

*Leadership Transition
in a Fractured Bloc*

Featuring:

CPSU Plenums; Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the Crisis in East Germany; Stalin and the Soviet-Yugoslav Split; Deng Xiaoping and Sino-Soviet Relations; The End of the Cold War: A Preview

The Cold War International History Project

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Photo on cover: From left to right: Anastas Mikoian, Nikita Khrushchev, Iosif Stalin, Georgii Malenkov, Lavrentii Beria, and Viacheslav Molotov.

From Zubok, Vladislav and Konstantin Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War*. Copyright ©1996 by Harvard University Press. Photo printed with permission from the Russian State Archive of Film and Photodocuments, Krasnogorsk.

“We [the CC CPSU Presidium members] were all stunned, though we knew much
And now it all was verified and confirmed by documents.”

A. I. Mikoian *Memoirs*¹

Leadership Transition in a Fractured Bloc : Editor's Note

On 1 March 1953, I.V. Stalin retired from a late night feast with Comrades Beria, Bulganin, Khrushchev and Malenkov to read some top secret files.² The first told him that the Soviet gold reserve had reached 2049 tons. The second was bad news: despite imaginative efforts, Soviet organs had failed to “rub out” (*skovyrmut*) Tito.³ In the course of the following few hours, Stalin himself was laid low by a stroke. On 5 March 1953, with Stalin in a terminal coma, an emergency plenary session (*plenium*) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) was called. The mood was somber and the final resolution focused on one point.⁴

In connection with Comrade Stalin's serious illness, which means his longer or shorter non-participation in leadership [duties], to consider the most important party and government task during Comrade Stalin's absence to be the unbroken, correct leadership of the country, which in turn requires complete leadership unity and the impermissibility of any kind of division or panic.

Stalin did not tarry long, dying that very night at 9:50, but the succession crises, against which the plenum had warned, dragged on for years.

This period of “collective leadership,” as it was known, also defined a new era of the Cold War. Whether for reasons of state, matters of principle or simply convenient pretext, decisions on current foreign policy and interpretations of past decisions became linked to the personal political fortunes of a series of top leaders. The falls of Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, Zhukov, and finally Khrushchev himself are linked to such key Cold War topics as the German question, nuclear strategy, Yugoslavia, “Open Skies” and the Cuban Missile Crisis, respectively. With the West, hesitancy gave way to renewed hostility.⁵ Insecure and changing leadership in the Kremlin was a poor base on which to try and build *détente*. Stalin was gone, but the nature of the succession to his autocratic regime guaranteed long life to the Cold War.

Several sections of this *Cold War International History Project Bulletin 10* cover the immediate post-Stalin period from a variety of angles. The **Plenums** section presents excerpted transcripts from three gatherings of the CC CPSU at which bitter words of leadership disagreement were spoken in the interstices of foreign policy debate. In addition, new materials on Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in a “secret speech” to the 20th

Party Congress on 25 February 1956 show the exclusively domestic concerns driving a decision that would have fateful consequences for the international Communist movement and, in particular, the Sino-Soviet relationship. The origins of the speech are documented with such important Russian sources as Malin notes⁶ and the Mikoian diary, while the Polish archives provide an impromptu “second secret speech” by Khrushchev to the Polish sixth party plenum in March 1956. Here Khrushchev describes in some detail Stalin's “persecution complex” and its dark consequences.⁷

The **Berlin 1953** section presents multiple perspectives from German, Russian and Hungarian archives on this earliest East-bloc uprising against Communist rule, quashed in a day by Soviet occupation forces stationed in Germany. Unlike 1956 in Hungary and 1968 in Czechoslovakia, no invasion was necessary. To broaden perspective even further, materials come from party, military and state sources. On the actual day of maximum unrest, June 17, coverage becomes almost hourly thanks to the frequent reporting schedule of the Russian military authorities repressing the “disorders.” Other highlights are Beria's groveling, unheeded pleas from prison to old associates in the Presidium, following his arrest in late June (he was shot in December 1953) and the remarkable meeting, literally on the eve of the German uprising, between Soviet and Hungarian leaderships that shows reforms being suggested to Budapest that are in perfect parallel with the New Course pressed on Berlin. Soviet plans for internal change were bloc-wide in scope.⁸

The **Yugoslavia** section examines the first fracture in the Communist bloc and the special role played by the Southern Slavs in both Stalinist and post-Stalinist international relations. Possibly, the most exciting materials in this section are Stalin's conversations with Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders in 1946 and 1948, with detailed introduction and notes by Leonid Gibianskii. These Stalin conversations, together with others (Mao Zedong, Wilhelm Pieck, Kim Il Sung) published in previous *CWIHP Bulletins*, are part of a growing body of material on Stalin being assembled by CWIHP. It would be hard to pick any single individual more important to this period and yet remarkably little is known about Stalin as a Cold War statesman. Much material remains bottled up in the Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation. Control of Stalin's archive was considered a perquisite of highest office in Soviet times and the practice continues. It remains unclear, however, how much material there really is, since Stalin did not like note-taking. But he did like to talk.⁹ As Averell Harriman said in Stalin's presence when escorting Harry Hopkins on a mission to convince the

aging dictator to help salvage the deteriorating Grand Alliance: 10

President Truman had sent him [Hopkins] to have the kind of frank talk with Marshal Stalin that we all know Marshal Stalin liked to have.

The two Stalin conversations in this *Bulletin* show the dictator in two moods, in two roles. Other talks show other facets. Scholars in possession of transcripts, memcons, reports and memoir materials in any language on Stalin's meetings with top leaders in the period 1939-1953 are invited to contribute and send them to CWIHP by mail or FAX. The 3-4 October 1997 Stalin Workshop in Budapest and the 19-20 March 1998 Moscow Workshop will be followed by other Stalin events.

The section on the **End of the Cold War** is also the overture to a larger project, jointly planned with the National Security Archive at George Washington University and leading to commemorative activities and publications in 1999-2001. The nearness of the events to be covered will almost certainly inspire controversy.¹¹ This issue of the *Bulletin* aims only to raise the thorny question of dating the Cold War's demise by publishing two sets of documents that offer divergent perspectives from different regions of the world, Southeast Europe and Northeast Asia. The Soviet Foreign Ministry's presentation to the American Ambassador of the "Brezhnev doctrine" as a gift on Christmas Eve, 24 December 1989, bears note as a key symbolic turning point. The Cherniaev excerpt, previously available to Japanese readers only, reveals the long and laborious process by which Gorbachev tried to change the insular nature of Soviet-Japanese relations, but he ran out of time.

The **Deng** section invokes the memory of the late paramount leader of the PRC by shedding light on his role in Sino-Soviet affairs between 1956 and 1963, the very years when fraternal relations were breaking down. Was renewed entente possible even as late as 1962? Did a group within the CCP leadership favor this option, even counter to Mao Zedong's views? These are crucial questions for understanding the ultimate end of Sino-Soviet cooperation, the origins of the Cultural Revolution and the prehistory of the Strategic Triangle. Just as *Bulletins 6-9* and the CWIHP conference at the University of Hong Kong in January 1996 focused attention on Sino-Soviet disagreements regarding the Korean War, even at the height of the two regimes' intimacy, *Bulletin 10* and the October 1997 Beijing conference co-sponsored by CWIHP (See pp.6-7) highlight documents on persistent themes and practices of unity, where the powers of hindsight would emphasize ineluctable discord. Once again, access to East-bloc documents shows that these historical processes were much more complex and multi-sided than previous analysts have portrayed them (or indeed, *could* portray them in the absence of archival access). Of course, many aspects are still unclear and the

documentation is far from complete.

Research Notes on Soviet intelligence and documents on nuclear weapons in Cuba and China, among others, conclude *Bulletin 10*. Andropov's 1967 report, his first as KGB Chairman, gives us an inside overview of the world's largest intelligence agency charged with both domestic and foreign responsibilities. For millions, the Cold War is synonymous with nuclear terror. In this *Bulletin* the moment of purest dread (at least for Americans) comes on page 225, when the Soviet rocket forces on Cuba are ordered to "be prepared, following a signal from Moscow, to deal a nuclear missile strike to the most important targets in the United States of America."

The next to last article leads off a series of CWIHP publications dealing with Ukraine. Together with the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, CWIHP has begun a Kyiv initiative. It was almost axiomatic among sovietologists that the Soviet Union could not survive the loss of Ukraine. Khrushchev, who served as Party boss there in the 1930s and 1940s, and then went on to become General Secretary in Moscow, certainly thought so. In his concluding remarks to the July 1955 CC CPSU plenum, Khrushchev exclaimed: ¹²

If someone set us such conditions: to separate the Russians from the Ukrainians or Belorussians, what would we say? We would say, without pausing for thought: You take your proposals to the mother of God (*k bozhei materi*).

The first installment on the Ukrainian initiative is Mark Kramer's presentation of the diary of Politburo member, Petro Shelest, who served simultaneously as Ukrainian Communist Party First Secretary. This top-level source adds a whole new subplot to the history of the Prague Spring, while highlighting the largely unexplored importance of Ukraine (and Slovakia) in the Cold War.¹³

1997 has been a busy year at the Cold War Project. In addition to serving as organizer or lead co-organizer of conferences/workshops in Beijing, Budapest, Warsaw and Washington, CWIHP put up a new website at:

cwihp.si.edu.

The ease and availability of web use as a reference tool has risen greatly in the past five years. Furthermore, as CWIHP-published materials multiply, the information becomes much more accessible via electronic search than in print. The inclusion below of the Gromyko-Vance talks of 28-30 March 1977 illustrates the division of labor. One printed *Bulletin* page is devoted to excerpts and overview, while the *Electronic Bulletin* carries the twenty-page full text. Of course, those who want to read hardcopy should feel free to download and reproduce. CWIHP is committed

to helping all those who want to read our electronic publications up onto the web.

It is traditional at this point to make acknowledgements, although I know I do not have enough space to name all those who have contributed to this *Bulletin* and *Electronic Bulletin*. First of all, I want to thank Dean Anderson, George Bowen, Joe Brinley, Sam Crivello, Rob Litwak, John Martinez, Michael O'Brien, and the Smithsonian Institution, without whom the website would have never happened. Christian Ostermann was the best Co-editor and Associate Director one could wish for. Christa Sheehan Matthew deserves full credit for the greatly improved appearance, layout, and French translations. I am grateful to Andrew Grauer for putting up with some unusual scheduling. Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie is the name that appears most often in this *Bulletin*, because he translated much more than his share. Without Tom Blanton, CHEN Jian, Leo Gluchowski, Mark Kramer, Odd Arne Westad, and Vlad Zubok, I might have despaired of finally getting the *Bulletin* out. Without Jim and Annie Hershberg, I certainly would have.

Wishing everybody happy archival hunting in 1998.

David Wolff, Editor
CWIHP Bulletin and *CWIHP Electronic Bulletin*.

¹ A. I. Mikoian, the longest serving member of the Presidium/Politburo (1926-1966), wrote these words in reaction to the presentation to the Presidium of the (P.N.) Pospelov report, the first detailed, documented study of Stalin's mass slaughter of Party cadres. For more on this, see Naumov and Gluchowski articles below. Mikoian's *Memoirs* are cited as Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation (AP RF), f. 39, op.3, d.120, although it appears that the file has actually already been transferred to the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Contemporary Documentation (RTsKhIDNI) in preparation for declassification.

² Stalin was a night owl and, therefore, so were his minions. On the abolition of nocturnal summonses under Khrushchev, see John Gaddis, *We Now Know* (Oxford University Press: New York, 1997), p. 206.

³ On the assassination plans, see p.137 below.

⁴ The materials of the March 1953 plenums can be found in TsKhSD (Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation), f.2, op.1, dd.23-26; Additional materials are available on Reel 7 of the Volkogonov papers in an article draft entitled "Smert' Stalina" (Library of Congress, Manuscript Collection); Qualified medical personnel had become scarce after Stalin took to torturing his doctors, an ultimately effective, though indirect, way for one of history's greater tyrants to hasten his own end.

⁵ Vojtech Mastny has recently argued in his Beer-prize winning book (see p. 74 below) that only "irresistible Western pressure" coinciding with internal crisis might have caused significant change in the Kremlin's policies. See Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (Oxford University Press: New York, 1996), p. 190.

⁶ V. N. Malin was head of the General Department of the CC CPSU under Khrushchev and kept detailed notes of Presidium discussions and decisions. For his notes on the crises of 1956 in

Poland and Hungary, see Mark Kramer, "New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises" *CWIHP Bulletin* 8-9, pp. 358-410. This is also the longest *CWIHP Bulletin* article of all time.

⁷ Of course, we should not forget that if Khrushchev, in attacking Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov can allow himself to mock the whole Soviet diplomatic corps by saying, "that is what it means to be a diplomat—he sees, and I don't see anything. (laughter in the hall)," any bickering over foreign policy issues may actually mask a personal attack on the Foreign Minister or his institutional stronghold, the "MID." For quote, see p. 42 below.

⁸ To a certain extent, it appears that the Soviet Presidium was trying to replicate its own "collective" nature in other East-bloc countries by removing the Stalinist party chieftains, who had ruled the fraternal parties in a dictatorial manner. In the Hungarian document, Matyas Rakosi, Hungary's mini-Stalin, was forced to humble himself with such comments as: "Regarding hubris, that's an illness that one can not detect, just like one can not smell one's own odor." On the scope of change, Molotov was most direct: "The comrades had a chance to become convinced that even though we are talking about Hungary, this issue is not only Hungary, but all the peoples' democracies." (See pp. 85, 83 below.)

⁹ This is not to say that Stalin was loquacious. It is unimaginable that Stalin would speak for hours impromptu like Khrushchev (pp. 44ff. below) or Gorbachev (pp. 196 ff.).

¹⁰ On the Hopkins mission, see William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War* (New York, 1982), pp. 101, 103-7. The Harriman quote comes from a memorandum of conversation for the 26 May 1945 meeting between Hopkins and Stalin held in Box 179 of the Harriman Papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. The editor is grateful to Jim Hershberg for locating and providing this document.

¹¹ Examples of such discussions are: "The Kramer-Blight et al. Debate on Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Cuba" (*Bulletin* 3), "The Sudoplatov Controversy on Atomic Espionage" (*Bulletins* 4, 5), and "The Cumings-Weathersby Exchange on Korean War Origins" (*Bulletin* 6-7).

¹² See p. 43 below.

¹³ In Summer 1997, a CWIHP delegation consisting of Jim Hershberg, Mark Kramer, David Wolff and Vladislav Zubok visited the archives of Chisinau (Kishinev), Kyiv, Riga, and Vilnius, where over 8000 pages of materials (often unavailable in Moscow) were gathered. These will be an important resource in the preparation of planned *CWIHP Bulletins* on "Intelligence and the Cold War," "Nationalism and the Cold War," and "The End of the Cold War," as well as for additional publications on Cold War crises in Central and Eastern Europe.

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The Drama of the Plenums : A Call to Arms

Khrushchev. You want to turn everything back in order then to take up the axe yourself.
Molotov. No, this is not so, com. Khrushchev. I hope that that is not what you want, and moreover,
 that is not what I want.
 CC CPSU Plenum, Kremlin, 24 June 1957

by *David Wolff*

In the third week of June 1957, a series of meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) found N.S. Khrushchev, the First Secretary, in the minority. With a Kremlin coup in the offing, Khrushchev managed to convoke a CC plenary session, whose outcome was not at all certain prior to the meeting's opening. But by the third day, when the epigraph above was spoken, it was clear that the Army and security organs, together with the CC, would support Khrushchev. Thus, Molotov had no axe at hand and Khrushchev's concern was purely rhetorical, a reminder of the true correlation of forces on the plenum floor.¹ This kind of showmanship is illustrative of the theatrical qualities of the plenum transcripts, excerpts from which are presented here for the first time in English translation. Additional materials can be found on the CWIHP website.

For the most part, the CC CPSU Presidium/Politburo members staged and took leading roles in the drama.² Under Stalin, and later under Brezhnev, autocratic rule produced unanimously-approved speeches and decisions to be rubber-stamped by the plenum. But during the Khrushchev years, especially between 1953 and 1957, "collective leadership" produced multiple Presidium scripts to compete on the plenum floor, with the winning narrative to be determined by the audience. With this in mind, the selection of cadres for the plenum (to paraphrase Stalin) would decide all.³ Of course, the structure of CPSU work and promotion was such that all Presidium members had chaired innumerable meetings of the *aktiv* and knew all the organizational tricks. But Khrushchev was best of all, both at garnering loyalty and placing the trustworthy onto the CC. This is not to say, as Mark Kramer points out in his essay, that the plenum decisions were made in the course of the session. Nonetheless, the plenum discussions provide us with a window into the Presidium-level discussions that did lead to the key decisions, just prior to the plenums themselves.

Aside from the sharp dialogue generated by clashing scripts, another theatrical plenum element is the role of the "voices" rising up from the plenum floor to interrupt the speaker. Although one can not tell from the transcripts, one suspects that these are generated by loyalists hand-picked for their eloquence to play a role somewhere between *claque* and Greek chorus. Their functions are

multiple, serving sometimes as echo (**Mikoian**: That is why Nikita Sergeevich [Khrushchev] blew up. I also almost blew up. **Voices**: Blew up.), sometimes as a prompt (**Pospelov**: The July 1955 plenum recorded this. **Voice**: On Yugoslavia.), and sometimes for emphasis (**Khrushchev**: How much gold did we spend then, com. Malenkov, 200-250 tons? **Voice**. If not more.). Heckling was also part of the job, as was laughing at the right jokes and myriad other planned impromptus.⁴

The three essays that begin this section each cover different ground. Vladislav Zubok's piece most closely captures the core problematic of this *Bulletin* issue. As each of Khrushchev's competitors is expelled from the inner circles of power, Zubok chronicles the key foreign policy decisions linked to the demotion. Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, and Zhukov followed each other down in dizzying succession. Gael Moullec reminds us that foreign policy and leadership struggle were just a small part of the issues touched on by the plenums. The social and cultural history of the Cold War can also draw from this invaluable source. Mark Kramer's article will be essential reading on this topic and for all those planning work in *fond 2* at the former Central Committee archives in Moscow (now known as the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation, or TsKhSD) for many years to come.

The plenum excerpts themselves help tie together the various sections of this *Bulletin*. (Excerpts from the July 1953 plenum, at which Beria was denounced, have already appeared in English and are summarized in CWIHP *Bulletin* 1, and are therefore omitted here.) In January 1955, the role of Malenkov and Beria during the 1953 German events took center stage, complementing Christian Ostermann's essay and accompanying documents. By July 1955 Molotov and Khrushchev clashed over the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia. These discussions supplement the Yugoslavia section. Khrushchev's "second secret speech" at the Sixth Plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party in March 1956 adds context to Stalin's conversations with Yugoslav leaders. In the part of the *Bulletin* devoted to Deng Xiaoping and Sino-Soviet relations, we often see Deng eager for information about plenum results. Chinese matters, as well as wide-ranging foreign policy disagreements, appear in the June 1957 transcripts.⁵ Mark Kramer's essay also makes clear how extensively the plenum sessions treated

China in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Although the “second secret speech” comes from the Polish archives and the June 1957 plenum materials have been published in Russian and Chinese, the remaining excerpts, including extensive citations in the Kramer, Moullec and Zubok essays, come directly from TsKhSD’s *fond 2*.⁶ In the spring of 1996, with the preliminary polls for Russia’s presidential election suggesting that the Communists might take back power and reclaim their archives, CWIHP’s former director James G. Hershberg launched a special initiative to study and copy these documents while available.⁷ Although the alarm proved premature, the happy result is that CWIHP was able to gather a substantial collection of plenum records, now on deposit and available for general use in the reading room of the National Security Archive at The George Washington University as part of READ, the Russian and East European Archival Database. We hope that the brief excerpts and expert commentary assembled here will whet appetites for more systematic exploration, both in Washington and Moscow, of this important Cold War source.

¹ The following morning, on June 25, Khrushchev staged a similar reminder with a reference to Molotov’s wanting “to return to some of Stalin’s bad methods.” Other comments by Khrushchev on Stalin’s methods can be found in the Warsaw “Second Secret Speech” introduced in this *Bulletin* by Leo Gluchowski.

² Starting from the 19th Party Congress in October 1952, the Politburo was renamed the Presidium. With Khrushchev’s fall

from power in late 1964, the older name, Politburo, was reintroduced.

³ This is known in the political science literature by a term coined by Robert Daniels, the “circular flow of power.”

⁴ An example where the hecklers clearly found their way through the thick skin to a soft spot follows:

Molotov: (quoting *Pravda*, citing Khrushchev) “If, for instance—N.S. Khrushchev adds as a joke—our [foreign] minister Gromyko and your secretary [of state] Dulles met, in a hundred years they wouldn’t agree on anything, and, perhaps, only our grandsons would wait long enough to get any results from these negotiations.” **Voice:** Read on. **Molotov:** Read on yourself.

Voice: It is being said as a joke there. **Molotov:** One does not play with the authority of the MID of the USSR in front of bourgeois governments. (All examples are drawn from June 1957 plenum extracts published here or on the CWIHP website.)

⁵ This helps to explain why the transcripts of the June 1957 plenum sessions, first printed in *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 3-6 (1993) and 1-2 (1994) have already appeared in a two-volume set in Chinese. See *Sugong gongchandang zuihou yige “fandang” jitian* (The CPSU Final “Antiparty” Group) (Beijing, 1997). The introduction by one of Mao’s Russian translators (who is also often present at Deng’s meetings with the Soviets), Yan Mingfu, has since been reprinted twice in the popular press. See *Wenhui dushu zhoubao* 4 October 1997 and *Zuoja wenzhai* 24 October 1997.

⁶ TsKhSD (Tsentr khraneniia sovremennoi dokumentatsii) = Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation. This is the former CC CPSU working archive.

⁷ CWIHP associates participating in this initiative included Ray Garthoff, Hope Harrison, James G. Hershberg, Mark Kramer and Vladislav Zubok.

More Evidence on Korean War Origins from the July 1955 CPSU Plenum

[Ed.Note: During the past five years the CWIHP *Bulletin* has hosted important new findings on the origins of the Korean War. This excerpt from the plenums, though present in the verbatim record, was later expunged from the internal-circulation print version, since it so clearly contradicts the Soviet Union’s official pronouncements. Further East-bloc documentation on the Korean War can be found in *Bulletin* 3, pp.1, 14-18; *Bulletin* 4, p. 21; *Bulletin* 5, pp. 1-9; *Bulletin* 6-7, pp. 30-125; and *Bulletin* 8-9, pp. 237-242.]

Khrushchev. Viacheslav Mikhailovich [Molotov], this smells a bit hostile to us [*nemnzhko ot vrazhdebnogo nam v etom otnoshenii popakhivaet*]. Viacheslav Mikhailovich, if you, as minister of foreign affairs, analyzed a whole series of our steps, [you would see that] we mobilized people against us. We started the Korean War. And what does this mean? Everyone knows this.

[Anastas] Mikoian. Aside from our people, in our country.

Khrushchev. Here, Viacheslav Mikhailovich, this must be borne in mind; everything must be understood, everything analyzed, [and] only then can one come to the correct conclusion. We started the war. Now we cannot in any way disentangle ourselves. For two years there has been no war. Who needed the war?...

[Source: *TsKhSD f.2, op. 1, d. 173, ll. 76 ff. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.*]

Declassified Materials from CPSU Central Committee Plenums: Sources, Context, Highlights

by Mark Kramer

In October 1995 the Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD) in Moscow, which houses the former archive of the Central Committee (CC) of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), received materials from the Russian Presidential Archive for a newly opened section known as Fond 2. The new *fond* (an archival term roughly translated in English as “collection”) includes different versions of CPSU Central Committee plenum transcripts from 1918 to 1990 as well as secret documents that were used at the plenums. Some 845 voluminous files (*dela*) of declassified plenum materials from 1918 to 1941 had been available since the early 1990s at another repository in Moscow, the former Central Party Archive (now known as the Russian Center for Storage and Study of Documents of Recent History, or RTsKhIDNI); but the newly-opened Fond 2 at TsKhSD is many times larger and much more comprehensive.¹ Not only does Fond 2 add to the RTsKhIDNI collection of pre-1941 materials; it also provides full documentary coverage for the dozens of Central Committee plenums after 1941.

This article will briefly discuss the structure of Fond 2, the problems that arise when using the documents, and a few highlights from plenary sessions held in the 1950s and 1960s.

Structure Of Fond 2

Fond 2 of TsKhSD is divided among five *opisi* (roughly translated as “inventories” or, in this context, “record groups”).² Initially, only Opis’ 1 of Fond 2 was released. In early 1996 the Russian government’s “Commission on Declassification of Documents Created by the CPSU” announced that the other four *opisi* of Fond 2 had been declassified in 1995 and would be transferred to TsKhSD.³ Unfortunately, this announcement turned out to be misleading. As of late 1997, none of the other four *opisi* had yet been transferred from the Presidential Archive. Thus, even though Opis’ 2, 3, 4, and 5 were nominally “declassified,” researchers had no access to them. In response to complaints from visiting scholars, the director of TsKhSD conceded that the commission’s announcement had been “premature.”⁴

The four additional *opisi* of Fond 2 are due to be transferred to TsKhSD in the first half of 1998. However, officials at TsKhSD have no direct say in the Presidential Archive’s actions and therefore can offer no guarantees. Once the transfer is completed, these new *opisi* will provide an invaluable complement to the existing Opis’ 1. Opis’ 2 includes the protocols and stenograms from Central Committee plenums held between 1918 and 1966,

adding to the RTsKhIDNI materials. Opis’ 3 includes documents from Central Committee plenums ranging from 1966 to 1986. Opis’ 4 includes protocols from Central Committee plenums held between 1966 and 1990. Opis’ 5 comprises documents from plenums held between 1986 and 1990, the core of the period when Mikhail Gorbachev was CPSU General Secretary.

Opis’ 1 of Fond 2 consists of 822 separate *dela*, with materials arranged in the order in which they were produced. The files include transcripts and other documents from Central Committee plenums held between 1941 and 1966. In principle, the plenum materials from before 1953 should be housed at RTsKhIDNI rather than at TsKhSD. However, to maintain the integrity of the *fond*, the earlier materials will be kept together with the more recent documents. All told, Opis’ 1 covers 51 plenums.⁵

In many cases, two or more versions of the same plenum exist. The closest thing to a verbatim transcript, known as an “uncorrected stenogram” (*nepravlennaya stenogramma*), was compiled by a team of stenographers during the plenum. Excerpts from this raw text were sent by the head of the CPSU CC General Department to all those who spoke at the plenum. The speakers were permitted to see and edit only their own remarks.⁶ The full text then underwent further editing by one or two senior party officials. The corrected version, known as the “author’s copy” (*avtorskii ekzempliar*), contains the full verbatim text marked up in handwriting as well as newly drafted pages and paragraphs to be inserted into the transcript. (Often the insertions were in handwriting, too.) The revised version was then retyped to produce a “corrected copy” (*korrektorskii ekzempliar*), which was given to a few senior Presidium/Politburo members to review.⁷ Usually, one of the officials (e.g., Mikhail Suslov) would approve the corrected copy as the final version, but in a few cases each official would make additional changes, resulting in an “edited copy” (*redaktsionnyi ekzempliar*). A few last-minute revisions might then be made in the edited copy before a final “stenographic account” (*stenograficheskii otchet*) was typeset. The whole process of editing and revision could sometimes take several months or longer.⁸ The final stenographic account was disseminated to all members of the CPSU Presidium/Politburo, CPSU Secretariat, and CPSU Central Committee, to other senior employees of the central party apparatus, to leading officials in the fourteen union-republic Communist parties, and to the first secretaries of the CPSU’s territorial, regional, provincial, municipal, and local committees.

The different versions of the proceedings were preserved for most, but not all, of the 51 plenums. The status of each version is specified clearly both in the *opis'* and on the cover of each *dela*. The *dela* for a particular version are grouped consecutively, which makes it relatively easy to distinguish them from other versions.

In addition to the transcripts of plenum proceedings, Opis' 1 includes many files of documents that were used or distributed at the plenums. These documents in some cases were publicly available after the plenums, but in other cases they were classified "secret" or "top secret" and issued on a highly restricted basis. For certain plenums, a separate *dela* contains the resolutions and theses (or drafts) approved by the Central Committee as well as any final comments by senior party officials.

Although Opis' 1, like all the other *opisi* of Fond 2, is officially described as "declassified," selected materials in Opis' 1 (and in the other four *opisi* of Fond 2) are in fact still classified and are marked as such (*ne rassekrecheno*) in the *opis'*. The fact that some materials in Fond 2 have not yet been declassified is one of the reasons that TsKhSD has been allowing researchers to use the original, bound transcripts and documents, rather than microfilms of them. The listing of sequential numbers for microfilm reels in the *opisi* leaves no doubt that all the *dela* in Fond 2 have been filmed, but the reels mix classified with declassified materials. Hence, only the hard copies are being loaned out.⁹ Although the continued classification of some materials in Fond 2 is vexing and unwarranted, the opportunity for scholars to use the original documents (rather than the more cumbersome and, in certain cases, barely legible microfilms) is a welcome, if perverse, benefit of this obsessive secretiveness.

The Context of the Plenum Materials

Through almost the whole of the Soviet era, very little information about CPSU Central Committee plenums was released to the public. During the long reign of Josif Stalin (1929-1953), virtually nothing about Central Committee plenums was disclosed. That pattern continued for several years after Stalin's death. Transcripts of key plenums during Nikita Khrushchev's consolidation of power (e.g., the sessions in July 1953, January 1955, July 1955, February 1956, June 1957, and October 1957) were not publicly disseminated at all. This policy of strict secrecy was eased during the final years of Khrushchev's tenure, when edited "stenographic accounts" of some plenums were published. Although the appearance of these transcripts was a major step forward, the accounts did not always enable readers to determine precisely what went on at the plenums. Moreover, the publication of stenographic accounts ceased in March 1965, five months after Leonid Brezhnev displaced Khrushchev; and from that point until the end of the 1980s information about Central Committee plenums was as exiguous as it had been in Stalin's time. The only materials released during the two decades under Brezhnev and his immediate

successors, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko (and even during the first few years of the Gorbachev era), were brief announcements (*informatsionnye soobshcheniya*) that Central Committee plenums had been held, lists of those who had spoken, and the resolutions (*postanovleniya*) and theses (*tezisy*) adopted by the plenums, which revealed nothing about the tenor of the meetings.¹⁰ The opening of Fond 2 thus fills an important gap in the historical record.

Nevertheless, scholars who use the newly declassified plenum materials should bear in mind a number of caveats. First, it is important to recognize that the Central Committee was not a decision-making body.¹¹ The list of plenums in Opis' 1, provided in Note 5 below, underscores just how limited the Central Committee's role was in Soviet policy-making, especially during the Stalin era, when the Central Committee almost never met. During the final twelve years of Stalin's life, the Central Committee convened only six times, for a total of ten days. The extremely infrequent and perfunctory nature of Central Committee plenums was part of Stalin's general policy of weakening subordinate structures that might in some way infringe on his immense personal power. Under Khrushchev, the frequency of plenums increased, but the Central Committee still convened no more than a total of fifteen days in a given year, and usually far less. Moreover, the timing of plenums did not settle into a particular pattern. All members of the Central Committee had full-time jobs elsewhere, which consumed the vast bulk of their energies and attention.

Even on the rare occasions when the Central Committee met, it usually functioned as little more than a rubber stamp for the Presidium/Politburo's decisions. As interesting and valuable as the plenum documents are, they clearly show that, with the exception of the June 1957 plenum, all key decisions had been arranged in advance by the Presidium/Politburo, which met shortly before the plenums to iron out any differences and approve the plenum agenda and resolutions. It is telling that in some instances the drafts of resolutions, prepared several days before the Central Committee convened, would already say that the resolutions had been "adopted unanimously"—a result that clearly was not in doubt.¹²

The June 1957 plenum was a special case because Khrushchev had been outvoted on the Presidium by what became known as the "Anti-Party Group." During a session of the Presidium from 18 to 21 June 1957, only three of the ten other full Presidium members—Anastas Mikoyan, Mikhail Suslov, and Aleksei Kirichenko—had supported Khrushchev. Through last-ditch maneuvers, Khrushchev was able to stave off his dismissal by forcing the convocation on June 22 of a Central Committee plenum, which he knew would take his side in the dispute. That session marked the only time from the mid-1920s onward when the top leaders had failed to reach a consensus beforehand about the results they hoped to achieve at the plenum.

The fact that the general outcomes of the plenums were arranged in advance does not mean that the discussions were dull and lacking in substance. On the contrary, in many cases the debates were very lively and the top leaders provided important information to the rank-and-file Central Committee members about salient issues and controversies. Even so, it is clear from the transcripts and other materials that the Presidium/Politburo carefully stage-managed and orchestrated the plenums to produce a desired result. The plenums were extremely useful for the top leaders in many ways—by giving ordinary Central Committee members a sense of involvement in the policy-making process, by ensuring wide support within the party for the top leaders' policies and objectives, and by conferring a formal stamp of legitimacy on the Presidium/Politburo's actions—but this does not change the basic fact that key decisions were actually made by the Presidium/Politburo, not by the Central Committee.

The highly circumscribed nature of the Central Committee's role was broadly understood even before any of the plenum materials were declassified. It is not at all surprising that the plenum transcripts would confirm that the Central Committee routinely complied with the Presidium/Politburo's wishes. The notion of a "circular flow of power"—whereby the top party leader and his allies chose (and had the power to dismiss) lower-ranking personnel, who in turn were empowered to vote for delegates to the party congress, who in turn elected the members of the Central Committee, who in turn were responsible for electing the highest party organs—had long enabled Western scholars to understand why the Central Committee, despite nominally being empowered to countermand the Presidium/Politburo, instead was staunchly supportive of the top leaders' preferences.¹³ The members of the Central Committee had an in-built incentive to be loyal, resting on self-interest.

The thing that researchers need to bear in mind, then, is that the sudden availability of the plenum materials should not lead to an exaggeration of the Central Committee's role. The documents must be seen in context. Some of the plenum transcripts and supplementary materials contain valuable information that is not readily available from other declassified documents, and this will be of great benefit. But unless the plenums are evaluated against the wider backdrop of Soviet politics (in which the Presidium/Politburo was the dominant organ), there is a danger that some scholars will end up "looking for their keys where the streetlight is."¹⁴

This temptation may be particularly strong because the vast majority of records of Presidium/Politburo meetings from the post-Stalin era have not yet been released. Detailed notes from Presidium meetings during the Khrushchev era, compiled by the head of the CPSU CC General Department, Vladimir Malin, exist in Fond 3 at TsKhSD, but only a tiny fraction of these had been released as of late 1997, despite earlier promises that the full collection would be declassified by the end of 1996.¹⁵

Verbatim transcripts were kept for Politburo meetings during the Brezhnev era and afterwards, but only a minuscule portion of these have been released so far. In late 1991 and 1992, some Politburo transcripts (or portions of transcripts) were declassified for a short-lived trial of the Soviet Communist Party at the Russian Constitutional Court.¹⁶ The bulk of the selected transcripts were from the Gorbachev era (mainly because Russian president Boris Yeltsin hoped they would embarrass Gorbachev), but even these materials represented only a small fraction of the sessions held between 1985 and 1991. Although a few additional Politburo transcripts from the Gorbachev era have been published since the early 1990s—some were put out by the Gorbachev Foundation to offset the impact of the materials released by the Yeltsin administration, and others were featured in the Russian archival service's journal *Istochnik*—these scattered documents are no substitute for access to the full collection.¹⁷ Moreover, only a handful of transcripts have been released for Politburo meetings from the Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko periods (though a few well-placed Russian officials have been given access to the full collection of transcripts). The unavailability of most of the Politburo notes and transcripts may create at least some temptation to ascribe too large a role to the Central Committee and other agencies whose records are now available.

The dominance of the CPSU Presidium/Politburo in the Soviet policymaking process was necessarily reflected in the Central Committee plenums. The context of each plenum can be understood only by answering several questions: What was the Presidium/Politburo hoping to derive from the plenum? Why did the Presidium/Politburo decide to convene the Central Committee? What steps were taken to ensure that the plenum bolstered the Presidium/Politburo's aims? So long as the Politburo's records remain largely sealed, definitive answers to these questions may not always be possible; but the transcripts of the plenums and other documents often permit well-founded conclusions. For example, it is now clear that the plenum in early July 1953 which denounced the "criminal anti-party and anti-state activities of [Lavrentii] Beria" was convened by Beria's rivals to reassure the Central Committee that Beria's arrest had been a matter of high principle, and not simply part of a power struggle. The Presidium members who had ordered Beria's arrest outdid one another at the plenum in recounting the alleged iniquities of their deposed colleague, accusing him of actions that they themselves had initiated (or at least strongly backed) during the previous few months. Khrushchev, Vyacheslav Molotov, Georgii Malenkov, Nikolai Bulganin, and their allies orchestrated the plenum to cover up their own roles in promoting policies for which they were now holding Beria solely accountable. So egregious was their abrupt disavowal of their own actions and views that the plenum often took on a surreal quality.¹⁸ The rank-and-file members of the Central Committee, having long been accustomed to accept whatever they

were told by the highest party authorities, went along obediently this time as well.

The stenographic account of the July 1953 plenum was declassified and published in early 1991, and it has been cited by many Western and Russian scholars since then.¹⁹ Unfortunately, most of these scholars have failed to take due account of the context of the plenum. Rather than seeing the plenum for what it was—namely, an attempt by Beria's rivals to rationalize their actions by blaming the ousted security chief for a host of purported "crimes"—many researchers have taken at face value the allegations made against Beria. This has been especially true of the claims about Beria's supposed effort to "destroy the people's democratic regime in [East Germany]." Beria's real views about Germany in the spring of 1953 bore little resemblance to the accusations lodged against him. It was Molotov, not Beria, who had taken the lead in forging the new Soviet policy toward Germany after Stalin's death, and all the other top Soviet officials, including Beria, had supported him.²⁰ The views attributed to Beria were contrived by Molotov to gloss over his own responsibility for having drastically reshaped Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik* just before the June 1953 uprising in East Germany. Numerous Western and Russian scholars who have used the published stenographic account of the July 1953 plenum have been far too accepting of Molotov's tendentious portrayal of Beria and Germany.²¹

The misunderstandings that have arisen from the declassified account of the July 1953 Central Committee plenum underscore the need for circumspection when drawing on the materials in Fond 2. Unless scholars constantly bear in mind the purpose and context of each plenum, they risk going astray in their interpretations of substantive issues as well as of the dynamics of Soviet policy-making.

One additional problem that researchers may encounter when using the new plenum materials is the distortions that sometimes crept in during the editing of the Central Committee transcripts. As noted above, Fond 2 contains two or more versions of most of the plenums. For research purposes, the most useful version is the "author's copy," which contains a verbatim transcript with handwritten changes and handwritten or typed insertions. This version of the transcript enables scholars to see both the original proceedings and the changes that senior officials wanted to make. If scholars consult only the "corrected copy" or the "stenographic account," they are likely to miss some important nuances in the original proceedings. For example, by the time a stenographic account was issued for the July 1953 plenum, numerous modifications had been made to cast as sinister a light as possible on Beria's actions. A comparison with the verbatim transcript shows that, among other things, Beria's views about Germany were depicted in far more extreme terms in the edited account. At one point in the verbatim transcript, Molotov claimed that Beria had supported a united Germany "which will be peaceloving and under the control of the

four powers."²² (Molotov conveniently neglected to mention that this was precisely the position he himself had long supported.) To be on the safe side, the words "and under the control of the four powers" were omitted from the stenographic account, thus implying that Beria had wanted the Soviet Union simply to abandon East Germany. Numerous other changes of this sort were made, including some of much greater length. All of them were designed to bring even greater discredit upon Beria.

For most of the other plenums as well, extensive changes were made in the transcripts before stenographic accounts were issued. In some cases lengthy portions were rewritten, and several new paragraphs or even new pages were added. On occasion, entirely new speeches were inserted.²³ The finished product is valuable, indeed essential, for scholars to consult, but it can be highly misleading unless it is compared with the verbatim transcript. Only the "author's copy" permits researchers to examine simultaneously the original proceedings and the subsequent editing.²⁴ If that version is not available, it is important to look at both the "uncorrected stenogram" and the "stenographic account." In a few cases (e.g., the December 1959 plenum) these two versions do not differ markedly, but in the large majority of cases the differences can be of great importance.

Selected Plenum Highlights

Most of the Central Committee plenums between 1941 and 1966 had no direct bearing on foreign policy. Instead they focused on agricultural policy, economic problems, local party management, and the like. A number of the plenums, however, dealt at length with foreign policy issues. Some plenums covered two or more topics, both external and internal, whereas other plenums focused exclusively on important foreign developments. Plenums that approved changes (or impending changes) in the leadership, as in March 1953, July 1953, January 1955, June 1957, October 1957, and October 1964, also are of great importance for studies of the Cold War. In a brief article of this sort it would be impossible to give an exhaustive overview of the many issues covered by the plenums, but a few highlights will suffice to indicate how rich some of the material is.

Intensity of the Post-Stalin Leadership Struggle

One of the most intriguing aspects of the plenums from 1953 through 1957 is what they reveal about the leadership struggle. Western observers had long surmised that a fierce struggle was under way behind the scenes, but the only direct evidence for this at the time was the occasional announcement that a senior official had been dismissed or demoted. The declassified transcripts of Central Committee plenums, as well as other new documents and first-hand accounts, reveal that the leadership struggle was even more intense than most analysts had suspected. At some plenums, notably those in July 1953, when the Central Committee denounced Beria, in January

1955, when Malenkov came under sharp criticism prior to his dismissal as prime minister, in February 1956, when preparations were under way for Khrushchev's "secret speech" condemning Stalin, in June 1957, when Khrushchev ousted the Anti-Party Group, and in October 1957, when Khrushchev removed his erstwhile ally and defense minister, Marshal Georgii Zhukov, the leadership struggle dominated the sessions. Yet even at plenums that were ostensibly convened for other reasons, the ferocity of the leadership struggle often affected the entire proceedings.

One of the best examples came at the lengthy plenum in July 1955, which focused on several topics, including the recent *rapprochement* with Yugoslavia. [Ed. Note: For extensive excerpts, see below in this *Bulletin*.] During the debate about Yugoslavia, one of Khrushchev's chief rivals, Vyacheslav Molotov, came under fierce attack. At this juncture, barely a year-and-a-half after Beria had been executed, the prospect of losing out in the power struggle still implied potentially grave risks. Even so, Molotov largely held his ground and only grudgingly, at the very end of the plenum, sought to propitiate his attackers. The segment of the plenum that dealt with Yugoslavia featured a lengthy (138-page) opening speech by Khrushchev, which provided a detailed, highly informative (albeit selective and tendentious) overview of the reasons for the Soviet-Yugoslav split under Stalin.²⁵ (Much of the blame was laid on "the provocative role of Beria and Abakumov.") Toward the end of the speech, Khrushchev revealed to the Central Committee that the Presidium had "unanimously" decided to report that Molotov had "consistently adopted an incorrect position" on the Yugoslav question and had "refused to disavow his incorrect views."²⁶ Khrushchev read aloud the Presidium's conclusion that "Com. Molotov's position on the Yugoslav matter does not serve the interests of the Soviet state and the socialist camp and does not conform with the principles of Leninist policy."

Khrushchev's comments touched off a spate of denunciations of Molotov's views on Yugoslavia. One such attack came from Georgii Malenkov, who, despite having lost his post as prime minister four months earlier, was still a key figure on the CPSU Presidium:

If we speak about Com. Molotov's main mistake, I would say it is that, contrary to new facts and contrary to everything that has happened over the past two years—and contrary to the overwhelmingly positive results that the CC Presidium has achieved from the steps it has taken to develop friendly relations with Yugoslavia—contrary to all this, he persists in embracing the position laid out by him and by Comrade Stalin in 1948-1949 in their letters to the Yugoslav leadership.²⁷

Malenkov emphasized that "Com. Molotov still does not acknowledge that his errors in the tactics of struggle

played a huge and decisive role in bringing about the split with Yugoslavia." Malenkov noted that Molotov had "blatantly disregarded the instructions of the CC Presidium" during the preparations for the *rapprochement* with Yugoslavia, adding that "this is typical of him." Molotov's views, according to Malenkov, were "weakening the forces of the camp of socialism and strengthening the forces of the imperialist camp." Malenkov "demanded from [Molotov] a full-fledged explanation and a statement about his obligation to rectify his behavior and to disavow his erroneous views in an unequivocal manner."²⁸

Some of the other condemnations of Molotov during the sessions on Yugoslavia extended far beyond the Yugoslav question alone. Maksim Saburov argued that Molotov's "ridiculous" position on Yugoslavia was "one in a long series of issues on which Com. Molotov does not agree with the CC Presidium." Saburov cited the virgin lands scheme (which, he said, Molotov believed would be a "largely ineffective and dubious pursuit"), the new planning system for agriculture, the negotiations on the Austrian State Treaty, and the appointment of a new prime minister as issues "on which Com. Molotov disagreed with the principled and correct stance adopted by the CC Presidium."²⁹ Saburov claimed that Molotov's "deviations" on these matters were far from innocent, being "directed against Com. Khrushchev. . . . I personally believe that Com. Molotov regards Com. Khrushchev as an unsuitable official." Saburov then likened Molotov to Beria and implied that Khrushchev should deal with Molotov in the same way they had treated Beria:

I don't want to say that Com. Molotov is simply repeating what Beria said; I'm not equating him with Beria, but this is indeed like what we heard from Beria. Com. Molotov, by the logic of his struggle, objected to any question considered by the CC that had been proposed—coincidentally or not so coincidentally—by Com. Khrushchev. I believe that one might draw the conclusion that Com. Molotov would not be objecting to these proposals if Com. Khrushchev did not enjoy the level of trust and support that everyone has in him.³⁰

Coming so soon after the execution of Beria, Saburov's statements clearly were intended as a threat, which may well have been coordinated with Khrushchev. On some matters, Saburov certainly was acting at Khrushchev's behest, and the whole speech was designed not only to deprecate Molotov, but to bolster Khrushchev's standing. Saburov insisted that he was not trying "to give undue glory to Com. Khrushchev; he doesn't need that sort of glorification. We know that he commands trust not only in the Presidium, but in our whole party," a line that drew sustained applause.

By the end of the plenum, when sharp exchanges ensued between Khrushchev and Molotov just before Khrushchev's closing speech (which "condemned the line

advanced by Com. Molotov as inimical to our party and a non-Leninist and sectarian position”), it was clear that Molotov had experienced a major setback. But what is perhaps most striking, in view of the intense criticism Molotov encountered, is that he was able to hold onto his position for another two years and that he very nearly won out over Khrushchev in June 1957. The transcript of the July 1955 plenum thus provides crucial evidence that Khrushchev, despite having consolidated his position a good deal, had by no means overcome his most formidable challenger. Anyone who could withstand and recover from the attacks that Molotov endured during the July 1955 plenum was obviously well-suited to be a constant threat.

Fissures in the Communist World (I): Yugoslavia and Poland

Quite apart from what the plenum documents reveal about the post-Stalin leadership struggle, they shed intriguing light on the priorities of Soviet foreign policy. One thing that quickly becomes evident from the 822 files in Opis' 1 is the importance that CPSU officials attached to ideological relations with other Communist countries. Although no plenums dealt at length with the crises in East Germany in 1953 and Poland and Hungary in 1956 (in contrast to the much more prolonged crisis with Czechoslovakia in 1968-69, which was the main subject of three separate plenums), numerous plenums during the Khrushchev and early Brezhnev periods focused exclusively, or at least extensively, on the nettlesome problem of relations with Yugoslavia, China, and the world Communist movement. The momentous decision to seek a *rapprochement* with Yugoslavia in May 1955 was regarded as such an abrupt and, from the ideological standpoint, potentially disorienting change of course that Soviet leaders believed they should explain the move to the full Central Committee.³¹ At a plenum in July 1955, Khrushchev and numerous other Presidium members laid out the basic rationale—that “because of serious mistakes we lost Yugoslavia [*my poteryali Yugoslaviyu*] and the enemy camp has begun to lure that country over to its side”—and emphasized the “enormous importance of winning back our former loyal ally.” Not surprisingly, the Central Committee voted unanimously in support of the Presidium's actions.

Similarly, in later years when tensions reemerged with Yugoslavia (in large part because of the crises in 1956), Khrushchev and his colleagues again believed it wise to explain these tensions to the Central Committee. One such occasion came in December 1957, when a plenum was convened to inform Central Committee members about a two-part conference held in Moscow the previous month to mark the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik takeover. The leaders of the thirteen ruling Communist parties had been invited to the first part of the conference on 14-16 November, but Yugoslav officials had declined to take part. When the other twelve parties met and issued a statement reaffirming the CPSU's preeminent role in the

world Communist movement, Yugoslav leaders refused to endorse it.³² At the CPSU Central Committee plenum a few weeks after the conference, one of the highest-ranking party officials, Mikhail Suslov, who was broadly responsible for ideology and intra-bloc relations, explained to the members that “Yugoslavia's failure to participate . . . attests to the continuing ideological disagreements between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] and the other Communist parties of the socialist countries.”³³ He cited several areas in which “ideological disagreements remain:” the “unwillingness of the Yugoslav comrades to speak about a socialist camp, especially a socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union”; the desire of the Yugoslav authorities to “play their own special and exalted role between West and East”; and the “unduly close relationship” Yugoslavia had established with the United States, a country that was “applying pressure” on the Yugoslavs to “serve as a counterweight to the Soviet Union.” Although he insisted that “we have not retreated, and will not retreat, one step from our fundamental positions,” he assured the Central Committee that “Yugoslavia's failure to sign the Declaration does not mean that our relations have deteriorated. . . . There is no need to stir up new tensions.”³⁴

When the matter came up again five months later, at a plenum on 7 May 1958, Soviet officials were less accommodating. Although the plenum dealt mostly with other matters, Khrushchev initiated a discussion about Yugoslavia toward the end of the third session.³⁵ He argued that the recent LCY congress had been a “step back toward revisionist, anti-party, and anti-Marxist positions,” and he condemned Yugoslavia's close ties with Imre Nagy, the Hungarian leader who had been removed during the Soviet invasion of Hungary in November 1956 and who was put to death in Hungary in June 1958, a few weeks after the CPSU Central Committee plenum. Khrushchev also denounced statements by the Yugoslav leader, Josip Broz Tito, particularly a speech Tito had given in Pula on 11 November 1956, which raised serious concerns about the Soviet intervention in Hungary. Khrushchev informed the Central Committee that the CPSU Presidium had decided not to send a delegation to the LCY congress after the Yugoslavs had changed the agenda at the last minute. He received lengthy applause from the Central Committee when he affirmed that the Soviet Union would continue to offer “principled and constructive criticism” of Yugoslav policy whenever necessary.

It may seem peculiar that Khrushchev would have included these detailed comments about Yugoslavia after a plenum that had dealt with agricultural policy, but his remarks are indicative of the efforts that Soviet leaders made to ensure strong, unwavering support within the CPSU for the latest ideological twists and turns in relations with Yugoslavia. This is one of many instances in which documents from the former Soviet archives reveal that Yugoslavia was a more important factor for Soviet leaders during the Cold War than most Western observers had

realized.³⁶

The plenum documents also reveal that Yugoslavia was not the only East European country that complicated Moscow's efforts in the late 1950s to unite the world Communist movement under explicit Soviet leadership. The standoff with Poland in October 1956 had induced Khrushchev to reach a *modus vivendi* with the Polish leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, which provided for Poland's continued status as a loyal member of the Soviet political and military bloc.³⁷ This arrangement was briefly strained in late October and early November 1956 when Gomulka insisted on the withdrawal of Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski, the Soviet officer who had been serving as Polish defense minister for the previous seven years; but Khrushchev eventually acceded to Gomulka's demand. Despite this breakthrough, the plenum materials confirm that Soviet-Polish relations were still marred by occasional frictions. Suslov's report at the December 1957 plenum indicated that the Polish representatives at the world conference of Communist parties in Moscow had been at odds with the Soviet Union on several key issues:

During the preparation of the documents—the Declaration and the Peace Manifesto—the Polish comrades tried to introduce their own slant by ensuring there was no reference to the leading role of the Soviet Union and by avoiding harsh attacks against imperialism, especially against American imperialism. They steadfastly objected to the passage in the Declaration that said American imperialism has become the center of international reaction. The Polish comrades argued that the peculiar circumstances they face in Poland do not yet enable them to embrace the formula “under the leadership of the Soviet Union.” They claimed that the Declaration is supposedly too bellicose a document and that it could damage relations with the imperialists.³⁸

Suslov also complained that the Polish delegation's draft of the so-called Peace Manifesto, the document that was due to be approved by the 64 Communist parties attending the second phase of the conference (on 16-19 November), was “seriously deficient” because “it made no mention of where the threat of war originated.” He emphasized that the “document prepared by the Polish comrades had to be drastically revised” because “the representatives of the other fraternal parties [including the CPSU] did not support the Polish comrades on even a single point that they raised.”

Suslov did not directly impugn the motives of the Polish authorities, but he maintained that “these allusions to some sort of special circumstances in their country don't seem particularly convincing.” Khrushchev, for his part, implied that the main reason Polish officials did not want to antagonize the United States is that they were uncertain whether U.S. banks would “still give credits” to Poland if relations deteriorated.³⁹ Despite these skeptical com-

ments, both Suslov and Khrushchev acknowledged that “the important thing is that the Polish comrades in the end signed the Declaration, which undoubtedly will have an enormous impact in Poland.”

In subsequent years, especially after the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, Gomulka came more closely into line with the Soviet point of view. Even so, the plenum materials indicate that Khrushchev remained concerned that the defiance Gomulka displayed in 1956 and the unorthodox positions he adopted in 1957 might someday resurface.

Fissures in the Communist World (II): China and Albania

As important as the ideological challenge posed by Yugoslavia may have been, it was nothing compared to the rift that emerged with China at the end of the 1950s. From December 1959 on, an inordinately large number of Central Committee plenums were devoted to the subject of China and the world Communist movement. At a plenum on 22-26 December 1959, Suslov presented a detailed report on “the trip by a Soviet party-state delegation to the People's Republic of China” in October 1959.⁴⁰ This report, which had been commissioned by the CPSU Presidium on 15 October (shortly after Khrushchev and the other members of the delegation had returned to Moscow) and was approved in a draft version by the Presidium on 18 December, gave many Central Committee members the first direct inkling they had received of how serious the incipient problems with China were. Although Suslov's report did not feature the strident rhetoric and harsh polemics that would soon characterize Sino-Soviet relations, he spoke at length about the “dangerously foolish ideas of the Chinese comrades,” the “egregious economic and intra-party mistakes committed by the Chinese comrades,” and the “acute disagreements” between Moscow and Beijing on “basic matters of socialist construction.”

In addition to highlighting ideological differences, Suslov enumerated many “foreign policy issues on which major disagreements have surfaced between us and the Chinese comrades,” including Mao Zedong's rhetorical dismissal of nuclear weapons as “a paper tiger” (a claim that, in Suslov's view, was “leading the Chinese people to believe that a nuclear war would be an easy matter and that no preparations were needed”); China's aversion to peaceful coexistence with the United States (a policy that, according to Suslov, Chinese leaders “regard as merely a convenient tactical maneuver” rather than a “profound Leninist principle”); China's clumsy handling of negotiations with Japan; the recent exacerbation of tensions between China and India despite Moscow's efforts to mediate (efforts which, Suslov complained, had “not been matched by the requisite understanding on the part of Chinese leaders” because “the Chinese comrades cannot properly evaluate their own mistakes”); and the deterioration of China's relations with Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, and other East Asian countries (a trend that, in Suslov's

view, had left China “isolated in the international arena”). Of particular interest were Suslov’s comments about Mao’s “completely incomprehensible” retreat during the Sino-American crisis that erupted in August 1958 when China began bombarding the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits:

We [in Moscow] regarded it as our internationalist duty to come out decisively in support of the fraternal Chinese people, with whom our country is bound by alliance obligations. According to secret documents that we had intercepted, it had become clear that the ruling circles in America were already psychologically prepared to relinquish the offshore islands to the PRC. However, after precipitating an extreme situation in the vicinity of the offshore islands and making far-reaching statements, the Chinese comrades backed down at the critical moment. . . . It is obvious that in backing down, the Chinese comrades squandered things. The perception abroad was that they had caved in.⁴¹

In all these respects, Suslov argued, “the Chinese comrades are at odds with the common foreign policy line of the socialist camp. The lack of needed coordination between the two most powerful Communist parties on questions of foreign policy is abnormal.”⁴²

After recounting this litany of “serious disagreements,” Suslov emphasized that long-standing efforts to increase the appearance and reality of unity within the socialist camp made it imperative to curtail China’s deviations in foreign policy:

The incorrect actions of one of the socialist countries affects the international situation of the entire socialist camp. We must bear in mind that imperialist propaganda directly links the actions of the Chinese comrades with the policy of the USSR and other socialist countries. And indeed, our Communist parties, too, always emphasize that the socialist camp has only one foreign policy course.⁴³

Suslov declared that the Soviet Union would try to restore “complete unity” by continuing “to express our candid opinions about the most important questions affecting our common interests when our views do not coincide.” Although the aim would be to bring China back into line with the USSR, Suslov argued that if these efforts failed, the CPSU Presidium would “stick by the positions that our party believes are correct.”

Throughout the report, Suslov insisted that the disagreements were not yet irreparable. He noted several measures that could rapidly improve Sino-Soviet ties, and he pledged that the CPSU Presidium would do all it could to “strengthen and develop Soviet-Chinese friendship and unity” on the basis of “Leninist principles of equality and mutual cooperation.” Nevertheless, a key passage in his

report may have left some Central Committee members wondering whether relations with China could really be mended, at least while Mao Zedong remained in power:

It has to be said that all the mistakes and shortcomings in the internal and foreign policies of the Chinese Communist Party can be explained in large part by the cult of personality surrounding Com. Mao Zedong. Formally, the CC of the Chinese Communist Party abides by the norms of collective leadership, but in reality the most important decisions are made by one man and therefore are often plagued by subjectivism and, in some instances, are simply ill-conceived. By all appearances, the glorification of Mao Zedong in China has been growing inexorably. More and more often, statements appear in the party press that “we Chinese live in the great era of Mao Zedong.” Comrade Mao Zedong is depicted as a great leader and a genius. They call him the beacon, who is shining the way to Communism and is the embodiment of the ideas of Communism. The name of Mao Zedong is equated with the party, and vice versa. The works of Com. Mao Zedong are presented in China as the final word of creative Marxism and are placed on a par with the classic works of Marxism-Leninism.... All of this, unfortunately, impresses Com. Mao Zedong, who, judging from everything, is himself convinced of his own infallibility. This is reminiscent of the situation that existed in our country during the final years of J. V. Stalin. We, of course, weren’t able to speak with the Chinese comrades about this, but the [CPSU] plenum must be aware of these aspects of life in the Chinese Communist Party.⁴⁴

This part of Suslov’s report went well beyond any previous statements that Soviet leaders had made in forums larger than the CPSU Presidium. Up to this point, Soviet officials had said nothing in public about the problems with China, and even in private Moscow’s criticism of Mao had been subdued. Despite Suslov’s willingness to voice much stronger complaints at the Central Committee plenum, he indicated that a low-key policy should be maintained in public. Although he acknowledged that the Soviet Union would not praise or overlook what it believed to be “profound mistakes,” he averred that “we shouldn’t engage in direct criticism, since this would lead to an unnecessary public discussion which might be construed as interference in the internal affairs of the Chinese Communist Party and would induce our enemies to gloat over the discord between the CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party.” Suslov argued that, at least for the time being, the CPSU must “avoid public discussions and rely instead on private meetings and other contacts between the two parties to explain our position to the Chinese comrades.”

Despite Suslov’s hopes that the situation could be rectified and that public polemics could be avoided, the

Sino-Soviet split continued to widen. Tensions increased rapidly in the first few months of 1960, culminating in the publication of a lengthy statement by Chinese leaders in April 1960 during celebrations of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birthday.⁴⁵ The statement, entitled "Long Live Leninism," removed any doubts that Soviet officials and diplomats still had about the magnitude of the rift between the two countries.⁴⁶ Soon thereafter, in early June 1960, all the East European governments became aware of the conflict when Chinese officials voiced strong criticism of the Soviet Union at a meeting in Beijing of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The dispute escalated a few weeks later at the Third Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in Bucharest, where Khrushchev sought to rebut the comments expressed at the WFTU meeting and to retaliate for China's decision to provide other delegates with copies of a confidential letter that Khrushchev had sent to the CCP leadership. The top Chinese official in Bucharest, Peng Zhen, responded in kind.⁴⁷

This confrontation was the main topic of discussion at the next CPSU Central Committee plenum, on 14-16 July 1960. Khrushchev designated one of his closest aides on the Presidium, Frol Kozlov, to present a lengthy report to the plenum outlining "the mistaken positions of the CCP CC on fundamental questions of Marxist-Leninist theory and current international relations."⁴⁸ Kozlov reiterated all the complaints voiced by Suslov seven months earlier, but the tone of his speech was much more pessimistic. Kozlov accused the Chinese leadership of "acting surreptitiously, behind the backs of the CPSU and the other fraternal parties, to create fissures and rifts in the international Communist movement and to spread its own special views, [which] contravene sacred Leninist principles." His speech prefigured the harsh rhetoric that would soon pervade Sino-Soviet exchanges.

At the next CPSU Central Committee plenum, on 10-18 January 1961, the growing acrimony in the world Communist movement was again the main topic of discussion. By this point, the Soviet Union had withdrawn all its military technicians and advisers from China, and had begun recalling its thousands of non-military personnel, causing disarray in many of China's largest economic and technical projects and scientific research programs.⁴⁹ At the plenum, Suslov presented a lengthy and—on the surface—surprisingly upbeat assessment of the "world conference" of 81 Communist parties in Moscow in November 1960. He claimed that the meeting had "successfully resolved all these problems [of disunity in the Communist world] and had marked a new, spectacular triumph of Marxism-Leninism in the international Communist movement."⁵⁰ The Soviet Union, he declared, could now "tirelessly work to strengthen the unity, cohesion, and friendship" among socialist countries.

Despite this optimistic gloss, much of Suslov's speech at the plenum actually gave grounds for deep pessimism. Although Soviet and Chinese officials had been able to

achieve a last-minute compromise that temporarily papered over their differences, this fragile "solution" had been preceded by venomous exchanges. Suslov acknowledged that, from the outset of the conference, "the Chinese Communist leaders not only had declined to reassess their mistaken views, but had grown even more adamant in espousing anti-Leninist and anti-Marxist" policies. Suslov maintained that the CPSU Presidium had "done its best to overcome its disagreements with the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party" through a series of preliminary meetings and contacts, but had failed to persuade the Chinese delegates to alter "their mistaken views on crucial matters."⁵¹ All the preparatory work for the conference, according to Suslov, had been turned by the Chinese into "a source of discord." The proceedings of the conference itself had not been made public, but Suslov informed the Central Committee that the head of the Chinese delegation, Deng Xiaoping, had delivered two speeches that were sharply at odds with the CPSU's positions, demonstrating "a complete unwillingness to find some way of overcoming the two parties' disagreements." Suslov also noted that the Albanian delegation, led by Enver Hoxha, had sided with the Chinese participants and had expressed "bizarre, malevolent, and dogmatic views aimed solely at causing tension and dividing the conference."⁵² Although Soviet leaders had been aware since mid-1960 that Albania was aligning itself with China, Hoxha's speech at the November 1960 conference, according to Suslov, had shown for the first time what a "monstrous" form this realignment was taking.

The speeches of the Chinese and Albanian delegations, Suslov told the Central Committee, had been greeted by a torrent of angry criticism. "Everyone at the conference," he claimed, "understood that the Chinese delegation's opposition to certain points," especially to a proposed statement regarding the need to overcome the "pernicious consequences of [Stalin's] personality cult," was motivated by "an awareness that this statement could be directed against all forms of personality cults, including the one in the Chinese Communist Party."⁵³ Suslov argued that the "mistaken views of the Chinese comrades" would persist so long as Mao Zedong demanded "endless glorification" and "aspired to claim a special role in the development of Marxist-Leninist theory" and the policies of the socialist bloc:

With the obvious guidance of the CCP leadership, the Chinese press is fanning the personality cult of Com. Mao Zedong and proclaiming him "the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our time" (*Renmin Ribao*, 7 October 1960), in the hope of staking out a special role for Mao Zedong in the international Communist movement. It is hardly accidental that CCP leaders have geared their actions over the past year toward the assumption of a dominant place among the fraternal Communist parties.⁵⁴

Suslov acknowledged to the Central Committee that the impasse resulting from the “obduracy” of the Chinese leadership had nearly caused the conference to collapse. Although Khrushchev was able to reach a compromise with the Chinese delegation in last-ditch talks on 30 November, the bulk of the conference had given little reason to believe that the dispute was genuinely resolved. Suslov tried to put the best face on the whole matter—claiming that “our party achieved a great moral-political victory from the conference” and that “one of the most important results of the Moscow Conference was the resumption of close contacts between the CPSU CC and the Chinese Communist Party CC”—but his lengthy account of the conference belied his expressed hope that “there is now a solid basis for the strengthening of Soviet-Chinese friendship and the unity of our parties.”⁵⁵

The precariousness of the outcome in November 1960 became evident soon after the January 1961 plenum, as the polemics and recriminations resumed behind the scenes with ever greater stridency. Before long, the dispute flared into the open, and news of the Sino-Soviet conflict spread throughout the world. Khrushchev and Mao made a few additional attempts to reconcile their countries’ differences, but the rift, if anything, grew even wider. Hopes of restoring a semblance of unity in the international Communist movement were dashed. At CPSU Central Committee plenums from late 1962 on, Soviet leaders no longer held out any hope that the split could be surmounted. Instead, they used the plenums to marshal broad support within the party for what was projected to be a long and dangerous struggle against China.

A typical session occurred in December 1963 when Khrushchev, Suslov, and a number of other CPSU Secretaries—Boris Ponomarev, the head of the CPSU CC International Department, Yurii Andropov, the head of the CPSU CC department for intra-bloc relations, and Leonid Il’ichev, the head of the CPSU CC Ideology Department—spoke at length about the “disagreements connected with the willfully divisive actions of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.”⁵⁶ Coming after a year of acrimonious polemics between the Soviet Union and China, the December 1963 plenum featured endless condemnations of “the CCP leadership’s resort to open polemics and other actions that, in both form and method, are unacceptable in relations between Marxist-Leninists.” The speakers at the plenum claimed that “the CCP leaders are now increasingly trying to carry their profoundly mistaken views on ideological matters into interstate relations [so that] they can destroy the friendship and cohesion of the Communist movement and weaken the anti-imperialist front.” To ensure that CPSU members at all levels would be prepared for a confrontation with China, the CPSU Secretariat decided on 16 December 1963 to expand the distribution list for the major speeches given at the plenum.⁵⁷

One of the consistent themes about Sino-Soviet relations at the Central Committee plenums in 1963, 1964,

and 1965 was the effort China had been making to lure other Communist states and parties to its camp, building on its success with Albania. As early as the January 1961 plenum, Suslov reported that China had done its best at the November 1960 conference to line up broad support for its “mistaken and divisive” positions:

I have to acknowledge that there was a small group of waverers. In addition to the Albanians, the Burmese and Malayan representatives usually followed the lead of the Chinese comrades. The reasons for this are clear: namely, that they lived and worked for a long time in Beijing. Besides the Burmese and Malaysians, the delegates from the Vietnamese Workers’ Party and the Communist parties of Indonesia, Japan, and Australia also showed signs of wavering. These parties are from countries that are geographically close to the PRC, and they have close traditional ties with the CCP. Unusual pressure was applied on their representatives [by the Chinese].⁵⁸

Over the next few years, Soviet concerns about the fissiparous effects of the Sino-Soviet split greatly increased. At the Central Committee plenum in December 1963, Yurii Andropov, the head of the CPSU CC department for intra-bloc relations, claimed that China had been secretly attempting to induce other East European countries to follow Albania’s lead. He noted that the Chinese had been focusing their efforts on Poland, Hungary, and East Germany:

The Chinese leaders are carrying out a policy of crude sabotage in relation to Poland, Hungary, and the GDR. Characteristic of this is the fact that in September of this year, during conversations with a Hungarian official in China, Politburo member Zhu De declared that China would welcome it if the Hungarian comrades diverged from the CPSU’s line. But, Zhu De threatened, if you remain on the side of the revisionists, we will have to take a stance against you.⁵⁹

Beijing’s contacts with these three countries bore little fruit in the end, but Soviet leaders obviously could not be sure of that at the time. The mere likelihood that China was seeking to foment discord within the Soviet bloc was enough to spark heightened vigilance in Moscow.

Soviet concerns increased still further over the next several months when another Warsaw Pact country, Romania, began seeking a neutral position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Although the Romanians never went as far as the Albanians in pursuing outright alignment with China, the Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu refused to endorse Moscow’s polemics or to join in other steps aimed at isolating Beijing. This policy had been foreshadowed as early as February 1964, when Suslov warned the CPSU Central Committee that China was redoubling its efforts to split the Soviet bloc:

These efforts by the CCP leaders, far from being limited to the ideological sphere, extend into the sphere of practical politics among socialist countries and Communist parties. In seeking to enervate the unity and cohesion of the socialist commonwealth, the CCP leadership resorts to all manner of tricks and maneuvers to disrupt economic and political relations among the socialist countries and to sow discord in their activities on the international arena. Recently, the fissiparous and subversive actions of the Chinese leaders in the world Communist movement have drastically increased. There is no longer any doubt that Beijing is seeking to achieve a schism among the Communist parties and the creation of factions and groups that are hostile to Marxism-Leninism.⁶⁰

Suslov's warning seemed even more pertinent a year later, when Romania's defiance had become more overt. In April 1964 the Romanian government issued a stinging rejection of Khrushchev's scheme for supranational economic integration within the socialist bloc (a scheme that would have relegated Romania to being little more than a supplier of agricultural goods and raw materials for the more industrialized Communist countries).⁶¹ From then on, the Romanian authorities began reorienting their foreign trade away from the Soviet Union. By 1965, Romania's divergence from the basic foreign policy line of the Warsaw Pact countries was extending well beyond foreign economic matters. In March 1965, Ceausescu declined to take part in a Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, which was designed to lay the groundwork for another world conference of Communist parties, following up on the November 1960 session. Romania's refusal to attend was based, at least in part, on China's boycott of the meeting. Soviet leaders had assured Ceausescu and the Chinese authorities that, in the wake of Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, there was an opportunity to search for "new approaches and new means of achieving unity in the world Communist movement," but neither the Chinese, nor Ceausescu, agreed to take up the offer. Romania's absence from the meeting was conspicuous as the only ruling Communist party other than China and Albania that failed to show up. (Officials from Cuba, North Vietnam, Mongolia, and North Korea all attended, as did representatives of several non-ruling Communist parties.)

At a CPSU Central Committee plenum on 24-26 March 1965, Suslov praised the consultative meeting, but noted regretfully that Romania had not taken part. He then accused the Chinese of trying to sow discord within the Warsaw Pact:

The leadership of the CCP not only is directly supporting factional groups in the fraternal countries, but is also saying that "in the future this sort of work must be greatly stepped up." The Chinese leaders declare that their disagreements with the CPSU and the other

parties are "disagreements between two hostile classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie," and hence they reject any attempts to improve relations between our parties.⁶²

The tone of Suslov's presentation at this plenum was far more somber than his earlier reports. He even warned of Chinese efforts to stir up unrest in the Soviet Union itself, alluding to a student demonstration that Chinese officials had orchestrated in Moscow in early March 1965 to try, as Suslov put it, to "incite an anti-Soviet hysteria."⁶³ No longer did he hold out any hope that relations with China could be ameliorated. Although Suslov affirmed that "the CPSU Presidium believes it necessary to move ahead patiently without giving in to provocations. . . to show the Chinese people our sincere desire to live with them in friendship," he acknowledged that "the Chinese leadership has completely rejected all the positive suggestions in the communiqué from the Consultative Meeting."

The increasingly harsh tone of the speeches given by Suslov and other Soviet leaders at Central Committee plenums provides a valuable way to track the deterioration of Soviet ties with China. After having sought, at the December 1959 plenum, to caution against public denunciations of China, Suslov over time had to embrace the hostile rhetoric that characterized Sino-Soviet relations. This trend corresponded with the shift in bilateral ties from the amity of the mid-1950s to the tensions in the late 1950s to the bitter dispute of the early and mid-1960s. Once the conflict was fully under way, the pronouncements by Suslov and others at the plenums were intended not only to warn about real dangers from China, but also to reassure the Central Committee that the top leaders would not compromise Soviet interests.

The Zhukov Affair

Normally, the Central Committee was not involved in military policy. That sphere of activity was left to the CPSU Presidium/Politburo, the Defense Council, the Ministry of Defense, and the CPSU CC Administrative Organs Department. Military issues were not brought before the Central Committee even for nominal approval. A partial exception came in late October 1957, when Khrushchev decided to oust Soviet defense minister Marshal Georgii Zhukov from all his senior party and ministerial positions. Khrushchev took this step to consolidate his own power, but the affair inevitably had some bearing on civil-military relations. Although it did not represent an institutional clash between civilian and military authorities (and clearly was not motivated by fears that Zhukov would try to seize power in a *coup d'état*), it reinforced the norm of the army's subordination to civilian (i.e., Communist Party) control.⁶⁴

The declassification of the October 1957 plenum materials, amounting to several thousand pages, does not fully dispel the mystery that has long surrounded the Zhukov affair. Just four months earlier, in June 1957,

Zhukov had sided with Khrushchev against the “Anti-Party Group” and had been rewarded for his efforts by being promoted to full membership on the CPSU Presidium. Khrushchev’s abrupt shift against Zhukov in October 1957 came as a shock both inside and outside the Soviet Union. The decisive maneuvers to remove Zhukov occurred while the defense minister was on an extended trip to Yugoslavia and Albania in the last few weeks of October, a trip that had been authorized by the CPSU Presidium. When Zhukov began his travels he had no inkling that he was about to be dismissed, as he acknowledged at the plenum:

Some three weeks ago, when I was instructed to set off for Yugoslavia and Albania, I said goodbye to all the members of the CC [Presidium], or at least to most of them, and we spoke as though we were the closest of friends. No one said a word to me about any problem. . . . I was not given the slightest hint that my behavior was somehow deemed improper. Only now are they saying this to me. . . . We all parted in such good spirits and warm friendship three weeks ago that it’s still hard to believe all this has suddenly happened.⁶⁵

In a remarkably short period of time after Zhukov’s departure, Khrushchev arranged with the other Presidium members (and with senior military officers) to deprive the defense minister of all his top posts. The CPSU Presidium formally endorsed the ouster of Zhukov and the appointment of a successor, Marshal Rodion Malinovskii, at a meeting on 26 October, which Zhukov was hastily summoned to attend while he was still in Albania. The announcement of his dismissal and the appointment of Malinovskii as defense minister was carried by the TASS news agency later that day. Only after Zhukov’s fate was sealed did Khrushchev convene the Central Committee.

Because the notes from Khrushchev’s earlier discussions and from the relevant Presidium meetings (especially the meetings on 19 and 26 October) have not yet been released, key information about Khrushchev’s motives in the affair is still unavailable.⁶⁶ The plenum documents show only what Khrushchev wanted the Central Committee to hear, not necessarily what he really believed. Nevertheless, the plenum materials do add some intriguing details to previous accounts and, if used circumspectly, shed considerable light on the reasons for Khrushchev’s move against his erstwhile ally.

One of the most valuable aspects of the declassified documents, repetitive and turgid though they may be, is that they clarify the allegations against Zhukov. The general case against Zhukov had been known since a few days after the plenum, when summary materials were published in the CPSU daily *Pravda*.⁶⁷ Official histories of the Soviet Army’s political organs, published in 1964 and 1968, had provided some additional information.⁶⁸ Even so, a few of the allegations were at best unclear, and in some cases it was not known precisely what Zhukov

had been accused of. Nor was it known whether Zhukov had tried to defend himself against the charges. The vast quantity of declassified testimony and supporting documentation introduced at the plenum, beginning with Suslov’s opening speech (which outlined all of Zhukov’s alleged transgressions), gives a much better sense of what the charges entailed.

For example, it had long been known that Zhukov was denounced for having proposed certain changes in high-level military organs, but it was not known precisely what his alleged intentions were. The plenum materials indicate that Zhukov was accused of having wanted to abolish the Higher Military Council, a body consisting of all the members and candidate members of the CPSU Presidium as well as all the commanders of military districts, groups of forces, and naval fleets. The Higher Military Council was under the direct jurisdiction of the Defense Council, the supreme command organ in the USSR, whose existence had not yet been publicly disclosed. According to Suslov’s speech at the plenum, Zhukov had refrained from convening the Higher Military Council and had then proposed to disband it. The CPSU Presidium, Suslov added, “rejected the defense minister’s unwise proposal.”⁶⁹

The plenum materials also clarify what Zhukov allegedly wanted to do with the extensive system of Military Councils. Each military district, group of forces, and naval fleet had its own Military Council, which consisted of regional party secretaries as well as senior commanders and political officers from the local military units. The Military Council was responsible for “upholding the constant combat and mobilization readiness of troops, the high quality of combat and political training, and the strictness of military discipline.”⁷⁰ According to Suslov, Zhukov wanted to “transform the Military Councils into informal consultative organs under the [military] commanders,” a step that supposedly would have relegated the Communist party to a subordinate role in military affairs:

It didn’t bother Com. Zhukov that the members of the Military Councils in the [military] districts include secretaries of the party’s oblast and territorial committees and secretaries of the Central Committees of the union-republic Communist parties. It was perfectly fine with him that the secretaries of oblast committees, territorial committees, and Communist party CCs would be placed “under the commanders and not given an equal voice” in the Military Councils.⁷¹

Suslov emphasized that “the existence of full-fledged Military Councils in no way detracts from the dignity and role of [military] commanders. On the contrary, the Military Councils allow the commanders to be certain that the decisions they make are appropriate.”⁷² Only a “petty tyrant,” Suslov added, would have tried to scale back the Military Councils.

Another allegation discussed at great length at the plenum was Zhukov's supposed desire to establish a "cult of personality" around himself. One of the main things cited as evidence for this accusation was the efforts that Zhukov allegedly made to highlight the depiction of his own feats in the film "Velikaya bitva" ("The Great Battle"), a documentary about the Battle of Stalingrad. The film had been commissioned in October 1953 to replace the 1943 film "Stalingrad," which was deemed to give undue prominence to Stalin's role in the campaign. The new documentary was completed in early 1957 but was then subject to a number of revisions. At the CPSU Presidium meeting on 26 October, Zhukov insisted that he had not been involved in the production of "Velikaya bitva," but Suslov argued at the plenum that Zhukov's denials "do not correspond to reality."⁷³ Relying on a letter from the Soviet minister of culture, Nikolai Mikhailov, which was drafted at Khrushchev's request after the decision to remove Zhukov had been made, Suslov claimed that the defense minister had "directly and actively intervened in the film-making" numerous times to "propagandize [his own] cult of personality."⁷⁴ Suslov cited a few other items as well—notably, the preparation of an article about World War II for the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, and the majestic depiction of Zhukov in a painting in the Soviet Army Museum—to bolster his claim that "Zhukov was deeply concerned to aggrandize his persona and his prestige, without regard for the interests of the [Communist] Party." Having waged "a struggle against the well-known abuses resulting from J. V. Stalin's cult of personality," Suslov declared, "our Party must never again permit anyone to build up a cult of personality in any form whatsoever."⁷⁵

Perhaps the most serious allegation put forth by Suslov and Khrushchev was that Zhukov had been trying to "take control of the army away from the party and to establish a one-man dictatorship in the armed forces."⁷⁶ Khrushchev argued that there was supposed to be "a division of responsibilities among [senior] members of the party," and that no single official, not even the CPSU First Secretary (much less the defense minister), could "take on all the functions of the Central Committee."⁷⁷ He condemned Zhukov for allegedly having sought to "place everything, the Committee on State Security as well as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, under the Ministry of Defense." Khrushchev added that if the situation had continued this way "for another month or so", Zhukov would have been insisting that "the Central Committee, too, must be brought under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense."⁷⁸

Khrushchev produced no concrete evidence to substantiate these claims, but both he and Suslov specifically accused Zhukov of having sought to establish military jurisdiction over the main security organs:

Com. Zhukov recently proposed that the chairman of the Committee on State Security and the Minister of

Internal Affairs be replaced by military officers. What lay behind this suggestion? Wasn't it an attempt to fill the leading posts in these organs with his own people, with cadres who would be personally beholden to him? Isn't he seeking to establish his own control over the Committee on State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs?⁷⁹

Newly available evidence suggests that this charge was disingenuous, or at least highly misleading. The KGB's own top-secret history of its activities and organization, compiled in 1977, makes no mention of any such effort by Zhukov. On the contrary, the KGB textbook emphasizes that in the mid- and late 1950s "the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government" themselves sought to "fill the ranks of the state security organs with experienced party *and military* personnel" in order to "eliminate the consequences of the hostile activity of Beria and his accomplices."⁸⁰ To the extent that military officers were brought into the KGB and MVD after 1953, this trend was initiated and encouraged by the top political leadership. (Khrushchev and his colleagues, after all, had learned at the time of Beria's arrest that they could count on Zhukov and other senior military officers to support the CPSU.)

