
as reasonable. To hold otherwise would be to plunge the law backward into the
228. Niehaus, supra note 80, at 340. It also creates murderers out of traditional leaders enforc-
ing the death penalty against the tamers of evil spirits. Id.
229. 1971 (2) SA 319 (A).
230. Id. at 324.
92 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW .[Val. 21:62
Dark Ages." 2 3 ' The standard the Mokonto court used was subjective in that the
reasonable standard was based on minority beliefs or those of the "civilized"
culture.
South African courts also reject a defense that an accused acted under the
superior order of the chief and his customary law powers to put a witch to death.
A defendant hoped to use obedience to an order as a justification for his act,
negating the unlawfulness of it. In Rex v. Masongo,2 32 the court held that the
accused could not rely on this defense because the chief did not have the author-
ity to make the order under applicable witchcraft legislation. Furthermore, the
court wrote:
But assuming, merely for argument's sake, you were ordered to do this, it is no
excuse ... if we were to accept your plea it would mean that in every case where
witchcraft is involved, and where an allegation is made that the persons consid-
to commit the deed by their Chief, those persons are to be
ered were ordered 233
allowed to go free.
the instant case likely would be forced
The court also suggested that the chief in234
to stand trial for his part in the murder.
With uneasiness, the common law courts have been willing to treat the
belief in witchcraft as an extenuating circumstance mitigating a murder sentence
where the defendant honestly believed the deceased intended to use witchcraft to
harm the defendant or his relations, or where the defendant believed he was
acting in the public interest. 235 The courts seem to have at least some sympathy
for accuseds who acted on genuine fears of witchcraft. An extenuating circum-
stance is defined as "a fact associated with a crime which serves in the minds of
reasonable men to diminish, morally albeit not legally, the degree of the pris-
oner's guilt."' 23 6 Typically, extenuating circumstances involve some form of di-
231. Id. In the 1917 Rex v. Hlatshwayo decision, the Native High Court rejected a self-defense
plea with little explanation. Because the court suggested that the accused could argue an insanity
defense, it seemed to be saying that the belief in witchcraft is unreasonable, therefore insufficient to
meet the standard for self-defence. In certain circumstances, an accused may qualify for an insanity
defense. 1917 Native High Court 262, 262 (Natal).
232. 1916 Native High Court 42 (Natal).
233. Id. at 45.
234. Id. This case seems correctly decided given that, under the Witchcraft Suppression Act,
traditional authorities cannot prosecute witchcraft cases, making the underlying order unlawful. Had
the traditional leader carried out the order himself, it would still be unlawful.
235. S v. Lukhwa, 1994 (1) SACR 53 (A); S v. Motsepa, 1991 (2) SACR 462 (A) (mitigating
factor if accused believed he was acting to protect the community); S v. Nxele, 1973 (3) SA 753 (A);
R v Bungweni, 1959 (3) SA 142 (Eastern Cape); S v. Thonga, 1993 (1) SACR 365 (V) (holding that
the belief that one is serving the community by killing or banishing witches may be a mitigating
factor); S v. Magoro, 1996 (2) SACR 359 (A) (court refused to accept belief in witchcraft as an
extenuating circumstances where no evidence of such belief was put forth at trial;) The headnotes of
S v Dikgale, 1965 (1) SA 209 (A) explain: "Where accused are convicted of murder, and the only
probable reason why they had so treated the deceased and committed the crime was that they be-
lieved that he was a bad and dangerous witchdoctor, then his must be an extenuating circumstances,
even if the witchdoctor did not affect the accused or their near relations." Some scholars fear that
defendants take advantage of the doctrine of mitigating circumstances by claiming to believe in
witchcraft when they do not or the motivation for killing had nothing to do with the belief. Minnaar,
supra note 92, at 8.
minished capacity237 -whether due to intoxication, provocation, or severe

emotional stress.2 38 By common law standards, witchcraft beliefs seem to be
one of the "factors which may contribute towards the conclusion that he [the
accused] failed to realize what was happening or to appreciate the unlawfulness
of his act," thus mitigating the accused's moral blameworthiness.2 39 Keeping in
mind that witchcraft belief is not legally reasonable, this is one of the few op-
tions open to courts to limit an accused's liability.240
Not every circumstance of witch-killing leads to mitigation. Where a per-
son not believed to be a witch is injured or killed along with the alleged witch,
the defendant may be prosecuted fully, without consideration of extenuating cir-
cumstances. 24 1 The accused in R v. Bungweni burned the hut of an alleged
witch believing that an innocent child also was inside. 242 The court found that
this recklessness for another's life, in combination with the calculation with
which the accused murdered the deceased, eliminated any extenuating circum-
stances based on a strong cultural belief. 243 Nor can a defendant invoke a belief
in witchcraft as a mitigating factor when he or she was paid to kill a witch. In S
v. Ngubane,2 4 4 the defendant claimed he was commissioned by friends to kill a
witch whom they believed was killing children in the community. While the
court agreed that "a belief in witchcraft, forming the motive for the killing of
one believed to practice it, almost invariably is a relevant consideration,"245 the
defendant did not prove that he acted because of a genuine fear of harm or for
the 'common good' of the community, rather, he killed for payment.2 46 To be
considered an extenuating circumstance, the belief in witchcraft must have moti-
vated the crime.
Although ultimately rejected on the facts, court decisions suggest that in-
sanity and provocation can mitigate the culpability of an accused in a witch-
killing case. In S v. Mokonto,247 the court stated that, where an accused kills a
person he or she believes to be a witch because the victim provoked the accused
with an immediate threat of witchcraft, the charge could be lessened from mur-
der to culpable homicide.248 To qualify for a provocation defense, the accused
must act in the heat of the moment, without time to think through his or her
behavior. In the instant case, the defendant brought a cane knife with him when
237. CR SNYMAN, CRIMINAL LAW 152 (1995); EM BURCHELL & PM HUNmr, SoUTH AFRICAN
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 201 (vol. 1, 1996).
238. BURCHELL & HUNT, supra note 237, at 204-05.
239. Id. at 204 (quoting S v. Van Vuuren, 1983 (1) SA 12 (A)).
240. See also S v. Netshiavha, 1990 (2) SACR 331, 333 (A) ("Objectively speaking, the reason-
able man so often postulated in our law does not belief (sic.) in witchcraft.").
241. Bungweni, 1959 (3) SA at 146.
242. 1959 (3) SA 142.
243. Bungweni, 1959 (3) SA at 241.
244. 1980 (2) SA 741 (A).
245. Id. at 745.
246. Id. at 746. See also, S v. Mafu, 1992 (2) SACR 494 (A) (where motive was to punish the
deceased for refusing to allow his son to belong to the comrades, witchcraft belief is not a mitigating
factor).
247. 1971 (2) SA 319.
248. Id. at 325.
he confronted the deceased about practicing witchcraft. Although the deceased