The spuriousness of this particular accusation reflected a more general pattern. As valuable as the plenum materials are in spelling out the case against Zhukov, the main conclusion one can draw from the documents is that the affair was little more than a personal clash between Khrushchev and Zhukov. Despite the sinister veneer that Khrushchev gave (both at the plenum and later on in his memoirs) to Zhukov's actions, the documents leave no doubt that the charges against Zhukov were largely contrived. Zhukov was justified in pointing this out during his first speech at the plenum:

I think we have gathered here not to review individual offenses. . . . That's not what this is all about. In the end, the question here is political, not juridical.⁸¹

Khrushchev's motive in convening the Central Committee was similar to his (and others') motives in orchestrating the July 1953 plenum to denounce Beria. Rather than acknowledge that the ouster of Zhukov was the latest stage in a consolidation of power, Khrushchev used the October 1957 plenum to suggest that the defense minister had been removed because of genuine concerns about the Communist Party's supervision of the army.

It is true, of course, that numerous problems existed in the Soviet armed forces in 1957, and that the military's political organs were not functioning as well as most officials had hoped. It is also true that Zhukov wanted to enforce stricter discipline in the army by establishing a more orderly chain of command and by mitigating the opportunities for insubordination. And it is true that Zhukov tended to be impatient and abrasive with his

colleagues and subordinates (both fellow soldiers and party officials), and that he went along with efforts to play up his own role in World War II. Nevertheless, these deficiencies hardly amounted to a broad indictment of Zhukov's tenure as defense minister. The activities that Suslov claimed were an attempt by Zhukov to establish a "cult of personality" were not at all unusual in the context of Soviet politics. The routine glorification of Khrushchev in the late 1950s far exceeded anything that Zhukov may have been promoting for himself. Similarly, most of the other problems that were highlighted at the plenum, both in the armed forces as a whole and in the political organs, had long existed. Zhukov may have marginally worsened a few of these problems, but he also seems to have rectified certain key deficiencies, notably by boosting morale and increasing the combat readiness of frontline units. During the one major operation that Zhukov oversaw as defense minister, the large-scale intervention in Hungary in November 1956, Soviet troops accomplished their mission within a few days despite encountering vigorous armed resistance from Hungarian insurgents.

The flimsiness of the allegations against Zhukov undoubtedly accounts for Khrushchev's decision to raise questions about Zhukov's military abilities and accomplishments. Although Khrushchev and Suslov both claimed that they "deeply value Com. Zhukov's performance during the Great Patriotic War," they also wanted to ensure that Zhukov's legendary reputation and stature would not cause members of the Central Committee to be hesitant about criticizing him. To this end, Khrushchev downplayed Zhukov's role in World War II by arguing that Vasilii Chuikov, not Zhukov, was the "chief hero" of the Stalingrad campaign. Khrushchev also rebuked Zhukov for dwelling solely on the positive aspects of his military career:

Com. Zhukov, I don't want to disparage your military accomplishments, but you should think about it a bit. You had both your successes and your failures, just as all the other generals and marshals did. Why do you insist on talking only about the successes and victories, and completely glossing over the failures?⁸²

Amplifying on this point later on, Khrushchev declared that "our [other] generals and marshals know at least as much as Zhukov does, and perhaps much more, about military organization and the other military sciences. Com. Zhukov has only a poor understanding of the latest technology."⁸³

In addition to expressing doubts about Zhukov's military prowess, Khrushchev alleged that Zhukov had advocated certain foreign policy steps that "bordered on treason." In particular, Khrushchev claimed that Zhukov "wrote a memorandum to the party's Central Committee recommending that we accept [the U.S. government's] 'Open Skies' proposal," which would have entitled the United States and the Soviet Union to fly reconnaissance

flights over one another's territory to monitor compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements. Khrushchev averred that the other members of the Presidium were startled to learn that "the defense minister, of all people, could have favored such a thing," and they "reacted with heated protests against Zhukov's proposal."⁸⁴ Khrushchev's efforts to impugn Zhukov's "adventurist" positions on "the most important foreign policy issues facing the Soviet Union" (in the phrasing of the plenum resolution) were not altogether different from the attempts in July 1953 to portray Beria's alleged views about Germany in the most unsavory light possible.

Despite the many similarities between the October 1957 plenum and the July 1953 plenum, there was one fundamental difference. Unlike Beria, who was held in prison during the July 1953 sessions and executed five months later, Zhukov was given the opportunity to speak twice at the October 1957 plenum and to interject comments from time to time during others' remarks. His first speech came after the main allegations against him had been laid out, and his second, much briefer (and more contrite) statement came just before Khrushchev's lengthy speech at the fourth session of the plenum, on the evening of October 29. On neither occasion did Zhukov project an air of angry defiance or even take as firm a stand as Molotov did in July 1955, but he defended his record at some length and rebutted the most lurid accusations against him. Overall, he left no doubt that he strongly disagreed with the grounds for his dismissal. At the same time, Zhukov had decided beforehand that it would be best if he accepted responsibility for certain "mistakes" (whether real or not) and indicated his willingness to comply with the party's wishes:

I request that you understand that [my] mistakes were not the result of any sort of deviation from the line of the party, but were the sorts of mistakes that any working official might make. I assure you, comrades (and I think I will receive appropriate support in this regard), that with the help of our party I will be able, with honor and dignity, to overcome the mistakes I have committed, and I absolutely will be a worthy figure in our party. I was and always will be a reliable member of the party.⁸⁵

Zhukov's willingness to acknowledge unspecified shortcomings reinforced the long-standing pattern of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union. If the most renowned figure in the Soviet armed forces was willing to submit himself to the discipline of the Communist Party, the norm of civilian supremacy was clearer than ever.

This is not to suggest, however, that the affair was in any way an institutional clash between the party and the military. On the contrary, the declassified plenum materials show, more strongly than ever, that the Zhukov affair was *not* a confrontation between civilian officials and military commanders. During the plenum, senior military

officers went out of their way to emphasize that Khrushchev “is not only First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, but is also chairman of the Defense Council,” a position equivalent to commander-in-chief of the Soviet armed forces.⁸⁶ Although it is now clear that General A. S. Zheltov, the chief political officer in the Soviet Army in 1957, was instrumental in pressing for Zhukov’s ouster, a substantial number of career military officers were also behind the move. (The plenum documents suggest that Zheltov resented Zhukov mainly because Zheltov had been left off the Central Committee at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, an omission that Zheltov evidently blamed on Zhukov.⁸⁷) Zheltov’s report at the CPSU Presidium meeting on October 19 was a catalyst for the final actions to remove Zhukov, but it is clear that the preliminary maneuvering had begun well before then, with the involvement of senior military commanders. Khrushchev was able to secure a political-military consensus on the need to dismiss Zhukov.

The lack of any civilian-military disagreements on this issue is well illustrated by the plenum itself, where not a single military officer spoke in defense of Zhukov. The norm of subordination to party control outweighed any inclination that senior commanders might have had to speak even mildly in favor of the deposed minister.⁸⁸ All of Zhukov’s military colleagues and subordinates joined with Khrushchev and Suslov in denouncing Zhukov’s alleged efforts to foster a “cult of personality” and to “take control of the army away from the party.” Zhukov’s successor, Malinovskii, expressed regret that Zhukov had allowed problems in the military to become so acute that the Central Committee was forced to step in to resolve matters:

Comrades, we military officers are very glad that the plenum of the Central Committee is discussing the matter of strengthening party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy. On the other hand, it is regrettable that we, as military officers and members of the party, have reached the point where the Central Committee itself has been compelled to intervene in this matter.⁸⁹

Even military officers who had benefited greatly during Zhukov’s tenure, such as Fleet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who had been appointed commander-in-chief of the Soviet navy in 1956, argued that Zhukov’s “leadership of the ministry has created an extremely agonizing, oppressive, and distasteful situation, which is totally at odds with party and Leninist principles of leadership.” Gorshkov insisted that Zhukov “regards himself as absolutely infallible” and “refuses to tolerate views different from his own, often reacting with uncontrolled rage, invective, and abuse.”⁹⁰ Other officers expressed even stronger criticism, doing their best to side completely with the party hierarchy.

So clear was the party’s dominance of the military that

even the officers who had known Zhukov the longest—Marshal Semyon Budennyi, Marshal Ivan Konev, and Marshal Sergei Biryuzov, among others—disavowed their past ties with him.⁹¹ After one of the speakers on the first day of the plenum referred to the “special friendship between Com. Konev and Marshal Zhukov,” Konev spoke with Khrushchev and sent a note to the CPSU Presidium insisting that it would be a “profound mistake to believe I was ever particularly close to Zhukov.” Konev’s denials prompted Khrushchev to begin his own speech at the plenum by “correcting the record” along the lines that Konev sought:

We don’t have any basis for suggesting that Com. Konev’s past relationship with Com. Zhukov should cast any sort of pall on Com. Konev. Com. Konev is a member of the CPSU CC and a long-time member of the party, and he always was a loyal member of the party and a worthy member of the CPSU CC. He remains so now.⁹²

By highlighting Konev’s eagerness to renounce his previous ties with Zhukov, Khrushchev underscored the consensus against the deposed minister and let the full Central Committee see that, despite Zhukov’s misdeeds, high-ranking military officers were no different from other “true Communists” in placing party loyalty above personal relationships.

One final point worth mentioning about the October 1957 plenum is the valuable light it sheds on the state of the Soviet armed forces in the mid- to late 1950s. Intriguing information about this matter can be found not only in the proceedings, but in the collection of documents associated with the plenum. These documents consist mainly of various drafts of the plenum resolution and the “Closed Letter” that was eventually distributed to all CPSU members about the Zhukov affair.⁹³ The letter itself adds nothing to the many charges outlined at the plenum, but one of the other documents released to the Central Committee, a top-secret “Order of the USSR Minister of Defense,” signed by Zhukov and the chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, on 12 May 1956, provides an interesting assessment of “the state of military discipline in the Soviet Army and Navy” in the mid-1950s.⁹⁴ Zhukov and Sokolovskii highlighted problems in the Soviet armed forces that seem remarkably similar to many of the ills afflicting today’s Russian armed forces:

Both the army and the navy are plagued by a huge number of crimes and extraordinary incidents, of which the most serious dangers are posed by: cases of insubordination to commanders and, what is particularly unacceptable in the army, the voicing of insults to superiors; outrageous behavior by servicemen vis-à-vis the local population; desertion and unexplained leaves of absence by servicemen; and accidents and

disasters with aviation transport, combat aircraft, and ships.

The problem of drunkenness among servicemen, including officers, has taken on vast dimensions in the army and navy. As a rule, the majority of extraordinary incidents and crimes committed by servicemen are connected with drunkenness.

The extremely unsatisfactory state of military discipline in many units and formations of the army, and especially in the navy, prevents troops from being maintained at a high level of combat readiness and undermines efforts to strengthen the Armed Forces.⁹⁵

The standards used by Zhukov and Sokolovskii may have been a good deal higher than those used today, and the pervasiveness of “unsavory phenomena” is undoubtedly greater now than it was then. Some of these problems had been known earlier from the testimony of emigres/defectors and occasional articles in the Soviet press.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, it is striking (and comforting) to see that dissatisfaction about the state of military discipline was nearly as great in Moscow some 40-45 years ago as it is today.

Concluding Observations

This overview of the structure, context, and content of declassified materials from Central Committee plenums shows both the limitations and the potential value of these documents. So long as scholars bear in mind that the Central Committee was not a decision-making body and that the plenums were carefully managed by top CPSU officials for their own purposes, the documents can yield a good deal of useful information. Some of the materials provide fresh insights into key trends and events, including domestic changes in the Soviet Union and important episodes from the Cold War. Other documents are important mainly because of what they reveal about the manipulation of the plenums by senior officials. One of the most salient features of the plenums during the first five years after Stalin’s death was the spillover from the leadership struggle. Even when the plenums were supposed to focus on crucial domestic or foreign issues, the divisions among top leaders had a far-reaching effect on the proceedings. By the late 1950s, after Khrushchev had dislodged his major rivals and consolidated his position as CPSU First Secretary, the plenums increasingly were devoted to the growing rift between the Soviet Union and China. This theme continued even after Khrushchev was unexpectedly removed in 1964.

The plenum materials cover only selected portions of Soviet history and Soviet foreign policy. Many topics were barely considered at all by the Central Committee. The plenum documents are no substitute for the vastly more important and far more voluminous records of the supreme decision-making body in the Soviet Union, the

CPSU Presidium/Politburo. Those records, unfortunately, are still largely sealed. Yet even if the Politburo archives are eventually made fully accessible, the plenum materials will remain a valuable, indeed indispensable, source. Although the plenum transcripts and supplementary documents must be used with great caution, they provide a wealth of insights into the role of the Central Committee in Soviet policy-making.

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¹ The materials at RTsKhIDNI for Central Committee plenums from 1918 to 1941 are stored in Opis’ 2 of Fond 17. Unlike at TsKhSD, the items at RTsKhIDNI do not constitute a separate *fond*.

² In the Soviet/Russian archival lexicon, the word *opis*’ refers both to a segment of a *fond* and to the finding aid or catalog that specifies what is contained in that segment.

³ “Perechen’ dokumentov Arkhiva Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Tsentra khraneniya sovremennoi dokumentatsii, Rossiiskogo tsentra khraneniya i izucheniya dokumentov noveishei istorii, Tsentra khraneniya dokumentov molodezhnykh organizatsii, rassekrechennykh Komissiei po rassekrechivaniyu dokumentov, sozdannykh KPSS, v 1994-1995,” Moscow, 1996. A slightly abridged version of this list was published in *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya* (Moscow), No. 3 (May-June 1996), pp. 249-253.

⁴ Conversation in Moscow between the author and Natal’ya Tomilina, director of TsKhSD, 14 July 1997. This was not the only aspect of the commission’s report that was highly misleading. The report contains *fond* and *opis*’ numbers of collections that supposedly have been “declassified,” but it fails to mention that a large number of *dela* in many of these *opisi* are in fact still classified. For example, the commission’s list of “declassified documents” includes Opis’ 128 of Fond 17 at RTsKhIDNI, which is divided into two volumes. One would expect, based on this listing, that all documents from both volumes of the *opis*’ would be freely accessible, but it turns out that the entire second volume, amounting to 504 *dela*, is still classified, and even in the first volume only some of the 702 *dela* are actually available to researchers. (The only way to determine which files in the first volume are really declassified is to ask the head of the RTsKhIDNI reading room before submitting a request.) Similarly, at TsKhSD only a small fraction of the *dela* in many of the purportedly “declassified” collections are genuinely accessible. Even when files at TsKhSD are nominally “declassified,” they may still be off limits because they supposedly contain “personal secrets” (*lichnye tainy*), which have to be processed by an entirely separate commission. Because of the barriers posed by classified files and files that allegedly contain personal secrets, very few files from some of the “declassified” *opisi* at TsKhSD are actually given out. (This problem is compounded when, as in the case of Opisi 22 and 28 of Fond 5 at TsKhSD, only the film reels are lent out. If one *dela* on a reel is proscribed, all other *dela* on the reel are also off limits unless a researcher can convince the archivists to have a staff member serve as a monitor for several hours while the researcher uses the “permitted” *dela* on the reel.)

⁵ 5 May 1941 (Delo 1a); 10 October 1941 (Delo 2); 27 January 1944 (Dela 3-5); 11, 14, and 18 March 1946 (Dela 6-8); 21, 22, 24, and 26 February 1947 (Dela 9-20); 16 October 1952 (Dela 21-22); 5 March 1953 (Dela 23-24); 14 March 1953 (Dela 25-26); 2-7 July 1953 (Dela 27-45); 3-7 September 1953 (Dela 46-61); 23 February-2 March 1954 (Dela 62-89); 21-24 June 1954 (Dela 90-109); 25-31 January 1955 (Dela 110-138); 4-12 July 1955 (Dela 139-180); 13

February 1956 (Dela 181-184); 27 February 1956 (Dela 185-187); 22 June 1956 (Dela 188); 20-24 December 1956 (Dela 189-208); 13-14 February 1957 (Dela 209-221); 22-29 June 1957 (Dela 222-259); 28-29 October 1957 (Dela 260-272); 16-17 December 1957 (Dela 273-284); 25-26 February 1958 (Dela 285-298); 26 March 1958 (Dela 319-327); 6-7 May 1958 (Dela 304-318); 17-18 June 1958 (Dela 319-327); 5 September 1958 (Dela 328-332); 12 November 1958 (Dela 333-338); 15-19 December 1958 (Dela 339-360); 24-29 June 1959 (Dela 361-397); 22-26 December 1959 (Dela 398-448); 4 May 1960 (Dela 449-452); 13-16 July 1960 (Dela 453-485); 10-18 January 1961 (Dela 486-536); 19 June 1961 (Dela 537-543); 14 October 1961 (Dela 544-548); 31 October 1961 (Dela 549-553); 5-9 March 1962 (Dela 554-582); 23 April 1962 (Dela 583-587); 19-23 November 1962 (Dela 588-623); 18-21 June 1963 (Dela 624-658); 9-13 December 1963 (Dela 659-696); 10-15 February 1964 (Dela 697-743); 11 July 1964 (Dela 744-747); 10 October 1964 (Dela 748-753); 16 November 1964 (Dela 754-764); 24-26 March 1965 (Dela 765-786); 27-29 September 1965 (Dela 787-805); 6 December 1965 (Dela 806-812); 19 February 1966 (Dela 813-817); and 26 March 1966 (Dela 818-822).

⁶ See, for example, the standardized form (classified “sekretno”) that was circulated along with appropriate transcript pages to each speaker, in TsKhSD, Fond (F.) 2, Opis’ (Op.) 1, Delo (D.) 268, List (L.) 15.

⁷ The name of the CPSU CC Politburo was changed to the “CPSU CC Presidium” at the 19th Party Congress in October 1952. The name was changed back to the Politburo just before the 23rd Party Congress in March 1966.

⁸ See, for example, “Tov. Sukovoi E. N.,” 18 March 1958, memorandum on materials to include in the final stenographic account of the plenum held on 28-29 October 1957, in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 269, L. 79, as well as the attachment on Ll. 80-145.

⁹ This is in contrast to the plenum documents in Opis’ 2 of Fond 17 at RTsKhIDNI. RTsKhIDNI gives out only the microfilms of these documents.

¹⁰ Useful compilations of the materials published after Central Committee plenums from 1953 through the late 1980s are available in two sources: *Kommunisticheskaya partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s’ezdov, konferentsii, i plenumov TsK*, various editions (Moscow: Politizdat, various years); and the 29 volumes of the CPSU yearbook published between 1957 and 1989, *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika* (Moscow: Politizdat, published biennially until the mid-1960s and annually thereafter). From 1989 to 1991, the new Central Committee journal *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* featured stenographic accounts of selected plenums, including some from the pre-Gorbachev era.

¹¹ The term “Central Committee” refers here exclusively to the body comprising 200-300 people who convened for plenums. Even when plenums were not in session, many resolutions and directives were issued in the name of the Central Committee, but these were actually drafted and approved by the Politburo or Secretariat, not by the Central Committee itself. Soviet officials also frequently used the term “Central Committee” to refer to the whole central party apparatus, but this, too, gives a misleading impression of the Central Committee’s role. The term is used here only in its narrowest sense.

¹² See, for example, the marked-up draft “Postanovlenie plenuma TsK KPSS: Ob uluchshenii partiino-politicheskoi raboty v Sovetskoi Armii i Flote,” October 1957 (Secret), in “Materialy k Protokolu No. 5 zasedaniya plenuma TsK KPSS 28-29. 10. 1957 g.,” in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 261, Ll. 69-74.

¹³ The term “circular flow of power” was coined by Robert V. Daniels in “Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev,” in John W. Strong, ed., *The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev and Kosygin* (New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold, 1971), p. 20. Daniels had developed the basic interpretation at some length more than a decade earlier in his *The Conscience of the Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), and similar views had been elaborated by numerous

scholars such as Merle Fainsod and Leonard Schapiro.

¹⁴ On this general problem, see Mark Kramer, “Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls,” *Cold War International History Bulletin*, Issue No. 3 (Fall 1993), p. 34.

¹⁵ For an analysis and translation of these notes and supplementary materials, see Mark Kramer, “Special Feature: New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises,” *Cold War International History Bulletin*, Issue No. 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 358-410.

¹⁶ Almost all of the transcripts that were released in the early 1990s are now accessible in Fond 89 of TsKhSD. For a convenient, cross-indexed, and chronological list of these transcripts compiled by I. I. Kudryavtsev and edited by V. P. Kozlov, see *Arkhivy Kremlya i Staroi Ploshchadi: Dokumenty po “Delu KPSS”*—Annotirovannyyi spravochnik dokumentov, predstavlenykh v Konstitutsionnyi Sud RF po “Delu KPSS”, (Novosibirsk: Siberskii Khronograf, 1995).

¹⁷ The two most valuable collections put out by the Gorbachev Foundation are Mikhail Gorbachev, ed., *Gody trudnykh reshenii* (Moscow: Alfa-Print, 1993); and A. V. Veber et al., eds., *Soyuz možno bylo sokhranit’—Belaya kniga: Dokumenty i fakty o politike M. S. Gorbacheva po reformirovaniyu i sokhraneniyu mnogonatsional’nogo gosudarstva* (Moscow: Aprel’-85, 1995). Some relevant items also have appeared in the Foundation’s journal *Svobodnaya mysl’*. The items published in *Istochnik* (e.g., about the Politburo’s immediate reaction to the Chernobyl accident) seem to have been released for the same reason that materials were turned over earlier to the Constitutional Court.

¹⁸ In a typical case, Khrushchev attributed to Beria “dangerous and counterrevolutionary” policies that Khrushchev himself had devised only a few weeks earlier for Latvia, Estonia, and Moldavia. See “Voprosy Latviiskoi SSR (Proekt),” 7 June 1953 (Top Secret), “Voprosy Estonskoi SSR (Proekt),” 8 June 1953 (Top Secret), and “Voprosy Moldavskoi SSR (Proekt),” 8 June 1953, all from N. S. Khrushchev to the CPSU Presidium, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 6, Ll. 20-29; F. 5, Op. 15, D. 445, Ll. 46, 267-277; and F. 5, Op. 15, D. 443, Ll. 29-59, respectively.

¹⁹ For the published version, see “Delo Beria,” two parts, in *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* (Moscow), No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 139-214, and No. 2 (February 1991), pp. 141-208. As discussed below, the published stenographic account differs substantially from the verbatim transcript, though the comments here apply just as much to the verbatim transcript.

²⁰ For extensive evidence of this, see my forthcoming article on “The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy-Making.”

²¹ Even a prominent scholar like Amy Knight, who is deservedly skeptical of many of the charges lodged against Beria, uncritically accepts the statements made about East Germany. See her *Beria: Stalin’s First Lieutenant* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 193-200.

²² “Plenum Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS, 2-7 iyulya 1953 g.,” July 1953 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, Fond (F.) 2, Opis’ (Op.) 1, Delo (D.) 29, List (L.) 51.

²³ This was the case, for example, with the plenum on 24-26 March 1965. A new, 22-page text was inserted by Mikhail Suslov in place of his original report to the plenum, “Soobshchenie ob itogakh Konsul’tativnoi vstrechi kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii,” in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 766, Ll. 81-102. Suslov indicated at the bottom of the new version that “[t]his text should be used in place of the stenogram.”

²⁴ Sometimes, the changes that turn up can be both amusing and revealing about events and individual leaders. For example, at the plenum in late October 1957, a few weeks after the Soviet “Sputnik” had been launched into orbit, Khrushchev boasted that “we now have European missiles, which can strike targets all over Europe without leaving our territory.” In the left-hand margin of the verbatim transcript, the first editor wrote a large question mark next to this

passage. The second editor changed it to read: "We now have medium-range missiles, that is, European missiles, which can strike targets all over Europe after being launched from our territory." See the marked-up verbatim transcript "Rech' tov. N. S. Khrushcheva na plenum TsK KPSS, 29 oktyabrya 1957 goda," 29 October 1957 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 269, L. 66.

²⁵ Khrushchev's speech, "Doklad Pervogo sekretarya TsK KPSS Khrushcheva N. S. 'Ob itogakh sovetsko-yugoslavskikh peregovorov,'" is in "plenum TsK KPSS—XIX Sozyv: Stenogramma desyatogo zasedaniya 9 iyulya 1955 g. (utrennego)," July 1955 (Strictly Secret), TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 172, Ll. 1-138.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, L. 105.

²⁷ "Plenum TsK KPSS—XIX Sozyv: Stenogramma trinadtsatogo zasedaniya 11 iyulya 1955 g. (vechernego)," July 1955 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 175, Ll. 135-136.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, L. 149.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Ll. 172-183.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, L. 179.

³¹ The sessions on Yugoslavia in July 1955 were designed to inform the Central Committee about actions already taken, not to consult it in advance. This is fully in line with the analysis above of the Central Committee's role in Soviet policy-making.

³² "Deklaratsiya Soveshchaniya predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii sotsialisticheskikh stran, sostayavshegosya v Moskve 14-16 noyabrya 1957 goda," *Pravda* (Moscow), 22 November 1957, pp. 1-2.

³³ "Plenum TsK KPSS—XX Sozyv: Stenogramma tret'ego i chetvertogo zasedanii plenuma TsK KPSS 16-17 dekabrya 1957 g.," in F. 2, Op. 1, D. 282, Ll. 161-182.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, L. 172.

³⁵ "Plenum TsK KPSS—XX Sozyv: Stenogramma tret'ego zasedaniya 7 maya 1958 g. (vechernego)," May 1958 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 317, Ll. 57-93.

³⁶ Among numerous other examples of the important ideological role that Yugoslavia played in Soviet policy-making was the close attention that Soviet leaders paid in 1968 to Yugoslavia's influence on the reformist officials in Czechoslovakia. See, for example, the plethora of documents in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, Dd. 279 and 284. Whenever Soviet leaders detected hints (or what they construed as hints) that "Titoist" ideology was filtering into Czechoslovakia, they raised the issue with the Czechoslovak authorities and discussed the matter at length during CPSU Politburo meetings.

³⁷ See Kramer, "New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises," pp. 360-362.

³⁸ "Plenum TsK KPSS—XX Sozyv: Stenogramma tret'ego i chetvertogo zasedanii plenuma TsK KPSS 16-17 dekabrya 1957 g.," in F. 2, Op. 1, D. 282, Ll. 173-174.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, L. 174.

⁴⁰ "O poezdke sovetskoj partiino-pravitel'stvennoi delegatsii v Kitaiskuyu Narodnuyu Respubliku," plus extensive modifications and insertions incorporated by Suslov, in "Materialy k Protokolu No. 15 zasedaniya plenuma TsK KPSS," 22-26 December 1959 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 447, Ll. 57-91. For background on this trip, see Mark Kramer, "Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split," *Cold War International History Bulletin*, Issue No. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 170-186.

⁴¹ "O poezdke sovetskoj partiino-pravitel'stvennoi delegatsii v Kitaiskuyu Narodnuyu Respubliku," L. 71. The sentence referring to the interception of secret documents and the U.S. government's alleged readiness to surrender Quemoy and Matsu did not appear in Suslov's initial draft. It was added during the revisions shortly before the plenum.

⁴² *Ibid.*, L. 80.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, L. 81.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Ll. 88-89.

⁴⁵ "Long Live Leninism!" was first published in *Hongqi* (Beijing), No. 8 (16 April 1960), and then republished in translation in *Peking*

Review, Vol. III, No. 17 (April 1960), pp. 14-22.

⁴⁶ See, for example, the interview with the former head of the Soviet "missile group" in China, General Aleksandr Savel'ev, in Aleksandr Dolinin, "Kak nashi raketniki kitaitsev obuchali," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 13 May 1995, p. 6.

⁴⁷ For a lively account of the Bucharest session, which includes details omitted from the official transcript, see Edward Crankshaw, *The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1963), pp. 97-110.

⁴⁸ "Doklad na plenum TsK KPSS ob itogakh Soveshchaniya predstavitelei bratskikh partii v Bukhareste i ob oshibochnykh pozitsiyakh rukovodstva TsK KPSS po nekotorym printsipial'nym voprosam marksistsko-leninskoi teorii i sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii," 13 July 1960 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 472, Ll. 2-74.

⁴⁹ For a useful account of this process by a participant, see Mikhail A. Klochko, *Soviet Scientist in Red China* (Montreal: International Publishers Representatives, 1964), esp. pp. 164-188. See also Dolinin, "Kak nashi raketniki kitaitsev obuchali," p. 6.

⁵⁰ "Ob itogakh Soveshchaniya predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii," in "Materialy k Protokolu No. 18 zasedaniya plenuma TsK KPSS, 10-18 yanvarya 1961 g.," January 1961 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 495, Ll. 11-85. The quoted passage is on L. 12.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, L. 33.

⁵² *Ibid.*, Ll. 55-57.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, L. 45.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, Ll. 65-66.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, Ll. 78, 87.

⁵⁶ See the marked-up versions of the presentations in "Materialy k Protokolu No. 6 zasedaniya plenuma TsK KPSS, 13 dekabrya 1963 g.: O deyatelnosti Prezidiuma TsK KPSS po ukrepleniyu edinstva kommunisticheskogo dvizheniya, postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK KPSS ob izdanii tekstov vystuplenii na plenum TsK Ponomareva B. N., Andropova Yu. V., i Il'icheva L. F., rechi sekretarei TsK KPSS Ponomareva, Andropova, Il'icheva, i Khrushcheva N.S.," 9-13 December 1963 (Strictly Secret), F. 2, Op. 1, D. 665.

⁵⁷ "Vypiska iz protokola No. 90/257gs zasedaniya Sekretariata TsK ot 16.XII.1963 g.," 16 December 1963 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 693, L. 4.

⁵⁸ "Ob itogakh Soveshchaniya predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii," Ll. 61-62.

⁵⁹ "Rech' Sekretarya TsK KPSS tov. Andropova Yu. V. na dekabrskom (1963 g.) plenuma TsK KPSS," No. P2002, (Top Secret), 9-13 December 1963, in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 665, L. 30.

⁶⁰ "Bor'ba KPSS za splochnost' mirovogo kommunisticheskogo dvizheniya: Doklad tovarishcha M. A. Suslova na plenum TsK KPSS 14 fevralya 1964 goda," P. 480, in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 731, L. 158ob.

⁶¹ Romanian Press Agency, *Statement on the Stand of the Romanian Workers' Party Concerning Problems of the World Communist and Working Class Movement* (Bucharest: Agerpres, 1964).

⁶² "Soobshchenie ob itogakh Konsul'tativnoi vstrechi kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii," Ll. 98-99.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, Ll. 105-106.

⁶⁴ For an excellent analysis of the Zhukov affair written long before the archives were opened, see Timothy J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 175-195. Colton's account holds up very well in the light of the new evidence.

⁶⁵ "Plenum TsK KPSS 28-29 oktyabrya 1957 g. XX Sozyv: Stenogramma vtorogo zasedaniya," 27-29 October 1957 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 266, L. 57.

⁶⁶ One item that *has* been released in the materials gathered for the plenum, a letter from the Soviet minister of culture, Nikolai Mikhailov, to the CPSU Presidium, indicates that Zhukov's ouster

was assured as of 25 October, the day before the CPSU Presidium formally approved the measure. See “V Prezidium TsK KPSS,” 25 October 1957 (Secret), from N. Mikhailov, in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 261, Ll. 45-51. No doubt, other documents, not yet released, will shed greater light on the timing and motives of Khrushchev’s actions.

⁶⁷ “Informatsionnoe soobshchenie o plenum Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS” and “Postanovlenie plenuma TsK KPSS ob uluchshenii partiino-politicheskoi raboty v Sovetskoii Armii i Flote,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 3 November 1957, pp. 1-3.

⁶⁸ Yu. P. Petrov, *Partiinoe stroitel’stvo v Sovetskoii Armii i Flote (1918-1961)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), pp. 460-462; and Yu. P. Petrov, *Stroitel’stvo politorganov, partiinykh i komsomol’skikh organizatsii Armii i Flota (1918-1968)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), pp. 434-439.

⁶⁹ “Doklad tov. Suslova M. A.: Ob uluchshenii partiino-politicheskoi raboty v Sovetskoii Armii i Flote,” 28 October 1957 (Strictly Secret), in “plenum TsK KPSS 28-29 oktyabrya 1957 g., XX Sozyv: Stenogramma pervogo zasedaniya (utrennego),” 27-29 October 1957 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 266, L. 14.

⁷⁰ Marshal S. F. Akhromeev, et al., eds., *Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar’*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986), p. 146.

⁷¹ “Doklad tov. Suslova M. A.,” Ll. 15-16.

⁷² *Ibid.*, L. 16.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, L. 21.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* For the letter from Mikhailov, see “V Prezidium TsK KPSS,” as cited in Note 61 *supra*. When evaluating Mikhailov’s letter, it is important to bear in mind that the letter was not written spontaneously. Mikhailov had been instructed by Khrushchev to write such a letter, and his detailed assertions must be judged accordingly.

⁷⁵ “Doklad tov. Suslova M. A.,” Ll. 4, 17-18.

⁷⁶ “Materialy k Protokolu No. 5 zasedaniya plenuma TsK KPSS,” L. 72.

⁷⁷ “Rech’ tov. N. S. Khrushcheva,” Ll. 60-61. This passage in the verbatim transcript was deleted from the stenographic account.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, L. 61.

⁷⁹ “Doklad tov. Suslova M. A.,” L. 21.

⁸⁰ Lieut.-General V. M. Chebrikov et al., eds., *Istoriya sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti*, No. 12179, Top Secret (Moscow: Vysshaya Krasnoznamenayaya Shkola Komiteta Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, 1977), p. 532 (emphasis added). This lengthy textbook is still classified in Moscow, but a copy was unearthed in Riga by the Latvian scholar Indulis Zalite, who is now head of the Center for Documentation of the Consequences of Totalitarianism, a leading research institute in Riga. He generously allowed me to photocopy it and many other Soviet KGB documents that are currently inaccessible in Moscow.

⁸¹ “Plenum TsK KPSS, oktyabr’ 1957 goda: Stenogramma tret’ego zasedaniya (utrennego),” in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 266, L. 60.

⁸² “Rech’ tov. N. S. Khrushcheva na plenum TsK KPSS, 29 oktyabrya 1957 g.,” 29 October 1957 (Strictly Secret), in “plenum TsK KPSS, oktyabr’ 1957 goda: Stenogramma chetvertogo zasedaniya plenuma TsK KPSS,” in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 269, L. 45.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, L. 65. This passage in the verbatim transcript was toned down in the final stenographic account.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Ll. 58-59.

⁸⁵ “Plenum TsK KPSS 28-29 oktyabrya 1957 g. XX Sozyv: Stenogramma vtorgogo zasedaniya,” L. 76.

⁸⁶ “Plenum TsK KPSS, oktyabr’ 1957 goda, XX Sozyv: Stenogramma tret’ego zasedaniya plenuma TsK KPSS, 28-29.10.1957 g.,” in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 268, L. 77.

⁸⁷ See the comments to this effect in “Rech’ tov. N. S. Khrushcheva,” Ll. 5-6.

⁸⁸ Malinovskii, who had been a first deputy minister during Zhukov’s tenure, started his remarks with a positive observation (saying that “he had no ill feelings toward Com. Zhukov” and had

“always gotten along well” with him), but then offered a highly critical assessment. “Plenum TsK KPSS, oktyabr’ 1957 goda, XX Sozyv: Stenogramma vtorgogo zasedaniya plenuma TsK KPSS,” 28 October 1957 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 267, Ll. 63-64.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, L. 64.

⁹⁰ “Plenum TsK KPSS, oktyabr’ 1957 goda, XX Sozyv: Stenogramma pervogo zasedaniya plenuma TsK KPSS,” 28 October 1957 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 266, Ll. 123-124.

⁹¹ See, for example, the speeches recorded in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, Dd. 267, 268, and 269.

⁹² “Rech’ tov. N. S. Khrushcheva,” Ll. 4-5.

⁹³ “Materialy k Protokolu No. 5 zasedaniya plenuma TsK KPSS 28-29. 10. 1957 g.,” in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 261. The drafts of the closed letter, “Zakrytoe pis’mo Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS ko vsem partiinym organizatsiyam predpriyatii, kolhozov, uchrezhdenii, partiinym organizatsiyam Sovetskoii Armii i Flota, k chlenam i kandidatam v chleny Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza,” are found on Ll. 99-122ob.

⁹⁴ “Prikaz Ministra oborony SSSR No. 0090, 12 maya 1956 g., o sostoyanii voinskoi distsipliny v Sovetskoii Armii i Voenno-Morskoi Flote i merakh po ee ukreplenyu,” 12 May 1956 (Top Secret), signed by G. Zhukov and V. Sokolovskii, in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 261, Ll. 31-35.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, L. 32.

⁹⁶ Herbert Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1975), pp. 141-169.

Central Committee Plenums, 1941-1966: Contents and Implications

By Gael Moullec

Since the collapse of the USSR, the doors of the Soviet archives are partially open to Russian and foreign researchers and we can say that the balance sheet is, for today, “on the whole, positive.” At the same time, however, faced with the multiplicity and diversity of meticulous scientific publications,¹ the historian has the right to ask: Is Soviet history hiding collections of unedited documents, worthy of publication in full?

In order to better grasp the importance of this question, we must keep in mind the fact that we are studying a system that made a veritable religion of secrecy. Currently, we are only in possession of very weak documentation on Soviet decision-making and on the exact terms of the decrees adopted at the top of the State-Party pyramid. In contrast to historians of France, we have neither an official journal nor a complete anthology of laws. Thus, after five years of a democratic regime, the collection of the joint decisions of the Soviet Central Committee and Council of Ministers is still stamped “for official use” and doesn’t include any secret decisions, clearly the most important ones.² Still more serious, the titles, (let alone the texts) of Politburo resolutions made after 1953 have not yet been declassified and the preparatory materials for these resolutions (notes, reports, etc.) remain inaccessible in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF).

Happily, in February 1995, the files containing the documents of the plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the VKP(b)-CPSU³ which took place between 1941 and 1966 were declassified and transferred from the APRF to the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD).⁴

[A chronological classification of plenum files follows and can be found in the CWIHP Electronic Bulletin.]

Four major themes run through the plenum materials. The first has to do with major reports about the economic life of the country, especially agricultural reforms. Thus, we note the importance of the plenary session of 23 February to 2 March 1954 dedicated to the development of the “virgin lands” of northern Kazakhstan, of Siberia, of the Altai, and of the southern Urals. Less than a year later, at the 25-31 January 1955 plenum, Khrushchev returned again to the necessity of launching a major campaign to grow corn. In addition to agricultural reform, Khrushchev’s project also emphasized expanding the production of consumer goods. In this respect, the 6-7 May 1958 plenums sanctioned the reorientation of the chemical industry towards the production of synthetic

material to meet the needs of the population. This subject deserves a special study of its own.

These transcripts also offer a view into the inner-workings of the *nomenklatura*. Personnel changes at the head of the Soviet Party and State resulted in particularly violent settlements of accounts. Strong language was employed to discredit adversaries in the eyes of the Party “Parliament” which at least on paper made the final decision regarding the nomination and dismissal of leaders. Plenum transcripts concerning the dismissal of Beria, the demise of the antiparty group, and the removal of Khrushchev have already appeared in the journal *Istoricheskii archiv*.⁵ Therefore I use as an example the dismissal of Bulganin, decided by the 26 March 1958 plenum without even a hint of discussion. During the 5 September 1958 plenum, Suslov returned to this issue in order to justify this decision, certainly imposed by the Presidium on a Central Committee that possibly still needed convincing.

[The full citation is available on the CWIHP website.]

Another aspect of these transcripts is to present, from the inside, the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. One cannot hope to find in these transcripts “revelations” on the diverse interventions of Soviet troops which adorned the period or on major international crises. These subjects are part of the “private preserve” of the Politburo and they never directly appear in the plenum debates. These documents, however, do furnish us with supplementary information about specifics of Soviet foreign policy. An example of this is the angry altercation given below between Khrushchev and Molotov during the 4-12 July 1955 plenum devoted to the results of the Soviet-Yugoslav discussions.⁶

[The citation is available on the CWIHP website.]

The question of Soviet-Chinese relations was also broadly discussed during the 13-16 July 1960 plenums on the eve of the withdrawal of Soviet experts from China. [Ed. note: On this, see Chen Jian, “A Crucial Step Toward the Sino-Soviet Schism: The Withdrawal of Soviet Experts from China, July 1960” in *CWIHP Bulletin* 7, pp. 246-250.] More than Suslov’s report on the ideological differences between the two parties, it is the statements of Khrushchev which clarified the lack of understanding between Mao and the Soviet leader.⁷

Finally, these transcripts also shed some light on more specific questions about the organization of cultural life in

the Soviet Union, the circuitous route that a non-conformist manuscript had to follow to be published, and the resistance of certain sectors to all forms of change.

Khrushchev: A number of you have most certainly read the novel by Solzhenitsyn, *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, published in the last issue of *Novyi Mir*⁸ ...

[A few months ago] Comrade Tvardovskii, the editor in chief of *Novyi Mir*, sent me a letter and the manuscript of this new author, and asked me to read it. I read it, and it seemed to me that it was worth publishing the manuscript. I gave the manuscript to other comrades and asked them to read it. A little while later, I met these comrades and asked them their opinion: they were quiet [movement in the room].

They didn't say that they were against it—no, nobody said anything openly—they simply said nothing. But me, the First Secretary, I realized what this really means and I convened them to review the situation.

One discussant said to me, “We should be able to publish it, but there are certain passages ...”

I said to him: “We ban books precisely because they have this type of passage. And if it didn't have such passages, the editor in chief wouldn't have asked our opinion. Which passages bother you?”

-Yes, he said, the [security] organ officials are presented in a bad light.

-What do you want, it was exactly these people who were the executors of the orders and the wishes of Stalin. Ivan Denisovich dealt with them and why would you want him not to talk about it? Moreover, Ivan Denisovich does not have the same sentiment towards all of these people. In this novel, there is also the moment where the captain of the ship, the second rank captain, this Soviet sailor, who finds himself in a camp just because an English admiral sent him a watch as a souvenir, says to the head of the camp, Beria's henchman: “You don't have the right, you're not a real Soviet, you are not a communist.”

Buinovskii, this communist sailor, speaks on behalf of the prisoners, to a soulless being and calls for justice in calling to mind the high standards of communism. What has to be softened here? If we have to make it milder, and take this away, then nothing will remain of this novel.

Following that, I asked the members of the Presidium to read *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* and we reached a consensus: we had the same positive opinion of this work as Comrade Tvardovskii ... Why did certain of our comrades fail to understand the positive contribution of Solzhenitsyn's book? Because once more we have before us some people branded by the period of the personality cult, and they haven't yet freed themselves from it, and that's all ...⁹

This brief overview of the broad range of questions raised by these transcripts testifies to their importance for a better understanding of the last four decades of the Soviet Union. Publication and a complete study of this body of

documents would permit us, to borrow the apt expression that Nicolas Werth applied to the 1930s, “to scrape off the many layers of vagueness, of factual error, and of hypotheses based on second-hand accounts, [the very source] on which the history of the USSR had been founded.”¹⁰

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[Translated from French by Christa Sheehan Matthew]

¹ See, e.g., *Stalin's Letters to Molotov* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1995); *Stalinskoe Politbiuro v 30-e gody* [Stalin's Politburo During the 1930s] (Moscow, AJRO-XX, 1995); *The “Special Files” for I.V. Stalin*, (Moscow, Blagovest, 1994); N. Werth, G. Moullec, *Rapports secrets soviétiques (1921-1991)* [Secret Soviet Reports], *La société russe dans les documents confidentiels* [Russian Society Revealed in Confidential Documents] (Paris: Gallimard, 1994); *Neizvestnaia Rossiia XX vek, Arkhivi, Pis'ma, Memuary, Istoricheskoe nasledie*, [The Unknown Russia in the 20th Century: Archives, Letters, Memoirs, Historical Heritage] (Moscow, vol. 1: 1992, vol. 2: 1992, vol. 3: 1993); also the reviews of *Istoricheskii arkhiv* [Historical Archives] and *Istochnik* [Sources].

² See, e.g., *Postanovleniia Soveta Ministrov SSSR za oktiabr' 1981*, No. 957-1051. *Dlia sluzhebnogo pol'zovaniia* [The Decisions of the Soviet Council of Ministers in October 1981] [for official use]. Also decisions No. 961 (On Obligatory Insurance) and No. 964 (Nomination of the Vice-Minister of Energy) are in this collection; decisions 962 and 963 are not included.

³ We review here the definitions given by Soviet works: “The Central Committee of the CPSU: supreme organ of the Party in the interval between two congresses. It is elected by the congress. It elects the Politburo of the Central Committee, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and the Secretary General of the Central Committee.” [*Sovetskii Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar'*, p. 1483] “Plenum of the Central Committee: plenary meeting of the Central Committee. It meets at least once a semester to resolve the political questions that are of the utmost importance for the Party” [*Sovetskii Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar*, p. 1025].

⁴ See essay by Mark Kramer in this issue for full list of plenums and fond numbers.

⁵ “Poslednaia antipartiinaia grupa” [The Last Antiparty Group], *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 2-3-4-5-6 (1993).

⁶ TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 180, ll. 132-202. A Soviet delegation led by Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoian went to Yugoslavia from 26 May to 3 June 1955. This was the first visit of Soviet leaders since the 1948 rupture of relations between the two countries. On the rupture, see, *The Cominform, Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1994).

⁷ TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 469.

⁸ The novel was published in the journal *Novyi mir* 11 (November 1962).

⁹ CC Plenum 19-23 November 1962, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 623, l. 990b.

¹⁰ See the preface of N. Werth in O. Khlevniuk, *The Kremlin's Circle, Stalin and the Politburo in the 1930s*.

CPSU Plenums, Leadership Struggles, and Soviet Cold War Politics

by *Vladislav M. Zubok*

The transcripts of plenums of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is perhaps the most valuable collection released during the second (after 1991-92) declassification campaign in the Russian archives. Pressure from central media and his approaching re-election campaign made Russian President Boris Yeltsin deliver on his promise to transfer documents of “historical” value from the closed Kremlin archive (now the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation) to the open state archives for public scrutiny and publication. In fulfillment of Yeltsin’s decree of September 1994, no less than 20,000 files arrived at the Russian Center for the Study and Preservation of Documents of Contemporary History (RTsKhIDNI) and the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD). Among them are the files of CPSU plenary meetings (plenums) declassified in February 1995, organized as “Fond 2,” and made available in the fall of 1995 in the TsKhSD reading room. This event brought surprisingly little attention in the press, so several months passed before researchers took notice of it.

The significance and role of CPSU plenums varied dramatically: in the early years of the Bolshevik regime they were reminiscent of the Jacobean club with its lively and sometimes vituperative debates. The Stalin plenums, along with Party congresses, became stages for the orchestrated character assassination of “deviationists,” yet only at the February-March 1937 plenum, the last of any political significance, did Stalin manage to crush the lingering resistance of the Bolshevik political elite to his absolute tyranny and continuing purges.¹ The next plenum known for its political drama took place only in October 1952, when Stalin feigned an attempt to resign, then before the stunned audience he denounced his staunchest, most senior lieutenants, Viacheslav Molotov and Anastas Mikoian, and excluded them from a proposed new political structure, the Bureau of the Presidium.²

In the years after Stalin’s death the plenum’s importance increased. Stalin’s former lieutenants, the oligarchs of the regime, mauled and bruised each other, seeking to change the power balance by appealing to the party and state elites, heads of the central CPSU apparatus, secretaries of regional party committees, leaders of powerful branches of the economic, military and security structures. Khrushchev’s son Sergei concluded that “in June 1957 [as a result of the plenum on the “anti-party group”] a totally new correlation of forces emerged. For the first time after many years the apparatus...from passive onlooker became an active participant that defined the balance of power.”³ In fact, this happened not just in June 1957, but gradually,

as the CC members recognized the importance of their role in demystifying, dislodging, and dismissing formidable oligarchs to the political profit of the half-baffoon N.S. Khrushchev. After Khrushchev’s ouster there was yet another period of “collective leadership” during which Kremlin infighting continued into the late 1960s, ending only with the victory of Leonid Brezhnev.

The “thirty-year rule” embedded in Russian legislation on secrecy allowed the release of plenum files up to 1966. Most of the documents contain copies of stenographic minutes of discussions that had been sent by the CC General Department to all members of the Secretariat and Politburo as well as other plenum speakers so that they could insert their corrections. After that, additional editing was done by professional editors and the copies were published in bound volumes for internal consumption. It is therefore possible to see to what extent the initial “unvarnished” discussion changed in the process of editing. In general, there was no deliberate policy to distort or excise texts (with a few important exceptions to which I will return later). In quite a few cases some speakers objected to cuts and editorial remarks and reinserted the passages from the verbatim transcripts. The guiding principle in this editorial game was, no doubt, political opportunism and (for some) ideological correctness.

The first important plenum reflecting the power struggle after Stalin’s death is the one devoted to the “Beria affair” in July 1953. It was published in 1991 in “*Vestnik TsK KPSS*” [CC CPSU News] and then translated into English and published in the United States by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.⁴

After Beria’s removal the next to fall was Georgii Malenkov who had first slipped in March 1954 when he made a controversial statement in his “electoral” speech that nuclear war might bring about the end of civilization. He was roundly criticized for this by Molotov and Khrushchev. However, this criticism did not leave the narrow confines of the CC Presidium. Only when the fate of Malenkov had been decided by political intrigues and coalition-building, his “sins” became a subject for discussion at the plenum on 31 January 1955. The scenario, like that of the “Beria affair” is easily recognizable: in fact, its prototype had been honed to perfection by Stalin and his assistants during the “party deviations” struggle in the second half of the 1920s. The victorious group, that is Khrushchev and Molotov, revealed, with well-rehearsed indignation, facts and judgments that led them to believe that Malenkov was unfit to occupy the leadership position.

Then a chorus of supporting voices chimed in. But in contrast to Beria's affair, where the object of criticism was safely incarcerated in a military prison on the other side of the Moscow River, Malenkov could speak, and in the comparatively open spirit of the times, even attempted to defend himself.

Malenkov: I have no right to not say that I was wrong, when in April or May [of 1953], during the discussion of the German question, I believed that in the existing international situation, when we had started a big political campaign ["peace initiative" after Stalin's death—trans.], we should not have put forward the task of socialist development in Democratic Germany [i.e. the GDR—trans.] in the question of Germany's reunification.¹¹

I viewed this question at that time from a tactical side. I fully understand that defending this view essentially is politically harmful, politically dangerous, incorrect. And I did not adopt such a position. The decision that was passed at that time at the suggestion of comrade Molotov I consider to be the correct one.

Bulganin: At that time you thought it was incorrect.

Malenkov: In the course of discussion I considered it to be incorrect.

Bulganin: You then said: For how long will we feed ourselves with the cud from Molotov's mouth, why do you read Molotov's lips.

Malenkov: You must have confused my words with Beria's.

Khrushchev: You simply lack courage even now to admit it, and Bulganin told me about [your words] exactly at that time.

Malenkov: Today I admit that I essentially took a wrong position on the German question.

Most remarkably, the Plenum transcript confirms that two leaders of the ruling triumvirate, and not only Beria, proposed to renounce the slogan of "socialist" Germany. This could hardly be "a confession" of the kind elicited by torture and terror in Stalin's times, although Malenkov must have been filled with dread when placed in the same category with "the spy and traitor" Beria, who wanted, according to the verdicts of the July 1953 plenum, to sell the GDR to the imperialists. Hence, his lame explanation that his support of Beria's proposal was dictated only by tactical expediency. [Ed. Note: After all, Malenkov would be the first top leader to be demoted in a non-fatal manner. But there was no way to know of this distinction in advance.]

After just six months of relative peace, infighting within the Presidium spilt over again onto the plenum floor. Khrushchev's growing annoyance with Molotov's seniority and the fact that Molotov was the permanent critic of Khrushchev's foreign and domestic initiatives led to frictions in February-April 1955 over the conclusion of

a peace treaty with Austria and, to a real showdown over Khrushchev's decision to reconcile with Tito's Yugoslavia. Molotov had since 1953 given lip service to the idea of "normalizing state relations" with Yugoslavia, while treating "the Tito clique" there as renegades of the communist movement. Khrushchev, however, insisted that there should be an attempt to bring Yugoslavia back into the communist camp. Molotov finally agreed to a trip of the Soviet party-state delegation to Yugoslavia in April 1955, but refused to support the resolution on the results of the visit and, according to his accusers, threatened "to go to the plenum" to explain his dissent,⁵ but Khrushchev and his growing camp of supporters pilloried Molotov. Again, in the best traditions of Stalinist politics, everyone had to spit on the fallen leader, only Klement Voroshilov among the Presidium members attempted to protect his old friend Molotov from the pack of party wolves.⁶

The July 1955 plenum was a remarkable discussion, for such a large forum, of underlying principles, aims, and tactics of Soviet foreign policy. Perhaps it was the most extensive airing of such topics for the entire period of the Cold War. Khrushchev defended his initiative on Yugoslavia from two angles—geo-strategic and political: "The United States of America has in mind for a future world war, as in the past war, to let others fight for them [chuzhimi rukami], let others spill blood for them, with the help of equipment supplied to future 'allies.' Knowing the combative mood of the Yugoslav people...American top brass considered that the Yugoslavs, along with the Germans, could be a serious force that could be used against the Soviet Union. It is known that in an emergency Yugoslavia is capable of mobilizing from 30 to 40 divisions."⁷

Besides this concern about the Yugoslavs as a factor in the future, Khrushchev evoked memories of World War II, so important for the vast majority of the people in the audience: he indignantly reminded them that the Yugoslav communists were the only force that fought the Nazis right until 1944, only to be rewarded with excommunication from the communist camp in 1948.⁸

Although Khrushchev had won the power game against Molotov even before the plenum began, it was not enough. The man had been a member of Lenin's Secretariat and Politburo, the second most respected and visible politician in the Soviet Union for at least two decades—therefore it was necessary to destroy his *political* authority in the eyes of the elite gathering. The Khrushchev group was prepared to do it by all means, including ideological polemics. Their goal was to prove that Molotov became hopelessly dogmatic and lost touch with the "ever-evolving and live" ideology of Marxism-Leninism. But the old party horse Molotov was unusually well prepared for this kind of battle and delivered a broadside of Lenin quotations.

In the political discussion about Titoism, Molotov also held strong cards. His main thesis was about the political danger of the Yugoslav version of "nationally-oriented

socialism” for the Soviet empire in the past and the future. He made it clear that Stalin’s reaction against Tito was not a costly mistake, as Khrushchev maintained, but an absolutely rational preemptive measure against the growing threat of nationalist deviations in the communist camp, led by the Soviet Union. “Nationalist vacillations took place in other communist parties. For instance, in Poland—Gomulko (sic), then the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party. It is easy for all of us to understand how dangerous and negative such a nationalist deviation [*uklon*] can be, if it contaminated the leadership of the Polish United Workers Party. As we know, the Polish population is one and a half times as large as Yugoslavia’s population. One should keep in mind other countries as well.”⁹

Ultimately the most effective weapon of Khrushchev against Molotov proved to be neither ideological, nor political theses, but something else. First, he made revelations of Molotov’s “errors” in the past and thereby demystified his aura as a world statesman. If Stalin’s aura had to be damaged in the process, so much the better. At one point, irked by the cold logic of Molotov’s presentation on the dangers of Yugoslav-style national-communism, Khrushchev burst out:

Khrushchev: Viacheslav Mikhailovich, if you, as minister of foreign affairs, analyzed a whole series of our steps, [you would see that] we mobilized people against us. We started the Korean War. And what does this mean? Everyone knows this.

[Anastas] Mikoian. Aside from our people, in our country.

Khrushchev. Here, Viacheslav Mikhailovich, this must be borne in mind; everything must be understood, everything analyzed, [and] only then can one come to the correct conclusion. We started the war. Now we cannot in any way disentangle ourselves. For two years there has been no war. Who needed the war?...¹⁰

This exchange appeared in the final version of the stenographic report distributed among the party elite, but the passage about “who started the Korean War” disappeared. Presumably, somebody reminded Khrushchev of the complications this revelation might cause for relations with North Korea and the People’s Republic of China.

In another exchange, Khrushchev, in the heat of debate, blurted out what was beginning to dawn on him regarding the role of Stalin in Soviet foreign policy. In April 1955 during his visit to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev still professed to believe that the Soviet-Yugoslav split had been caused by the machinations of the “Beria-Abakumov gang.” The transcript of the plenum discussion reveals what really was on the mind of the Soviet leadership.

Molotov: In a discussion of this issue in the CC Presidium, some doubt was expressed in relation to the awkwardness and incorrectness of the given explanation.

However, the following arguments followed in defense of the given explanation of the reasons for the rupture: that if we did not say that the main reason was Beria’s and Abakumov’s intrigues, then the responsibility for the rupture would fall on Stalin, and that was impermissible.

These arguments should not be accepted.

Khrushchev. On Stalin and Molotov.

Molotov. That’s new.

Khrushchev. Why is it new?

Molotov. We signed the letter on behalf of the party CC.

Khrushchev. Without asking the CC...¹¹

Molotov. Com. Khrushchev is speaking imprecisely [*netochno*].

Khrushchev. I want once again to repeat: I was not asked, although I [was] a member of the Politburo.

Only eight months later, in February 1956 Khrushchev attacked Stalin for his mistakes and crimes, but then he spared Molotov. [Ed. note: For Khrushchev’s second secret speech given in Warsaw in March 1956, see below in this *Bulletin* section.] De-Stalinization was a turning point in the history of international communism and the Soviet Union itself. Yet, plenums did not play any noticeable role in this revolutionary development. Khrushchev chose a larger forum, the party congress, to deliver his speech against Stalin. Growing reaction to Khrushchev’s political radicalism and growing ambitions reflected itself, for a time, in heated discussions within the CC Presidium which, with the exception of the debates on the 1956 Polish and Hungarian crises, are still hidden from historians’ eyes. [Ed. Note: For “Malin notes” on 1956 Presidium meetings regarding Poland and Hungary, see *CWIHP Bulletin* 8-9 (Winter 96-97)]

Khrushchev’s rivals correctly feared that his combination of populist style, control over the KGB, military support from Marshal Georgii Zhukov, and the pivotal position as head of the party machinery would soon reduce all adversaries. Materials from the June 1957 plenum published in the Russian journal *Istoricheskii arkhiv* [*Historical Archive*] in 1993-94, offer a remarkable insight into the final stage of the post-Stalin power struggle and reveal the nature of Khrushchev’s victory.¹² The opposition, particularly Molotov blamed Khrushchev for destroying the “collective leadership” and monopolizing decision-making on all issues, from economy to diplomacy. Molotov attempted to direct Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin against its author by warning about a new cult of personality and wondering out loud where the radical de-Stalinization could lead.¹³ Molotov disparaged Khrushchev’s new doctrine that an agreement between the two nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, could be a solid foundation for an international détente.¹⁴ He stated his belief that a next world war could be “postponed and prevented,” even while there still existed war-spawning “imperialism.” Besides, said

Molotov, “this formula of com. Khrushchev ignores all other socialist countries, besides the USSR. However, one should not ignore the People’s Republic of China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and other communist countries.”¹⁵

In one instance Molotov was right on the mark: radical de-Stalinization and the new doctrine of “peaceful coexistence” did annoy the Chinese leadership and the pressure from within the communist camp forced

Khrushchev on a number of occasions to make drastic, if only momentary, detours from his preferred policies. One was during the Hungarian crisis on 19-30 October 1956, when Khrushchev had to cave in, at first, to Beijing’s insistence that Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Hungary and the practice of “great power chauvinism” with regard to Eastern Europe in general should be renounced in words, if not in deeds. Molotov reminded the plenum of another episode, when Khrushchev had to

Eisenhower, “Open Skies” and Khrushchev’s Global “Peace Offensive” : New Evidence from the 6th Polish Party Plenum (20 March 1956)

[Ed.Note: Although Khrushchev’s speech to the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party was, in largest part, devoted to Stalin, the First Secretary of the CC CPSU also found time to discuss the international situation in a frank manner with the Polish comrades. A longer excerpt regarding Stalin is elsewhere in this section. One can only speculate about the relationship between Eisenhower’s request to “Ask Zhukov” and the role of “Open Skies” in Zhukov’s dismissal 19 months later. On this, see next page.]

“Concerning the propositions of Mr. [US President Dwight D.] Eisenhower and “open skies,” among us I tell you, that we tell the Americans that this proposition deserves some attention. But [strictly] among us, I tell you, it deserves attention so that it can be thrown into the garbage. What does it mean to fly? What do you think—nothing else better to do.....this is nonsense. Its only advantage is to avoid concrete propositions about the reduction of arms. They gave us nonsense and they are trying to confuse us.

I’m not letting you in on a secret. I said it to Eisenhower as soon as he finished his presentation, when we met at the buffet which he organized for the meeting. We had a glass of cognac and he asks me: “So?” And I told him: “In my opinion, your proposition is no good.” “Why?” “Because it does nothing good. All you are proposing is nonsense.” He replied: “Well, maybe the military judge it differently. Let’s ask Marshal [and Minister of Defense Georgii] Zhukov. What will he say?” And I said: “Ask Zhukov, let him judge. If such things were done during the war, right before the attack.....Comrade [Marshal Konstantin] Rokossowski.....then you have to know where.....during the war and for sometime since.....then we already cannot imagine, because the enemy can always re-group his troops or use camouflage and then totally confuse us. But, what do you think, if we want to show you a factory then we can show you some kind of dummy; different lighting and you’ll photograph it all, and what will you get? It will be an empty place. But, we can do it, and you can do it, so why should we do such nonsense. Someone can ask, then why did we write that this proposition deserves attention? Because this capitalist language is such that you cannot just say, to hell with it. You have to say that this problem demands deep investigation, and will be discussed.....follow the rule, and it was written like this.....

I think we have very good prospects on this matter [dealing with the capitalists] and we will, with pleasure, conduct the discussion with [Nikolai] Bulganin in London, with [British Prime Minister Anthony] Eden, and other friends. We are placing great hopes on the arrival of [French President Guy] Mollet and [Foreign Minister Christian] Pineau, and the delegation from the [French] Socialist Party, which shows that we have achieved so many contacts.

Of course, comrades, I have to tell you that we correctly understand our position and our responsibility. We have to smartly lead this policy and move toward disarmament. But, we should never cross the line, which would endanger the survival of our conquests. We have to do everything to strengthen defense, to strengthen the army. Without these things, nobody will talk to us. They are not hiding the fact that they have the hydrogen bomb, nuclear arms, and jet-propulsion technology. They know that we have all these things, and therefore, they have to talk to us, fight with us; but not be afraid.....this is a game, in which nobody will be a winner. If Lenin would arise he would have been pleased to see his cause become so strong, that the capitalistic world admits being unable to win the war against the socialist countries.

Comrades, this is the power of Marxist-Leninist teaching. We did not work for nothing; not for nothing used the strength of this form of government. Therefore, we must continue working. We must work, work, work to reduce the troops and increase defense, Comrade Rokossowski. It is difficult to agree with marshals on this matter, they’re rather hot-tempered.

Right now, we have to work on the demoralization of their camp. The demoralization of NATO, the Baghdad pact, SEATO. I think we have a great opportunity to carry it out. And the stop of Comrade [Anastas] Mikoian stirred up everybody, his trip to Karachi. Yesterday morning, he flew out to Pakistan.”

[Source: AAN (Archiwum Akt Nowych, Archive of Modern Records), PZPR 2631 Materiały do stosunków partyjnych polsko-radzieckich z lat 1956-1958, “Przemówienie tow. Chruszczowa na VI Plenum K.C.,” k. 14-87 Translated from Russian by L.W. Gluchowski.]

praise Stalin in the presence of Zhou Enlai, during a visit of the Chinese delegation to Moscow in January 1957, but “after Zhou Enlai left, we stopped [praising Stalin].”¹⁶ Finally, Molotov could not contain his disdain for Khrushchev’s homespun style of diplomacy, particularly his use of inappropriate words and what he called lack of “dignified behavior” in meeting foreigners. As an example, Molotov mentioned that Khrushchev spent a whole night with Finnish President Urkho Kekkonen in a Finnish sauna, naturally without a jacket and a tie!¹⁷

Anastas Mikoian gave the most consistent rebuff to the opposition. He recalled the recent series of crises in Poland, Hungary and Egypt and concluded that both the unity of the Soviet leadership and Khrushchev’s bold initiatives contributed to their successful resolutions. In a most revealing insight into a little known dimension of Soviet Cold War policies, Mikoian gave a detailed account of the discussions in the Presidium about trade and economic relations with East bloc countries as well as with neutral Austria and Finland. He blamed Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich for a narrow, purely budgetary, approach to the issue of foreign policy. Khrushchev, on the contrary, regarded foreign trade and subsidies to these countries as a vital necessity, dictated by Soviet security interests. “We believe we must create an economic base for our influence on Austria, to strengthen its neutral status, so that West Germany would not have a [economic and trade] monopoly in Austria.” And as to the Soviet bloc, “if we leave East Germany and Czechoslovakia without [purchase] orders, then the entire socialist camp will begin to collapse.”¹⁸

Yet support of the majority of the plenum for Khrushchev was not dependent on considerations of “high policy” and the strategies of the Cold War. Rather most of delegates wanted to get rid of the oligarchs and the sense of fear, stress and subservience that had been prevalent for so many years. Career considerations mattered as well: members of the CC, particularly the Secretaries were not much younger than the oligarchs and had waited too long to switch from the junior league to the top league. One of them complained that Molotov “still considers us as wearing short pants.”¹⁹ These complaints, repeated, among many, by CC Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, reflected the drive that in 1964 propelled the younger group of Stalin’s appointees to power.

The 28-29 October 1957 plenum that discussed the “Zhukov affair” crowned Khrushchev’s ascent to power. The plenum transcripts do not shed much light on the murky details of this affair, but indicate that there were enough “grave” (at least in the immediate post-Stalinist atmosphere pregnant with power struggle) reasons for Khrushchev to suspect that the minister of defense Georgii Zhukov together with the head of the GRU Shtemenko were plotting against him. Of greater relevance for Cold War historians, the plenum gives some valuable insights into the thinking and discussions at the highest level of the Soviet political-military leadership. For instance, head of

the General Staff Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii said that:

Sokolovskii: Zhukov insisted [in 1955-57] on granting “open skies” for Americans to fly over our territory, over our country, i.e. to create a situation that would give Americans certain superiority in intelligence. I must say that the Americans do not know our coordinates [of our military objects]. Maps do not reflect the truth [*ne skhodiatsia*]. They cannot bomb our cities with precision. This is absolutely definitive and absolutely clear. The General Staff opposed [Zhukov’s proposal], insisting that this should not be done. Nevertheless, Zhukov confused [Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei] Gromyko and together with Gromyko sent to the CC proposals so that Americans could fly over our territory and make aerial reconnaissance.”

Khrushchev: I should correct. Gromyko did not sign [this proposal]. Zhukov signed it alone. Gromyko opposed it.

Sokolovskii: I know very well that, at the suggestion of Nikita Sergeevich, the Presidium rejected [*zabrakoval*] this proposal of com. Zhukov.”²⁰

The importance of the plenum discussions for Cold War studies should not be underestimated. Not only do they recreate almost in flesh and blood the atmosphere inside the Soviet ruling elite, but they demonstrate the impact of power struggle on Soviet Cold War behavior. The outcome of this struggle defined the boundaries for decision-making and debates. Once denounced at a plenum, any initiative, be it the one of Beria and Malenkov on “construction of socialism” in East Germany, or Zhukov’s on “open skies” became a taboo, at least for a considerable period of time. The very notion of “state interests” changed as did the names of the Kremlin powerholders. A speech by Andrei Gromyko in July 1955 illustrates this point.²¹ The influence of plenums as an important tool in power struggles also led to the reinforcement of the ideological underpinnings of Soviet foreign policy after Stalin’s death. While rejecting the dogmatism of Molotov and denouncing his and Stalin’s foreign policy errors, plenums, in general, helped to preserve the “ideologized” climate in debating international affairs and military security. Through plenums, as well as through the permanent party apparat permeating all state structures, ideology survived—not as a set of guidelines for action, but as a normative set of assumptions that weighed on the minds of Soviet statesmen during the Cold War. For historians, particularly for those with “realist” perspectives, plenums present a problem that is difficult to ignore—how to factor the “politics” of the Kremlin, together with the relationships inside the communist camp, most crucially the Sino-Soviet and Soviet-Yugoslav relationship, into the explanatory schemes of the Cold War.

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¹ Materialy fevral'sko-martovskogo plenuma TsK VKP(b) 1937 g. [Materials of the February-March CC VKP(b) Plenum of 1937], *Voprosy istorii*, Moscow, 1995, no. 2-8, 10-12.

² See the plenum files in TsKhSD, fond 2, op. 1, dd. 21-22; for substantive recollections on Stalin's speech there (not in the records of the plenum) see Konstantin Simonov, "Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia. Razmishleniia o I.V. Staline" [Through the eyes of a man of my generation. Reflections on I.V. Stalin], *Znamia*, 1988, no. 4, pp. 96-99; Aleksandr Shepilov in *Neizvestnaia Rossiia: XX vek* [Unknown Russia; the twentieth century] (Moscow: Istoricheskoe nasledie, 1992), vol. 1, p. 275.

³ Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev: krizisy i raketi* (Moscow, Novosti, 1994), p. 320.

⁴ D.M. Sickle, *The Beria Affair. The Secret Transcripts of the Meetings Signalling the End of Stalinism*, translated from Russian by Jean Farrow (New York, Nova Science Publishers, Inc, 1992). A researcher Svetlana Savranskaya cross-checked the original transcripts and the published text at the request of the Cold War International History Project and found no major cuts and changes.

⁵ See the speech of A. Mikoian on 11 July 1955, TsKhSD, fond 2, op. 1, d. 174, l. 99.

⁶ His speech on 12 July 1955, TsKhSD, fond 2, op. 1, d. 176, ll. 141-142.

⁷ Khrushchev's speech at the CC CPSU Plenum, 9 July 1955, TsKhSD, fond 2, op. 1, d. 172, l. 87.

⁸ TsKhSD, fond 2, op. 1, d. 172, ll. 88, 100-101.

⁹ Molotov's speech at the CC CPSU Plenum, 9 July 1955, TsKhSD, fond 2, op. 1, d. 173, l. 3.

¹⁰ TsKhSD, fond 2, op. 1, d. 173, l. 40.

¹¹ TsKhSD, fond 2, op. 1, d. 173, l. 4.

¹² "Posledniaia 'antipartiinaia' gruppa. Stenograficheskii otchet iun'skogo (1957) plenuma TsK KPSS" [The last "anti-party" group. Stenographic report of the June 1957 Plenum of CC CPSU], *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, no. 3, 4, 5, 6 (1993) and 1, 2 (1994). This huge document still fails to attract serious attention from historians and Soviet studies experts, although it has already been published in Chinese in full.

¹³ *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 3 (1993), pp. 74-75.

¹⁴ *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 4 (1993), p. 4.

¹⁵ *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 4 (1993), p. 6.

¹⁶ *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 4 (1993), p. 12.

¹⁷ *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 4 (1993), p. 7.

¹⁸ *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 4 (1993), p. 27, 29.

¹⁹ *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 3 (1993), p. 79.

²⁰ TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 1, d. 271, l. 33.

²¹ "I must declare with all the determination of which I am capable that the position of Molotov in this question [on Yugoslavia] is erroneous, profoundly mistaken and does not correspond to the interests of our state...Comrades, in conclusion I must declare with all determination that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only then will become a communist [partiinim] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when it follows the line of the Central Committee of our party." Gromyko's speech at the July 1955 Plenum, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 176, l. 202.

New Sources and Evidence on Destalinization and the 20th Party Congress

By V. P. Naumov

[Ed. Note: Although the Cold War International History Project specializes in the publication of newly-declassified documents, a prerequisite to this activity is knowledge regarding which key materials are likely to emerge from the vault in the near future. Among the best predictors (though far from guaranteed) are citations in the published work of Russian scholars with privileged access. In this respect, as well as for its innate historical value, the appearance of V. P. Naumov's article "Towards a history of N.S. Khrushchev's Secret Report [on 25 February 1956] to the 20th Congress of the CPSU" in *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia* 4 (1996) and its subsequent reprint in German was of exceptional importance.

Although Naumov made use of many new sources, three stand out both for their significance in the context of his article, but also for their potential as resources for scholars working on many aspects of Cold War history. The first is the dictated memoirs of longtime Politburo/Presidium member A. I. Mikoian covering his activities from the 1920s until the ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964.¹ Prior to its transfer to the archives, this folder had been read by only four men: Iu. V. Andropov, M. A. Suslov, K. U. Chernenko and V. A. Pribytkov (Chernenko's top assistant). As featured in *CWIHP Bulletin* 8-9's treatment of the 1956 crisis, with translation and introduction by Mark Kramer, the "Malin notes" offer remarkable "fly-on-the-wall" vision of Presidium decision-making. V. N. Malin, the head of the CC CPSU General Department under Khrushchev, kept notes on the discussions at which he was present, often with verbatim excerpts.² Finally, the original draft of N. S. Khrushchev's secret speech to the 20th Party Congress is a marvelous supplement to the "second secret speech" (See below in this *Bulletin* section) presented by Khrushchev in Poland a month later.³

Below are a few excerpts from Naumov's article.]

Concluding the [1 February 1956 Presidium] discussion, Khrushchev said, we must decide this in the interests of the party. "Stalin," he stressed, "[was] devoted to socialism, but he did everything by barbaric means. He destroyed the party. He was not a Marxist. [Ed. Note: Khrushchev changed his mind on this 180 degrees as can be seen in the "second secret speech," excerpted below in this *Bulletin*.] He wiped out all that is sacred in man. He subordinated everything to his own caprices."

"At the Congress, [we] should not speak of the terror," Khrushchev continued. "It is necessary to clarify the [party] line of giving Stalin his own place [*otvesti Stalin svoe mesto*]." He called for "strengthening the attack on the personality cult."⁴

On 9 February 1956 the CC Presidium heard the report of the Pospelov Commission [on Stalin's crimes]. Mikoian remem-

Continued on page 41

Plenum Transcripts, 1955-1957

[Ed. Note: Thanks to Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie, Leo Gluchowski and Vladislav Zubok for expert translation from Russian. Khrushchev's impromptu remarks are always a special challenge.]

Central Committee Plenum of the CPSU Ninth Session

Morning, 31 January 1955

Khrushchev: ... Comrades, now the issue of Germany of which we spoke [in July 1953].¹ We then calculated, comrade Malenkov, we debated about Beria and Germany, but, I should say here bluntly, if it comes down to this, that comrade Malenkov had been entirely together with Beria on this issue. Voroshilov was not [a supporter of Beria on the German issue], because this issue was discussed not at the CC Presidium, but at the Presidium of the Council of Ministers.² All the members of the CC Presidium, who were members of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, were against [the proposal to abrogate “the construction of socialism in the GDR”], except for Beria and Malenkov. And all argued, comrades. It was a big fight [*bol'shaia draka*]. But what was actually Malenkov's stand? Sometimes a person can get things wrong, can let himself slip in a big issue and this should not always be held against him. But what did Malenkov do when he saw that everyone was against [Beria's proposal] and not only that they voted against it, but argued against it? He continued to fight for this proposal, along with Beria.

Bulganin later calls me, I do not remember, it was a day or two afterwards, and asks: So, have they called you?³ I respond: No, they have not. And they have already called me, he says. First the one, then the other called and warned: if you behave like this and if you read Molotov's lips—since it was about Molotov's proposal [that Beria and Malenkov opposed], well, you would not remain the minister [of Defense] for long. That was the gist [of that conversation]. This is a fact, although I do not know who of the two of them called first. He [Bulganin] asks me—have they called you? I said: they will not call me. Indeed, they did not call. They believed I would come over to their side.

After the session [of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers] there was a talk that if Molotov speaks this way [i.e. stubbornly fights against Beria's proposal on the GDR—trans.], then he should be relegated to be minister of culture. I then said: comrade Malenkov, if there were a proposal to remove Molotov, I would consider this as an attempt [to overthrow the collective] leadership and to smash the leadership of the Presidium.

This is the fact how far [the power struggle] reached. It was no good at all. [*Kuda zhe eto goditsia?*]

Now, comrades, I will speak on [Malenkov's] speech [on 8 August 1953].⁴ We all read it, and I read it, too. It is cheap stuff [*deshovka*]. Malenkov told us later: you read it [before he presented it—trans.]. Yes, we read it. I read it, too. Am I responsible for this speech? Yes, I am, but the author should be a bit more responsible. It is one thing, when you read the speech and it sounds to you sort of fine and even attractive. But the author, who composes it—he is more responsible, since he thinks it [and its implications] through. So, when we later looked at it again and read it, it became clear to us what that speech was driving at. It was designed to buy personal popularity. It was not a leader's speech. It was a truly opportunistic speech. Perhaps comrade [I.F.] Tevosian remembers, when the commission [probably of the Presidium of Council of Ministers or the CC Presidium—trans.] discussed [the production of] “shirpotreb” [consumer goods of great demand—trans.], Malenkov then said: I will not let anybody disrupt this decision. Then I said in passing: Of course, “shirpotreb” is necessary, but we must develop metal and coal industries. Did I say it?⁵

Tevosian: That is correct.

Khrushchev: That's how it was...

Now, about the speech [i.e.] with regard to the destruction of civilization [on 12 March 1954]. He [Malenkov] says again, why, you looked at it [in advance].⁶ He managed to confuse several comrades, because his speech was quoted abroad and our comrades considered it was the line of the Central Committee to a certain extent since Malenkov spoke this way. And we must protect our authority, which is a great authority for brotherly communist parties. That assumption was theoretically incorrect and it did not work to the benefit of our party.

Com. [Semen D.] Ignat'ev is present here. In another two weeks or so, Beria would have probably locked him up, because everything was ready by the moment he was removed.⁷ [Nevertheless] I believe that he [Ignat'ev] was correctly removed from the post of Minister of State Security. He is anybody but the minister of State Security. Do not take offense at me, com. Ignat'ev. You should not have accepted the ministerial post; you are not qualified for it.

Kaganovich: He did not want to accept it.

Khrushchev: He did not want it, but he was offered the post.⁸

I'll speak directly—I do not doubt the integrity of com. Malenkov, but I doubt very much his abilities in

pursuing the [policy] line: he lacks character and backbone [*kharaktera i khrebt ne khvataet*].

I used to say to other comrades, in particular to comrade Molotov: now [in April-May 1953] Churchill is so terribly eager to have a [summit] meeting⁹ and I, by golly, am afraid that if he comes [to Moscow] to speak face to face with Malenkov, then Malenkov would get frightened and surrender. I do not ask comrade Malenkov to prove the opposite, since this cannot be confirmed or proved like a mathematical formula. However, I see that if a person gets confused, if he tries to ingratiate himself, [it means] he lacks character.

This is a serious matter, and I look at it in a straightforward way. The leadership of such a great party, of such a great country, growth and further development [of everything] that has been accumulated by our party, all this will depend, comrades, again on who will stand at the head of the leadership.

...You can see for yourselves what is the situation today, how skillfully the Americans stewed the porridge [*zavarili kashu*] in Taiwan,¹⁰ how they sent [publisher Randolph] Hearst and [other] messengers [to Moscow]. What for? To deafen us, to test if we have guts, if we are nervous or not. This is being done to test us.

Malenkov: I have no right to not say that I was wrong, when in April or May [of 1953], during the discussion of the German question, I believed that in the existing international situation, when we had started a big political campaign [“peace initiative” after Stalin’s death—trans.], we should not have put forward the task of socialist development in Democratic Germany [i.e. the GDR—trans.] in the question of Germany’s reunification.¹¹

I viewed this question at that time from a tactical side. I fully understand that defending this view essentially is politically harmful, politically dangerous, incorrect. And I did not adopt such a position. The decision that was passed at that time at the suggestion of comrade Molotov I consider to be the correct one.

Bulganin: At that time you thought it was incorrect.

Malenkov: In the course of discussion I considered it to be incorrect.

Bulganin: You then said: For how long will we feed ourselves with the cud from Molotov’s mouth, why do you read Molotov’s lips.

Malenkov: You must have confused my words with Beria’s.

Khrushchev: You simply lack courage even now to admit it, and Bulganin told me about [your words] exactly at that time.

Malenkov: Today I admit that I essentially took a wrong position on the German question.

Khrushchev: At that time you and Beria believed you could get away with anything.

Molotov: You should summon your courage and speak more frankly. Even now you beat around the bush

[*pletesh*], even now you prevaricate [*krutish*].

Malenkov: Where exactly?

Molotov: You did not make the distinction between communism and capitalism.

Malenkov: Had we dug deeper, then this question would have been discussed in this way.

Khrushchev: That was how the question was discussed: so what, we had spilt our blood and now we should retreat to the [Polish] borders. If we withdraw behind the Polish borders, then the enemy would say: If they are leaving, then one must chase them to the devil [*k chortovoi materi*]. You took the position of capitulationism, and now you are afraid to admit it...

Pervukhin: [to Malenkov] You have explained nothing about why it happened this way on the German question.

Malenkov: I misunderstood this question from a tactical viewpoint.

Bulganin: Fuzzy...The discussion was about liquidating the GDR and turning it over to Western Germany.

Malenkov: We spoke then about conducting a political campaign on the question of German reunification and I believed that one should not have set the task of the development of socialism in the Democratic Germany.

Molotov: Comrades, we have heard the draft resolution proposed by the Central Committee’s Presidium for approval of the Plenum and we have heard two speeches of comrade Malenkov on this issue. I think that there is a very big difference between them, and to put it simply, both the first and the second speeches of comrade Malenkov are fraudulent. Fakes!

Both the first and the second speeches are not truthful, not quite honest. This is a shortcoming to which I would like to draw your attention. But we must look at this issue fundamentally. Comrades, we are discussing, in essence, a political issue. We should draw lessons from it, to learn certain things for the future.

What is the main fault of comrade Malenkov? It seems (and it is written in the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee that is proposed for your consideration and approval) that the main errors of comrade Malenkov are the following. First: absence of principles in policy-making. Second, carelessness in the realm of theory. This is not simply a mistake, comrades, not simply a drawback: a communist cannot be unprincipled, a leading figure cannot be careless on the questions of theory. It will not do, comrades. I can admit everything: blindness, blindness. But no, it is not blindness, it is the lack of principles. No, it was not blindness, when comrade Malenkov was in cahoots, was inseparable for a decade with that scoundrel Beria. It was not blindness, comrades, but the absence of political principles, and for that he received the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers [from Beria—trans.]. He did not stay in cahoots [with Beria] for free; it was not all that simple an enterprise: Lavrentii and Georgii. Lavrentii and Georgii drank

together, drove in a car together, traveled from dacha to dacha, etc. No, comrades, we should admit that we are dealing with a very profound phenomenon that exists not only inside the CC, but exists even lower: in regional committees, in district committees, but here it took a very dangerous turn, comrades. The absence of principles in party life, particularly for the leader of the whole party, the whole state—this is a dangerous affair. And that comrade Malenkov overlooked criminal tendencies in Beria's activities—this was not a coincidence, not merely blindness. Regarding this blindness we all share the blame, here are all the members of the Presidium—we all were a little bit blind, even too much, since we took Beria until Stalin's death (I am speaking for myself) for an honest communist, even though a careerist, even though a crook, who would frame you up behind your back [*okhulki na ruku ne dast*]. As a careerist, he would not stop at any machinations, but on the surface, he seemed an honest person. I must say that on the day of Beria's arrest, when we sat at the Presidium, and Beria sat in the CC Presidium, here in the Kremlin, I gave a speech: here is a turn-coat [*pererozhdenets*], but comrade Khrushchev turned out to be more correct and said that Beria was not a turn-coat, but he was not a communist and had never been, which is more correct.

(*Voice from the audience*: That is right).

I was convinced myself. This is a more correct, sensible, truthful assessment. He was not a communist, he was a scoundrel, rogue to the core, who insinuated his way into our party, a smart fellow, a good organizer, but he made it to the top, ingratiated himself with comrade Stalin so that his role was very dangerous, not to mention that it was mean and depraved. Yet I must say that I did not take part in the talks between Malenkov and Beria, and they were in communication every day, between them two, and they must have spoken about certain subjects which would make comrade Malenkov blush, but we do not ask him to speak about them.

What happened, comrades? Comrade Stalin's death. We stand at the bed of the sick, dying man. An exchange of opinions would be appropriate, but nobody talks to us. Here are the two [who talk to each other—trans.]—Malenkov and Beria. We sit on the second floor: me, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, and these two are up there. They bring down the prepared, well-formulated proposals, an announcement of the CC, draft decisions of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the composition of the government, the head of the government, of the Ministry [of Security], such and such ministries should be merged, etc. All that was presented to us by Beria and Malenkov. And they were not people of some special tone. We do not need a special tone, but we need the truth, principles, integrity in policy.

So this shortcoming has reached so far that he [Malenkov] did not stand out. He worked as a CC secretary for decades and happened to become Chairman of the Council of Ministries, and we should admit now,

before all the people—we made a mistake, we are removing [him] from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. This is what lack of principles can lead to, but it will not make a home for itself in our party. The party will sort it out and will take measures.

The second shortcoming of comrade Malenkov is carelessness on issues of theory. Comrades, for the leading cadres of the party this is inadmissible. One can not simply say about Marxism—this is wrong, let's turn it upside down; or this is Leninism and this is not; this does not fit; communism or capitalism—let me try communism. What kind of a party leader are you if you do not know on the elementary level which way you are going—towards communism or capitalism—and have to choose. What kind of party secretary are you then? Can such a man be a secretary of a [low-level party] cell? I believe not. In the regional committee, in the district committee there is no place for such a man, not to mention the Central Committee...

Another issue is about the destruction of civilization. This [was] a very dangerous theoretical error. Comrade Malenkov remarked: "I overlooked it." We also fear responsibility for what he said in the speech. But what is this actually about? That allegedly if there were a third world war, atomic war, the conclusion is only one—the death of civilization, the death of mankind. [The French physicist], Joliot Curie, wrote some goddamn gibberish: "the destruction of humankind." When we looked [at his pronouncement—trans.] we did not even know if we should publish it or not. Joliot Curie said, they published it there [abroad]. We reflected on it and finally published it with all that gibberish, because we did not want to put Joliot Curie in an uncomfortable situation. But not only Joliot Curie commits such errors. Read the newspaper "For stable peace, for people's democracy." Comrade Mitin, a CC editor is present here. In the issue dated 21 January of this year the newspaper "For stable peace, for people's democracy" published a speech of comrade [Palmiro] Togliatti [leader of the Italian communist party—trans.] and again [he repeats] the same gibberish, that the war would be the end of civilization. We confused even such outstanding leaders of communism as Togliatti. We have no better than him. This speech [of Malenkov] was politically incorrect, and even today it plays a demoralizing role, although almost a year has passed. We took measures to correct [Malenkov's statement, but nevertheless] comrade Togliatti got himself confused.

That this [statement] is theoretically illiterate is apparent—communists simply should not exist in this world for any other reason than overthrowing capitalism. We have the Communist Manifesto that Marx had written more than 100 years ago. He wrote that the crash of capitalism was nearing and that communism would triumph. And if we, with the countries of people's democracy and with such a powerful mechanism as the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, if we talk our-

selves into admitting that some kind of war allegedly would lead to the end of capitalism and the end of civilization, it means that we do not have our head on our shoulders, but on the totally opposite part of the body (laughter). Therefore, no science, no political considerations can justify [such a statement of Malenkov]. It merely proves how harmful is carelessness in the questions of theory and the lack of principles in politics.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 2, op. 1, d. 127. Translated by Vladislav Zubok.]

¹ Khrushchev is probably referring to the discussion of Beria's role in the debate on the future of Soviet policy in Germany at the July 1953 Plenum [see the publication in *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, no. 1-2, (1991)]. In the following paragraph Khrushchev criticizes Malenkov's position on the "construction of socialism in the GDR" during the meeting of the Soviet leadership on 28 May 1953, when Lavrentii Beria and Viacheslav Molotov presented two rival proposals. Beria suggested renouncing the goal of constructing socialism altogether and, according to some sources, even contemplated a neutral, democratic, bourgeois Germany. The rest of the leadership, however, opposed this proposal and agreed with Molotov who only suggested rejecting the course of "forced" construction of socialism that had been earlier sanctioned by Joseph Stalin for the GDR communist leadership. The debate resulted in the behind-the-scenes negotiations that led to the "New Course" proposals of the Soviet leadership. The following excerpts from Khrushchev's speech at the plenum highlight Malenkov's role in the debate. Khrushchev, clearly for the purpose of undermining Malenkov's authority, "reveals" that he had been supportive of Beria's proposal. On historians' debate about the significance of this episode see: Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War. From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 160-162; James Richter, "Re-examining Soviet Policy Towards Germany in 1953," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 45, no. 4 (1993), pp. 671-691. On Beria contemplating a "neutral reunified" Germany, see Pavel Sudoplatov et al., *Special Tasks*. pp. 363-364.

² Khrushchev makes an important distinction between the two bodies that ruled the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. Malenkov as a chairman of the Council of Ministers presided over the meeting of May 28, while Khrushchev was there only by invitation as a Secretary of the CC. Voroshilov who did not get any important government job in the post-Stalin setup was not apparently invited to the meeting, although he was a member of the CC Presidium (Politburo). Khrushchev's statement generally corroborates the view that immediately after Stalin's death Beria and Malenkov sought to continue Stalin's tradition in putting the state government above the party "collective" decision-making body.

³ "They" meaning Beria and Malenkov. On the details of these behind-the-scenes negotiations and threats, see "Memuary Nikiti Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," *Voprosy Istorii*, no. 2-3 (1992), pp. 93-94; Feliks Chuev, *Sto sorok besed s Molotovym*, (Moscow: Terra, 1990), pp. 332-335.

⁴ In this speech Malenkov proposed substantial measures to improve living standards of Soviet people, particularly the collectivized peasantry, by reducing taxes, increasing the size of private plots of land for peasants' households. He also proposed, for the first time since 1928, to increase investments into "light"

industries' production of consumer goods at the expense of "heavy" industries, producing armaments.

⁵ I.F. Tevosian was a minister of "black" metallurgy and first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. He made his career as one of Stalin's favored "captains" of "industrialization." Khrushchev in this episode poses as a defender of the interests of heavy industry against Malenkov.

⁶ This discussion of yet another "political error" by Malenkov reveals, incidentally, the negligence of the "collective leadership" to peruse carefully routine speeches delivered by all members of the top Soviet leadership who, by the Constitution, had to run for elections for the Supreme Soviet—nominally the highest power of the land. Malenkov said that "a new world war...with modern weapons means the end of world civilization." On the background of Malenkov's remarkable initiative, see David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 337-339; Zubok and Pleshakov, pp. 166-167.

⁷ The sentence is unclear in the Russian original, but Khrushchev talks here about Beria's attempt to make Ignat'ev, minister of the MVD or Internal Security a scape goat for the Kremlin doctors' affair in 1952. In his proposal to the Council of Ministers on 3 April 1953 to free the arrested doctors and close the affair, Beria specifically blamed Ignat'ev and the leadership of the "old" MVD. Later, when he was arrested, this gesture came to be regarded as a clever ruse to earn popularity in the country and to restore Beria's personal control over the secret police machinery. For the text of Beria's proposal and the comments, see G.Kostyrchenko, *V plenu u Krasnogo Faraona*, pp. 358-60.

⁸ Both Khrushchev and Kaganovich confirm that it was Stalin who hand-picked Ignat'ev after he removed and arrested his much stronger predecessors, Beria and Abakumov. See Gennadi Kostyrchenko, *V plenu u krasnogo faraona; Politicheskii presledovaniia evreev v SSSR v poslednee stalinskoe desiatiletie. Dokumental'noe issledovanie*. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie otnosheniia, 1994), pp. 289-357 or the English-language version *Out of the Red Shadows: Anti-Semitism in Stalin's Russia* (Prometheus Books, 1995).

⁹ In April-May 1953 Churchill, before he was incapacitated by a stroke, advocated an early summit of Western powers with Stalin's successors without a definite agenda.

¹⁰ This paragraph contains Khrushchev's reference to the "Taiwan crisis" unleashed by the PRC's leadership in September 1954 with bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu, two offshore islands occupied by the Nationalist troops. The crisis ended on 23 April 1955. American newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst came to Moscow and talked to Khrushchev in 1955.

¹¹ This admission is the first "hard" evidence that Malenkov, along with Beria, was the principal architect of the Soviet "peace initiative" of the Spring of 1953. Although Malenkov adhered here to the infamous party tradition of "self-criticism," in this case he must have told the truth—he denied other "sins," but there was simply no reason for him to frame himself on such a serious issue. For more extensive comment on the significance of Malenkov's statement here, see Vladislav Zubok, "'Unacceptably Rude and Blatant on the German Question': The Succession Struggle after Stalin's Death, Beria and the debate on the GDR in Moscow in April-May 1953," presented at a conference "Das Krisenjahr 1953 und der Kalte Krieg in Europa," Potsdam, 10-12 November 1996.

N.A. Bulganin Address to the Plenum of the CC CPSU 9 July 1955

Bulganin. [Ed. note: Bulganin begins his speech by laying out the 31 May 1954 Presidium resolution on the turn towards friendly relations with Yugoslavia. He then summarizes the positive reactions of key socialist leaders consulted, including Ulbricht, Mao Zedong and others.] As for military potential, we lost the strongest country in Europe. Not one state in Europe has an army like Yugoslavia's, which today has 42 divisions. The Yugoslav army has modern equipment, including artillery, tanks, air power, even jets supplied for free by the Americans.

By its geographical position, Yugoslavia occupies a very important and very vulnerable place for the Soviet Union. If you look at a map, you will see that Yugoslavia has driven a wedge deep into the east. And now imagine future military events. Let's assume that we had to rush our military forces toward the west. In such a case, we would have 40-50 divisions of the Yugoslav army on our left flank.

Khrushchev. Plus American ones.

Bulganin. We would be so pinned down that we would have to send a covering force of at least 70-80 divisions there.

Mikoian. And not on plains, but in the mountains.

Bulganin. And if we must fight in the south...

Khrushchev. With the Turks, for instance. Such a possibility is not ruled out, either.

Bulganin. Yes, such a possibility is not ruled out... Then on our right flank we would have the Yugoslav army with a contingent of 50, and perhaps more, divisions.

Yugoslavia controls the Adriatic Sea, which is connected with the Mediterranean Sea, one of the very important, decisive lines of communication of the Anglo-American military forces, since the Americans and English receive vital strategic raw materials and other sorts of supplies through the Suez canal and across the Mediterranean. Controlling the Adriatic, Yugoslavia threatens the Mediterranean.

It must be remembered how significant this state is.

And, finally, comrades, there are the people and the cadres. The Yugoslavs are superb fighters, superb people, who like us.

Khrushchev. It would be well if com. Molotov looked at these cadres, and saw what sort of people they are, what sort of life path they have traveled...

[Ed. note: Khrushchev and Bulganin then begin to sing the praises of Yugoslav comrades in counterpoint, remembering shared service in the Spanish Civil War, earlier meetings in the USSR, etc.. Discussion then turned to the origins of the split and the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers from Yugoslavia.]

Bulganin. The [Soviet] military and civilian advisers who were told to leave were perplexed. What was going on? They believed that there would be a military confrontation, even war, and some wept.

Khrushchev. Tito told us that when the military advisers left Yugoslavia, some of them wept.

Bulganin. Here, then, comrades, is the reason. There was no mention of internationalism at all. There was pride and ambition. This is how the rupture began. Com. Molotov was there then; he should know.

At the same time [as the withdrawal of advisers] there came a communication from Albania that Tito had decided to move a division into Albania, without having asked Stalin about it. That poured even more oil on the fire. And, finally, the third reason is the one about which com. Molotov spoke, although entirely incorrectly. He correctly depicted the fact, but gave the issue his own evaluation. That is in relation to Trieste. On Trieste, I will say that com. Molotov's position was incorrect both then and recently. [Ed. note: For more on Yugoslav-Albanian relations and the Trieste issue, see the Yugoslavia section of this *Bulletin*.]

Khrushchev. Both the beginning and the end were incorrect.

Bulganin. The beginning was incorrect and the end was especially incorrect. Tito wanted to get Trieste.

Khrushchev. And at that time we wanted Yugoslavia to get Trieste.

Bulganin. But what's wrong here? God grant that he get two Triestes [*Dai bog, chtoby dva Triesta poluchil*], but we objected to it then.

In 1954 there was also a scandal regarding Trieste. In October 1954, under pressure from the Americans and the English, Yugoslavia and Italy agreed on a division of the Trieste zone. The agreement did not wholly satisfy the Yugoslavs, but all the same Tito decided to agree to what they proposed. It would seem that we should have then, at the beginning and in 1954, supported the Yugoslavs and said that we were "for" [it]. But our MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] decided to protest and to submit the issue to the UN; it was said that they were violating the interests of the Soviet Union as an allied power and were undermining our prestige, because they didn't ask us.

In the Presidium it was decided that the MID's point of view was incorrect.

Khrushchev. That was the period when no one was any longer recognizing our allied rights in relation to Trieste.

Bulganin. We did not support MID's proposals, but proposed that we write that the Soviet Union agreed to support the Yugoslavs, for which our Yugoslav comrades thanked us when we were there.

That is how the rupture began. There were no facts to the effect that the Yugoslavs were creeping away from a Marxist-Leninist position, from internationalism, and were taking a nationalist path. There was nothing of the sort. Simply ambition, pride, and only afterwards the letters which you know about were written to the Yugoslavs. Com. Molotov wrote at Stalin's dictation. We all helped however we could.

Khrushchev. And the main material for this de-

scended from the ceiling [*bralsia s potolka*], that is, was thought up.

Bulganin. Yes, the material was a fabrication. It was then that they made fabrications about Marxism-Leninism and nationalism. Let's speak plainly. After all, it was so. I understand that com. Molotov will say that Bulganin is simplifying. I am not simplifying; I am saying how it was. That is how the disagreements with Yugoslavia began, as a result of which we lost the friendship of this country.

Com. Molotov spoke here about 1945, about Trieste. The disagreements started, he said, not in 1948, but back in 1945.

From 1945 to 1948, we lived like great friends with Tito; both during the war and afterward, we had very good relations. Tito visited Moscow. You introduced him to me, com. Molotov; incidentally, together we drove with him to [visit] Stalin. We lived like friends. What sort of conflict did we have with Tito in 1945? There was no conflict. Everything happened in 1948.

I already talked about Albania, and now I will talk about the Balkan federation. Comrade Molotov spoke about how the idea arose, but he forgets that there were witnesses: myself, Mikoian, Malenkov and other members of the Presidium, Kaganovich, Voroshilov; Khrushchev at that time was not there; he was in the Ukraine.

Khrushchev. Yes, I was not there; at that time I was in the Ukraine.

Bulganin. Now com. Molotov is ascribing the Balkan federation to Tito. [Ed. Note: For more on this, see the article by Gibianskii in this *Bulletin*.] But the issue was first raised by Stalin in a conversation with Dimitrov—what if, he said, you united the Balkans, created a federation[?]

Khrushchev. There, in Yugoslavia, they almost built an office building for the federation's institutions, but did not finish it.

Bulganin. You would be supported, said Stalin to Dimitrov; try talking with Tito. Dimitrov went home, visited Tito, spoke with him, and then it [i.e. the federation] got underway [*poshlo*].

Khrushchev. And now he is being accused of straying from Leninism for that.

Bulganin. I state that with all responsibility. Let the other members of the Presidium confirm where the idea came from. Now com. Molotov is foisting the idea on com. Tito.

Malenkov. That's right.

Khrushchev. How is that! They directed such actions by com. Tito against Leninism.

Bulganin. That is how the matter stood. Now I want to speak about Yalta.¹ We were not there. Coms. Stalin and Molotov were there. Was Voroshilov there or not?

Voroshilov. I was not.

Bulganin. How did they divide Yugoslavia between England and the Soviet Union and how did Tito find out about it? This is a major embarrassment. Com. Khrushchev spoke about this in his report, [and] I will not

dwell on it. A tactical conversation [*takticheskii razgovor*] with Churchill took place, but it came into the open.²

Khrushchev. Tito should have been informed in time.

Bulganin. Yes, Tito should have been informed. Churchill divulged the fact in his memoirs, which were recently published.

Khrushchev. The Yugoslav leaders found out from Churchill and not from us what we should have told them

Bulganin. I want to return somewhat to the beginning, when a letter of 31 May 1954 on the Yugoslav issue was written by the CC Presidium. At first we ordered the MID to write the letter. To write a draft and present it to us. Unfortunately, I do not have the text of the letter; com. Suslov has it. If only you knew what sort of letter it was! Com. Zorin wrote it on the order of com. Molotov. I do not know whether he reported on it to Molotov or not. Com. Molotov was then in Geneva. Zorin came to the Presidium and said that he had acquainted com. Molotov [with it] and that he had agreed. In the letter it talked about the necessity of doing a survey on our relations with fascist Yugoslavia. In the letter it was called fascist Yugoslavia, and its leaders, fascists...

On the issue of disarmament, com. Molotov took an incorrect position on the decrease of military forces by a third.

Khrushchev. And even committed a distortion of a CC decision.

Bulganin. Afterwards, the CC Presidium adopted a decision to the effect that our position had to be changed on the issue of cutting armaments. I will speak in greater detail of this. The Soviet proposal on the issue of disarmament, which was being looked into and discussed in different committees of the United Nations, stipulated a reduction in arms and armed forces of the five great powers by one third. The Westerners insisted on a reduction of armed forces to a definite level, because one third, let us say, of five million is one thing, and one third of one million is another. If we cut one third and France cuts one third, that would be different things. From this point of view our position was out of date [*ustarela*].

Khrushchev. That position is unwise.

Bulganin. But for several years we have been chewing [*zhuem*] the same thing over: one third, one third. Com. Gromyko sat on the subcommittee in London for a month and kept reporting that the most ideal thing was cutting by a third. Stupidity!

Khrushchev. Besides himself, he didn't convince anyone there.

Bulganin. In March 1955, the CC Presidium recognized the position of the MID on that issue to be incorrect [*nepravil'noi*] and adopted a resolution to reject that thesis. We said that we should agree with the Westerners as to levels. A directive went to London in fulfillment of our decision. And all of a sudden we read Malik's telegram from London, that he is continuing his line on one third. What was going on? It turns out that in the telegram

which went to London as an instruction from com. Molotov, the following clarification was made: if necessary, if you are asked, what the term “agreed levels” means, you must say that we have in mind a reduction of arms and armed forces by one third. Com. Molotov then excused himself, saying that he had made an oversight, that it was a mistake, but I consider it necessary to speak about this.

[Source: *TsKhSD f.2, op. 1, d. 173, ll. 76 ff.* Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

¹ Ed. Note: In February 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin met in the Palace of Livadia at Yalta in the Crimea to discuss and agree on the postwar order.

² Ed. Note: In October 1944, Churchill and Stalin met in the Kremlin and divided up spheres of influence in Europe, allegedly on the back of an envelope. For details, see Albert Resis, “The Churchill-Stalin Secret ‘Percentages’ Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944,” *American Historical Review* 83 (1977-78) pp. 368-87.

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Evening, 9 July 1955

Bulganin. (Chairman) Com. Molotov has the floor.

Molotov. [Ed. note: Molotov presents the development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations since World War Two for about twenty minutes.] Comrades, the issue of Yugoslavia has great political significance. Obviously, the complex nature of the Yugoslav issue is clear to us all...

If one were to judge by this statement, it would appear that the main reason for the rupture in relations between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) in 1948 was some “materials” which were fabricated by the enemies of the people Beria and Abakumov, and the rest is not worthy of attention.

From what I have said and from a real acquaintance with the materials, one can, however, establish that this statement, which tries to explain the reason for the rupture in relations with the CPY in large part by the hostile intrigues of Beria and Abakumov, does not fit with the factual situation. Beria and Abakumov’s intrigues, without a doubt, played a certain role here, but this was not of chief importance.

The groundlessness of that explanation, it seems to me, is visible from the following:

First, it was incorrect to place the blame for the rupture in relations between the CPSU and the CPY only on our party, while keeping silent about the responsibility of the CPY. This falsely exonerates [*obeliae*] the leadership of the CPY, for which there are no grounds.

Secondly—and this is the important point—it should not be ignored that as the basis of the disagreement

between our party and the leadership of the CPY, there was the fact that the Yugoslav leaders distanced themselves from the principled international positions for which they had stood in the previous period.

In a discussion of this issue in the CC Presidium, some doubt was expressed in relation to the awkwardness and incorrectness of the given explanation. However, the following arguments followed in defense of the given explanation of the reasons for the rupture: that if we did not say that the main reason was Beria’s and Abakumov’s intrigues, then the responsibility for the rupture would fall on Stalin, and that was impermissible.

These arguments should not be accepted.

Khrushchev. On Stalin and Molotov.

Molotov. That’s new.

Khrushchev. Why is it new?

Molotov. We signed the letter on behalf of the party CC.

Khrushchev. Without asking the CC.

Molotov. That is not true.

Khrushchev. That is exactly true [*tochno*].

Molotov. Now you can say whatever comes into your head.

Khrushchev. Without even asking the members of the Politburo. I am a member of the Politburo, but no one asked my opinion.

Molotov. Com. Khrushchev is speaking imprecisely [*netochno*].

Khrushchev. I want once again to repeat: I was not asked, although I [was] a member of the Politburo.

Molotov. You must not forget that the basic and real reason for the rupture was the move of the leadership of the CPY from a position of communism to a position of nationalism, and not just someone’s intrigues which, of course, also played their role.

Did such a departure by the Yugoslav leaders from communism occur or not? We must give an answer to that question...

Does this mean that there are no grounds for rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia? No, it does not.

If a rapprochement and an improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and this or that country which does not belong to the socialist camp (for instance, India or Finland) is possible, then, consequently, an improvement in relations and a rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia is also possible, if Yugoslavia shows, along with the USSR, an aspiration to this. In the present conditions such a rapprochement is possible chiefly along intergovernmental [Ed. note: i.e., non-party] lines.

In our relations with Yugoslavia, we cannot forget the fact that Yugoslavia left the people’s democratic countries with which it was together from 1945-1947. But, on the other hand, we must reckon with and appreciate the fact that Yugoslavia, although it drew closer to the imperialist camp, is trying in some capacity to preserve its sovereignty and national independence, although in recent years

its ties with countries like the USA, England and others, and together with this, its dependence on these countries, have become stronger and stronger. It [Yugoslavia] is between two camps, tilting towards the capitalist countries. In view of this, it is completely clear that it is our task to weaken Yugoslavia's ties with the capitalist countries which are pulling it into the imperialist camp, be they commercial, economic, or military-political ties, which are putting Yugoslavia in a position of dependence on imperialism. For this, it is necessary to increase and strengthen Yugoslavia's ties with the USSR and the people's democratic countries, showing all possible vigilance in relation to the remaining ties that Yugoslavia has with the capitalist countries. Such a policy will strengthen our socialist camp and at the same time will weaken the camp of the imperialist countries. Such a policy is correct, let's say, in relation to India (or Finland), and is all the more correct in relation to Yugoslavia, where the revolutionary traditions of partisan struggle against fascist occupiers are alive and sympathies for the USSR are great in the people, and where such post-war revolutionary victories as the nationalization of large industry and others, which were accomplished when Yugoslavia marched in the same ranks as the people's democratic states which had arisen at that time, have been preserved. However, it should not be forgotten that in recent years (1949-1955), Yugoslavia has made a series of steps backward both in the city (the weakening of state planning authority in relation to nationalized industry), as well as especially in the countryside, where in recent years a line of renouncing the collectivization of agriculture has been followed.

We must make sure that Yugoslavia does not enter the North Atlantic bloc, or any of its international affiliates, and that Yugoslavia leaves the Balkan union, [since] two of the three participants (Turkey and Greece) are members of the North-Atlantic bloc. It is also in our interest to help Yugoslavia reduce its economic dependence on the USA and other capitalist countries. We must expand and strengthen cooperation with Yugoslavia, above all in the international arena, in the struggle to strengthen peace in Europe and in the whole world. The same can be said in relation to possible international cooperation in the economic sphere, insofar as joint steps with Yugoslavia and other countries in the interest of normalizing international trade and against discrimination and other aggressive actions by capitalist countries headed by the USA, are possible and desirable.

However, appropriate caution and a critical approach should be shown toward Yugoslavia's political steps, bearing in mind that in recent years Yugoslavia's position on a series of issues (for instance, on the German issue) has been closer to the position of the Western powers than to the position of the USSR and the people's democratic countries. It should not be forgotten that in accusing the Soviet Union of imperialist tendencies and of the so-called policy of "hegemony," the Yugoslav government has

untied its hands to speak out against the USSR at any time on all and sundry issues of international relations. The government of Yugoslavia has not yet once said that it has revised these views, or even that its foreign policy is closer to the position of the USSR and the people's democratic countries than to the position of the powers in the imperialist camp...

[*TsKhSD*, f.2, op.1, d.173, ll.1-11. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

Continued from page 29

bered, "The commission report was given by Pospelov (he was and remains pro-Stalinist). The facts were so terrifying that when he spoke, especially in very serious places (*tiazhelyi*), tears appeared in his eyes and his voice trembled. We were all stunned, although we knew much, but all that the commission reported we, of course, did not know. And now it all was verified and confirmed by documents."⁵

After the report Khrushchev stated his position: "Stalin was incompetent (*nesostoiatel'nost'*) as a leader (*vozhd'*). What kind of leader [is this], if he destroys everyone? We must show the courage to speak the truth. Opinion: tell the Congress; to consider: how to tell the Congress. Whom to tell[?] If we do not tell, then we are dishonest (*nechestnost'*) towards the Congress. Maybe have Pospelov prepare a report and tell—the causes of the cult of personality, the concentration of power in one [set of] hands, in dishonorable (*nechestnykh*) hands."⁶

[Ed. Note : Behind the scenes of the ongoing Congress, the Presidium edited Khrushchev's speech. The passage below was excised.]

"Every member of the Politburo can tell of disrespectful (*bestseremonnyi*) treatment by Stalin of Politburo members. I present, for example, this case. Once, not long before his death, Stalin summoned several members of the CC Presidium. We went to his dacha and began to discuss several questions. It happened that on the table across from me there was a big stack of papers, which hid me from Stalin.

Stalin testily shouted: 'Why are you sitting there?! Are you afraid that I will shoot you? Do not be afraid, I will not shoot, sit a bit closer.' There are your relations with members of the Politburo."⁷

[Source : V.P. Naumov, "K istorii sekretnogo doklada N.S. Khrushcheva na 20th s'ezde KPSS," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia* 4 (1996) pp. 147-168, reprinted in *Forum für osteuropäische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte* 1(1997), pp. 137-177. Special thanks to Donal O'Sullivan for permission to reprint. Translated by Andrew Grauer.]

¹ Mikoian's diary can be found in the Presidential Archive (APRF, f.39, op.3, d.120).

² Malin Notes are located in the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD, f.3, op.8, d.389).

³ The draft of Khrushchev's speech can be found in TsKhSD, f.1, op.2, d.16.

⁴ TsKhSD f. 3, op. 8, d. 389, ll. 52-54.

⁵ APRF f. 39, op. 3, d. 120, ll. 115-116.

⁶ TsKhSD f. 3, op. 8, d. 389, l. 62.

⁷ TsKhSD f. 1, op. 2, d. 16, ll. 76-77.

Concluding Word by com. N.S. KHRUSHCHEV
[12 July 1955]

Comrades. I want to read you a telegram which com. Gromyko cited in part, since this document is of interest in understanding the position of the Yugoslav leaders. It is a communication from our ambassador in Yugoslavia about a conversation with com. Tito.

On 29 June com. Tito invited the Soviet ambassador to visit him and had a lengthy conversation with him. Here is what com. Val'kov wrote about that:

"In a conversation with me on 29 June Tito told me the following:

At present, Tito said, there are many conversations among the Yugoslavs and foreign representatives, surrounding the communication published in the Yugoslav press on 28 June about his, Tito's, acceptance of an invitation to visit the Soviet Union.

I noted that at a lunch in the Egyptian mission on 28 June the Canadian ambassador, the Egyptian envoy, the Japanese envoy, and the English consul all asked me about this issue. After this Tito noted that he would be happy to visit the Soviet Union and, in keeping with the understanding with comrades Khrushchev and Bulganin, the trip would take place next year. Concerning [U.S. Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles' announcement at a 28 June press conference on the fact that the possibility of the Yugoslav president's visiting the United States of America would be reviewed favorably if the Marshal expressed a desire to visit the United States of America, Tito said that the Americans would have to wait a long time for the expression of such a desire, if indeed they ever wait long enough [to hear it]." (Laughter in the hall). Not badly put!

Voice from the audience. Not bad...

Now on Austria. This is a very important issue. I remember how Stalin, about a year before his death, said several times:

- Why don't we conclude a treaty with Austria?

But this matter kept being postponed; it was said that we would resolve it after Trieste. When the Trieste matter got cleared up, comrade Stalin again ask[ed]:

- Why aren't we concluding a treaty with Austria?

After Stalin's death, somehow com. Malenkov and I began talking with com. Molotov about Austria. He told us that the Austrian issue was a very complex one which we needed very much [i.e. to keep on the agenda without resolving it], [and] that its resolution had to be delayed.

Here, at the plenum, I will frankly say that I believed Molotov's word on everything, [and] like many of us, thought that he was a great and experienced diplomat. Sometimes you'd look and then reason and think:

- Damn it [*chert voz'mi*], maybe I am missing something! After all, that is what it means to be a diplomat—he sees, and I don't see anything (laughter in the hall). I'm telling you this in all sincerity.

Some time passed, and I still wanted to find out what

Molotov saw in the Austrian issue and [why] he was fighting to drag out its resolution, but I can't see [it].

I came to the conclusion that there was no reason for us to drag out this matter, since time was beginning to work against us. In Austria we are losing our good position by dragging out a resolution to the issue of a peace treaty with the country. I then say to com. Bulganin:

- You know what I think, Nikolai Aleksandrovich? In my opinion, the Austrian issue as Molotov understands it is reminiscent of an egg which has gone bad. Soon you will have to throw it in the garbage because everything will change and there will be no value in resolving it positively. And that is really so.

But if we had gone halfway [*vyshli navstrechu*] with a resolution of the Austrian issue when the events connected with the conclusion of the Paris agreement had just ripened, after all, then the issue of these agreements could have arisen in a different way.

Voice from the Presidium. Correct.

Voice from the hall. The Paris agreement wouldn't have come about.

Khrushchev. We put forward the Austrian issue in a discussion of the CC Presidium. I said to com. Molotov:

- Listen, Viacheslav Mikhailovich, you understand this issue. But some comrades and I do not understand why we should delay the conclusion of a treaty with Austria. Explain to us how you understand it. Perhaps I will begin to understand it differently; after all, we aren't fools. And when I understand, I will support you; after all, right now I don't see anything complicated in it. I see only stupidity on our side, which consists of the fact that we are dragging out the conclusion of a peace treaty with Austria for no apparent reason.

We discussed the issue and came to the conclusion that we should conclude a peace treaty with Austria, [and] make sure that Austria became a neutral state. When we came to such a decision, Molotov said:

- It is good that it was decided this way. After all, I did not object to such a decision.

Comrades! We, all of the members of the Presidium, each spoke to Molotov twice, reporting to him that it was necessary to stop dragging out the Austrian issue and to resolve it. And you know how we usually resolve issues in the Presidium,—we don't speak because everything is already clear and that issue that has been brought for examination does not need additional clarification. And here, I repeat, we all spoke several times without convincing com. Molotov that it was impossible to delay any further on this matter.

Kaganovich. And [we spoke] quite sharply [*i dovol'no ostro*].

Khrushchev. During the discussion I ask[ed] com. Molotov:

- Tell me, please, are you for or against war?

- No, he says, I am against war.

- Then what are you achieving by having our troops sit in Vienna? If you stand for war, then it would be

correct to stay in Austria. It is a beach-head [*platsdarm*], and only a fool would give up such a beach-head if he planned to make war now. If [you are] not for war, then we have to leave. In our country, communists do not understand you; the Austrian communists do not understand, and Austrian workers begin to see our troops as occupiers. Communists abroad also do not understand us. Why are we sitting in Austria; what are we waiting for there?

Com. Molotov was commissioned to prepare a draft. He presented the draft, but it said that if an *anschluss* were to be prepared of Austria with Germany, we would reserve the right to lead our troops into Austria. There was a lot of all sorts of nonsense in the draft presented by the MID.

I said to com. Molotov:

- Listen, we have to look at things realistically and concretely. Let's assume that we manage to conclude a treaty in which this is said. Imagine that they prepare an *anschluss*. After all, after we find out about it, everything will be ready for an *anschluss*—artillery will be deployed where they should be, and troops will be assembled. After all, they are not fools, and know that if there is an *anschluss*, we can oppose an *anschluss* and, probably, repulse it. So, in such a situation, would you start a war?

You have to keep in mind, after all, that the Austrians and Germans are nations [*natsii*] close to one another. If someone set us such conditions: to separate the Russians from the Ukrainians or Belorussians, what would we say? We would say, without pausing for thought:

- You take your proposals to God's mother [*k bozh'ei materi*]!

Why should we stick our noses into that matter? Remember what has already happened. After the First World War, France reserved rights for itself as to the Saar, the Ruhr, and the Rhineland zones. But Hitler came to power in Germany. He squeezed France, seizing the Saar district [and] the Ruhr [and] Rhineland zones, and what became of it? An embarrassment. The French disgraced themselves, since it became clear that France was not in a condition to defend itself. And Hitler, having gotten cocky [*obnaglev*], began to mobilize forces for other expansionist adventures.

I said to Molotov:

- Why should we do what you are proposing in Austria? Let us save our strength at home, and everyone will understand us correctly.

And so when we all bore down on him [*navalilis' nego*], he couldn't do anything other than to say, I agree; we have to submit whatever draft you propose. After the resolution of the Austrian issue, abroad they began to write about how wise [and] what a good diplomat Molotov was, and how he so skillfully took care of the Austrian issue. I even once said to com. Bulganin: "Probably Molotov doesn't like to read such articles." After all we know what position com. Molotov took on that issue. And then at a meeting of the CC Presidium he said:

- Did I really object to the resolution of the Austrian

issue?

Perhaps in another month he will say that he approved the resolution on the Yugoslav issue as well?

Or take the issue of arms control. For a long time we took an incorrect position, proposing to cut the armed forces of all countries by one third. With such a stance on the issue [*postanovka voprosa*], they will send us to the devil and put forward convincing arguments as well. Who will make such an agreement? We have so many million [men] at arms (and the Americans have data on this). We say: let's disarm, cut armaments by a third. And what sort of disarmament can there be here; can they really discuss our draft? Judge for yourself: we have, for example, six million soldiers, reduced by one third—four [million] are left. They have, for instance, three million, which must also be reduced by one third. After this, what sort of correlation of forces is left after that? By making that sort of proposal, we give the imperialists trump cards to decline our proposal; we will look like opponents of disarmament. The rulers of bourgeois states under the pressure of their people also raise the issue of disarmament. In order to knock all of the trumps out of the hands of the imperialists, we decided to introduce a proposal that, on the issues of arms control, we start from the conditions of each state, taking into account the size of the territory of the country, the quantity of its population, and other conditions. Based on these conditions, we must attain arms cuts to an appropriate level. Is this decision correct? Undoubtedly, it is correct. Such a proposal permits us the possibility of taking the initiative.

We adopted a resolution of the CC Presidium on this issue and instructed com. Molotov to inform com. Malik about it, but he sent a different directive, did not fulfill the resolution of the CC Presidium, as com. Bulganin has correctly stated here. At the meeting of the CC Presidium we asked com. Molotov: why did he do so? He explained it like this: I gave correct instructions, but when they looked at the ciphered communication, it turned out that it was incorrectly written. Com. Molotov admitted that he had made an error in this matter, for which we then gave him a warning...

[Source: *TsKhSD f.2, op.1, d.176, ll.282-95. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.*]

“Stalin, comrades, is such a figure that many historians will break their teeth trying to learn this history; and there will still be something left to learn.”

Khrushchev’s Second Secret Speech *Introduced and Translated by L.W. Gluchowski*

Much has already been written about Khrushchev’s secret speech to the closed session of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on the evening of 24-25 February 1956. The secret speech, “On the cult of personality and its consequences,” ignited a flame which set the communist world afire. In one fell swoop Stalin was branded a criminal by Khrushchev.¹ The international communist movement went through a period of chaos following Khrushchev’s revelations and nowhere was this more apparent than in Poland.

On 12 March 1956, the Polish United Worker’ Party (PUWP) lost its own leader. Boleslaw Bierut, ill with pneumonia, had traveled to the 20th CPSU Congress but he never returned. He died of heart failure in Moscow shortly after reading the secret speech, which the Soviets provided to all the leaders of the fraternal parties on the evening of 24 February. The secret speech found its way to Poland with the delegates who returned to Warsaw.² Bierut’s death forced Khrushchev to move quickly. He travelled to Warsaw with Bierut’s body for the state funeral and remained there for a week. Khrushchev met with the Polish leadership to settle the succession question. On 20 March, the PUWP held its 6th plenum to chose a new First Secretary. Khrushchev was invited to make a speech and to participate in the proceedings. Below is an excerpt of his 73 page, largely extemporaneous, often incoherent and ungrammatical explanation to the Polish comrades of why he gave the secret speech at the 20th congress, as well as other matters.³ This speech was not included in the official protocol of the 6th plenum and remained hidden in the Polish archives until recently. It was never translated and has never been published before.

Khrushchev was an emotional speaker who tended to speak his mind. A number of episodes are noteworthy in this speech: Khrushchev said that the legacy in foreign policy left by Stalin was terrible; that Stalin was smart, but suffered from a persecution complex; that we after all coped with foreign policy despite Stalin’s warnings; that we could not arrest Stalin on 22 June 1941; that we should “demoralize NATO;” that Stalin had called him a Pole.⁴ Moreover, Khrushchev agreed to answer questions by the Polish comrades from the floor about the secret speech and Stalin’s legacy.⁵

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The Speech by Comrade Khrushchev at the 6th PUWP CC Plenum (Excerpt) 20 March 1956, Warsaw

[Head of State Council]

Comrade Aleksander Zawadzki [in Polish]

Comrades, the [PUWP] Politburo has taken advantage of the occasion afforded by Comrade Khrushchev’s visit with us, and has invited Comrade Khrushchev to meet with the Central Committee plenum. As a result we should treat this as the beginning of the plenum—the actual meeting will begin in the late afternoon.

I suggest, in the name of all present, that we give Comrade Khrushchev a heartfelt greeting, at this, our plenum. (Applause.) We ask that Comrade Khrushchev take advantage of this meeting, and speak to all who are gathered, from a perspective of personal experience.

Comrade Khrushchev [in Russian]

My task is very difficult because I don’t know which problems interest you, the Polish United Workers’ Party. The questions [discussed at] the 20th [CPSU] congress. All the questions of the 20th congress.

I was told that you’re familiar with the report presented at the closed session of the congress. You also read it. Now, comrades, I would like to talk about a very crucial question—the question of the cult of personality.

The report of the closed session [of the 20th CPSU congress] you have read. But.....[Ed. Note: Dots not enclosed in parentheses are found in the original.] with such openness we presented these questions. We didn’t hide anything; we said everything. Why did we introduce this question to the party congress? We had a discussion. We exchanged opinions, if such a topic should be touched. People, for decades, thought like this. And suddenly, we’ll show them that it’s not that clean, how we always looked at and understood this subject, that it’s dirty, this subject. We discussed it a lot, argued about it, and finally decided to present this question. This is our capital, and we have to use it. Our biggest capital is that which aids in reinforcing the ranks of our party. And capital which aides in reinforcing our authority among the masses is our main capital. After the death of Stalin, we freed tens of thousands of people from jails. We reinstated thousands of people to party membership. We reinstated our friends. I talked to one of them, who spent sixteen years with.....This is my

acquaintance, we worked together in the Donbass. I was in charge of the *orgotdel* [Organization Department] of Stalin's regional committee, he was in charge of the.....regional committee. A member of the party since 1917, joined as a young man, and spent sixteen years in jail, a completely honest man. Comrades, this was a member.....up until the 7th congress and [he was] a delegate to the 7th congress. They came, they wanted, you see, not only the pants from the Red Cross, but.....and he would have been satisfied. But, he wants to receive moral satisfaction. How can we say it to him? And we would have been simply.....if we simply.....our head, and said that nothing had happened. So, thousands of people came, and people who were in the party for decades.....

II

The most important thing is to educate correctly. ...Who will decide, how can one explain the absence of the.....congress for thirteen years. How can one explain? But, we have so many people who asked us this question during Stalin's tenure. They were arrested. This is already an anti-Soviet person. The party should be informed at a certain time, right before the party congress, but this is arbitrariness. The party cannot live like this. Well, we have decided to report these questions to the congress, and said.....and saying.....To state the question, and where were you, you were with Stalin. We said we've seen, and we're saying, you judge. Let the congress judge, if it deserves trust or not. But, the party must know everything. As the master, the congress must know about it and decide. Therefore, we came and stated it. I would say.....that after we had made this report, and now we're reading this report to members of the party, then we decided to read it to Komsomol members. There are eighteen million warm-hearted young people that were brought up by us in a certain direction. If they don't know everything—won't understand us.....We decided.....then we went ahead. We decided to have it read during workers' meetings. Not only to party members, but to non-party members as well, so that non-party members feel that we trust them.....will know. When we were told.....the entire world talks, the entire diplomatic corps is making noise that Khrushchev did.....exactly. The connections [i.e., intelligence communications] aren't bad. Here he gave such a report, he talked for three hours, really talked for three hours, that such questions were presented, that such questions were really presented, and that after that, they won.....so to speak. To each other.....there's such a situation among the diplomats, that Khrushchev flew to Warsaw, Malenkov to London, Mikoian to Karachi, during a bad state in the [Soviet] Politburo they're not going to fly all over the world.....checking themselves. Because, really, let them make some noise; make some noise and then they'll be left with nothing (*na bobakh*). But, we will only win from this, because now we have a colossal growth of party solidarity around the Central Committee, and firmness

among party ranks, and it's only natural that the party receive satisfaction, that we, so to speak, the Central Committee.....under the party.....He made the report to the party, because.....the reasons.....and we're saying how to cure why this could have happen.....

(...)

After reading this, you'd probably be indignant, and probably say, this is really an enemy of the people. (*Voice from the audience [in Russian]* No.) No? Comrades, comrades, you're saying no. I'm not upset with you. Yes, Comrades. But, you're saying this in 1956, after my presentation. Now, even a fool can be smart, as they say. But, you have to make the decision when the question is being discussed. Here, before you, sits your wonderful fellow-countryman, and our friend, Rokossowski. He spent two years in jail. (*Question from the audience:.....Berezhkov*) There is. Yes, there is. Here, in my report, I was talking about Meretskoy. Meretskoy, I don't know if he sat for two years or not, but not for a long time. But, now he's a complete invalid. He was interrogated by Rodos.⁶ This big man was interrogated by Rodos. They had very smart techniques. The doctors' case. I was sick, before my trip to Warsaw. The professor, Vinogradov came, who was one of the saboteurs and had been in jail. And then he was freed. I ask: "So, what do you think, Vladimir Nikitovich, can I fly to Warsaw?" He says: "You can. Breathe carefully, through the nose. Don't make speeches outdoors. Do not take off your hat." A doctor says that to a person who's not yet completely well. He was in jail. After jail he examined us. But, I read his testimony myself, that he was a German spy. It so happened that this doctor, Vinogradov, attended to me, and was at my place practically a day before his arrest. After my presentation to the 19th congress, I fell ill. And I was laying in bed, for three day. And he was taking care of me, and I was already reading the protocols on his statements. The other doctors were saying this.....What could I do? What could I do, when a doctor who works with him says: I say such-and-such, I did such-and-such things, I poisoned this one, I strangled that one. I had the help of such-and-such. What could I say to myself. I'll go and say to Stalin that this isn't true. But, he'll say: "What are you doing, these people are admitting it." In any case, I wouldn't be allowed. The investigator should have been called, then the doctors, and questioned. But these conditions weren't available. These conditions—this is the cult of personality.

(...)

Well, you have read everything in the report. This is, so to say, fresh news. The situation in the agricultural field is difficult. Once I said to Stalin: "Comrade Stalin, we have a crisis in agriculture." He says: "What do you mean, crisis?" I reply: "A crisis: no milk.....no meat, no milk. What's happening?" "This is not correct," he says, and immediately became defensive because of this word. "Stalin's age," "Stalin's leadership," and here is a crisis.....Only enemies say this word. Malenkov was

asked: "Do we procure more meat now or less?" "More." I said: "I'm saying more too." "More milk?" "More." "Well, the population has increased too." Wages have risen. The purchasing ability has increased too. Then, if that's so, talk like this. We couldn't tell him these things. Well, what kind of socialism is it when a person can't drink an extra cup of milk. I, at the time of capitalism, drank as much milk as I wanted, being a miner during capitalism. And now, I have to, I should be thankful, that now, I can buy a cup of milk for my child. But, such is the situation. This means that this is our fault; we're discrediting socialism. The workers and employees, and all the people—a socialist system, capitalist system, he doesn't choose by himself. But, he chooses a system which will provide a better lifestyle for him. This system for him, the socialist system, this is a social system where the tools of production are located in the hands of society. Therefore, the society itself, in its own interests, will use these tools of production. So, you have to provide uninterrupted growth in the standard of living of the population. Stalin said that a committee should be formed to study this matter. I was nominated as the chairman of that committee. I knew what it meant. I'm not going to do anything to cause problems. I'll get nothing. I can't do anything. I know this. I say: "Comrade Stalin, why me, maybe Malenkov is better?" Why did I nominate Malenkov, for that I had grounds. Malenkov was entrusted with leadership for agriculture. I said, why. I'm the secretary of the Moscow committee. I have so many things (*vot tak vot*) of my own to be done. Let Malenkov do it. "Let it be." So, what can I do, you can't argue with Stalin. He says, Mikoian should be in the committee, and others, let them work. Well, I know that if I had the opportunity to solve this question, I'd give a suggestion. But, I wouldn't be allowed to solve this matter. And they would make me an enemy. Because, whatever I'd have suggested, Stalin would say that it's all harmful. Only enemies can suggest this. We spent a lot of time sitting and arguing. But, do you know, comrades, how many ass-lickers are there? There was this Kozlov, an agriculture manager, we kicked him out from the Central Committee, but this big bastard (*svoloch*) remained in the party. I beg your pardon for such harsh words, but he should have been expelled from the party. All the time he presented documents to the Central Committee on how everything is moving, agriculture is developing, that we have nothing, but agriculture is growing. We sat, corrected the material a little bit. I'll tell you exactly how it was. Corrected the materials, and went to Comrade Stalin: The materials are ready. Spent a lot of time, not because we couldn't figure it out, but because we didn't know how to suggest it, how to put it. Therefore, we had to disguise it so that no one would be the wiser, and there was some benefit from it. Stalin read it. So, he says, many billions should be given. Something like six or seven billion. This is child's play, only enemies look at this question from this angle. They don't understand how the peasant lives.....Stalin says. With one hen, he says, the

peasants sells and pays duties with all of one hen. How can he say that, when Stalin didn't see a live peasant for probably thirty years. Stalin's more aloof than his dacha—he can't see anything from his dacha, because it's surrounded by woods, and with guards. And with field-glasses you wouldn't see a living person, except the guard. How can he think like that? But, a man who knows the village, who sees the peasants, he can't agree with him. Instead of accepting our suggestion, Stalin says—no. I suggested my own ideas. Together, with this proposition, we looked at this question and raised the duties on peasants some 40 billion rubles. My God, here I left. I told Mikoian, the only salvation is if the peasants rebel. Because there's no other way out. Because they sell all the produce to pay duties, their duties. Already, they don't have this money. From where can they get it? And, well, we researched. And we researched. But, what's there to research. And then I saw that the situation was like this. I knew, and I said: "Comrade Stalin, this is a very big problem you gave us. It's difficult to decide by such a committee. We need more people." He said: "What do you want?" I said: "Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Kaganovich"—named all the members of the Politburo, so that everybody will be involved. "What are you doing. What for?" I said: "It's a big question." "Big question? Well, include Malenkov and Beria." "Very well." At least now it's easier. I had to involve Beria, that bastard, because if he proposed what Mikoian proposed, then he would have to sign the document. You see what kind of complicated conditions existed. And then we all got together. "Well, I said, comrades, how are we going to solve this?" Well, Beria probably understood. He said this is all nonsense. Where can we get the money from? From where? Let's look for money. The matter ended with the death of Stalin. So the document was burned. But, just before the death, a document existed. But, if he had not died, I myself don't know how all this would have ended. I think that it would have ended with additional arrests. Because, Stalin told us—these are populists and SRs [Socialist Revolutionaries], meaning enemies. These were difficult conditions. If you look at it this way, Stalin died, we made way for an increase in agriculture. It means we understand. It means we can find the necessary solution. Why didn't we find it at the time, because of one person who was stopping it. And we couldn't do anything. Absolutely couldn't do anything. That's why, now, we have fuel. And that's why we're roaring like bulls: "Down with the cult of personality!" Just like the Komsomol. Why, because if we get rid of the cult, then we will always collectively find the correct solution. Stalin was telling us that the capitalist world will fool us, that we're like blind kittens. But, if Stalin came back now, we would show him what we've done after him, and how we've cleaned up the atmosphere. I think that Stalin couldn't have done it, and in ten years. And if he had lived a little bit longer, then he possibly would have started another war.

Listen! When Stalin died, 109 people were killed. 109 people died because everyone moved like a mob and smothered them. This is just such a psychosis (*psikhos*). Some people, when they were in the hall near the casket, started crying—What are we going to do now? Comrades, common people is one thing, but how many party members and Komsomol members thought when Stalin died, what will happen after him? Is it proper? Is it appropriate to imagine a hero, and make everything dependent on him? Comrades, do we then need the party? What is it? It means not believing in human judgment, not believing in the force of democracy, not believing in collective leadership. Comrades, then let's choose a king. The monarchists say their system is better, because all your elections depend on your voters, and they adapt [to each other], but our monarch, he was given the power to rule and manage by God. Then we must agree with even such an absurdity. And now, we're trying to break this myth of power and infallibility. Some say, what would you have done during the war, if you didn't have Stalin? Defeated the Germans. Defeated them—and defeated them sooner, with less blood [lost]. I'm sure of it. And maybe we could have avoided the war. Maybe, if our policy was a little smarter, maybe, we could have avoided the war. Nobody knows. That is how I and my friends in our collective see these things.

Listen, such absurdity. When Lenin died, no busts. Stalin died, there wasn't a single town or city where a monument to him was not placed. We, when he died, we couldn't imagine what to name after him, to immortalize him the day he died, because whatever we did would have been significantly worse than what he had done during his lifetime. Can this be correct? Can this be correct upbringing? There was no modesty, although he talked a lot about modesty. There were many, many shortcomings, which, unfortunately, we could not.....We ourselves suffered from it. I vacationed with him one year. I lived next [door]. I told my friends and they understood it. They said that if you're still alive after this vacation, say "Thank God." Why? Because I had to dine with him every day. It means I had to be drunk every day. I beg your pardon. Am I saying it too frankly, yes? (*Voices from the audience [in Russian]:* You're saying the truth. Say it. Say it.) You just can't do this. We had foreigners arriving and coming over sometimes. We were ashamed when we came for dinner, because there was a battery of mortars (*batareia minometov*) [Ed. note: hard liquor] on the table. There's a limit to everything.....It was like this, comrades. It was. But, if one doesn't drink and eat with him, you're his enemy. You're his enemy. This kind of absurdity, why did it happen? If he was not protected by the cult of personality, he would have been kicked out, and told: Listen, dear, drinking so heavily isn't allowed. You have to work. We're responsible for the work done. He [Stalin] himself once told us in the heat of conversation: "Go on talking. Once, Lenin called me [to him] and tells me: Why, my dear (*baten'ka*), are you drinking so heavily? You're buying champagne by the case, getting people drunk. And

he wanted to put me on trial." He [Stalin] told us this.....We couldn't tell him that it would have been for the best if Lenin had done it, because if you said it, you wouldn't be going home anymore. You're not children, comrades. You should understand. I have a lot of Polish friends. And [Stalin] made me a Pole. Stalin asked me: "What's your last name?" I said: "Khrushchev." "Your last name ends like a Polish one with [one line black out in text] ski." I said: "Who knows. I lived for a long time as Khrushchev, and now it's—ski." Comrades, I was standing near Yezhov, and Stalin said: "Yezhov said it." Yezhov replied: "I didn't." "How is it you didn't say it? When you were drunk, you said it to Malenkov." Malenkov passes by. Stalin says: "Did Yezhov tell you that Khrushchev's Polish?" He says: "No." You see, they'll say, why is Khrushchev denying. First of all, I'm a Russian, I'm not denying. Second, what kind of crime is it if I had been Polish? What kind of crime? Look, comrades, when Stalin died, Beria took his post. And he was then the most influential man among us. Beria and Malenkov. He took the post of internal affairs minister, comrades. Beria. But, what kind of counter-revolution did we have in 1953? None. We have a good, friendly, lively society in the Soviet Union. What did he need it for? So that he could stand above the party. What does it mean to stand above the party? It means to raise his own cult of personality. What Stalin was, Beria would have become (*Byl Stalin, stal by Beriia*). He'd have destroyed the party. The party would be like a formality, because he'd be in command. So, then, we rebelled and arrested Beria for raising his hand against the party. We told him this. We didn't arrest him like Stalin arrested Kosior. Instead, we arrested him during the meeting. All members of the Presidium were present. We told him: "We accuse you of such and such actions. You encroach on the rights of the party as shown by. We said it to him." This, he says, I did because of this and that. We then said, arrest him. When the prosecutor interrogated him, Beria said: "On what grounds do you arrest me?" He replied: "You're asking me on what grounds? The entire Presidium and Council of Ministers were there when you were arrested. Not only them, but the entire government apparatus!" [Ed. note: For Beria letters from prison to Malenkov, see the Berlin 1953 section of this *Bulletin* and the CWIHP website: cwihip.si.edu.]

With these words, allow me to finish my presentation. (Applause.)

Chairman [Comrade Zawadzki in Polish]

In accordance with our mutual agreement, those among the comrades with a question, please ask them, and those among the comrades who want to express themselves—also feel free to express yourself.

Comrade Kazimierz Witaszewski [in Polish]

I want to deal with the following problem. Comrade Khrushchev spoke of Comrade Stalin as the strongest, the best type of Marxist-Leninist. On the other hand, we read

Comrade Khrushchev's speech. And what Comrade Khrushchev said here, it's all about what Stalin did on his own, in spite of the collective, without coming to an understanding with anyone. I can't understand, how to explain this, that a Marxist, the party leader, who, on the one hand talks about what kind of person a party member ought to be—a communist, modest, ought to listen to the voice of the masses—and, on the other hand, this same party leader does not recognize the collective, the Central Committee, the Politburo, works on his own, shoots people, old Bolsheviks, without cause. Here, for me, a question emerges, how is it possible to reconcile one with the other, that Stalin was a good Marxist?

[Several questions follow. Then Khrushchev answers, not always to the questions, but at some length.]

Comrade Khrushchev [in Russian]

Where would you place Stalin? Would you say he's not a Marxist? Stalin, who occupied such a prominent position in the party, and possessed indisputable, colossal influence, and revolutionary abilities, led the party by what path? In the direction of building a socialist society. This is a fact. Could Stalin have led in a different direction? He could have. Could he have brought it to some other result? I think that he couldn't, because the party would have resisted. But, Stalin himself was a convinced Marxist, and he was convinced that society in particular must become a communist society, and he served this society with all his body and soul. Of this, I have no doubt. The question of the means and of the course taken, this is a completely different question. It's difficult to combine, but it's a fact. And these facts have already taken place. How you want to combine it, and think it through, this depends, so to speak, on your individual abilities. But, it's a fact. We can't say that by using such and several methods to kill people, he killed so-and-so many in order to destroy the socialist regime, so that he could put the Soviet Union onto the capitalist rails. This would be stupid (*glupost'*). This would be a lie. This would be stupid. Who would believe it? No, that's wrong. Here's the whole tragedy for Stalin was a revolutionary. And therefore, to affirm the new, we should fight with the old. And in this struggle, comrades, we never denied harsh methods and extreme actions. We didn't deny it in the past, and we don't deny it now. Therefore, on this, Stalin was a Marxist, and he served, and used all the methods available. He used them so that in this struggle to affirm [the new], he destroyed his own people. His own people were destroyed (*svoikh unichtozhal*). Of course it's possible. This was in every party. There were always cases where someone was under the suspicion of being an agent provocateur. Sometimes investigations and courts were used, but it later turned out that they had been honest people. Were there cases like these? Of course there were. And it was the same in the Polish party. It was everywhere. If there's an underground, if there's a struggle,

then it's always possible. And the fact that the enemy sends its agents is known to everybody, comrades. Its all a question of intelligence, methods, and abilities. Stalin had such views, he understood it well, and tried to protect himself. And in protecting the revolution, he got to the point where, as they say, the artillery fired on its own army.

Well, my dear friend, I can't say anything else. I would be dishonorable, if after his death, everything was blamed on him. That wouldn't be very smart. We would then not have been Marxists, or we would not have understood it and explained it correctly. Stalin in particular was a Marxist. A Marxist. We think so. The question of his mistakes on the questions of theory, and in other instances, is not being discussed right now, comrades. This was a man who devoted his body and soul to the working class. There isn't a single doubt about it.

But.....always, so to speak, humans are fallible. Something unpleasant is omitted, something pleasant is exaggerated. So this kind of lesson is not accepted as a valid source of history. I don't want to insult our elders, I myself am not young, but I know that sometimes.....[about events] forty to fifty years ago, everyone tells his own [version]

...Stalin valued every revolutionary. It had to be seen. We saw it. We're now talking about the negative [side of] history. But, Stalin, comrades, if I could talk about the good times, [Stalin's] attention and caring. This was a revolutionary. He lived life, but he had a persecution mania (*maniia presledovaniia*) about somebody pursuing him.....And, because of it, he would never stop.....He, even his own relatives.....He shot them. Because, he thought that the brother of his first wife—a Georgian woman, she died a long time ago. (*From the audience: Alilueva. No, Alilueva's the last wife.*) Svanidze. Svanidze. Her brother. This was a friend of Stalin's. This was already an old man. He was a Menshevik, then he joined the party, and we often saw him with Stalin. And, evidently, Beria suggested that this Svanidze was an agent, that he was an enemy, and that he had a directive to kill Stalin. Stalin, of course, said listen, he sleeps over at my place, he dines with me, he's often been with me. So, why is he not doing what he's supposed to? He could have poisoned me a long time ago. But, Beria tells him: "No. You know there are different agents. Some get the assignment immediately. Some agents are kept near you, behave normally, then the time comes, he gets the signal, and then he'll do it!" Stalin believed him. Svanidze was arrested. He was interrogated by all methods [i.e., torture]. He was sentenced to execution by shooting. Stalin lived with Svanidze for so many years; something human [remained]; so he still had doubts. Then, he orders Beria: When Svanidze is about to be shot, tell him that if he admits his guilt—Stalin was already sure that Svanidze was an enemy—and asks for forgiveness, we will forgive him. We will forgive him. Before Svanidze was shot, we are told, he was told Stalin's words, and he said: "Exactly

what am I guilty of? Why should I ask for forgiveness. I'm not a criminal. I'm a member of the party. I'm an honest person. I didn't commit any crimes before Stalin, and before the party and country. I won't ask." And he was shot. That's what was happening. So, why did Stalin destroy [Svanidze]? He destroyed him simply so (*prostotak*).....He believed he was an enemy. We have to rack our brains to explain things that are not so easy. You have to complicate this question a little bit. Only then will you understand correctly, and correctly give an explanation. This is a complicated question.

The beginning of the war and Stalin. Comrades, here, it was said that maybe we could have used it to our advantage, when he turned out to be.....This was impossible, comrades. The war began.....the enemy attacks, and if we, at that time, had announced that we dismissed Stalin from the leadership. Comrades, a better present to Hitler could not be imagined.....(*Voice from the audience:* Correct, [he] had to direct the collective.) Exactly, had to direct. Comrades, all this is being explained simply, right here at this meeting, and after Stalin's death, and you have to have [in mind] the concrete conditions. The war was going on, and the name of Stalin played a big part, and suddenly we're announcing we dismissed Stalin. Comrades, that is defeat. This would mean the death of the country.

...Stalin must be criticized, and we already see how we are criticizing him. But, comrades.....even if you smear a person more and more, he won't get darker than he deserves. We can smear his reputation. But, after us, there are going to be people, you know, like restorers, who in cathedrals or somewhere start restoring things that were already painted and repainted, each artist in his own way. But, a good restorer takes it, cleans everything, washes everything off, and says: "This is, in reality, the work of such and such. And everything else was merely appended." So it is in this matter, too, comrades. Stalin, comrades, is such a figure that many historians will break their teeth trying to learn this history, and there will still be something left to learn. Stalin is Stalin. He's a very complex figure. He had a lot of good and a lot, a great lot, of bad. Now, we're trying to deal with the bad so that we can strengthen the party's correct path of action. But, Stalin will, in any case, from us, and after us, and from our grandchildren and children, receive what he deserved. He played his part and played in such a way that God left it to others, who worked with him, to know. I'm saying it directly, because it's a question of the struggle.....Stalin had his own methods. He said that in order for the working class to succeed, in order to take power, many thousands and millions of workers had to die. Maybe it was a mistake. At such a moment of revolutionary struggle, it's possible that there are mistaken victims. But, he says, history will forgive me. Is it possible? Perhaps. The whole question concerns the scale of these mistakes. A question of methods. Because his doses were incorrect, because an incorrect method of leadership was used. And

we want to avoid this. Comrades, we ourselves aren't guaranteeing that mistakes won't be made. We also can't allow; we also arrested people, and will probably make arrests in the future. I think that you'll also have to do this. But, if you now become liberals, and look at everybody and pat everybody on the back, then these enemies will bite your hands off (*ruki pootkusaiut*). We have such enemies and you have them. You probably have more enemies, because you're younger than we are, and we destroyed more, and you're closer to them. So, I think that even in the future mistakes are possible. I can't say, right now, that we promise that not even a single hair will fall from the head of any person. No. Comrades, this is very complicated. Comrades, the enemy is really insidious, the enemy really is, has been all the while, and we'll fight with these enemies wherever we recognize them and, maybe, where we don't recognize them. I, for example, know that when I worked in Ukraine, we destroyed not one, but many of our enemies using the hands of our enemies. We knew.....these ones.....we forged some documents. We would place them surreptitiously everywhere.....they arrested them, tortured them, and hung them. But, you'll say that this is cruel. But, comrades, we're fighting with the enemy. Is this method with enemies allowed? I think it's allowable. Will we give it up, now? I, for example, won't refuse to use it, if it's used to destroy the enemy.....If we're going to be cowardly, it means we are cowards. So there, dear comrades. (...)

(Applause. Stormy applause.)

[Source: AAN, (*Archive of Modern Records*) PZPR 2631 *Materialy do stosunkow partyjnych polsko-radzieckich z lat 1956-1958*, "Przemowienie tow. Chruszczowa na VI Plenum K.C.," k. 14-87. Translated from the Russian and Polish by L.W. Gluchowski.]

¹ Ed note: The full text of the speech as released by the US Department of State on 4 June 1956 (citing "a confidential source") can be found in *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism: A Selection of Documents* edited by the Russian Institute, Columbia University. (NY, 1956).

² For further details see Tony Kemp-Welch, "Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' and Polish Politics: The Spring of 1956," *Europe-Asia Studies* (March 1996), pp. 181-206.

³ The text makes clear that Khrushchev had a copy of the 20th Congress speech in his hand as he spoke in Warsaw.

⁴ I would like to express my thanks to Vladislav Zubok of the National Security Archive for his helpful comments on an earlier draft translation of this speech.

⁵ Ed. note: No discussion had been permitted after the Moscow secret speech. On this, see Vladimir Naumov, "Zur Geschichte der Geheimrede N.S. Chruschchevs auf dem XX Parteitag der KPdSU" in *Forum* 1,1 (1997), p. 173.

⁶ Ed. note: In the Moscow secret speech of 25 February 1956, Rodos is referred to as follows: "He is a vile person, with the brain of a bird and morally completely degenerate."

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Evening, 24 June 1957

Suslov chairing. Com. Molotov has the floor.

Molotov. Comrades, I have already spoken about the fact that I wish further to touch on international issues. It seems to me that in this regard com. Khrushchev's efforts are not entirely successful. We all understand and consider it necessary to conduct, support, and stimulate those measures which assist the lessening of international tensions. This is the basis for our work on strengthening peace, on delaying and averting a new war. And we must by all means possible be careful that this policy gives the results that we want to derive from it.

In connection with this, I consider that when com. Khrushchev, in a conversation with the editor of the American newspaper, *The New York Times*, Turner Catledge, published on 14 May spoke about the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, he committed an error, an incorrect [step]; he spoke as follows: "Speaking more concretely about international tension, the matter, obviously, reduces in the final analysis to the relations between two countries—between the Soviet Union and the United States of America."

Voices. Correct.

Molotov. And further, he says: "We consider that if the Soviet Union is able to come to an agreement [*dogovorit'sia*] with the United States, then it will not be hard to come to an agreement with England, France, and other countries."

Voices. Correct.

Molotov. I consider this incorrect both in essence and in tactics. It does not accord with the Leninist policy in international affairs which has been approved by the 20th party congress. (Agitation in the hall)...

Molotov. ...we can fight against imperialism and win out over imperialism only by making use of contradictions in the imperialist camp. If we imagine that we can come to an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States of America and therein see the expressed essence of our policy, then we forget the basic Leninist position on making use of "cracks", contradictions in the imperialist camp. We must not unite the imperialist and capitalist states around America, [must] not push for that and [must] not depict the situation in such a way that the Soviet Union must only agree with the United States of America, and all the remaining countries will supposedly play an insignificant role. No, comrades, now that we have become a great power, a powerful force, and have huge support in our socialist camp in the East and the West—in these conditions we must be particularly careful to deepen any split, any disagreements and contradictions in the imperialist camp, in order to weaken the international position of the United States of America—the most powerful of the imperialist powers. But imperially strong America cannot dictate everything to the other imperialist states. For that reason we support all sorts of contacts with non-socialist

countries and consider it to be very important. We support contact with little Denmark, Norway, Burma, Egypt, and so on. Moreover, we bear in mind that the use of contradictions in the camp of the capitalist states has a very great significance. And only in that way, squeezing not only America, but also other states which diverge from or waiver within the capitalist camp, only in that way can we weaken America itself, which is struggling against us. For that reason the issue of the use of the stated contradictions, that we not forget about these contradictions—that is our most important issue in the whole of our foreign policy

[Ed. Note: After numerous interruptions]

Molotov. Let me finish. From a different angle, there is another shortcoming here. How can one reduce the matter to the relations between the USSR and the United States of America, forgetting about the socialist camp? Com. Khrushchev's formulation ignores all of the remaining socialist countries besides the USSR. One must not, however, ignore the People's Republic of China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, or the other socialist countries...

Kirilenko. Answer this question: who are such dogmatists, how are we to understand them?

Molotov. Maybe you are not up [*plokho razbiraetes'*] on this matter, com. Kirilenko, but how are the others relevant here [*pri chem tut drugie*]? I am talking about something that requires the attention of the comrades present at this plenum. For this reason I am saying important things, although maybe you do not agree with this. There is a measure of truth here, in any case. We have never formulated the issue of the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and America as did com. Khrushchev. Once in 1924, Trotskii tried to throw out the slogan that now America had made a beggar of Europe. That was an anti-Marxist thing. Perhaps com. Khrushchev forgot this and has forgotten the lessons which the party had on that count in the past? But it doesn't hurt us to give a reminder about that. (Noise in the hall.)

I, comrades, want to say something further about the second mistake of com. Khrushchev in the statement to the editor of the newspaper *The New York Times*. Com.

Khrushchev speaks in this way—I am citing from *Pravda*:

"If, for instance—N.S. Khrushchev adds as a joke—our minister Gromyko and your secretary Dulles met, in a hundred years they wouldn't agree on anything, and, perhaps, only our grandsons would wait long enough to get any results from these negotiations."

Voice. Read on.

Molotov. Read on yourself.

Voice. It is being said as a joke there.

Molotov. One does not play with the authority of the MID of the USSR in front of the bourgeois governments. It is incorrect in its essence, and it is tactically harmful to the Soviet state. And however much you say, these things must not be condoned, because they bring harm to our state, and let us tell com. Khrushchev that right to his face [*priamo v glaza*]...

Khrushchev. Imagine: the President in the presence of the other Finnish leaders invites guests to a steam bath, but the visitors spit and leave. That offends, insults them. When we returned to Moscow and they started to upbraid me for visiting the Finnish steam bath and Bulganin began to join in as well, I said: Molotov wants to depict me as an unprincipled person because I went to the bath. How can you not be ashamed of yourself? You here won't go with anyone. If you got your way, you would lead the country to the end of its tether [*do ruchki*], would argue with everyone, would lead [the country] to conflict. Look at your telegram from San Francisco; what did you write in it? You wrote that war could start right now. How could the foreign minister behave so?

Molotov. Don't make things up [*Ne vydumyvaete*], com. Khrushchev.

Voice. Com. Molotov, there is nothing left for you to do but drag out the dirty laundry [*ubornuiu vytaashchit'*]; you've stooped so low.

Mikhailov. Com. Khrushchev, both in former trips, and when he was in Finland, worked for the people, for the party, and you, com. Molotov, should be ashamed to spit on this work; it is not worthy of you.

Molotov. I disagree with com. Mikhailov. (Noise in the hall). The First Secretary could have behaved in a more dignified manner in Finland.

Voice. Tell us, how was it undignified?

Rudenko. And you consider it dignified to visit Hitler?

Voice. Better to go to a steam bath than to engage in conspiratorial activities.

Suslov. Com. Molotov, you reduced questions in international relations to a steam bath. It's possible to say that the CC reached correct foreign policy despite you.

Molotov. A lie [*nepravda*].

Pospelov. The July 1955 plenum recorded this.

Voice. On Yugoslavia

Molotov. That was discussed; there was a CC resolution; I voted for it. Comrades, on the Yugoslav issue I want to dwell on one point. At one point in the heat of polemics on the Yugoslav issue, com. Khrushchev imputed that I did not understand that on some issues the Chinese comrades could correct us. I understand this and recognize it. But I maintain that in the given case and in a series of other cases, things were ascribed to me that I did not say. I said something else. Once, when, on the basis of a ciphered communication from Beijing, I referred to the fact that com. Mao Zedong, criticizing the Yugoslav comrades, pointed out that they were behaving like Laborites and not like communists—on the basis of that case, I asked the question: why do we not understand what the Chinese comrades understand? On the given issue we should have figured it out earlier than them. That is what I said on the subject

Pospelov. You said: you are going to the fascists cap in hand [*na poklon*].

Molotov. There were exaggerations in relation to

Yugoslavia, but not that sort. In a CC resolution in the summer of 1953, we wrote that the Yugoslavs should be treated like other bourgeois governments. You can find that resolution of the CC Presidium. Comrades, you must not say something that hasn't happened. But it was said by me, although the resolution was mistaken...

Molotov. Does our press, the selfsame *Pravda*, ever mention the name of Stalin? No, it modestly remains silent about Stalin, as if for 30 years Stalin did not play a prominent role in the history of our party and of the Soviet state.

We recognized his mistakes, but one must also talk about his achievements. Otherwise, the party itself is injured.

Voice. Why did you not make a statement about that at the 20th party congress?

Molotov. It was after the 20th congress, what I am saying to you. Of course, when com. Zhou Enlai came, we began to attest that Stalin was such a communist that, God grant, every one should be; but after Zhou Enlai left, we stopped doing so. This does not increase the authority of our party, since we are not giving a firm, clear answer; but that is what is demanded of us, and we should not permit anything else.

Khrushchev. You want to turn everything back, in order then to take up the axe yourself.

Molotov. No, that is not so, com. Khrushchev. I hope that that is not what you want, and moreover, that is not what I want.

Note the following fact. There is a decree of the CC Presidium of 28 April 1955 on the archive of I.V. Stalin: "To confirm a commission to examine the documents from the archive of Stalin, staffed by coms. Khrushchev (chairman), Bulganin, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, Pospelov, and Suslov." And, all the same, after 28 April 1955, the commission has not once met. They do not want to meet, and, after all, more than two years have gone by...

[Dmitrii] Shepilov. Bulganin already said that he did not meet with me at any meetings.

Voice. The members of the CC Presidium told what assessment you made, your approach to this issue.

Voice. Why is your surname in particular in this group, and not another, if you are not privy [to this matter]?

Khrushchev. You are against the cult of personality, and I, no less, have fought and fight against the cult of personality. But if you are such a fighter, then why did you, after Stalin's death, as editor of *Pravda*, falsify the photograph and place a shot of Malenkov next to Mao Zedong in the newspaper, when this did not actually happen [*v prirode etogo ne bylo*]?

Shepilov. It is true, that happened, and I was punished for doing so. I considered that the basic problem was our friendship with China, the closeness of the two heads of government—the symbol of this eternal friendship, and I did it in those interests; that was my mistake.

Khrushchev. For that the CC Presidium reprimanded you...

[Break]

Mikoian. Comrades, first of all I want to talk about some facts which have brought the party leadership chosen after the 20th party congress to its present state, when the plenum meets amidst the crisis of the party leadership. Now we have a crisis in the party leadership; that must be frankly stated.

Voice. No, there is no crisis.

Mikoian. I am talking about the crisis in the CC Presidium.

[Averki] Aristov. But the CC Presidium is not the leadership of our party. The leadership is the CC.

Mikoian. Com. Aristov has spoken correctly.

After the 20th party congress showed ideological unity, we considered that collective leadership was the guarantee of the success of our party, and tried in every way to uphold that unity. It seemed that everyone tried. There were disagreements on separate issues, disputes, but insofar as they did not turn into a system, they did not harm the cause...

The events in Poland and Hungary were a great test for our party and our leadership, [and] for the CC Presidium. I was very glad, [and] everyone else was very happy that in those days our CC Presidium was wholly unified and firm. On such serious issues, unity was gratifying.¹ It was pleasant for me that the comrades with whom we disagreed, like Molotov, Kaganovich, [and] Malenkov, in this matter behaved as was appropriate, although it should be noted that on the issue of the new Hungarian leadership, com. Molotov did not agree. Malenkov behaved well in Hungary, and it was believed that he had come into line [*voshel v obshchuiu koleiu*]. That is how it was until recently.

After the February 1957 CC Plenum, from the point where the issue of the organization of the *sovnarkhoz* [large collective farms] was decided, the atmosphere began to worsen; an unstated dissatisfaction on the part of some members of the Presidium was evident; disagreement was noted, [and] it was felt that some people were not saying everything [they thought]. Then it was still bearable, but the atmosphere continued to poison the situation...

Until recently there was no sign of the formation of a group in the CC Presidium, but there was some impression that com. Molotov [and] com. Kaganovich were sometimes silent, as if they had come to an understanding. They avoided arguing with one another. For instance, I did not avoid argument with Molotov or Kaganovich, but they avoided argument between themselves. Perhaps there were no grounds for disagreement? There were. Recently, Malenkov also began avoiding arguments with them. There was one case in which he agreed that he had not acted entirely properly; that was in relation to Yugoslavia. In connection with the incorrect speech by com. Tito in Pula, Soviet communists and the communist parties of other countries delivered a dignified rebuff. As a result, by

its own fault, the Yugoslav party ended up practically in isolation from the other communist parties. After this, the Yugoslav leadership began to speak out in conversations with our comrades and made known its desire to improve relations with us in its open statements.

On com. Khrushchev's suggestion, we discussed this issue in the CC Presidium and decided to instruct [Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia] com. [Nikolai] Firiubin to engage in an appropriate conversation with com. Tito at the instructions of the CC Presidium.

Several days before this, information about the fact that one Yugoslav diplomat tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to win over one important leader of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party [HSWP] to the Yugoslav side, was sent around to the members of the CC Presidium. Thus, in connection with a discussion of measures to improve relations with Yugoslavia, com. Molotov introduced a proposal that the CC CPSU inform all fraternal parties that Yugoslav diplomats were engaging in the recruitment of communists in fraternal parties. The adoption of com. Molotov's proposal would have led, of course, to the disruption of the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia, because such an appeal by us to all parties could not be hidden from the Yugoslav leadership, and, in this, it would see duplicity in our policies and the absence of a true wish to reconcile. This was, in essence, Molotov's wish to put a fly in the ointment [*vlit' lozhku degtia v bochku meda*].

Then they talked very calmly about this; there were no insults. Khrushchev said: Viacheslav, you again want to continue your line on disputes with Yugoslavia. I also calmly spoke twice, criticizing com. Molotov; com. Bulganin criticized him. Malenkov sat opposite and stayed silent. I know that Malenkov was against this; on many political issues he was not close to the views of Molotov and Kaganovich, but he sat and kept silent...

Mikoian. Generally there was unity in the Presidium on the Hungarian issue, but I must say that com. Molotov held an incorrect line in relation to the new Hungarian leaders.

Imagine that tomorrow, on 4 November, our troops had to move out [*vystuplenie*] all over Hungary, but by this evening it was still unclear who would be at the head of the new government of Hungary, by whose summons and in support of whom our troops were mobilizing. Why? Khrushchev and Malenkov were in Yugoslavia meeting with the Romanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Yugoslavs over the course of two days in order to obtain their agreement for the use of our troops. I was busy with getting [Janos] Kadar, [Ferenc] Muennich, and others out of Budapest; there was still no government, [and] they were discussing whom to move into the government. We proposed Kadar. Molotov insisted that [Andras] Hegedus be at the head—the former prime minister. He asked: who is this Kadar? We, he implied [*mol*], did not know him and were slighting him. We could not agree on the

composition of the government. Zhukov said: I cannot put off the operation; there is already an order to our troops to move out. Molotov insisted on reinstating the old leadership.