may have threatened the accused with more witchcraft, the court concluded249that
because he brought the cane knife, he must have premeditated the death.
Insanity also may remove a defendant's culpability for witch-killings. The
Natal Native High Court, in its 1917 Hlatshwayo decision, stated that an accused
may plead insanity in defense to a witch-killing charge. 250 In that case, the
accused killed a person he believed used witchcraft to cause lightning to strike
his hut. Despite the suggestion, the court noted that the defendant did not actu-
ally appear insane. 25 ' The tenor of the court's decision suggests that belief in
witchcraft alone is insufficient to support an insanity plea.
In at least one instance, a South African High Court accepted as a defense
to assault the involuntary reaction of a defendant to what he believed to be252a
tokoloshe, a particularly evil spirit, but was in fact a friend. In R v. Ngang,
the defendant had a nightmare that there was a tokoloshe in the room. When he
awoke after the dream, the defendant placed a knife under the bed and went
back to sleep. When he awoke again, the defendant mistook his friend for a
tokoloshe and stabbed him. Finding no possible motive, the court accepted that
the defendant's action was a reflex, removing the necessary criminal intent for
assault. The court distinguished the defendant's action from a belief in witch-
craft that leads a fully conscious and competent person to kill an alleged witch:
This was not proved to be a case merely of mistaken belief in magic or witchcraft
or something like that by a person whose mind was not otherwise affected so that
a possibility of finding the necessary mens rea could be said to arise. The appel-
lant acted involuntarily or automatically and cannot be held criminally
2 53 responsible
for his act which was no more than a purely physical reflex.
Implicitly, it seems the court accepted a belief in tokoloshes as sufficiently rea-
sonable to justify an involuntary reaction defense.
There is at least some indication that South Africa's courts may further
limit the use of the witchcraft belief to mitigate an accused's culpability for
attacks against alleged witches because of the continued "modernization" of
South Africa. In S v. Phama,254 the court refused to allow a defendant to argue
that his belief in witchcraft mitigated the murder of two alleged witches. In
strong dicta, the court argued:
Modem South African courts have for over a hundred years been passing sentence
in cases where the background to or motivation for a killing is a belief in witch-
craft. In many cases this has been regarded as strong mitigation: cases where the
accused and the victim come from a primitive society steeped in superstition,
where the accused and his immediate family have been exposed to disease, death
and disaster, and where the accused kills the deceased because in his mind this is
the only way to put a stop to the curse which he firmly believes has been put on
him and his family by supernatural means. This degree of mitigation is not pre-
249. 1971 (2) SA at 325.

250. Hlatshwayo, 1917 Native High Court at 262.
251. Id.
252. 1960 (3) SA 363 (T).
253. Id. at 366.
254. 1997 (1) SACR 485 (EC).
sent here. The accused is uneducated and from a simple rural background, but he
is not a tribesman from some remote district completely cut off from the influ-
ences of modem civilization... He now lives in a suburb in quite a large, devel-
oping town which is the local political and commercial capital. He is able to
function properly to hold his own in modem society. While he may not have
escaped entirely from the beliefs and superstitions of his forebears, he is expected
to control those beliefs and superstitions instead of allowing them to regulate his
behaviour towards his fellow human beings. The accused, the victims, and their
families do not come from a primitive society, and the message255which my sen-
tence must shed out is not a message from a primitive society.
The court's language implies that a person living in the modem world, no matter
how uneducated or how strong his belief, should be able to control himself when
faced with a witch.2 5 6 Ultimately, the court found that the defendant sincerely
believed in witchcraft and believed the deceased were witches. The court, how-
ever, did not believe that he killed them to protect his family or community from
an imminent threat of witchcraft, but that the killing was revenge for prior
witchcraft.257 What makes this decision difficult from a cultural perspective is
that the court ignored that people who believe in witchcraft see it as truly dan-
gerous and threatening, so much so that witchcraft must be eradicated no matter
what the cost and despite so-called "modem influences."
The decision in S v. Matala,25 8 further suggests that South African courts
are less willing to use witchcraft belief as an extenuating circumstance. This
decision requires the defendant to provide support for his or her belief that the
deceased practiced witchcraft before a court can mitigate a sentence. In Matala,
the defendants attended a meeting where the speaker urged the participants to
aid in the battle against witches. Following the meeting, a mob of people went
to individual houses to kill alleged witches. Facing criminal charges, the de-
fendants initially stated that they did not believe in witchcraft, while also stating
that they participated in the actions to stop witches. The court held that a denial
of a belief in witchcraft is not conclusive where there is evidence to the contrary.
In the instant case, however, the court concluded, "There is not the slightest
evidence that the deceased had ever behaved in any way which could have af-
forded grounds, reasonable or otherwise, for a belief that she [the deceased] was
practicing witchcraft or anything remotely akin to witchcraft., 259 By requiring
such evidence, the court is applying something like a reasonableness test to be-
lieving a person is a witch. Absent a basis for believing the deceased was a
255. Id. at 487-88.

256. Even before the advent of the Witchcraft Suppression Act, the court in Rex v. Magebeni,
1911 Native High Court 107 (Natal) felt South Africa too civilized to accept a belief in witchcraft as
a mitigating factor. The court commented, "When is it to come that these Natives are to learn that
consulting diviners and committing murders will not be tolerated by the British Government? As I
have already said, these men lived under a Magistrate for ten or twelve years, Is this sort of thing to
continue for ever?" Id. at 111.
257. Phama, 1997 (1) SACR at 487.
258. 1993 (1) SACR 531 (A).
259. Id. at 535.
witch, an accused could not depend on a belief in witchcraft by itself to be a

mitigating factor.26 °
The actions of the government of the Transkei from the 1970s to the 1980s
provide an interesting commentary on the extenuating circumstances doctrine.
In 1977, the independent government of the Transkei grew frustrated with the
number of witch-killing cases that came before the courts. The government en-
acted legislation removing witchcraft belief from the list of extenuating circum-
stances to be considered in a murder case. 261 They hoped this would deter
witch-killings, as it meant all witch-killers would be given the death penalty if
no other extenuating circumstances were found.2 62 After the change in rules,
the witch-killings continued at the same rate and members of the legal commu-
nity complained about the number of hangings as a result of the policy. 263 In
1988, after a military takeover in the Transkei, the act forbidding the use of
witchcraft belief as an extenuating circumstance was repealed in large part be-
cause of the complaints in the legal community.
b. Ritual and Medicine Murders

In contrast to witch-killing cases, South African courts do not tolerate or
mitigate ritual or medicine murder offenses. Ritual or medicine murder cases
lack the element of belief of real and imminent harm necessary to mitigate a
witch-killing. Furthermore, the targets of ritual or medicine murder typically are
not those believed to practice witchcraft, but are innocent victims and often chil-
dren. The court in S v. Modisadife refused to accept a belief in witchcraft as a
mitigating factor for a defendant who killed his brother's eleven-year-old step-
daughter to use certain parts of her body in a medicine that would protect him
from harm. 264 The court noted that the harm being protected against was 2an 65
amorphous one and that the victim had nothing to do with any threat of harm.
Conviction for ritual and medicine murder is treated no differently than other
murder convictions primarily because the goal is to kill for 26 6
gain, not to protect
family or the community from perceived imminent harm.
c. Violations of the Witchcraft Suppression Act

Somewhat surprisingly, there are few published decisions on violations of
Section 1(a) of the Witchcraft Suppression Act, which makes pointing out or
260. Id. at 536.