Molotov. That's not correct; we spoke about Muennich.

Mikoian. You proposed Hegedus; before his departure to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev proposed Muennich; others proposed Kadar—we argued all day. If there had been no argument, why not agree right away on the composition of the government? We had it out [*rugalis*] with you, argued fiercely. Bulganin and other comrades should remember.

Khrushchev. Anastas Ivanovich [Mikoian], when, during the Hungarian events, Malenkov and I returned from our trip to a series of people's democratic countries and Yugoslavia, we had formed the opinion that we must support Kadar's candidacy. Some called for Muennich's candidacy. He is an honorable comrade who likes us; I did military training together with him in the Proletarian Division. He is an excellent comrade, but in the given situation, com. Kadar is the best candidate.

Mikoian. Only after com. Khrushchev's arrival was it possible to specify the composition of the government headed by Kadar. Com. Kadar is from the working class and is a serious person, and that has now been justified. It is good that com. Khrushchev reminded [us]. There was the following case: Molotov calls and proposes a meeting. On what topic? [Matyas] Rakosi wrote a letter to the HSWP, [saying] that they were not allowing him back into Hungary and requested that he remain here. Molotov asked: who decided, how, why? He considered that the convocation of a special session of the CC Presidium was called for. And when we met at the next regular meeting [i.e., no special session had been called], he insisted that Rakosi and [Erno] Gero be given the chance to work.

Molotov. Who insisted? That is not exact.

Mikoian. After all, you demanded the convocation of a special session of the CC Presidium in order to discuss Rakosi's letter, which came to the CC CPSU Presidium with an accusation against the new leadership of the HSWP. Two days later [*chez den*], at the next meeting of the CC Presidium, you spoke with a criticism of the resolution of the CC Plenum of the HSWP that at present and in the near future, the interests of the HSWP demanded that Rakosi, Gero, Hegedus [be prevented from working] in Hungary, but remain in the Soviet Union for a specified period. You demanded that Rakosi, Gero, and Hegedus return to Hungary. If we had heeded Molotov's advice, we would have lost the trust of the Hungarian party; the Hungarians would have thought that we were playing a double game. We argued with Molotov: Rakosi did not see what was happening, became detached from reality and led the party into a catastrophe. While located in Moscow, he called certain of his supporters in Budapest on the telephone and, essentially, led a group struggle against the new Hungarian leadership. In connection with

this we told him: do not live in Moscow; live in another city, and don't mess things up [*ne port' dela*].

Khrushchev. When the Hungarian government delegation visited us, Molotov said to Kadar: why are you not taking Rakosi with you? This question once again upset the Hungarian leaders. They thought that we were supporting them [only] on a temporary basis, and that then Rakosi would once again come to power in Hungary.

Mikoian. It's true; during the reception, com. Molotov scolded Kadar [as to] why they weren't taking Rakosi back to work in Hungary. Such behavior by com. Molotov was incorrect.

Molotov. We were talking not about Rakosi, but about Hegedus.

Mikoian. You were talking about Rakosi.

Mikoian. In relation to the [Presidium] Saturday meeting, at which Bulganin said that Khrushchev acted incorrectly. What does that consist of?

The people's democratic countries request that, when we order equipment for the next year, the orders be given out at least six months' in advance, so that blueprints can be drawn up and inventories can be ordered. Otherwise, it is impossible—to order in January and receive the products in January. This is an elementary thing. Not only our friends, but also the capitalists demand this.

This is an indisputable issue, but arguments have begun around it: will we be able to pay for the equipment? Here we order, but what will we pay with? I provide information: in all, we buy 16 billion rubles in goods, and now we are talking about a preliminary order for 3 billion rubles in equipment, and these are needed goods. Why should we not be able to pay? We will be able to. There is no issue here. The total volume of trade will be approximately the same as last year's.

Finally, what does this mean politically? On the whole, equipment is being supplied by the GDR and Czechoslovakia. If we do not strengthen East Germany, where workers are supporting their communist government, our army will end up in the fire. And, after all, there is an army of a half million [men] there. We cannot lose the sympathy of the German populace. If we lose their sympathy and trust—that will mean the loss of East Germany. And what would the loss of East Germany mean? We know what that would be, and for that reason operate on the basis that we must use the capacity of East German industry in full. Then the workers of the GDR will have work and will give us what we need; otherwise we will have to give the GDR both goods and food, without receiving equipment in return. I consider that our position is absolutely correct.

Voice. Correct.

Mikoian. But we are told: you will order, but will we be able to pay? This is an issue unto itself—a great political issue. I kept calm, although I am also a quick-tempered person, but Nikita Sergeevich caught the scent of the whole political edge of the issue. Seeing that a

majority against the draft was forming, he said the following phrase: "I would like on this issue in particular to hold a vote and to remain in the minority." The socialist camp has been created because it is important to strengthen it and not to permit wavering. If East Germany and Czechoslovakia today are left without orders, the whole socialist camp will crack. Who needs such a camp if we cannot ensure orders? After all, the issue stands as such: either feed the workers of the GDR for free, or provide orders, or otherwise lose the GDR entirely. That is why Nikita Sergeevich blew up [*vzorvalsia*]. I also almost blew up.

Voices. Blew up.

Khrushchev. Now it is clear that they had an understanding to fight us on this issue.

Mikoian. I also think so...

Comrades, after the Hungarian and Polish events, our prestige abroad temporarily weakened somewhat. First, we bared our teeth to the enemies, the Americans, for Hungary, and bared our teeth for Egypt and achieved a halt to the war which had started there.

Then they again conducted a policy of disarmament in order to turn the sympathy of the petty-bourgeois elements toward them. Molotov says that the Leninist policy of using the contradictions of the imperialist camp is not being put into practice. But he makes [only] one citation. First of all, he incorrectly interprets it. But even so, let us assume that he is correctly interpreting it. Look at our party's policy on splitting the bourgeois world. Our comrades went to India and to Burma, and managed to undermine the influence of the imperialist powers on the countries of Asia.

Voices. Correct.

Mikoian. Earlier we had no access to the Arab countries; English influence had such a hold on the Muslim religion, that we had no access there. Three imperialist powers gathered together and decided all of the issues of the Near East without us. But when we sold arms to Egypt, we bared our teeth to our enemies, and Nasser turned out to be a strong leader, so that now they cannot any longer resolve the issues of the Near East without us. Is that not a realization of the Leninist policy on using the contradictions of the imperialist camp? In the given case we are supporting bourgeois nationalists against the imperialists.

Voices. Correct.

Mikoian. Com. Voroshilov went to Indonesia. Indonesia is a bourgeois state, in many ways feudal, even, which only recently won its political independence. They met Voroshilov triumphantly not only because he is a good person, but because he represents the Soviet Union. Remember the age we are living in, and the strength we have. The Indonesians are a 70-million-strong people; they have a smart President, Sukarno, but in order to strengthen his power with the people, he needs a visit from Voroshilov, in order to strengthen his influence through him. What strength we have and communism has...

They accuse com. Khrushchev of being hot-tempered and harsh [*goriach i rezok*]. But there they went and met without him. You can't imagine the precipitousness and fervor of coms. Molotov and Kaganovich at the meeting of the Presidium! In the course of less than 10 days at three sessions of the CC Presidium on the three foreign-trade issues this now open grouping held trial battles, specifically on trade with Austria, on orders for equipment in people's democratic countries, on trade with Finland. After this, an attack started along the whole front. It is true, Finland is a bourgeois country and borders us, but is that really important to us? We know this through war with the Finns and the Germans. The Finnish people knows how to make war, and our task, not to make war, is the greatest task for our state. For that very reason coms. Khrushchev and Bulganin travelled to Finland and succeeded there...

Further, what did we do in foreign policy? Com. Khrushchev proposed that a letter be written from com. Bulganin to the Norwegians. At that time we had been arguing with the Norwegians after the Hungarian events, so let's now write a letter to the Norwegians, but say politely that if you meddle in military affairs, we will wipe you off the face of the earth [*sotrem s litsa zemli*]. We approved this, and it turned out to be a good idea.

Khrushchev. To speak about serious issues in a friendly tone.

Mikoian. The people from MID [*Midovtsy*] have now begun to write drafts of notes and letters. Well before, they put together documents very badly, in a criminal, crude way of speaking, stereotypically; it was impossible to read them.

That has made a huge impression. They sent letters to the English as well. They were influential. They addressed the French people. They didn't write to Eisenhower, not to everyone, but only to those of whom I have talked. Does this mean that we know how to see and use contradictions? We have been using the contradictions of capitalism everywhere in our foreign policy.

Molotov has picked on one sentence of com. Khrushchev's: the USSR and the USA are the only possessors of atomic weapons, and now decide the questions of war and peace.

Khrushchev. Or the following fact: when we proposed to the President of the USA, Eisenhower, to call England and France to order during the English and French attack on Egypt. Was that not a use of contradictions?

Mikoian. I am concerned about time, and for that reason do not talk about that. Remember the circumstances: there was an uprising in Hungary; our troops occupied Budapest, and the Anglo-French decided: the Russians are stuck in Hungary, [so] let's hit Egypt; they can't help; they can't fight on two fronts. We'll pour dirt on the Russians, they say, and we will thump Egypt; we will deprive the Soviet Union of influence in the Near East. That is what they decided, and we found both the

strength to keep troops in Hungary and to threaten the imperialists that if they do not end the war in Egypt, it could lead to the use of missile weapons by us. Everyone recognizes that with that we decided the fate of Egypt. Even before that, we made a move that com. Khrushchev talked about. Since the Americans were conducting a different policy from the English, and did not want to dirty themselves with a colonial war, [or] that their “friends” be so dirtied, but to do in Egypt themselves [*a samim ukhlopat’ Egipet*]. We said the following to the Americans: let’s introduce American-Soviet troops together in order to restore peace in Egypt, which would accord with the goals of the United Nations. This produced a huge effect.

From the point of view of using the contradictions of imperialism in the interests of communist policy, there has never been such a broad practice, such rich results, as in recent years in our Central Committee with the participation of com. Khrushchev...

Voice. Correct (Applause).

[Source: Istoricheskii arkhiv 3-6(1993) and 1-2 (1994)
Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie]

¹ Ed. Note.: It is especially ironic to hear Mikoian praise the opposition’s unity in 1956, since he himself was the main dissenter from the decision to invade Hungary. Unanimity of decision was only formally maintained because Mikoian was in Budapest, protesting long-distance, when the actual decision to intervene was made on 30-31 October 1956. For more on this, see “The Malin Notes on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956” Translated, annotated and introduced by Mark Kramer, *CWIHP Bulletin* 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997) pp. 385-410.

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Evening, 25 June 1957

Gromyko. Comrades! Our foreign enemies are at present betting on and placing their main hopes on disorder and collapse in our leadership. Let us ask one question: what would happen if this anti-party group seized the leadership; how would that be seen abroad, above all by the American bourgeoisie—our main enemy? They would see it as their victory.

Voices. Without a doubt.

Voice. They would thank Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov.

Gromyko. They would see it in the following way, that Dulles’ policy, the policy of the “cold war,” the policy of squeezing, of pressure on the Soviet Union, had won out. Let coms. Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, and those who made a bloc with them, look at the situation they have put themselves in. I think that it would not be a mistake to say that they have put themselves in a certain sense in the position of Dulles’ allies.

Voices. Correct.

Gromyko. And in the absence of unity, it is easier for enemies to slip us another Hungary and a second edition of

17 June 1953—the events in the GDR. They can say to us: fine, the Russian people have shown that more than once in complicated circumstances they close ranks; the leadership also closes ranks, and victory is assured thereby.

It is true, history has shown that both the people and the leadership close ranks when the dark hour tolls. The people closed ranks even when the tsars were in our country. But at what price would the defense of our great cause of socialism come, if the hopes of the enemy were realized, if our leadership were shattered!

Comrades, I cannot agree with some of the statements that there is only an embryonic political platform here so far, but not a platform. I think that if one analyzes everything that has been said by the troika, above all by Molotov as well as those who formed a bloc with him, then one must come to the conclusion that politically—if a political assessment is to be given—a real revisionist platform was present. It affected both the political and the economic life of our country, as well as the issue of cadres.

As for cadres, I think that no one would disagree that if the troika and their accomplices had taken control of the leadership, the shadow of Shatalin or some equivalent of him would have reappeared. And these people don’t have to be taught how to make short work of cadres.

The comrades who spoke correctly said that we were talking about people who had lost touch with life, with the people, with practical work, having buried themselves in paperwork [*zashlis’ v bumagakh*]. But I would like as far as possible to emphasize one side of the affair, which has not been sufficiently emphasized. These people for a long time put themselves in a position where they lecture members of the CC Presidium who are taking the correct position, CC members, and so on, left and right. They regard everyone sitting here, as a rule, as adolescents who, as they say, walk under the table like a pawn [*pod stol peshkom khodiat*].

Voices. Correct.

Gromyko. It is true that many of us are ten or perhaps fifteen years younger than some of the participants of the anti-party group. But that is not our fault. If that is anyone’s fault, it is our mothers’ and fathers’.

Voice. That is only by age.

Gromyko. They do not notice that people have grown up both literally and politically. They are not the same people who they were ten or fifteen years ago. The present plenum has confirmed this well. Our CC is the full master of the situation.

The participants in the anti-party group have put themselves in the position of some sort of priests [*zhretsy*]. Even in ancient Greece where there were priests, they existed when their existence corresponded to the needs of the ruling class. I think that something similar must be said now. Approximately the same conclusion should be made: there is no need at all for these priests. (Laughter, applause.)

Comrades, even the bourgeoisie, including the

American and English [bourgeoisie], cannot permit themselves the luxury of keeping a person who has lost all value for the state leadership in his job. An example: Churchill. He did not serve badly in the interests of the colonial British empire, but when he lost his value, they sent him to paint landscapes. (Laughter in the hall.)

Voices. Correct.

Gromyko. When Eden lost his value, although he was a bit younger, they sent him on an indefinite vacation. I think that the troika, and perhaps some of those who formed a bloc with the troika, should also be sent to paint landscapes. (Laughter in the hall.)

Voices. Correct.

Gromyko. Comrades, I wanted to emphasize with all decisiveness one more point, since it relates to many of the actions of our foreign policy. In my opinion, the Central Committee should know some facts which the previous speakers could not talk about simply because they are not involved in this business, while our brother [Molotov] sits on [*nash brat sidit na*] foreign policy affairs.

From all of the practical work of the CC Presidium over the course of at least the last two years, it has become clear that these priests are trying to present com.

Khrushchev's role in the CC as that of an agronomist. That is a definite line. You see, they say, he knows agriculture and runs it. In this way they want to cancel out the huge contributions which the First Secretary of the CC, com. Khrushchev, has made to the country and the party.

I want to touch on another area in the political and economic leadership of the country, and also in the area of foreign policy.

Here com. Mikoian has touched on one issue of foreign policy—our serious warning which was made to England and France when these countries launched into military adventurism against Egypt. It is well known that that action was appreciated abroad, and it is correct, that the way the ultimatum put an end to the military actions against Egypt in 28 hours after com. Bulganin's message was sent to Eisenhower, the English and French premiers and the Israeli premier, Ben Gurion, was in our interests.

Malik. Eden broke out crying when he received the message.

Gromyko. There were reasons to cry.

Comrades, I consider myself a person who is economical with words, but I should report to the Central Committee that the dispatch of that message was the initiative of com. Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Central Committee. (Applause). Shepilov was minister of foreign affairs then. He spoke here, but his tongue could not move to note that fact. He loses the gift of speech in such cases.

Shepilov. At dozens of meetings, including at MID meetings, I said that this aided our rapprochement with the Arabs, that this was com. Khrushchev's initiative.

Gromyko. Why did you not say so to the Central Committee?

Shepilov. I agree.

Gromyko. Why am I talking about this? I want to emphasize that the CC Presidium, and above all the First Secretary, has led on issues of the USSR's foreign policy. Unfortunately, not so many foreign policy issues were discussed at plenums. It would be good if we correct this in the future; we must correct this situation.

And so, speaking about the leadership of our foreign policy, I do not want to create the impression that merits in this matter fall proportionately to all in the CC Presidium, including from the troika. Nothing of the sort.

The main, if one can express oneself this way, impulses on issues of foreign policy came from the First Secretary of the party Central Committee (Applause).

Voices. Correct.

Gromyko. I do not hesitate to say this, although at present I head our diplomatic department. If I did not want and did not desire to speak about this, I would be misunderstanding [*lozhno ponimal by*] the prestige of the MID.

Second issue. I will only mention it—the Austrian treaty. That is not only a decision by the CC Presidium. Com. Khrushchev insisted on the necessity of making a decision. You all know the positive significance of that whole affair.

The Trieste issue—that is also his proposal.

The issue of normalizing relations with West Germany—that is also his initiative. As a result, we received a huge lever of influence on the internal conditions in West Germany. Without this, it is possible that the Bundeswehr would be armed with atomic weapons. The plans to expand the West German army were disrupted and in any case delayed in large part because we, by establishing our embassy in Bonn, provided the Social Democratic opposition in West Germany with a rich line of argument. I repeat, the normalization of relations with West Germany has in large part aided this.

This was adopted on the insistence, not only by the proposal, but on the insistence of com. Khrushchev in the face of opposition from com. Molotov.

Voices. Yes.

Gromyko. The normalization of relations with Japan...

Molotov. I did not oppose, but on the contrary, supported...

Gromyko. When, Viacheslav Mikhailovich?

Molotov. I supported the establishment of relations with West Germany as well.

Gromyko. I will remind you of the facts: You came back from the conference in San Francisco. The day before, the issue was discussed in the CC Presidium. There was a decision at com. Khrushchev's suggestion to normalize relations with West Germany and to send an open note to the Adenauer government. We at MID prepared such a note in keeping with com. Khrushchev's proposal. Against this, as far as I remember, there were no objections in the Presidium.

Com. Molotov returned. I did not physically have the

time to introduce [show to the Presidium] this issue before his return. The minister arrived; he examined the proposal. Deputy minister V.S. Semenov who is present here and I tried to convince com. Molotov that the draft should be brought to the CC as had been pre-approved in the Presidium. Am I speaking correctly, com. Semenov?

Semenov. Correctly.

Gromyko. We said: it is a correct decision and should be introduced in this form in particular. Com. Molotov says: no, by introducing such a draft, we will extend a hand to [West German Chancellor Konrad] Adenauer and entreat him. He cancelled this decision and introduced his own proposal. Of course, the Presidium altered the whole thing and affirmed its decision.

Molotov. An open letter is one thing, and a non-open letter is another. The difference here is not an essential one, but one of form.

Gromyko. Not only on this issue, although it in particular was a very important issue.

Voice. We were talking about the content.

Gromyko. We were talking about making a direct proposal on normalization to put Adenauer in a difficult position and not to drag out the matter as before.

On disarmament. I am not going to repeat what has been said before—it is a complex problem. But here as well the main decisions were, as a rule, taken by the First Secretary of the CC.

The virgin lands were spoken about here. I want to emphasize this matter from another angle. If it hadn't been for the virgin lands—and it is well known on whose insistence the relevant decision was made—this year we not only would have been on hunger rations [*na golodnom païke*], but we could not have sold grain to our friends. We would have been obliged to market our gold abroad, in the context of our very tight foreign-trade balance. We could not have sold bread to the Poles, the Hungarians, or the Albanians. I am not even talking about the fact that we could not have sold [bread] to Egypt.

I do not want to repeat myself on the theme of how significant that would have been, but I do want to emphasize one fact: if we had not given [*dali*] the people's democratic countries bread, then...

Mikoian. If we had not sold [*prodali*] it [to them].

Gromyko. If we had not sold them bread, those countries would have been obliged to turn to someone else; there is only one someone else—the Americans. And they will not only sell bread, but will sell with the simultaneous attachment of one-sided conditions.

The negotiations which have recently taken place between the Poles and the Americans on some issues, including on the issue of selling so-called agricultural surpluses to Poland, have shown that the Americans seize anything they can with their teeth in order to attach the conditions they need.

After all, in Egypt, if it had not been for our arms and our grain...

Mikoian. And oil plus [our] purchases of cotton,

then, although it cannot be said definitely; in such matters you cannot make categorical assertions; but there is a good likelihood that Egypt would have been brought to its knees.

I want to touch on another issue as well. It would be good if com. Molotov mentally went out into the middle of the hall and looked at himself speaking from this tribune. He would see what a pathetic picture it is. It was also a pathetic picture when he tried to denigrate the visits of our leading officials, above all, of course, com. Khrushchev, to other countries with serious missions, as a result of which the foreign-policy influence of our state, the Soviet Union, has been increased in several countries and several world regions.

I must say that I simply bow before the huge work of great state importance which was done during these trips by com. Khrushchev. As is well known, com. Bulganin travelled with him, but com. Khrushchev was always the soul of the matter.

Voices. Correct. (Applause).

Gromyko. This applies to the visit to India. I was among the accompanying persons. It applies to the trip to Yugoslavia, to Afghanistan, to Burma, to England, to Finland, and to the meeting of the leaders of the four powers' summit in Geneva in 1955. And I think that com. Molotov resorted to fairly dirty methods on purpose in his effort to denigrate [Khrushchev], since com. Molotov did not and could not have any other arguments worthy of attention.

Voices. Correct.

Gromyko. In Finland during the last visit there was a pack of foreign correspondents from Finnish, French, American, and English newspapers that were very hostile to us. But not one of the correspondents nor any one of the newspapers which were most hostile to the Soviet Union dared to bring any facts that would cast a shadow on the behavior of com. Khrushchev and com. Bulganin during their last trip.

What sort of conclusion follows from this? The conclusion is as follows: the ethics of the bourgeois newspapers which were most hostile to us turned out to be more elevated than the ethics by which Molotov now lets himself be guided at the CC Plenum.

Voices. Correct. (Applause.)

Gromyko. Com. Molotov also dredged up com. Khrushchev's interview. I want to inform the Central Committee [about something]. I consider that it has the right and should know this fact. Com. Khrushchev did not propose himself, did not ask for this interview. The proposal that com. Khrushchev agree to give an interview was made by the MID, by me. It was discussed in the CC Presidium. At the beginning I had the following impression: com. Khrushchev did not have a very fixed opinion as to whether he should or should not give an interview. I spoke "for," and the members of the Presidium approved our proposal, and the decision was taken.

By its content the interview given was good and

correct. I must say that not many of the Soviet Union's foreign policy actions have stirred up a hornet's nest in the USA as did that interview. In vain, Molotov tried to depict the matter as if there were some new doubtful positions which do not follow from our party line and were not approved by the CC Presidium. There is nothing of the sort. There are no such positions. The only positions there are those which follow and are wholly founded on the resolutions of the 20th congress of the CPSU, on the resolutions of the CC Presidium and of the party CC itself. There is one new thing in the interview. What is new? It is the fresh, original form of the presentation of our views with an exposition of Soviet foreign policy. But that itself is valuable. What was needed was exactly a lively, intelligible form of presentation, of exposition of the views and issues of our foreign policy. That was needed; it contributed to the interview's huge effect.

In the course of our work we read official and unofficial communications, which in particular relate to an assessment of this interview, and with all confidence I can state that it was assessed in precisely that way...

[Source: Istoricheskii arkhiv 3-6(1993) and 1-2 (1994) Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie]

26 June 1957

Ustinov. I am convinced that this anti-party grouping had a platform on the issues of agriculture and foreign policy. Remember the plenum [in July 1955], when the issue of Yugoslavia was discussed. At that time I thought: why object to the establishment of friendly relations with any country, and in particular with Yugoslavia, which has a highly important strategic significance? It would seem, on the contrary, that we must win it at any cost. The Americans are throwing around colossal amounts of money in order to make the territory available for their bases. Com. Khrushchev made a reasonable proposal. Remember what he said: we must attract Yugoslavia to our side and try to isolate it [Yugoslavia] from the capitalists...

Shelepin. Since the steam bath was talked about, I want to bring up the following fact. There was a discussion in the plenum about com. Molotov's wife and he was warned: "Take charge of her; bring her into line (*Vos'mi ee v ruki, navedi poriadok*)," - but he evidently did not draw conclusions from that.¹ At one point I was sent together with com. N.M. Pegov to accompany [North Vietnamese leader] com. Ho Chi Minh to a pioneer camp. We arrive there and suddenly see a woman who tells us that she is from a children's home under Molotov's wife, and that she had come in order to take com. Ho Chi Minh and drive him to the children's home. We told her that com. Ho Chi Minh was not going there. In reply to this, she stated: no, he will go, since Polina Semenovna [Zhemchuzhina] said that he would go.

If com. Molotov had drawn conclusions from the criticism at the plenum, would she really have dared to act in that way?

Molotov. You must say the facts, and not what someone said.

Shelepin. And I'm telling facts. I myself was there and am not adding a word.

¹ Ed. Note: P.S. Zhemchuzhina's Jewishness, her friendship with Golda Meir, and her sister in Palestine/Israel brought a charge of treason, when the campaign against "rootless cosmopolitans" was loosed. She had been exiled in 1949 by a direct vote of the Politburo, Molotov abstaining. According to Roy Medvedev: "The day of Stalin's funeral, 9 March, was also Molotov's birthday. As they were leaving the mausoleum, Khrushchev and Malenkov wished him a happy birthday, despite the occasion, and asked what he would like as a present. 'Give me back Polina,' he replied coldly, and moved on." Two years later, Mikunis bumped into Molotov in the privileged Kremlin Hospital at Kuntsevo [where Stalin had one of his dachas]. "I went up to him and asked, 'How could you, a member of the Politburo, let them arrest your wife?' He gave me a cold look and asked me who I thought I was. I replied, 'I am the General Secretary of the Israeli Communist Party, and that's why I'm asking you.'" (Quotes from Roy Medvedev, *All Stalin's Men*. (New York, 1985), pp. 98-99, 102-3.)

[Source: Istoricheskii arkhiv 3-6(1993) and 1-2 (1994) Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie]

Evening, 28 June 1957

Suslov (chairing). Com. Kuznetsov has the floor.

Kuznetsov. ...How is it possible not to note—even our enemies recognize this—that since 1953, the Soviet Union has enjoyed huge successes in the area of foreign policy, while in 1953, the country was essentially on the brink of war? Friendly ties have been established and are being strengthened with many states on the basis of a struggle to consolidate peace. The international authority of the Soviet Union as the leading state in the struggle for peace and security, as the friend of all peoples who are fighting against the imperialists for their national independence and freedom, has grown immeasurably...

The steps taken by the Soviet Union in the Egyptian issue and on the whole throughout the Near and Middle East are exemplars of the realization of Leninist policy in international affairs.

What was the situation in the United Nations prior to 5 November of last year, as the English, French, and Israeli imperialists unleashed war on Egypt at the end of October.

Day and night the General Assembly meets; the [UN] Security Council meets and adopts many resolutions, but no concrete steps are taken against the aggressors. With

the assent of the USA, the English and French imperialists had conducted things so as to deflect public opinion and make quick work of Egypt.

The delegations of Egypt and other Arab countries in the UN were in a very anxious state; help could only come from the Soviet Union. And the Soviet Union did not let them down. When on 5 November they found out in the UN about the letters sent by the Soviet government on 5 November to England, France, the USA and Israel, there was an effect that could not have been produced by the explosion of several hydrogen bombs. On 7 [November], military actions were halted, and after that the withdrawal of the aggressors from Egypt began.

Even the bourgeois diplomats, who of course are embittered against the USSR, said in conversations with us that from the point of view of diplomacy it was a step that was hard to overestimate. At the same time they noted with obvious envy that the Soviet Union, without a single shot, without any actual involvement, forced two imperialist plunderers—England and France—to cease military activities and withdraw their troops from Egypt.

Besides this, these actions by the Soviet government helped us to acquire many new friends and to strengthen ties with old ones.

I want to draw your attention to the fact that com. Molotov talks a lot about using contradictions in the capitalist camp. It is well known that before 1953, the Soviet Union in its position on many international issues pushed the USA, England, and France together. [People] simply stopped believing that [over] there, the USA, England, and France have serious differences on many problems...

Khrushchev. ...we stopped buying butter abroad. When Malenkov was Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1953-1954, we threw away a lot of gold in order to buy butter [*maslo*], herring, fabric, and other products and goods. How much gold did we spend then, com. Malenkov—200-250 tons?

Voice: If not more.

Khrushchev. Can one really resolve state issues in such a way? We will give away all of the gold, and there will be no more butter. They must be resolved in another way.

I want to say the following. Everyone knows that we must help (by treaty) the German Democratic Republic [GDR], since it is our socialist stronghold, our front line [*perednii krai*] in the struggle with the capitalist world. Politics has its logic. If the Germans in the GDR live worse than in the Federal Republic of Germany, then communists there will not be supported. For that reason, we must sell the GDR the necessary agricultural products. And we are doing this. Now we received a telegram in which the Germans are asking us to withhold shipments of butter and meat to them, since more has been prepared there than foreseen by the plan. That is a gratifying development.

This year for the first time, we celebrated the First of May without introducing a resolution on strengthening shipments of goods to the cities. Because everything that was stipulated in the plan is being supplied. This is the first time that has happened. And they try to depict that as a deviation! Oh, you... What makes you happy, if our successes distress you so?

Remember what sad results this policy led to, to the disruption of friendly relations with Turkey and Iran, our neighbors. It was literally a stupidity [*glupost'*]. In our incorrect policy in relation to Turkey we helped American imperialism. The Turks used to receive Voroshilov like a brother; they named a square after Voroshilov. But when the Second World War ended, we wrote a note to Turkey [saying] that we were tearing up the friendship treaty. Why? Because you are not giving up the Dardanelles. Listen, only a drunkard could write such a thing. After all, no country would give up the Dardanelles voluntarily.

The issue of Iran. What did we do in Iran? We put our troops there and started to boss them around [*stali tam khoziainichat'*]. And when the smell of gunpowder was in the air and we had either to fight or to leave, Stalin said—we must leave before it's too late, and we left. We poisoned the Persians' mood. When the Iranian shah visited us, he said that they could not forget what we wanted to do. I do not remember who was the minister of foreign affairs then, but in any case, Molotov was one of Stalin's main advisers on issues of international politics.

Gromyko. Molotov was minister then.

Molotov. But the proposal was not mine.

Khrushchev. But you fully agreed with it. With our short-sighted policies we drove Turkey and Iran into the embraces of the USA and England, into the Baghdad pact.

Take the war with Finland. It was costly to us, and as a result of it we were disentangling ourselves for a long time. And the war in Korea, which exacerbated the international situation to the utmost.

There was a period in which, as a result of a series of incorrect foreign-policy steps, our relations with the people's democratic countries started to worsen.

After Stalin's death, Molotov once again became head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He kept trying to conduct his same policy, which could not but lead to the isolation of the Soviet Union and to the loss of many foreign-policy positions. How did Molotov enter the MID? Beria and Malenkov decided that. What guided them? I think that it is not accidental; everything was thought out. Essentially, the international policies of Stalin were Molotov's policies. Although it must be said that Stalin was much wiser and more flexible in his conduct of basic foreign policy than Molotov. The CC was forced to remove Molotov from leadership over foreign issues...

Molotov's policy could not but lead to a worsening of relations between states; it would have helped the imperialists unite their forces against the USSR. It is an

adventurist policy. And he still has the gall to cite Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, teaching us Leninist foreign policy. He is an empty dogmatist (*nachetchik*) detached from [real] life...

Khrushchev. A little while ago when we were in Finland, I criticized Bulganin for his incorrect statements. We came to a peasant's farm, went out onto a hillock; the farmer is showing us his lands, and everything is going well. Suddenly Bulganin says: here is an excellent observation point (laughter in the hall). I almost gasped [*chut' ne akhnul*]. Listen to what you're saying, I say. And he answers me: you are a civilian, and I am a military man. Well, what sort of military man are you! You should think before speaking. There is a saying: in the house of a hanged man you don't talk about rope.

Just imagine what it must have been for the Finns to hear such words. We fought against Finland, and then restored good relations; we came to visit as guests, they met us in a cordial manner, and it turns out that we have come to pick out command points. Is that friendship? It is obvious that that offends, insults them. The minister of foreign affairs and other Finnish officials were with us, and I don't know how they took that statement...

Khrushchev. Molotov said that allegedly we are not using the contradictions between the imperialist states in the interests of strengthening the countries of the socialist camp. But that is a slander. Remember our government's appeal to the United States with a proposal to speak out jointly against the aggression of England, France, and Israel in Egypt. Was that really not an example of our active policy of unmasking the imperialists? Having proposed joint action against England, France, and Israel to Eisenhower in order to avoid war in Egypt, comrades, we tore the veil [*pokryvalo*] off the aggressors. We also got a big trump for exposing the USA's policy. Before this, the Egyptians said that the Soviet Union was leaving them to the whims of fate, that only the USA was defending them in the Security Council. And suddenly we propose joint action. The Egyptian people rejoiced and thanked the Soviet Union.

Or remember our letters to Guy Mollet, Eden, and Ben Gurion. In those countries, one could determine the meaning of those letters even by the smell of the air (laughter in the hall), because within 24 hours the war was halted. And they tell us about an inability to use contradictions. Is that really not using contradictions?

Voice: At that moment Eden came down with a fever.

Khrushchev. Some wits at one of the receptions said: Eden came down with an inflammation of the [urethral] canal... The Suez canal, because at that moment he resigned and lay down in bed. (Laughter in the hall).

The foreign-policy steps of our party's CC during the Anglo-Franco-Israeli aggression and the counter-revolutionary putsch in Hungary averted the danger of the outbreak of a new world war.

What is the position of the Soviet Union now in the international arena? On all the core issues of international politics, including issues such as the problem of disarmament and the banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the initiative is in the Soviet Union's hands. With our peace-loving policy we have put the imperialist states on the defensive.

In my rejoinder I already spoke about the worrying case when Shepilov, as editor of *Pravda*, committed an outright forgery, having published a falsified photograph depicting Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Malenkov in the interests of servility toward Malenkov. In reality, there was no such photograph. There was a group photograph in which many persons were photographed. But Shepilov removed all of these people from the photograph and left only three people, wishing by this to aggrandize Malenkov and serve him. For that the Central Committee gave Shepilov a stern reprimand....[Ed. Note: The Stalin-Mao-Malenkov faked photo and copy of original from which it was made can be found facing p. 128 in Martin Ebon, *Malenkov: Stalin's Successor* (McGraw Hill: NY, 1953).]

[Source: Istoricheskii arkhiv 3-6(1993) and 1-2(1994)
Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie]

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“This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse”¹

The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik* and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives

*Introduced and annotated
by Christian F. Ostermann*

Since the opening of the former Communist bloc archives it has become evident that the crisis in East Germany in the spring and summer of 1953 was one of the key moments in the history of the Cold War. The East German Communist regime was much closer to the brink of collapse, the popular revolt much more widespread and prolonged, the resentment of SED leader Walter Ulbricht by the East German population much more intense than many in the West had come to believe.² The uprising also had profound, long-term effects on the internal and international development of the GDR. By renouncing the industrial norm increase that had sparked the demonstrations and riots, regime and labor had found an uneasy, implicit compromise that production could rise only as long as norms remained low and wages high — a compromise that posed a severe restraint for Ulbricht when, in the early 1960s, he sought to reform the GDR economy through his “New Economic System.”³ Moreover, instead of allowing for greater political liberalization, as the Soviet-decreed New Course had envisioned at least to a certain degree, the eventual triumph of the hardliners headed by Ulbricht resulted in a dramatic expansion of the apparatus of repression and in the encrustation of an essentially Stalinist system in the ensuing months.⁴

Even more surprising, important and controversial are the international repercussions of the crisis. How did it intersect with the power struggle that was taking place in the Kremlin in the weeks following Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953? Recently, this question has received impetus by the publication of new materials on the activities of KGB chief and Minister of the Interior, Lavrentii Beria. A number of formerly secret internal party documents and memoirs seem to suggest that Beria was ready to abandon socialism in the GDR, in fact to give up the very existence of the East German regime, which had been set up with Soviet support in the Soviet occupation zone in Germany in October 1949.⁵ Did Beria’s alleged plan — the reunification of Germany as a democratic and neutral country — represent a missed opportunity for an early end to Germany’s division and perhaps the Cold War? Some historians have questioned the new evidence and the existence of a serious policy alternative, arguing that the disagreement on German policy among the Soviet leadership was “not as serious as it looked.”⁶

1953 also looms large as a defining moment in Soviet-

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East German relations as Ulbricht seemed to have used the uprising to turn weakness into strength. On the height of the crisis in East Berlin, for reasons that are not yet entirely clear, the Soviet leadership committed itself to the political survival of Ulbricht and his East German state. Unlike his fellow Stalinist leader, Hungary’s Matyas Rakosi, who was quickly demoted when he embraced the New Course less enthusiastically than expected, Ulbricht, equally unenthusiastic and stubborn — and with one foot over the brink — somehow managed to regain support in Moscow. The commitment to his survival would in due course become costly for the Soviets who were faced with Ulbricht’s ever increasing, ever more aggressive demands for economic and political support.

Curiously, the 1953 East German uprising also turned out to be crucially significant for Western, in particular American, policy. The uprising did not only undermine British premier Winston Churchill’s grand scheme for an East-West deal on Germany and help West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer win a sweeping victory at the federal elections later that fall.⁷ The uprising also jolted the U.S. administration, first into believing that the dawn of “liberation” had arrived, and then, after a US-sponsored food-aid-program evoked much more of a response among East Berliners and East Germans than the Americans had expected, into reassessing the feasibility of a “rollback” strategy.⁸

Perhaps the most fascinating meaning of 1953 lies in the impact of these events on the mindset of the SED and Soviet leaders. Much like the discourse among dissidents and the population at large, in which 1953 became an almost mythological, though ambiguous, point of reference, the crisis became deeply embedded in the collective memory of a generation of East German leaders and a powerful symbol within the “discourse” among East bloc leaders. 1953 came to stand for a hardline repressive resolution of internal unrest and the ultima ratio of Soviet military intervention, and as such was central Ulbricht’s (and later Erich Honecker’s) hardline approach to crises in Eastern Europe in 1956, 1968 and 1980/81. “This is our experience from the year 1953,” Honecker reminded Polish party chief Stanislaw Kania and his colleagues during the December 1980 East bloc summit at the height of the Polish crisis, urging a crackdown on the oppositional “Solidarity” movement and holding out the possibil-

ity of Warsaw Pact intervention.⁹

Given the importance of the 1953 East German crisis, it is little surprising that Soviet policy towards Germany and the East German uprising in the spring and summer of 1953 have come under intense scholarly scrutiny since the opening of the Russian and East German archives in 1990-1992.¹⁰ Yet key aspects of this episode of the Cold War remain controversial. Historians, in particular Germans, still fiercely debate the essential character of the crisis: was it basically labor unrest against industrial norm increases or a failed popular rebellion?¹¹ Even more controversial are the international ramifications of the East German crisis in the spring and summer of 1953. What were the intentions of Stalin's successors with regard to Germany? Did Beria favor "a grand bargain that would reunify Germany as a capitalist, neutral government?"¹² What role did the German question play in the post-Stalin succession struggle. What effect did the East German uprising have on the policy-making process in Moscow?

The documents edited below, obtained in preparation or as a result of the November 1996 conference on "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," co-sponsored by the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Studien (Potsdam), the National Security Archive (Washington), and the Cold War International History Project, shed new light on these questions and contribute in important ways to our understanding of the 1953 crisis.¹³ The following essay will briefly introduce the documents, highlighting the significance of the new evidence.

Soviet policy toward Germany after 1945 has been a hotly contested field of research. Recent studies on the Soviet occupation zone in Germany have revealed that Stalin's policy was deeply conflicted and inherently contradictory. Soviet policy options in postwar Germany — the Sovietization of the Eastern occupation zone, the creation of a unified, socialist Germany, or the establishment of a demilitarized "neutral" Germany — remained essentially unresolved during the early years of the Cold War.¹⁴ Even after the establishment of the German Democratic Republic, run by the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands = SED), Stalin's policy remained, by all indications, torn between the full satellization of the new state and all-German aspirations. Stalin's hopes for gaining influence over all of Germany notwithstanding, by early 1953 his policies had driven East Germany's economy into the ground, and socio-economic conditions had become critical.

Reparations and occupation costs had taken a heavy toll on East Germany's economic resources since the end of the war.¹⁵ In early April 1952, Stalin had told visiting East German leaders that "you must organize your own state," demanding that they turn the relatively open demarcation line between East and West Germany into a "frontier" and that everything be done to "strengthen the protection of this frontier."¹⁶ Stalin apparently also decreed the creation of an East German army — "Every-

thing without clamor but persistently" — and announced that the "pacifist period" was over. He also sanctioned the socialization of GDR agriculture and industry, again "without much clamor."¹⁷ That summer, at its Second Party Conference (July 9-12), the SED announced the policy of "the forced construction of socialism," following final approval by Moscow on July 8. The crash socialization and collectivization course quickly aggravated economic dislocations and popular discontent. Extraordinarily harsh regimentation and persecution, massive arrests and trials accompanying the new policy added to the strains on the social and economic fabric of the GDR. By early 1953, East Germans were fleeing their homeland by the thousands.

The mounting crisis in the GDR coincided with a change of leadership in Moscow: Stalin died on 5 March 1953. Even as the dictator was still dying at his dacha in the Moscow suburb of Kuntsevo, Beria and Georgii Malenkov plotted to seize the reins of power. The two quickly coopted Nikita Khrushchev, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, into the leading "troika," and secured the state and party apparatus under their control. Lacking both stature and legitimacy, they put Viacheslav Molotov in charge of foreign affairs, leaving the defense ministry to Nikolai Bulganin. Breaking with the hard-line and paranoid policies that had put Soviet policy on the defensive worldwide, the new leadership immediately moved to put Soviet foreign policy on a more calm and flexible track. Shortly after Stalin's death, Malenkov announced a "peace initiative," arguing that there were "no contested issues in U.S.-Soviet relations that could not be resolved by peaceful means." Within weeks, the Soviet leadership indicated its desire to end the Korean War, and deal with lingering disputes such as those over Austria, Iran, and Turkey. While terrified to let any internal dissension leak out to the West, Malenkov and Beria soon began to press the more conservative "Stalinist" Molotov to reconsider Soviet policy on these critical issues. Slowly but persistently, Malenkov and Beria sought to limit Molotov's prerogative over foreign affairs.

Germany loomed large in the minds of the Soviet leaders in those days. In March, the Deutsche Bundestag, the West German parliament, had sanctioned the Bonn Treaty (General Treaty) which provided the Federal Republic with a broad degree of sovereignty, and it had passed the government's decision to join the European Defense Community (Paris Treaty). Brainstorming within the Soviet Foreign Ministry, therefore, was initially concerned with finding a response to the Bonn and Paris Treaties, with regaining the initiative on the German question, rather than with solving the East German crisis per se. Initial memoranda were drafted in the Foreign Ministry by German specialists Georgii Pushkin and Jakob Malik on April 18 and 21 for the Presidium meeting on April 22. They suggested a nation-wide plebiscite on the "immediate establishment of a provisional all-German Government appointed by the parliaments of the GDR and

West Germany, while preserving Germany's two existing governments." Expecting that the measure would be opposed by the Western powers, the memoranda suggested as an alternative option a GDR government appeal to the Soviet government for the conclusion of a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. Wary of the possibility, as remote as it may have seemed, that the West might take the Soviets up on their proposals, Molotov remained skeptical of the exercise, reminding his subordinates at one point that they "failed to understand the essence of the policy of the three [Western powers] — to pull Germany to the bourgeois rails."¹⁸

Significantly, the proposal for a separate treaty with East Germany did not contain any references to the crisis in the GDR, but rather assumed the continued existence, even strengthening, of the East German regime until the conclusion of a peace treaty. As early as the beginning of April, Moscow had apparently hinted at a relaxation of the harsh socialization measures (only to be ignored by Ulbricht), and on April 18, the Soviet government promised aid in copper, steel and other raw materials to the GDR.¹⁹ Only after Vladimir Semenov, the Political Adviser to the Soviet Control Commission in Germany, had been recalled to Moscow on April 22 to head the Third European Division within the Foreign Ministry, did further concerns about the GDR enter the policy-making process. The April 28 version of the memorandum on Germany, entitled "Further Soviet Measures on the German Question,"²⁰ continued to call for the formation of a provisional all-German government by the East and West German parliaments "while preserving the existing governments of the GDR and West Germany" for an interim period. The provisional German government would draft an all-German electoral law, carry out free all-German elections and represent Germany in the quadripartite peace treaty negotiations. Once a provisional German government had been formed, the occupation powers would be obliged to withdraw their troops simultaneously. To raise the GDR's international prestige, however, the draft memorandum also called for the elimination of the Soviet Control Commission, the establishment of a Soviet embassy in its place and the return of German prisoners of war. It also suggested reducing reparation payments by 50%, returning all Soviet-owned enterprises in Germany to the GDR, and inviting a GDR government delegation to Moscow.

MID officials believed that such a proposal would not only "represent a new concrete step by the Soviet Government" on the issue of reunification and evoke a "broad positive response among the German people," but also "expose" the Western opposition to German unification on a "peaceful and democratic basis." Since it was likely that the Western powers would reject a troop withdrawal which, as the MID planners clearly recognized, would effectively upset "the aggressive plans of the North Atlantic bloc in Europe," the Soviet Union would gain considerable propaganda advantages.

Semenov continued to draft memoranda which sought to conceptualize the ministry's approach to the German question.²¹ Thus, in line with earlier planning papers on May 2, he suggested the elimination of the Soviet Control Commission, the domineering presence of which "emphasiz[ed] the inequality in relations between the USSR and the GDR," and reflected a degree of "political mistrust" in the SED regime, impeding the development of qualified East German cadres. Semenov also argued in his May 2 memorandum, in a statement that in retrospect turned out to be a gross miscalculation, that the SED had "strengthened and matured enough to manage on their own the leadership of the country."²² Semenov's insistence on reducing reparations apparently proved successful. On May 4, Molotov forwarded to Malenkov another draft of the proposals on Germany for discussion at the May 5 Presidium meeting, according to which reparations from the GDR for the 1953/55 period would be limited to the "sum of payment set for 1953" and terminated altogether by 1956. The document also suggested June as the date for the official state visit by an East German delegation, headed by Grotewohl and Ulbricht, to Moscow.²³

Sometime after mid-May 1953, the Soviet Foreign Ministry altered — or was forced to alter — its position, now taking a more critical attitude towards Ulbricht's policy of the "forced construction of socialism." Historians have long wondered what might have caused this change.²⁴ In light of the documents presented below, one very probable explanation is the growing number of reports critical of the deteriorating situation in the GDR and the SED's handling of crisis. The crucial point is that these reports emanated not only, and perhaps not even primarily, from the MID representatives in Germany, many of whom were ideologically committed to the GDR and inclined to underestimate the problems, but from the Soviet intelligence community. As early as March 9, Soviet intelligence officials in Berlin sent a pessimistic report to Berlin pointing to the "worsening class conflict in the GDR."²⁵ On May 6, Beria circulated an intelligence report among senior members of the CPSU presidium that argued that the dramatic rise in the number of refugees²⁶ could not "only be explained by the hostile propaganda directed by West German organs at the population of the GDR." Rather, it was the "unwillingness of individual groups of peasants to enter the agricultural production cooperatives now being organized, the fear on the part of small and middle-level businessmen of the abolition of private property and the confiscation of their goods, the desire of the youth to avoid military service, and the difficulties experienced in the GDR in supplying the population with foodstuffs and consumer goods" that caused the mass exodus. The Beria report blamed the SED and GDR government of not conducting "a sufficiently active fight against the demoralizing work carried out by the West German authorities," and charged that the SED "falsely assume[d] that as long as free circulation exists between West Berlin and the GDR, such flights are

inevitable.” Beria hence proposed to ask the SCC to submit proposals on ways to gain control over the mass flight “in order to make the necessary recommendations to our German friends.”²⁷

Given the later accusations against Beria, it is interesting that Beria apparently managed to receive the Presidium’s approval for his initiative on Germany. Very likely in response to the May 6 report, the head of the Soviet Control Commission (SCC), Vladimir Chuikov, Deputy Political Adviser to the SCC, Pavel Iudin, and USSR mission chief Ivan Il’ichev sent a memorandum to Moscow that criticized the SED’s handling of the implementation of “accelerated construction of socialism.”²⁸ Significantly, the memorandum was not addressed to Molotov but to Premier Malenkov, perhaps reflecting the impatience and annoyance of the Soviet representatives in Germany with the staunchly orthodox position of the Soviet Foreign Ministry on the German question (and Semenov’s key role in shaping that position).²⁹ Chuikov’s, Iudin’s and Il’ichev’s lengthy report on developments in the GDR gave an in-depth analysis of the mounting crisis and was highly critical of the SED, particularly its indifference to the mass flight of East Germans to the West. Foreshadowing the new course adopted in early June, Chuikov, Iudin and Il’ichev recommended an increase in consumer goods production, support of private artisanal production and individual farmers, a decrease in agricultural requisitions and a termination of the ration card system on basic foodstuffs. Nevertheless, the three Soviet officials eschewed more radical recommendations, and instead sought to suggest ways which would improve the efficiency and success of the socialization program.

On political administrative issues, the May 18 report similarly recommended changes while avoiding a call for more drastic steps. Thus, Chuikov, Iudin and Il’ichev wanted the SED to acknowledge the serious problem posed by the mass exodus of East Germans, reduce the massive number of those arrested as a result of excessive and arbitrary criminal codes, and reinstall some sense of reason, moderation and lawfulness in judicial and criminal procedures. At the same time, however, they emphasized increased and improved propaganda efforts as adequate ways to deal with the mass flight and opposition sentiment within the population. Chuikov, Iudin and Il’ichev hence seemed to have embraced Ulbricht’s witch hunt policies which blamed foreign propaganda, especially the US-controlled radio station in West Berlin, RIAS,³⁰ and internal subversion for the problems in the GDR.³¹

The discussion of the German problem among the Soviet leadership reached a climax in late May, at a meeting of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, which, chaired by Malenkov, had for a short time surpassed the CPSU Presidium as the main collective decision-making body.³² At the May 27 session, called to “analyze the causes which had led to the mass exodus of Germans from the GDR to West Germany and to discuss measures for correcting the unfavorable political and

economic situation in the GDR,” the Presidium members apparently agreed that the policy of the “forced construction of socialism” had to be terminated in order to avert a full-blown crisis.³³

According to the testimony by Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin and Khrushchev at the July 1953 CPSU plenum as well as later accounts by Khrushchev, Molotov, and Gromyko, Beria was not satisfied with solely adjusting the pace of socialization in East Germany. Instead of terminating the forced construction of socialism, he allegedly shocked his colleagues with a proposal to abandon socialism in the GDR altogether in favor of the creation of a united, neutral and non-socialist Germany. “We asked, “Why?,”” Molotov later recounted: ““And he replied, ‘Because all we want is a peaceful Germany, and it makes no difference whether or not it is socialist.’”³⁴ According to Molotov, Beria kept insisting that “it made no difference whether Germany was socialist or otherwise, that the most important concern was that Germany be peaceful.” Beria’s proposal was reminiscent of Stalin’s earlier musings on Germany, but since then had been superseded by Soviet — indeed Stalin’s own — commitment to the build-up of the Communist German state. The proposal, moreover, ran counter to the German initiative that Molotov’s foreign ministry had been carefully and stubbornly drafting. Molotov, therefore, raised strong objections to Beria’s proposal. A special committee consisting of Beria, Malenkov and Molotov was created to consider the matter, and, following several discussions and a late evening phone conversation, Beria finally gave in: “To hell with you! Let’s not go to another meeting. I agree with your stand.”³⁵

Beria’s alleged zigzags on policy towards the GDR conform to what we know about his views. Much less ideologically committed than Molotov, or, as Molotov put it himself, “lacking deeper interest in fundamental policy decisions,” Beria would not shy away from unorthodox, “heretical” solutions.³⁶ With a wide-ranging intelligence apparatus at his command, Beria was better informed about the growing crisis in the GDR than many of his rivals, even Molotov, and he used his unmatched sources to challenge Molotov in the field of foreign policy.³⁷ His unique knowledge of the recent strides in the Soviet nuclear weapons development (later that year the USSR successfully tested a thermonuclear bomb) might have caused him to experience less concern about the wider repercussions of any radical solution in Germany.³⁸ It was also fully in line with what we know about his personality to withdraw proposals as soon as he faced fierce opposition, such as Molotov and Khrushchev seem to have mounted within the Presidium.

Declassified documents and more recent recollections seem to confirm the existence of divisions within the Soviet leadership on Germany. In his letters from prison,³⁹ Beria acknowledged having displayed “inadmissible rudeness and insolence on my part toward comrade N.S. Khrushchev and N.A. Bulganin during the

discussion of the German question” while “along with all of you” introducing “initiatives at the Presidium aimed at the correct solution of issues, such as the Korean one, the German one.” A year-and-a-half later, at the January 1955 CC CPSU Plenum, Beria’s ally in 1953, Malenkov, now under attack by Khrushchev and Molotov, “admitted” that he had been wrong in 1953 when he held the view that “the task of socialist development in Democratic Germany” was “incorrect.” “Today I admit that I essentially took a wrong position on the German Question.”⁴⁰

Additional evidence is provided by secondary figures such as KGB operative Pavel Sudoplatov, a close collaborator of Beria. In his memoirs *Special Tasks*, Sudoplatov recounts that as early as April, “[p]rior to the May Day celebration in 1953, Beria ordered me to prepare top-secret intelligence probes to test the feasibility of unifying Germany. He told me that the best way to strengthen our world position would be to create a neutral, unified Germany run by a coalition government. Germany would be the balancing factor between American and Soviet interests in Western Europe. East Germany, the German Democratic Republic, would become an autonomous province in the new unified Germany.” According to Sudoplatov, Beria intended to air the idea through his intelligence contacts in Central Europe and “begin negotiations with the Western powers.”⁴¹ Similarly, Vladimir Semenov, who, as head of the responsible division within the Soviet Foreign Ministry, participated in the key meetings of the Soviet leadership on Germany (as well as the later meetings with the SED leaders), charges in his 1995 memoirs that Beria was pursuing a line on Germany which would have “disrupted the continuity of our policy on the German question and aimed at shocking the Soviet Union and eliminating the GDR.” Semenov reports that during a Presidium meeting “in the second half of May, 1953,” Beria, once called on, “took a paper out of his jacket pocket, without haste, as if he was the master of the house, put on his glasses and read his own draft on German policy. It differed fundamentally from the one which I carried in my bag.”⁴²

Serious doubts, however, have been raised about the existence of a “Beria plan.” Thus far, the evidence on Beria’s role in the decision-making process within the Kremlin is fragmentary, biased and contradictory. The transcript of the May 27 Presidium meeting at which Beria supposedly made his proposal remains classified in the Presidential Archive in Moscow. Mention of Beria’s alleged initiative on the German question was first made by his opponents at the July 1953 CPSU Plenum that condemned him, following his arrest on June 26.⁴³ It is probable that the charges about Beria’s views on the German question, made by Khrushchev and others at the Plenum, were motivated largely by a desire to portray Beria in most sinister ways and to characterize him as a traitor to the socialist cause, as a Western agent and provocateur. United in their fear of the brutal KGB chief and desirous to eliminate a strong competitor in the

struggle for supremacy within the Kremlin, Beria’s opponents might well have fabricated, distorted or exaggerated any difference of opinion on his part.⁴⁴

The documents presented here suggest a somewhat different interpretation. They certainly reflect Beria’s activism in the foreign policy field, especially on the German question. What is striking, however, is the fact that Beria managed to gain Presidium approval for the demarche to the Soviet Control Commission, which in turn, with its May 18 critique of the SED’s indifference and mishandling, set the tone for the May 27 meeting and the June 2 “New Course” document. Beria’s initiative in early May thus turned into a Presidium-approved SCC investigation into and review of the situation in Germany which most likely forced the Foreign Ministry to take a much more critical attitude towards the SED’s policy. At least initially, therefore, Beria’s views on Germany apparently corresponded with the thinking within the SCC and were not blocked within the Presidium. Beria’s continued prominence in foreign affairs after the May 27 meeting — see his active participation in the discussions with the German and Hungarian leaders — also lends weight to this argument.

The available documentation through May 27, of course, does not preclude the possibility that Beria put forth a more drastic approach to the German problem at the Presidium meeting. Whether he did so or not, within days the Council of Ministers agreed on a draft resolution, which was adopted as an order “On Measures to Improve the Health of the Political Situation in the GDR,” dated June 2. Thus far, only draft versions of the document and its German translation have been available to scholars.⁴⁵ For the first time, an English translation of the original Russian version is printed below. Sharply criticizing the “incorrect political line” of forced construction of socialism in the GDR, the resolution called for an end to the “artificial establishment of agricultural production cooperatives” and to the prohibitive taxation of private enterprise, for support of small and medium-size enterprises, for an increase in mass consumption production at the expense of heavy industry as well as for the elimination of the ration card system. The resolution also recommended strengthening democratic rights in East Germany, changing the excessively punitive criminal code, ending the crude interference in church affairs, and “eradicating” the brutal administrative methods by which the SED regime had been ruling. Significantly, the order also emphasized that it was necessary to put the “tasks of the political struggle to reestablish the national unity of Germany” at the center of attention.

The same day, the Moscow leaders expressed their concerns about the GDR to an arriving East German delegation, composed of Ulbricht, GDR Premier Otto Grotewohl and Fred Oelßner, confronted it with the resolution and, after Oelßner had translated the document, asked for a response by the next day. According to Grotewohl’s fragmentary notes, the East German propos-

als, half-heartedly drafted during the night and tabled the next day in their meetings with Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoian, Kaganovich, Semenov and Grechko, apparently fell short of Soviet expectations. "Our document is a reversal, yours is [just] reform," an exasperated Kaganovich exclaimed.⁴⁶ According to the memoirs of SED Politburo member Rudolf Herrnstadt, the editor of the party organ *Neues Deutschland*, the SED leaders had to take quite a beating as all of the Soviet comrades rejected the superficial draft. Beria displayed particular aggressiveness, allegedly throwing the documents at Ulbricht across the table with the words: "This is a bad remake of our document!"⁴⁷

The Soviet leaders acknowledged that "we all have made mistakes" and that the recommendations were not meant as "accusations," but insisted that "everything has to be based on a change in the conditions in the G.D.R." Demanding that the SED leaders should "not worry about [their] prestige," Malenkov warned that "if we don't correct [the political line] now, a catastrophe will happen." The Soviet leaders appealed to the Germans to "correct fast and vigorously." "Much time has been lost. One has to act quickly." And in a manner, as Molotov curiously added, "that all of G[ermany] can see it."⁴⁸

The June 2-4 talks with the East German leaders have to be viewed against the background of a larger effort by the post-Stalin Soviet leadership to halt and mitigate some of the worst excesses of Stalinist rule in East Central Europe. Similar talks, which, in each case, resulted in the announcement of a "New Course" program were held with the Hungarian leadership (13-16 June 1953)⁴⁹ and the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha later that month.⁵⁰ The transcript of the Soviet-Hungarian talks on June 13-16,⁵¹ are instructive for several reasons: Much fuller than the fragmentary Grotewohl notes,⁵² the transcript of the Soviet-Hungarian meeting is striking for its similarities: as in the German case, the discussion focused on the "audacious" industrialization and socialization drive and the abuses of power (especially by the security police), though cadre questions received considerable attention, too. As before with the East Germans, the Soviet leaders "urgently" demanded changes and warned that "a catastrophe will occur if we do not improve the situation." Once again, Malenkov and Beria were harshest and most "passionate" in their criticism, though Molotov and Bulganin did not lag behind. Unlike the earlier talks with the German leaders, however, Soviet criticism was vented primarily at premier and party chief Matyas Rakosi, the leading proponent of Stalinist rule in Hungary. Criticism of Rakosi's rule, his personal involvement in most political issues, and his "personality cult" quickly produced changes within the leadership: within days of their return from Moscow, Rakosi resigned from the premiership which was given to the agrarian specialist Imre Nagy (though Rakosi stayed on as party leader).⁵³

Grotewohl's notes of the June 2-4 Kremlin meetings do not reflect any personal criticism of Ulbricht, who had

stood for the accelerated socialization program. Following their return to Berlin on June 5, however, discussion within the SED Politburo of how and when to publicize the New Course document quickly turned into criticism of Ulbricht's dictatorial leadership style. During SED Politburo meetings on June 6 and 9, fellow Politburo members vented their dissatisfaction with the Ulbricht's personality cult and management of the Secretariat. Semenov, who had returned with the SED delegation from Moscow and participated in the sessions, seemed increasingly inclined to support Ulbricht's critics.⁵⁴ Arguing against any great celebration planned for Ulbricht's 60th birthday (June 30) during the forthcoming 13th Central Committee Plenum, Semenov recommended that the SED leader celebrate the way Lenin did his 50th birthday, by "inviting a few friends to drop in for dinner."⁵⁵ The Politburo finally decided to draw up a comprehensive statement on "the self-criticism of the work of the Politburo and the Secretariat" which would be presented to the CPSU Central Committee Presidium. It also resolved to set up a commission, composed of Ulbricht, State Security chief Wilhelm Zaisser, Oelßner, Herrnstadt, and Berlin SED boss Hans Jendretzky, to "prepare an organizational reform of the working methods of the Politburo and Secretariat."⁵⁶

A recently declassified report to the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, S. Kruglov by the KGB deputy resident in Berlin, Ivan Fadeikin, throws new light on the events within the SED Politburo. In a June 30 conversation with Soviet officials, the GDR Minister of Trade and Supply Curt Wach reported on the opposition which the New Course instructions from Moscow, particularly the shift of resources from the heavy to consumer goods industries, had encountered within the SED Politburo on June 9. Just about everybody seemed to oppose a plan tabled by the Minister of Machine Construction, Hermann Rau according to which 1.3 billion marks would be reallocated to light industries. Key members of the SED leadership — Rau himself, Wilhelm Leuschner, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Fritz Selbmann, Minister for the Ore-Mining Industry, Fred Oelßner, Anton Ackermann — opposed the plan to cut back on heavy industry. According to Wach, Ulbricht most vehemently spoke out against the plan, arguing that "[w]e cannot free up such resources. Rau's plan disorganizes the national economy, and our economy is already disorganized as it is." With the GDR lacking sufficient resources, Ulbricht instead favored a different approach. Shifting the burden to the Soviets, who after all, had decreed the policy shift, he argued that "we should turn to the Soviet government with the request that they lower the reparations payments." A fellow Politburo member succinctly pointed to the thought that must have been on everybody's mind: the only way "to get out of this catastrophic situation and improve our position" was for the Soviet Union to "[render] us the same help that the USA is giving Western Germany through the Marshall Plan." As Wach recounted, "[n]oone reacted to this

statement.”⁵⁷

Most Politburo members agreed that the announcement of the New Course program warranted careful preparation of the party and the population at large, but Semenov urged speedy implementation of Moscow’s instructions. When, on the evening of June 10, Herrstadt pleaded with Semenov to give the SED two week’s time to prepare the policy change, the High Commissioner insisted that “the communiqué has to be in the paper tomorrow, warning the *Neues Deutschland* editor that “you may not have a state for much longer.”⁵⁸

Heeding Semenov’s order, the Politburo announced the “New Course” liberalization program in *Neues Deutschland* on June 11. As expected by Herrstadt and others, the communiqué with its frank admission of past mistakes came as a surprise to many in and out of the party. Reports from local party organizations, carefully monitored by the SED headquarters in Berlin indicated with great candor the widespread disappointment, disbelief, confusion and shock within party ranks as well as the populace. To many, the communiqué signaled the SED’s final bankruptcy and the beginning of its demise. Party members felt betrayed and “panicky,” others even called for Ulbricht’s resignation. Many thought the SED retreat from crash socialization resulted from pressure by the West German government under Konrad Adenauer and the Western powers, evidenced by such reports as the one from the small town of Seehausen where “the entire village is in the bar, drinking to the health of Adenauer.” To make matters worse, the only segment of the population which seemed to have been excluded from the New Course liberalization were — paradoxically — the workers: the raised work norms arbitrarily imposed on May 28 remained in force. Labor dissatisfaction was further fueled when the SED regime, groping to maintain its authority, confirmed the controversial norm increases on June 13.⁵⁹

The internal events in East Germany from the New Course announcement through the first days of the uprising have been treated elsewhere.⁶⁰ Suffice it to say that the riots and demonstrations, which climaxed on 17 June, eventually engulfed more than 350 cities and villages in the GDR, and more than 500,000 people throughout the GDR marched in defiance of the regime. Both the SED leaders and the Soviets were surprised by the extent of the uprising. Underestimating the crisis situation and eager not to precipitate bloodshed, the Soviet Berlin commandant, General Dibrova, balked when East Berlin police chief Waldemar Schmidt requested authority on the morning of June 16 to clamp down on the demonstrators.⁶¹ Complaining about the hesitant, even passive, initial response on the part of the Soviets, Schmidt later charged that “if we had taken strong action immediately, the whole thing would have been forgotten.”⁶² Fearful of wider unrest the next day and a statewide general strike, Soviet troops did finally, in the early morning hours of June 17, enter East Berlin, and by 1 p.m. that day, Soviet military authorities

declared martial law. In the evening, Berlin’s citywide traffic was interrupted and the East sector sealed off.

The reaction to the crisis by Soviet diplomatic and military observers in East Germany can now be documented in detail.⁶³ What is striking about the reports is how quickly the Soviet representatives assumed that the uprising had been instigated by the West. As early as the evening of June 16, High Commissioner Semenov and General Grechko, in reporting on the day’s events, pointed to the fact that persons from West Berlin participated in the demonstrations in increasing numbers. According to Semenov and Grechko, “large crowds started arriving from West [Berlin]” late on June 16, and it was “mainly West Berliners” who were rioting in the streets of Berlin. Citing the evening edition of the local newspaper *Der Abend*, they concluded that it was “clear from the reports of the West German press and radio that the above-mentioned hostile actions have been organized from West Berlin.”⁶⁴ The next day, Grechko cabled to Bulganin that “[i]t may be considered that a special organization based in West Berlin has directed the strikes in East Berlin.” “Analyzing the situation,” Grechko continued, “I have also come to the conclusion that the provocation was prepared in advance, organized and directed from the Western sectors of Berlin. The simultaneous actions in the majority of the big cities of the GDR, the same demands of the rebels everywhere as well as the same anti-state and anti-Soviet slogans have proved such a conclusion.”⁶⁵ KGB sources soon provided details on alleged Western subversion, mentioning in particular the activities of the Berlin-based anti-Communist organization “Fighting Group Against Inhumanity.”⁶⁶ General Vasilii Sokolovskii, deputy USSR defense minister confirmed this judgement the day after his arrival in Berlin. Given that the disorders had erupted simultaneously in Berlin and other major cities and that “the same tactics of action were used everywhere,” the uprising had to have been “prepared beforehand on the entire territory of the German Democratic Republic and aimed at making a coup d’état.”⁶⁷

Considering the perception that the West had instigated the crisis, Soviet authorities in Berlin — as well as the Soviet leadership in Moscow — were carefully monitoring Western troop movements on the GDR border. Semenov remembers that during those days, “the telephones kept ringing. Khrushchev called several times, even more often did Molotov and others.”⁶⁸ The Soviets knew that U.S., British and French troops in the Western sectors of Berlin had been put on higher alert status on June 17. In the early morning hours of June 18, Soviet military intelligence learned that the 7th U.S. Army and the 12th Air Force unit in Western Germany, as well as NATO headquarters, were put on alert. Within three hours, however, Grechko could reassure Moscow: The alert of U.S. forces had been cancelled.⁶⁹ Given the restrained and passive Western response to the events in the East sector, it must have been evident to Soviet authorities that Western troop alerts had likely been defensive in nature.

According to Semenov, Sokolovskii in turn ordered the state of alert for Soviet border troops canceled and took precautions to avoid unintended incidents, which could have caused a military confrontation with the West. As Semenov put it in his memoirs in rather dramatic terms: "The danger of events developing into a Third World War had been banished."⁷⁰

For days if not weeks Soviet military authorities remained concerned about continuing signs of resistance — in particular continuing strikes — throughout the GDR, and arrests continued in high numbers through the end of June. Yet as early as June 19, Moscow was receiving clear signals that the immediate danger to the SED regime had passed. That day, Grechko informed the Soviet leadership that "street disorders on the territory of the GDR have ended everywhere." A growing number of workers were resuming work, and SED activists were back in the factories, propagandizing the SED's interpretation of the riots. Much to the Soviet observers' satisfaction, more and more people were distancing themselves from the disturbances. By July 4, the Soviet High Commission was even considering easing travel restrictions between the Eastern and Western sectors in Berlin and reopening the sector border.⁷¹

While for the Soviet observers, the peak of the crisis seemed to have passed by June 19-20, tensions were mounting within the SED regime. "This is not a Politburo, but a madhouse," one GDR minister had characterized the situation within the top party committee as early as June 9.⁷² The uprising paralyzed the SED leadership and froze the discussion on internal renewal. In the early morning hours of June 17, Semenov ordered the SED Politburo to evacuate to the more secure Soviet headquarters, cynically commenting that "it is almost true" when RIAS allegedly reported that the GDR government had fallen apart.⁷³ After the acute crisis had passed, dissensions within the SED leadership heightened dramatically. Key SED functionaries, such as Fred Oelßner, who had just accompanied Ulbricht and Grotewohl to Moscow, now mounted criticism against the party chief. According to Fadeikin's report, Oelßner stated in conversations with Soviet officials on July 1 that "Ulbricht most of all has not understood the erroneous nature of his conduct. He has not understood that as a matter of fact he lost touch with the masses and that his methods of dictatorial leadership were one of the serious reasons that errors were committed." Despite Moscow's New Course instructions, "Ulbricht had not changed and continued to work as before," though Oelßner noted that he had become somewhat more passive. But he was still inclined to create an atmosphere of pomp around his person." With telling understatement, Oelßner revealed to his Soviet interlocutors that "no complete unity of views existed in the Politburo."⁷⁴

Another one of Ulbricht's close collaborators, Hermann Matern, registered his views with the MVD [KGB predecessor] the next day. Reflecting the paralysis and catharsis prevalent within the SED in the aftermath of

the uprising, Matern argued that the party was lacking militant leadership. Politburo meetings were "disorganized" and not well attended, and the body had "made almost no practical decisions." The work of the secretariat had come to a standstill after Ulbricht left for Moscow in early June and left much wanting in general. In Matern's opinion, the "secretariat has been turned from a political organ into Ulbricht's personal office, and its members "nodded their heads in agreement with all the proposals of the secretary-general." Matern also complained about the state of local and regional party leadership, which, not used to independent decision-making, totally depended on direction from above. Communications with the central leadership were difficult since, as Matern explained, on Ulbricht's orders, "telephone operators did not connect them [the local party leaders] with him." All of this "was the result of the defective leadership methods on the part of Ulbricht whose motto was "'No one can do anything without me.'" Matern announced that he would speak out against Ulbricht at the forthcoming Central Committee Plenum.⁷⁵

The opposition to Ulbricht within the Politburo crystallized around the issue of the leadership structure. On June 25, the "organization commission," set up on June 6 to improve the workings of the Politburo, met for the first time and discussed key issues such as the dualism of Politburo and Secretariat, collective decision-making, and Ulbricht's leadership methods. The results of the discussion, tabled at the second meeting on July 2, called for an elimination of the post of secretary general — Ulbricht's position — and an enlargement of the Politburo which, following the Soviet model, would henceforth be called the "Presidium of the Central Committee." While the secretariat of the Central Committee would be dissolved, a 4-man "Permanent Commission of the Presidium" would direct the implementation of the New Course according to Soviet instructions.⁷⁶

The organization commission's recommendations were similar to proposals which Semenov, Sokolovskii and Iudin sent to Moscow on June 24/25.⁷⁷ Besides calling for additional aid to the GDR to improve the food supply of the population, a sharp reduction of GDR exports and occupation expenses, and greater internal party democracy, the Soviet representatives in Germany also favored a reorganization of the GDR government. The Soviet High Commissioner and his colleagues considered it necessary to "liquidate the Ministry of State Security" and to "relieve com[rade] Ulbricht of the responsibility of deputy prime minister of the GDR so as to enable him to concentrate his attention on the work of the C[entral] C[ommittee of the] SED." At the same time, the position of general-secretary should be abolished, the secretariat itself should be limited in its functions, re-staffed, and reduced in size. The proposals suggested to "radically renew the personnel of the Politburo," removing from it those who do not "demonstrate the necessary capabilities" required for the leadership of the party and state in the current circum-

stances. The People's Chamber should take on the responsibility for dismissing "less capable and less popular ministers" and replacing them with more popular personalities, "drawing more widely from among representatives of other parties." Semenov, Sokolovskii, and Iudin also called for investigations into the union leadership, a strengthening of the People's Police and changes in the Free German Youth. In order to raise its international and domestic prestige, the new GDR regime should be invited to Moscow for an "official visit."⁷⁸ According to Semenov's memoirs, Molotov's overall reaction to the report was "positive," but "as far as Ulbricht is concerned, Semenov has drifted to the right."⁷⁹

Molotov's reaction, if reported correctly, spoke not only of his commitment to Ulbricht but also might have indicated the shifting balance of forces in Moscow in the latter's favor. The day after the organization commission's meeting, on June 26, Beria was arrested in Moscow. Most likely, the arrest had little to do with Beria's views on Germany, but his more flexible position on socialism in the GDR, if he indeed had taken such a position, was quickly seized by his opponents within the Kremlin to justify the action. Beria's arrest probably brought any discussion and reassessment of Soviet policy towards Germany to an abrupt halt. By the second meeting of the organization commission on July 2, B. Miroshnichenko, who was participating in the meeting on Semenov's behalf,⁸⁰ objected to any immediate changes to the secretariat structure, thus indirectly reinforcing Ulbricht's position. Semenov himself apparently withdrew some of his earlier recommendations. About the same time, moreover, a Foreign Ministry subcommittee headed by first deputy Foreign Minister Andrej Vishinskii, "canceled" or postponed the implementation of key measures in the Semenov-Sokolovskii-Iudin report, particularly those which affected Ulbricht's control of state and party.

Grotewohl's notes on the night session of the Politburo on July 7-8, shortly before he and Ulbricht were to leave for Moscow, reflect the volatile balance of forces within the SED Politburo.⁸¹ There was still considerable criticism of Ulbricht, led by Zaisser's statement that, while Ulbricht was "no more responsible for the wrong course than we all," he was to blame for the brutal administrative methods which had "spoiled the Party." To leave the party apparatus in Ulbricht's hands, Zaisser argued, would "be catastrophic for the new course." Several Politburo members sided with Zaisser. Hermann Rau, for example, doubted that Ulbricht had the will to change his working methods and favored a change at the top. Anton Ackermann argued that the party had to recover but could not do so with Ulbricht in the leadership. Alluding to the divisions within the Politburo, Fred Oelßner stated that "U. has considered all of us as stupid. W. has not learned his lessons." There would not be "any need for a first secretary." Faced with such criticism, Ulbricht acknowledged that the criticism was correct and his behavior regarding the ostentatious birthday celebration mistaken. He pro-

fessed that he did not have to be first secretary: "This takes confidence which has to be renewed."

Yet Ulbricht called the elimination of the secretariat "dangerous" and considered Zaisser's nomination of Herrstadt as first secretary "the logical consequence," thus reneging on the "agreement" that had been reached in the organization commission. Moreover, some members now spoke up in his defense. Arguing that Ulbricht's resignation would "cause damage to the party," Erich Honecker objected to blaming Ulbricht alone for the situation, and Hermann Matern flatly stated that "U. must be first secretary." Playing for time, Ulbricht announced that he would "take a stand in the C[entral] C[ommittee]" plenum scheduled for later that month.

In Moscow on July 8, Ulbricht and Grotewohl apparently learned about Beria's arrest and his alleged plans for the GDR. It is likely that Ulbricht turned the Beria affair to his advantage, using his short presence in Moscow to garner support for his position. It may not have been by accident that on the following day, Vyshinskii was informed of the cancellation of several of Semenov's, Sokolovskii's and Iudin's recommendations. In any case, upon his return to Berlin, Ulbricht, probably backed by the Soviets, went on the offensive, turning first against Zaisser and Herrstadt. Ulbricht used the resolution on "The New Course and the Renewal of the Party," drafted in June by Herrstadt in preparation of the forthcoming 15th SED Plenum, to launch a massive attack against both Herrstadt and Zaisser when the Central Committee met on July 24-26. Accusing Herrstadt and Zaisser of behavior "hostile to the Party" and alleging a connection between both of them and Beria, Ulbricht managed to achieve the expulsion of his two opponents from the Politburo.⁸² By late July, Ulbricht had weathered the most dangerous challenge to his leadership thus far.

Ulbricht's survival did not only mean the survival of his hard-line policies and Stalinist practices, many of which were gradually reintroduced in the following months. With the decision to continue the support for Ulbricht and the East German regime, Moscow shed the last ambiguities in its German policy. In the following months, the Soviets took steps to boost the East German regime's economic viability and internal support, first by agreeing to provide East Berlin with an extensive economic aid package, and later by an official termination of the reparations' payments. In the international arena as well, Moscow sought to raise the prestige of its client regime. In August, the Soviet leadership announced its decision to turn the High Commission into an embassy. In March 1954, Moscow officially announced the GDR to be a "sovereign state." The road was set for the "two-Germany doctrine," espoused by Khrushchev in 1955, which guided Soviet policy in Germany until 1989.

Although the documents presented below shed much new light on the 1953 crisis, the documentary record is fragmentary at best. While we have a pretty clear sense of what went on in the SED Politburo, the decision-making

process in Moscow still remains elusive. Key documents, such as the transcripts of the May 27 USSR Presidium meeting or the June 2-4 meeting with the SED leadership, have not yet been declassified by Russian archival authorities. Little is yet known about Malenkov's, Beria's or Khrushchev's reaction to the events of June 16-17 or their conversations (if any took place) with Ulbricht and Grotewohl in early July. What role exactly did Semenov or Sokolovskii play? Fuller documentation from the Russian archives might allow for more conclusive answers to these questions.

¹ Kurt Gregor, GDR Minister for Foreign and Inner-German Trade, during the 9 June 1953 SED Politburo meeting. See Note from S. Kruglov to Malenkov with an accompanying communication from the representatives of the MIA USSR P. Fedotov and I. Fadeikin (printed below).

² Ilko-Sascha Kowalczyk, Armin Mitter, Stefan Wolle (eds.). *Der Tag X. 17. Juni 1953* (Berlin, 1995).

³ See the path-breaking work by Jeffrey Kopstein, *The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989* (Chapel Hill, 1997), 36-38.

⁴ Armin Mitter/Stefan Wolle, *Untergang auf Raten* (Berlin, 1993).

⁵ See D.M. Stickle (ed.), *The Beria Affair* (New York, 1992); Delo Beria. Plenum Ts KPSS. Ijul' 1953 goda. Stenograficeskij otchet. *Izvestija Ts KPSS 1* (1991), 139-214; 2 (1991), 141-208.

⁶ Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity. The Stalin Years* (New York, 1996), 180.

⁷ On Churchill's initiative. see Klaus Larres, *Politik der Illusionen* (Göttingen, 1996).

⁸ Christian F. Ostermann, "Keeping the Pot Simmering, the United States and the East German Uprising of 1953," *German Studies Review* 19:1 (March 1996), 61-89.

⁹ "Stenographic transcript of the meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders on 5 December 1980 in Moscow," Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BArch), DY 30 J IV 2/2 A-2368; Michael Kubina/Manfred Wilke (ed.), "Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen" *Die SED contra Polen 1980/81* (Berlin, 1995), 170.

¹⁰ The best surveys to date are Ilko-Sascha Kowalczyk, Armin Mitter, Stefan Wolle (eds.). *Der Tag X. 17. Juni 1953* (Berlin, 1995) and Manfred Hagen, *DDR. Juni '53. Die erste Volkserhebung im Stalinismus* (Stuttgart, 1992).

¹¹ For a survey of the current state of the debate, see Ilko-Sascha Kowalczyk, "Die Ereignisse von 1953 in der DDR," *Jahrbuch für historische Kommunismusforschung* (1996), 181-186; and Torsten Diedrich, "Zwischen Arbeitererhebung und gescheiterter Revolution in der DDR," *Jahrbuch für historische Kommunismusforschung* (1994), 288-305.

¹² Amy Knight, "Beria the Reformer," *New York Times*, 3 November 1993.

¹³ For a report on the conference, see Ruud van Dijk, "Der 17. Juni als Krise im Kalten Krieg," *Deutschland Archiv* 1 (1997), 291-293; *CWIHP Bulletin* 8/9 (Winter 1996/97), 355-357.

¹⁴ Norman M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany. A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation* (Cambridge, MA, 1995).

¹⁵ Rainer Karlsch, *Allein bezahlt? Die Reparationsleistungen der SBZ/DDR 1945-53* (Berlin:1993).