261. DS Koyana, The Demise of the Doctrine of Extenuating Circumstances in the Republics of
South Africa and Transkei, CONSULTUS 115, 116 (1991).
262. Id.
263. id.
264. 1980 (3) SA 860, headnote (A).
265. Id.
266. S v. Munyai, 1993 (1) SACR 252 (A); S v. Marhungu, 1981 (1) SA 56 (A); Rex v.
Magebe, 1916 Native High Court 167 (Natal); Rex v. Magundane, 1915 Native High Court 64
(Natal); Rex v. Fayedwa, 1915 Native High Court 44 (Natal); Chief Butelezi, 1910 Native High
Court 84 (Natal); Rex v. Qoqa, 1911 Native High Court 112 (Natal); Rex v. Mabebana, 1911 Native
High Court 235 (Natal).
naming a witch an offense. 2 6 7 Interesting questions of interpretation have arisen

in these cases. The first is whether violations of this section must meet the
criteria for defamation. The court in S v. Mafunisa determined that a person
may be convicted of naming another as a witch by making the allegation directly
to the alleged witch, meaning that the accusation need not be published more
broadly as required in other defamation cases.2 68 Perhaps more interesting, the
same court had to decide whether the terms "witch" and "wizard" are intended
to include both males and females or whether someone can indicate only women
as witches and men as wizards. The Mafunisa court noted that dictionaries de-
fine witches as women and wizards as men. But, the court held, the purpose of
the statute is to protect against all accusations of witchcraft, regardless of gen-
der, so each term includes both male and female witches and wizards. 2 6 9 South
African courts also confronted the issue of whether a person can be charged
under the Witchcraft Suppression Act for indicating someone as a healer who
uses supernatural powers to cure illness. One case flirted with answering this
question, suggesting that pointing out a healer who uses the power for good
likely would not contravene the Act.
The majority of the cases the author was able to locate in which persons
were convicted of divination were prosecuted under predecessor statutes to the
Witchcraft Suppression Act and significantly before 1957. These opinions con-
demn diviners for the harm that results from having smelled out someone as a
witch. For example, the Natal Native High Court, in Rex v. Nozindhlela, wrote:
"If a man is smelt out as an Mtakati [witch], it is no exaggeration to say that he
is in grave danger. The stigma is not easily removed; he is regarded with suspi-
cion."'270 That all these cases were decided long before the enactment of the
Witchcraft Suppression Act and that they are relatively few in number is surpris-
ing because scholars believe the diviner is a key actor in the witchcraft-related
crimes. 271
The South African courts have faced some interesting difficulties when
dealing with charges for professing knowledge of witchcraft. 2 72 In S v.
267. From the decisions recorded in the Commission of Inquiry Report, 190 persons were ac-
cused of naming others as witches. Niehaus, supra note 147, at 120. Forty-five percent of the
allegations resulted in convictions. Id. Unfortunately, the report does not provide sufficient detail to
analyze any trends in what leads to acquittals or to convictions.
According to some scholars, the successive white governments were unwilling to enforce the
act because of the amount of policing and force it would require. Id.; Hamischfeger, supra note 207,
at 82.
268. 1986 (3) SA 495, 499 (Venda).
269. Id. at 497. For another interesting interpretation question, see S v. Mmbengwa, 1988 (3)
SA 71 (Venda) (holding that, where a defendant acts upon the suggestion by another that a person is
a witch, the defendant contravenes the Act).
270. 1916 Native High Court 163, 164 (Natal). See also Rex v. Fayedwa, 1905 Native High
Court 84, 90 (Natal), Rex v. Mabebana, 1911 Native High Court 235 (Natal); Fayedwa, 1915 Native
High Court 44.
271. Niehaus, supra note 147, at 128 (citing the COMM'N OF INQUIRY REP.).
272. For decisions in which a defendant was convicted of professing knowledge of witchcraft,
see R v. Butelezi, 1961 (I) SA 91 (Natal); Mpanza v. Mtembu, 1929 NAC 148 (Natal and
Transvaal).
Patel,2 73 the complainant paid the defendant to help protect her house from
whatever was causing her children to die in infancy. The defendant sold her a
rabbit's foot to keep in her home and was charged with professing knowledge of
witchcraft. The court found the sale of the charm insufficient evidence of pro-
fessing such knowledge.2 74 Furthermore, the court differentiated between pro-
fessing knowledge of witchcraft aimed at bewitching someone and attempts to
undo "a purported prior magicking. ' 27 5 The court changed the charge from a
violation of the Witchcraft Suppression Act to one of fraud because the accused
276
pretended for payment he could undo the curse on the complainant's family.
Perhaps even more difficult, the Natal Provincial Division in S v. Dlamini
had to decide whether a priest in the Zionist Church should be convicted of
professing knowledge of witchcraft.2 77 During the course of a religious cere-
mony, the priest used stones and objects that were supposed to have supernatural
powers. The court refused to convict the priest because religious leaders are
expected to have a relationship with God that may involve supernatural powers.
The court explained:
To a member of the faith concerned the conduct of the accused would be abso-
lutely normal in the discharge of his duties as a minister of God. However strange
the ceremonies of the Zionist Church might seem to people outside the Church, it
is clear that there is no question of witchcraft involved here. The accused pro-
fessed a knowledge of God, and this seems prima facie to exclude a profession on
his part of a knowledge of witchcraft. Nor does the use of symbolic objects or
belief in the efficacy thereof constitute witchcraft. The pilgrim to Lourdes be-
lieves in the 'supernatural' quality of the waters of the grotto. Moreover, many
shrines and even cathedrals housing relics would be unattended by pilgrims seek-
ing divine assistance where the 'supernatural' objects of belief and intercession to
be dismissed as no more than the tools of witchcraft.27 8
The Natal court concluded that the practices of the accused were in accordance
with Christianity and, at a minimum, the state had failed to meet the burden of
proof that the priest professed knowledge of witchcraft. 279 As in the Patel case
above, this court noted that the priest was280not using his connection to god or his
supernatural powers to bewitch anyone.
The two previous decisions considered whether the person accused of pro-
fessing knowledge of witchcraft seemed to be using the powers for good or evil,
also suggesting that when supernatural powers are used for good, the 'pre-
tended' use is not witchcraft.
Finally, the author located one decision charging an accused with consult-
ing a diviner under a predecessor statute to the Witchcraft Suppression Act. The
273. 1973 (2) SA 208 (Northern Cape).