¹⁶ See *CWIHP Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994), 34-35, 48, for an English

translation of both Russian and German versions of the 7 April 1952 conversation. For an excellent recent treatment of this problem, Stefan Creuzberger, "Abschirmungspolitik gegenüber dem westlichen Deutschland im Jahre 1952," *Die sowjetische Deutschland-Politik in der Ära Adenauer*, ed. Gerhard Wettig, (Bonn, 1997), 12-36.

¹⁷ See SED leader Wilhelm Pieck's notes on the meeting with Stalin, as published in Wilfried Loth/Rolf Badstübner (eds.), *Wilhelm Pieck – Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953* (Berlin, 1994), 396-397.

¹⁸ Vladislav Zubok, "Unacceptably Rude and Blatant on the German Question." The Succession Struggle after Stalin's death, Beria and the significance of the debate on the GDR in Moscow in April-May 1953." Paper presented at the conference on "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," Potsdam, November 1996, 5.

¹⁹ Hope Harrison, "Politics in East Germany and Soviet Policy Towards East Germany Leading Up to and Following the June 1953 Uprising. Summary of Paper Prepared for the conference on "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," Potsdam, November 1996; Gerhard Wettig, "Zum Stand der Forschung, ber Berijas Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr 1953," *Die Deutschlandfrage von der staatlichen Teilung Deutschlands bis zum Tode Stalins* (Berlin, 1994), 190; James Richter, "Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany During the Beria Interregnum," *Europe-Asia Studies* 4 (1993), 677.

²⁰ Printed below.

²¹ Wladimir S. Semjonow, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow. Ein halbes Jahrhundert in diplomatischer Mission 1939-1991* (Berlin: 1995), 290.

²² AVP RF, f. 6, op. 12, p.16, por. 261, ll. 6-7. The document was provided and translated by Hope Harrison (Lafayette College) for the conference on "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," Potsdam, November 1996. See the conference document reader *The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the 17 June 1953 Uprising in East Germany: The Hidden History*, ed. Christian F. Ostermann (Washington, DC, 1996). On 28 May, the Soviet Control Commission was indeed dissolved and replaced by a Soviet High Commission, which, at least in name, resembled its Western counterparts. Semjonow, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow*, 291.

²³ Zubok, "Unacceptably Rude and Blatant on the German Question," 5-6.

²⁴ Gerhard Wettig, "Zum Stand der Forschung über Berijas Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr 1953," *Die Deutschlandfrage von der staatlichen Teilung Deutschlands bis zum Tode Stalins* (Berlin, 1994), 183-197.

²⁵ Report is quoted, without source reference, by David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev and George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin* (New Haven, CT, 1997), 156.

²⁶ Refugee numbers had significantly declined from 1950 to 1952 but almost doubled in 1953 (1953 total: 408,100). For an in-depth analysis of the East-West German migration see Helge Heidemeyer, *Flucht und Zuwanderung aus der SBZ/DDR 1945/1949-1961* (Düsseldorf, 1994).

²⁷ Report No. 44/B, Beria to CPSU Presidium, 6 May 1953, Archives of Sluzhba vneshnei razvedki (SVRA), file 3581, vol. 7, quoted in David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev and George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin*, 157-158.

²⁸ Printed below.

²⁹ Semenov hints at his uneasy relationship with Chuikov in his *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow*, 293.

³⁰ Radio in the American Sector.

- 31 Printed below.
- 32 On the succession struggle, see the remarkable presentation by Mark Kramer on "The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the Soviet Bloc: New Courses, Upheavals and the Beria Affair" at the conference "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," Potsdam, November 1996. A revised published version of the presentation is forthcoming.
- 33 See "Delo Beria," 2 (1991), 144.
- 34 Nikita Khrushchev, "Die Aktion," in Vladimir F. Nekrassow (ed.), *Berija. Henker in Stalins Diensten. Ende einer Karriere* (Berlin, 1992), 323-324; Albert Resis (ed.), *Molotov Remembers. Inside Kremlin Politics. Conversations with Felix Chuev* (Chicago, 1993), 334-335.
- 35 Resis, *Molotov Remembers*, 335. See also Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, 180.
- 36 James Richter, *Reexamining Soviet Policy towards Germany During the Beria Interregnum. CWIHP Working Paper No.3* (Washington, DC, 1992), 15-16.
- 37 Vladislav Zubok, "Soviet Intelligence: The 'Small Committee of Information, 1952-1953,'" *Diplomatic History* 19 (1995), 453-72 (first published as CWIHP Working Paper No. 4 (Washington, DC, 1992)).
- 38 Vladislav Zubok/Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA 1996), 159-162.
- 39 Printed below.
- 40 Stenographic Report of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, 31 January 1955, TsKhSD, f. 2, op.1, d. 127, ll. 65-66. Other excerpts from this and other CC CPSU plenums appear in this issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*.
- 41 Pavel and Anatoli Sudoplatov, with Gerold L. and Leona P. Schecter, *Special Tasks, The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness — A Soviet Spymaster* (New York, 1994), 363-365. For a review of Sudoplatov's memoirs see Wettig, "Zum Stand der Forschung über Berijas Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr 1953," 196-197; and Vladislav Zubok, "Atomic Espionage and Its Soviet 'Witnesses'" *CWIHP Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994), 50, 52-53.
- 42 Semjonow, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow*, 290-291. SED functionary Karl Schirdewan, who headed the Department of "Leading Organs of the Party and the Mass Organizations," writes in his 1995 memoirs that at that time, "Soviet comrades" told him that "your party will have to solve a great and difficult task and prepare for free and secret elections." *Aufstand gegen Ulbricht* (Berlin, 1995), 47-48.
- 43 For details on Beria's arrest, see Amy Knight, *Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant*. (Princeton, 1993).
- 44 See statements by A. Filitov at the conference on "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," Potsdam, November 1996.
- 45 Rolf Stöckigt, "Ein Dokument von großer historischer Bedeutung vom Mai 1953," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung* 32:5 (1990), 648-654.
- 46 Document printed in full below.
- 47 Herrstadt, *Herrstadt-Dokument*, 59.
- 48 Document printed in full below.
- 49 Document printed in full below.
- 50 Enver Hoxha, *The Artful Albanian*, ed. Jon Holliday (London, 1986), 147-151.
- 51 Printed below.
- 52 Unfortunately, it is still hard to follow exactly the dialogue, as for political reasons, the statements by the Soviet leaders were recorded separately from those of the Hungarians.
- 53 György Litvan, *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Reform, Revolt and Repression 1953-1963* (London, 1996), 24-25.
- Curiously, the East German crisis was not mentioned in the talks with the Hungarian leadership.
- 54 Herrstadt, *Das Herrstadt-Dokument*, 65.
- 55 Hope Harrison, "Politics in East Germany and Soviet Policy Towards East Germany Leading Up to and Following the June 1953 Uprising. Summary of Paper Prepared for the conference on "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," Potsdam, November 1996.
- 56 Grotewohl Notes, SAPMO-BArch, NY 90/699; "Protokoll Nr. 33/35 der außerordentlichen Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees am 6. Juni 1953," SAPMO-BArch J IV 2/2/287; Elke Scherstjanoi, "'Wollen wir den Sozialismus?' Dokumente aus der Sitzung des Politbüros des ZK der SED am 6. Juni 1953," in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, 33:5 (1991), 658-680; Nadja Stulz-Herrstadt, *Das Herrstadt-Dokument. Das Politbüro der SED und die Geschichte des 17. Juni 1953* (Hamburg, 1990), 74.
- 57 Printed below.
- 58 Herrstadt, *Das Herrstadt-Dokument*, 74.
- 59 One of the events leading up to the June 16/17 uprising, see Christian Ostermann (ed.), "New Documents on the East German Uprising of 1953," *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 10-20.
- 60 See note 1.
- 61 Heinz Brandt, *The Search for a Third Way*, (Garden City, NY, 1970), 212; Fritz Schenk, *Im Vorzimmer der Diktatur* (Cologne, 1962), 203-204; see Harrison, "Politics in East Germany and Soviet Policy Towards East Germany Leading Up to and Following the June 1953 Uprising. Summary of Paper Prepared for the conference on "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," 7.
- 62 Brandt, *The Search for a Third Way*, 225.
- 63 See the documentation printed below.
- 64 Semenov and Grechko to Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian and Bulganin, 16 June 1953, Archives of the Russian General Staff [AGSh], f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 1-3.
- 65 Grechko and Tarasov to Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian and Bulganin, 17 June 1953, AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 12-14.
- 66 Report by Col. Fadeikin to Sokolovskii, 19 June 1953, AGSh, f.16. o. 3139, d. 155, ll. 217-222.
- 67 Sokolovskii and Govorov to Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian and Bulganin, 18 June 1953, AGSh, f. 16. op. 3139, d. 155, l. 4-5.
- 68 Semjonow, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow*, 294.
- 69 Grechko and Tarasov to Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian and Bulganin, 18 June 1953, AGSh, f. 16. op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 19-20.
- 70 Semjonow, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow*, 295.
- 71 Memorandum, Miroshnichenko and Lun'kov to Semenov, 4 July 1953, courtesy National Security Archive (Washington, D.C.).
- 72 Note from S. Kruglov to Malenkov with an accompanying communication from the representatives of the MIA USSR P. Fedotov and I. Fadeikin, AP RF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 925, ll. 156-165. (Printed in full below.)
- 73 Herrstadt, *Das Herrstadt-Dokument*, 74.
- 74 Printed below.
- 75 See also the memoirs of SED leader Karl Schirdewan, *Aufstand gegen Ulbricht* (Berlin, 1995), 49.
- 76 Wilfriede Otto, "Dokumente zur Auseinandersetzung in der SED," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung* 5:32 (1990), 655-672.

⁷⁷ The report, published in excerpt by the Cold War International History Project in 1995, was completed and most likely sent on 24 June. See Christian Ostermann, "New Documents on the East German Uprising of 1953," 10-21. Semenov maintains that the report was sent 25 June. *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow*, 297.

⁷⁸ Sokolovskii, Semenov and Iudin to Molotov and Bulganin, 24 June 1953, AVP RF, f. 06, op. 12a, p. 5, d. 301, ll. 1-51. See Ostermann, "New Documents on the East German Uprising of 1953;" Faina Nowik, "Die sowjetische Deutschland-Politik, 1953-1955," *Die sowjetische Deutschland-Politik in der Ära Adenauer*, ed. Gerhard Wettig, (Bonn 1997), 57. In his memoirs, Semenov points out that the report also described the role Karl Schirdewan, the head of the important Central Committee department "Leitende Organe and Massenorganisationen der Partei" and later an outspoken critic of Ulbricht, had played. Semenov seemed to have favored Schirdewan's promotion to the Politburo at this time (Schirdewan was eventually promoted to the top party organ in at the 15th plenum).

⁷⁹ Semjonow, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow*, 297.

⁸⁰ Semenov was probably in Moscow for the CPSU Central Committee Plenum 2-7 July 1953.

⁸¹ Printed below.

⁸² See Ulbricht's final speech at the 15th Plenum, in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (12 June 1957), 364-370.

MASTNY WINS

1997 GEORGE LOUIS BEER PRIZE

CWIHP is pleased to note that **Dr. Vojtech Mastny** has been awarded the *George Louis Beer Prize* of the American Historical Association for his book *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (Oxford University Press, 1996). The prize is given for the best book on European international history in the 20th century. A close collaborator of CWIHP and the National Security Archive for many years, Dr. Mastny is currently in Europe as a fellow of the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities in Essen, Germany, as well as the Manfred Woerner Fellow of NATO. In the fall of 1998, he plans to return to Washington to resume work on his next book about the origins of détente in the 1960s.

II.

Soviet Foreign Ministry Memorandum "On Further Soviet Measures on the German Question," ca. 28 April 1953

Top Secret
Copy # 1

ON FURTHER SOVIET MEASURES ON THE GERMAN QUESTION

Considering that lately a number of important events have taken place concerning Germany (the Bundestag's ratification of the Bonn and Paris "agreements,"¹ the intensification of militarization and fascism in Western Germany, Adenauer's trip to France, England, and the United States), and also stemming from the necessity for the USSR to retain the initiative on the German question, we should plan our further measures concerning Germany. These measures should promote the increase of Soviet Union's authority among the German people and contribute to further development of the movement of German democratic forces for the unification of Germany, against the Bonn and Paris "agreements," against the militarization and fascization of Western Germany.

For these purposes it is necessary:

1. To advance a proposal for the formation of a [unified] German Provisional Government, by the parliaments of both the German Democratic Republic and Western Germany, while preserving the existing governments of the GDR and Western Germany, with the aim of reunifying Germany on a democratic and peaceful basis.

The chief task of the all-German Provisional Government should be the preparation and carrying out of free all-German elections without foreign interference. The Provisional Government will work out a draft of the all-German electoral law on the basis of the electoral laws of the GDR and Western Germany and also bearing in mind the electoral law of the Weimar Republic. The Provisional Government will organize, if it deems necessary, an inspection of available conditions for carrying out democratic all-German elections, and it will also take the necessary measures to create the requisite conditions for carrying out such elections.

The Provisional Government will represent Germany in quadripartite negotiations on the question of concluding a peace treaty with Germany, which should begin without further delay.

Furthermore, the Provisional Government should be entrusted with discussing and resolving questions touching upon common interests of Germany, namely: representation of Germany in international organizations, questions of German citizenship, trade between the GDR and West Germany, postal and telegraph communications, railway and water communications [transportation links], scientific and technical collaboration, and other issues of an all-German character.

After carrying out all-German democratic elections, the National Assembly of Germany, elected by the people, will ratify the German Constitution and will form the permanent Government of a united and independent Germany. With this in mind, the united democratic Germany will be allowed to field its own national armed forces, necessary for the defense of the country.

The proposal on the formation of an all-German Provisional Government will represent a new concrete step by the Soviet Government towards the national reunification of Germany, which will evoke a broad positive response among the German people. This proposal will help expose the position of the [other] three great powers [i.e., USA, Great Britain and France] on the German issue, directed at preventing German unification on a democratic and peaceful basis. The three great powers will have difficulty objecting to the formation of an all-German Provisional Government, since the existing governments of Western Germany and the GDR will be retained, and the Provisional Government, as its main task, will be responsible for preparing and carrying out all-German elections.

If the United States, England and France object to the proposal on the formation of an all-German Provisional Government by the parliaments of both the GDR and Western Germany, we, on our part, should offer to conduct a referendum amongst the entire population of Germany on this issue.

2. In order to create conditions that provide for the realization of truly equal and democratic elections without foreign interference on the whole territory of Germany, [we should] advance a proposal on the simultaneous withdrawal of all armed forces of the occupying powers, immediately after forming the all-German Provisional Government. At the same time, all foreign military bases located on German territory should be liquidated and the armed forces of any foreign power or a group of great powers, should be prohibited on German soil. Also prohibited should be the use, in any form, of human and material resources, of the German territory or any of its parts for purposes of war by one or another of the great powers or a coalition of great powers.

The proposal for simultaneous withdrawal of all occupation troops out of Germany in order to provide freedom for the all-German democratic elections will thoroughly undermine the slogan advanced in first order by the three great powers to carry out free all-German elections under international control. The great powers are very likely to decline the proposal to withdraw troops, but this would place them in a difficult situation in front of the German people. Accepting this offer would mean the withdrawal of American troops back across the ocean and the effective derailment of the aggressive plans of the North Atlantic [NATO] bloc in Europe. At the same time, the Soviet Government proposal for simultaneous withdrawal of occupation troops out of Germany, following the formation of an All-German Provisional Government, would find warm approval among the people of Germany,

including Western Germany and amongst certain parts of the German bourgeoisie.

3. For the purpose of further strengthening the German Democratic Republic, raising its own all-German and international prestige, as well as for the purpose of strengthening the USSR's influence on the German people and equally emphasizing the peaceful and friendly character of mutual relations between Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, it is advisable to carry out the following measures:

a.) To remove the control exercised by Soviet occupation authorities over the activities of GDR government organs and accordingly liquidate the Soviet Control Commission in Germany² with its central and local agencies.

b.) Instead of the currently existing Soviet diplomatic mission in Berlin, establish an Embassy of the Soviet Union in the German Democratic Republic, entrusting it with functions of an all-German nature, stemming from the quadripartite agreements on Germany as a whole. In large cities of the GDR [we should] establish 7-8 Soviet consulates, to serve the needs of Soviet citizens and troops and to carry out other consular functions.

c.) To declare amnesty and return to their homeland the [German] prisoners of war, held in the USSR, [including those] convicted for crimes against the Soviet people, except those who have committed particularly grave crimes.

Removing control over the activity of governmental bodies of the GDR would promote the normalization of our relations with the GDR as a people's democracy, and strengthen the position of the Soviet government on the all-German question, described above in articles 1 and 2. The German population would see that the Soviet Union, not only in its diplomatic speeches but also in practice, adheres in its relations with Germany to a policy that takes into account the fundamental national interests of the German people.

4. For the purpose of rendering assistance to the German Democratic Republic for further development of its peaceful economy, building the basis of socialism, and raising the well-being of the working people, it is advisable to carry out the following measures:

a.) To reduce by half the remaining sum of reparation payments from the GDR;

b.) To transfer to the government of the GDR, on favorable terms and for the appropriate recompensation, all enterprises of GUSIMZ,³ located on GDR territory.

c.) To enter into negotiations with the GDR government on establishing a joint Soviet - German joint-stock company "Wismut," on the basis of [the] already existing enterprise of "Wismut."⁴

d.) To establish an official exchange rate for the German mark of the GDR in terms of the Soviet ruble.

5. To invite in the near future a government delegation from the GDR for an official visit to Moscow. To discuss with this delegation the aforementioned questions,

including the proposal for the formation of an all-German Provisional Government, and look into questions of an economic character, presented in article 4, as well as questions of broadening scientific-technical collaboration and exchange of specialists between the USSR and GDR, of the education of German students in higher educational establishments, etc.

[Source: AVP RF f. 6, op. 12, p.16, d. 259, ll.45-46. Provided by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive). Translated by Daniel Rozas (Johns Hopkins University)]

.....
**Memorandum, V. Chuikov,⁵ P. Iudin,⁶ L. Il'ichev⁷
 to G. M. Malenkov,⁸
 18 May 1953**

Soviet Control Commission in Germany

Secret

18 May 1953

copy No. pg. 00195

In the Presidium of the Central Committee of the
 Communist Party of the Soviet Union

to comrade G.M. MALENKOV

In keeping with instructions from the CPSU C[entral] C[ommittee], the Soviet Control Commission in Germany presents this report on the reasons for the departure of the population from the German Democratic Republic to West Germany, and also on proposals to end these departures.⁹

In its note to the CPSU CC of 15 March 1953, the Soviet Control Commission in Germany delivered a detailed analysis of the economic and political situation of the German Democratic Republic.

Despite the general economic improvements and political strengthening of the GDR, the departure of the

population from the GDR to West Germany is growing, as is confirmed by the data furnished below:

Detailed data on social and age composition are contained in Appendix No.1.¹⁰

Of this number, 320 persons exited across maritime and zonal borders during the [first] four months of 1953; the rest left through Berlin.

The increase in the number of persons moving from the GDR to West Germany can be explained by an intensification of the class struggle in the city and the countryside, and also by the fact that in the practical work of implementing major economic and political measures, administration often is substituted for political mass work, and certain ministries [and] local party and state organs commit gross errors and excesses in regard to different strata of the population.

After the second conference of the SED [in 1952], the government of the GDR and the SED CC took a number of important decisions aimed at limiting capitalist elements in industry and trade, as well as the kulak class in the countryside.

All of this led to the fact that a portion of the peasantry, chiefly large [peasants], began to give up their land. On 1 April 1953, 442,8 thousand ha., or 7.3% of the entire arable agricultural area of all peasant farms, including 393,0 thousand ha. from farms having over 20 ha. land, or 26% of the agricultural area of these sorts of farms, were abandoned and vacant.

It should be noted that the measures to limit capitalist elements in the city and the countryside in many cases are implemented without sufficient political and economic preparation, as a result of which some party and governmental measures have found insufficient support among a significant portion of the populace.

II

With the general rise in the standard of living of the



populace, a disjunction between the growth of the populace's income and the growth of commodity circulation developed toward the beginning of 1953. The fund of wages paid out in the first quarter of 1953 was 17.3% greater than that of the first quarter of the previous year; the volume of commodity circulation over this period rose by only 10% at comparable prices, while commodity circulation in the first quarter of 1953 compared with the fourth quarter of 1952 shrank and consisted of 6.030 million marks against 7.361 million marks in the fourth quarter of 1952.

The under-fulfillment of the production plan of consumer goods in the absence of corresponding reserves and the non-fulfillment of the export-import plan, led to a sharp shortage of goods in the commercial network. In this way, the elevated requirements of the population were not wholly satisfied.

The autumn and winter of 1952-1953, which were difficult for the GDR, and the weak organization of harvest work led to a significant drop in the harvest of sugar beets, oil crops, potatoes and vegetables. Besides this, the unsatisfactory fulfillment of the plan for stockpiles and purchases of agricultural goods in 1952 led to difficulties in the supply of food to the populace.

This made it necessary to halt commercial sales of fats and sugar in the first quarter of 1953, to substitute partially rationed fats and sugar with other goods, to abolish ration cards for private-capitalist elements and persons of free professions (this affected about 500 thousand people), to abolish some additional ration cards for the intelligentsia, and also to raise the prices for meat given out through ration cards by 10-15%, and for commercially sold confectioneries by 12-50%.

With the cancellation of ration cards for footwear and for knitted goods, the general price level was left close to the previously effective commercial prices. Prices were raised on a significant portion of imported consumer goods.

During the entire winter, interruptions in the supply of coal and electricity to the populace in the republic occurred, as a result of which many schools, residential buildings, and socio-cultural [*kul'turno-bytovye*] establishments often went unheated.

III

Recently the government of the GDR made a series of decisions on strengthening punitive policy in the struggle against the theft of the people's property, on criminal sanctions for evading state agricultural quotas and taxes, on limiting the activity of private wholesale firms, and on purging certain regions of dubious elements of questionable class.¹¹ These decisions are basically correct. However, during the implementation of these decisions manifold excesses are being committed, as is expressed in the intensification of different sorts of repressive measures in relation to the populace. As a result of this the arrest of citizens and convicted persons significantly increased: if in

the first half-year of 1952, 11,346 arrests were carried out, [and] in the second half-year – 17,471, then during just the first quarter of 1953, 14,348 arrests were carried out.

By the directive adopted by the GEC¹² on 23 September 1948, "On punishments for violations of economic order," which is currently in effect, the police are given the right broadly to carry out arrests and searches only on the grounds of suspicion of economic crimes. On the basis of this directive, in 1952, 16,482 proceedings were instituted and 4,185 persons were arrested. In 1953, in only the first quarter, 5,094 proceedings were instituted and 2,548 persons were arrested.

There are many cases of incorrect arrests, unlawful and groundless searches in apartments and offices, [and] violations of the established arrest and custody procedure.

On 1 April 1953, there were 54,876 persons in the jails of the GDR; of these, up to 13,141 had not yet had their cases reviewed by the courts.

IV

In the SED CC and in local party organs, there is an underestimation of the political significance of the populace's departure from the GDR to West Germany. This underestimation has manifested itself, in particular, in the SED CC directives. Thus, in letters from 6 January and 30 April of this year, no political evaluation was made of the issue and no measures are planned which would help bring about a fundamental change in the situation. In CC directives, the departure of party members from the GDR is not characterized as a party crime. Meanwhile, 2,718 members and candidates of the SED, and of these, 175 functionaries, were counted among those who left the GDR during the [first] four months of 1953. In addition, in that period, 2,610 members of the Union of Youth left.

Party organs exert almost no influence over the mass democratic organs—labor unions, the Union of Youth, and the Women's League—in inducing them to carry out work to prevent the departure of the population from the GDR.

The press and radio of the GDR weakly expose the slanderous propaganda emanating from West Germany about the refugees, weakly publicize the measures taken by the government of the GDR to accommodate refugees who have returned to the Republic, by giving them work [and] living quarters, and guaranteeing other rights to them, [and they] rarely organize statements by persons who have returned from West Germany. Newspapers, as a rule, remain silent about the facts of the migration of residents of West Germany to the GDR, and do not use their statements for propaganda purposes.

Party and governmental organs commit serious distortions in the implementation of the SED's policy with regard to the intelligentsia.

In the second half of 1952, the SED CC and the GDR government undertook a series of economic and political measures aimed at drawing the intelligentsia into active participation in cultural and economic construction. From 1 July 1952, the pay for engineering-technical and

scientific workers was significantly increased, and for the most outstanding scientific and technical personnel, high personal salaries of up to 15 thousand marks a month were established.

Despite this, the role of the intelligentsia in building the Republic and the necessity of involving the old intelligentsia is still underestimated within the party and the country. In a significant portion of enterprises, a sectarian relationship to the intelligentsia has still not been overcome. The intelligentsia is not drawn into active participation in the productive and social life of the enterprises.

There are serious drawbacks in the way ideological work with the intelligentsia is handled. In a crude and clumsy manner, demands are made for the reconstruction of all scientific work on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Due to this, scientists of the old school consider that, insofar as they are not Marxists, they have no prospects in the GDR.

Little attention is paid by the SED to organizing scientific discussions, to the free exchange of opinions, [and] the discussion of different problems in advanced science and practice, in the intelligentsia's milieu.

To date, the linking and exchange of scientific activity between scientists of the GDR and scientists of the Soviet Union and social democratic countries is still insufficiently developed.

A feeling of anxiety for their personal safety is evident among broad circles of the intelligentsia and most of all among the technical intelligentsia.¹³ The instances of groundless accusations of sabotage constitute the reason for this sort of mood. The absence of the necessary explanatory work on this issue creates favorable conditions for the activity of enemies and the broad dissemination of all sorts of slanders.

V

West German and Anglo-American authorities are carrying out economic and political diversion aimed at disrupting the five-year plan and at discrediting the policy of the GDR government before the populace. They have worked out a system of measures to entice engineering-technical, scientific and highly-qualified workers from the enterprises and establishments of the GDR.

In West Berlin, a high exchange rate of the Western mark in relation to the Eastern mark is being artificially maintained, making it profitable for the West Berlin population to buy food in the GDR. On the other hand, the acute shortage of high-quality consumer goods in the GDR and their presence in West Berlin attracts a large mass of the residents of the GDR into the Western sector of Berlin. Providing West Berlin with a high level of supply of every imaginable good and lower prices for goods compared to the rest of West Germany has the aim of creating the impression among the population that a high standard of living in West Germany exists in comparison with the GDR.

One of the methods of enemy activity is to dispatch special recruiters to the GDR who engage in the enticement of qualified workers, engineers and technicians, and teachers of secondary and higher schools, to the West.

The West German authorities, the Americans, English, and French, systematically conduct propaganda on the radio in favor of the GDR population's departure for the West, send large quantities of provocative letters, and give provocative telephone warnings of allegedly imminent arrests of GDR citizens.

VI

The church, especially of late, is displaying an active role in enemy propaganda against the GDR. The leaders of the Protestant and Catholic Churches located in West Germany have taken the path of open struggle against the GDR; in sermons and in multiple letters, the clergy calls upon the populace to flee to the West.

The SED CC is committing some mistakes in its relations with the Church.

On 27 January 1953, the SED CC made a decision on exposing the anti-democratic activity of the church youth organization "Junge Gemeinde."¹⁴ It was proposed not to start the exposure of the reactionary activity of "Junge Gemeinde" with broad propaganda work among the populace, but with the organization of trials. In connection with this instruction, the organs of the MfS carried out the arrests of some clergymen and members of "Junge Gemeinde" in February and March. Due to the inadequacy and unconvincing character of the material, however, the trials have not yet been held. Then the SED CC gave an order to begin unmasking "Junge Gemeinde" in the youth press. During the implementation of these instructions, the accusation was made across-the-board that all of the members of "Junge Gemeinde" were members of the terrorist West German youth organization (BDJ).¹⁵ As a result of this, the campaign to expose the reactionary activity of "Junge Gemeinde" has currently aggravated relations between the church and the state.

At one of the meetings with the first secretaries of the SED district committees, W. Ulbricht¹⁶ gave the order that open meetings were to be held in all institutions of higher learning and 12-grade schools of the League of FGU¹⁷ to expose the "Junge Gemeinde," in the course of which the expulsion of the leaders and most active members of "Junge Gemeinde" from schools and educational institutions was to be demanded. In certain schools the number of those expelled reaches 20-30 persons, and in each institution of higher education, the number of expelled students ranges from 5 to 20 persons, this in particular, has led to the fact that in March and April of this year alone, 250 people from 39 twelve-grade schools have fled to the West.

VII

In the interest of halting the departure of the population to West Germany, it seems expedient to recommend

the implementation of the following measures to the leadership of the GDR:¹⁸

On economic issues:

1. To take measures toward the unconditional fulfillment of the industrial production plan for 1953, which is decisive for the fulfillment of the five-year plan. To liquidate the lag which took place from the beginning of the year and especially to devote attention to assuring the fulfillment of the plan for machine-building [industry], the introduction of electric power, and the development of the metallurgy [industry].

2. Over the course of a month, to work out measures to increase the 1953 consumer goods production plan and the development of commodity circulation.

For this purpose, the government of the GDR must take additional measures to import necessary raw materials: cotton - 15-20 thousand tons, wool - 3 thousand tons, heavy leather - 2.5 thousand tons. To increase imports of food stuffs (fats, fruits, and others) and some high-quality manufactured consumer goods. For this purpose, to assign additional output of high-quality production for export, in particular to capitalist countries, having found the necessary raw materials locally, using the free [industrial] capacities at hand, especially in precision mechanics and optics.

The GDR Ministry of Foreign Trade makes insufficient use of the possibilities of trade with capitalist countries. It is desirable to render necessary aid to the GDR Ministry of Foreign Trade through the trade representatives of the USSR and the people's democracies in capitalist countries.

3. To oblige local organs of power to improve the leadership of local industry significantly. To oblige the GDR Gosplan to re-examine within a month the 1953 production plans for local industry with a view to significantly expanding them.

4. In noting the underestimation of the role of manufacture in supplying the population with consumer goods, it is necessary to take governmental measures in support of craftsmen production. It is expedient, in keeping artisans' cooperatives, to organize supplies of raw materials for them on a contractual basis on the condition that they hand over their completed products to the state commercial network; to work out measures to offer artisans tax and credit advantages, and also to equip artisans' cooperatives and individual enterprises with industrial equipment.

5. Considering that one of the reasons for the departure of peasants from the GDR to West Germany is the high norms for quotas of agricultural deliveries to the state, to reduce by 5-10% the differentiated norms in effect in 1953 for compulsory supplies of grain crops and meat by peasant farms

6. To cancel ration cards for meat, fats and sugar from the autumn of 1953, thereby completing the elimination of the rationing system in the GDR, keeping in mind that the per-capita consumption norms that have been attained furnish the possibility of a transition to free commerce.

7. To work out a three-year plan on mechanizing agriculture, developing the MTS network, and equipping it with tractors and agricultural machinery in order to have the possibility of fulfilling the needs for mechanized cultivation of the land not only of agricultural cooperatives, but also of individual peasant farms.

8. To halt the practice of using tractors and agricultural machines from private cultivators through the MTS for work on other farms.

9. To work out a three-year plan to develop animal husbandry and to create a fodder base, assuming the need for the future improvement of supplies for the populace from their own resources.

10. To work out a production plan for fertilizer in quantities that will meet in full the needs of agriculture, including large private farms.

11. To concentrate the attention of state and party organs on the organizational-economic strengthening of the agricultural production cooperatives which have been created in order to ensure even this year a harvest in the cooperatives that is larger than that of the best individual agricultural farms, and the income of cooperative members exceeds the incomes of individual peasant farms.

12. In carrying out measures on limiting private-capitalist elements, to differentiate between attitudes toward large and small retailers and other small entrepreneurs (proprietors of small restaurants, hairdressers, bakers, and so on), as to taxes, credits, issuing food ration cards, supplying goods to merchants, and to use private commerce in the capacity of a commodity distribution network to serve the populace.

13. Considering the great popular demand for construction materials, [as well as] agricultural and gardening equipment, to organize broad rural and urban trade in them, having ensured a portion of additional funds for cement, timber, tiles and machine-manufactured articles; to increase the production of agricultural and gardening equipment.

On administrative issues:

1. In the near future, to carry out a broad amnesty both with regard to persons convicted in the first period for Nazi crimes, and, in particular, persons convicted in the most recent period, with the exception of persons convicted for espionage, terrorist acts, diversions, premeditated murder and for large thefts of the people's property. Fifteen to 17 thousand persons could be freed from prisons by the amnesty.

2. To take measures quickly toward the introduction of strict order and the observance of lawfulness in the procedure for arresting and detaining citizens.

3. To organize expediently social courts [*obshchestvennye sudy*] in enterprises, in institutions, and at people's estates [*narodnye imeniia*], to examine minor economic and administrative violations.

4. To re-examine the current criminal code to remove those articles of criminal law which permit their applica-

tion to even the most inconsequential violations.

5. To cancel all criminal-legal orders containing the directives and circulars of separate ministries. Henceforward, to establish a procedure by which criminal-legal sanctions can be stipulated only in laws of the People's Chamber, and in exceptional cases, in a decree by the government of the GDR.

6. To consider it crucial to carry out a reorganization of the communities [*obshchiny*] in the direction of enlarging and strengthening the local authorities.

7. To carry out, in 1953, an exchange of passports for the entire population of the GDR and, first and foremost, for the population of the democratic sector of Berlin and its surrounding districts.

8. To re-examine the GDR government's decree of 5 March 1953 on mass criminal indictments for the non-fulfillment of supply quotas [*postavki*] [to the state] and taxes.

9. In view of the fact that the migration of the population from the GDR to the West is taking place through Berlin, to consider it expedient to require GDR citizens to have passes [*spravki*] and business travel papers [*komandirovochnye udostovereniia*] from local institutions or organs of power upon entry into Berlin.

On political questions:

1. To end the political underestimation of the significance of the issue surrounding the departure of GDR citizens to West Germany that currently exists in party and state organs and among party workers. To oblige party organs and primary party organizations to analyze with care and to study all cases of departure and to take effective measures to ascertain the reasons influencing the population's migration to West Germany.

To view the departure of members of the SED as a betrayal of the party. To investigate according to party procedure each case of departure by members of the SED to the West and to discuss [it] at general meetings of the party organizations and regional committees of the SED.

2. To commit the party and the mass democratic organizations of the GDR to conduct systematic explanatory work among the GDR populace against leaving for West Germany, exposing with concrete examples the slanderous fabrications, [and] the essence and methods of the subversive work which is being carried out by West German agents.

3. To take concrete measures to strengthen counter-propaganda, organizing it in such ways that the press and radio of the GDR systematically carry out the exposure of mendacious Western propaganda on the issue of refugees from the GDR. To set aside the necessary resources for this.

4. In the interests of an effective struggle against the reactionary broadcasts of "RIAS,"¹⁹ to ensure the completion in 1953 of the construction of powerful radio stations in Magdeburg, Schwerin, and Dresden. To build 15 medium-wave low-power radio stations with up to 5

kilowatts of power and 10 short-wave stations each with up to 2-3 kilowatts of power. To manufacture and deploy 400-600 "Gebor" radio sets.²⁰

5. In the interests of strengthening counter-propaganda, to organize through the KPD²¹ the systematic collection of information about the refugees' difficult conditions and the poor material and legal conditions of different strata of the West German populace.

6. In order to expose the reactionary propaganda of the church, to explain in a detailed and systematic way through the press and in oral propaganda, that the government of the GDR unswervingly observes the freedom of conscience, of religion, and of religious observance, as provided for in the GDR constitution. To explain that the actions of the authorities are directed only against those church officials and leaders of "Junge Gemeinde" who conduct hostile subversive work against the democratic tradition of the GDR.

7. To take measures to correct the excesses which have been committed with regard to students expelled from school and from institutions of higher learning for belonging to the "Junge Gemeinde."

8. For the SED CC to examine in particular the issue of improving work among the intelligentsia and to correct the mistakes that have been committed.

9. To take measures to improve scientific and cultural links between scholars in the GDR and in the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, as well as to supply the GDR intelligentsia with foreign scientific and technical literature.

V. Chuikov
P. Iudin
I. Il'ichev

18 May 1953.

[Source: Archive of the President, Russian Federation (AP RF), Moscow, f. 3, op. 64, d. 802, ll.124-144. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie (CWIHP).]

CWIHP FILLER

(WEBSITE LOGO)

USSR Council of Ministers Order
“On Measures to Improve the Health of the
Political Situation in the GDR,”
2 June 1953

Com. Sneshnoi T. K.

Top secret

Council of Ministers of the USSR
 Order

2 June 1953. No. 7576-rs
 Moscow, Kremlin

To confirm the proposed draft resolution on measures to improve the health of the political situation in the GDR.

Chairman of the
 Council of Ministers of the USSR G. Malenkov

No. 10

Top secret

Attachment

to the order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR from
 2 June 1953. No. 7576-rs

On Measures to Improve the Health of the Political
Situation in the GDR

As a result of the incorrect political line being carried out in the German Democratic Republic, a very unsatisfactory political and economic situation has developed.

There is serious dissatisfaction with the political and economic measures carried out by the GDR among the broad mass of the population, including the workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia. This finds its clearest expression in the mass flight of the residents of the GDR to West Germany. Thus, from January 1951 through April 1953, 447 thousand people fled to West Germany; over the course of four months in 1953 alone over 120 thousand. Many refugees are workers. Among the refugees are about 18 thousand workers, about 9 thousand middle peasants, land-poor [peasants], artisans and pensioners, about 17 thousand employees and representatives of the working intelligentsia, and over 24 thousand housewives. From the corps of barracked police, 8,000 people fled to West Germany. It is remarkable that among those who have fled to West Germany in the course of four months of 1953, there are 2,718 members and candidates of the SED and 2,610 members of the Free German Youth League.

It must be recognized that the chief reason for the situation that has been created is that, in keeping with the decision of the Second Conference of the SED and as approved by the Politburo of the CC All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a mistaken course was taken in accelerating the construction of socialism in East Germany without the presence of its real prerequisites, both internally and internationally. The social-economic measures which have been carried out in connection with this include: the forcible development of heavy industry which also lacked raw materials, the sharp restriction of private initiative which harmed the interests of a broad circle of

small proprietors both in the city and in the country, and the revocation of food ration cards from all private entrepreneurs and persons in the free professions; in particular, the hasty creation of agricultural cooperatives in the absence of foundations for it in the countryside led to serious difficulties in the area of supplying the population with manufactured goods and food stuffs, to a sharp fall in the mark's exchange rate, to the ruin of a large number of small entrepreneurs-artisans, workers in domestic industries, and others, and set a significant stratum of the populace against the existing authorities. The matter has gone so far that at present more than 500 thousand hectares of land have been abandoned and neglected, and the thrifty German peasants, usually strongly tied to their plots, have begun to abandon their land and move to West Germany *en masse*.

The political and ideological work being carried out by the leadership of the SED is not adequate for the task of strengthening the German Democratic Republic. In particular, serious errors have been committed with regard to the clergy, evident in their underestimation of the influence of the church amongst the broad masses of the population and in their crude administrative methods and repression.

The underestimation of political work amongst the intelligentsia should also be admitted as a serious mistake. To a certain extent this [underestimation] explains the vacillations, instability, and even hostile relation to the existing order that is evident among a significant part of the intelligentsia.

All of this creates a serious threat to the political stability of the German Democratic Republic.

In order to correct the situation that has been created, it is necessary:

1. To recognize the course of forced construction of socialism in the GDR, which was decided upon by the SED and approved by the Politburo of the CC of the All-Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in the decision of 8 July 1952, as mistaken under current conditions.

2. In the interests of improving the political situation of the GDR and strengthening our position both in Germany itself and on the German issue in the international arena, as well as securing and broadening the bases of mass movement for the construction of a single democratic, peace-loving, independent Germany, recommend to the leadership of the SED the implementation of the following measures:

- a) to halt the artificial establishment of agricultural production cooperatives, which have proven not to be justified on a practical basis and which have caused discontent among the peasantry; to check carefully all existing agricultural production cooperatives and to dissolve both those which were created on an involuntary basis as well as those which show themselves to be non-viable. To keep in mind that under the present conditions in the GDR, only the most simple form of productive cooperation by the peasants, such as cooperation in the

joint preparation of the soil without collectivizing the means of production, can be more or less viable. Such cooperatives, given the provision of the necessary help to them, can become an attractive example to the peasantry;

b) to strengthen the existing machine-leasing stations as the main lever of influence on the countryside and as the fundamental means of helping the working peasant in the business of raising agricultural productivity.

Besides helping cooperatives for jointly working the soil, machine-hiring stations must also serve individual peasant cultivation on a leasing basis;

c) to renounce the policy of limiting and squeezing middle and small private capital as a premature measure. In the interests of stimulating the economic life of the Republic, to recognize the expediency of the broad attraction of private capital in different branches of small and domestic industry, in agriculture, and also in the area of trade, not including in this its large-scale concentration.

In distributing material resources, to see to the apportionment of raw materials, fuel, and electrical energy, as well as to the provision of credits to private enterprises. To re-examine the existing system of taxing private enterprises, which has practically eliminated in them the stimulus to participate in economic life, with a view to alleviating the pressure of taxation. To restore food ration cards to private entrepreneurs and also to persons of the free professions.

d) to re-examine the five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the GDR with a view to curtailing the extraordinarily intense pace of development of heavy industry and sharply increasing the production of mass consumption goods, as well as fully guaranteeing food for the population in order to liquidate the ration card system of providing foodstuffs in the near future;

e) to implement the necessary measures on restoring the health of the financial system and curtailing administrative and special expenses, as well as strengthening and raising the exchange rate of the GDR mark.

f) to take measures to strengthen legality and guarantee the rights of democratic citizens; to abstain from the use of severe punitive measures which are not strictly necessary; to re-examine the files of repressed citizens with the intent of freeing persons who were put on trial on insufficient grounds; to introduce, from this point of view, the appropriate changes in the existing criminal code;

g) to consider the wide development of political work among all the strata of the population to be one of the most important tasks of the SED; to eradicate decisively the elements of naked administrative methods; to attain a position whereby the measures taken by the government are understood by the people and meet with support from the population itself.

To assign special attention to political work among the intelligentsia in order to secure a turnabout by the core mass of the intelligentsia in the direction of active participation in the implementation of measures to strengthen the existing order.

At the present and in the near future it is necessary to put the tasks of the political struggle to reestablish the national unity of Germany and to conclude a peace treaty at the center of attention of the broad mass of the German people both in the GDR and in West Germany. At the same time it is crucial to correct and strengthen the political and economic situation in the GDR and to strengthen significantly the influence of the SED in the broad masses of workers and in other democratic strata of the city and the country.

To consider the propaganda carried out lately about the necessity of the GDR's transition to socialism, which is pushing the party organizations of the SED to unacceptably simplified and hasty steps both in the political and in the economic arenas, to be incorrect.

At the same time to consider it necessary to elevate significantly the role of the bloc of democratic parties and organizations, as well as of the National Front for a Democratic Germany, in the political and social life of the GDR.²²

h) To put a decisive end to [the use of] naked administrative methods in relation to the clergy, to end the harmful practice of crude interference in the affairs of the church. To cancel all measures doing harm to the immediate interests of the church and the clergy, that is: the confiscation of the church's charitable establishments (almshouses and shelters), the confiscation by local authorities of neglected church lands, the removal of state subsidies from the church, and so on. To end the oppression of rank-and-file participants in the religious youth organization "Junge Gemeinde," moving the center of gravity to political work among them. Keeping in mind that repressive measures toward the Church and the clergy can only serve to strengthen the religious fanaticism of the regressive strata of the population and their dissatisfaction, the main means of combatting the reactionary influence of the Church and the clergy must be carefully sought through explanatory and cultural-enlightenment work. The broad diffusion of scientific and political knowledge among the populace should be recognized as the basic form of anti-religious propaganda.

3. To recognize that the provision of economic aid to the GDR by the Soviet Union is necessary, especially in the area of supplying food.

4. To oblige the High Commissioner of the USSR in Germany, com. Semenov,²³ and the Supreme Commander of the Soviet occupation troops, com. Grechko,²⁴ to eliminate the present shortcomings in the way the occupation regime is being carried out by Soviet troops. To take measures in order [to ensure] that the presence of the Soviet occupation troops infringes upon the immediate interests of the civilian population as little as possible, [and] in particular, to free up all of the educational premises, hospitals, and cultural establishments, which have been occupied by Soviet troops.

5. Based on the fact that the political and economic condition of the GDR is one of the most crucial factors not

only in the resolution of the general issue of Germany but also in the peaceful settlement of fundamental international problems, it is necessary to take strict account of the real conditions inside the GDR, both the situation in Germany and the international circumstances as a whole, when specifying a general political line on this or that period and when realizing each concrete measure to strengthen the German Democratic Republic in the future.

6. Taking into account the fact that at present the main task is the struggle for the unification of Germany on a democratic and peace-loving basis, the SED and KPD, as the standard-bearers of the struggle for the aspirations and interests of the entire German nation, should ensure the use of flexible tactics directed at the maximum division of their opponents' forces and the use of any oppositional tendencies against Adenauer's venal clique. For this reason, inasmuch as the Social Democratic Party [SPD] of West Germany, which a significant mass of workers continues to follow, speaks out, albeit with insufficient consistency, against the Bonn agreements, a wholly adversarial position in relation to this party should be rejected in the present period. Instead, it should be attempted, where possible, to organize joint statements against Adenauer's policy of the division and imperialist enslavement of Germany.

[Stamped by the General Office of the Administration for the Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the USSR].

[Source: AP RF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 802, ll. 153-161. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie (CWIHP).]

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Notes of GDR Premier O. Grotewohl²⁵ on Meetings between East German and Soviet Leaders in Moscow, 2-4 June 1953

Malenkov	Semenov
Beria ²⁶	Grechko
Molotov ²⁷	Kaganovich ²⁸
Khrushchev ²⁹	Ulbricht
Bulganin ³⁰	Oelßner ³¹
Mikoian ³²	Gr[otewohl]

Concerned about GDR
Document on Measures for Improvement
Read by Oelßner
continuation at 10:00 on 3 June

6/3/53 Continuation
the same composition

Malenkov: the point of departure for everything has to be the change of the conditions in the GDR.

Beria: We all have been at fault; no accusations

Molotov: So many mistakes, therefore correcting it in a way that all of G[ermany] will see it.

Khrushchev: L.P.G. greatest [degree of] voluntarism

Beria: Correct fast and vigorously - that document you can take back again

Kaganovich: The flight from the republic is bad. Our document is reversal, yours is reform.

Mikoian: Without revision of the five-year plan (heavy industry), the reversal is impossible

Why iron and steel industry since one can buy pig iron[?]

Malenkov: [Do] not to worry about prestige; if we do not correct [the situation] now, a catastrophe will happen..

Candid corrections.

Delayed - lost much time.

One has to act quickly.

Calm work style.

Ulbricht: no panic within the L.P.G.

1) lowering of the requisition quotas

2) improve equipment of MTS

food: we want to help

Mistake to do everything yourself since you can't [...]

[Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BArch), DY 30 J IV 2/2/286. Provided by Hope Harrison (Lafayette College). Transcribed and translated by Christian Ostermann (CWIHP).]

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Transcript³³ of the Conversations between the Soviet Leadership and a Hungarian United Worker's Party Delegation in Moscow on 13 June 1953

Kremlin, 13 June 1953.

Com. Malenkov: They had a discussion recently with Comrade Rakosi³⁴ about the Hungarian situation. After that conversation, it seemed necessary to discuss certain questions in a wider range. He recommends as the procedure for discussion that the Hungarian comrades unfold their views primarily regarding three questions that relate to fields where not everything is in order in Hungary:

1. certain questions of economic development
2. the selection of cadres
3. certain questions of the state administration (abuses of power).

After discussing these questions, the ways to correct the mistakes must be discussed.

Com. Malenkov: We view Hungary's situation with a critical attitude. We would like the comrades to be critical as well, and to tell us their opinions about the problems. Our impression is that the Hungarian comrades underestimate the problems. Without a thorough debate of the questions, it is impossible to find proper solutions. The facts that we are familiar with indicate that the situation in the field of agriculture is not good. The quality of animal husbandry is not improving; on the contrary, it is declining. Regarding the [agricultural] collectives, the situation

is not too good there either. As far as we know, 8-10,000 families left the collectives last year. They say the harvest was bad. That cannot explain everything. There were excessive orders during the collection of the [agricultural] levy. It was not proper to collect the entire sunflower and rice harvest. Many peasants are sentenced by the courts, because they do not fulfill their obligations to the State. There are problems in the area of trade as well. They provide few commodities for the population.

Persecutions were initiated against 250,000 people in the second half of 1952. It is true that 75% of the persecutions were stopped; yet, the number is still rather high. In 1952, they brought sentences in about 540,000 cases of transgressions within 9 months. All these provoked dissatisfaction among the population.

To return to the [question of] collectives, there is evidence according to which the income of the collectives' employees is less than that of individually working farmers. It is also a mistake that they appropriate [only] a small sum for investments in the field of agriculture. Regarding the cadres. It is appropriate that many [of them] study. But if the leaders are always studying, they are not working. They virtually turn the leaders into students.

Com. Beria: He agrees with what comrade Molotov said. When comrade Rakosi was here last time, it was brought up that certain questions should be discussed with more comrades. Not that they do not trust comrade Rakosi or that comrade Rakosi does not represent Hungary, but just so that they would get to know more comrades.

Comrade Rakosi himself suggested this on several occasions.

It can not be said that there is no improvement in Hungary. The positions of the people's democracy are continuously becoming stronger. The point is that the situation should become even better. The international and internal conditions will not always be this favorable. This is exactly why now the internal situation must be strengthened. We must be stronger than we are now.

Let us look at agriculture from this point of view. The collective sector in Hungary could work much more effectively if the Central Leadership and the Government paid more attention to agriculture. In that case, there would not be 750,000 ha. fallow land. The situation wouldn't be such that the peasants leave agriculture and move into industry. The situation wouldn't be such that the peasants are significant debtors to the State. This debt constitutes 400 million forints according to our information. The situation wouldn't be such that the peasants do not know how much levy they would have to surrender to the State the following year. Comrade Imre Nagy³⁵ was excluded from the PB [Political Bureau] because he recommended that the collective movement should be developed more slowly. This was not correct. The Comrades who lead the KV [Central Leadership] and the Ministerial Council do not know the countryside well, and they do not want to get to know the countryside.

The large number of major investments contribute to the bad situation in the villages. The Hungarian industry is not small. If the Hungarian industry was rectified and broadened a bit, it would be possible to develop metallurgy and certain other industrial branches more slowly. This would allow them to pay more attention to light industry, to the industry that serves the citizens.

Regarding legality and law enforcement, comrade Malenkov is right. Comrade Rakosi once again misunderstands us in this question. The issue is not that comrade Rakosi mentioned 30-40,000 arrested, and their number is somewhat higher.

Could it be acceptable that in Hungary—a country with 9,500,000 inhabitants—persecutions were initiated against 1,500,000 people? Administrative regulations were applied against 1,500,000 people within two and a half years. These numbers show that the interior and judiciary organs and the AVH³⁶ work very badly, and the Ministry of the Interior and the AVH must merge precisely because of this. A respectful comrade must be placed in the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior; someone who will be able to change the situation that developed there. Several leaders replaced each other at the AVH and the M. of Interior; it is not even possible to know exactly what the situation is now. And Hungary will be the object of the attention of many capitalist countries, of the USA, and of England for a long time. There is a big and well-qualified Hungarian delegation in the West that keeps in touch with the leading foreign imperialist circles. It is to be expected that certain capitalist countries will try to curry their favor; others will send diversionists to Hungary. They have one goal: to overthrow the existing authorities and to restore the power of the capitalists. There are many elements in Hungary who could be exploited by the enemy. And there are many who are dissatisfied with the policies of the Party. Why does he treat this question so extensively? Because it has great significance in the relations of the peoples' democracies, but also in the Soviet Union.

There is another way to improve the situation. The personal intervention of the President of the Ministerial Council or of the Party's First Secretary in the questions of the Ministry of the Interior. Comrade Rakosi does that. This intervention is not always appropriate. Even comrade Stalin made a mistake in this question. He directly gave instructions for the questioning of those arrested, etc. Comrade Rakosi would be even more likely to make mistakes.

It is not right that comrade Rakosi gives directions regarding who must be arrested; he says who should be beaten. A person who is beaten will give the kind of confession that the interrogating agents want, will admit that s/he is an English or American spy or whatever we [Hungarians] want. But it will never be possible to know the truth this way. This way, innocent people might be sentenced. There is law, and everyone has to respect it. How investigations should be conducted, who should be arrested, and how they should be interrogated must be left

to the police organs.

Thus, there are two ways to improve the situation. One of the methods: a responsible person is placed at the top of the Ministry of the Interior who becomes the supervisor of the area and corrects the mistakes. The other method: comrade Rakosi directly directs the work of the Interior and AVH organs. This latter method is not correct. Comrade Rakosi tells who is to be arrested, etc. This is how we reach the point that comrade Rakosi is never wrong; all the other comrades are wrong. This situation leads to a point where comrade Rakosi will not be respected, but feared. [He] is the Party's [First] Secretary, the Ministerial Council's President, and the director of the AVH in one person.

Com. Malenkov: Here we are correcting the mistakes that we made in this area.

Com. Beria: The issue of Peter's³⁷ arrest. Bielkin, a person arrested by the Soviet State-security, confessed that he spied together with Gabor Peter. Later he withdrew his confession.

Comrade Rakosi said that Peter could not be released because he had other sins.

Two people were beaten at the AVH until they died. This [was] a serious mistake. Comrade Rakosi is an important person. It is not right that he does everything. It was not even right for comrade Stalin to be everyone in one person. One person is only one person. When comrade Rakosi says the people would not understand if he were released from his position as First Secretary, he overestimates himself. Those comrades who are here and the other comrades at home are not accidental [sic] people either. It would be better if the President of the Ministerial Council were Hungarian.³⁸ Comrade Stalin told comrade Rakosi several times that the Hungarians should be promoted more. They say that they (Jews in Hungary) served Horthy.³⁹ If they are honest people and now they serve us, they must be supported. Today the Red Army is still in Hungary, but it will not be there forever. Therefore, we must prepare and become stronger so that nobody can do any harm to us.

If comrade Nagy becomes the President of the Ministerial Council, comrade Rakosi should remain at the head of the Party as a comrade rich in experience who is faithful to the cause of the Party. Comrade Nagy would be satisfactory as the President of the Ministerial Council (faithful to the Party, Hungarian, knows the agricultural sector).

Comrade Rakosi in his telegram misinterpreted the suggestion that comrade Gerö should be the Minister of the Interior.

Comrade Molotov: The comrades had a chance to become convinced that even though we are talking about Hungary, the issue is not only Hungary, but all the peoples' democracies.

The criticism is severe, but the comrades have to get used to severe criticism. He [Molotov] agrees with com. Malenkov's and com. Beria's speeches. He also agrees

with what has been said about comrade Rakosi. The tendency for bossiness that plagued comrade Rakosi as well originated in the Soviet Union. This mistake must be corrected as soon as possible.

Is the MDP's⁴⁰ political line correct? In my opinion, it is not correct. There have been many mistakes made in the economic field that must urgently be corrected. The speed of industrialization is exaggerated; it is beyond our capabilities. There is a disease in almost all peoples' democracies that leads them to want to establish autarky. This is a children's disease. They do not take into account the Soviet Union's existence. What happened in Hungary? The number of people working in industry grew by 500,000 people within 3 years. This is dangerous and detrimental for Hungary.

They want to invest 19 billion [forints?] this year.

There is a virtual wave of oppression against the population. They initiated persecution against 1,500,000 people in a population with 4.5 million adults in three and a half years. There were 1,500,000 violations during this time. They punish for everything, and punish insignificant acts for selfish reasons. The constitution was established in 1949 according to which a Bureau of State Affairs should be set up. It still has not been set up. This state of affairs is intolerable.

They resort to all kinds of manipulations to ensure a forced industrial development. For instance, there was [only] 57% wool in a particular fabric. They left the name and price of the material, but they took the wool out of it. They significantly worsened the quality of milk. Everything resembles counterfeit. They have lost contact with the population; they do not express the interest of the population in many questions. Is this why we chased the bourgeoisie away, so that afterwards the situation would be like this? Comrade Rakosi's bossiness played a role in this. He knows everything, sees everything and is capable of doing anything.

We talk with our Comrades in a totally frank and honest way. The necessary conclusions must be drawn.

Com. Bulganin: We had not discussed anything in advance; we have no such habits. There are many facts that I only heard for the first time from comrade Beria's presentation. All that was said by the comrades permits me to observe that a catastrophe will occur if we do not improve the situation. The whole situation might be entirely different if the Red Army were not there. It is a fact that the elements of power abuse exist; the population's quality of life has declined. This is not the road to socialism, but the road to a catastrophe.

The question of the army. It is intolerable and not permissible that the army is constantly being purged. Of course, there should be no dubious elements in the army. But it is not possible to keep purging the army for 8 years. Continuously purging the army and keeping it in a feverish state means disarming the army morally and counterpoising it with themselves [with the Party]. In 1952 and in the first quarter of 1953, 460 officers and generals were

discharged for political reasons. The army was not established in 1952. Why was it necessary to discharge this many people for political reasons? If Comrade Rakosi and the KV looked at these 460 people, it would become clear that some of them are our friends, our people. Thus they turned honest people into traitors. There were 370 desertions in 1952. There were 177,000 disciplinary punishments in the army in one year and 3 months. There was almost one punishment for each person.

There are many signals coming in that comrade Farkas⁴¹ likes glamour too much and strives to present himself as a great commander. Rather thorough steps must be taken urgently to improve the situation.

Com. Mikoian: Comrade Malenkov and comrade Beria brought up these questions as openly as they would have [just] between themselves. This is a sign of great trust and friendship.

I have known comrade Rakosi for a long time. The comrades analyzed comrade Rakosi's mistakes correctly. Comrade Rakosi has become very full of himself. There is a certain kind of adventurism in the question of economic planning. For instance, the forced development of their own metallurgy. Hungary does not have its own iron ore, nor its own coke. All this must be imported from abroad. Nobody has calculated yet how much one ton of raw iron and steel costs Hungary. They are building ironworks in Hungary for which nobody has promised the iron ore. In 1952, they had a shortage of 700,000 tons of coke. They [Russians] helped, based on the instruction from comrade Stalin, so that the ironworks would not stop. The coke is not secured for next year either. There are great excesses in the field of major investments. The construction of the metro [subway] could have waited 5-6 years. The amount of money invested in heavy industry has quadrupled since 1950. They are implementing [agricultural] collectivization without the appropriate economic basis, and, as a consequence, the collectives had a lower productivity rate than the individual producers.

This is a serious mistake.

The party newspaper reported [cases of] sentences in which [a] peasant was imprisoned and fined for 3,000 forints because he fed 1.5 q sugar canes [to his animals]. The peasantry can not respect a system like this.

They ask for a quarter million rubles of equipment for the army when Hungary has problems with food supply. Hungary has a debt of 360 million rubles to the people's democracies.

They draw up strenuous plans that they can not fulfill. The goods available to the populace in Hungary are of bad quality and expensive. There are no goods of good quality, because they export those to try somehow to achieve balanced trade. The situation is not improving but getting worse. Everything is growing in Hungary, but the amount of goods provided for the population is decreasing. (Examples for decreasing quantity: textiles, soap, etc.)

Hungary has all the potential to bloom. It was generally developing well until 1951, until success blinded

the leaders and they started to make audacious plans.

The mistakes must be corrected instantly.

Com. Khrushchev: He agrees with the criticism that the comrades developed. Comrade Beria's passionate criticism was aimed at helping to correct the mistakes. Certain comrades think that the Russian comrades did not form an entirely correct opinion when they criticized comrade Rakosi. Comrade Rakosi is primarily responsible for the mistakes. Comrade Rakosi observed that coal production grew by 25%, and in spite of this there were no protests in certain schools or hospitals. Even though Comrade Rakosi commented on this in the form of self-criticism, he is still responsible for it. It is possible that comrade Rakosi practiced self-criticism because he saw that things were going badly and this way he could avoid criticism.

Hungary used to be famous for her well-developed agriculture and for being a rich country. Now, even the middle peasantry is in uncertainty because of the extremely rapid pace of collectivization. The peasantry needs sires [stud stock], power for the ploughs, etc. If the peasantry sees that sooner or later they will have to join the collectives, they will not develop their farms. This is how individual farming declines. We should not even be surprised if all of a sudden they started to do away with the vineyards.

My impression is that there is no real collective leadership, [that] a true collective leadership has not developed. Comrade Nagy criticized the leadership; therefore, they excluded him from the Politburo. What kind of respect for [critical] opinions is this? Deeply effective consequences must be drawn from the criticism toward Comrade Rakosi. Is it not possible to produce a collective leadership made up of Hungarians? It is impossible that a population of 9.5 million can not produce people that are suitable leaders. This situation in which one has not finished studying yet, the other one just started, must be changed; thus, there are no leaders with sufficient values.

Comrade Rakosi can not work collectively. There are capable people; they must be promoted and the relationship [of the party] with the Hungarian people must be improved.

They are building the metro in Budapest. In the USSR they only started to build it in 1932. Moscow is the capital of a country with 200 million people. The Hungarian comrades are mistaken to start with the assumption that since it exists in Moscow; therefore, it must be quickly built in Budapest as well.

Com. Malenkov: Certain question must have surprised the comrades. They would need to stay for another 2-3 days to develop and discuss the main regulations. We should meet once again. We could meet on Tuesday afternoon.

The [Hungarian] comrades who spoke said themselves that things were not going very well in Hungary. It is not an issue of minor details, but the correction of the political

line has become necessary, because there are problems with fundamental questions, and it also has to do with the question of leadership. Last time, when comrade Rakosi was here, we talked with him in more immediate circles. Comrade Rakosi could not name anyone among the Hungarians as his primary deputy. This was an unpleasant surprise for us. Whenever someone's name came up, comrade Rakosi always immediately had some kind of objection, thus finally he could not name any Hungarian as his primary deputy. In connection with this came the idea that the comrades should be invited and we should discuss certain questions together. No matter what kind of candidate's name came up, there were always immediate objections. This was what worried us, and made it necessary to talk with more comrades, this way. Comrade Rakosi's telegram also had this kind of effect. And then we saw that we needed to help the comrades and we would have to talk about this question openly. It is not a coincidence that the question of bossiness came up. It is one thing to paint things very beautifully in the movies, but reality is another thing.

Why do we bring these questions up so harshly? We, as Communists, are all responsible for the state of things in Hungary. The Soviet Union is also responsible for what kind of rule exists in Hungary. If they say that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union advised certain incorrect things, we admit to that, and we correct the mistakes, too. We admit to the extreme military demands, but the comrades executed these demands even beyond what was expected. Why should an army be maintained with such a size that it bankrupts the state[?] The point is, we have to develop regulations together that are suitable to correct the mistakes, and these regulations must be put into writing. It must be determined how power can be allocated to the right places and distributed properly. We have to come to the conclusion that the Ministerial Council's President should be Hungarian. Comrade Rakosi will find his own important position as the [First] Secretary of the Party. A respectful person must be recommended as the Minister of the Interior; comrade Gerö should take over the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior. The Politburo must take its own place; the Secretariat and the Ministerial Council should also take their own places. It is an impossible state of affairs that persons in the Ministerial Council keep silent regarding the question of [agricultural] levy in kind [only] because it had been previously decided on by the Secretariat.

Recommendations must be made as to who should be placed where. There should be no favor for anyone with regards to who should be placed in what field. It is our sacred responsibility to place everyone in the proper position. Whoever is placed in a responsible position must be respected and full rights must be insured for him. There is no reason for people in responsible positions to work as employees next to the master. Nothing good could come of it, besides all the harm. That is a civic habit. These questions must be considered thoroughly, and the

recommendations must be prepared. We will meet on Tuesday, and then we will discuss the recommendations. Com. Rakosi: Regarding hubris, that's an illness that one can not detect, just like one can not smell one's own odor. If the comrades say this is the case, I accept it. (Beria: Comrade, what do you think?)

It must be said that I never wanted to be the President of the Ministerial Council. (Comrade Molotov: But you wanted a President for the Ministerial Council that would have had no say in decisions.)

Comrade Beria: We like you and respect you, that's why we criticize you. You had told comrade Stalin even before being elected as the President of the Ministerial Council that the power was already in your hands. Comrade Stalin reported this.

Com. Rakosi: The comrades said that we needed a big army and military industry.

Com. Malenkov: We wanted you to develop the army. We [will] correct this mistake. There are 600,000 people in the army. (Comrade Rakosi: Including the reserves. So you carried the Soviet Union's wishes to the extreme.

Com. Beria: The development of the army was discussed with comrade Stalin. Comrade Stalin gave incorrect instructions.

Com. Rakosi: We tried to execute the instructions. My heart was aching about the fact that we had to maintain such a big army.

Com. Malenkov: When you asked us to decrease our demands to build barracks, we withdrew our requests immediately.

Com. Rakosi: Twenty-six percent of the farm land is in the hands of collectives. We achieved this in 5 years. The peasantry knows that collectivization will happen sooner or later.

Com. Beria.: The policy toward the middle peasantry must be changed.

Com. Malenkov: One or two things can be explained, but not everything. The issue of comrade Rakosi's telegram. Comrade Rakosi started to expand in the telegram on something other than what they had talked about and agreed on. The issue is that there should not be three Jews in the leadership.⁴² However, comrade Rakosi in the telegram made it sound like we had given such an advice, and answered that he did not really understand it, but he accepted it.

Com. Beria: If the great Stalin made mistakes, comrade Rakosi can admit that he made mistakes too. It must not be prescribed who should be beaten by the AVH. Everyone will be afraid. Comrade Hidasi is afraid, too; that's what his speech reflects. Provocation can reach everything [sic!], if the methods are like these. People must not be beaten.

The Ministerial Council must make the decisions about important questions regarding production. The Party's Central Leadership must be preoccupied with education and the question of cadres.

Why is it necessary to invest one billion forints in

crude oil production? Romania has got enough oil. In Hungary, the aluminum industry should be developed more.

Com. Gerö: The criticism is justified and correct not just in general, but also regarding the question of bossiness. The leadership is not collective, and we did not raise Hungarian cadres. He often wanted to raise the question but never got to it. The situation really got to the point that whenever comrade Rakosi gave a speech, the newspapers really exulted it, and the KV's staff made sure that it would appear before the people as some extraordinary achievement. Such bossiness undoubtedly exists, and I am primarily responsible for it, second to comrade Rakosi. I did not have the courage to bring up the question. By expressing our mistakes this openly, the comrades helped us tremendously. It is a shame that we could not do this ourselves. It must be admitted that such bossiness happened in my case too, but I discontinued it during the last few years. The enemy tries to take advantage of these things. Bossiness is also practiced by comrade Farkas. In fact, there is bossiness even at the lower levels, at the smaller organs. The county and village secretary, the president of the collective, everyone is a leader in their realm. This kind of bossiness exists, and it must be uprooted thoroughly. In our case, bossiness is intertwined with civic phenomena; he [Gerö] also agrees with the comrades on that. We just had parliamentary elections. After the elections, a picture was published in the *Szabad Nep*, depicting Comrade Rakosi voting together with his wife. Comrade Rakosi did not arrange for this himself, but he did not protest it either.

Regarding mistakes in the economy. We noticed in a number of questions that there were mistakes, but we did not bring up these questions so explicitly. For instance, the issue of the metro. It is actually fortunate that they did not listen to the military advisers who recommended that the metro should be built such that tanks and military trains could commute on the metro line. There was great excess in the case of the metro.

Com. Malenkov: It seems like we all agree on recommending comrade Imre Nagy. He explicitly asked for comrade Rakosi's and comrade Dobi's opinions. Comrade Rakosi and comrade Dobi agreed with the proposal, too.⁴³

[Source: Hungarian Central Archives, Budapest, 276. f. 102/65. oe. e. -Typed revision. - Published by Gyorgy T. Varga in *Multunk*, 2-3(1992), pp. 234-269. Translated by Monika Borbely (Woodrow Wilson Center/Princeton University).]

Report from V. Semenov and A. Grechko (Berlin-Karlshorst) to V. Molotov and N. Bulganin, 17 June 1953, 7:26 a.m. (Moscow time)

OPERATIONS DIVISION,
MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION,
GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

Top Secret (Declassified)

To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV
To Comrade N.A. BULGANIN

We are reporting on the situation in Berlin towards the close of 16 June.

As reported before, there had been a demonstration by construction workers on strike in the downtown of the Soviet Sector of Berlin during the first half of 16 June, protesting against the raising of the output quotas in the Berlin construction industry. Some people from West Berlin took part in the rally. The majority of construction workers started breaking up after it was announced that SED CC had cancelled the rise in output quotas. The participation of the persons sent from West Berlin kept increasing in the subsequent gatherings.

The situation in the city worsened towards the evening of 16 June. While the activists of the SED were meeting in Friedrichsstadtpalast, big crowds started arriving from West [Berlin] into East Berlin, moving towards the above-mentioned building. At the same time, a band of up to 2,000 people, mainly West Berliners, were throwing stones at the I.V. Stalin monument at Stalinallee at 9.30 p.m. and moved towards Friedrichsstadtpalast, ransacking a shop on the way. Four hundred German (Eastern German) policemen dispersed this band. At the same time, large groups of West Berliners were attempting to promote chaos, blocking streets, holding up tram traffic, turning over cars, breaking shop windows. About 500 bandits tried to burst into the gas plant and block its operations. Some groups gathered at the Berlin City Railway Office, as well as near the SED CC building. Some hooligans tried breaking into the residential flats of SED activists at Berzarin Platz. All those groups were dispersed by German police. 25 people were arrested, according to incomplete information.

The organizers of the riots announced that there would be a meeting at Strausberger Platz in central Berlin at 6.00 a.m. on 17 June. At the same time, there was strong agitation for a general strike in East Berlin. The workers at "Fortschritt One" and "Fortschritt Two" clothing factories, as well as the night shift of 120 people at one of the Berlin plants, went on strike in the evening of 16 June.

The issue of *Der Abend* published in Western Berlin on the evening of 16 June [which] called for a general strike in East Berlin on 17 June. It is clear from the reports of West German press and radio that the above-mentioned hostile actions have been organized from West Berlin as a response to the recently declared measures on normaliza-

tion of the political situation in the GDR. From reports, it is also clear that this is a matter of a rather major planned provocation.

We talked with the GDR leaders ULBRICHT, GROTEWOHL, and ZAISSER. They all believed that the riots of 16 June were just the beginning of actions which have been organized from West Berlin. The friends [East German leadership] are considering the probability of even larger disorders on the morning of 17 June. They made the decision to introduce police patrols to the streets where riots took place as well as to strengthen the protection of the most important objects in the city by the German People's Police. ZAISSER, Minister of State Security and Politburo member, has been put in charge of maintaining order in the city. Units of the barracked police totaling 1,100 men are being called from Oranienburg and Potsdam to reinforce the Berlin metropolitan police forces. Measures have been taken to rally the party and youth activists to carry out explanatory work among inhabitants and to assist the authorities with maintaining order in the city.

At the request of the German friends, we are beginning troop patrols of 450 men [total] in cars in areas where disorders have occurred and also near the important installations in East Berlin.

We have agreed with the "friends" that the German People's Police will maintain order in the city and that Soviet troops will take active part in keeping order only in exceptional circumstances of extreme need. Colonel-General Comrade GRECHKO has taken the overall responsibility over Soviet troops in Berlin. Marshal GOVOROV⁴⁴ is also in Berlin.

The reports of the further events are to follow.
SEMENOV GRECHKO [...] ⁴⁵

[Source: Archives of the Russian General Staff (AGSh), Moscow, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 1-3. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev.]

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Report from V. Semenov and A. Grechko in Berlin to V. Molotov and N. A. Bulganin, 17 June 1953, 11:15 a.m.

THE OPERATIONS DIVISION,
THE MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

Top Secret (Declassified)
Copy #5
To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV
To Comrade N.A. BULGANIN

Today, the morning of 17 June, some plants are on strike in East Berlin, including the large plants of the Soviet Joint-Stock Company and the people's enterprises. In addition, the workers of the construction companies have not come to work. The striking workers went to

Strausberger Platz, which was arranged by the organizers of the disorders to be the place of the meeting.

By 8 a.m., some 30 enterprises, with a workforce of up to 25,000 people, were on strike. There are about 15,000 to 20,000 people in the streets. The speeches of the demonstrators are running under the same slogans as were put forward yesterday. The demand to decrease the prices by 20% in retail shops is strongly emphasized.

With the measures undertaken [so far], the German police have failed to disperse the demonstrators. Soviet military patrols run throughout the city. Two companies of armored personnel carriers are patrolling near the building that houses the SED CC and the government.

We note an American vehicle with two uniformed American officers in it, calling on the demonstrators to go to West Berlin.

The organization of a solidarity demonstration has been announced in West Berlin. There is a possibility that those demonstrators will attempt to cross from West Berlin to East Berlin which may increase the disorders

SEMENOV GRECHKO

11:15. a.m., 17 June 1953 ⁴⁶

[Source: AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 6-7. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev.]

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Report from A. Grechko and Tarasov in Berlin to N. A. Bulganin, 17 June 1953, 6:30 p.m.

OPERATIONS DIVISION,
MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION,
GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

Top Secret (Declassified)
Copy #6

To Comrade BULGANIN, N.A.

The situation in Berlin is improving. The principal government buildings, such as the one occupied by the Council of the Ministers, by the Central Committee of the Socialist United Party of Germany, and the police headquarters, are safe and guarded by our forces. The major districts of the Soviet sector of Berlin are under the control of our forces.

According to preliminary data, forty-six active instigators were arrested. The situation at the buildings occupied by the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the government is peaceful.

All the roads on the way to these buildings are blocked by our troops, tanks, artillery. The tanks and armored personnel carriers finish dispersing the demonstrators. Some demonstrators are leaving the columns and hiding themselves along the streets. Some three thousand

demonstrators are gathering at Friedrichsstraße in the American Sector of Berlin. Demonstrators have cried out anti-government slogans, demanded the immediate resignation of the present Government of the German Democratic Republic, and asked to decrease prices by 40%, to protect those on strike, to liquidate the [East] German armed forces and the People's Police, to regain the territories of Germany that were given to Poland, as well as other anti-Soviet slogans.

Martial law was introduced in the Soviet Sector of Berlin at 1:00 p.m. on 17 June, local time.

The 2nd Mechanized [Soviet] Army, consisting of the 1st and the 14th mechanized divisions and the 12th tank division, was brought into Berlin to restore complete order in the city by 9:00 p.m. on 17 June.

The units of the above divisions will be reaching the outskirts of the city.

The members of the GDR Government have been evacuated from the dangerous areas and are in comrade Semenov's residence.

With the intention to restore public order and terminate the anti-government demonstrations which have occurred, martial law has been declared in Magdeburg, Leipzig, Dresden, Halle, Görlitz, and Brandenburg.

Today, at 2:00 p.m., local time, a declaration was issued by the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the German people which explained the nature of the events that have taken place and called for unity and opposition to the fascist and reactionary elements.

GRECHKO TARASOV

Received on telephone by Lieutenant-Colonel N. PAVLOVSKY
17 June 1953, 6.30 p.m.⁴⁷

[Source: AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 8-9. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev.]

**Report from A. Grechko and Tarasov
to N. A. Bulganin,
17 June 1953, 9:30 p.m.**

OPERATIONS DIVISION,
MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION,
GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

Top Secret (Declassified)
Copy #6

To Comrade BULGANIN, N.A.

I am reporting the situation in the city of Berlin and on the territory of the German Democratic Republic as of 5:30 p.m., on 17 June (local time).

1. The forces of the [Soviet] Group [of Forces in Germany] continue to restore order in Berlin and other cities and towns of the German Democratic Republic. There are still some demonstrations and street disorders in

Berlin and some cities and towns of the German Democratic Republic.

The demonstrators demand the resignation of the government of the German Democratic Republic, a decrease in the output quotas, a decrease of consumer goods and food prices, the elimination of the sectoral borders, and the restoration of the united Germany within the pre-war borders.

There have been some pogroms of public buildings, commercial shops, as well as some attempts to capture public and government establishments.

2. Besides Berlin, demonstrations and disorders have also taken place in some other cities and towns of the German Democratic Republic. The following numbers of people took part in the demonstrations: up to 15,000 in Magdeburg, up to 1,500 in Brandenburg, up to 1,000 in Oranienburg and Werder, up to 1,000 in Jena, 1,000 in Gera, up to 1,000 in Sömmerda, up to 10,000 in Dresden, up to 2,000 in Leipzig, 20,000 in Görlitz.

The following mechanized and tank units of the Group [of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany] have been dispatched for the restoration of order: some units of the 19th mechanized division in Magdeburg, a mechanized infantry regiment of the 11th tank division in Dresden, a mechanized regiment and a motorbike battalion of the 8th mechanized division in Leipzig. Order was restored in Jena, Gera, and Sömmerda by 6:00 p.m.

3. There are still some disorders in some parts of the Soviet sector of Berlin. According to incomplete information, more than 30 plants and other enterprises have been on strike in the Soviet sector of Berlin.

The 1st and the 14th mechanized divisions are operating in Berlin. The 12th tank division has approached the northeastern suburbs of Berlin.

According to incomplete information, 94 instigators and provocateurs were arrested by 5:00 p.m.

4. According to [our] data, by 9:00 p.m., Moscow time, 50 people were killed or wounded in Magdeburg during the restoration of order. Three Germans were killed and 17 wounded in Leipzig. There have been no losses on our side.

5. Comrade Sokolovskii⁴⁸ arrived in Berlin at 8:43 p.m., Moscow time.

GRECHKO TARASOV

"Correct". General of the Army SHTEMENKO
17 June 1953, 9:30 p.m.⁴⁹

[Source: AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 10-11. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev.]

**Report from A. Grechko and Tarasov in Berlin
to N. A. Bulganin,
17 June 1953, 11:00 p.m.**

OPERATIONS DIVISION,
MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION,
GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
Top Secret (Declassified)

To Comrade BULGANIN, N.A.

I am reporting on the situation in the GDR and Berlin as of 11:00 p.m., 17 June 1953 (Moscow time).

1. The Soviet forces, namely the 1st mechanized infantry division, the 14th mechanized infantry division, and the 12th tank division (altogether 600 tanks), have for the most part restored order in the Soviet sector of Berlin. The provocative plan of the reactionary and fascist-like elements has been wrecked.

There have been only minor groups around the Alexanderplatz and Stalinallee downtown area in the evening, which are being dispersed and arrested by our forces.

It may be considered that a special organization based in West Berlin has directed the strikes in East Berlin.

Analyzing the situation, I have also come to the conclusion that the provocation was prepared in advance, organized, and directed from Western sectors of Berlin. The simultaneous actions in the majority of the big cities of the GDR, the same demands of the rebels everywhere as well as the same anti-state and anti-Soviet slogans, serve as proof for this conclusion.

As the result of measures undertaken in the Western sectors of Berlin, there have been large gatherings of German residents at the borders between the Soviet sector and the British and American ones.

The border with the Western sectors of Berlin was closed by our troops.

Power-stations, gas plants, water-supply, and railway have worked smoothly.

About 300 organizers and provocateurs were arrested in Berlin by 8:00 p.m.

2. Order was restored in the majority of the cities of GDR. Normal life and activity of state institutions were restored toward the end of the day. Order was restored by measures undertaken in Magdeburg. 50 Germans were killed and wounded, and over 100 instigators and provocateurs have been arrested during the restoration of order.

3. With the purpose of preventing further possible riots, the forces of the Group [of Soviet Forces in Germany] are being moved from field camps into the following big and important populated points:

The 3rd Army - the 19th mechanized division into Magdeburg; the 136th artillery-technical, tank & self-propelled gun regiment into Burg; the 13th mechanized division into Parchim, Ludwigslust, Pirleberg; the 207th infantry division into Gardelegen, Stendal.

The 8th Guards Army - the 20th Guards mechanized division into Weimar, Jena, Zeitz; the 21st Guards mechanized division into Halle, Merseburg; the 57th Guards infantry division into Naumburg, Weißenfels and its one infantry regiment into Eisenach.

The 1st Guards Army - the 11th tank division into Dresden (the main forces) and Meißen, Königsbruck (the minor forces); the 8th Guards mechanized division into Leipzig (the main forces) and Borna, Grimma (the minor forces); the 9th tank division into Piesa, Oschatz, Zeithavn.

The 3rd Guards Mechanized Army - the 6th Guards tank division into Dessau, Wittenberg; the 9th mechanized division into Lübben, Cottbus, Spremberg.

The 4th Guards Mechanized Army - the 6th Guards mechanized division into Bernau, Eberswalde, Bad Freienwalde; the 7th Guards mechanized division into Fürstenwalde, Frankfurt an der Oder.

The motorbike battalion and the howitzer battalion of the 10th tank division into Brandenburg; the 25th tank division (a tank regiment and a mechanized infantry regiment) into Oranienburg.

4. According to preliminary information, the losses of the strikers in the whole territory of the GDR have been[:] 84 people killed and wounded, 700 men arrested. Our exact losses are being determined.