274. Id. at 216.
275. Id. at 217; see also, Rex v. Ngodhleweni, 1904 NAC 48 (Natal) (overturning a conviction
for practicing as a diviner for lack of evidence).
276. Patel, 1973 (2) SA at 217.
277. 1973 (3) SA 629.
278. Id. at 632. It would be interesting to see a court explain the difference between witchcraft
and Satanism.
279. Id.
280. Id.
court in Rex v. Behngu held that where a person approaches a healer to use his28or1
her powers for good purposes, there is no violation of the predecessor statute.
The accused had approached a healer to help his wife become pregnant. The
court wrote, "there is no offence in a man consulting a doctor because his wife
won't get in the family way ... There is not a bit of evidence to show that this.
man was a diviner or a lightning or rain doctor. '2 82 The court differentiated
between seeking the aid of supernatural powers to name witches and approach-
ing a traditional healer for help with a medical problem.
d. Civil Cases
At least in the past, South African courts looked to customary law treat-
ment of witchcraft accusations before making decisions in defamation and di-
vorce cases. 2 83 As described above, a person accused of witchcraft can
approach a traditional leader or traditional court for damages for false accusa-
tions. The South African courts follow this lead, allowing accused persons to
recover damages for defamation.284 Interestingly, in Twala v. Nboqo,285 the
court held that, since "witchcraft is not recognized by the law of the land, an
action for damages for such a claim could only be granted under customary
law." 286 While common law has no remedy, a complainant could claim defa-
mation under customary law. Whether the customary and common law distinc-
tion remains today is unclear. 287
Common law courts treat defamation under customary law similarly to how
common law treats defamation, with variations necessary because of the state's
stance on witchcraft. The plaintiff must show that the defendant actually called
the complainant a witch.28 8 Hiring a diviner who identifies a witch is not
281. 1916 Native High Court 18 (Natal).

282. Id. at 20.
283. The author was unable to locate any decisions on divorce resulting from being smelled out
as a witch after the adoption of the Witchcraft Suppression Act.
284. Moumakwa v. Nageng, 1951 NAC 14 (Central); Tsepe v. Tjamela, 1946 NAC (4) 98
(Natal and Transvaal); Nqoko v. Nqoko, 1942 NAC (3) 86 (Natal and Transvaal); Mothoagae v.
Mothoagae, 1941 NAC 105 (Natal and Transvaal); Ngobese v. Zulu, 1939 NAC (2) 71 (Natal and
Transvaal); Mansa v. Temba, 1938 NAC 115 (Natal and Transvaal).
285. 1968 BAC 10 (North-Eastern).
286. Id. at 13. See also, Buthelezi v. Msimang, 1964 BAC 105 (Johannesburg) (holding that
the customary apportionment of damages applies to civil claims of imputation of witchcraft, not
common law) and Tubela v. Roemese, 1946 NAC 24 (Cape and Orange Free State) (concluding that
because no actions lie in customary law of defamation for accusing someone of seeking the assis-
tance of a diviner, the defendant did not defame the plaintiff).
287. See Ntembo v. Nohlovu, 1947 NAC 93 (Natal and Transvaal) (holding "if the imputation
of witchcraft is a criminal offense, it must also be defamatory of a person's character to accuse him
of practicing supernatural means").
288. Ngcobo v. Mzobe, 1950 NAC 235, 236-37 (North-Eastern Division) (refusing to make
defendant vicariously liable for the statements of the diviner he hired); Dhlamini v. Gwebu, 1944
NAC 7, 8 (Transvaal). In 1970, a case came before the Bantu Appeals Court where the diviner had
smelled out a witch with the description of the person but no name. The description was that the
witch was a person who accompanied the defendant to see the diviner. There was conflicting evi-
dence on the number of people who went on the trip. The court refused to grant damages because
there was no evidence that the defendant named the plaintiff as a witch, simply that the plaintiff
assumed he had been named. Buthelezi v. Magwaza, 1970 BAC (3) 33, 35 (Natal and Transvaal).
enough to support a defamation action under the doctrine of vicarious liability.

The defendant in a defamation case cannot defend on the basis of truth 289
of the
statement, as common law courts refuse to hear any such evidence.
What privileges to apply to defamation cases is a more difficult question
for South African courts, particularly when faced with whether to grant damages
when the accusation of witchcraft is made to a traditional leader. The courts had
to consider that traditionally community members brought all such accusations
to the traditional leader. In one decision, the Native High Court in Natal set
aside a damages award to a complainant because the alleged defamatory state-
ment was made to a traditional authority under "an honest, although mistaken
belief, without malice and in good faith." 29 ° More recently, the Bantu Appeals
Court found a privilege for certain situations in which witchcraft accusations
were made to a chief. When a person approached a chief in hopes of beginning
a witchcraft trial, accusations of witchcraft before the chief could form the basis
of an action in defamation. 29 ' No privilege would attach to situations, as the
chief had no authority to hear such cases. On the other hand, when the chief had
to look into a defamation complaint, accusations made to the chief were privi-
leged.292 The courts appeared caught between the traditional role of the chief,
the privileges that attach to that role, and the perceived necessity of suppressing
witchcraft belief.
Another privilege may arise when the complainant agreed to join the smell-
ing out ceremony. 29 3 Publication of the results of the ceremony to those who
participated in and paid for the ceremony is insufficient to meet the requirements
of defamation.29 4 When persons present at the ceremony report the results be-
yond this limited group, however,
295
they can be found liable for damages resulting
from the loss of reputation.
In the past, South African courts also followed customary law with respect
to divorces that were carried out on grounds of having been smelled out as a
witch. 2 9 6 Almost all of the cases were decided well before the Witchcraft Sup-
pression Act came into force but after the enactment of the first suppression
statutes. Essentially, when a man had his wife "smelled out" as a witch and she

290. Yoli v. Sitendeni, 1900 Native High Court 34 (Natal).
291. Makhoba v. Makhoba, 1966 BAC (I, 2) 28, 30 (Eshave); Zungu v. Zungu, 1942 NAC 8,9
(Natal); Sibisi v. Mtshali, 1939 NAC (2) 137, 139 (Natal and Transvaal).
. 292. Makhoba, 1966 BAC at 30; Ngcobo v. Mdhlalose, 1949 NAC (1)68 (North Eastern Divi-
sion). There is some suggestion that this privilege also applies to a report to a kraal-head, Fungula v.
Sithole, 1956 NAC (4) 172, 173 (North-Eastern), or to a family meeting. Majola v. Ngubane, 1970
BAC (3) 36, 37 (Natal and Transvaal).
293. Ziqubu v. Ziqubu, 1953 NAC 72, 74 (North-Eastern); Miya v. Miya, 1947 NAC 108, 108-
109 (Transvaal and Natal).
294. Id. See also, Buthelezi, 1970 BAC (3) at 35. But see, Sibisi, 1939 NAC (2) 137 (holding
that the privilege does not exist simply because the plaintiff agreed to the meeting with diviner;
plaintiff must have consented to the report back to the chief for the privilege to arise).
295. Ziqubu, 1953 NAC at 74.
296. It appears from one case that by statutory law, a woman could be granted a divorce for
being smelled out as a witch under certain conditions. Ngubane v. Ngubane, 1937 NAC 27, 28
(Natal and Transvaal).
returned to her home, if the man did not request her return within a short period
of time, a divorce followed.297 The wife and her father were expected to report
the divination to the chief on her return to her father's home, giving the chief the
opportunity to question the husband about the wife's claim. 29 8 Where this crite-
ria was not met, the court would require evidence that the wife was driven from
her home or that the situation was so intolerable she was forced to leave before
recognizing a dissolution. 299
Once the divorce ensued, the ex-husband lost any privileges he normally
would have received from a wife as a result of the divorce. For example, the
husband could not claim entitlement to repayment of lobola or dowry, a com-
mon entitlement when a wife leaves a husband. 30 0 Nor could the ex-husband
receive the benefits he would have been entitled to had he remained married or
had not caused the divorce. For example, the ex-husband lost the right to lobola
paid for daughters born to the ex-wife after the dissolution of the marriage, even
if he is the natural father. 30 The father of the woman smelled out as a witch by
her husband could request damages.30 2 These same rules applied when the hus-
band's family had the wife smelled out as a witch on the husband's death.30 3
There are conflicting decisions on whether the woman also lost her rights to
the husband's estate following a divorce on these grounds. In Mdungzawe v.
Mabecela,30 4 the widow was allowed to claim against the estate of her husband
on behalf of her minor son born to the husband but after the divorce.30 5 Three
years later, the Native Appeals Court decided that any child born after the wo-
man was smelled out and had returned to her own family was a non-marital
child, which under customary law means the child cannot inherit from his
father.30 6
From this review of the government and common law treatment of witch-
craft belief, it becomes evident that the government and common law courts will
297. Mafaka v. Dyaluvana, 1903 NAC 65, 66 (Transkeian Territories). Even where a husband
did return for his wife, courts have found that a divorce ensued. Links v. Mdyobeli, 1947 NAC 96,
97 (Cape and Orange Free State).
298. OLIVIER, BEKKER, OLIVIER, JR., & OLIVIER, supra note 16, at 66; Mxonya v. Moyeni, 1940
NAC 87, 88 (Cape and Orange Free State). But see Nyamekwangi v. Maduntswana, 1951 NAC 313,
314 (Southern Division).
299. Mqitsane v. Panya, 1951 NAC 354, 355 (Southern Division).
300. Nqambi v. Nqambi, 1939 NAC 57 (Cape and Orange Free State); Petrus v. Alice, 1916
Native High Court 86, 86 (Natal). Under customary law, when a woman marries, she becomes a
part of her husband's family. The husband's family is required to pay lobola or the dowry for the
woman, which may be returned to the husband's family should the woman cause a divorce.
301. See Maxobongwana v. Funda, 1909 NAC 273, 273 (Transkeian Territories); Mtuyedwa v.
Tshisa, 1906 NAC 122, 122 (Transkeian Territories); Juleka v. Sihlahla, 1905 NAC 88, 88 (Trans-
keian Territories). There is some authority that if the wife is pregnant at the time she is smelled out,
the ex-husband remains entitled to lobola paid for that child. Nyamekwangi, 1951 NAC at 314. This
may imply a reciprocal duty of the father to maintain the child.
302. Somabokwe v. Slooto, 1911 NAC 118, 119 (Transkeian Territories); Maxobongwana,
1909 NAC at 273.
303. Tsibiyan v. Ngoceni, 1908 NAC 204 (Transkeian Territories).
304. 1908 NAC 219 (Transkeian Territories).
305. Id. at 219.
306. Somabokwfe, 1911 NAC at 119.
suppress cultural beliefs whose manifestations they find abhorrent. Witchcraft

belief can never be a defense to witchcraft-related violence. To the extent a
defendant in a witchcraft violence case can prove he or she could not discern
right from wrong because of that belief, the court may reduce the charge to a
lesser crime or shorten the sentence for the crime. Where the crime seems par-
ticularly cold or calculated, the mitigation witchcraft belief provides will likely
be erased. The government and its courts may not suppress particular aspects of
the customary law treatment of these cultural beliefs when the results of the
customary law meet the goal of eliminating the belief. For example, the com-
mon law courts willingly enforce customary law treatment of witchcraft accusa-
tions that punishes accusers-such as in defamation or certain divorce cases.
Surprisingly, in light of the courts' desire to protect the 'innocent' victims of
witchcraft accusations, the courts seem hesitant to punish persons violating the
Witchcraft Suppression Act, or, perhaps, prosecutors were unwilling to prose-
cute the cases.
3. Proposed Reforms to the Witchcraft Suppression Act

Changes to customary practices and law related to witchcraft and the fail-
ure of the Witchcraft Suppression Act to alter witchcraft beliefs or to control
witchcraft violence have forced the government to begin thinking about a reform
process for the Witchcraft Suppression Act. 30 7 Described below are a few pro-
posals for reforming the Act.
The Minister of Safety and Security of the Northern Province in 1996, Seth
Nthai, declared witch-killings the number one social problem in the province. 30 8
In 1996, the Executive Council of the Northern Province commissioned a report
researching the causes of witchcraft violence and ritual and medicine murder.
The head researcher was Professor NV Ralushai of the University of the North.
Professor Ralushai approached the issue from the perspective that the govern-
ment can no longer deny or suppress witchcraft beliefs. Instead, the government
needs to integrate the customary law and common law treatment of witchcraft to
reach a more effective solution to witchcraft accusations and violence. This
holds particularly true since the witchcraft belief itself is not the problem, but
the actions taken on those beliefs. The Commission of Inquiry Report makes
many recommendations but for purposes of this Article, the author will describe
30 9
recommendations for the role of law in combating witchcraft violence.
The report's recommendations on the role of law begin by describing how
most sub-Saharan African countries continue to outlaw "the practice of magic
and witchcraft.., which [is] not readily appreciated by people, of whom a large
number regard the operation of magic as normal events of everyday life."3 10
307. Hund, supra note 170, at 49. From 1990-1995, and in 1997 and 1998, over 400 witchcraft
related cases a year were recorded in the Northern Province. Faure, supra note 107, at 172-73.
309. It is not the purpose of this Article to critique the Commission of Inquiry Report or the
Draft Witchcraft Control Act, which it recommends, as a critique will do little to answer the ques-
tions posed in the paper.
Recognizing the unpopularity of witchcraft-suppression legislation, the report