5. Martial law was declared in the British sector of Berlin. Soldiers are not allowed to leave the barracks. The patrols at the border with the Soviet sector have been reinforced. Troops in the American and French sectors of Berlin are in barracks.

GRECHKO TARASOV
"Correctly": COLONEL-GENERAL MALININ
17 June 1953⁵⁰

[Source: AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 12-14. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev.]

**Report from V. Sokolovskii and L. Govorov in Berlin
to N. A. Bulganin,
17-18 June 1953**

OPERATIONS DIVISION,
MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION,
GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
Top Secret (Declassified)
Copy #6

To Comrade BULGANIN, N.A.

1. The events that have taken place in Berlin and the other large cities of the Soviet Zone of Germany today, 17 June, seem to be a major planned uprising covering the whole territory of the German Democratic Republic and aimed at making a coup d'état and simultaneously replacing the government in the German Democratic Republic. It is confirmed by the following:

Firstly, the disorders began simultaneously in Berlin and the following big cities: Magdeburg, Brandenburg, Leipzig, Jena, Gera, Halle, Bitterfeld, Dresden, Cottbus, Riesa, Görlitz, etc.

Secondly, the same tactics of actions were used everywhere, i.e. stoppages at plants, factories, public transport facilities and institutions; there were attempts to capture the same kind of objects, such as the district committees of the SED, the branches of the state security forces, and prisons.

Thirdly, all the disorders have taken place under the same slogans:

- a. To pay salaries in accordance with the previous output quotas.
 - b. To decrease immediately the food prices.
 - c. To oust the current government by means of free and secret elections.
 - d. To release political prisoners and eliminate the state security bodies.
2. Despite the fact that this uprising had been prepared beforehand and took place under the leadership of the West, it was totally unexpected for the German democratic government as well as for our [Soviet control] structures [organy].
3. It should be noted that the People's Police have been active, but poorly armed.
4. The timely implementation of measures to restore order by our troops has been complicated by the fact that all the troops happened to be located far from the big cities, i.e. in the field camps, as well as by the fact that the Staff of the Group [of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany] and the Office of the [Soviet] High Commissioner [in Germany] did not take seriously the events starting on 16 June.

These factors have unavoidably led to delays in liquidating of the disorders.

SOKOLOVSKII GOVOROV

17 June 1953

Reported by "VCh-phone" at 2.05 a.m., on 18 June 1953 by General Gryzlov.⁵¹

[Source: AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 4-5. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev.]

**Report from A. Grechko and Tarasov to N. A. Bulganin,
18 June 1953, 11 a.m.**

THE OPERATIONS DIVISION,
THE MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

Top Secret (Declassified)

Copy #6

To Comrade BULGANIN, N.A.

I am reporting the situation on the territory of the German Democratic Republic and in the city of Berlin by 8.00 a.m. on 18 June 1953, Moscow time.

1. There have been no disorders observed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic and in the city of Berlin during the night of June 18. Some groups of Germans started gathering in Görlitz, where they were dispersed by the [Soviet] troops. There is information that the rebels might try to turn the funeral of a German killed there into an anti-government rally in Veida, which is 12 km to the south of Gera. A tank-training battalion of the 20th Guards mechanized division has been sent to Veida.
2. The units of the Group of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany during the night of June 18 have moved from their field camps to the [assigned] areas in accordance with the decision made on June 17. They also have continued to perform their duties along the zonal borders, as well as patrol in the cities and towns of the German Democratic Republic.

By 6.00 a.m. on June 18, the forces have been concentrated in the following areas.

The 3rd Army: the 19th Guards mechanized division in Magdeburg; the 18th mechanized division in Parchim, Ludwigslust, Pirleberg; the 136th artillery-technical and tank & self-propelled gun regiment in the field camp Born [at Burg]; the 207th infantry division in Gardelegen and Stendal.

The 8th Guards Army: the 20th Guards mechanized division in Weimar, Jena, Zeitz; the 21st Guards mechanized division in Halle and Merseburg; the 57th Guards infantry division in Naumburg, Weißenfels, and Eisenach; the 39th Guards infantry division in Ordruff, Plauen, and Saalfeld.

The 1st Guards Mechanized Army: the 11th Guards tank division, except the 44th tank regiment and the 45th tank regiment and a tank-training battalion, in Dresden; the 44th tank regiment and a tank-training battalion in Königsbruck; the 45th tank regiment in Meißen; the 9th tank division in Piesa, Oschatz, Zeithavn; the 19th mechanized regiment and the 1st tank regiment of the 8th Guards mechanized division in Glatzhau and Schönau, and the 20th mechanized regiment and the 21st mechanized regiment of the 8th Guards mechanized division in the vicinity of Meißen.

The 2nd Guards Mechanized Army: the 12th Guards

tank division in the north-east area of Berlin; the 1st Guards mechanized division in the west and south-west areas of the city; the 14th Guards mechanized division in the central and south-east areas of the city; the 9th Guards tank division in Neustrelitz; the 31st anti-aircraft artillery division in Schönwalde; the 172th separate light artillery brigade in camp Schepek.

The 3rd Guards Mechanized Army: the 9th mechanized division in Lubben, Cottbus, and Spremberg; the 6th Guards tank division in Oschnitz, Wittenberg, Alteslager, Dessau; the 7th Guards tank division, except the 23rd mechanized infantry regiment, in the field camp Magdeburg; its 23rd mechanized infantry regiment and the 41st tank-training battalion in Roslau.

The 4th Guards Mechanized Army: the 10th tank division in Kolbitz, Brandenburg, and Krampnitz; the 6th Guards mechanized division in Eberswalde and Bad Freienwalde; the 25th tank division, except the 20th mechanized infantry regiment and the 111th tank regiment, in the field camp Templin; its 20th mechanized infantry regiment and the 111th tank regiment in Oranienburg, Kremen, Felten, and Birkenwerder; the 7th Guards mechanized division in Fürstenwalde and Frankfurt a.d. Oder.

3. Altogether, 209 people were killed and wounded, and 3,351 people were detained on the territory of the German Democratic Republic. Of these, 90 people were wounded and 2,414 were detained in Berlin.

There have been no losses to the units of the Group [of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany].

GRECHKO TARASOV

Correct. General of the Army SHTEMENKO
18 June 1953, 11:00 a.m. [...] ⁵²

[Source: AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 15-16. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev.]

.....

**Report from A. Grechko and Tarasov in Berlin
to N. A. Bulganin,
18 June 1953, 2:30 p.m.**

OPERATIONS DIVISION,
MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION,
GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

Top Secret (Declassified)
To Comrade BULGANIN, N.A.

I am reporting the situation in the GDR and Berlin as of 18 June 1953, 1.00 p.m. (Moscow time).

1. Berlin is calm.

2. There have been some attempts to organize riots and demonstrations in Swinoujscie, Starkau, Bernau, Oranienburg (up to one third of the workers there are on strike), Nordhausen, Görlitz, Warnemünde, Halle, Eisleben, Ettelstadt, Fürstenwalde (up to 400 people),

Zeitz, Apolda and Ettelstadt.

All attempts at riots and demonstrations have been curbed by the units of the Group.

3. According to military intelligence information, the US 7th Army and the 12th Air Force Army were put on alert in the US zone at 5.30 a.m. on June 18. The Main Headquarters of the NATO Armed Forces in Louveciennes (20 km to the west of Paris) were also put on alert.

The alert state for the 7th Army was cancelled and its units were ordered to return to the places of their permanent location at 8.30 a.m.

No movement of troops was observed in the British and French sectors of Berlin.

The French military police has dispersed West Berlin residents gathering at the sectoral border. No gatherings of demonstrators were observed in the British sector of Berlin.

4. The units of the Group have been concentrated in the assigned locations. Besides maintaining order in the area of its location, every garrison has the task to make a reconnaissance up to 50 km around the location and, in case riots occur in any place, deploy sufficient forces there.

GRECHKO TARASOV

“Correctly”: GENERAL OF THE ARMY SHTEMENKO
18 June 1953, 2:30 p.m. ⁵³

[Source: AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 19-20. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev]

.....

[The following is an excerpt from a secret telephonogram by V. Semenov and V. Sokolovskii in Berlin to V. M. Molotov, dated 18 June 1953, describing the situation in East Germany on the morning of June 18. ⁵⁴]

“We are reporting about the situation in Berlin and the GDR at 2 p.m. (Berlin time) on June 18.

Today efforts to restore order in Berlin began actively to include German organizations and SED party organizations, which are devoting their main attention to the development of political work at enterprises. Some of the municipal enterprises worked at reduced capacity in the morning, as a result of continued ferment among workers, who in part, when they arrived at the enterprises, gathered into groups and began discussions. The appearance of organized groups of provocateurs at some enterprises was established, in connection with which small numbers of Soviet troops were sent to separate enterprises, acting in concert with the German police. In some cases, it was possible to expose and arrest the ring-leaders of the strikes at enterprises. Thus, at the chemical factory in Grunau (Köpenik region), an engineer who had been urging workers to strike was arrested. At a high-frequency apparatus factory in Köpenik, workers began work after the arrest of two strike organizers. At a cable factory in Köpenik, the workers themselves detained five provoca-

teurs and strike ring-leaders and handed them over to the police.

Toward midday, the situation in Berlin's enterprises improved, although individual enterprises continue partial strikes. Capacity at electric power stations grew from 30% in the [early] morning hours to 70% by 11:00 a.m.

At 9:30 a.m. at the Brandenburg gates, employees of the people's police of the GDR were fired upon from the direction of West Berlin. The people's police made several shots in return, as a result of which one West Berlin policeman was killed.

Representatives of the intelligentsia took almost no part in the strikes and disturbances. Many well-known representatives of the intelligentsia spoke publicly stating their trust in the government and condemning the West Berlin provocateurs. Classes in schools and in institutions of higher learning [and] rehearsals in the theaters of Berlin continued in a normal fashion yesterday and today. At selected enterprises, engineers and technicians obstructed the cessation of work by strikers and convinced workers not to participate in the disorders.

West Berlin radio broadcast the speech by the Bürgermeister of the Kreuzberg district (American sector), [Willy] Kreßmann, who called upon the residents of East Berlin not to approach the border between East and West Berlin, since the Soviet Army had received orders to use their weapons. "We do not want to bear responsibility for your death," Kreßmann said.

In today's issue of *Neues Deutschland*, a letter from the Stalinallee construction brigade was published, calling on workers to start work again and to end the disturbances. The letter contained the following impermissible phrase: "Today the enterprises belong to us and it depends on us to force our leading colleagues to do what we need. The last two days at Stalinallee is evidence that we have not yet achieved that at all enterprises." We drew Ulbricht's attention to the impermissibility of such publications.

In the GDR, the situation continues to improve. Only isolated cases of disturbances are taking place. At some points, efforts to start demonstrations have been made. Workers at the Stralsund shipyard (900 persons) went on strike. In Halle, strikes are continuing at some factories. The strikers conveyed the following demands to the Soviet commandant through his representatives: Cancel martial law and withdraw troops from Halle, change the government, lower prices, and so on.

In Berlin, Magdeburg, Jena [and] Görlitz, the military commanders announced that death sentences had been carried out against the organizers of the disturbances (seven persons in all)."

[Source: AVP RF, f. 82, op. 41, por. 93, p. 280, ll. 13-15.
Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie (CWIHP).]

**Report from A. Grechko and Tarasov in Berlin
to N. A. Bulganin,
18 June 1953, midnight**

OPERATIONS DIVISION,
MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION,
GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

Top Secret (Declassified)

Copy
#6

To Comrade BULGANIN, N.A.

1. I am reporting on the situation on the territory of the German Democratic Republic and in the city of Berlin by 10:00 p.m. (Moscow time), on 18 June 1953.

1. Berlin is calm. The city's life is going on as usual.

2. There are still some strikes and rallies within some plants in the German Democratic Republic, namely in the following cities and towns: Görlitz, Dresden, Eilenburg, Riesa, Borna, Magdeburg, Halberstadt, Stafffurt, Wernigerode, Rüdersdorf, Groß Dölln, Gera, Halle. Some groups of Germans, altogether of up to 1,500 people, in Dresden at 6:40 p.m. made an attempt to organize a demonstration and go to the prison. Those groups of Germans were dispersed by the actions of a tank company and a battalion of machine-guns of the Soviet forces.

The group of bandits in Halberstadt set a shop of the "Economic Association" on fire. A group of 450 people in Drewitz attempted to rob shops. Order in Halberstadt and Drewitz has been restored by the actions of the [Soviet] troops. The workers of some of the plants in Leipzig have started working.

It is calm in other regions of the German Democratic Republic.

3. The units of the Group [of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany] have continued to perform their duties along the sectoral borders in the city of Berlin and to patrol in the other cities and towns of the German Democratic Republic.

There is no change in the disposition of the units of the Group.

4. According to incomplete information, 544 people were arrested and detained, 2 provocateurs were killed, 27 rioters were wounded on 18 June. A policeman of the GDR and 9 activists were wounded.

GRECHKO TARASOV

"Correct." General of the Army SHTEMENKO
18 June 1953, 12.00 p.m. [midnight]⁵⁵

[Source: AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 26-27. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev.]

[The following is an excerpt from a telephonogram sent by V. Semenov and V. Sokolovskii in Berlin to V. Molotov and N. Bulganin on 19 June 1953 (received in Moscow at 1:20 a.m.) reporting on the situation in East Germany on the evening of 18 June 1953.]

“We are reporting on the situation in Berlin and the GDR on 18 June 1953 at 9:00 p.m. (Berlin time).

In the course of the day on 18 June the liquidation of the remains of the nodes of strikes and disturbances continued in Berlin and the GDR. In the streets of Berlin, full order was restored. There were no efforts to organize demonstrations or public addresses in the streets. The larger portion of the workers who were striking yesterday returned to work. Short partial strikes affected a small number of Berlin enterprises. On average, about 50-70% of workers worked in the enterprises. This is also explained by the fact that workers living in West Berlin could not come to work because of the halting of movement across the sector border.

The organs of the MfS of the GDR and our forces continued to expose the ring-leaders of yesterday’s strikes. The necessary arrests were made. The state and party organs of the GDR are taking measures to restore the normal organization of work at all enterprises in East Berlin. The supply of food and indispensable goods to the populace is being achieved without interruption.

In the majority of the Republic’s regions, order has been restored. Short strikes took place in individual enterprises in the Rostock, Erfurt, Leipzig, Halle, and Dresden districts. The overwhelming majority of the workers who were on strike yesterday returned to work. An enemy demonstration of about one thousand people, who headed for the jail and the railway, was organized in the evening in Dresden. Troops opened fire at the demonstration and it was dispersed. Among the demonstrators, one person was killed and others were wounded. In the other districts of the Republic, it was quiet today. In a number of places, workers were observed catching the provocateurs and handing them over to the police in keeping with the GDR Government’s appeal.”

[Source: AVP RF, f. 82, op. 41, por. 93, p. 280, ll. 27-28. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

*[The following excerpt is from a telephonogram sent by V. Semenov and V. Sokolovskii in Berlin to V. Molotov and N.A. Bulganin on 19 June 1953.]*⁵⁶

“We inform you about the situation in Berlin and in the GDR at 11 o’clock in the morning of 19 June.

In Berlin and in the GDR, the overwhelming majority of striking workers returned to normal labor. Only the small remnants of strikes in some comparatively minor points throughout the Republic were left.

So, in the morning, 1200 workers in the “Pelse”

factory, Erfurt district, struck. The strike lasted for about one hour. There was a short partial strike at the factory “Lova” (city of Gotha). In Erfurt workers in the “RFT” factory (800 persons) struck during the morning, putting forward the demands - announce the names of those who were shot in Berlin;—we do not want war.

The organizers of the disturbances, seeing the failure of public speeches [*vystuplenii*] in Berlin and the large cities, are scattering their agents in small cities and villages where our troops are not stationed, trying to incite strikes and disturbances there. In particular, the fact has been established that enemy provocateurs have been sent from Potsdam to small cities, and also that enemy activists have been scattered from enterprises in large cities, where strikes have ended, to factories located in small villages and cities, where the German police is weak and our troops are not present. We are taking counter-measures, above all by mobilizing and sending activists of the SED and organizers from the districts and large centers to these localities.

In the district of Magdeburg strikes have started in the population centers of Stafffurt (about 1500 workers), Wernigerode (1500-2000 persons), [and] Burg (300-400 persons).

In the district of Halle, strikes are continuing in the Mansfeld copper-smelting complex, at the factory “Ifa” (up to 1000 persons), the boiler factory (1500-2000), and strikes have begun at some enterprises and mines in the regions of Sangerhausen, Eisleben.

In Berlin at almost every factory, normal order has been restored. Only at isolated enterprises are cases of partial strikes taking place.

In Berlin and in the Republic no efforts are being made to conduct demonstrations. Everywhere, normal life is quickly being restored.

During the night of June 18 and 19, the Soviet sector of Berlin was fired upon with cardboard shells filled with leaflets. At the border between the American and Soviet sectors, motor vehicles with loud-speakers appeared which called upon Germans not to irritate Russian soldiers and not to allow clashes with them.

Testimony by persons arrested by the organs of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] gives evidence of the very active organizing role of the American military in the disturbances in Berlin. Those who have been arrested testify that American officers personally gathered in large numbers West Berlin residents whom they had selected and gave them instructions to organize disturbances, arson of buildings, and other things, in East Berlin. At the same time the Americans promised to distribute weapons, bottles with flammable liquid for arson, etc., at Potsdamer Platz (the border between the American and English sectors and the Soviet sector of Berlin). As a reward, the American officers promised money, and for people who showed the greatest activism—a three-month holiday at resorts, and so on. American military personnel personally gave instructions from motor vehicles with loud-speakers

to the participants in the disorders at the House of the Government of the GDR on the border with the Soviet sector. In the provinces of the GDR there is also evidence of the dispatch there of American agents from West Berlin and West Germany. Further work on this issue is being done. We will inform [you] further of the details.

This morning we received a letter from three commandants of the Western sectors of Berlin addressed to the representative of the SCC⁵⁷ in Berlin, Dengin, in which they declare their protest against the measures taken by Soviet troops to restore order in the Soviet sector of Berlin, the halting of travel [*soobshchenie*] between the sectors, and categorically deny the assertion that “a certain Willi Götting,⁵⁸ killed after a spurious trial, was an agent-provocateur working for the intelligence service of a foreign government.” The commandants demand “in the interests of the whole of Berlin, the quick removal of the severe limitations that have been placed on the populace and the restoration of free movement inside Berlin.”

At 11:30 in the morning, American officers handed us the Deputy Prime-Minister of the GDR, the Chairman of the Central Administration of the Christian-Democratic Union, Otto Nuschke.⁵⁹ The representatives of the German authorities in the Central Administration of the CDU were present at the hand-over.

We will inform you about future events.”

[Source: AVP RF, f. 82, op. 41, por. 93, p.280, ll. 22-24. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

[The following is an excerpt of a telephonogram by V. Semenov and V. Sokolovskii in Berlin to V. Molotov and N. A. Bulganin, sent on 19 June 1953 at 5:35 p.m., describing the alleged capture of infiltrating parachutists.]⁶⁰

“In the region of Sangerhausen (45 kilometers west of Halle) on the night of 17 June 1953, a group of 6 parachutists was dropped.

On 19 June 1953, one of the parachutists was captured; at the preliminary interrogation he indicated that together with him, another five parachutists were dropped, as were weapons (5 carbines and a large quantity of grenades). Upon reaching the ground, they hid the weapons in a forest in the region of Sangerhausen. The captured parachutist also indicated that they were given a radio transmitter with which they were supposed to report on the uprisings. The basic task of the dropped parachutists was to participate broadly in the uprising and to incite the populace to rebellion.

The inquiry is continuing.”⁶¹

[Source: AVP RF, f.82, op. 41, por. 93, p. 280, l. 31. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie (CWIHP)]

[The following excerpt is from a secret telephonogram sent by V. Semenov and V. Sokolovskii to V. Molotov and N. Bulganin on 19 June 1953 at 7:50 p.m., describing the situation in East German as of late afternoon that day.]

“We are reporting on the situation in Berlin and the GDR at 5 p.m. (Berlin time), on June 19.

In Berlin all enterprises are working at normal capacity. The number of workers who have reported to work is at 90-98 percent. Those who have not come to work are, by and large, workers who live in West Berlin. At the construction sites on Stalinallee, about 60% of workers reported to work.

In the morning there were isolated efforts by provocateurs to disorganize work at some enterprises and to call a strike. The provocateurs were arrested.

Life in East Berlin is proceeding normally.

The overwhelming majority of enterprises in the Republic are working without interruption. A number of enterprises, at which partial strikes were begun in the morning, have fully resumed work. [Public] transport is working punctually and without interruption. Order at all 29 Soviet joint-stock company (SAO) factories has been restored. At individual SAO enterprises, workers are requesting that they be allowed to work off on Sunday the time that was lost on June 17-18. In the Republic, only isolated enterprises are left at which comparatively small groups of workers are striking. During the day, a strike of about two thousand workers began at several enterprises in the city of Halberstadt. In the city of Freiberg (Chemnitz district), there was an effort by 500 persons to organize a demonstration, which was broken up by troops and German police. Today, with the occurrence of partial strikes, as a rule, political demands were not put forward, aside from demands for the release of arrested persons, the removal of armed guards at factories, and, more rarely, a change in the military situation.

At a series of enterprises, meetings and gatherings led by SED organizations were held.

The situation in the countryside, as before, is quiet. However, during these days a certain reduction has been noted in the supplies of agricultural produce given by peasants to the state. The peasants universally regard the events in Berlin with disapproval, expressing their fear that they can lead to war.

The West German Bundestag adopted a resolution on increasing the numbers of West German border police from 10 to 20 thousand men, which is linked to the events in the GDR.”

[Source: AVP RF, f. 82, op. 41, por. 93, p. 28, ll. 25-26. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie (CWIHP).]

[The following excerpt is from a secret telephonogram sent by V. Semenov and V. Sokolovskii in Berlin to V. Molotov and N.A. Bulganin, 19 June 1953, midnight, reporting on the situation in East Germany as of 9:00 p.m. that day.⁶²]

We report on the situation in Berlin and the GDR at 9 p.m. (Berlin time),
19 June.

In East Berlin, all is quiet.

In the course of the day, isolated efforts by enemy elements to incite [*sprovotsirovat'*] talk against the arrests of the ring-leaders of the disturbances of June 17-18 and the execution of Götting were noted. At two factories, GDR flags were put at half-mast as a sign of mourning for the provocateurs who had been killed. At other enterprises, workers demanded the release of members of strike committees who had been arrested.

Organizations of the SED began to conduct meetings of workers at enterprises in East Berlin at which resolutions are being passed in support of the GDR government.

The residents of East Berlin, who were on West Berlin territory at the time of the disturbances, are returning home. In order to let these people through, we have opened three temporary checkpoints on the sector border.

The commandants of the Western sectors of Berlin issued a decree to the effect that any demonstrations in West Berlin can only take place after receiving permission from the commandants. The need for this decree is based on the situation which has arisen and on the preservation of security and order.

The situation in the GDR generally is quiet. Certain enemy speeches have the character of a protest against the punishment of the ring-leaders of the disturbances. Efforts were made to organize 15-minute demonstrations of silence as a sign of mourning for the provocateurs who have been killed. At the factory "Simag" in the city of Finsterwalde, thirty-five provocateurs conducted such a demonstration, although the majority of workers did not support it.

In a series of districts, meetings of regional SED activists have been conducted. At several activist sessions, demands for criminal indictments of members of the SED who took part in the disturbances were put forward.

In some villages, cases were noted in which leaflets had been distributed urging peasants not to supply produce to the government.

The mood of the populace has somewhat improved. Political demands put forward by workers, by and large, under the influence of enemy elements, have been put on the back burner. In Potsdam, workers say: "We do not want to strike, although many of our demands are just. We are waiting for these demands to be recognized."

We will inform [you] about future [developments]."

[Source: AVP, RF, f. 82, op. 41, por. 93, p. 280, ll. 29-30. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

**Report, I. Fadeikin⁶³ to V. D. Sokolovskii,
19 June 1953**

OPERATIONS DIVISION,
MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION,
GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

Top Secret (Declassified)

To Marshal of

Soviet Union Comrade SOKOLOVSKII, V.D.

I am reporting that the situation in the country (Germany) is improving. The workers' strikes are over in the overwhelming majority of the GDR cities as of 5:00 p.m., June 18.

A minor number of enterprises have been on strike (LAS, the plant in Leipzig, the tool plant in Schmelna). Part-time strikes occurred in a number of other enterprises where personnel in the night shifts from 30% to 60% were to the close of June 18.

The meetings at the plants were stopped by the evening of June 18. Street demonstrations in the GDR cities and towns were not permitted during June 18.

The provocateurs and instigators had been actively withdrawn and arrested in Eastern Berlin and the Districts of GDR for June 18 and the night of June 19. The workers themselves have started participating in the exposing of the provocateurs and taking them into custody.

For instance, some workers arrested SIMON, an engineer, who had visited plant shops calling for a strike, in Köpenick (Berlin). Two provocateurs calling for a strike were detained by some workers at the High-Frequency Instruments Plant in Treptow.

The German People's Police revealed the gathering of provocateurs in MITROPA, the restaurant, and arrested 40 instigators, confiscating weapons from three of them on the evening of June 18. Twenty provocateurs were arrested at Alexanderplatz.

There have been some reports that workers at some plants (Railway-Carriage Repair Works in Weimar, et cetera), indicating that the strikes had been provoked by hostile elements, met and passed resolutions condemning themselves for their actions on 17 June 1953, and undertook to make up the lost working time next Sunday.

Many workers understood they had been misled by provocateurs and cursed the fascist thugs from Western Berlin.

The German People's Police arrested two persons in front of Cho, the restaurant, in the evening of June 18, who proved to be residents of West Berlin. The police action was welcomed by passers-by.

Relations between Soviet troops and Berlin residents have been improving on June 18. Our soldiers have been very disciplined during all of the events. It was possible to witness peaceful conversations between Soviet soldiers and German residents in the streets of Berlin by the evening of June 18.

As brought to light by now, the strikes were a protest

against the 10% rise in output quotas that the government had declared at some GDR industry enterprises on May 29-30. They continued on June 6-7. The construction workers on Stalinallee in Berlin started saying that they did not agree with the new output quotas and would declare a strike if needed.

The central leadership of the Free German Trade Union [League] and the SED CC knew about such feelings and opinions among working class people on June 15.

However, timely preventive measures were not undertaken.

During the investigation it became evident that many West Berlin residents and members of West Berlin subversive organizations, [such as the] so-called "Fighting Group Against Inhumanity,"⁶⁴ were among arrested provocateurs and instigators.

For instance, BEREND, Helmut, a German, an active participant in the uprising, was arrested in Dessau. He indicated during interrogation that a large group of instigators including himself had arrived in Dessau from the American Sector of Berlin during the night of June 17 and that they had been sent by the West Berlin Center of "Fighting Group [against Inhumanity]."

This is a typical example revealing that West Berlin authorities had been well-informed in advance about the actions in East Berlin on June 17. They had sent beforehand some West Berlin radio-commentators to democratic Berlin, where they were doing live radio-commentary in the places where clashes between East Berliners and the People's Police occurred on the morning on 17 June. RIAS, the West Berlin radio station, was continuously broadcasting that recorded commentary.

Some members of the GDR Government and SED CC had been displaying cowardice and bewilderment during the events. This is the most typical evidence of such behavior. WEINBERGER, the Minister of Transport and Farm Mechanical Engineering, and HENKST, the member of the SED CC, arrived in Rostock on the evening of 17 June. Negotiating with the strike committee of Varnav, the shipyard, on the morning of 18 June, they cowardly made many unrealistic promises to the strikers.

WEINBERGER signed a protocol in which he promised to raise salaries, to establish a new vacations system, to compensate workers for travel from residential areas to the enterprises, to pay for their staying apart from their families, etc. When the strike committee in their counter-suggestions was demanding the resignation of the GDR Government, releasing the convicts and canceling the state of emergency, WEINBERGER and HENKST did not reject those points while they were read in their presence on the radio to the workers at the plant. Speaking about their promises just after that, they said no word about the "provocative demands" of the strikers.

Moreover, WEINBERGER and HENKST made a decision regarding the release of two strike organizers arrested by police.

It is clear from secret service and official information

that some SED members took an active part in the delays and strikes. The interrogations of the arrested SED members have revealed that many of them were dissatisfied with the worsening living standard among the working people and justified their conclusions by referring to the SED Politburo's published admission of its mistakes.

The evidence of considerable dissatisfaction among the Party members has been the fact that about 100 people have quit their SED membership in the Cottbus district in the last two days.

The numerous secret service official and investigatory evidence has revealed that organizers and leaders of many strike committees at the GDR enterprises were executives of German trade-unions.

For example, among the four organizers of the strike at the public enterprise Wohnungsbau (Berlin), on June 17 who were arrested by the MfS GDR, the main part was played by the chairman of the local trade-union committee and the candidate-member of SED, a certain MIIFS.

KOLSTER, the chairman of the plant's trade union committee, led the strike at the Electric Equipment Plant of the Soviet Joint-Stock Company in Treptow, Berlin (arrested).

VETSEL, the chairman of the plant's trade union organization, was in charge of the strike at the Optical Apparatus Plant in Rathenow, Potsdam District. It was he as well who headed the demonstration and called on the workers of other plants to join the strikers (VETSEL was arrested).

KULTUS, the leader of the Construction Workers Trade-Union in the Frankfurt [a. d. Oder] district, called on the workers to take to the streets and declared, "We are going to show our power and strive to get our demands fulfilled."

According to information by 5.00 a.m. on 19 June 1953, 2,930 organizers, leaders and participants of the strikes, provocateurs and instigators as well as persons who took part in armed attacks on the German People's Police units, prisons, courts, party and state institutions in Berlin, Brandenburg, Magdeburg, Leipzig, Halle, Görlitz, Jena and other GDR cities, were arrested.

Among the GDR MfS, People's Police, officers and democratically-inclined [East] German citizens, 7 were killed and 151 wounded.

According to information by 5.00 a.m. 19 June 1953, 21 rebels were killed in the armed clashes, and 85 were wounded.

Apart from 6 rebels caught and shot instantly by Soviet troops during the armed clashes, military tribunals sentenced 6 of the most active organizers and participants in the armed actions to be shot, including: 1 in Berlin, 2 in Magdeburg, 2 in Görlitz, and 1 in Jena.

The Military Council of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany confirmed the sentences which were carried out the same day, and it was announced by radio to the German population.

Among those executed, there was DARCH, Alfred, born in 1910, a non-Party man and resident of Magdeburg, who, armed (with a reconnaissance rifle) and jointly with other rebels, had burst into the House of Justice in Magdeburg, took part in its devastation and had fired from there at the arriving units of the German People's Police and Soviet troops.

There was STRAUCH, Gerbert, owner of a private firm, also executed in Magdeburg, who had taken an active part in devastating the prison and releasing state criminals.

GÖTTLING, Willi, the resident of West Berlin, born in 1918, was executed in Berlin. He confessed under interrogation that he had been recruited by American intelligence on 16 June while he was repeatedly visiting the West Berlin Labor Exchange and had received the order from the latter to drive to the Democratic Sector of Berlin and take an active part in the planned riots there. Joining with other rebels during the clashes with German People's Police units in the center of Berlin, GÖTTLING attacked a propaganda-vehicle of the German People's Police, which was calling for an end to the strike with a radio loud-speaker, threw the driver and the announcer out of the vehicle and brutally assaulted them. He called on the crowd to attack police and Soviet troops.

REPRESENTATIVE OF MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OF USSR IN GERMANY
Colonel FADEIKIN
19 June 1953

[Source: AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 217-222. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev]

**Report from A. Grechko and Tarasov
to N. A. Bulganin,
20 June 1953, 11:40 a.m.**

OPERATIONS DIVISION,
MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION
GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
Top Secret (Declassified)

To Comrade N.A. BULGANIN

I am reporting on the situation in the GDR and Berlin at 10.00 a.m.(Moscow time), 20 June 1953

1. No riots were observed in Berlin and the GDR last night.
2. Enterprises in Berlin have resumed their routine operations since the morning of 20 June. There is still a pocket of strike movement in Magdeburg, where some enterprises have not resumed their operations yet. For instance, the workers of Electric Motor Plant in Wernigerode have entered the grounds of the plant but have not resumed their work. Moreover, the night and morning shifts at some plants and factories have not resumed their work in the following towns: Staßfurt (a plant), Halberstadt (furniture factory) and Ilsenburg

(veneer and furniture factories, Rail-Wheels Plant).

3. Exposure of provocateurs and instigators of street riots and strikes is continuing.

Overall, 8,029 provocateurs, rebels, suspicious persons, [and] offenders of the Soviet military authorities' orders were arrested and detained in the GDR; 33 rebels were killed, and 132 wounded. After sentencing by court martial, 6 active provocateurs were shot.

Seventeen supporters of the democratic power, government and party officers, were killed, and 166 wounded.

4. The state and disposition of the units of the Group are unchanged. There have been no losses.

GRECHKO TARASOV

Correctly." GENERAL OF THE ARMY SHTEMENKO
20 June 1953, 11.40 a.m. ⁶⁵

[Source: AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 34-35. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev.]

[The following excerpt is from a telephonogram sent by V. Semenov and V. Sokolovskii in Berlin to V. Molotov and N. A. Bulganin, on 20 June 1953 at 5:50 p.m., describing the situation in the GDR that day.]

"We report on the situation in Berlin in the GDR at 12 o'clock, Berlin time, June 20.

The situation in the GDR and in East Berlin is generally peaceful. The partial strikes which took place at night in the cities of Staßfurt, Halberstadt and in the Stralsund shipyard have ceased. In the morning, provocative elements managed to conduct short meetings and strikes at the railway car repair factory in the city of Halberstadt, in the Helsford shipyard (Rostock district), at the medicine factory in the city of Wernigerode (Magdeburg district). In addition, demands for the liberation of the arrested ring-leaders of the disturbances have surfaced. The strikes which began yesterday at several small enterprises in the city of Ilsenburg in the region of Magdeburg (about 2,500 workers in all) are continuing.

From the villages we are informed that among many workers who took part in the strikes of June 17-18, a sobering-up is taking place. These workers are stating regrets about the disturbances which arose and are distancing themselves from the provocateurs. But at the same time they often state that the discontent of the workers should not be mixed with the actions of provocateurs, as, allegedly, the government of the GDR is doing.

A leading article written by us and published in today's *Neues Deutschland* provides the necessary orientation on this issue.

According to the SED agitators, a majority of the Berlin workers with whom they spoke have a negative opinion of the actions of the provocateurs, but some of

them are still pleased that the demonstration occurred. A readiness to work off the time lost because of the strikes is universally voiced.

The workers who did not take part in the strikes sharply condemn the strikers and demand severe punishment for the provocateurs. In many enterprises the workers adopt resolutions which express trust in the government of the GDR and state the necessity of raising vigilance.

Mass purchases of produce by the population, as was evident on June 16-17, is not observed. In a number of cities a certain increase in withdrawals from savings banks can be noted. The payment of money from accounts is taking place without restrictions.

A series of cases has been noted in which provocateurs agitate among the workers to the effect that the decision of the Politburo of the SED CC, which was published in connection with the new political course in the GDR, is directed at defending the interests of the private sector [and] the kulaks and not those of the workers. They say that the SED has been reborn, having taken the path of supporting the bourgeoisie. In the districts of Neubrandenburg and Suhl, the withdrawal of several hundred peasants from [agricultural] collective [production] cooperatives has been noted.

In the district of Steglitz, in the American sector of Berlin the regional committee of the SED has been broken up. The first secretary of the regional committee, Pirsch, and regional committee employee Firman were arrested and taken away in an undisclosed direction.

West Berlin newspapers speak of the arrival in West Berlin of the American High Commissioner, Conant, and the deputies of the English and French High Commissioners. The exchange rate of the Eastern mark has remained stable throughout all of these days and has stood at 1:5.40.

On June 20, the Berlin military commandants permitted theatre and movie operations until 9 p.m."

[Source: AVP RF, f. 082, op. 41, por. 93, p. 280, ll. 37-39.

Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

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**Report from Lieutenant-General F. Fedenko
to Lieutenant-General N.O. Pavlovskii,
27 June 1953**

OPERATIONS DIVISION,
MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION,
GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

Top Secret
(Declassified)

To LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
Comrade PAVLOVSKII, N.O.

I am reporting the generalized data regarding the demonstrations and strikes in the German Democratic Republic.

The strikes and demonstrations in the GDR from 17 to 19 June 1953 had been prepared beforehand by the so-called Center of Strike Movement located in West Berlin and bore an organized and openly anti-government character. This is confirmed by the fact that the riots were simultaneously taking place in 95 cities and towns.

The major centers of strikes and demonstrations were Berlin, Magdeburg, Leipzig, Halle, and Erfurt.

In all, there were the following number of strikers in the GDR:

on 17 June - 132,169, including 81,000 in Berlin;
on 18 June - 218,700, including 20,000 in Berlin;
on 19 June - 46,884, (there were no strikers in Berlin).

In all, there was the following number of demonstrators:

on 17 June - 269,460, including 66,000 in Berlin;
There were minor demonstrations in some localities.

There were no demonstrations in Berlin.

The organizers of riots and strikes intended to seize power and abolish the democratic regime in GDR.

The demonstrators, headed and instigated by provocateurs, broke into premises occupied by the SED and units of the Ministry of State Security of GDR as well as state-owned shops, released convicts from the prisons, attempted to capture some administrative buildings and important municipal facilities such as banks, post offices, telegraph offices, [and] power stations. There were some beatings and dispersals of the units of people's police and workers who went on with their work and did not want to take part in the strikes.

The attitude of [the East] German people towards the events of 17-19 June 1953 has varied. The most progressive part of German population has been outraged by the actions of the West Berlin provocateurs. Some Germans have been indifferent to the events. Others have welcomed them. A significant strata of society are satisfied with the most recent decisions of the GDR government aimed at improving the living standard of German people.

The bourgeois parties have responded very coldly to the events. The reactionary elements of the Christian Democratic Union have demanded that the current government, as the one that made some mistakes, resign and let the Christian-Democratic Union become the governing party.

The occupation (US, British, French) forces in West Berlin have been on higher alert since 17 June 1953, guarding military facilities, government and administrative buildings as well as the borders with the Soviet sector of Berlin. The Commandant of the British sector of Berlin declared martial law on 17 June 1953.

No fresh military units were observed arriving in West Berlin from 17 to 24 June 1953.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL F. FEDENKO
27 June 1953

[Source: AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 31-33. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev.]

Letter, L. Beriia to G. Malenkov, 1 July 1953

To the CC CPSU
Comrade Malenkov

Dear Georgii!

During all these four days and nights that were hard for me, I gave considerable thought to everything, concerning the activity on my side during the last months after the plenum of the CC CPSU, concerning [our] work as well as you personally - and some comrades of the CC Presidium and I subjected my actions to severest criticism, disapproved of myself strongly. Particularly grave and inexcusable is my behavior towards you, where I am a guilty party one hundred percent. Along with other comrades, I also strongly and energetically got down to work with the sole idea to do everything possible and not to let all of us flop without comrade Stalin and to maintain the new leadership of the CC and the government by action. According to the existing instructions of the CC and the government, building up the leadership of the MVD and its local organs, the MVD proposed to the CC and the government on your advice and on some issues on the advice of com. Khrushchev N.S. a number of worthwhile political and practical initiatives, such as: on the rehabilitation of the doctors, rehabilitation of the arrested of the so-called Mingrel Nationalist Center in Georgia and the return of the falsely-exiled from Georgia. On [sic] the Amnesty, on liquidation of the passport regime, on correction of the deviation of the party line in nationality policy and in the repressive measures in Lithuanian SSR, Western Ukraine [sic] and western Belorussia [sic], but the criticism is completely justified, the criticism by com. Khrushchev N.S. and the criticism by the other comrades at [the session of] the CC Presidium; with my last participation, to my erroneous wish to send along with the decisions of the CC also the information memoranda of the MVD. Of course, one reduced to a certain degree the significance of these very resolutions of the CC and, that an inadmissible situation emerged, that the MVD, as if it corrects Central Committees of Commun. [sic] parties of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belorussia, while the role of the MVD was limited to implementation of the resolutions of the CC CPSU and the government. I would frankly admit that my insisting on the dispatch of the memoranda was stupidity and political short-sightedness, particularly since you advised me not to do it. My behavior at the session of the Presidium of the CC, and the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, very often incorrect and inadmissible [behavior] that introduced nervousness and excessive harshness, I would say, as I have thought well about it and realized, [this behavior] went so far as to [constitute] inadmissible rudeness and insolence on my part toward comrade Khrushchev N.S. and Bulganin N.A. during the discussion on the German question [sic], of course, here I am guilty without question and have to be denounced thoroughly. At the same time, along with all of you, I tried

to introduce initiatives at the Presidium [sic] aimed at the correct solution of issues, such as the Korean, the German, the responses to Eisenhower and Churchill, the Turkish, the Iranian, etc.

My behavior during the reception of the Hungarian comrades [was] untactful, nothing could justify it.⁶⁶ The proposals about Nagy Imre should not have been introduced by me, but you should have done it, but at that moment I sprang up idiotically, and besides, along with correct remarks I made some loose remarks and was overly familiar, for which, of course, I should be given a good rap [*vzgrēt*]. But I must say in all sincerity that I thoroughly prepared myself and made all my assistants prepare themselves for the sessions of the CC and the government, so that within the limits of my strength and abilities [I tried] to assist in [finding a] correct solution of the issues under discussion. If and when I introduced initiatives, I revised them several times, together with the comrades collaborating with me, so as not to make a mistake and not to let the CC and the government down. In the Council of Ministers I left and had no time to introduce a report and draft resolution on reorganizing the award procedures [*nagrādnikh del*], for I busily worked on that during about two months. As you know, we mulled over [*vynashivaly*] this question for a long time even while comrade Stalin was [still] alive. Concerning the comrades I work with, I always sought to be a man of principles, of party norms, demanding, so that the orders given to them were fulfilled, as it was required in the interests of our party and our government. I have never had any other kinds of relations with the above-mentioned comrades. You can take, for instance, the leading officials in the MVD. Coms. [Sergei] Kruglov, [Amaiak Zakhārivich] Kobulov, [Ivan A.] Serov, Maslennikov, [Piotr] Fedotov,⁶⁷ Stakhanov, [Yevgeny] Pitovranov, [Vitalii V.] Korotkov, Sazykin, Gorlinsky, [Sergei A.] Goglidze, Ryasnoy, [Pavel] Sudoplatov, Savchenko, Raykhman, Obruchnikov, Meshik, Zyryanov and many others, nothing else they had from me other than my demands, how to better organize the struggle with the enemies of the Soviet state, within the country as well as outside. When comrade Stalin passed away, I named you, without thinking, as did other comrades, to be the chairman of the government and that I always considered and consider to be the only right choice. Subsequently I became even more convinced that it is you who will successfully lead together with the ruling collective of the CC and the government. Therefore, my tragedy is that as I have already said earlier, during more than ten years we have been true Bolshevik friends, worked with all our soul under various complicated conditions and were together in [one] mind and nobody disrupted our friendship, so valuable and necessary for me and now exclusively on my own fault, [sic] I lost everything that held us together.

Lavrentii Beriia

1 July 1953

[Source: AP RF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 463, l. 163-174. Published in *Istochnik*, 4 (1994), 4-8. Translated by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive).]

[The following excerpt is from a 4 July 1953 telephonogram from Soviet High Commission officials Miroshnichenko and Lun'kov to High Commissioner V. Semenov.]⁶⁸

“In connection with the events of June 17, the movement of all types of transport and pedestrians across the sector border between East and West Berlin, as well as between the GDR and East Berlin through West Berlin, was halted.

At present in East and West Berlin, the metro, the city railroad and the tramway run separately, which causes dissatisfaction on the part of the GDR and East Berlin population. Up to June 17, 83 thousand workers and white-collar workers, who live on GDR territory adjacent to the western sector of Berlin but work in East Berlin, used the city railway. Now they use a bus, steam train or some other form of transport to get to their place of work, making several stops on the way. Such trips, which previously took 30-40 minutes, now require up to 2 or 3 hours one-way.

Workers and white-collar workers and other strata of the population express serious discontent with these circumstances, and turn to the government of the GDR with the request that it change the existing transport system. In connection with this we consider it expedient to carry out the following measures on the morning of July 6:

1. In the morning and evening hours, to organize electric train traffic from the GDR to East Berlin and back without stops in the western sectors of the city.

2. In order to improve the travel of the populace living in western sectors and working in the eastern sector of Berlin, and vice versa, to open five check-points on the sector boundary in addition to the existing three points.

3. For the residents who live in communities in the GDR located close to the western sectors of Berlin but work in West Berlin, to organize electric train traffic from the GDR to certain stations of West Berlin.

[Our] friends (com. Ulbricht) fully agree with the measures we are proposing and request that they be informed about the decision taken on these proposals today, in order for them to be able to announce the decision on the radio and to calm the population.

In relation to the decision by the SED Politburo to request the High Commissioner of the USSR in Germany to open the sector border, Ulbricht stated that this issue could be examined after the implementation of the aforementioned measures.

We ask for your instructions.”

[Source: AVP RF, f. 82, op. 41, por. 93, p.280, ll.61-62. Trans-

lated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

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**O. Grotewohl's Handwritten Notes on the
SED CC Politburo Meeting
8 July 1953**

Politburo 7/8/53

Grotewohl: reports on 2 commission sessions of the reorganization commission

Herrnstadt: refuses to take office of first secretary

Honecker: one cannot blame Ulbricht alone. It would damage the Party if U[lbricht] would resign as Gen[eral] Sec[retary] and as First Secretary. Proposal for supplementing Wandel-Winzer.

Zaisser: my suggestion [is] Herrnstadt since he was more in tune with the people than we [were]. Proposal is not an ideal solution. My argument is: W.U. is no more responsible for the wrong course (2nd Party Conference) than we all are. His fault is the rigid administering—wrong education of the cadres etc. That has spoiled the Party, the New Course cannot be implemented with this attitude. He therefore has to be kept at a distance from the party apparatus. [To leave] the apparatus in the hands of W.U. would be catastrophic for the New Course.

Ulbricht: The proposal by Herrnstadt + Zaisser for the elimination of the secretariat is dangerous. The proposal by Zaisser to name Herrnstadt as First Sec[retary] is the logical consequence.

Zaisser: protests against [this]. U. had agreed on the elimination of the Secretariat.

Herrnstadt: likewise

Rau: U.'s work methods inhibit the Party. Does U. have the will to change this? The past weeks have not shown this. If somebody other than Walter takes over the party organization and becomes first secretary, this would be better.

Ackermann: one also has to change the cabinet. Gr[otewohl] has to be obligated to express in [illegible] that no decisions had yet been made.

The Party has to recover but not with W.U.

Ebert: for secretaries. It would be a gain for the Party if Com. W.U. would state himself that somebody else had to be first secretary.

E. Schmidt: I was completely frightened, welcome the free and serious presentation by Zaisser. You [Ulbricht] cannot remain any longer at the top of the party.

Matern: U. must be first secretary.

Oelßner: H[errnstadt]'s and Zaisser's appearance signifies the existence of factions. U. has considered all of us stupid. W. has not learned his lessons. One has to work as a collective. There is no need for a first secretary. Instead collective decision-[making].

Jendretzky: W. has learned nothing.

Mückenberger: there was no central leadership for the districts. Everybody is overworked.

Gr[otewohl]: I can not make a final statement in Moscow

W.U.: To acknowledge the criticism was correct. My behavior [regarding the ostentatious celebration of my] birthday [was] mistaken. I will take the stand in the C[entral] C[ommittee]. I am not of the opinion that I have to be first secr[etary]. This takes confidence which has to be renewed again.

U: Proposals by H[errnstadt] and Zai[sser] i[n] [the] committee were an experiment. I will make a statement before the CC.

[Source: SAPMO-BArch IV 2/2/363. Provided and translated by Christian Ostermann (CWIHP & National Security Archive).]

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Note from S. Kruglov to Malenkov with an accompanying Communication from the Executives of the MIA USSR P. Fedotov⁶⁹ and I. Fadeikin⁷⁰

No. 166/k

9 July 1953
Top secret

I present you with a communication from the head of the First Chief Directorate of the MIA USSR, Com. Fedotov, and the Representative of the MIA USSR in Germany, Com. Fadeikin, about some facts characterizing the situation in the Politburo of the CC SED.

**Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR
S. Kruglov**

MIA USSR

In the last few days, the GDR Minister of Trade and Supply, Com. Wach, [and] the members of the Politburo of the SED CC, Coms. Oelßner and Matern⁷¹ in conversations with the executives of the apparatus of the MIA of the USSR in Germany, informed them on their own initiative of several noteworthy facts about the situation in the Politburo of the SED CC after the June events in the GDR.

1. In a 30 June conversation with the head of the apparatus division, representative com. Popov, com. Wach shared his impressions about the meeting of the Politburo of the SED CC of 9 June 1953, at which the report of the deputy prime-minister Rau⁷² on the redistribution of capital investment was presented.

Rau proposed to save 1,300 million marks of capital investment in heavy industry and to direct them toward the financing of light and other branches of industry which supply the needs of the populace, but he stated at the same time that he personally disagreed with cutting expenditures on capital investment in heavy industry.

Speaking at the meeting of the Politburo, Ulbricht said:

"I do not agree with the planned sum of 1,300 million

marks. We cannot free up such resources. Rau's plan disorganizes the national economy, and our economy is already disorganized as it is. I have been to a series of enterprises and have established that the workers are worried not so much by rises in the output norms as by the disorganization of the economy, [and] the lack of a normal food supply. Industrial enterprises cannot work normally if they are supplied with raw materials and materials to [only] 40% of their needs. Rau's project must be re-examined, in particular on the issues of external trade."

In his address, the chairman of the State Planning Commission, Leuschner⁷³ also noted that Rau's plan was unrealistic. This plan, he pointed out, relied on the resources that were supposed to be freed up as a result of limiting expenditures on heavy industry, but all of these resources had already been used to meet other needs and there were practically no funds available. Leuschner also pointed out that Rau, in introducing his proposals, did not agree on them with the members of the commission created to locate resources for financing the measures projected in the government decree of 25 June.

At the meeting, the Minister of Ore-Mining Industry Selbmann⁷⁴ stated:

"I believe that we must not curtail expenditures on heavy industry. It is incomprehensible to me why it is necessary to close down the construction of enterprises temporarily if 50% of the work is not yet completed. If resources are refused to me, I will have to reduce the output of steel, and that will be reflected in light industry: the output of machines will be reduced, mines will stop working, workers will have to be laid off, not to mention that stopping work in some mines will lead to their flooding with water."

The Minister for Machine Construction, Ziller⁷⁵, sharply objected to the withdrawal of 100 million marks previously designated for capital investment in energy production. "I ask," he said, "who is supposed to, and at the cost of what resources, carry out the Republic's program of energy-supply? You yourselves have said a lot about the necessity of carrying out this program. Such a plan as that proposed by Rau cannot be carried out. If it is taken as a basis [for action], then I cannot deliver the necessary machines for light industry and am not in a condition to fulfill the plan on the supply of electrical equipment."

Oelßner, Elli Schmidt,⁷⁶ Ackermann,⁷⁷ Strassenberger,⁷⁸ and others also spoke in opposition to Rau's plan.

The Minister of State Security Zaisser noted on the subject: "From listening to the statements by our comrades, one gets the impression that capital investment in heavy industry not only must not be cut, but, quite the opposite, must be further increased. But where can the resources be taken from? Rau gave no answer on this issue."

Ulbricht spoke a second time, saying: "In my opinion, we should turn to the Soviet government with the request

that they lower the reparation payments.”

In support of Ulbricht, the Director of the State Administration for Material Supply, Binz, said: “I believe that we will be able to get out of this catastrophic situation and improve our position only if the Soviet Union renders us the same help that the USA is giving Western Germany through the Marshall Plan.” No one reacted to this statement by Binz.

During the break the Minister for External Trade of the GDR, Gregor,⁷⁹ characterized the situation at the Politburo meeting, saying: “This is not a Politburo, but a madhouse.”

2. Politburo member, Com. Oelßner, with whom a conversation took place on the first of July of this year, believes that the Politburo committed a mistake when it announced the Politburo’s and Government’s New Course program in a very brief form without announcing the reasons for the party’s policy change beforehand. In his opinion, it would have been better to put the New Course into operation step by step, accompanying this with broad propagandistic-explanatory work.

Com. Oelßner further criticized the party leadership for not heeding the signals of discontent among the populace earlier and for not understanding that this discontent could have serious consequences.

In the opinion of com. Oelßner, the measures which are currently being carried out by the party and the government to improve the living standard of the populace have not yet yielded the expected results. The workers, in his words, continue to take a wait-and-see position, not yet trusting the party.

In the words of com. Oelßner, they can take such a wait-and-see position for a month or a month and a half. If in that time the party does not eliminate the mistakes which have occurred, then the situation could worsen again.

In the opinion of com. Oelßner, the admission of mistakes by the leading officials of the party and government had an unhealthy effect. Speaking before workers, they try to admit to as many errors as possible and, to an extent, such expressions of atonement provoke mistrust on the part of the workers. At the same time, they themselves still have actually not recognized the full depth of the erroneous actions by leaders of the party organs in the past. In com. Oelßner’s opinion, com. Ulbricht most of all has not understood the erroneousness of his conduct. He has not understood that as a matter of fact he lost touch with the masses and that his methods of dictatorial leadership were one of the serious reasons that errors were committed. In his practical activity, Ulbricht had not changed and continued to work as before; of note was only the fact that he had become more passive. Ulbricht was still inclined to create an atmosphere of pomp around his person.

Thus, for example, through his wife, Lotte Kuhn, who is a member of the committee organizing the celebrations for his 60th birthday, Ulbricht demanded that a celebration

be held in the most majestic circumstances. At the same time, when com. Pieck, during a conversation with Ulbricht in Moscow, drew his attention to the undesirability of such excessive ceremonies, Ulbricht replied that he knew nothing about the plans being made for the celebration, and that if something was being planned, it was without his participation.

At the conclusion of the conversation, com. Oelßner stated his opinion that at present there was no complete unity of views in the Politburo.

Thus, he recounted that when he recently went into Grotewohl’s office where Zaisser and Herrstadt were sitting, those present were embarrassed and quickly ended their conversation. Previously, com. Oelßner noted, nothing of the sort had been apparent.

3. Politburo member com. Matern, with whom a conversation took place on 2 July of this year, stated his opinion that the party at present did not have a really militant leadership and, related to this, that its work was disorganized. The Politburo meetings which took place in June were—on the whole—of an elemental and unorganized character. The Politburo made almost no practical decisions. In a series of meetings less than half of the members and candidates of the politburo were present.

The executive party members, including the members of the Politburo, did not have a concrete idea of how to proceed at the 15th Plenum of the SED CC, which is planned in the near future. Up to this point, the fundamental documents had not been assigned.

The secretaries of the SED CC, after the arrival of com. Ulbricht in Moscow at the beginning of June, were not really doing any work; meetings of the secretariat were not being held. Com. Ulbricht had not explained the reason for the halting of work.

Touching on the work of the secretariat, com. Matern stated that, in his opinion, this work was incorrectly organized. The secretariat has been turned from a political organ into Ulbricht’s personal office. The members of the secretariat did not take any personal responsibility for their separate spheres of work, but only prepared materials at the direction of Ulbricht and “nodded their heads in agreement with all the proposals of the secretary-general.”

Com. Matern believe that the secretariat should become the basic executive organ of the party and should carry out all of its practical work. In connection with this, the secretariat should be reduced to be composed of approximately 5 persons who were also members of the Politburo and bear responsibility for precisely defined spheres of work.

Com. Matern pointed out the poor leadership on the part of the SED CC of the district, regional, and local party organizations. The chairmen of the district parties’ governing boards did not receive concrete principled instructions from the SED CC. Lately they did not even have the chance to communicate with com. Ulbricht by telephone, since, on his orders, the telephone operators did not connect them with him.

For this reason, the leaders of the district organizations were obliged to deal only with members of the secretariat—Axen⁸⁰ and Schön,⁸¹—who, however, could not give them concrete instructions and usually limited themselves to statements about the fact that they did not know anything and that the leaders of the organizations had to make decisions as they saw fit. At the same time, com. Matern noted, the party organizations, given existing practice, were not versed in independent work.

In the opinion of com. Matern, the party workers had lost the ability to look at life with their own eyes, to take stock of circumstances independently, [and] were afraid to take decisions at their own risk, even if this was urgently called for. During the June events, for instance, not one of the leaders of the local party organizations held a meeting, explaining this by an absence of instructions.

All of this, com. Matern observed, was the result of the defective leadership methods on the part of Ulbricht, whose motto was “No one can do anything without me.”

At the upcoming plenum of the SED CC, com. Matern is determined to speak out, particularly with a criticism of these leadership methods on the part of Ulbricht.

Touching on the disorganization in party work, com. Matern cited the following example: Ulbricht, Grotewohl and Oelßner, who were in Moscow at the beginning of June of 1953, sent a telegram to the SED CC with the order to take all literature touching on the work of the second party conference⁸² out of libraries and commercial circulation. On the basis of this telegram, the Central Committee sent a directive to the local party organizations which initiated a mass confiscation of the specified literature. The matter went so far that in the central library of Leipzig all of the works of Ulbricht which referred to CC directives were removed.

In the opinion of com. Matern, the party is at present disunited, once more sectarian tendencies were emerging. Com. Matern divides all of the members of the party into three groups:

1. communists with a longstanding record of service who understand the New Course of the party and support it;
2. young party members who entered the party after 1945, many of whom do not understand the New Course of the party, consider it a step back from the construction of the foundations of socialism and for that reason do not agree with it;
3. former social-democrats, who consider that if the former social democratic party still existed, the events of 17 June would never have happened. Com. Matern noted that he knew of a whole series of cases where former social democrats demanded the party leadership to return their membership cards to the social democratic party. In the opinion of com. Matern, Buchwitz,⁸³ one of the veterans of the Social Democratic Party, is the leader of this third group.

Com. Matern believes that so far the mood of the population has not changed decisively. One of the reasons

for this, in his opinion, is the continuation of the policy of embroidering the truth by the party. The CC delegates who travel to the factories promise the workers everything they demand. Moreover, every [official] making a report considers it his duty to surpass the promises of his predecessor. As there is still no practical fulfillment of promises, the workers have again stopped believing in them.

In conclusion, com. Matern noted that correcting the errors that have been made and strengthening the party will in large part depend on what position com. Ulbricht will take at the 15th plenum of the SED CC, on whether he will admit his mistakes and find the courage for self-criticism. Ulbricht's current passive behavior, in the words of com. Matern, does not inspire optimism in this respect.

Leader of the First Chief Directorate of the MIA of the Union of SSR Fedotov

Representative of the MIA USSR in Germany
Fadeikin

5 July 1953

[Source: *AP RF*, f. 3, op. 64, d. 925, ll. 156-165. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie (CWIHP).]

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[The following excerpt is from a secret 9 July 1953 memorandum from MID German affairs specialist Georgii Pushkin⁸⁴ to first deputy foreign minister Andrei Vyshinskii,⁸⁵ indicating the measures taken in response to Sokolovskii's, Semenov's and Iudin's proposals regarding the situation in the GDR.⁸⁶]

Proposals of coms. Sokolovskii, Semenov and Iudin

1. Firmly and consistently to implement a new political course projected in the Resolution of the Soviet Government of [2] June 1953 on improving the health of the political state of the GDR.

2. To take urgent measures to improve radically the supply of food to the GDR populace through the provision of appropriate aid to the GDR by the Soviet Union and countries of people's democracy. Moreover, it should be taken into account that the aid measures taken up to this point, including the additional supplies sent by a resolution of the Soviet Government on June 24, ensure only the distribution of food through rationing and minimal sales in "KO" stores in the third quarter of this year.

3. In order to create a stable economic situation in the Republic and to raise the standard of living of the GDR's populace to that of West Germany's populace, to examine the issue of halting the delivery of goods to the Soviet Union and Poland and of counting the export of goods to the USSR as revenue for the Soviet enterprises in the GDR from the first half of 1953 with the aim of applying these goods toward the development of the GDR's external trade and the satisfaction of the internal needs of the Republic.

To preserve reparations in marks on the scale necessary to assure the normal function of A/O "Wismut."

4. To examine the issue of sharply reducing the occupation expenses which are being levied on the GDR to maintain the Soviet occupation troops in Germany.

5. To hand over all Soviet industrial, commercial, and transport enterprises remaining on GDR territory as GDR property at favorable terms, as well as the Black Sea-Baltic Bank and Insurance Society, using the payment received for these enterprises mainly to meet the future expenses incurred by the Soviet Union through the A/O⁸⁸ "Wismut."

6. To establish for the purposes of financial settlements between the USSR and GDR an exchange rate of the GDR mark to the ruble that relates to the true ratio of purchasing power between the mark and the ruble.

7. To consider the serious improvement of the everyday material situation at public and private enterprises of the GDR, as well as the development of broad political work among workers directed at strengthening the ties between the party and the working class, to be the primary task of the SED CC and the GDR government.

Measures undertaken

This proposal does not necessitate the adoption of new measures and is a general statement of intent.

The MVVT⁸⁷ of the USSR is preparing concrete proposals on this issue.

The MVVT is preparing proposals on the Soviet Union's renunciation of reparations

Proposals have been presented to com. A. Ia. Vyshinskii's subcommittee. At present, the MVVT is preparing additional proposals in connection with the planned renunciation of reparations.

The MVVT of the USSR is preparing proposals.

Proposals have been presented to com. A. Ia. Vyshinskii's subcommittee.

The proposal has been withdrawn by coms. Sokolovskii, Semenov and Iudin, insofar as this wish has already been reflected in resolutions of the GDR government and of the SED CC.

8. In light of the fact that lately the SED CC has adopted an incorrect method in leading the state and the economy, replacing the state and economic organs; to undertake a strict separation of functions between the government of the GDR, on the one hand, and the SED CC on the other, bringing only the major principal issues of building the state and developing the economy to the SED CC for examination. To concentrate the attention of the SED CC on developing political work in the masses of the population and on placing the SED's internal party work on the basis of the broad development of internal party democracy, criticism, and self-criticism from the bottom to the top [of the party].

In keeping with this, to consider it necessary to:

a/ carry out the reorganization of the GDR government with the aim of strengthening and simultaneously reducing the state apparatus at the center and the localities, having united a series of fragmented ministries and departments into larger ministries and departments.

b/ liquidate the GDR Ministry of State Security, merging it with the staff of the GDR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

c/ free com. Ulbricht of the responsibilities of Deputy Prime Minister of the GDR with the aim that he concentrate his attention on the work of the SED CC.

d/ elevate the role of the People's Chamber as an actively functioning republican parliament which discusses and adopts laws for the republic, approves commissions [and] discusses questions and demands raised by deputies of the People's Chamber of the GDR.

Prohibit the adoption of any decrees having the character of laws, except by the People's Chamber of the GDR.

e/ convene an extraordinary session of the GDR People's Chamber for an evaluation of the GDR government's work and of the mistakes it has committed, to be followed by changes in the government's personnel, the dismissal of incompetent and unpopular ministers and the promotion of people who are more popular in the country into ministerial posts by drawing more heavily on the representatives of other parties.

9. To limit the functions of the Secretariat of the SED CC to: issues of monitoring the implementation of the CC's Politburo decisions, organizational issues, the selection, placement, and training of cadres, and also issues of party-political work amongst the masses.

To carry out a change in the personnel of the Secretariat of the SED CC with the aim of moving a series of new employees, including intelligentsia members, into the Secretariat. To reduce the number of members of the Secretariat from 11 persons to five. To eliminate the presently existing post of General Secretary of the SED CC, introducing the posts of secretaries of the CC.

10. To consider it crucial to hold, in the course of the coming 3-4 months, the upcoming Fourth Congress of the SED, at which the issues of the party's tasks in connection with the implementation of the New Course would be discussed. To carry out a serious

The proposal will be discussed in connection with the visit by the leadership of the SED CC to Moscow.

Proposal canceled as untimely in com. A.Ia. Vyshinskii's subcommittee with the agreement of coms. Sokolovskii, Semenov and Iudin.

Proposal similarly canceled.

Proposal canceled.

Proposal will be implemented through operational procedure and a resolution on this is not required.

Proposal canceled

Will be discussed in connection with the visit by the leadership of the SED CC to Moscow.

Issue will be discussed in connection with the visit by the leadership of the CC SED to Moscow.

renewal of the CC personnel at the Congress, in order to replenish it with young cadres who have proved themselves in practical work with the masses, the working class, the working peasantry, and also the intelligentsia. To renew in a fundamental manner the personnel of the Politburo of the SED CC, removing from it those who do not stand at the level necessary for the leadership of the party and the state in the current circumstances.

11. To conduct [both] a special investigation into the work of trade unions and [to carry out] a decisive change in the personnel of the unions' leadership organs, as well as adopting new Charter which would fundamentally change the character of the work of trade unions in conformity with the tasks of the new course.

12. To re-examine the numbers, organization, and distribution of the People's Police of the GDR, equipping them with modern arms, including armored transport vehicles, armored cars and communications equipment, as well as creating from the current divisions of barracked police, sufficiently strong, mobile, [operationally] ready divisions of the People's Police, which are capable of preserving order and calm in the republic without the help of Soviet troops.

To consider it necessary to transform the presently existing army corps of the GDR into a troop formation for internal service in the GDR by analogy with the corresponding formation present in West Germany.

13. To give the organization of the SNM the character of a broad-based, non-party youth organization with the use of the relevant experience of the previously existing youth organizations in Germany. To carry out a change in the leadership of the Central Council of the Free German Youth (FDJ).

14. To consider it expedient to change the character and the tasks of the delegations sent to the Soviet Union from the GDR. To strengthen cultural and technical ties between the GDR and the Soviet Union.

To consider it expedient to curtail holiday and medical [*na lechenie*] travel by functionaries of the SED to the Soviet Union and other countries, and to increase holiday and medical travel to the USSR by representatives of the German intelligentsia, workers, and activists of other parties, as well as tourists.

15. In order to raise the international prestige of the GDR, as well as the authority of the government of the GDR in the eyes of the local populace, to consider an official visit by the governmental delegation of the GDR to Moscow to be necessary after the confirmation of the new government by the People's Chamber.

16. To consider the opening of the sector border of East Berlin with West Berlin after the end of the military situation in East Berlin to be inexpedient, as long as the commandants of West Berlin do not take all necessary measures to guarantee an end to the dispatch of agents and provocateurs from West Berlin to East Berlin and the GDR with the aim of carrying out subversive activities against the GDR.

In connection with this, to establish in the near future a

Proposal will be implemented through operational procedure and no resolution is required for this.

The leadership of the GDR are to present their proposals, which are now being prepared, on the issue of the police.

The proposal will be implemented through operational procedure and no resolution is required.

In the subcommittee of com. A.Ia. Vyshinskii the proposal has been canceled with the agreement of coms. Sokolovskii, Semenov and Iudin. The issue should be resolved in the course of operational procedure.

Proposal has also been withdrawn as untimely.

Proposal withdrawn insofar as a resolution on abolishing limitations on the sector border in Berlin has been adopted.

system of permanent and temporary passes for passage through the sector border between East and West Berlin. Moreover, in issuing these passes, not to create unnecessary difficulties and broadly to take account of the interests of the German populace.

17. To order the Command of the Group of Soviet occupation forces in Germany to improve the distribution of Soviet troops, taking into account the lessons of the events of June 17, and, in particular, to see to the stationing around Berlin of the necessary quantity of tank units.

The issue has been resolved by the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in the course of operational procedure.

[Source: AVP RF, f. 82, op. 41, por. 93, p. 280, d. 93, ll. 63-68. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

**Memorandum, S. Kruglov to G. M. Malenkov,
15 July 1953**

Top secret

USSR
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Presidium of the CC CPSU
15 July 1953.

To comrade G.M. Malenkov

No. 216/k

In the investigatory process of the MfS of the German Democratic Republic there are group files on the persons who took an active part in the preparation and realization of the provocation on June 17 of this year in Berlin and in other cities.

The investigation has established that the provocative work was carried out according to assignments given by reactionary and espionage organizations in West Germany.

The most characteristic are the following files:

1. An investigative file on 7 residents of the city of Berlin - HERTEL, 18 years of age, lubricator in a transport association, MÜLLER, 26 years old, the owner of a truck, DIBALL, 20 years old, without definite occupation, and others, who took active part in the riots (broke glass in government buildings and shops, tore down slogans and placards, and threw stones at police).

The arrested HERTEL and DIBALL admitted that they took part in the riots on the instructions of the fascist organization "League of German Youth," of which they had been members since 1952.

The arrested MÜLLER stated that he was drawn into participation in the disorders by the representatives of the anti-Soviet organization of West Berlin, "Fighting Group Against Inhumanity."

The file of the investigation is complete.

2. The investigative file on 14 residents of the city of Leipzig - GNICHTEL, 33 years old, auto electrician; MULBERG, 41 years of age, dental technician; SCHEBE,

24 years old, student of the veterinary faculty, and others.

The arrested Germans in this group admitted that they were connected with the agents of the "Group for the Struggle Against Inhumanity" in West Berlin - TALEM and SCHUBERT - and on their instructions, carried out espionage and other enemy activity on GDR territory and took active part in preparing the provocation of June 17. They received instructions at secret meetings of the "Fighting Group Against Inhumanity" in West Berlin.

The arrested SCHEBE showed that TAHL called him to a secret meeting in West Berlin at the beginning of May of this year and informed him that an uprising was being prepared and accordingly instructed him.

The arrested GNICHTEL also received an assignment from TAHL to show up active supporters of the SED and to warn them in writing that they would be eliminated. Stamps displaying a picture of one of the leaders of the GDR with a noose around his neck were supposed to appear on the envelopes.

Workers in the apparatus of the Representative of the MVD SSSR in the GDR, having consulted with the High Commissioner in Germany, Com. Semenov, are introducing a proposal to organize open trials on these cases with the goal of unmasking West German fascist organizations engaged in preparing and carrying out the provocations of June 17 of this year in Berlin and in other cities.

Presented for your examination.

MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR S. KRUGLOV

[Source: AVP RF. Provided by the National Security Archive; translated by Ben Aldrich-Moodie.]

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¹ The West German Bundestag had ratified the Bonn and Paris agreements on the creation of a European army (European Defense Community or EDC) on 19 March 1953.

² On the establishment of the SCC, see Elke Scherstjanoi, *Das SKK-Statut. Zur Geschichte der Sowjetischen Kontrollkommission in Deutschland 1949 bis 1953. Eine Dokumentation* (Munich, forthcoming).

³ USSR State Directorate for Soviet Property Abroad.

⁴ The Wismut uranium mining complex in southern East Germany was established in 1947 as a Soviet stock company under exclusive Soviet control. In 1954, Wismut was transformed into a "Joint Soviet-German Stock Company," which it remained until 1990. Wismut produced about 215,559 tons of uranium between 1945 and 1990, 13% of the total global uranium production (to 1990). See Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany. A History of the Soviet Occupation Zone 1945-1949* (Cambridge, 1996), 238-250; Rainer Karlsch, "Ein Staat im Staate. Der Uranbergbau der Wismut AG in Sachsen und Thüringen," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 49-50 (1993), 14-22; and Rainer Karlsch/Harm Schröter (eds.), "Strahlende Vergangenheit" – *Studien zur Geschichte des Uranbergbaus der Wismut* (St. Katharinen, 1996).

⁵ Marshal Vasilii I. Chuikov (1900-1982) had been the commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and head of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany until May 1953.

⁶ Pavel F. Iudin (1899-1968), Soviet philosopher and diplomat, deputy USSR High Commissioner since 1953. He later became ambassador to China.

⁷ Probably Ivan Il'ichev, head of the USSR mission in the GDR. See Semjonow, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow*, 297.

⁸ Georgii M. Malenkov (1902-1988), 1946-1957 member of the CPSU Politburo/Presidium, 1953-1955 Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. In 1957 excluded from the Presidium, in 1961 from the CPSU.

⁹ Underlined by hand.

¹⁰ See the CWIHP *Electronic Bulletin* (www.cwihp.si.edu).

¹¹ Reference is made to the "Law for the Protection of People's Property," enacted in October 1952, providing for exorbitant punishments for even minor "crimes" such as black market deals ("economic crimes") or anti-regime statements. The law led to an explosion of arrests and prison sentences.

¹² German Economic Commission.

¹³ Some of these anxieties stemmed from the large-scale deportation of German scientists and technicians to the Soviet Union by the NKVD and Soviet army units in the early years of Soviet occupation. See Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*, 220-233.

¹⁴ Following the establishment of the GDR, the SED sought to eliminate the influence of the churches, particularly the dominant Protestant Church, which had remained an interzonal, all-German organization and was regarded by many as the last force of resistance within East Germany. The main target of the SED's brutal "Kirchenkampf" were the church youth organizations, especially the Protestant "Junge Gemeinde" [Youth Congregation]. After Soviet intervention in early June 1953, the SED agreed to a "truce" with the churches. The SED, however, continued to fight the "Junge Gemeinde" by forcing young people to choose between the Church's "confirmation" and the so-called "youth consecration" ("Jugendweihe"), a rival secular initiation process. On the SED's church policy, see Martin George Goerner, *Die Kirche als Problem der SED* [The Church as a Problem for the SED] (Berlin, 1997), and Thomas Raabe,

SED-Staat und katholische Kirche. Politische Beziehungen 1945-1961 [SED State and Catholic Church. The Political Relationship 1945-1961] (Paderborn, 1995).

¹⁵ Bund Deutscher Jugend – German Youth League.

¹⁶ Walter Ulbricht (1893-1973), since 1950 Deputy Prime Minister, 1950-1953 SED Secretary-General, 1953-1971 First Secretary of the SED Central Committee, 1960-1973 Chairman of the GDR State Council (President).

¹⁷ Free German Youth, the Communist-front youth organization.

¹⁸ Underlined by hand.

¹⁹ Radio in the American Sector. — Central to Western efforts to destabilize the SED regime and maintain the spirit of resistance in the GDR, the US-controlled RIAS had become, in the words of the first U.S. High Commissioner, John J. McCloy "the spiritual and psychological center of resistance in a Communist-dominated, blacked-out area." US authorities estimated that up to 70% of East Germans tuned into the radio station. See Christian F. Ostermann, "Keeping the Pot Simmering. The United States and the East German Uprising of 1953," *German Studies Review* 19:1 (March 1996), 65. In the spring of 1953, RIAS led a vigorous propaganda campaign against the forced norm increase of 28 May. See Markus Wacket, "Wir sprechen zur Zone. Die politischen Sendungen des RIAS in der Vorgeschichte der Juni-Erhebung 1953," *Deutschland Archiv* 26 (1993), 1035-1048.

²⁰ It was not until late August 1953, that the SED Politburo decided to make an all-out effort in the "fight against the reactionary RIAS broadcasts." Minutes of Politburo Meeting, 26 August 1953, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BArch), DY 30 IV 2/2/312. See Christian F. Ostermann, "The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953 and the Limits of Rollback." *CWIHP Working Paper No. 11* (Washington, 1994).

²¹ Communist Party of West Germany

²² Created in February 1950 as the successor to the failed People's Congress Movement, the Communist-front organization "National Front of a Democratic Germany" was a Soviet/GDR instrument for all-German propaganda. Although nominally a national organization, it was only effective in the GDR where it served to facilitate the electoral "unity list." Dietrich Staritz, *Geschichte der DDR*, rev. ed. (Frankfurt, 1997), 49.

²³ Vladimir S. Semenov (1911-1992) was the Political Adviser to the Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany 1946-1949 and, since 1949, Political Adviser to the Soviet Control Commission in Germany. In April 1953 he became head of the Third European Division in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The next month he was named the USSR High Commissioner in Germany. He later became Deputy Foreign Minister and USSR Ambassador to West Germany. See his memoirs *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow. Ein halbes Jahrhundert in diplomatischer Mission 1939-1991* (Berlin, 1995).

²⁴ Andrei A. Grechko (1903-1976), 1953-1957 Commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

²⁵ Otto Grotewohl (1894-1964), 1945-1946 Chairman of the Central Committee of the Social Democratic Party in the Soviet Zone; since October 1949 GDR prime minister. On Grotewohl's role see Markus Jodl, *Amboß oder Hammer? Eine politische Biographie* (Berlin, 1997).

²⁶ Lavrentii P. Beriia (1899-1953), 1938-1946 People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, 1946 Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, head of the KGB, was arrested on 26 June 1953 and executed in December 1953.

²⁷ Viacheslav M. Molotov (1890-1986) had been a member of

the CPSU Politburo/Presidium from 1926 until 1952 and again from March 1953 to June 1957, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars 1931-1941. In 1939-1941 and 1953-1956 he headed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs resp. the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

²⁸ Lazar M. Kaganovich (1893-1990), 1930-1957 member of the CPSU Politburo/Presidium.

²⁹ Nikita S. Khrushchev (1894-1971), 1939-1964 member of the CPSU Politburo/Presidium, 1953-1964 First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, 1958-1964 Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

³⁰ Nikolai A. Bulganin (1895-1975), 1948-1958 member of the CPSU Politburo/Presidium, 1953 Minister of Defense, 1955-1958 Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

³¹ Fred Oelßner (1903-1977), since 1950 member of the SED Politburo, Central Committee Secretary for Propaganda and editor-in-chief of the SED party magazine *Einheit*.

³² Anastas I. Mikoian (1895-1978), 1935-1964 member of the CPSU Politburo/Presidium.

³³ This is not a verbatim transcript since it first gives the Soviet statements which are followed by those of the Hungarian officials.

³⁴ Matyas Rakosi (1892-1971), Prime Minister 1952-1953 and 1955-1956, the central figure in Hungary's Stalinist dictatorship.

³⁵ Imre Nagy (1896-1958), Hungarian Prime Minister 1953-1955 and October – November 1956; condemned in a secret trial and executed on 16 June 1958. For recent biographies see Andras B. Hegedus et al. (eds), 1956. *Kezikönyve. Megtorlas es Emlekezes* (Budapest, 1996), 108-109; Janos Rainer, *Imre Nagy* (Budapest, 1996).

³⁶ *Allamvedelmi Hatóság*, the Office of State Security, had been established in 1946.

³⁷ Gabor Peter (1906-1993), head of the Political Police 1945-1954, was arrested in 1953 for "trespasses against socialist legality" and sentenced to life in prison (from which he was freed in 1960).

³⁸ Hungarian, in this context, meant non-Jewish.

³⁹ Admiral Miklos Horthy, regent of Hungary 1911-1945.

⁴⁰ Magyar Dolgozok Partja – the Hungarian Workers' Party, formed in 1948 as a result of the forced merger of the Social Democratic Party and the Hungarian Communist Party.

⁴¹ Mihaly Farkas (1904-1965), since 1945 secretary of the MKP and MDP Central Committee; later Minister of Defense under Rakosi.

⁴² All four top Hungarian Communists — Rakosi, Gerö, Farkas and Jozsef Revai — were of Jewish background, a factor which seriously complicated popular attitudes towards communism in the face of widespread anti-semitism.

⁴³ For a transcript of the Hungarian leaders' speeches on 13 June and the transcript of the 16 June 1953 Soviet-Hungarian leadership meeting, see the CWIHP Electronic Bulletin (www.cwihip.si.edu).

⁴⁴ Marshal Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov was the Chief Inspector of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. See David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev and George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin* (New Haven, CT, 1997), 168.

⁴⁵ Reported by "VCh-phone" at 7.26 a.m., 17 June 1953, Moscow time. The reporter was Comrade Kovalev (Assistant to Comrade Semenov). The receiver was Chief of Main Operations Department of General Staff Lieutenant-General PAVLOVSKY. Copies were sent to Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich and Mikoian.

⁴⁶ The reporter was Colonel General GRECHKO. The receiver was Lieutenant General PAVLOVSKY, Chief of the Main Operations Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. Sent to Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian

⁴⁷ Sent to Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian.

⁴⁸ Marshal Vassili D. Sokolovskii (1897-1968), an old Germany expert who had been deputy commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany in 1945/46 and commander-in-chief and head of the Soviet Military Administration of Germany, headed the Soviet General Staff from 1952-1960.

⁴⁹ Sent to Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian.

⁵⁰ Sent to Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian.

⁵¹ Sent to Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian.

⁵² Sent to Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian.

⁵³ Sent to Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoian.

⁵⁴ Stamped "MID USSR, 18 VI 53; Declassified"

⁵⁵ Sent to Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian.

⁵⁶ Stamped: "MID USSR, 19 June 1953; MID USSR 7 July 53; Declassified"

⁵⁷ Soviet Control Commission.

⁵⁸ 37-year old West Berliner Willi Göttling who had been crossing the Soviet sector in Berlin to pass from one part of the Western sectors to another, was arrested by Soviet troops and became the first person to be executed. See Manfred Hagen, *DDR Juni '53. Die erste Volkserhebung im Stalinismus* (Stuttgart, 1992), 91.

⁵⁹ Otto Nuschke (1883-1957), since 1948 Chairman of the Soviet Zone CDU, was GDR Deputy Prime Minister from 1949 to 1957.