recommendations presume that the success of any reforms depends on whether
the populations at whom the reforms are aimed accept them. 3 '
In place of the Witchcraft Suppression Act, which it concludes is wholly
ineffective, the Commission of Inquiry Report recommends the adoption of the
Witchcraft Control Act. The proposed act accepts that witchcraft in fact exists
and believes law can control it. 3 1 2 Under the proposed act, only an unreasona-
ble and unjustifiable cause for naming a person a witch will be prosecuted. 3 13 A
victim of witchcraft, however, cannot seek the aid of a diviner to find a witch,
no matter how reasonable or justifiable the belief a witch was involved in the
harm.3 14 Nor is it legal for a diviner to practice his or her craft. 3t 5 The Act also
would criminalize: (1) "any act which creates a reasonable suspicion that he is
engaged in the practice of witchcraft '' 3 16 and (2) anyone who "on the advice of
any witchdoctor, witch-finder or other person or on the ground of any knowl-
edge of witchcraft, uses or causes to be put into operation any means or process
which, in accordance with such advice or his own belief, is calculated to injure
or damage any person or thing." 3 17 These provisions deem the belief in witch-
craft as reasonable, which would alter the common law significantly. And, un-
like under the existing Witchcraft Suppression Act, all acts of witchcraft would
be criminalized under the Witchcraft Control Act.
The Commission of Inquiry Report does recognize that witchcraft cannot be
proved through eyewitnesses, and perhaps not at all. 3 18 The recommendations
do not suggest how to deal with evidentiary problems in common law courts,
nor does the report say whether jurisdiction over witchcraft trials should be re-
turned to customary law courts.
In September 1998, a few years after the completion of the Commission of
Inquiry Report, the Commission for Gender Equality, a national statutory body,
organized a Conference on Witchcraft Violence. The conference members ap-
proved the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry Report, including the
integrated approach to reform. 3 19
The National Conference Report, which reflects the events of the confer-
ence, includes a list of working groups, the action the working groups hope to
take, by whom the actions will be completed and time frames for the comple-
tion. Under the working group on legislation, the first action expected is the
repeal of the Witchcraft Suppression Act and its replacement with new legisla-
311. Id.
312. For a discussion of the problems courts would face in prosecuting witches, see Harnischfe-
ger, supra note 207, at 83-86
313. Draft Witchcraft Control Act, in COMM. OF INQUIRY REP., supra note 3, at 55.
314. Id. This provision seems incongruous with the goal of treating witchcraft as real. If witch-
craft is real, how are people supposed to protect themselves? Perhaps the Commission of Inquiry
Report envisions an institutional mechanism to meet this need.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
319. Harnischfeger, supra note 207, at 100.
104 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Vol. 21:62
tion.320 The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development was ex-

pected to call a meeting with stakeholders including the Department of Safety
and Security, the Departments of Education and Welfare, traditional leaders,
traditional healers and victims of witchcraft violence. 3 2' The target date for the
meeting was the end of October 1998. The second piece of expected legislation
would govern traditional healers by bringing them under regulation.32 2 The De-
partment of Health planned to coordinate with stakeholders by August 1999 to
discuss this legislation. According to the working group schedule, the Depart-
ment of Constitutional Development planned to complete a greenpaper on con-
trolling the manifestations of witchcraft belief by August 1999.323 The
government has not produced a greenpaper.
The Institute for Multi-Party Democracy recommends the creation of spe-
cial witchcraft courts to hear witchcraft cases.324 These courts would handle the
same issues as the chiefs formally did and would fine people for false, reckless
or self-serving accusations of witchcraft as well as fines for the practice of
witchcraft.3 25
Each of these recommendations provides for reforms that accept the belief
in witchcraft as true, while fighting the negative manifestations of the belief. As
discussed in the next section, whether South Africa will adopt the provisions
that integrate customary and common law mechanisms for controlling the mani-
festations of witchcraft belief remains unclear and seems unlikely.
V.
IMPLICATIONS
This Article has shown that the present answer to the question of how the
common law system treats witchcraft, a traditional belief accepted by customary
law that is not valued by the common law system, is that it attempts to suppress
the belief. The implications of this include: (1) that the repugnancy clause insti-
tuted by colonists remains intact, and (2) that common law solutions to custom-
ary problems may lead to distortions of customary law that harm society in
general. Unfortunately, these implications apply more broadly than to just the
witchcraft belief.
A. Repugnancy Clause
The language of recent court decisions on witchcraft violence, together
with the acquiescence of the new South African government to the Witchcraft
Suppression Act and the apparent halt on discussions to reform the act, lead the
320. NAT'L. CONF. RE'., supra note 5, at 64.

321. Id.
322. Keep in mind that diviners fall under the category of traditional healers.
324. Hund, supra note 170, at 52. These courts may have problems complying with the consti-
tutional rights to a fair trial if the concept of fair trial remains based in Western norms and values.
325. Id. Many fear that it will be impossible for traditional courts to regain the trust and the
perception of legitimacy they had before the Black Administration Act and before the Witchcraft
Suppression Act. Id.
author to believe that little will change in the treatment of witchcraft belief
under the new constitutional dispensation. Somewhere between unreasonable
and insane, witchcraft belief may never be treated as more than mere supersti-
tion. It appears that customary beliefs and practices, particularly the witchcraft
belief, will continue to be subjected to a repugnancy clause, despite the change
to a democracy in which believers are in the majority. As a reminder, the colo-
nial and successive white governments used the repugnancy clause to measure
customary law and its underlying beliefs and values against the white, minority
notions of "public policy" and "natural justice." Any customary law that did not
measure up to these Western notions could not be recognized by the common
law courts or enforced by customary law courts. Under the new democratic
system, both common law and customary law were intended to be subordinate to
the Constitution, but not to each other. Yet, the continued use of the repugnancy
clause suggests that customary law remains subordinate to common law, as the
government can suppress customary law it deems unacceptable.
Several tools are available for the government to subordinate customary
law. South Africa's parliament has the most far-reaching power, as it can legis-
late away any customary law it deems repugnant or less than repugnant through
statutes aimed directly at customary law. 3 2 6 Parliament, however, also has the
power to legislate away common law based on Western values and norms. By
itself, the existence of the power to legislate against customary law does not
subordinate it.
The courts, however, can access an explicit repugnancy clause provided in
Section 1 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, which states that courts
cannot recognize customary law to the extent to which it is "opposed to the
principles of public policy and natural justice." This clause is a remnant of the
colonial past devised to suppress and subordinate indigenous beliefs and prac-
tices. Inherently, the repugnancy clause measures customary law against West-
ern and minority values and norms. From the common law court discussions of
uncivilized indigenous beliefs and the modernizing and civilizing effects of
white influence, the concepts of public policy and natural justice explicitly are
based on Western norms and values.32 7 The courts also can apply a repugnancy
clause implicitly by explaining how customary law violates public policy, with-
out specific reference to the Law of Evidence Amendment Act.
326. There are some limitations to this power-it must not be used to violate anyone's rights to
culture or beliefs, unless the practice or belief itself is inconsistent with the Constitution. CONST.
§§ 15, 30 and 31. How well such rights arguments will succeed depends on the justification for
legislating against the customary law. This burden does not seem too difficult in repugnancy clause
application, as by definition the custom targeted must be against 'public policy' and "natural
justice."
327. Fortunately, the Supreme Court of Appeal recognizes the need to change the basis of
public policy away from the norms of the minority to those of the majority. In Amod v. Multilateral
Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund, 1999 (4) SA 1319, the Court wrote: "it is quite inimical to all the
values of the new South Africa for one group to impose its values on another and that the Courts
should only brand a contract as offensive to public policy if it is offensive to those values which are
shared by the community at large, by all right-thinking people in the community and not only by one
section of it." Id. at 1329.
There is at least some question as to whether the Bill of Rights serves as a