⁶⁰ Stamped: "MID USSR, 23 June 1953; Declassified"

⁶¹ On 20 June, Semenov reported to Moscow that "the further interrogation of the parachutist allegedly dropped in the region of Sangerhausen gives ground for assuming that his initial testimony as to the drop of a group of parachutists is a provocative-mendacious statement. I ask you not to use this material until the end of the investigation." AVP RF, f. 082, op. 41, por. 93, p. 280, l. 41.

⁶² Stamped: "MID USSR, 23 June 1953 and 20 June 1953; Declassified."

⁶³ Colonel Ivan A. Fadeikin. According to Pavel and Anatoli Sudoplatov, with Gerold L. and Leona P. Schecter, *Special Tasks, The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness — A Soviet Spymaster* (New York, 1994), 365, Fadeikin was the deputy KGB resident in Berlin. According to David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev and George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin* (New Haven, CT, 1997), 177, Fadeikin was Acting MVD Berlin chief at the time.

⁶⁴ The Fighting Group Against Inhumanity ("Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit") was established in 1948 by publicist Rainer Hildebrandt as a humanitarian organization for East Zone refugees and victims of SED terror. In the early 1950s, the West Berlin-based KgU developed into an anti-communist resistance organization, devoted to providing and collecting information in East Germany and carrying out sabotage operations throughout the GDR.

65 Sent to Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoian.

66 For the transcript of the Soviet-Hungarian leadership meetings, see this Bulletin and the Electronic Bulletin (www.cwihp.si.edu).

67 Piotr Fedotov was a senior foreign intelligence official. See David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev and George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin* (New Haven, CT, 1997), 177.

68 Stamped: "Secretariat of com. Vyshinskii, MID USSR, 4 July 1953; Declassified." The document contains many illegible handwritten marginalia.

69 See note 67.

70 Type-script, original, autograph. Contains notes.

71 Hermann Matern (1893-1971), since 1950 member of the SED CC Politburo and Vice President of the GDR legislature, the *Volkskammer*.

72 Heinrich Rau (1899-1961), since 1949 candidate, since 1950 member of the SED Politburo, had been heading the State Planing Commission since 1950. In 1953, he became Minister for Machine Construction and in 1955 moved on to become Minister for Foreign and Inner-German Trade. Throughout this period, he also occupied the office of Deputy Prime Minister.

73 Corrected from original. Bruno Leuschner (1910-1965) had been a member of the SED Central Committee since 1950 and, as Rau's successor, chaired the State Planing Commission from 1952-1961.

74 Fritz Selbmann (1899-1975) had been Minister for Industry in 1949/50, Minister for Heavy Industry in 1950/51 and since 1951 Minister for Iron and Steel Industry. From 1953 on he again headed the Ministry for Heavy Industry.

75 Gerhart Ziller (1912-1957) had been GDR Minister for Machine Construction since 1950. From 1953 to 1954, he headed the GDR Ministry for Heavy Machine Construction.

76 Elli Schmidt (1908-1980), since 1949 chairman of the German Women's League, was a candidate of the SED Politburo from 1950 to June 1953, when she was removed from all her positions. In January 1954, she was forced to resign her membership in the SED. She was rehabilitated in July 1956.

77 Anton Ackermann (1905-1973), author of the controversial April 1946 article "Is There a Peculiar German Way to Socialism?," had been a candidate of the Politburo since 1949 and was in 1953 Director of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism. Due to his support of Herrstadt and Zaisser he lost these positions in June 1953 and was eventually expelled from the Central Committee in 1954. He committed suicide in 1973.

78 Paul Strassenberger (1910-1956) was the deputy chairman of the State Planing Commission from 1950-1953.

79 Kurt Gregor (1907-1990), had been GDR Minister for Foreign and Inner-German Trade since 1952.

80 Hermann Axen (1916-1992) had been a member of the SED Central Committee since 1950 and served in its secretariat from 1950 to 1953.

81 Otto Schön (1905-1968), a close associate of Ulbricht, was a member of the SED Central Committee from 1950 until 1968 and a member of the secretariat from 1950 to 1953. From 1953 to 1968 he headed the office of the SED Politburo.

82 At the Second Party Conference of the SED in July 1952, Ulbricht had announced the policy of the "forced construction of socialism."

83 Prior to the forced merger of the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party in the Soviet Zone in April 1946, Otto Buchwitz (1879-1964) had been a member of the SPD since 1898. By 1953, Buchwitz had staunch credentials as a SED party

loyalist: he had co-chaired the Central Party Control Commission in 1949-1950 and since 1949 had been a member of the *Volkskammer*. See his *50 Jahre Funktionär der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung* (1958). For his pre-1945 career, see Martin Schumacher/Ulrike Höroldt/Christian Ostermann (eds.), *M.d.R. Die Weimarer Reichstagsabgeordneten in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus* (Düsseldorf, 1994).

84 Georgii M. Pushkin (1909-1963) had been in the diplomatic service from 1949-1952. From 1952-1953 and 1959-1963 he was Deputy Foreign Minister.

85 Andrei J. Vyshinskii (1883-1954), 1949-1953 Soviet Foreign Minister, 1953-1954 Permanent Representative of the USSR at the U. N.

86 Stamped by the Secretariat of Com. Gromyko on 15 July 1953 and by the Secretariat of Vyshinskii on 9 July 1953. The document bears the initial of A. Gromyko. Andrei A. Gromyko (1909-1989), 1953-1957 Deputy Foreign Minister, 1957-1985 Foreign Minister.

87 Ministry of Domestic and Foreign Trade.

88 Soviet-owned "stock company."

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Yugoslavia and the Cold War

Co-editor's note: During the early years of the Cold War, Yugoslavia became one of the focal points of the East-West rivalry. As part of its "containment" strategy, the United States tried to promote fissures within the Communist world that would undercut Soviet expansionism and eventually lead to the disintegration of the Soviet empire. As recent studies have shown, the break between Joseph Stalin and Josip Broz Tito was hailed as a major success of this "wedge strategy" and influenced U.S. policy towards Moscow's Eastern European and Asian allies in the ensuing years. After the split became evident in 1948, the Truman administration adopted a policy of "keeping Tito afloat" by extending military support and economic aid to Tito. Efforts to promote Tito's influence among the satellites and to entice Tito to join NATO, pursued by both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations, however, failed. His increasing commitment to the non-aligned movement and rapprochement with the Soviets in the mid-1950s increasingly undermined U.S. support for Yugoslavia. Though the aid program was eventually terminated, the United States continued to support "Titoism" as an alternative to the Soviet model.¹

Much less is known about the origins, process and impact of the Soviet-Yugoslav split within the Communist world. What changed Stalin's mind about the Yugoslavs, whom, in 1945, he considered heirs to his throne and who considered themselves his most faithful disciples? What turned Tito and other top Yugoslav communists in the words of John L. Gaddis, "from worshipful acolytes into schismatic heretics?"² Did policy differences over a Balkan entente with Bulgaria or Yugoslav ambitions towards Albania cause the rift? Or was it, as Vojtech Mastny has argued, an "incompatibility of affinities" — the very Stalinist disposition and fervor of the Yugoslav Communists, which, despite their genuine devotion for the Soviet fatherland and socialism, antagonized the Soviet leader?³

With the following essays and documents, the Cold War International History Project presents new evidence on Yugoslavia's role in the early years of the Cold War. Research on this subject is not an easy task. In Moscow, tougher declassification policies and shrinking archival budgets have posed difficulties. Even more desperate is the situation in the former Yugoslavia where the recent conflict has left archives in shambles. Despite these difficulties, **Leonid Gibianskii**, a senior research fellow at the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, has unearthed major new findings in the archives in Moscow and Belgrade. His first article covers key episodes in Soviet-Yugoslav relations — the 1946 and 1948 Stalin-Tito meetings. Based on access to Yugoslav as well as Soviet materials, Gibianskii compares

Soviet and Yugoslav documents on the meetings. **Csaba Békés**, a research fellow at the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, offers an interesting snapshot of both Stalin's thinking about the establishment of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) as well as Yugoslav (and Hungarian) perspectives on the organization in 1947. By contrast, the document found and published by the Russian historian **Dmitrii Volkogonov** throws new light on one of the more bizarre efforts in the late Stalin years to eliminate the Yugoslav leader. Documents obtained from the Russian Foreign Ministry Archives by former CWIHP fellow **Andrei Edemskii** illuminate the difficult process of Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement in the mid-1950s. **Gibianskii's** second essay, as well as the documents concluding this *Bulletin* section, explore the evolution of Soviet-Yugoslav relations in the aftermath of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. The essay was first presented as a contribution to the 26-28 September 1996 conference on "Hungary and the World, 1956," a major international scholarly conference co-sponsored by the National Security Archive (Washington, DC), the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (Budapest), and the Cold War International History Project.⁴

The transcripts of the 1946 and 1948 Stalin-Tito meetings also inaugurate a major CWIHP initiative on "Stalin as a Statesman." Based on the recently-published appointment books for Stalin's Kremlin office, the Cold War International History Project will try to document Stalin's conversations and correspondence with foreign leaders as comprehensively as possible, with a view to capturing "the voice of Stalin" in the Soviet foreign policy-making process. The compilation and comparison of transcripts, memoranda, cables and other sources from both Russian and other archives will allow researchers to draw conclusions about Stalin's thinking on foreign policy issues from a richer and broader source base. For example, the 1948 Stalin-Tito conversation, printed below, sheds light not just on Stalin's views on Yugoslavia, but also on his feelings about the Chinese Communist revolution. "Triangulations" of this kind promise new insights for all historians of Stalin and the early years of the Cold War.

¹ See, most recently, Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat. The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War* (University Park, 1997).

² John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History* (New York, 1997), 49.

³ Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity. The Stalin Years* (New York, 1996), 37.

⁴ For further information on the conference, see *CWIHP Bulletin* 8-9 (Winter 1996/7), 355-357.

The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin's Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948

by *Leonid Gibianskii*

I. The Documents

Documents pertaining to Joseph Stalin's meetings with Eastern European communist leaders hold particular importance in the study of the initial stage of the Cold War. As a rule, records of such meetings, stored in Russian and Eastern European archives, contain extremely important materials for the purpose of clarifying: how relations developed between Moscow and its dominions (both individually and collectively) during the first postwar years; what kind of problems arose within the bloc; and what Soviet actions were taken to resolve them in the Kremlin's interests, what correlation existed at various times between Soviet policies and the "people's democracies" regarding the state of their relations with the West; how these relations and developments in the international arena were viewed by Stalin and his Eastern European interlocutors; and what questions were discussed and what goals were set on the given topic. In this regard, the archival documents printed below on the 27-28 May 1946 meeting of the Kremlin boss with a visiting Yugoslav government delegation headed by Josip Broz Tito as well as the 10 February 1948 conference, also in Moscow, of Stalin and his inner circle members (Viacheslav Molotov, Andrei Zhdanov, Georgii Malenkov, Mikhail Suslov) with leading officials from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, are of particular interest.¹

Both these meetings occupy important places in the early history of the Soviet bloc and have figured more than once in the historiography on this period. Until recently, however, the original documents pertaining to these meetings remained inaccessible in the archives of Moscow, Belgrade, and Sofia, and researchers could refer only to the descriptions of both meetings contained in the official biography of Tito, published after the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict of 1948 and written by one of the leading Yugoslav propagandists of the time, Vladimir Dedijer,² as well as—with regard to the second meeting—in the memoirs of two Yugoslav participants Milovan Djilas and Edvard Kardelj, published significantly later.³ In addition, these accounts, which for many years constituted the sole source of information for both these events and which were widely used in Western and Yugoslav historiography (the study of this topic was for a long time forbidden in the USSR and in most other communist countries), were not sufficiently complete; they omitted much of significance; inaccuracies and misrepresentations

also abound. In the case of Dedijer, who used the Yugoslav records of both meetings, the omissions and misrepresentations stemmed from deliberate selectiveness with data, made to correspond to the official Yugoslav version of events, formulated after the conflict of 1948.⁴ The same is also characteristic of Kardelj's memoirs, where this tendency was apparently further abetted by the fact that the author, one of the founding architects of the official Yugoslav version, came to believe, after many years of repetition, in his own inventions especially those concerning the 10 February 1948 meeting. At the same time he could not consult the original documents as he was dictating his recollections while seriously ill, only a few months before his death.⁵ Djilas, on the other hand, was already a dissident when writing his memoirs and was not interested in following the official version, and in this respect his account is more trustworthy. However, in a number of instances he was let down by his memory, and as a result he allowed mistakes and inaccuracies and at times suffered the influence of by-then habitual stereotypes brought into usage by Dedijer. All of this was fully discovered only in recent years, when I was able, finally, to examine the original archival materials pertaining to both meetings.

With regard to Stalin's 27 May 1946 meeting with Tito and members of the Yugoslav delegation accompanying him, there are two known documents: a Yugoslav record in handwritten Serbo-Croatian discovered in the Josip Broz Tito Archive in Belgrade (*Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita*);⁶ and a signed typewritten copy of the Soviet record of the meeting, stored in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF) in Moscow.⁷ The Yugoslav record was made by members of the Yugoslav delegation: Blagoe Neshkovich, at the time head of the Serbian Communist Party Central Committee and the Serbian government, and Koche Popovich, chief of the General Staff of Yugoslavia. The Soviet record was written down by the USSR Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Anatolii Lavrent'ev. Both records were co-published in 1993 in the Moscow journal *Istoricheskii arkhiv* (the Yugoslav record in Russian translation) by Yuri Murin, associate of the APRF, and myself, along with my introduction and footnotes.⁸

As for the Soviet-Yugoslav-Bulgarian meeting on 10 February 1948, there are archival documents kept by each of the three sides. The Josip Broz Tito Archive in

Belgrade has an extensive handwritten Yugoslav report by Djilas (in Serbo-Croatian using the Cyrillic alphabet), which he put together upon his return from Moscow on the basis of notes he took during the course of the meeting, and which was presented during the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CC CPY) Politburo meeting on 19 February 1948.⁹ In addition, the Tito archive contains a ciphered telegram reporting on the meeting and its results, sent from Moscow to Belgrade by the Yugoslav delegation on the day following the meeting with Stalin.¹⁰ Among the documents of the former Central Party Archive of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (CC BCP), currently stored in the Central State Archive (Tsentralen d'rzhaven arkhiv) in Sofia, there is a stenographic record of the 10 February 1948 meeting, made by Traicho Kostov, at the time Georgii Dimitrov's closest associate in the Bulgarian government.¹¹ This same archive also contains a record made by Vasil Kolarov, another Bulgarian government official present at the meeting; it is essentially a repetition of Kostov's stenographic record, having been put together using Kostov's material, with the exception of a few stylistic corrections and small addenda.¹² Finally, the APRF contains a still-classified Soviet record of the 10 February 1948 meeting. This record, the text of which I was also able to examine (but which is not printed below), was made by the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Valerian Zorin, who attended the meeting.¹³

For both the 1946 and 1948 meetings, the records of all the participating sides are on the whole compatible and sometimes almost entirely correspond in the essential contents of the discussions. At the same time, on certain questions touched upon at the meetings, the records of each side contain relatively significant discrepancies in their accounts of the course of the discussion and in their focus on the opinions expressed. At times, one record contains something that is not mentioned in another. As a rule, the Soviet records are shorter, drier, more formal, exhibiting a more generalized character, whereas the Yugoslav and Bulgarian records are more detailed, often punctuated with verbatim dialogue and expressions, particularly those of Stalin and Molotov. A comparative analysis of these archival documents allows one to piece together a fairly complete picture of both meetings, the reasons and reasoning behind them, the topics discussed, and the decisions arrived at.

II. The Background

The 1946 meeting was first proposed by the Yugoslav side in connection with questions of further Soviet economic and military-technical assistance to the Communist regime in Yugoslavia. As early as 1944, Kardelj had raised the question of joint-stock enterprises with the USSR for the purpose of exploiting mineral deposits in Yugoslavia.¹⁴ In the spring of 1945, CC CPY Politburo member Andrea Hebrang, the chief economic official (he headed the Economic Council, the Yugoslav Planning

Commission, and the Ministry of Industry), reiterated the proposal for Soviet participation in the exploitation of Yugoslav natural resources, by offering concession rights as well, to which Moscow replied by agreeing to the creation of joint enterprises, but not to concession rights.¹⁵ In addressing the Soviet government in September 1945 and February 1946, Hebrang, in the name of the government of Yugoslavia, put forth a program for the establishment of such enterprises not only for excavation, but also for his country's refining industry and the construction of power plants and transportation systems.¹⁶ Despite its positive response, the Soviet side delayed practical ratification of these plans, and only in mid-April 1946 did the new USSR ambassador Lavrent'ev inform Kardelj and Hebrang of Soviet interest in the Yugoslav proposals. The ambassador, however, discovered a certain amount of hesitation on the Yugoslav side: in their preparations to send a delegation to Moscow for trade negotiations, they strictly limited its authority to the finalization of an agreement for bilateral shipment of goods for 1946, while postponing the discussion of fundamental questions of economic collaboration for a later time. This was noted by Lavrent'ev in his discussions with Kardelj and Hebrang.¹⁷

The hesitation evident in Belgrade was brought about by complications within the Yugoslav government. By limiting the assignment of the delegation that was to go to Moscow, Tito lowered its status, thus allowing him, in turn, to designate the Minister of Foreign Trade, Nikolai Petrovic, as its leader, and not Hebrang, as was previously planned. Tito told one of his close associates that Hebrang could not be sent to the USSR, because he supported a misguided economic policy. When he found out about this, Hebrang asserted that Tito's main reason for not wanting to send him to Moscow was the fact that following Hebrang's visit there in January 1945, a number of telegrams from the Soviet government began to be addressed not any longer just to Tito or to Tito and Kardelj, but to Tito, Kardelj, and Hebrang.¹⁸ Hebrang believed that Tito viewed this as a sign of special relations between the Kremlin and Hebrang and a danger to the hierarchy which had formed within the Yugoslav government. During the discussion with Lavrent'ev on 17 April 1946, in response to the ambassador's question regarding the change in the Yugoslav position on economic negotiations, Hebrang did not mention his suspicions, but immediately following the meeting laid them out in a letter to Kardelj, apparently counting on his support. Kardelj, however, did not support Hebrang, and handed the letter over to Tito.¹⁹ The latter promptly called a Politburo meeting on April 19, during which he sharply condemned Hebrang. During this and the following meeting on April 24, the Politburo sided with the condemnation and resolved to exclude Hebrang from the Politburo and remove him from the majority of his government posts.²⁰ Alarmed by the apprehensions voiced by Lavrent'ev to Kardelj and Hebrang concerning the Yugoslav position on

the economic agreement with USSR, on April 18 Tito received the Soviet ambassador and announced that in the near future he himself would go to Moscow in order to sign the agreement on economic cooperation.²¹

In that same meeting with Lavrent'ev, Tito also said that the projected economic cooperation must also include the Yugoslav military-industrial sector, meaning Soviet assistance "in the establishment of infrastructure for military production."²² Such assistance had been in part already rendered in the past, but Tito wanted it to be continued and further broadened, and as early as January 1946 he had spoken regarding this matter with the previous USSR ambassador in Belgrade, Ivan Sadchikov, in particular noting the possibility of using projected Soviet-Yugoslav joint-stock enterprises for building the Yugoslav military industry.²³ There was a plan to send a special military delegation to the USSR to discuss these questions; candidates for this delegation were mentioned in the CC CPY Politburo meeting on April 9.²⁴ Now, in his discussion with Lavrent'ev on April 18, Tito announced his intentions to conduct negotiations with the Soviet government on this matter himself during a visit to Moscow.²⁵

On April 29, Lavrent'ev informed Tito of the Soviet government's positive response towards the proposed visit to Moscow for the purpose of discussing the aforementioned questions.²⁶ Later, the Soviet government abruptly moved forward the date of the visit: on May 7, the ambassador informed Tito that the visit had to take place during the second half of May, and that in addition the Soviet government wanted to discuss with him the question of the Yugoslav-Albanian Treaty on Friendship, the completion of which was being planned by Belgrade.²⁷ The treaty projected by Yugoslavia and its accompanying agreements on closer economic, military, and border cooperation, calculated to integrate Albania with Yugoslavia in an increasing manner, drew serious attention in Moscow, where the possibility of Albania's inclusion into the Yugoslav federation as a result of the Yugoslav-Albanian talks was not being ruled out.²⁸ While not explicitly opposing Belgrade's special patronage toward Tirane, the Soviet side nevertheless preferred to restrain the development of any further contacts, in particular by deferring, at least for the near future, the completion of the secret Yugoslav-Albanian military agreement planned by Belgrade and any decision on Albania's inclusion in the Yugoslav federation. In the report "On the question of Yugoslav-Albanian relations," compiled by the chief of the Balkan Sector in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Aleksandr Lavrishchev, in preparation for Tito's visit to Moscow, this position was based on the need to avoid a possible negative reaction from the West which would have complicated Yugoslavia's and Albania's positions in the international arena.²⁹ Whether this was the real reason for the Soviet position or not, it is clear that the Soviet leadership decided to hasten Tito's visit in order to sway him towards the Kremlin's desired position with regard to

Yugoslav-Albanian relations.

A week before his visit, Tito told Lavrent'ev that, in addition to those issues mentioned above, the agenda for the Moscow talks should also include "general foreign policy questions," including those pertaining to the upcoming peace conference in Paris and the question of Yugoslav relations with Bulgaria.³⁰ Clearly, he considered it important to discuss with the Soviet leadership the more significant aspects of the international situation given the unfolding Cold War, including the coordination of actions between the USSR, Yugoslavia, and the other Soviet-bloc countries. Of course, the Yugoslav leader had to be particularly troubled by those international problems that directly affected Yugoslavia: specifically, those concerning the Balkans and the Mediterranean-Adriatic region. As for Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations, what was implied was the completion of the Treaty of Friendship, followed by the union of the two countries in a federation, which had become a topic of discussion among Moscow, Belgrade, and Sofia as early as late 1944-early 1945. At that time, neither the plan for establishing the federation, nor the wish to sign a treaty of alliance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, could be implemented. The reasons for this were the vetoes placed on these intentions by London and Washington as participants in Allied control over Bulgaria, as well as disagreements over the structure of the future federative union: Yugoslavia wanted for Bulgaria to have the same status as each of the six federation units of Yugoslavia, that is, essentially become subordinate to the latter, whereas Bulgaria, supported by Stalin, was in favor of a "dual federation" with equal status between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.³¹ Later, Tito's interest in the federation with Bulgaria waned significantly. He reacted negatively to the Bulgarian proposal to return to the question of the treaty and the federation, put forth in April 1946 by the Bulgarian envoy in Belgrade, Petro Todorov, pointing out that under current circumstances such steps would still be inexpedient, in particular prior to the settlement of Bulgaria's postwar international situation. Tito notified Lavrent'ev of his position and requested Moscow's opinion on this account.³²

III. The Meetings

It is clear from the Soviet and Yugoslav records of the meeting between Stalin and Tito in the Kremlin on 27 May 1946 (printed below) that the discussion centered primarily on questions of Soviet economic assistance to Yugoslavia through the creation of joint-stock enterprises, on assistance in establishing the Yugoslav military industry and equipping the armed forces, and on Yugoslav-Albanian and Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations.

The result of the discussion regarding the first two questions was the signing of an agreement on 8 June 1946, which provided for the establishment of a number of joint-stock enterprises in Yugoslavia (for extracting and refining crude oil, excavating bauxite, and producing aluminum, excavating and producing lead, exploration and mining of

coal, ferrous metal production, civilian aviation, the Danube ship industry, the Yugoslav-Soviet Bank, and, in the future, lumber and cellulose-paper industry), as well as for Soviet technical assistance in many branches of the Yugoslav economy (in electrical, food, textile, chemical and metal-working industries, in the production of construction materials, and in agriculture,),³³ and for an understanding to follow this with the signing of a concrete agreement on supplying the Yugoslav army through a long-term loan and shipments for the Yugoslav military industry.³⁴

With regard to Yugoslav-Albanian relations, Stalin, judging from the records of the meeting, stated his endorsement of the closest possible alliance between Albania and Yugoslavia and even for Belgrade's patronage towards Tirane, but clearly strove to avoid Albania's direct inclusion in the Yugoslav federation. The archival documents obtained up to now do not clearly answer the question whether his arguments for postponing unification until the resolution of the Trieste question were a true reflection of the Soviet position or merely a tactical ruse, in actuality concealing the desire to obstruct completely Albania's unification with Yugoslavia. In either case, as a result of the Moscow negotiations, the question of unification was, for the time being, removed from the agenda. In addition, the Soviet side, having given its consent to the Treaty of Peace and Mutual Assistance and to an agreement for close economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania, notified the Albanian government of its support for the signing of these agreements and "for orienting Albania toward closer ties with Yugoslavia," and facilitated the signing of the aforementioned Yugoslav-Albanian documents in July 1946.³⁵

The Soviet and Yugoslav records demonstrate that during the meeting with Stalin, Tito argued his position against a federation with Bulgaria. But the Yugoslav record does not contain Stalin's disagreement with Tito's position, while the Soviet record directly states that Stalin insisted on the importance of such a federation, though he believed that at first one could limit oneself to the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance. It is unlikely that the Soviet record would contain something which Stalin did not actually say; thus, in this instance it is probably true to fact. However, it remains a mystery why Stalin rejected Molotov's observation at the meeting that it would be better to postpone the Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty until the signing of a peace treaty with Bulgaria. Indeed, Molotov's remark was invariably the Soviet position both before and after the meeting.³⁶ Perhaps the answer to this mystery will be found in further research.

As for the discussion of "general political questions," mentioned by Tito before the trip, they were also touched upon: during the Kremlin meeting itself there was a discussion on a possible strategy with regard to the handling of the Trieste question in Paris, the current and future status of Yugoslav relations with Hungary and Greece, and, during further conversation at the evening

dinner in Stalin's dacha that followed the Kremlin meeting (and which is absent from the Soviet record but sparsely summarized in the Yugoslav version), among other things, problems of strengthening of the Soviet bloc, relations between Communist parties, the situation in Greece and Czechoslovakia, the Italian "craving for revenge," and the question of the Polish-Czechoslovak dispute over Tesin (Cieszyn) were mentioned. Judging by the handwritten notes made by Tito during the return-trip from Moscow, the visit also included a discussion of Austria, Yugoslav-Austrian relations and Yugoslav relations with the other Slavic countries.³⁷ However, as with much of the dinner discussions at Stalin's dacha, the contents of these are not mentioned in the document.

As for the Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav meeting on 10 February 1948, this took place exclusively on the basis of Moscow's demands. The reasons were Stalin's strong dissatisfaction with the foreign policy moves of Sofia and Belgrade, undertaken without Soviet permission or even in defiance of Kremlin directives.³⁸ There had been three such moves. The first was the public announcement by the governments of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in early August 1947 that they had agreed upon (i.e., were on the verge of signing) a treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. This was done in direct defiance of Stalin's orders which specified that the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty had to wait until a peace treaty with Bulgaria had come into effect. Following a sharp, though not public, outcry from the Kremlin, Dimitrov and Tito, in a display of disciplined submission, acknowledged their mistake. However, in January 1948 two more moves were undertaken without Moscow's consent. First was Dimitrov's statement to the press regarding the possibility of a federation and a customs union of East European "people's democracies," even including Greece, in which such a regime would be established. The other move was Tito's appeal to Hoxha for consent to deploy a Yugoslav division in Albania. In this appeal, to which Hoxha responded positively, the Yugoslav leader warned of a Western-supported Greek invasion of Albania, but Djilas later maintained that in fact Tito wanted to use the deployment of forces to fortify the Yugoslav position in Albania, fearing a loss of ground as a result of growing Soviet participation in Albanian affairs. In either case, the Yugoslav move was taken without consultation with the Soviet leadership, which, having learned of the plans to send a division to Albania, sharply condemned such actions via Molotov's telegrams to Tito. Although subsequently the Yugoslav leader halted the deployment of the division, high-ranking Yugoslav representatives were swiftly sent to Moscow. At the same time, Bulgarian emissaries were also being sent there in connection with the aforementioned statement by Dimitrov, which had already been publicly condemned by *Pravda*, and subsequently Dimitrov himself went to the Soviet capital.

As for the course of the meeting in Moscow, sufficient coverage is provided by the Djilas report printed below

with the aforementioned corrections and additions from other records included in the footnotes. However, certain points of the 10 February 1948 meeting merit clarification or additional commentary.³⁹

The first and perhaps the most important is the continual Soviet insistence throughout the meeting that the aforementioned foreign policy moves undertaken by Belgrade and Sofia without Kremlin consent constituted serious mistakes, insofar as they might be used by the USA and Britain against the interests of the USSR and the “people’s democracies.” In particular, as evidenced by the record of the meeting, Stalin placed special significance on the fact that these misguided moves might bolster the position of supporters of a more hard-line policy against the Soviet Union and its East European underlings, possibly enabling them to achieve success in the upcoming elections for the U.S. Congress and President in fall 1948. How much did this contention reflect the actual Soviet desire to avoid an unfavorable reaction in the West? And was there not some deliberate fomenting of fear on the part of the Soviets, as a means of precluding any kind of attempt at independent action, without consultation with Moscow, on the part of Bulgarian and Yugoslav leaders? At this time researchers do not have at their disposal the Soviet documents which would provide a clear answer to these questions. Undoubtedly, the Soviet leadership was sufficiently aware of potential Western reactions to particular statements or actions of either the Kremlin itself or the “people’s democracies.” Nevertheless, while accusing Sofia and Belgrade of making moves leading to an undesirable deterioration in relations with the West, the Soviet side at the same time considered it entirely acceptable to implement its own plans, which were obviously fraught with a potential escalation of conflict with the Western powers. It is sufficient to recall the Soviet-induced Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, or (to an even greater degree) Soviet measures to limit access to Western sectors in Berlin three months later, which led to the Berlin blockade crisis. It seems that the basis for Soviet condemnation of the Yugoslav and Bulgarian initiatives was, in the final analysis, the dissatisfaction with the independence of the decisions themselves, undertaken by Sofia and Belgrade without sanction from Moscow, although it is entirely possible that at the same time the Kremlin was genuinely apprehensive of possible Western reactions to these moves.

The other significant point was the question of the origin of Stalin’s statement at the February 10 meeting of the possibility of creating three federations in East Europe: Polish-Czechoslovak, Hungarian-Romanian, and Bulgarian-Yugoslav-Albanian. As of now, historians do not have at their disposal documents which would provide a direct explanation for this. However, according to all records of the February 10 meeting, in speaking of the possibility of three federations, Stalin set this idea in opposition to the proposal for a federation or confederation of all East European countries, put forth by Dimitrov in the afore-

mentioned statement to the press in January 1948. This prompts the suspicion that the Soviet leader, in speaking of three federations, was in actuality only pursuing the goal of sinking Dimitrov’s proposal. It is perhaps significant, in this regard, that Stalin said nothing at all specific about either the Polish-Czechoslovak or the Hungarian-Romanian federations, mentioning them only in the most abstract form. Moreover, he spoke much more specifically of the federation of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Clearly, only the latter of these was the immediate goal of his comment on federations, while the reference to the previous two seems more plausible as a strictly tactical move, used to camouflage his true intentions. As for the question of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav-Albanian federation, according to both the Djilas report, printed below, and the Soviet record of the meeting, Stalin stated that a union between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia must come first, only then followed by the inclusion of Albania into this Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation (the Bulgarian records do not contain such a statement). It is apparent that such a plan fundamentally differed from Belgrade’s intentions to merge Albania with Yugoslavia, and was therefore put forth as a counterbalance to these intentions. Finally, the Djilas report, as well as all the other records (though the Soviet record is not as direct as the others on this point), notes Stalin’s statement that the creation of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation ought not be delayed. This raises the question: Did he really favor such a development, and if so, why? Documents currently at our disposal do not provide a clear answer. After 1948, the official Yugoslav version always maintained that Stalin was attempting to force a Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation as a means, using the more obedient government of Bulgaria, more effectively to control Yugoslavia. However, no documentary evidence was ever given in defense of this, while historiography contains numerous and entirely different readings of his statements in favor of a swift unification of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.⁴⁰

The third point is, how did the question of the Greek partisan movement come up during the February 10 meeting? All records note that its discussion arose in connection with the question of Albania. However, according to the Djilas report and—though not so directly—the Soviet report, Stalin began to express his doubts concerning the prospects of the guerrilla war in Greece in response to Kardelj’s conclusions regarding the threat of an invasion of Albania, while the Bulgarian records do not note such a connection. According to the Soviet record, still prior to the discussion of the Albanian question, Dimitrov was already asking Stalin concerning the prospects of future assistance to the Greek partisans. In any case, it is not clear from any of the records whether Stalin had planned before the meeting to discuss the future of the Greek partisan movement or whether the Greek question popped up spontaneously.

Finally, the fourth point is the manner in which Stalin raised the question of the importance of signing protocols

of commitment to mutual consultation between the USSR and Bulgaria and the USSR and Yugoslavia on foreign policy questions. The Djilas report states that this proposal was advanced by Stalin and Molotov within the context of accusations directed at Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for not informing Moscow of their projected foreign policy activities. At the same time, the Bulgarian and Soviet records portray the matter in an entirely different light: Stalin proposed to sign such a protocol in response to Dimitrov's complaint that Moscow gave out little information regarding its position on important foreign policy questions. Here, as in the case with the Greek partisan movement, we do not have at our disposal documents to determine whether Stalin was actually planning to raise this question, or whether he was simply availing himself of the opportunity provided by Dimitrov's statement.

The records printed below of Stalin's meetings with Yugoslav and Bulgarian communist leaders constitute an important source for historical study and point out directions for further archival research.

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¹ Editor's Note: The May 27/28 meeting only lasted 90 minutes before breaking up for an early morning snack. Stalin was a night owl and many of his summits (including the 1948 meeting included here) should be "double-dated," although for convenience, the earlier day is often used to identify meetings. On the abolition of nocturnal summons under Khrushchev, see John Gaddis, *We Now Know* (Oxford, 1997) p. 206.

² Vladimir Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito: Prilozi za biografiju* [Josip Broz Tito: Materials for Biography] (Belgrade, 1953), pp. 447-453, 497-504. For a slightly different version, in English translation, see *Tito Speaks* (London, 1953) and *Tito* (New York, 1953).

³ Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York, 1962), pp. 114-120 (in Yugoslavia this could only be published almost three decades later: Milovan Djilas, *Razgovori sa Staljinom* (Belgrade, 1990), pp. 111-118); Edvard Kardelj, *Borba za priznanje i nezavisnost nove Jugoslavije 1944-1957: Secanija* [The Struggle for Recognition and Independence of New Yugoslavia 1944-1957: Memoirs] (Belgrade-Ljubljana, 1980), pp. 112-117.

⁴ Thirty years later Dedijer himself admitted this selectiveness, explaining that this was entirely due to the fact that he was writing the book from the perspective of the Yugoslav government. Vladimir Dedijer, *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita* [New Materials for Josip Broz Tito's Biography], vol.3 (Belgrade, 1984), pp. 283-284, 291-293.

⁵ While dictating his memoirs, Kardelj asked to verify, corroborate and expand many of his recollections on the basis of archival documents. See Edvard Kardelj, *Borba*, p. 14.

⁶ Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, Kabinet Marsala Jugoslavihe (henceforth AJBT, KMJ), I-1/7, pp. 6-11.

⁷ Arhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of the President of the Russian Federation; APRF), fond (f.) 45, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 397, listy (ll.) 107-110.

⁸ "Poslednii vizit I. Broza Tito k I.V. Stalinu" ([J. Broz Tito's final visit to J.V. Stalin], *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 2 (1993), pp. 16-35.

⁹ AJBT KMJ, I-3-b/651, pp. 33-40. Minutes of the CPY Politburo meeting on 19 February 1948 are in Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia: henceforth AJ], fond 507, CK SKJ, III/31 a (copy).

¹⁰ AJBT, KMJ, I-3-b/651, pp. 45-46.

¹¹ Kostov's stenographic record, or more specifically its deciphered version in Bulgarian, was also included in Georgii Dimitrov's journal, stored in the same archive: Tsentralen d'rzhaven arkhiv (documents from the former Central Party Archives (TsPA), henceforth TsDA-TsPA), f. 146, op. 2, arkhivna edinitsa (a.e.) 19, ll. 103-128. The rights to the journal now kept in the archive, including Kostov's stenographic record, are held by Georgii Dimitrov's adopted son Boiko Dimitrov, to whom I am deeply grateful for giving me a copy of the text of this record.

¹² TsDA-TsPA, f. 147, op. 2, a.e. 62, ll. 5-35 (manuscript). Kolarov also noted in Russian some statements by Stalin and Molotov (*ibid.*, ll. 1-4).

¹³ The archive has a typewritten copy.

¹⁴ Minutes of conversation of Zorin and Gerashchenko, department heads in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of USSR, with Kardelj and the chief Yugoslav military envoy in Moscow, Velimir Terzic, 23 November 1944. Arhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, henceforth, AVP RF), f. 0144, op. 28, papka (p.) 114, d. 4, ll. 220-221.

¹⁵ Copy of Kardelj's letter to Tito, dated 28 May 1945, AJ, f. Edvard Kardelj, kutija (box) "Sabrana dela", t. IX (X), No. 9, p. 82; the USSR Embassy memorandum to the Yugoslav government (May 1945) in AJBT, KMJ, I-3-b/616.

¹⁶ Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Hebrang on 17 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 26; memorandum "Economic Relations Between the USSR and Yugoslavia," 22 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, ll. 6-7.

¹⁷ Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Hebrang on 16 April and between Lavrent'ev and Hebrang on 17 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, ll. 20-21; Hebrang's letter to Kardelj, dated 17 April 1946, AJBT, KMJ, I-3-b/623, l. 1.

¹⁸ Hebrang's letter to Kardelj, dated 17 April 1946, AJBT, KMJ, I-3-b/623, pp. 1-3.

¹⁹ The letter still remains in Tito's archive: see previous footnote.

²⁰ Copies of minutes of these Politburo meetings, AJ, f. 507, CKSKJ, III/17; III/18. The decision was secret, and it was published only when the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict broke out in 1948; see *Borba* (Belgrade), 30 June 1948.

²¹ Minutes of conversation between Tito and Lavrent'ev, 18 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 31.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Memorandum "On the creation of an industrial infrastructure for the production of ammunition in Yugoslavia," 27 May 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, ll. 19-20.

²⁴ Copy of minutes of this Politburo meeting, AJ, f. 507, CKSKJ, III/16.

²⁵ Minutes of conversation between Tito and Lavrent'ev, 18 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 31.

²⁶ Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 29 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 62.

²⁷ Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 7 May 1946, AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 76.

²⁸ Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Kardelj, 23 April 1946, AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 45; also see footnote 28.

²⁹ Memorandum, AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, ll. 1-3.

³⁰ Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 20 May 1946, AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 100.

³¹ I considered this problem in my "Balkanskii uzel" [The Balkan Knot], in O.A. Rzheshhevskii, ed., *Vtoraia mirovaia voina: Aktual'nye problemy* [The Second World War: Contemporary Problems] (Moscow, 1995), pp. 96-101.

³² Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 22 April 1946, AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, ll. 39-41.

³³ Copy of "Agreement on Economic Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia," 8 June 1946, Arkhiv Ministerstva vneshnikh ekonomicheskikh svyazi Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation], fond: Treaty-Legal Department, op. 11876, d. 55, ll. 17-19.

³⁴ Negotiations for a concrete agreement were being carried out by a special Yugoslav military-trade delegation which arrived in Moscow in fall 1946. The type and the amount of materials designated for shipment to Yugoslavia were determined by the Soviet side on the basis of a Yugoslav procurement application, the first of which was handed over at the time of Tito's visit. See, e.g., the correspondence between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow during November 1946-March 1947; AVPRF, f. 144, op. 6, p. 8, d. 3, ll. 121, 125, 132-143; *ibid.*, op. 7, p. 12, d. 1, l. 23.

³⁵ Minutes of conversations between Lavrent'ev and Enver Hoxha (the latter had arrived in Belgrade by then), 24 June 1946, and between Lavrent'ev and Hysni Kapo, Albanian Minister in

Yugoslavia, 1 July 1946: AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, ll. 167-168; and *ibid.*, d. 16, l. 1.

³⁶ See L. Ya. Gibianskii, "Problemy mezhdunarodno-politicheskogo strukturirovaniia Vostochnoi Evropy v period formirovaniia sovetskogo bloka v 1940-e gody" [Problems of East European International-Political Structuring during the Period of the Formation of the Soviet Bloc during the 1940s], in M.M. Narinskii et al., eds., *Kholodnaia voina: novye podkhody, novye dokumenty* [The Cold War: New Approaches, New Documents] (Moscow, 1995), pp. 103, 105, 106-107.

³⁷ These notes, untitled and undated, can be found in AJBT, KMJ, I-1/7, pp. 51-52.

³⁸ I have examined this episode elsewhere in more depth on the basis of Russian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian archival materials. See, e.g., "The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Formation of the 'Socialist Camp' Model," in Odd Arne Westad et al., eds., *The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989* (London & New York, 1994), pp. 30-39; "The Beginning of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Cominform," in Giuliano Procacci et al., eds., *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949* (Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli: Annali, Anno Trentesimo) (Milano, 1994), pp. 469-472, 474.

³⁹ Detailed analysis of this meeting can be found in: L. Ya. Gibianskii, "K istorii sovetsko-iugoslavskogo konflikta 1948-1953 gg.: sekretnaia sovetsko-yugoslavo-bolgarskaia vstrecha v Moskve 10 fevralia 1948 goda" [On the History of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict of 1948-1953: The Secret Soviet-Yugoslav-Bulgarian Meeting in Moscow on 10 February 1948], *Sovetskoe slavianovedenie* (since 1992 *Slavianovedenie*) 3 and 4 (1991) and 1 and 3 (1992). For a shorter analysis see my "The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict...", pp. 40-42.

⁴⁰ For more details see L. Ya. Gibianskii, "K istorii..." *Sovetskoe slavianovedenie* no. 1 (1992), pp. 55 ff.

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I. Soviet and Yugoslav Records of the Tito-Stalin Conversation of 27-28 May 1946

A. The Soviet Record:

Record of Conversation of
Generalissimus I.V. Stalin with Marshal Tito

27 May 1946 at 23:00 hours¹

Secret

Present:

from the USSR side – [USSR Foreign Minister] V.M. Molotov, USSR Ambassador to Yugoslavia A.I. Lavrent'ev;

from the Yugoslav side — Minister of Internal Affairs, A. Rankovich; Head of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General K. Popovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Serbia, Neshkovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Slovenia, Kidrich; Yugoslav Ambassador to USSR, V. Popovich.²

At the start of the meeting com. Stalin asked Tito whether, in the instance of Trieste being granted the status of a free city, this would involve just the city itself or the city suburbs,³ and which status would be better - along the lines of Memel [Klaipeda, Lithuania] or those of Danzig [Gdansk, Poland].⁴ Tito replied that the suburbs of the city are inhabited by Slovenians. Only the city itself would be acceptable. Though he would like to continue to argue for including Trieste in Yugoslavia. Further, Tito, in the name of the Yugoslav government, expressed gratitude to com. Molotov for the support that the Soviet delegation showed in the discussion of the question of the Italian-Yugoslav border at the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Paris.⁵

Com. Molotov gave a report on the differences in status between Memel and Danzig, pointing out that the status along the lines of Memel is more acceptable.

Com. Stalin asked Tito about the industrial and agricultural situation in Yugoslavia.

Tito replied that all land had been sown the intermediate crop was awaited, and that industry was working well.

After which, com. Stalin invited Tito to present the group of questions which the Yugoslav delegation wished to discuss this evening.

Tito put forth the following questions: economic cooperation between USSR and Yugoslavia, military cooperation,⁶ and Yugoslav-Albanian relations.

Regarding the question of economic cooperation, Tito said that Yugoslavia did not want to turn to the United States for credit. If America were to agree to provide loans, then this would be tied to demands for political concessions from Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia does not have the means for further industrial development. The Yugoslav government would like to receive assistance from the Soviet Union, in particular, through the establish-

ment of mixed Soviet-Yugoslav associations. Yugoslavia has a fair amount of mineral and ore deposits, but it is in no position to organize production, since it does not possess the necessary machinery. In particular, Yugoslavia has oil deposits, but no drilling machines.

Com. Stalin said: "We will help."

Regarding com. Stalin's questions, whether Yugoslavia was producing aluminum, copper and lead, Tito answered in the affirmative, noting that Yugoslavia had many bauxite and ore deposits for the production of these metals.

Com. Stalin noted that the Ministry of Foreign Trade had informed Yugoslavia of its readiness to participate in talks regarding the establishment of mixed associations, but no final answer had been received from Yugoslavia. As a result, the impression was created that Yugoslavia was not interested in forming such associations.⁷

Tito objected, stating that on the contrary, he had spoken several times with ambassador Sadchikov⁸ about the Yugoslav government's desire to create mixed Soviet-Yugoslav associations.

Regarding com. Stalin's note whether it will not be necessary to allow other powers into the Yugoslav economy following the formation of mixed Soviet-Yugoslav associations, Tito answered that the Yugoslav government had no intention of allowing the capital of other powers into its economy.

Subsequently, com. Stalin summarized, saying that in this way the Soviet-Yugoslav economic cooperation was being conceptualized on the basis of forming mixed associations.

Tito affirmed this, stating that he was intent on presenting the following day his proposals, in written form, on this subject.⁹

With respect to the question of military cooperation, Tito said that the Yugoslav government would like to receive shipments from the Soviet Union to supply the military needs of Yugoslavia, not in the form of mutual trade receipts, but in the form of loans. Yugoslavia has a small military industry which could produce grenade launchers and mines. In a number of places there were cadres. But there were no corresponding arms, since the Germans carried them away. The Yugoslav government would like to receive some machinery from Germany as reparations for the reconstruction of certain military factories. But Yugoslavia cannot by itself provide for all of its military needs, and in this regard, the Yugoslav government is hoping for assistance from the Soviet Union.

Com. Stalin said that Yugoslavia ought to have certain military factories, for example, aviation [factories], for Yugoslavia may produce aluminum given the presence of rich bauxite deposits. In addition, it was necessary to have artillery munitions factories.

Tito noted that [artillery] gun barrels may be cast in the Soviet Union and then further assembly may be done in Yugoslavia.

Touching upon the question of Yugoslavia's water borders, com. Stalin said that, for the purpose of safeguarding them, it was important to have a good naval fleet. You need to have torpedo boats, patrol boats, and armored boats. Although the Soviet Union is weak in this regard, we will nevertheless, in the words of com. Stalin, help you.¹⁰ Regarding Albania, com. Stalin pointed out that the internal political situation in Albania was unclear. There were reports that something was happening there between the Communist Party Politburo and Enver Hoxha. There had been a report that Kochi Dzodzej¹¹ wants to come to Moscow in order to discuss certain questions prior to the party congress.¹² Enver Hoxha has also expressed desire to come to Moscow together with Dzodzej.

Com. Stalin asked Tito whether he knows anything about the situation in the Communist Party of Albania.

Tito, appearing unacquainted with these questions, replied that Hoxha's visit to Belgrade was being proposed for the near future. That is why he, Tito, believes that the reply to the Albanians should note that Dzodzej's and Hoxha's proposed visit to Moscow will be examined following Hoxha's visit to Belgrade.

Com. Molotov noted that we were trying to hold back the Albanians' efforts to come to Moscow, but the Albanians were determined in this.

Com. Stalin noted that the Albanians' visit to Moscow might bring an unfavorable reaction from England and America, and this would further exacerbate the foreign policy situation of Albania.

Further, com. Stalin asked Tito whether Enver Hoxha agreed with including Albania in the Federation of Yugoslavia.

Tito replied in the affirmative.

Com. Stalin said that, at the present time it would be difficult for Yugoslavia to resolve two such questions as the inclusion of Albania into Yugoslavia and the question of Trieste.

Tito agreed with this.

As a result, continued com. Stalin, it would be wise to first examine the question of friendship and mutual assistance between Albania and Yugoslavia.

Tito said that, above all, this treaty must provide for the defense of the territorial integrity and national independence of Albania.

Com. Stalin said that it is important to find a formula for this treaty and to bring Albania and Yugoslavia closer together.¹³

Com. Stalin touched on the question of including Bulgaria in the Federation.

Tito said that nothing would come of the Federation.

Com. Stalin retorted: "This must be done."

Tito declared that nothing would come of the federation, because the matter involved two different regimes. In addition, Bulgaria is strongly influenced by other parties, while in Yugoslavia the entire government, [though] with the presence of other parties, is essentially in the hands of the Communist Party.

Com. Stalin noted that one need not fear this. During the initial stages things could be limited to a pact of friendship and mutual assistance, though indeed, more needs to be done.

Tito agreed with this.

Com. Molotov noted that at the present time difficulties may arise from the fact that a peace treaty had not yet been signed with Bulgaria. Bulgaria was perceived as a former enemy.¹⁴

Com. Stalin pointed out that this should not be of significant importance.¹⁵ For example, the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship with Poland before Poland was even recognized by other countries.¹⁶

Further, com. Stalin summarized the meeting, saying that what the Yugoslav government is looking for in economic questions and in military matters can be arranged. A commission must be established to examine these questions.

Tito informed com. Stalin of Yugoslavia's relations with Hungary, notifying of Rakosi's¹⁷ visit to Belgrade. Tito declared that the Yugoslav government had decided not to raise the question of Yugoslavia's territorial demands against Hungary (demands on the Ban'skii triangle ["Baiskii triangle," the region along the Hungarian-Yugoslav border centered on the city of Baia.])¹⁸ in the Council of Ministers.¹⁹ Tito expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia's signing of an agreement with Hungary on reparation payments.

Com. Stalin noted that if Hungary wanted peaceful relations with Yugoslavia, then Yugoslavia had to support these endeavors, bearing in mind that Yugoslavia's primary difficulties were in its relations with Greece and Italy.

Recorded by Lavrent'ev.

[Source: *Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF)*, f. 45, op. 1, d. 397, ll. 107-110. Published in *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, No. 2, 1993. Translated by Daniel Rozas.]

B. The Yugoslav Record

Yugoslav Record of Conversation of I.V. Stalin and the Yugoslav Government Delegation Headed by J. Broz Tito, 27-28 May 1946

In the Kremlin

27.V.46*, 23:00 hours.

[*Recorded by B. Neshkovich.]

[Translator's note: the brackets used in the text are from the Russian translation of the Serbo-Croatian document. Any brackets and notes by the English translator will hereafter be denoted by "trans."]

[Present:] Stalin, Molotov, Lavrent'ev, Tito, Marko,²⁰
Kocha,²¹ Vlado,²² Kidrich, Neshkovich.

Stalin: "Beautiful people, strong people."

[Stalin:] "A hardy nation."

Molotov: agreed.²³

Stalin: Asks how was our trip.

Tito [says] it went well...

Stalin (chuckling, ironically): "How is my 'friend'

[Russian word used in text] Shubashich?"

Tito (similarly) [says], he is in Zagreb, in the coop.²⁴
And also Grol.²⁵

Stalin (similarly): "And how is my 'friend' [Russian word used in text] Grol?"

Tito (similarly): "He's in Belgrade"...

[Tito:] "We always had measures to suppress them.

The parties exist only formally, though in fact they don't exist. In reality, only the Communist party exists."²⁶

Stalin chuckled pleasantly at this.

Stalin: "What kind of crop will you have?"

Tito: "An especially good one. The land has been well sown. In the passive regions²⁷ it will be good. The assistance of UNRRA²⁸ will not be needed. There will be lots of fruit."

Stalin: "Have you sown everything?"

Tito: "Everything has been sown."

Stalin: "What is your plan? What would you like to raise [for discussion]?"

Tito: puts forth economic and military questions.

Stalin during the whole time: "We'll help!"

* [Stalin] "How are Kardelj and Djilas?"²⁹[* Here a line was moved from below where it is denoted by * __*.]

T[ito]: "Well. We couldn't all come, and so only half of the government is here."

S[ta]lin: "The English and Americans don't want to give you Trieste!" (chuckling).

T[ito]: thanked for the support, [said] that the people send their greetings to Stalin and Molotov, [speaks] of the great political significance [of Soviet support].

Molotov: "But you still do not have Trieste..."

T[ito]: nevertheless, [Soviet support] is of great political importance...³⁰

* During the time that Tito [...]*

27.V.46**

23:00 h.

[** Recorded by K. Popovich.]

...1) S[ta]lin: "On our part we made a proposal to your comrades, responsible for economic questions, whether you would agree to the establishment of joint enterprises. We will hold nothing against you if you decline. Poland, for example, declined on the grounds that the Americans may, in their turn, raise questions of establishing joint enterprises."

T[ito]: "No, such is not my opinion nor the opinion of other leaders - [on the contrary, we think] it is necessary."

2) S[ta]lin: "...I agree to the establishment of these enterprises as you see fit...". (M[olotov]: "In those fields that are more beneficial both for you and for us...")

S[ta]lin: expressed interest in where our oil and bauxite deposits are located. "You have very good baux-

ite." T[ito] explained where the deposits were, as well as the locations Bora, Trepcha and Rasha³¹ - and that we have good coal, but not coke for house ovens.

3) M[olotov said that] one of the Italian economic arguments for receiving Rasha is the fact that without it Italy would only be able to meet 20% of its demand.

4) The army.

S[ta]lin: "This is right, that in the event of war, because of the difficulty of supply, that [there ought to be] as much military industry in the country as is possible. It would be good to develop the aviation industry, given the rich bauxite deposits, and, as for artillery, the forging ought to be done within the country."

S[ta]lin: "For coastal defense, you need to build formations of fast, light, and mobile ships, for Italy will be left with a sufficiently strong Navy (about two squadrons)."

T[ito]: "... In Boka Kotorska³² ships of 30,000 tons can be stationed."

S[ta]lin: "These days they build ships of 60,000 tons. Currently we are having great difficulties in naval fleet construction, but we must assist you. I agree to assist you with equipment for munitions and light firearms factories. We will also assist you with cadres, who will help to organize officer improvement schools, which would in 1-2 years be turned into an Academy (on the level of the Frunze [Academy]).

Shipments for the Yugoslav Army will be made outside the framework of trade agreements - that is, free and on credit.

It is very important that you have a naval fleet. We will assist you in the construction of shipyards and bases and corresponding naval cadres.

We will assist you with the extraction of oil. Together with munitions factories, it is important to reestablish arsenals, with which we will also assist you. It is necessary to examine the possibility of constructing aviation-engine factories."

5) Albania*.

[Further, two lines are crossed out:] S[ta]lin: "What do you think of [doing] with Albania?"

T[ito]: "Sign...". T[ito] [with regard to the naval fleet]: "We must know whether our border will be along Albania or the coast."

S[ta]lin: "What exactly are you proposing?"

T[ito]: "To sign one good treaty to help Albania - a treaty to defend independence, this will help both in the given situation and with regard to the naval threat."

S[ta]lin: "This is a new formulation, but it ought to be examined and worked out. You worked out a good treaty with Czechia and found a new formulation: not only against Germany and its allies during the war, but also against its future allies.³³ But one needs to think about it more and find an appropriate formulation.

Right now is not the time for a federation (not with Bulgaria either). Most important now is the question of Trieste, and this must be decided first. But if you want a

treaty right now, both are possible (Trieste and Albania) at the same time” (at this he chuckled).

T[ito]: “Three times we put off Enver Hoxha’s visit to B[el]g[ra]de, since we were planning on a meeting with you. Generally speaking, we are ready to sign an agreement with Albania assuring [its—trans.] “sovereignty.” ***.

[***Here text has been inserted from below, marked by *****.]S[alin]: “Do you know Enver? What kind of person is he?***** [**** Further text is crossed out: “They were trying to visit us, but they do not want to send Enver by himself - they want Kochi Dzodzej to accompany him.” This phrase is printed in a slightly altered form further below.] Is he a communist? Are there any internal problems of their own - what is your information on this?”

T[ito]: “I did not see Enver Hoxha [sic—trans.], he is a young man, but in the course of the war he became popular..

***** We will work out an agreement and foster circumstances for greater closeness.”

S[alin] agreed.*****

T[ito]: “...and in general, the government consists of young people. As far as we know, there aren’t any kind of special problems.”³⁴

S[alin]: “They were trying to come here, but they do not want to send Enver alone, but Kochi Dzodzej wants to come with him - as some kind of restraint. What do you know of this?”

T[ito]: “We are not aware [of this] nor of the presence of some kind of disagreements.”

S[alin]: “We are constantly putting off their visit. What do you think, should we receive them? We think that there is no need.”

T[ito]: “Yes, we can take care of everything with them.”

S[alin]: “Right now it would be inconvenient for us and for them. Better if we help them through you.”³⁵

S[alin]: after this, expressed the opinion that something is amiss in the Alb[anian] Politburo.

Marko: “Comrades in the Politburo do not see Env[er] Hoxha as a sufficiently solid party member, and thus they always insist on him being accompanied by Kochi Dzodzej as the most senior party member in the Politburo. At the April plenum they discussed the question of the party line, especially with regard to Yugoslavia and the S[oviet] Union, and ascertained certain mistakes, and excluded Seifulla Maleshov³⁶ from the Politburo as a bearer of these mistakes. Since then, the leadership has been more consistent.”

T[ito]: “We can resolve this question with them.”

S[alin]: “Good.”

6) Bulgaria.

S[alin]: “Are you currently in favor of a federation with Bulgaria?”

T[ito]: “No. Now is not the time. For they have not yet definitively resolved many things: the army, the

bourg[ois] parties, the monarchy and the Bulg[arian] position on signing a peace treaty.”

S[alin]: “Correct, but they must be offered help.”
7) Hungary.

T[ito]: “We have no territ[orial] demands. Since the int[ernal] polit[ical] situation has been corrected there, we have dropped our territ[orial] demands in accordance with your advice.”³⁷

S[alin]: “Right. If you have good relations with your nor[thern] neighbor, then Greece will also look at you differently... And does Greece raise any demands with regard to Yugoslavia?”

T[ito]: “There were provocations against us, but not in recent times.”

S[alin]: “The Eng[lish] maintain an army there in order to prop up the reactionary forces, and yes, possibly for other reasons as well.”

T[ito]: (laughs): “We have demands against them: Aegean Maced[onia] and Salonikki.”

M[olotov]: “Yes, Salonikki is an old Slavic city. You need access to the Aegean sea.”

S[alin]: “Damn it* [*Russian words used in document.] Many comrades have gone to Bulg[aria], but things are not moving, not developing as they should. The com[munists] have influence, but they do not hold corresponding positions in the state apparatus. We should have told them to remove Stainov.³⁸ Currently we have there the Sec[retary] of the Min[istry] of For[eign] Affairs.”** [*Russian word used in document.]

T[ito]: “I later explained to Rakosi that we demanded Petchui³⁹ because of strat[egic] reasons and in order to help the Hung[arian] communists, since the reactionary forces were beginning to raise their heads.”

S[alin]: “And did they really believe you?..”⁴⁰

S[alin]: “And what further plans have you for tonight?”

T[ito]: “We don’t have [a plan].”

S[alin] (laughing): “Leadership, but without a state* [*Russian word used in document.] plan!” (laughing).

Vlado: “We accommodated ourselves to meet with you.”

S[alin]: “Then we can have a snack.”** [*Russian word used in text and alongside in brackets an explanation in Serbo-Croatian is given: “to eat something”.]

M[olotov]: “If you are inviting us, then with great pleasure.”

At the villa****

[*** Russian words used in text with explanations in Serbo-Croatian alongside in brackets.]

S[alin]. Regarding Togliatti⁴¹: theoretician, journalist, can write a good article, a good comrade, but to gather people and “guide” them - this he cannot do; he has difficult circumstances there.

Torres [Thorez] and Duclos: good comrades.⁴²
Jose (Diaz)⁴³ was good, intelligent. Passionaria⁴⁴ is

not the same, she cannot gather and lead; at this difficult time she is in no condition to govern. In Rumania there are good young comrades.

In Germany F. is a good leader, Pieck - "the father"**** [****Russian word used in document.], is gathering people and resolving various questions...⁴⁵ Germans are nothing without orders.

The International - there's nothing to say.⁴⁶
Referenda - "but it's nonsense"*****⁴⁷

[**** Russian words used in quotes in the document.]

Warlike people are trying to draw in the Greeks.⁴⁸

"Do you want another war, to have your backs beaten again, to have Slavs lose another ten million? - If you do not want this, then the Slavs must unite in a single front with the Sov[iet] Union."

The idea of revenge in Italy.

Realism and idealism of Benes:⁴⁹ realist, when shown strength, but would be an idealist if he felt he was in possession of strength (this is an answer to Tito's remark: Benes is an English person, though a realist).

"Firlinger⁵⁰ will go with the communists."

Relations between Czechia and Poland: Entertaining as a pre-election maneuver; fact is, they did not undertake any dip[lomatic] steps.⁵¹

Yugoslavia is a democracy* [*further crossed out: "new"] of a special type (non-Soviet type), different from all others.

"We are Serbs, Molotov and I ... we are two Serbs..."** [**Phrase composed of Russian words.]

"Slovenian"*** [***Russian word used in text.] mercenary intelligentsia."⁵²

Eucalyptus.⁵³

"Tito must take care of himself, that nothing would happen to him ... for I will not live long ... laws of physiology..., but you will remain for Europe..."⁵⁴

Churchill told him about Tito..., that he is "a good man." - St[alin]: "I don't know him, but if you say so, that means he must be good. I will try to meet him."⁵⁵

Let Djido come, so I could rest under his care... "I will cure my migraine under his care."⁵⁶

"Bevin - an English Noske"⁵⁷

Vlado inquired about Marko, and after Marko, about Vlado...

"Beriiia - Marko - who will subvert whom?"⁵⁸

[Source: *Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita. Fond Kabinet Marsala Jugoslavije. I-1/7. L. 6-11. Original. Manuscript. Document obtained and translated into Russian by L. Gibianskii; translated into English by Daniel Rozas.*]

¹ According to the register of persons received by Stalin, the meeting lasted from 23:00 hours, 27 May 1946, to 00:30 hours, 28 May 1946. Note by Yu.G. Murin, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), Fond (f.) 45, Opis' (op.) 1, Delo (d.) 416, List (l.) 95 ob.

² I. V. Stalin (Djugashvili; 1879 (1878)-1953 - chairman of the

USSR Soviet of Ministers, member of the Politburo, secretary (essentially general secretary) of the Central Committee [CC] of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik) (TsK VKP(b)); Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) - chairman of the Council of Ministers of Yugoslavia, general secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY); V.M.Molotov (Skriabin: 1890-1986) - vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, member of TsK VKP(b) Politburo; A.I. Lavrent'ev (1904-1984); Aleksandr Rankovich (1909-1983) - Politburo member, secretary of CC CPY, in charge of organizational and cadre affairs; Kocha Popovic (b.1908); Blagoe Neshkovich (b. 1907), also CC secretary of the C[ommunist] P[arty] of Serbia; Boris Kidrich (1912-1953), at the 7 May 1946 meeting of the CC CPY Politburo was appointed to the post of Chairman of the Economic Council and Minister of Industry and Trade (AJ-CK SKJ.III 19) in place of Hebrang (see introduction), the official appointment took place in June after returning from Moscow; Vladimir Popovic (1914-1972).

Only the more important Yugoslav activists who had arrived in Moscow were present at the meeting with Stalin. In addition to those noted above, the delegation accompanying Tito in his visit to USSR included the assistant Chief of the General Staff Rade Khamovich, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Zdenko Ulepich, directors of the departments of the Navy and of Military Industry in the Ministry of People's Defense of Yugoslavia, Srechko Manola and Miyalko Todorovich, commander of the People's Defense Corps of Yugoslavia (state security force) Jovo Vukotich, member of the Union Planning Commission Zvonko Morich, author Radovan Zogovic, in charge of cultural policy affairs and CC CPY agit[ation]-prop[aganda]. See Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), f. 144, op. 6, p. 8, d. 2, ll. 169-170; Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita (Josip Broz Tito Archives, Belgrade), F. Kabinet Marsala Jugoslavije [hereafter AJBT-KMJ], I-1/7, L.1.)

³ The majority of the Trieste population was Italian, while the adjoining region [oblast'] was settled primarily by Slovenians and Croatians. Yugoslavia, with the USSR's support, claimed this entire territory, which had been included as a part of Italy following World War I. The Yugoslav proposal was to grant Trieste the status of a separate federal unit, within the parameters of the Federated Yugoslav state, while granting the port of Trieste the jurisdiction of a free port. The Western powers came out against transferring Trieste and its adjoining regions to Yugoslavia. Western diplomats were discussing possible compromises by granting Trieste and its adjoining regions the special status of a "free city." Later, by the end of June 1946, such a proposal was made by France.

⁴ Under the Versailles treaty of 1919, Danzig (Gdansk) and an adjoining region, up until that time under claim by Poland from Germany, were given a special status under the protection of the League of Nations. Danzig had the status of a demilitarized free city with its own laws and government organs, while control of its foreign relations and its water and rail transport lines was held by Poland, to whose customs system it also belonged. Memel (Klaipeda) and its adjoining region, until 1919 having also belonged to Germany but now claimed by the new Lithuanian state, was at first put under the control of the Entente, and then transferred to Lithuanian authority under the conditions of the special convention of 1924. It stipulated significant autonomy for Memel in its internal affairs, laws and executive organs, but which nevertheless had to operate under the parameters of the Lithuanian constitution.

⁵ The Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) of the USSR, USA,

Great Britain, France and China was created by the decision of the Potsdam conference in preparation for a peace treaty with Germany and its former European allies. At the CFM meeting in Paris during 25 April - 16 May 1946, where, among other things, the peace treaty with Italy was being drafted for later examination by the Paris peace conference, a central point of discussion became the establishment of a new Italian-Yugoslav border, in connection with the problem of Trieste and its adjoining territory. The Soviet delegation under Molotov's leadership actively supported Yugoslav territorial claims.

⁶ During the meeting with Lavrent'ev on 18 April 1946, Tito announced his intention to visit Moscow to discuss economic cooperation, and also noted that such cooperation "must also include the sphere of military industry." (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 31.) Yugoslavia, having received from the USSR during 1944-46 large-scale shipments of weapons, ammunition, military equipment, and military machinery (including equipment for 32 infantry divisions, several aviation divisions, tank and artillery brigades), had made similar requests previously. Since the summer of 1945, Yugoslavia had been sending requests to the Soviet government for captured factories, workshops, and materials for the production of ammunition, mainly from Soviet occupation zones in Germany and Austria. The Soviet side tried to fulfill these incoming requests in part. (Ibid., d. 10, ll. 18-19; *ibid.*, f. 144, op. 5, p. 5, d. 2, ll. 44, 46, 49-50; *ibid.*, op. 7, p. 12, d. 1, l. 43.) However, Tito, who had proposed even in January 1946 to send a military delegation to Moscow for the purpose of agreeing on a general plan for the training and equipping of a 350-400,000 men-strong Yugoslav army, tried to get the USSR to render broader assistance in the construction of the Yugoslav military industry, possibly through mixed Soviet-Yugoslav enterprises. (Ibid., f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, ll. 19-20.) On April 9, during an expanded meeting of the CC CPY Politburo, the members of the military delegation which was to go to USSR for negotiations were mentioned: K. Popovic, Z. Uleplic, S. Manola, M. Todorovic (Arhiv Jugoslavije (Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade), F. SKJ, CK SKJ [hereafter AJ-CK SKJ] III/16), that is, the same people who later accompanied Tito to Moscow.

⁷ Stalin was referring to the situation as of mid-April 1946 (see introduction). However, following this, the trade delegation led by the Minister of Foreign Trade Petrovic, which visited Moscow during the first half of May, was assigned the task, in addition to preparing an agreement for mutual shipments of goods, of also holding negotiations to draft agreements on economic cooperation, including the establishment of joint enterprises. Thus, these questions were discussed by the delegation during its negotiations with the Soviet partners prior to Tito's arrival. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 12, l. 5; *ibid.*, d. 15, ll. 38, 90.) On the question of joint enterprises, there were disagreements, which had emerged already during late April, when separate negotiations commenced in Belgrade on the first of these, an aviation enterprise: the Yugoslav delegates considered the Soviet version of the agreement on this enterprise unacceptable to Yugoslavia. The examination of this question was transferred over to the Moscow talks on the general problems of organizing future enterprises. Both sides expressed mutual dissatisfaction with each other's position with regard to the negotiations on the aviation enterprise. (See *ibid.*, d. 10, ll. 6-7; d. 15, ll. 89-90; Arhiva Saveznog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove SFRJ (Archives of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of the SFRY [Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia], Belgrade), Politicka arhiva (hereafter ASSIP-PA), 1948 god. F-I, Pov. 1535; V. Dedijer, *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita* [New

Materials for Josip Broz Tito's Biography], T. 3 (Belgrade, 1984), pp. 244-245.)

⁸ I.V. Sadchikov (b. 1906), USSR ambassador to Yugoslavia from March 1945 to February 1946. He was replaced by Lavrent'ev.

⁹ On the following day Tito proposed that in order to make comments the Yugoslav delegation should take the draft of the agreement put together by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 119.) As a result, on 8 June 1946, concurrently with the inter-government agreement on mutual shipment of goods for 1946 (Historical-Foreign Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties of the Russian Federation, f. Treaty-Legal Department, op. 11876, d. 55, ll. 14-16), Mikoian and Petrovic signed an agreement on economic cooperation. This agreement provided for the creation of eight Soviet-Yugoslav joint-stock enterprises in Yugoslavia: extraction and refinement of crude oil, extraction of bauxite and production of aluminum, extraction and production of lead, exploration and extraction of coal, ferrous metal production, civilian aviation, the Danube shipping company, and the Soviet-Yugoslav bank. It also provided for further examination of the proposed lumber and paper-cellulose enterprise. The agreement contained the overall equal-term scheme for enterprise organization, while the actual establishment of each of these was to be formulated by separate concrete agreements. (See *ibid.*, ll. 17-19.) In addition to the establishment of enterprises, the agreement provided for Soviet technical assistance to Yugoslavia in areas of electrical, food, textile, chemical, and metal forging industries, as well as the production of building materials and in agriculture (*ibid.*, l. 17). Like other documents signed during this visit, the agreement on economic cooperation was not published. The joint communique issued in connection with the visit stated only that "decisions were made concerning close economic cooperation between both friendly countries." *Pravda*, 12 June 1946.

But the carrying out of the agreement met with difficulties. By February 1947, an agreement had been reached only with regard to the establishment of two enterprises: civilian aviation and the Danube shipping company. As for the others, the main stumbling block was tied to the production of Yugoslav mineral resources: Yugoslavia insisted that the value of mineral deposits be counted as part of their share of the investment, while the Soviet side maintained that the overall value of mineral deposits could not be counted as investment. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 16, ll. 75, 109-110.) This was discussed by the CC CPY Politburo in late September 1946, where frustration with the Soviet position was voiced, with some members, as Lavrent'ev later found out, going so far as to compare this to the "capitalist countries'" mining of Yugoslav mineral resources before the war. (See AJ-CK SJK. III/21; AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 16, ll. 75-76.) And when in early 1947 the Yugoslav government sought decisive action from Molotov and even Stalin himself for the swift establishment of the planned enterprises on the basis of Yugoslav proposals, Stalin, during a 19 April 1947 meeting with Kardelj, announced that there must be no further establishment of enterprises and proposed instead to assist Yugoslav industrialization through Soviet shipments of complex machinery and materials, access to blueprints and technical documentation, and the dispatch of specialists on terms of credit. (See ASSIP-PA, 1947 god. F-IV, Str. Pov. 125, 1234, 1238; AJBT-KMJ, I-3-6/639, ll. 2-3; *ibid.*, I-3-6/646, ll. 9-11.) Yugoslavia agreed, and the corresponding agreement was signed in Moscow on 25 July 1947.

¹⁰ The outcome of the visit was announced in a joint communique: "The government of USSR agreed to equip the Yugoslav Army with weapons, ammunition, etc. on conditions of long-term credit, as well as to assist in the reestablishment of the Yugoslavian military industry." (*Pravda*, 12 June 1946.) However, no concrete agreement had been signed at this point. It was to be worked out in special negotiations. Even during Tito's visit, the Yugoslav General Staff forwarded requests, on the basis of which the Soviet General Staff determined the type and quantity of materiel to be shipped to Yugoslavia, and a portion of the shipments began to arrive even before the forthcoming agreement. (See AVP RF, f. 144, op. 6, p. 8, d. 3, ll. 132-134; *ibid.*, op. 7, p. 12, d. 1, l. 23.; ASSIP-PA, 1945/1946 god., F-IV, Str. Pov. 968; *ibid.*, 1947 god., F-IV, Str. Pov. 1881.)

¹¹ Enver Hoxha (1908-1985) - first secretary of the CC CPA [Com. Party of Albania], chairman of the Council of Ministers of Albania. Kochi Dzodzej - organizational secretary of CC CPA, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs, the number-two man in the Albanian government at the time. In 1948 he lost in the power struggle against Hoxha, was stripped of all posts, arrested, and executed in 1949.

¹² In February 1946 the CC CPA Plenum resolved to call the First CPA Congress on 25 May 1946. However, the Congress was not called until November 1948.

¹³ The memorandum "On Yugoslav-Albanian Relations," put together by the director of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Balkan sector, A.A. Lavrishchev, in preparation for Tito's visit to Moscow, labelled the completion of the Yugoslav-Albanian Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance "useful and important," and contained only the recommendation to avoid mentioning Italy in the treaty, adopting instead the wording from the Yugoslav-Polish treaty signed in March 1946, which could be used against Italy if it tried to "renew aggression." (The Yugoslav-Polish Treaty provided for mutual military and other assistance using all available means, if one of the countries "is drawn, as a result of invasion, into military operations against either Germany, a country which had been allied with Germany during the last war, or any other country which had directly or by any other means allied with Germany or its allies in such an aggression.") As for the "discussion of incorporating Albania into the Yugoslav Federation," the memorandum recommended to put this off, "in order not to exacerbate the international positions of Yugoslavia and Albania." It further specified that it be put off until peace treaties were signed with Italy and Austria, and Albania was included into the UN. "By the same reasoning" it advised to refrain from signing a secret military agreement between Yugoslavia and Albania, and to "simplify the border situation without signing a special agreement, so as not to attract British and American attention to this matter." (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, l. 3.)

In his meeting with Tito, Stalin stayed close to this strategy. However, it is unclear whether his arguments to put off federation for the time being were an actual expression of the Soviet policy or simply a tactical ploy, intended to shield the real Soviet efforts to prevent Albania's unification with Yugoslavia altogether, which later became one of the reasons for the 1948 conflict. As a result of the 1946 Moscow talks, the question of direct Albanian unification with Yugoslavia was for the time being removed from the agenda. In addition, the Soviet side, having given Tito the "okay" for the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and the Agreement on Close Economic Cooperation with Albania, informed the Albanian government that it had come out in favor of these agreements and of further "Albanian orientation toward

closer relations with Yugoslavia." This had an influence on the Albanian position and in particular on Hoxha, who arrived in Belgrade in late June 1946, where he consulted with Lavrent'ev before signing the corresponding Yugoslav-Albanian documents in early July. (*Ibid.*, d. 15, ll. 167-168; *ibid.*, d. 16, l. 1.)

¹⁴ Already since late 1944, the leadership of the communist parties of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, having come to power, began talks on uniting both countries into a federation. The talks were sanctioned, if not even initiated, by Stalin himself, who at the time was in favor of expediting the creation of such a body. Apparently, he had intended this as a means to significantly strengthen the "people's democracy" in Bulgaria: first, with the help of the more stable communist regime in Yugoslavia, and second, reckoning that by uniting with Yugoslavia—a member of the anti-Hitler coalition—Bulgaria would successfully shed its status as a vanquished nation and consequently escape U.S. and British prerogatives stemming from their participation in the establishment of allied control. In early 1945, however, the Western allies, exercising these prerogatives, vetoed the establishment of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. And when Stalin in turn decided to have Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for now sign only a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the veto was extended to this as well. The matter had to be put off to follow the signing of a peace treaty with Bulgaria. See L. Ya. Gibianskii, "U nachala konflikta: balkanskii uzel" ["The Beginning of Conflict: the Balkan Knot"], *Rabochii klass i sovremennii mir* 2 (1990), pp. 172-173.

In early 1946, although the peace treaty was still far off, the Bulgarian side began to pose the question to the Soviet and Yugoslav governments of resuming the Bulgarian-Yugoslav talks on federating, broken off a year ago. This was done mainly in January 1946, during the Moscow visit of the Bulgarian prime-minister and the ministers of foreign and internal affairs. In his reply Molotov pointed out the importance of holding off on federation and the Treaty of Alliance until a more opportune moment. (ASSIP-PA, 1945/1946 god., F-1, Str. Pov. 433, 434.) Nevertheless, in April the Bulgarian envoy in Belgrade posed the same question to Tito and Lavrent'ev. Tito, like Molotov, told the Bulgarian envoy that such steps, if taken prior to signing a peace treaty with Bulgaria, would cause harm. Nevertheless, in relating this to Lavrent'ev, the Yugoslav leader stated "in a significantly decided tone that he cannot currently support the idea of establishing a federation with Bulgaria," as the latter continued to remain a formal monarchy, and in particular because the communist party influence in Bulgaria was "incomparably weaker" than in Yugoslavia. However, certain that Bulgaria would once again raise this question, Tito asked the Soviet ambassador to ascertain Moscow's position on signing the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, ll. 39-41, 47-48.) And in the discussion with Lavrent'ev a week before his visit to the USSR, speaking on the agenda for the Moscow talks, he pointed out the importance of examining Yugoslav relations not only with Albania, but with Bulgaria as well. (*Ibid.*, l. 100.)

The Yugoslav position coincided with the Soviets', as reflected in the MFA USSR report by Lavrishchev, "On Relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria." The report was completed on 27 May 1946, the day of Tito's arrival in Moscow and his reception by Stalin. Its accompanying suggestions for talks with the Yugoslav leader stated that although "the establishment of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation would correspond to the interests of both countries," it would be a mistake to undertake its creation, as well as to conclude the Treaty of Friendship and

Mutual Assistance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, prior to signing a peace treaty with Bulgaria and resolving "difficult internal-political questions" within both countries. (Ibid., d. 10, ll. 13-17.)

¹⁵ It is unclear why, contrary to the previous Soviet position expressed in Lavrishev's report and in Molotov's statements during the meeting, Stalin suddenly announced that the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty could be concluded prior to signing the peace treaty with Bulgaria. However, at the meeting with Stalin a few days later, which, along with Tito and accompanying Yugoslav officials, also included the Bulgarian leaders Georgii Dimitrov, Vasil Kolarov and Traicho Kostov, it was decided that the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty would be signed after concluding the peace treaty with Bulgaria. In addition, it was provided that the matter would involve the closest cooperation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. See N. Ganchovskii, *Dnite na Dimitrov kakvito gi vidyakh i zapisyakh* (Sofia: 1975), vol. 1, p. 220.)

¹⁶ The reference is to the regime that appeared in Poland in July 1944 with the arrival of Soviet forces, and which was established by the Soviet Union and Polish communists relying on its military presence. On 21 April 1945, when the treaty between USSR and this regime was concluded, the Western allies continued to recognize the Polish government in exile.

¹⁷ Matyas Rakosi (1892-1971) - General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, deputy prime-minister.

¹⁸ The question of Yugoslav territorial claims on Hungary was raised by the Yugoslav representatives to the Soviet government already towards the end of the war. In particular, Hebrang, assigned by Tito to visit Moscow in January 1945 (see introduction), put forth to Stalin claims to the region of the city of Pecs and the "Bais triangle." Stalin at the time replied that such a question could be put before the allied powers only in the event that the Yugoslav population in these regions started to "clamor" for unification with Yugoslavia. The question of possibly posing Yugoslav territorial demands to Hungary and relocating Hungarians from Yugoslavia was discussed in April-May 1946 by Yugoslav and Soviet representatives of various ranks. In late April 1946, Tito also discussed the matter with Rakosi, who had come to Belgrade. The Yugoslav leader expressed readiness not to put the territorial demands on Hungary before the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Paris Peace Conference, but with the condition that the Yugoslav minorities in Hungary be granted ethnic rights and Yugoslav economic interests be ensured in border regions. Rakosi agreed. (See AVP RF, f. 06, op. 7, p.53, d. 872, l. 16; *ibid.*, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 12, l. 6; *ibid.*, d. 13, ll. 19, 22-23; *ibid.*, d. 15, ll. 39, 64-65.)

¹⁹ Reference is to the Council of Foreign Ministers (see note #5).

²⁰ Pseudonym of Aleksandr Rankovic.

²¹ Koca Popovic.

²² Vladimir Popovic.

²³ According to Dedijer's account given in his book, Stalin said this when Tito began to introduce to him members of the Yugoslav delegation, and Molotov nodded his head in agreement with Stalin's words. See Vladimir Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito: Prilozi za biografiju [Josip Broz Tito: Materials for a Biography]* (Belgrade, 1953), p. 448.