repugnancy clause. Section 211 makes application of customary law "subject to
the Constitution." Because the Constitution predominantly protects individual
rights, rather than collective rights, scholars argue that the Constitution is based
on Western norms and values rather than African norms and values. Reading
Section 211 with this argument in mind leads to the conclusion that customary
law is once again being subordinated by the minority system. 328 This may, in
fact, be true to the extent Parliament reforms customary law by replacing it with
common law rather than 329
developing customary law to bring it into compliance
with the Constitution.
That the tools for subordinating customary law exist does not mean they
will be used. Unfortunately, the language of a post-Apartheid common law
cases on witchcraft-related violence, which relied on past treatment of witch-
craft, and the continued validity of the Witchcraft Suppression Act provide am-
ple evidence that the repugnancy clause remains in effect. Since the early
twentieth century, common law decisions have deemed witchcraft belief primi-
tive and uncivilized. In 1911, hearing a witch-killing case, the Natal Native
High Court lamented the tenacity of such primitive beliefs: "When is it to come
that these Natives are to learn that consulting diviners and committing murders
will not be tolerated by the British Government? As I have already said, these
men lived under a Magistrate for ten or twelve years. Is this sort of thing to
continue forever?" 3 30 Sixty years later, the South African High Court declared
that any acceptance of witchcraft belief by the white government would
"plunge" South Africa back into the Dark Ages. 33 1
The exceptions common law courts make to the treatment of witchcraft
beliefs as uncivilized further support the proposition that witchcraft belief has
always been measured against Western values. In a few decisions, courts ac-
quitted persons of professing knowledge of witchcraft when the common law
judge could relate the alleged professions to Western superstition or practice.
As described above, in S v. Patel,332 a traditional healer sold a woman a rabbit's
foot to place in her home, which the defendant claimed would stop the com-
plainant's children from dying in infancy. Finding insufficient evidence of pro-
fessing knowledge of witchcraft, the court altered the charge to fraud. By
contrast, the Natal Provincial Division convicted a woman of professing knowl-
edge of witchcraft because she implied through her conduct that a bottle and its
328. For example, customary law as practiced in South Africa follows rules of primogeniture
and patriarchy, which stands in direct conflict with gender equality. Some scholars suggest that the
equality clause could eliminate up to 85 percent of customary law. Mqeke, supra note 34, at 5. See
also Loenen, supra note 32, at 123 ("Because African culture is pervaded by the principle of patri-
arch, the gender equality clause now threatens a thorough-going purge of customary law"); AJ Kerr,
Inheritance in Customary Law Under the Interim Constitution and Under the Present Constitution,
S. AnR. L. J 263, 267 (1998).
329. Integrating customary law and the common law could keep the two systems equal, unlike
wholesale implantation of common law.
330. Magebeni, 1911 Native High Court at I11.
331. Mokonto, 1971 (2) SA at 324.
332. 1973 (2) SA 208.
contents had supernatural powers that would allow the defendant to diagnose the
complainant with an ailment. 333 The court wrote: "it is sufficient to bring home
the present charge, for the Crown to prove that the appellant claimed or repre-
sented by his words or conduct that the bottle with its contents was endowed
with a quality such as to render its use by him in the circumstances the exercis-
ing of a kind of supernatural power or witchcraft.",334 The difference between
these two cases seems to be the defendant's choice of objects he or she claimed
had supernatural powers. The court in the first decision, at least implicitly, rec-
ognized a rabbit's foot as a good luck charm under Western superstition and
treated the case as one of fraud, not witchcraft. It seems unlikely the court
would have reached the same conclusion if the traditional healer had sold her a
goat's ear. When the court could not understand the idea that a bottle and its
contents held supernatural powers, the court convicted the defendant of profess-
ing knowledge of witchcraft.3 35
Another example of the difference it makes when the judge relates to the
alleged witchcraft practice is S v. Diamini. In that case, the court understood a
priest's claim to access to supernatural powers through charms because of the
similarity with Western Christian priests who are believed to have similar ac-
cess. 3 3 6 The court explained that a Zionist priest using supernatural powers in a
religious ceremony is no different than charms endowed with supernatural pow-
ers used in churches and cathedrals around the world. This understanding for
Church-related supernatural belief stops when people who are not priests claim
to have access to the spirit world that provides them with Western notions of
supernatural power.
In S v. Phama, one of the few post-Apartheid witch-killing trials, the court
explicitly accepted the Western premise that witchcraft belief is primitive and
uncivilized. The court found the defendant was uneducated and genuinely be-
lieved in witchcraft, yet refused to accept the belief as a mitigating factor to a
murder conviction because: "The accused, the victims, and their families do not
come from a primitive society, and the message337which my sentence must shed
out is not a message from a primitive society."
Even to the extent other South African court decisions will continue to treat
witchcraft belief as an extenuating circumstance, as long as the belief remains an
extenuating circumstance based on diminished capacity the repugnancy clause
will remain in force. Judging a belief as unreasonable requires it to be measured
against something. Without explicit language to the contrary, it can be assumed
that Western perceptions of "public policy" and "natural justice" will remain the
measuring stick. Although public policy should "mirror the community's sense
333. Butelezi, 1961 (1) SA 91.

334. Id. at 93.
335. Cf Mpanza, 1929 NAC 148 (Natal and Transvaal) (licensed doctor agreed to protect a
kraal against evil for payment; was convicted under Zululand proclamation No. VII of 1895 §§ 268,
269 and 270, which prohibited the use of spells and charms and make it a criminal offence to do
these things).
336. Dlamini, 1973 (3) SA at 632.
337. Phama, 1997 (1) SACR at 487-88.
of justice," 338 here it will represent Western beliefs and legal values. If public
policy were truly indicative of the community's beliefs and values, it would
reflect that the majority of South Africans believe in witchcraft. No longer
would the belief be legally unreasonable.
Other evidence of an implicit repugnancy clause is the unchanged Witch-
craft Suppression Act. "The underlying premise of this Act was that witchcraft
did not exist . . . and moreover that these practices were merely superstitious
African nonsense. ' ' 339 By keeping the Witchcraft Suppression Act intact, de-
spite the frustration of the majority of South Africans with legislation that allows
witches to run free and unfulfilled plans to reform the Act, the new multi-cul-
tural government implicitly accepts and is willing to enforce these Western
premises. The express purpose of the Witchcraft Suppression Act is to suppress
witchcraft belief. Many of the provisions are aimed directly at the belief, not
just at its negative manifestations. This Act could be challenged as a violation
of the constitutional rights to one's culture and beliefs, although no action has
been taken so far. The likelihood of success for such a challenge is beyond the
scope of this Article.
The treatment of witchcraft by the government and common law courts
provides an easy example of the continued existence of a repugnancy clause.
Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to witchcraft that would erase the repug-
nancy clause. Scholars believe that many problems will arise if witchcraft is
formally recognized and controlled by the South African government. It is not
the purpose of this Article to analyze or recommend reform efforts; however, it
will describe a few of these problems. First, problems arise from the patterns in
the accusations of witchcraft. Of great concern is the belief that women are
more likely to be witches, especially older women. Would the recognition of
witchcraft serve as another hurdle to equality? Regarding the poor, one scholar
remarked: "More significantly, the condoning of witchcraft accusations would
entrench social inequality . . .Villagers believe the witches are deprived, margi-
nal, and poorer persons ...Persons who have relatively greater status and influ-
ence have manipulated this cultural fantasy to their own advantage. 3 4 ° Others
argue that formal acceptance of witchcraft belief will hamper development and
exacerbate racism: "the recognition of the existence of crimes of an occult na-
ture would be counter-productive to modernity and development, perpetuating
the stereotyped notions of atavism and African barbarism that racist theories are
always quick to use as a political argument."'34' Finally, scholars fear that for-
mal mechanisms to control witchcraft will violate the constitutional guarantees
of a fair trial because of the difficulty of proving a causal link between alleged
witchcraft and the harm.
This Article has focused on witchcraft to show that the government and
common law courts (1)continue to perpetuate a Western bias in the treatment of
338. Van Niekerk, supra note 15, at 416.

341. Faure, supra note 107, at 171-72.
customary law and beliefs, and (2) have not acted to eradicate the repugnancy
clause. As long as customary law, beliefs and values continue to be measured
against Western norms and values, customary law will never be equal to com-
mon law, despite the intentions of the drafters of the Constitution.
B. Distortion of Customary Law
A similarly important implication of this research is that statutory law in-

tended to suppress or remove aspects of customary law actually may distort it.
This creates the possibility that the effects of the statute may be worse than the
customary law. A comparison of customary legal treatment of witchcraft before
and after the enforcement of the Witchcraft Suppression Act illustrates this
point. The Witchcraft Suppression Act failed to meet its primary goal of sup-
pressing witchcraft, as indicated by reports that witchcraft belief remains preva-
lent among indigenous cultures. The Act did accomplish the goal of removing
some power from traditional leaders, but it also proved the adaptability of living
customary law. When the government built roadblocks to the community's ac-
cess to witchcraft justice, community members dug a tunnel under it. Society
paid a heavy price for that tunnel: (1) the statute eliminated the procedural pro-
tections to witchcraft trials, while not eliminating the actual trials; (2) the statute
removed chiefs from hearing witchcraft cases, replacing them with individuals
who believe they have been wronged; (3) diviners garnered a new power to
destroy opponents and enemies (or the enemies and opponents of others for
pay); and (4) vigilantism came to seemingly reigns over social order.
In the end, the attempts of one legal system to suppress another in a legal
dualist society erased what may have been a potentially adequate mechanism for
controlling the manifestations of witchcraft belief and replaced it with a less fair,
more dangerous mechanism.342 People are far more vulnerable to witchcraft
accusations and accused witches no longer benefit from procedures designed to
make witchcraft trials fair. Now, as one law enforcement official reports, cus-
tomary law no longer can control the negative manifestations of witchcraft be-
liefs after the common law's failed attempts: "Even traditional authorities,
formerly considered to be the guardians of customary law, are now at pains to
cope with the situation, because of the considerable changes in the incidence,
content, and form of witchcraft accusations over time, and the compromising
attitude of traditional authorities during the Apartheid regime."3 43
The end result of the common law's supremacy over customary law is that
no mechanism exists to control witchcraft-related violence. The solution to vio-
lence caused by witchcraft beliefs turned out far worse than the problems ini-
tially identified by colonial and successive white governments. This research
342. Because there are so few resources that examine customary treatment of witchcraft, it is
difficult to ascertain whether prior customary legal treatment adequately handled the negative mani-
festations of witchcraft belief.
343. Dirk Kohnert, Witchcraft and the Democratization of South Africa, 2 AFR. LECAL STUD.
177-78 (2001).
110 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
should remind reformers to proceed with caution when attempting to replace

customary law with foreign law and practices.
VI.
CONCLUSION
An examination of the treatment of witchcraft belief by the government and

by common law courts shows that the repugnancy clause-created by the colo-
nial and perpetuated by successive white governments-remains in force. The
"civilized" solution to repugnant customary beliefs can result in such distortions
to customary law that the solution may become worse than the initial "primitive"
problem. The government, courts and reformers need to rid themselves of cul-
tural and ideological biases when approaching problems in customary law. Un-
til they do so, customary law is likely to remain subordinate to common law.
Secondly the government, courts and reformers need to search for solutions
within the communities whose problems they are trying to address. Unless re-
form efforts gain the acceptance of the citizens at whom legislation is aimed,
such efforts will fail.

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Cultural Denial: What South Africa's

Treatment of Witchcraft Says for the

d. C ivil C ases .................................... 99

A. What is Legal Pluralism?

B. Legal Pluralism In South Africa

2. Legal Pluralism Today

cise jurisdiction in terms of the legislation applicable to it" or until Parliament

44. GJ van Niekerk, DemocraticAspects Of Traditional Conflict Management: Unofficial Dis-

A. The Belief in Witchcraft

The belief in witchcraft is premised on the doctrines of manism and dyna-

the natural balance of cosmic good, this harmony is disrupted. 89 Keeping in

2. Witches and Their Powers

89. Id. at 180.

102. Motshekga, supra note 71, at 150.

3. Smelling Out a Witch

122. GELFAND, supra note 81, at 48.

B. Social Aspects of Witchcraft Accusations

2. Social Purpose of Witchcraft Accusations

Accusations of witchcraft and subsequent punishment of witches seem to

A. Treatment of Witchcraft Under Customary Law

followed by customary courts prior to the introduction of the Witchcraft Sup-

2. Treatment of Witchcraft After the Witchcraft Suppression Act 3 of

211. Niehaus, supra note 80, at 359.

There are members of communities who condemn vigilante justice prima-

B. Treatment of Witchcraft Under the Common Law System

ecutes "pretended" witchcraft as though it is a fraud, and not a harmful act. To

2. Witchcraft in the Common Law Courts

minished capacity237 -whether due to intoxication, provocation, or severe

he confronted the deceased about practicing witchcraft. Although the deceased

249. 1971 (2) SA at 325.

255. Id. at 487-88.

witch, an accused could not depend on a belief in witchcraft by itself to be a

b. Ritual and Medicine Murders

c. Violations of the Witchcraft Suppression Act

260. Id. at 536.

naming a witch an offense. 2 6 7 Interesting questions of interpretation have arisen

273. 1973 (2) SA 208 (Northern Cape).

281. 1916 Native High Court 18 (Natal).

enough to support a defamation action under the doctrine of vicarious liability.

289. Hund, supra note 78, at 368.

suppress cultural beliefs whose manifestations they find abhorrent. Witchcraft

3. Proposed Reforms to the Witchcraft Suppression Act

Recognizing the unpopularity of witchcraft-suppression legislation, the report

tion.320 The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development was ex-

320. NAT'L. CONF. RE'., supra note 5, at 64.

There is at least some question as to whether the Bill of Rights serves as a

333. Butelezi, 1961 (1) SA 91.

338. Van Niekerk, supra note 15, at 416.

B. Distortion of Customary Law

A similarly important implication of this research is that statutory law in-

should remind reformers to proceed with caution when attempting to replace

An examination of the treatment of witchcraft belief by the government and

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