²⁴ Ivan Subasic (1892-1955) - June 1944-March 1945 prime-minister of the Yugoslav monarchy's government in exile, signed an agreement with the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia with Tito at its head and took the post of foreign minister within the national coalition government formed by Tito in March 1945. Resigned in fall 1945, stating that his agreement

with Tito had not been fulfilled by the ruling regime. Afterwards lived in Zagreb under surveillance by state security organs.

²⁵ Milan Grol (1876-1952) - during the war, member of the monarchy's government in exile, in March 1945 took the post of vice-premier in Tito's united government. Resigned in August 1945, accusing the ruling regime of being in the hands of the CPY and thus in violation of the Tito-Subasic agreement, and became one of the leaders of the legal opposition formed in fall 1945. Following the first elections to the *skupscina* (parliament) in November 1945, when the opposition was defeated and was practically destroyed, Grol retired from politics and devoted himself to the theater.

²⁶ Following the 1945 elections, the opposition parties were in effect liquidated, while the parties comprising the People's Front, run entirely by the CPY, began to take on an increasingly fictitious and deceptive character.

²⁷ Regions that do not export foodstuffs, particularly bread, and are even unable to support themselves.

²⁸ The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency.

²⁹ Eduard Kardelj (1910-1979) - member of the Politburo, Secretary of CC CPY, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, chairman of the Oversight Commission of Yugoslavia; Milovan Djilas (b. 1911) - member of the Politburo, Secretary of CC CPY, minister without portfolio.

³⁰ Reference made to Molotov's support at the CFM meeting in Paris, 25 April - 16 May 1946 (see note #5).

³¹ Known deposits of non-ferrous metals.

³² The gulf on Yugoslavia's Adriatic coast.

³³ Such a formulation was not contained in the Yugoslav-Czechoslovak, but in the 1946 Yugoslav-Polish agreement on friendship and mutual assistance (note 13). The agreement of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation in peacetime, signed by Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia on 9 May 1946 made no mention of former German wartime allies. It stated that the signing parties would render each other military and other assistance using all available means, if one of them "is brought into conflict with Germany, the latter having repeated its aggressive policies, or with any other country which had aligned itself with Germany for the purpose of aggressive action."

³⁴ Tito was obviously being sly, as evidenced by the following reply from Rankovic, who referred to both the CC CPA Plenum which had expelled Maleshov from the government (see introduction), and the clear criticism by a number of Albanian Politburo members toward first Party secretary and head of government Hoxha.

³⁵ The Soviet Union's assistance to Albania, in particular military assistance using Yugoslavia as a go-between, was undertaken immediately following the war. When in summer 1945, during the first Moscow visit by the Albanian government delegation, the question of arming and equipping the Albanian army was being discussed, the USSR government enacted a resolution to send shipments of arms and other military materiel to Albania "via the government of Yugoslavia," that is, within the context of shipments to Yugoslavia. (See "New documents on the Great Fatherland War," *Kommunist [The Communist]* 7 (1975), p. 52.) On the eve of Tito's visit to Moscow in May 1946, Kardelj expressed to Lavrent'ev the opinion that USSR trade operations in Albania must be carried out by mixed Soviet-Yugoslav enterprises, once these were established. See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 108.

³⁶ Seifulla Maleshov (b. 1900) - member of the CC CPA Politburo in charge of economic policy; expelled from the Politburo by the CC CPA Plenum in February 1946.

³⁷ See note 19.

³⁸ Petko Stainov (1890-1972) - Bulgarian foreign minister 1944-1946, activist in the union "Zveno"—a party belonging to the Fatherland Front controlled by the Communist party. In early June 1946, during a meeting with Dimitrov, Kolarov and Kostov (see note 15), Stalin announced that "you must show your teeth to the rightist Zvenists" and that another prominent member of "Zveno," Damyan Velchev, must be removed from the post of Minister of War. (See Tsentralen d'rzhaven arkhiv - Sofia (Central State Archives - Sofia), former Tsentralen partien arkhiv [hereafter TsDA-TsPA] under TsK on BCP, f. 1, op. 5, A.e. 3, l. 134.) Stalin's orders were carried out in both cases.

³⁹ See note 19. Pechui—Serbian name for the city of Pecs in Hungary.

⁴⁰ Judging by handwritten notes made by Tito upon his return from Moscow, during the visit the Soviet side had discussed, along with the aforementioned topics, the question of Austria and Yugoslav-Austrian relations, as well as Yugoslav relations with other Slavic countries. (See AJBT-KMJ. I-1/7, ll. 51-52.)

⁴¹ Palmiro Togliatti (1893-1964) - general secretary of the Italian Communist party.

⁴² Maurice Thorez (1900-1964) - general secretary of the French communist party; Jacques Duclos (1896-1975) - member of the Politburo, secretary of CC F[rench]CP, second in rank at the time. Dedijer's description of the meeting with Stalin on 27 May 1946 states that "the leader" had mentioned a "great deficiency" in Thorez. "Even a dog that doesn't bite, said Stalin, shows its teeth when he wants to scare someone, but Thorez can't do even that..." Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito*, p. 451.

⁴³ Jose Diaz (1895-1942) - general secretary of the Spanish Communist party, died in the US.

⁴⁴ Pseudonym of Dolores Ibarruri (1895-1990), who became the general secretary of the Spanish Communist party following J. Diaz's death.

⁴⁵ Wilhelm Pieck (1876-1960) - leader of the German communist party, became one of the two chairmen of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) following the April 1946 merger of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Social-Democratic party into the SED in the zone of Soviet occupation. It is unclear who the writers referred to by "F."

Dedijer's account of the evening dinner mentions that Stalin, in characterizing the leaders of foreign Communist parties, expressed his opinion, alongside those already mentioned, regarding the chairman of the Czechoslovak communist party Klement Gottwald and the general secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain Harry Pollit. See Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito*, p. 451.

⁴⁶ The phrase obviously referred to the impossibility of reestablishing the Comintern. Apparently Stalin told the Yugoslav delegation the same thing he had said ten days earlier in his meeting with Dedijer, Kolarov and Kostov, of which an unidentified record has been preserved, written most likely by Kostov. According to this account, Stalin told the Bulgarian delegation: "We will never reestablish the old style of the [Communist] International. It was created with the example provided by Marx, who expected that revolution would take place concurrently in all countries. However, this does not correspond to our current ideology." In additional remarks, Stalin criticized the Comintern, stating that its directives had tied the hands of the Communist party, which "we untied" "when we dissolved the Comintern." (See TsDA-TsPA under CC on BCP, f. 1, op. 5, A.e. 3, l. 138.) In reality, Comintern directives were issued by Stalin himself. And even following the announced

dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, Stalin by no means had given up on administering via directives to the leadership of Communist parties—only the organizational forms and the concrete mechanism of such administration were changed. Thus, in speaking of the impossibility of reestablishing the "old style of [the Communist] International," he spoke only within that context. At the same time he discussed with the Yugoslav and Bulgarian guests his plan to set up a new organizational structure for the international communist movement: an informational bureau which would unite a number of communist parties. According to the Yugoslav delegation members' accounts reported by Dedijer, the question of establishing the information bureau was raised by Stalin during a conversation with Tito, and later during the joint meeting with the Yugoslav and Bulgarian delegations, when he emphasized that the new organ must maintain an informational character and its decisions would not be binding on a communist party which disagreed with the decision. (See Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito*, pp. 453, 471.) That the question was put forth in this manner is supported by the handwritten notes Tito made a few days after returning from Moscow. (See AJBT-KMJ, I-3-s/11, ll. 1-2.) Most likely these remarks, including the statement that there "can be no talk" of reestablishing the Comintern, were a tactical move intended to help his interlocutors "swallow" his idea to create the Informbiuro (Cominform) as some kind of entirely different "democratic" organ of which they had no reason to be wary.

⁴⁷ Possibly the reference is to the Greek referendum to be held on 1 September 1946 to decide whether to continue the monarchy, which was a focus of intense political struggle.

⁴⁸ Greece was at the time the arena of a sharp and intensifying confrontation which in the second half of 1946 began to erupt into an armed struggle between the partisan forces and the Greek government, with the former having been created under the leadership of the Greek Communist party and receiving assistance from Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, and the latter relying on military support from Great Britain and, later, the USA.

⁴⁹ Eduard Benes (1884-1948) - president of Czechoslovakia. Attempted in the years immediately following the war to navigate between the USSR and the West, but was forced into resignation following the de facto coup carried out in February 1948 by communists relying on Soviet political support.

⁵⁰ Zdenek Firlinger (1891-1976) - one of the officials in the Czechoslovak Social-Democratic party, head of the Czechoslovak government in 1945-1946, actively supported the communist party, including during the coup in February 1948.

⁵¹ Reference is made to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry announcement delivered on 24 April 1946 to the ambassadors of USSR, USA, Great Britain and France, which officially put forth territorial claims on Poland for the so-called border region of Teshinskaya Silesia. The Czechoslovak-Polish dispute regarding Teshin continued for some time following the end of World War II and reached its peak around late April-May 1946, on the eve of the first post-war parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia, held on May 26, a day before Stalin's meeting with Tito. From the record of conversation published herein, it follows that Stalin regarded the Czechoslovak announcement entirely as a pre-election maneuver. The question of Teshin was obviously raised by the Yugoslav guests, for even on May 7, in his discussion with Lavrent'ev, Tito inquired as to Moscow's opinion of the Czechoslovak demarche and informed him that the Polish ambassador to Belgrade had addressed him, Tito, with a request to influence the Czechoslovak government to renounce these

claims. AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 77.

⁵² According to Dedijer's account, Stalin had spoken about the Slovenian intelligentsia with Kidric, himself a Slovenian, using a play on words—"podlaya [sycophantic] intelligentsia" and "podlinnaya [genuine] intelligentsia." See Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito*, p. 452.

⁵³ Dedijer's book mentions that Stalin advised the Yugoslavs to plant eucalyptus, as this is the best tree for ship-building, and related how many years ago he had read in a book that this tree grows well in South America. So having received the seeds, he undertook to plant them in the Crimea where it took root very successfully and grew very quickly. Stalin promised to send eucalyptus seedlings to Yugoslavia. See Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito*, pp. 452-453.

⁵⁴ In Dedijer's account of the 27 May 1946 meeting these words are tied to an episode where, following a lengthy period during which the guests had sat at the dinner table, Stalin stood, walked over to the record player in the corner, and began to play record after record—all Russian folk songs. While listening to one of the records, he started to sing along and dance. Molotov and others present met this with exclamations of how robust Stalin was, from which followed Stalin's response about the laws of physiology, which dictated that he would not live long. Stalin added that Tito must take care of himself in order to be there for Europe. And further, according to this account, Stalin looked at Molotov and noted: "Viacheslav Mikhailovich will remain here...." He then proposed to Tito to drink to "bruderschaft" [brotherhood] (and then to all the other Yugoslav guests); they clinked glasses, embraced, and then "the leader" with the exclamation "I still have strength left!" grabbed the Yugoslav leader by the armpits and lifted him three times. (See Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito*, p. 452.) However, the Yugoslav political and cultural activist Josip Vidmar later maintained that, upon returning from accompanying Tito to Moscow, Kidric told of a different scene at the evening dinner at Kuntsevo: it was he, Kidric, who grabbed and lifted Stalin, and that the latter laughed and spoke compliments. See J. Vidmar, *Obrazi* (Ljubljana, 1980), p. 396.

⁵⁵ Prime-minister of Great Britain Winston Churchill (1874-1965), having met Tito in August 1944 in Italy, said this to Stalin during his visit to Moscow in October 1944. In actuality, Stalin by this point had already met Tito in person, when the latter secretly visited Moscow in late September.

⁵⁶ Djido—Djilas' pseudonym. Stalin knew from Tito that Djilas suffered from headaches.

⁵⁷ Ernest Bevin (1881-1951) - one of the leaders of the Labor party and a trade-unionist in Great Britain, foreign minister during the early years following World War Two. Gustav Noske (1868-1946) - German Social-Democratic activist, member of government following the November 1918 revolution in Germany, became famous as one of the organizers of the suppression of revolutionary action taken by the radical wing of the German labor movement.

⁵⁸ L.P. Beria (1899-1953) - member of CC VKP(b) Politburo, vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Dedijer's account states that Stalin joked about Beria and Rankovic, both in charge of security organs in their respective countries—who will subvert whom? According to this account, also present among the Soviet participants at the evening dinner at Kuntsevo, aside from Stalin and Molotov, were A. A. Zhdanov, Beria and N.A. Bulganin. See Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito*, p. 451.

Report of Milovan Djilas about a secret Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav meeting 10 February 1948¹

Kardelj and Vacaric arrived in Moscow on Sunday, February 8, and until Tuesday, February 10, nobody gave them any news. On Tuesday before noon Baranov² phoned to say that Kardelj and the others should stay put, because in the evening, at nine o'clock we would be invited to the Kremlin. Lesakov told us that the Bulgarians arrived on Monday, but stressed that these were "the top guys" from Bulgaria—Dimitrov, Kolarov and Trajco Kostov.

Indeed, we were invited to the Kremlin at nine o'clock in the evening. We arrived punctually, but since the Bulgarians were late, we sat for 10-15 minutes in Stalin's reception room, and when they joined us, we walked in [to Stalin's office].

So, the meeting took place on Tuesday, February 10, at 9:15 Moscow time, and it lasted about three hours. When we entered [the room], Soviet representatives were already there. Those present at the meeting were: Stalin (at the head of the table), Molotov, Malenkov, Zhdanov, Suslov and Zorin (to the right side from Stalin along the table), and Dimitrov, Kolarov, Kostov, Kardelj, Djilas, Vacaric (to the left side from Stalin along the table).

Molotov spoke first. At first, he stressed that this was already a matter of serious disagreement between them [the Soviets] and Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. These disagreements were inadmissible both from the party and the state point of view. As examples of the serious discord he gave three: firstly, the conclusion of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty of Union—lack of coordination between the USSR, on one hand, and Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, on the other hand; secondly, the declaration of Dimitrov about a Federation of East European and Balkan countries, including Greece—lack of coordination between the USSR, on one side, and Bulgaria, on the other; thirdly, the introduction of a Yugoslav division into Southern Albania (Korcha)³—lack of coordination between the USSR, on one hand, and Yugoslavia, on the other. As to the first point, he stresses that the Soviet government informed the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments—and they agreed to this—that one should not conclude a treaty with Bulgaria until the expiration of limitations imposed by the Peace Treaty [with Bulgaria in 1946]. However, the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments concluded the treaty, and the Soviet government learned about it from the newspapers. With regard to the second point he stresses that comrade Dimitrov grew too fond of press conferences. Meanwhile, if Dimitrov and Tito make announcements for the press, the whole world believes that such is also the view of the Soviet Union.⁴

At this moment, Stalin cut in to remind [us] that the Poles who were in Moscow in those days, spoke against [the Federation]. That means that the Soviet representatives first asked them what they thought of Dimitrov's declaration. And they said that they agreed, but when

Stalin told them that the Soviet Union was against it, they also said that they were against, but they had previously believed that this was a position and request of Moscow.⁵ Stalin adds that the subsequent clarification by Dimitrov (he probably had in mind the announcement of the Bulgarian telegraph agency) explained nothing. Stalin quotes from this announcement that says how Austria-Hungary had thwarted a customs union between Bulgaria and Serbia, and adds that it means—the Germans had worked against a customs union, and now we do (i.e. the Soviet Union).⁶ Stalin adds that Dimitrov diverts attention from domestic issues to foreign affairs—Federation, etc.⁷

Then Molotov passes to a third point of disagreement and stresses from the very beginning that they [in Moscow] accidentally learned about the entry of the Yugoslav troops into Albania. The Albanians told the Russians that they thought that the entry of the Yugoslav troops had been coordinated with the Soviet Union, and meanwhile it was not so. At that moment Molotov began citing some sort of dispatches, and Stalin told him to read them aloud. He asks Stalin which message he should read. Stalin leans [over] and points out [one]. Molotov reads a message from [Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia] Lavrent'ev about his meeting with Tito. From this reading, it becomes clear that the message is an answer to the question of the Soviet government if there is a decision about the entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania, and it says that such a decision—coordinated with Hoxha—really exists, that the motive comes from the notification about a probable attack against Albania; then the message points out that Tito said that he does not agree with Moscow that in case of an entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania, the Anglo-Americans would intervene beyond a campaign in the press. Tito, according to the message, said that, if it came to anything serious, Yugoslavia and the USSR would sort it out [*raskhlebivat kashu*] together, however, after the Soviet demarche about this issue he would not send a division [to Albania]. At the end, Molotov points out that Tito did not inform them about his disagreement with Moscow. He stresses that disagreements are inadmissible both from the party and state viewpoint and that disagreements should be taken out [for discussion], and not concealed, and that it is necessary to inform and consult. One must be cautious with regard to press conferences.⁸

Following Molotov, Dimitrov spoke. He, as well as the other Bulgarians and Kardelj (he was the only one among the Yugoslavs who spoke), did not give his reasons coherently, because Stalin kept interrupting him. He said that what Yugoslavia and Bulgaria publicized at Bled was not a treaty, but only a statement that a future treaty had been agreed upon. Soviet representatives affirm that they learned about this affair from newspapers, etc.⁹ Dimitrov stresses that Bulgaria's economic difficulties are so serious that it cannot develop without cooperation with other countries. It is true that he got carried away at a press conference.¹⁰ Stalin interrupts and tells him that he wanted to shine with a new word, and that is wrong, and it

is a mistake because such a Federation is not feasible.¹¹ Dimitrov says that he did not target the USSR by his assertion that Austria-Hungary had blocked a Bulgarian-Serb customs union. He stresses, at last, that there are essentially no disagreements between the foreign policies of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.

Stalin interrupts and asserts that there are substantial differences and there is a practice of the Leninists—to recognize differences and mistakes and to liquidate them. Dimitrov says that they make mistakes because they are only learning foreign policy, but Stalin replies to this that he [Dimitrov] is a senior political figure who had been engaged in politics for forty years, and in his case it is not mistakes, but a different perception [than the USSR's] (he [Stalin] said it two or three times during the meeting, addressing Dimitrov).¹² As to the repeated emphasis by Dimitrov on the fact that Bulgaria must get closer with other countries for economic reasons, Stalin says that he agrees if one speaks of a customs union between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, but if one speaks of Romania (later, as I recall, he also mentioned Hungary), then he is against it. In general, when he spoke about such ties of Bulgaria with which the Soviet Union disagreed, most often [he] cited Romania as an example. It happens as a result of a clause about the customs union in the Bulgarian-Romanian treaty and because, I believe, that the joint Bulgarian-Romanian communique calls for coordination of plans between Romania and Bulgaria. These issues were raised at the meeting and often referred to by Soviet representatives. They have in mind a forthcoming conclusion of the treaties between Bulgaria and Hungary, and [Bulgaria and] other countries. Thus, Soviet criticism of Romanian-Bulgarian relations touches on future Bulgarian-Hungarian relations, and, obviously, on the relations of Yugoslavia with Hungary and Romania.

Then Kolarov began to speak. He says about this part from the Bulgarian announcement regarding a customs union between Serbia and Bulgaria, where nobody meant to hint at the USSR, and as to the customs union between Romania and Bulgaria, the Romanians are also all for it. Besides, the Romanian-Bulgarian treaty had been earlier sent to the Soviet government and it already made only one amendment so that an article [on the joint defense] against any aggressor would be replaced by an article against Germany or a power that could be in alliance with it, and there were no comments on the Bulgarian-Romanian customs union. Then a brief exchange between Stalin and Molotov occurs. Molotov confirms what Kolarov says. Stalin stresses again that he is against the Bulgarian-Romanian customs union, although Bulgarians have a reason to think otherwise, on the basis of dispatches. He stresses that he did not know that there was an article about a customs union in the Romanian-Bulgarian treaty that had been previously sent to the Soviet government. Dimitrov says that that it was the very cause why in his statement he went further than necessary.¹³

Stalin says to him that he [Dimitrov] wanted to

surprise the whole world and adds that it looked like the secretary of the Comintern was explaining tediously and meticulously what should be done and how. [Stalin] says that this gives food to American reactionaries [*reaktziia*]. He then speaks about the significance of the American elections and [says] that one should be careful to do nothing to give the reactionaries arguments that could facilitate their victory. In his opinion, we should not give the reaction anything to snatch at [*nikakoi zatsepki*]. The current American government still contains itself, but money bags [*denezhniie meshki*] and sharks can come to power. The reactionaries in American, when they hear such statements, say that in Eastern Europe there is not only a bloc in the making, but [the countries] are merging into common states. He tells Dimitrov and the others that they are overdoing it [*perebarshchivaiut*], like the Young Communists and then like women take everything to the streets. Then he makes a linkage to the issue of Albania. The three world powers—the USSR, England, and America guaranteed Albania’s independence by a special agreement. Albania is our weakest spot, because other states are either members of the United Nations, or recognized, etc., but Albania is not [recognized]. If Yugoslav troops entered Albania, the reactionaries in England and America would be able to use it and step forward as defenders of Albanian independence. Instead of sending troops we should work intensely to build up the Albanian army, we should teach the Albanians, and then, if they are attacked, let the Albanian Skupcina [parliament] appeal to Yugoslavia for help. He makes an example of China, where nobody¹⁴ can reproach the USSR,¹⁵ but the Chinese are fighting well and advancing; he then adds that the Albanians are not worse than the Chinese and they must be taught. Then he adds that we should sign a protocol about joint consultations.¹⁶ He says that the Bulgarians and the Yugoslavs do not report anything [to the Soviets], and they [the Soviets] have to find out everything on the street, usually ending up faced with a *fait accompli*.

Kostov then begins to complain how hard it is to be a small and undeveloped country. He would like to raise some economic issues. Stalin cuts him short and says that there are competent ministries to do it, and this is the discussion of the differences.

Kardelj starts to speak.¹⁷ On the first point [of disagreements] he says that it was not a treaty that was published, but only a communiqué about the discussion leading to a treaty; he adds that we [Yugoslavs and Bulgarians] were too hasty. This triggers an exchange similar to that when Dimitrov made the same point. [Andrei] Zhdanov intervenes and says that they [in the Soviet Union] learned about this matter from the newspapers. On Albania he says that not informing them on that was a serious error. Stalin cuts in and says that we [in Yugoslavia] oversimplify this matter, but it is a complicated matter.¹⁸ Kardelj then mentioned the constant Greek provocations, the weakness of the Albanian army, and that

we are linked to Albania economically and that we underwrite [*soderzhim*] its army. Two or three times Stalin interrupted. For instance, regarding a Greek invasion of Albania, he said that it was possible. Then he asked if the situation was really such that one should not have any faith in the Albanian army, and added that the Albanians must be taught and their army must be built up. Molotov says that they have no information about any kind of attack on Albania and wondered that we withhold our information from them. Then, reacting to Kardelj’s explanation that the anti-Albanian campaign in Greece is worsening, Stalin demanded [to know] if we believe in the victory of the Greek guerrillas. Kardelj responds that we do. Stalin says that recently he and the rest of his collaborators have had grave doubts about it. He says that one should assist Greece [i.e. guerrillas] if there are hopes of winning, and if not, then we should rethink and terminate the guerrilla movement. The Anglo-Americans will spare no effort to keep Greece [in their sphere],¹⁹ and the only serious obstacle [*zakavika*] for them is the fact that we assist the guerrillas. Molotov adds that we are constantly and justifiably blamed for assistance to the guerrillas. Stalin says that if there are no conditions for victory, one must not be afraid to admit it. It is not for the first time in history that although there are no conditions now, they will appear later.²⁰ Then Kolarov speaks and tells that the American, British and French embassies appealed to them [Bulgarians] with a warning not to recognize the government of Markos.²¹ Kolarov says that the American ambassador is courteous, but the British ambassador is arrogant. Stalin cuts in and says that it means that the American is a great scoundrel and they [ambassadors of the US and UK] always trade roles. Stalin also said that we should not link the future of our state with a victory of the guerrillas in Greece. On Dimitrov’s comment that a victory of the Monarchists-Fascists would seriously aggravate the situation in the Balkans, Stalin says that it is not proven.

Then Dimitrov and Kolarov spoke about other matters that did not relate to the agenda of the meeting. Among other things, Molotov cited a paragraph from the Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty which read that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria would act in the spirit of the United Nations and would support all initiatives directed at the preservation of peace and against all hotbeds of aggression. Molotov cites from the treaty to reject Dimitrov’s attempts at a linkage between the struggle against “hotbeds of aggression” with the actions of the United Nations. Stalin adds that it would mean a preventive war which is a Komsomol [i.e. juvenile] stunt, a loud phrase, material for the enemy. Stalin then tells a story, hinting at the Komsomol behavior, that there was a seaman in Leningrad after the revolution who condemned and threatened the whole world by radio.²² Molotov then spoke about oats that Albania asked the USSR for, and that Tito had told Lavrent’ev that Yugoslavia would give oats, and after that the Yugoslavs are instructing the Albanians to buy oats in Argentina.²³ Stalin

said half-jokingly that the Yugoslavs are afraid of having Russians in Albania and because of this are in a hurry to send their troops.²⁴ He also said that the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs think that the USSR stands against a unification of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, but it does not want to admit it. Molotov raised some kind of a point from the Bulgarian-Romanian communiqué about the coordination of plans and mentioned that it would have been essentially a merger of these states. Stalin is categorical that this is inconceivable and that Dimitrov would soon see for himself that it is nonsense, and instead of cooperation it would bring about a quarrel between the Romanians and Bulgarians. Therefore mutual relations should be limited to trade agreements.

Then Stalin laid out a Soviet view that in Eastern Europe one should create three federations—Polish-Czechoslovak, Romanian-Hungarian and Yugoslav-Bulgarian-Albanian.²⁵ Bulgaria and Yugoslavia [he said] may unite tomorrow if they wish, there are no constraints on this, since Bulgaria today is a sovereign state. Kardelj says that we were not in a hurry to unify with Bulgaria and Albania, in view of international and domestic moments, but Stalin reacts to it by saying that it should not come too late, and that the conditions for that are ripe. At first, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria must unite, and then let Albania join them. This should be agreed upon through People's Skupcina [parliaments], by the will of the peoples. Stalin thinks that one should begin with political unification and then it would be difficult [for the West] to attack Albania. As to a Bulgarian-Yugoslav unification, Stalin repeatedly stressed that this question has ripened, and one even began a discussion about the name of [a united] state.

Then Kardelj returned to the issue about what after all one should do in Albania, but [Stalin's] answer boiled down to what Stalin said earlier, i.e., the Albanian army ought to be taught, and that Albania should ask for assistance in case of aggression. As to oats, Kardelj says that it is possible that the enemy interfered to spoil Yugoslav-Soviet relations (Molotov kept silent).²⁶ Then Kardelj says that he does not see any big differences between Yugoslavia and the USSR in foreign policy. Stalin interrupts him and says that it is incorrect, that there are differences and that to hide them would mean opportunism. We should not be afraid to recognize differences. Stalin stresses that even they, Lenin's pupils, many times disagreed with him. They would have a quarrel on some issue, then talk it over, work out a position and move on. He believes that we should put the question more boldly about the guerrillas in Greece. Then he mentions the case of China again, but now he raises another aspect. In particular, that they [the Politburo] invited the Chinese comrades and considered that there were no conditions for successful uprising in China and that some kind of "modus vivendi" [with the Guomindang] had to be found. The Chinese comrades, according to Stalin, in words agreed with the Soviet comrades, but in practice kept accumulating forces. The Russians twice gave them assistance in

weapons. And it turned out that the Chinese, not the Soviet comrades, were right, as Stalin says. But he does not believe that the case of the Greek guerrillas falls into the same category. On China he says that they [the Soviets] do not have their people there, except in Port Arthur [Lushunkov] which is a neutral zone according to the treaty with the Chinese government. He spoke about the tactics of the Chinese who avoided attacking cities until they had accumulated sufficient strength.²⁷

Kardelj speaks again and says it was a mistake that we [the Yugoslavs] failed to inform them. Stalin interrupts him and says that it was not a mistake, it was a system [a policy] and that we do not inform them on anything.

Then Stalin and Molotov propose a protocol on mutual coordination of foreign affairs. Kardelj agrees with that. Stalin proposes that we inquire of them [the Soviets] on all questions of interest to us, and that they would also inform us about everything.²⁸

Then Dimitrov diverted the conversation to economic and other issues. When Dimitrov says there are important economic issues, Stalin cut him short by remarking that he would speak about it with a joint Yugoslav-Bulgarian government. During subsequent discussion Stalin raised a question about how the Albanians would react to such a union, and Kardelj and Djilas explained to him that the Albanians would accept it well, because it would be in their national interests, considering that eight hundred thousand Albanians reside in Yugoslavia.²⁹ Stalin also said with regard to Albania that one on our side [*u nas odin*] has already committed suicide,³⁰ and that we want to overthrow Hoxha and that it should not be done hastily and crudely—"the boot on the throat"—but gradually and indirectly. Stalin says again that at first Yugoslavia and Bulgaria ought to unite, and then Albania should join them. And Albania must declare itself about its desire to join. Then Kostov raised the question that the [Bulgarian-Soviet] treaty about technical assistance, also about patents, licensing and authors' rights, is not favorable for the Bulgarians (he failed to mention if this treaty has already been signed). Molotov said that this matter will need consideration, and Stalin said that Kostov should submit a note [to Molotov].

Then we discussed the answer of the Sovinformburo to the slander of the Americans regarding [their] publication of the documents on Soviet-German relations.³¹ Kardelj gave a positive assessment to the answer published in *Pravda* and Dimitrov says that the Western powers wanted to unite with Germany against the USSR. Stalin replies that he had nothing to hide [*on vse vynosit otkrito*], and the Western powers did not speak openly, in particular that Europe without Russia means against Russia. Molotov remarks during the conversation that the Bulgarians do not put enough camouflage on the number of their troops and that it exceeds the clauses [about limits] in the Peace Treaty, and the Bulgarians may be criticized for it. Dimitrov said to this that, on the contrary, the number is even below the limit stipulated by the Peace Treaty.

Molotov was satisfied with that [answer] and did not mention it again.³² Dimitrov raised the issue about the conclusion of a treaty on mutual assistance between the USSR and Bulgaria. He stressed that it would be of great significance for Bulgaria. Stalin agreed with this, but added that among the Quisling countries³³ [the USSR] would first conclude treaties with neighbors: with Romania—this treaty is almost ready, with Hungary and Finland.

Then Stalin underlines that we (i.e. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) must build up our economy, culture, army, and that a federation is an abstraction.

Suddenly Stalin asked about “our friend Pijade,”³⁴ Kardelj told him that he is working on our legislation.

Kardelj asked [the Soviets] about their opinion what answer should be given to the Italian government who asked the Yugoslav government to support Italian claims to govern their former colonies. Stalin said that these demands must be supported and asked Molotov how [the Soviet side] responded. Molotov says that they still have to respond and that he believes they should wait. Stalin told them that there is no point in waiting and the answer should be sent immediately. He said that former Italian colonies should be put under Italian governance [trusteeship] and remarked that kings, when they could not agree over the booty, used to give [disputed] land to a weakest feudal so they could snatch it from him later at some opportune moment, and that feudal lords invited a foreigner to rule them so they could easily overthrow him when they become fed up with him.

On this note the conversation ended.

I would remind [*napominaiu*] that the criticism of Dimitrov by Stalin, although rough in form, was expressed in friendly tones. This report was composed on the basis of notes taken at the meeting and from memory.

[Source: *Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, Fond Kabinet Maršala Jugoslavije I-3-b-651, ll.33-40. Translated by Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive)*]

¹ [Translator’s Note: In *Conversations with Stalin* (1962) Milovan Djilas recounted this meeting in great detail. He mentioned that he had submitted a written report of that meeting to the Yugoslav Central Committee, but that he could not get access to it when he wrote the book. As the comparison of the document with the book reveals, Djilas’ memory retained with remarkable precision some pivotal moments of the conversation.—V.Z.]

² Baranov, Leonid Semenovich—assistant director of the CC VKP(b) [Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Department of Foreign Policy.

³ The statement concerns the Yugoslav intention of deploying a division, which never took place.

⁴ In the Bulgarian records, particularly Kolarov’s account, this is presented in the following manner:

“It seems to us that com. Georgii Dimitrov has taken a fancy to press conferences and interviews, thus giving opportunity to be prompted with questions which ought not be discussed in the first place. This is misguided and undesirable. During the course of

the interview a plan was set forth which goes too far without any attempt to consult with whomever it may concern. A question was put forth of creating a federation or a confederation, a customs union that would include both Poland and Greece. Com. Georgii Dimitrov speaks of all these things without being granted authority by anyone concerned. This is misguided in principle and is tactically harmful. This eases the burden of the creators of the Western bloc.” And further: “We must take the position in such a way that all would know—both enemies and friends—that this is our point of view. We consider this absolutely wrong and unacceptable in the future.” This is contained in slightly abbreviated form in the Soviet record as well.

⁵ According to Bulgarian and Soviet records this was spoken by Molotov, not Stalin. Kolarov’s account puts it in the following manner: “When we spoke with the Polish comrades, they said: We thought that this was Moscow’s opinion. Everyone thinks that if Dimitrov or Tito speaks of a number of countries, it originates from the USSR. In essence, the Polish comrades said that they are against Georgii Dimitrov’s idea and consider it misguided.”

⁶ According to the Bulgarian and Soviet records, this was also spoken by Molotov, while Stalin supplemented this with separate remarks.

⁷ Before these statements by Stalin, the Bulgarian records, particularly Kolarov’s account, show the following remarks by Molotov:

“[Czechoslovak President Eduard] Benes’ newspaper immediately hastened to write that ‘Dimitrov puts out communist plans, and now the Czech communists must answer.’ On the other hand, this position of Georgii Dimitrov contradicts the declaration of the nine communist parties.” The same is corroborated by the Soviet record.

⁸ According to Bulgarian and Soviet records, this statement by Molotov sounded more categorical. Kolarov’s account records the following words: “In the future, com. Georgii Dimitrov must rid himself and us of the risks of such statements.”

⁹ [Translator’s Note: This intervention is presented dramatically in Djilas’s book. “‘Yes, but you didn’t consult with us!’” Stalin shouted. “We learn about your doings in the newspapers! You chatter like women from the housetops whatever occurs to you, and then the newspapermen grab hold of it.” (p. 175)—V.Z.]

¹⁰ The Bulgarian and Soviet records note somewhat stronger self-criticism by Dimitrov. Kolarov recorded his words: “This was harmful and fundamentally misguided. This was self-indulgence. Such statements will not be repeated in the future.”

¹¹ According to Bulgarian records, in particular Kolarov’s, Stalin said: “We wanted to say another word. The Poles and Czechs are laughing at your federation. Ask them—do they want it?” The same is corroborated by the Soviet record.

¹² According to the Bulgarian records, in particular Kolarov’s account, Stalin said to Dimitrov: “You are a politician and must think not only of your own intentions, but also of the consequences of your statements.” Later, returning once more to this question, the Soviet leader said to Dimitrov: “You are an old politician. What possible mistakes could one speak of? You may have another goal in mind, but you yourself will not admit it. You must not give interviews so often.” According to the Soviet record, Stalin, noting that Dimitrov has apparently another goal that must be revealed, added that these are not little children sitting here, and Dimitrov is not a “pre-schooler.”

[Translator’s Note: This part of the conversation is dramatized in Djilas’ book in the following dialogue:

“Stalin, decidedly and firmly: ‘There are serious differences,

Why hide it? It was Lenin's practice always to recognize errors and to remove them as quickly as possible.'

Dimitrov, placatingly, almost submissively: 'True, we erred. But through errors we are learning our way in foreign politics.'

Stalin, harshly and tauntingly: 'Learning! You have been in politics fifty years—and now you are correcting errors! Your trouble is not errors, but a stand different from ours.'

Then Djilas writes that Dimitrov's ears "were red, and big red blotches cropped up on his face covering his spots of eczema. His sparse hair straggled and hung in lifeless strands over his wrinkled neck. I felt sorry for him...The Lion of the Leipzig Trials...looked dejected and dispirited." (pp. 176-177)—V.Z.]

¹³ The entire conversation recorded by Djilas about the draft of a Bulgarian-Romanian treaty sent to the Soviet government, which in turn expressed no objections over the article on the customs union, is absent from the Soviet and Bulgarian records. Kolarov's account contains only the following phrase: "Kolarov points out that the treaty with Romania had been harmonized with Moscow."

¹⁴ [Translator's note: "nobody" here means the United States and Great Britain, not the Communist Party of China. This phrase reveals Stalin's emphasis on realpolitik as a method to prevent "imperialists'" consolidation and intervention into Balkan affairs.—V.Z.]

¹⁵ The Bulgarian records contain the following words expressed by Stalin over this matter: "You see the kind of war that is raging in China. We don't have a single one of our soldiers there."

¹⁶ According to Bulgarian records, the question of signing a protocol on mutual consultation arose in connection with Dimitrov's statement on 10 February concerning Moscow: "We also receive little information from here." Stalin responded: "You have the right to demand from us to keep you informed. Let us then put together a protocol on obligatory consultation between us on all important international questions." This is similarly recorded in the Soviet record.

¹⁷ [Translator's note: According to Djilas, "he was red and, what was a sign of agitation with him, he drew his head down between his shoulders and made pauses in his sentences where they did not belong." (p. 179)—V.Z.]

¹⁸ [Translator's note: The exchange on the failure to inform the USSR on sending Yugoslav troops to Albania was more serious and emotional, according to Djilas' book: "'Stalin shouted, "This could lead to serious international complications..." Kardelj explained that all that had not yet been final and added that he did not remember a single foreign problem but that the Yugoslav Government did not consult with the Soviets... "It's not so!" Stalin cried. "You don't consult at all. That is not your mistake, but your policy—yes, your policy!" Cut off, Kardelj fell silent and did not press his view." (pp.179-180)—V.Z.]

¹⁹ [Translator's Note: In Djilas's book Stalin says: "No, they have no prospect of success at all. What do you think, that Great Britain and the United States—the United States, the most powerful state in the world—will permit you to break their line of communication in the Mediterranean Sea! Nonsense. And we have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible." (p. 182) —V.Z.]

²⁰ As noted in the Bulgarian records, in particular in Kolarov's account, Stalin cautioned the Yugoslav side against careless involvement in Albania, where the USA and England might strike back, claiming to be defenders of Albanian independence. With this in mind, Stalin put this question to Kardelj: "If the Greek partisans are defeated, will you go to war?" Kardelj replied in the negative. To which Stalin said: "I am arguing on the basis of

an analysis of the current forces of the partisans and their enemies. Recently I have started to doubt the prospects of a partisan victory. If you are not convinced that the partisans will win, the partisan movement ought to be wrapped up. The Americans and the English are very interested in the Mediterranean sea. They want to have a base in Greece and will spare no means to preserve a government that listens to them. This is an important international question. If the partisan movement is wrapped up, then they will have no reason to attack you. It's not so easy to start a war now. If you are convinced that the partisans have a chance of victory, then that's a different matter. But I somewhat doubt it."

The Bulgarian records note the following remark by Kostov: "We believe that a defeat of the partisan movement in Greece would create a very difficult situation for other Balkan countries." To this Stalin replied:

"Of course the partisans must be supported. But if the prospects for the partisan movement are falling, it is better to postpone the fight until better times. That which is lacking in relative forces cannot be supplemented with moans and exclamations. What is needed is a thoughtful reckoning of forces. If this shows that at the present time the matter is moving nowhere, one must not be afraid to admit it. There have been other instances when partisan movements were terminated given an unfavorable situation. If it's impossible today, it will be possible tomorrow. You are afraid to state the question clearly. You are under the impression of a "moral obligation." If you cannot lift the weight which you have hoisted upon yourselves, you must admit it. You must not be afraid of some kind of a "categorical imperative" of moral obligation. We do not have such categorical imperatives. The entire question rests in the balance of forces. We go into battle not when the enemy wants us to, but when it's in our interests." Further discussion of the Greek question, following these observations by Stalin, is recorded in the Bulgarian records: "Kardelj: Over the next several months the chances of the partisans will become clear.

Stalin: In that case, fine, you can wait. Perhaps you are right. I also doubted the abilities of the Chinese and advised them to come to a temporary agreement with Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-Shek]. They formally agreed with us, but in practice continued on their own course—that is, mobilizing the forces of the Chinese people. After this, they openly raised the question: we will continue to fight; the people support us. We said: fine, what do you need? It turned out that the conditions were very favorable to them. They turned out to be right, we turned out to be wrong. Maybe we will turn out to be wrong here as well. But we want you to act with certainty. Kolarov: Will America allow a partisan victory?

Stalin: They won't be asked. If there are enough forces for victory, and if there are persons capable of employing the force of the people, then the fight must be continued. But one must not think that if things are not successful in Greece, then everything is lost."

The Soviet record overall corroborates this course of discussion, but sets it down in significantly condensed form, without a number of details. In particular, it does not record Kostov's remark found in Bulgarian records on the difficult consequences the defeat of the Greek partisans would bring to other Balkan countries (in the Djilas report this remark is attributed to Dimitrov), and Kardelj's negative reply to Stalin's question whether Yugoslavia would go to war in the event of a Greek partisan defeat. In addition, the Soviet record corroborates Kardelj's optimistic assessment, noted by Djilas, of the prospects

of a partisan victory in Greece, though at the same time noting his qualification that this is possible only in the absence of direct US assistance to the Greek government, apparently meaning intervention by the American military.

²¹ The reference is to the creation of a Provisional Democratic Government of Greece, declared by the decision of the leadership of the Communist Party of Greece in late December 1947. This government would be headed by the commander of the partisan forces, member of the Communist Party Politburo, Markos Vafiadis, known at the time as “general Markos.” The Bulgarian records note that at the 10 February 1948 meeting Stalin said on this subject: “The bordering countries must be the last to recognize the Markos government. Let others, who are further away, recognize it first.” This statement by Stalin—that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania must refrain from recognizing the Greek revolutionary government, and allow other “people’s democracies,” not bordering Greece and not accused of interfering in its internal affairs, to recognize it—is absent from the Soviet record. However, it does contain a statement by Kardelj (not present in the Bulgarian records) declaring that it would be better for Albania or Bulgaria to recognize Markos, and not Yugoslavia, for the latter is a member of the UN.

²² [Translator’s Note: This “seaman” must be Fedor Raskolnikov, a famous Bolshevik and agitator of the Baltic fleet, later a Soviet emissary to ignite the Muslim revolution in Asia. He defected in 1937 from Bulgaria, where he was ambassador and wrote a letter to Stalin denouncing his regime and the purges of Bolsheviks in the USSR.—V.Z.]

²³ On 13 December 1947, Lavrent’ev, on orders from Moscow, informed Tito of the Albanian government’s request for a shipment of 5 thousand tons of oats from the USSR, and inquired whether Yugoslavia had any objections to this. Two days later, Tito replied to the ambassador that the shipments from the USSR are not needed: Albania will receive the oats from Yugoslavia. However, the oats promised by Yugoslav never arrived in Albania. Even after the meeting in Moscow, during the second half of February 1948, Lavrent’ev, in his discussion with Kardelj, attempted to find out why this occurred. Kardelj explained this through a misunderstanding and lack of cooperation between the corresponding government bodies in Yugoslavia. AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 32, p. 128, d. 8, ll. 3, 8, 96, 102-103, 114-115.

²⁴ The Bulgarian records note this statement by Stalin in the following manner: “The Yugoslavs, apparently, are afraid that we will take Albania away from them. You must take Albania, but wisely.” The Soviet record notes this statement by Stalin in more detail. It notes his words that “the Yugoslavs, apparently, are afraid that we will take Albania from them, and that’s why they want to deploy their forces there sooner. They believe that we are tearing away from them their union both with Bulgaria and with Albania, and want to present us with a fait accompli.”

²⁵ The Bulgarian records present this thought by Stalin in the following manner: “Only three federations are possible and naturally inherent: 1) Yugoslavia and Bulgaria; 2) Romania and Hungary and 3) Poland and Czechoslovakia. These are the possible and realistic federations. A confederation among ourselves is something far-fetched.” Somewhat further along in the Bulgarian records are the following words by Stalin: “You must not delay with uniting three countries—Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania.” The Soviet record does not include the idea of three federations, and only mentions that Stalin remarked on the natural rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, and Poland and Czechoslovakia, while calling the idea of a single federation of all countries “nonsense.”

According to the Soviet record, Stalin used the term “federation” only in connection with the Bulgarian-Yugoslav union, though also noting that first Bulgaria and Yugoslavia could be united, and then Albania could also be included. Neither the Soviet nor Bulgarian records contain any mention of a conversation, found in the Djilas report, regarding the name of the united Yugoslav-Bulgarian country.

²⁶ Kardelj’s reply on possible enemy interference in the shipment of oats is not mentioned either in the Soviet or Bulgarian records. The Soviet record mentions only Kardelj’s words that the question of oats is unclear to him.

²⁷ Ed. Note: For the Bulgarian version of this Greek-Chinese comparison, see footnote above.

²⁸ The Bulgarian and Soviet records do not contain such a dialogue between Stalin and Kardelj. According to the Bulgarian records, such a dialogue took place between Stalin and Dimitrov.

²⁹ According to the Bulgarian records, this was stated not by Kardelj and Djilas, but by Stalin himself.

³⁰ [Translator’s Note: This is a reference to Nico Spiru, a member of the Albanian leadership with links to Belgrade, who committed suicide in November 1947.—V.Z.]

³¹ [Translator’s Note: Early in 1948 the US Department of State published the documents on the Nazi-Soviet talks and agreements in 1939-41, seized in Germany at the end of the Second World War.—V.Z.]

³² According to the Soviet record, Dimitrov said nothing of the kind, and, indeed, said that the Bulgarian government would take measures to cover more carefully their forces and weapons.

³³ [Translator’s Note: In other words, the countries that collaborated with Nazi Germany during the Second World War.—V.Z.]

³⁴ [Translator’s Note: A member of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party. On Stalin’s remarks about Pijade to Djilas, see *Conversations with Stalin*, p. 154.—V.Z.]

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Soviet Plans to Establish the COMINFORM in Early 1946: New Evidence from the Hungarian Archives

by Csaba Békés

It has been long debated by scholars when the idea of forming a new Communist world organization after the Second World War was raised. In the absence of relevant sources the still prevailing classical interpretation suggests that this idea was a Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan introduced in the Summer of 1947 and after the Soviet Union's refusal of the plan, the formation of the Eastern Bloc and its 'executive committee', the COMINFORM, was a logical next step in breaking off relations with the West. Surprisingly enough, no evidence of any kind has emerged from Russian archives from the time of their partial opening in 1991 pertaining to this important topic. However, documents discovered by Russian scholar Leonid Gibianskii in the Tito archives in Belgrade show that the idea of setting up such an organization was already discussed during the talks between Stalin and the Yugoslav leader in Moscow in May-June 1946.¹

Documents from Hungarian archives not only confirm that a Soviet plan to re-establish a Communist-world organization was in the making already as early as March 1946, but they also show that the implementation of the plan was postponed in order to avoid its potential negative effects during the forthcoming elections in France, Czechoslovakia and Romania as well as in the course of the ongoing European peace settlement.² This proves that the idea of setting up the later COMINFORM, rather than

being a reaction to the intensification of frictions between the allies, originally was a part of a wider Soviet scheme aimed at fostering Communist takeover in East Central Europe by peaceful means, while preserving Soviet-Western cooperation as well.

The document published below, is an excerpt from the speech of Mátyás Rákosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party at the 17 May 1946 meeting of the Central Committee of the HCP.³ As part of a long survey on current international issues, he informed the CC members about the Soviet conception on the setting up of a new Communist-world organization. He gave a detailed analysis to his audience of how this new body would be different from the KOMINTERN using exactly the same arguments presented at the time of the setting up of the KOMINFORM in September 1947. Between 28 March and 2 April 1946, Rákosi had been on a secret mission in Moscow, where he was trying to achieve better terms for Hungary at the forthcoming peace conference.⁴ On 1 April 1946, he met with Stalin and Molotov, and it is likely that at this point he received the information he presented later to the Central Committee.⁵

Besides stressing the general importance of the document as the earliest known evidence of Soviet plans for the establishment of the later KOMINFORM, it is also worth noting that during recent talks between the Hungar-

Speech by Mátyás Rákosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party at the Meeting of the Central Committee, 17 May 1946

[...] Finally I would like to raise another question, which, like socialism, we have not spoken much about so far. This refers to the creation of a new International. The comrades know that the third International had to be dissolved, because progress proved that it damaged rather than benefited the growth of the communist parties. [...] When we arranged the third International, I remember the trouble we went to to show that we wanted a centralized, strong International with executive powers, similar to how Marx imagined the International in 1864, and not just the sorting office and so on that the second International became before the First World War. And this was the catastrophe of the third International. Because instead of every country looking separately for the conditions for revolution, and not trying the impossible task of centralizing and directing the whole movement, it directed it from the center. The result was that the parties gave up independent politics, continually looked in the direction of the center, and waited for its instructions. This view led the comrades to announce the discontinuation of the third International. And afterwards, now that the International has been discontinued, the parties are coming forth one after the other to say how the existence of the International limited their progress, e.g. most recently we heard from our Yugoslav comrades how much such a central institution held them back, which, unaware of local conditions, sometimes demanded quite the opposite of what they needed. So such an International can no longer be established. On the contrary, the International should be such that it does not hinder the progress of individual parties, that it provides a means for individual parties to execute the tasks leading to the liberation of the proletariat, bearing local circumstances in mind. I should immediately say that as far as this is concerned, the new International cannot be compared to the previous ones. This will not be an organizing body; its task will be to compose, to help in making objections, to communicate the good or bad experiences of one country's communist party to that of another country, that they should learn from their neighbors' experiences and losses. This will undoubtedly be very useful, as not just us, but communist parties the world over are beginning to feel that without the exchange of experiences and objections they cannot produce adequate plans on international questions. It is such an International that we now intend to establish, and this International will help rather than hinder the international communist movement. On the same note, the view will change that was widely spread at the third International, for

example, that we have to wait for the conditions for revolution to appear in at least a bunch of countries, and only then can we instigate the revolution. I remember that when the situation was revolutionary in Germany in 1923, in all the neighboring countries we prepared for such revolutionary action, so that there could be a revolutionary situation in more than one country at the same time. I remember that in the Czech Republic, France and other countries where the situation was not nearly as developed as in Germany, we prepared assistance programs, similar uprisings, etc. History has shown that that was wrong. Now we are going to follow another route. Here I should immediately say that not many people are aware of this interpretation of the dissolution of the International, because they did not talk about it very much in this period and therefore completely incorrect views are spread amongst some of the parties. For example when we were with the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia and we tried to reconcile the Hungarian Communist Party's line on the question of the Hungarians in Slovakia with that of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the comrades announced the theory that the International had to be dissolved, because the international aspirations [meaning "national aspirations" — Cs. B.] of the individual Communist Parties are so much at odds with each other, that they could not be fitted into the agenda of an International. Because of this they calmly recommended to us that we should attack the Czech Communist Party, while they attack the Hungarian Communist Party. We rejected this theory. We were convinced that this was wrong, and that Stalinist reasoning would say something totally different. There is not even a trace to show that the national aspirations of the particular communist parties do not fit into the International; it points to completely different reasons. Now that communist parties have everywhere become stronger and come to the fore, there should be pressure for the institution of the Communist International or some other international communist body. At the moment this is being disturbed by the whole list of parties preparing for elections. The comrades know that they are preparing for elections in France, Czechoslovakia and Romania, and that our comrades there are otherwise occupied. They are also occupied with the question of peace. But as soon as the elections die down and peace is agreed, at that moment this will come to the fore and then we will establish some kind of international body. One part of this conception is that in these changed circumstances, whenever a country achieves the conditions for the liberation of the proletariat or for socialism, this will be carried out, with no regard for whether the respective country is in a capitalist environment or not. This is also a new perspective, which simply means that in a country where as a result of the work of the communist party these conditions are present, it has to be realized. This is fresh encouragement for all Communist Parties, because now it will principally be dependent on their work whether or not the conditions for the liberation of the proletariat are created in their own country.

[Source: Archives of the Institute for Political History (AIPH), Budapest, 274. f. 2/34. Translated by David Evans.]

ian and the Yugoslav Communist leaders the latter complained about how the KOMINTERN, unaware of local conditions, sometimes demanded quite the opposite of what they needed. Paradoxically, although Tito and the Yugoslav leaders now themselves became proponents of the new Communist organization, their eventual rupture with the rest of the Soviet bloc was caused by exactly the same Soviet attitude. Rákosi's speech also provides an important contribution to the "blueprint debate" on whether Stalin had a plan to sovietize these countries. The conception, outlined by Rákosi, obviously repeating what he had heard in Moscow, shows a cautious, but determined, policy: in those countries where the Communist party itself would be able to create favorable internal conditions for a smooth and peaceful takeover, they would be allowed to do so. However, at this stage, in the spring of 1946 Stalin, eager to maintain cooperation with the Western Allies, did not plan to permit any kind of forceful takeover, relying on direct Soviet support, or implying civil war.

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¹ L. Gibianskii: "Kak voznik Kominform: Po novym arkhivnym materialam," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia* (1993), No. 4. 135-136,

quoted by: Robert C. Tucker: "The Cold War in Stalin's Time," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 21:2 (Spring 1997), 275. See also Leonid Gibianskii, "The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War," in this issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*.

² I first presented this finding at the international conference: Internal Factors Facilitating Communist Takeover in East Central Europe 1944-1948, Opocno, Czech Republic, 9-11 September 1993, see: Csaba Békés, "Mad'arská politická krize na jare 1946," *Suodobé Dejiny* (Praha), 1994, No. 4-5, pp. 509-513.

³ Archives of the Institute for Political History, (AIPH) Budapest, 274. f. 2./34.

⁴ For the story of this Hungarian Communist initiative see: Csaba Békés, "Dokumentumok a magyar kormánydelegáció 1946. áprilisi moszkvai tárgyalásairól. (Documents on the negotiations of the Hungarian Government Delegation in Moscow in April, 1946)" *Régió* (1992), 3, 161-194; for an English version see: "The Communist Parties and the National Issue in Central and Eastern Europe (1945-1947). An Important Factor Facilitating Communist Takeover in the Region," *6. Martie 1945: Incepturile comunizarii Romaniei. Editura Enciclopedia*, (Bucharest, 1995), 245-253.

⁵ No minutes of that meeting have been found to date on either side. After returning from Moscow Rákosi reported on his visit at the 3 April Politburo meeting but according to the then prevailing practice no minutes were taken. However, on 18 April, he gave a speech at the meeting of party secretaries of factories and plants in Budapest, where he briefly summarized the Soviet ideas on setting up a new Communist World organization (AIPH 274. f. 8/14).

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Stalin's Plan to Assassinate Tito

[Co-editor's Note: The following excerpt is from a document, discovered and published by Russian military historian Dmitrii Volkogonov (1928-1995) in the Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow, outlining various options to assassinate the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito with the help of Iosif Romual'dovich Grigulevich alias "Max," a Soviet agent who had been involved earlier in operations to kill Trotskii and later became a historian and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The document, classified as top secret and prepared in the Ministry of State Security (MGB), was addressed personally to Stalin (in its only copy). While, according to Volkogonov, Stalin did not indicate his authorization of the operation on the document, it is likely that he approved of it since preliminary preparations began. Grigulevich, for example, had to write a "farewell letter" to his wife to cover up Soviet government involvement in case the assassination failed. Following Stalin's death in March 1953, however, the operation was terminated.]

"The MGB USSR requests permission to prepare a terrorist act (*terakt*) against Tito, by the illegal agent 'Max'," Comrade I.R. Grigulevich, a Soviet citizen and member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since 1950 ([biographical] information attached).¹

"Max" was placed in Italy on a Costa Rican passport, where he was able to gain the confidence and enter the circles of South American diplomats as well as well-known Costa Rican political and trade figures visiting Italy.

Using these connections, "Max", on our orders, obtained an appointment as the special plenipotentiary of Costa Rica in Italy and Yugoslavia. In the course of his diplomatic duties, in the second half of 1952, he visited Yugoslavia twice. He was well received there, with entrée into circles close to Tito's clique; he was promised a personal audience with Tito. "Max's" present position offers us opportunities to carry out active measures (*aktivnye deistviia*) against Tito.

In early February of this year, we summoned "Max" to Vienna for a secret meeting. While discussing options, "Max" was asked how he thought he could be most useful, considering his position. "Max" proposed some kind of active measure against Tito personally.

In relation to this proposal, there was a discussion with him [Max] about how he imagined all of this and as a result, the following options for a terrorist act against Tito were presented.

1. To order "Max" to arrange a private audience with Tito, during which a soundless mechanism concealed in his clothes would release a dose of pulmonary plague bacteria that would guarantee death to Tito and all present. "Max" himself would not be informed of the substance's nature, but with the goal of saving "Max's" life, he would be given an anti-plague serum in advance.

2. In connection with Tito's expected visit to London, to send "Max" there to use his official position and good personal relations with the Yugoslav ambassador in England, [Vladimir] Velebit, to obtain an invitation to the expected Yugoslav embassy reception in Tito's honor.

The terrorist act could be accomplished by shooting with a silent mechanism concealed as a personal item, while simultaneously releasing tear gas to create panic

among the crowd, allowing "Max" to escape and cover up all traces.

3. To use one of the official receptions in Belgrade to which members of the diplomatic corps are invited. The terrorist act could be implemented in the same way as the second option, to be carried out by "Max" who as a diplomat, accredited by the Yugoslav government, would be invited to such a reception.

In addition, to assign "Max" to work out an option whereby one of the Costa Rican representatives will give Tito some jewelry in a box, which when opened would release an instantaneously-effective poisonous substance.

We asked Max to once again think the operation over and to make suggestions on how he could realize, in the most efficient way, actions against Tito. Means of contact were established and it was agreed that further instructions would follow.

It seems appropriate to use "Max" to implement a terrorist act against Tito. "Max's" personal qualities and intelligence experience make him suitable for such an assignment. We ask for your approval."

[Published on 11 June 1993 in Izvestiia. Translated by Natasha Shur (CWIHP)]

Dmitrii A. Volkogonov (1928-1995) was a prominent Russian military historian. For several years, Volkogonov headed the Institute of Military History of the Soviet Army and since 1991 chaired a special parliamentary commission which oversees the handling of the former Soviet archives. His numerous publications include Iosif Stalin: Triumf i tragediia (Moscow, 1989) and Lenin: Politicheskii portret (Moscow, 1994).

¹ Not printed.

The Turn in Soviet-Yugoslav Relations, 1953-55

By *Andrei Edemskii*

Between the spring of 1953 and July 1955, relations with Yugoslavia changed sharply from collaborating with Yugoslavia “as a bourgeois country” (May 1953) to Mikoian’s May 1955 toast with Yugoslav leaders to the “prosperity of Yugoslavia.” Unfortunately, the correspondence carried out in 1954 and early 1955 between the central committees of the two ruling parties is not available in the archives. Other documents, however, can illuminate the earlier stages of the shift. Below, two Foreign Ministry internal reports prepared by M. Zimianin in May 1953 and October 1954 illustrate the radical change of opinion reached at the 31 May 1954 Presidium meeting in which the need to foil the “anti-Soviet plans of the Anglo-American imperialists and to use all means to strengthen our influence over the Yugoslav people” prevailed, opening the door to rapprochement. [Ed. Note: N. Bulganin discussed this decision and the ostensible resistance to it by Molotov and the Foreign Ministry during the July 1955 plenums, excerpted in this *CWIHP Bulletin*]

About the Situation in Yugoslavia and its Foreign Policy

To Comrade V. M. Molotov Top Secret

The internal policy of the Tito clique, after breaking with the USSR and peoples’ democratic countries, aimed at restoring capitalism in Yugoslavia, at the liquidation of all the democratic accomplishments of the Yugoslav people, and at the fascistization of the state and army personnel.

In foreign policy, the efforts of the ruling circles of Yugoslavia aim at broadening economic and political ties with capitalist states, first and foremost with the USA and England. This has made Yugoslavia dependent on them and has drawn it [Yugoslavia] into aggressive blocs organized by the Anglo-American imperialists....

27 May 1953

[Source: AVPRF f. 06, op. 12a, por. 74, pap. 617, ll. 7-12.
Translated by David Wolff]

On Recent Yugoslav Foreign Policy (second half of 1954)

Yugoslavia’s foreign policy measures in the second half (July-October) of this year have been dictated, as far as can be judged by sources, by the government’s attempt to strengthen the country’s position by improving relations with the countries of the capitalist camp and by normalizing relations with the USSR and other countries of the democratic camp...

The [Fourth European] Sector [of the Foreign Ministry] considers it possible to come preliminarily to the following conclusions and proposals:

The Soviet Union’s policy on Yugoslavia has pro-

duced serious positive results, has increased the influence of the USSR among the peoples of Yugoslavia, has helped explode the aggressive, anti-Soviet plans of the USA in the Balkans, and made difficult the actions of anti-Soviet elements in Yugoslavia itself.

At the same time it is impossible not to see that the Yugoslav ruling circles have normalized with the USSR within the bounds of their self-interest...

Under the given conditions, it seems appropriate to put forward measures for the further development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations that would force the Yugoslav government to come closer to the USSR and the peoples’ democracies.

We make the following proposals.

To poll (*zondazh*) the Yugoslav government regarding joint action with the USSR against US plans to draw Italy and the Balkan Union into a broadening of anti-Sovietism in the region. To clarify the position of the Yugoslav government on establishing diplomatic relations with the GDR.

If the test [results] of the Yugoslav government on two or three major foreign policy questions are positive, this will be an important condition towards the resurrection of the Treaty on Friendship and Mutual Aid between the USSR and Yugoslavia [of 1945].

21 October 1954

Head of the IV European Sector of the Foreign Ministry
Zimianin

[Source: AVPRF f. 021, op. 8-a, por. 184, pap. 11, ll. 16-21.
Translated by David Wolff]

Andrei Edemskii, a former CWIHP fellow, is a researcher at the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Soviet-Yugoslav Relations and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956

By *Leonid Gibianskii*

[Co-editor's Note: The following essay by Leonid Gibianskii, a senior researcher at the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow and coeditor [with Norman Naimark] of *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949*, introduces a fascinating set of documents on Yugoslav-Soviet relations in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Hungary on 4 November 1956. Though the immediate concern was the fate of Imre Nagy, the reform communist leader of the Hungarian Revolution, who had fled to the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, the documents make clear that both Moscow and Belgrade were aware that more fundamental issues in the Soviet-Yugoslav relationship were at stake. The full version of Gibianskii's essay, which was abbreviated for this introduction, can be found in the *CWIHP Electronic Bulletin* (cwiwp.si.edu). The documents printed below were obtained by the National Security Archive and CWIHP and translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie. Additional documents may be found in the *CWIHP Electronic Bulletin*.]

Much has been written about Soviet-Yugoslav relations with respect to the Hungarian Revolution. Even during the unfolding of the events themselves and the immediately following period, this subject became a topic of discussion in mass media channels and in the press. Later it was touched upon to a lesser or greater degree in the historiography. However, in both cases, this was done, as a rule, on the basis of only those facts which were available from public Soviet or Yugoslav declarations and actions. The behind-the-scenes side of the relations between Moscow and Belgrade regarding the 1956 events in Hungary remained hidden long afterwards: both sides, each for its own reasons, preferred to keep this secret.¹

The curtain of secrecy was partially lifted in the 1970s, first when Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs, which had been written, or, more precisely, recorded by him against the will of the Soviet Union after his removal from power,² were published in the West; and secondly in Yugoslavia, where, not without obstacles, the memoirs of Veljko Micunovic, who had been the Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR during the 1956 Hungarian crisis, came to light.³ These publications contained some previously unknown evidence about secret Soviet-Yugoslav contacts in connection with the development of the revolution in Hungary and its suppression by Soviet troops. However, despite the importance of the publication of this evidence, it was very incomplete, and in a series of cases, imprecise, as a result of the political-ideological prejudices of each of the authors, but also because the disgraced Khrushchev, deprived of the chance to refer to documents, was sometimes betrayed by his memory, while Micunovic, who had his daily notes at his disposal, had to stay within the confines of the official Yugoslav version of the time in his

depictions of Belgrade's policy.

Only since the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, with the fall of the Soviet and Eastern European communist regimes, has the opportunity arisen for the first time to examine previously unavailable archival materials. In particular, I researched a number of aspects of this subject using documents from Yugoslav and Russian (former Soviet) archives.⁴ In addition, a significant number of relevant Russian, Yugoslav, and Hungarian archival documents have been published.⁵ This article is based on both already published materials as well as unpublished documents from Moscow and Belgrade archives.⁶

Moscow's and Belgrade's concern towards the Hungarian revolution both differed and coincided simultaneously. Recently-released documents, including those contained in the aforementioned publications,⁷ leave no doubt that the Soviet leadership viewed the events in Hungary from the very beginning as a deeply threatening event, which had to be stopped at all costs. For this reason, the Soviets decided on 23 October and again on 31 October to move troops into Budapest.⁸ The Yugoslav situation with regard to the Hungarian revolution was more difficult. Belgrade was not at all interested in preserving Moscow's ultra-conservative henchmen (Matyas Rakosi and Erno Gerö) and the severe Soviet mandate in Hungary. To the contrary, the relative liberalization of the regime and the weakening of Soviet control in a neighboring country could open the relatively alluring prospect of the emergence, alongside Yugoslavia, of another similar Communist country standing outside of the Soviet bloc or at least significantly independent from the Kremlin. However, while the Yugoslav leadership's conception of the permissible changes in their neighboring

country was somewhat broader than the far more conservative conceptions of the Kremlin rulers, it could approve of liberalization in Hungary only to the degree that it did not threaten the existence of communist power there. Steps taken by Belgrade at the very beginning of November were a reflection of this ambiguous position.

Judging by its actions, the Soviet leadership considered the Yugoslav position to some extent ambiguous. Having decided on October 31 to militarily intercede again and to replace Nagy's government with a new government subservient to Moscow, the CC CPSU Presidium believed it necessary to hold talks regarding the impending military strike with Tito, the leaders of Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia (the agreement of which was never in doubt) and with the new leadership in Poland.⁹ The goal pursued by the Kremlin was obvious: afraid that Tito and Wladyslaw Gomulka might condemn the impending military action, Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev tried to incline them through direct negotiation toward some sort of agreement with it, using the argument that a counter-revolution had taken the upper hand in Hungary, threatening the complete liquidation of socialist development and the establishment of Western control there. As is made clear in Khrushchev's memoirs, this very argument was set out at the secret meeting of Khrushchev and CC CPSU Presidium members Viacheslav Molotov and Georgii Malenkov with Gomulka and the premier of the Polish government, Juzef Tsirankevich in Brest on November 1. However, they could not convince Gomulka of the necessity of implementing the Soviet plan.¹⁰ With even greater disquiet, Khrushchev and Malenkov went on to the meeting with Yugoslav leader Josip Tito,¹¹ expecting, in Khrushchev's words, that it would be still more complicated.¹² But despite this expectation, quite the opposite occurred.

The secret meeting in Tito's residence on Brioni island which took place on the night of November 2-3 and at which Tito, together with his assistants Edvard Kardelj and Aleksandr Rankovich and in the presence of ambassador Micunovic, conducted negotiations with Khrushchev and Malenkov, was until recently known about partly from Khrushchev's memoirs, but for the most part from Micunovic's memoirs. According to the latter's testimony, there were no records made during the meeting, but afterwards he set down the contents from memory.¹³ In one of the documents of the former CC LCY archive, the existence of this record was mentioned, but I was not able to locate it.¹⁴ Clearly it was the basis for the account of the Brioni meeting in Micunovic's memoirs. But from other archival materials it becomes clear that the memoirs do not include much that was discussed. Both Khrushchev and Micunovic relate the following basic results of the meeting: when the high ranking Soviet visitors informed the Yugoslav side of the Kremlin's decision to employ military force in Hungary again in order to replace the Nagy government and to "defend socialism," Tito, to the "pleasant surprise" of Khrushchev and Malenkov, immedi-

ately and without reservations expressed his agreement with this plan, since, in his opinion, the Hungarian events had gone in the direction of "counter-revolution."¹⁵ True, later, when the suppression of the Hungarian revolution by the Soviet troops elicited widespread disappointment and condemnation from throughout the world, the Yugoslav leadership, in a secret memorandum to Moscow, maintained that at the Brioni meeting it had accepted the Soviet plan with reservations, as a "lesser evil," since Khrushchev and Malenkov had declared that no other means existed for preventing the restoration of capitalism in Hungary. However, from the very same memorandum, it followed that Yugoslav reservations did not at all call into question the undertaking of military actions, but instead stressed the importance of taking care to insure that the costs of "preserving socialism" to be incurred by the punitive measures employed by the Soviet forces should be held to a minimum. In essence, Tito stated in his correspondence that the Soviet leadership should "normalize" the situation in Hungary not solely by military force but by accompanying simultaneous political measures to create a suitable Hungarian government with Kadar at its head, which would consist of people who had not been compromised under Rakosi and were capable of uniting the forces supporting the "continuing progress of socialism."¹⁶ This accorded with the intentions of Moscow, which had already been planning such a step and of which Khrushchev and Malenkov immediately informed their Yugoslav counterparts.¹⁷

From the memoirs of Khrushchev and Micunovic as well as the subsequent secret correspondence between Moscow and Belgrade, it is clear that there were certain differences in the positions of Soviet and Yugoslav participants at the meeting. The Yugoslav side especially stressed that the government had to condemn the regime of Rakosi-Gerö, and put forth a program for surmounting the "Stalinist inheritance" and "reforming socialism," using the support of recently-emerged worker councils in Hungary.¹⁸ Although the Soviet notions of acceptable parameters for "reform" were significantly narrower than the Yugoslav, judging by the documents, they did not object to these proposals. As for the selection of people for the government in question, Khrushchev expressed his support for the candidacy of Ferenc Munnich as prime minister, while the Yugoslav side leaned more toward Kadar. In addition, the Yugoslavs favored including in the government certain persons close to Nagy. According to Micunovic, Geza Losonczy and Pal Maleter were mentioned. Khrushchev also noted the Yugoslav selection of candidates in his memoirs, but, without remembering their names, maintained that both were rejected as unacceptable.¹⁹

From the subsequent secret Soviet-Yugoslav correspondence it becomes clear that the Yugoslav agreement with the proposed Soviet military intervention was accompanied at the Brioni meeting with an agreement to give political assistance to the Soviet troops and in the

replacement of Nagy with a “revolutionary worker-peasant government.” Until recently, such an agreement was essentially unknown. It is not mentioned in Khrushchev’s memoirs, while Micunovic’s memoirs contain only an unclear suggestion that the meeting included a discussion of the question of Yugoslav efforts to “try to see whether something can be done with Nagy.” Micunovic did not explain what was meant by this, noting only that they had in mind “using influence on Nagy in order to minimize casualties and unnecessary bloodshed” and that the Soviet participants expressed a special interest in this.²⁰ It becomes clear from the correspondence that the Yugoslavs, before the start of Soviet actions, were to try to convince Nagy as well as his closest supporters from in the government to resign.²¹

In my earlier published work, I noted that Nagy’s resignation from the post of prime minister would, under these circumstances, signal his government’s liquidation; and this, in turn, would have created such a political and legal vacuum that in such conditions the self-declaration of a new government, created under Soviet aegis, would not have seemed like a direct overthrow of the previous government and the Soviet intervention itself would not have been formally directed against a recognized Hungarian government. That is why the Soviet participants at the meeting expressed such an interest in agreeing with Yugoslavia to combine their actions with Nagy’s resignation.²² In contrast to Micunovic’s memoirs, from which it may be concluded that his question was discussed at Soviet initiative, it follows from the aforementioned Soviet-Yugoslav correspondence that such was the proposal of the Yugoslavs themselves.²³ Of course, there is room for the possibility that the two may have overlapped. In any case, the Yugoslav promise would have been in practice, had it been realized, an aid in camouflaging the Soviet intervention and armed suppression of the Hungarian revolution. This character of the Soviet-Yugoslav understanding was acknowledged, obviously, by the Yugoslav participants in the negotiations at Brioni, insofar as they, as it follows from the archival documents, did not show a particular desire to enlighten their colleagues in the Yugoslav leadership about it. Judging by the minutes of the meeting of the executive committee of the CC LCY on November 6, at which Tito informed the rest of the members of this higher party organ about the Brioni meeting, the Yugoslav leader preferred to remain silent about the said understanding.²⁴

The Yugoslav side, however, did not fulfill its promise. The documents on which I was able to conduct research do not clarify the reasons for this. In the subsequent correspondence with Soviet leadership, Tito in general tried to assure Moscow that the Yugoslav side started to act immediately according to the agreement and undertook corresponding efforts in Budapest in the second half of November, but were unable to achieve concrete results. Kardelj informed the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade, Nikolai Firiubin, that on November 4, as was

agreed upon with Khrushchev, they contacted Nagy. But neither Tito nor Kardelj explained what exactly had been undertaken. In correspondence, Tito only tied the Yugoslav actions to the talks which had been conducted since November 2 between the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Budapest and Nagy’s close collaborator Zoltan Santo, who came with the request that, in the event of the threat of an anti-communist pogrom, he and a few other communists from the government and party leadership, created to replace the collapsed HWP, be allowed to take refuge at the embassy.²⁵ From documents it is clear that the envoy Soldatic inquired from Belgrade with regard to Santo’s request and received an answer on November 3 that refuge would be given.²⁶ However, apart from this exchange, references to Nagy or, more importantly, his resignation, were not found. Nor did Tito say anything concrete in his later correspondence with Moscow.

Whatever the case may be, when at dawn on November 4 Soviet troops began actions to suppress the revolution and overthrow the Nagy government, the latter not only did not resign, but, to the contrary, broadcast an announcement on the radio condemning the Soviet intervention as illegal and then, with a large group of supporters, including Santo, took refuge at the Yugoslav mission. With this, the events took a turn directly contrary to what had been anticipated at the time of the Brioni meeting. Belgrade, having been informed of what had happened by Soldatic, found itself in a ticklish situation.²⁷

Intent on escaping from this extremely uncomfortable position, the Yugoslav leadership on November 4 informed the Soviets of what had transpired and affirmed that Yugoslavia would attempt to influence Nagy to retract his recent statement and, to the contrary, make a statement of his support for the Kadar government.²⁸ At the same time, Soldatic received instructions to try to convince Nagy of this and to prevent him and members of his group from carrying out any kind of activity and establishing any kind of contact outside the diplomatic mission.²⁹ However, the Soviet leadership immediately replied on November 4 that in light of the new situation (i.e., in which Nagy’s government was already overthrown by military force and the creation of the Kadar government already announced), it considered an address by Nagy to be unnecessary and proposed that Belgrade hand Nagy and his group over to Soviet troops. They, in turn, would hand them over to Kadar’s government.³⁰ Evidently in order to achieve a quicker extradition of Nagy and the rest, on November 5, Khrushchev and Malenkov sent a telegram to Tito, Rankovic, and Kardelj which spoke of the successful suppression of the “counter-revolution” in Hungary and emphasized that this action had been undertaken in accord with what had been agreed to at Brioni and that the results of this conference had made the most positive impression on the CC CPSU Presidium.³¹

The Soviet demands put Belgrade in a dead-end situation: on the one hand, the Yugoslav leadership by no means wanted to argue with Moscow, while on the other

hand it could not agree to surrender Nagy and his comrades to the Soviet military authorities or to the Kadar government for fear of serious discredit in the eyes of its own people as well as the outside world. Thus, on November 5, Tito, Kardelj, and Rankovic replied to Khrushchev with a proposal to send Nagy and the rest to Yugoslavia.³² On November 7, however, Khrushchev categorically rejected this offer in the name of the Soviet leadership and added a blunt threat: Citing the Brioni agreement, he warned that the proposal to send Nagy to Yugoslavia could be seen by Moscow as an example of Belgrade's secret solidarity with Nagy's policies and could cause "irrevocable damage" to Soviet-Yugoslav relations.³³

The Kremlin rejected Kadar's hesitant proposal, which was made to Andropov on November 8, regarding the possibility—in order to avoid heightening the tensions in relations with Yugoslavia—to allow Nagy and his group to go to Yugoslavia under the condition that a written document was received from Nagy stating his resignation from the post of prime minister of the overthrown government and written promises from him and the others not to harm Kadar's government. In response to the communication received from Andropov, Moscow instructed him to tell Kadar on behalf of the CC CPSU that it was not advisable under any circumstances to let Nagy and the others go to Yugoslavia, and that the Yugoslavs would be forced to agree to the demands for his surrender. As for Kadar's apprehension about aggravating relations with Belgrade, the CC CPSU Presidium confirmed the position set out in Khrushchev's communication of November 7 to Tito, Kardelj, and Rankovic.³⁴

Insofar as this position did not leave the Yugoslav leadership any possibility of slipping between the Scylla of confrontation with the USSR in case Nagy was not surrendered and the Charybdis of its public exposure as an accomplice to Soviet intervention in case he was handed over, on November 8, in a new message to Khrushchev on behalf of the CC LCY, Tito tried to explain to the Kremlin that Yugoslavia was simply not in a condition to permit the surrender of Nagy and the others to the Soviet or Hungarian authorities for fear of being discredited. At the same time, Tito tried in various ways to justify why the Yugoslavs had not achieved Nagy's resignation, after he with his entourage had shown up in the Yugoslav mission. In the message Yugoslavia's support for the Kadar government was forcefully emphasized, and it was proposed that a joint compromise resolution be found, including through an amnesty for Nagy and the others hiding in the Yugoslav mission in Budapest.³⁵ In the hopes that it would help soften Moscow's position and obtain the assent of the Kadar government, Belgrade gave a directive to Soldatic on November 9 to try to obtain from Nagy at least a formal announcement of his resignation from the post of prime minister of the fallen government.³⁶ However, Nagy refused.³⁷

Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership replied to Tito's

appeal of November 8 with a proposal on November 10 that Nagy and Losonczy (who had entered his government) be sent to Romania. The rest, on condition of a statement of loyalty to the Kadar government, could receive their freedom and remain in Hungary.³⁸ The departure to Romania was, in essence, tantamount to Nagy's surrender, but formally it was the compromise asked for by Tito. The Yugoslav government found it impossible to accept such a proposal, which Soldatic had already expressed to Kadar on November 11, noting that Nagy's departure to Romania could, in Belgrade's opinion, damage Yugoslav prestige and that Romania is not a suitable country for such a purpose.³⁹ It was clear that the Romanian scenario, involving a country of the "socialist camp" under Soviet control, was virtually tantamount to handing Nagy over to the Soviet military or to Kadar's government. In addition, such a scenario had no chance of Nagy's acceptance.⁴⁰ Belgrade, for its part, proposed two scenarios: either a declaration by Kadar's government guaranteeing Nagy and the rest freedom if they leave the Yugoslav diplomatic mission, or their unhindered departure to Yugoslavia.⁴¹

Like Belgrade, Moscow and its subordinate Kadar sought to find a solution to this situation, though each in their own interest. In contrast to Yugoslavia, which was in a hurry to resolve this question in order to rid itself of the source of difficulty with the USSR, the Soviets at first showed a tendency to outwait the Yugoslav leadership. But the continued formal existence of the Nagy government, which still had not resigned, seriously aggravated an already difficult domestic and international political situation for the Kadar government. This provoked great concern at the meetings of Kadar's temporary Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (CC HSWP) on November 11 and 16, at which the situation of the "two governments" was seen as one of the most important tasks.⁴² Diplomatic maneuvers ensued, when Kadar first assured Soldatic on November 16 that Nagy and his group could leave the Yugoslav mission without fear of being followed, and, if they wanted, leave Hungary. On the instructions of the Soviet side, he demanded on the following day in the form of a preliminary condition, a statement from Nagy and Losonczy that they no longer considered themselves members of the government, and, together with the others, would agree to support Kadar's government. The Yugoslavs for their part began to work towards the Kadar government's granting them a written promise that Nagy and the others could freely live at home without repression against them.⁴³

The arguments surrounding these positions, which continued until November 21, shifted entirely to the sphere of negotiations between Belgrade and the Kadar government;⁴⁴ the Soviet side, able to manipulate Kadar from behind the scenes, outwardly removed itself from the discussion regarding the Nagy question. Immediately, polemics arose between Hungarians and Yugoslavs (previously avoided by both sides) regarding general

principles of the Hungarian crisis and the evaluation of Soviet and Yugoslav policy in Hungary. The ground was laid by the publication in the 16 November issue of *Borba* of Tito's speech to party activists in Pula on 11 November. In his speech, the Yugoslav leader had justified the Soviet military intervention undertaken on 4 November as the lesser evil in the face of the threat of "counterrevolution" and expressed support for Kadar's government, but at the same time characterized the crisis as a consequence of the Soviet support given until the last moment for the Rakosi-Gero regime, including the first Soviet military intervention on October 24, which naturally provoked outrage in Hungary. Tito connected a similar orientation of Soviet policy in relation not only to Hungary, but also to other Eastern European countries of the "socialist camp" with the fact that among a portion of the Soviet leadership, the Stalinist legacy, which he characterized as a product of the system that had formed in the USSR, was still strong. Tito's speech itself and its publication in particular constituted a clear attempt to distance himself from Soviet policy in Hungary in light of disappointment with Moscow's actions both in Yugoslavia and the outside world, while at the same time defending Yugoslavia's agreement to intervention on 4 November and the support for the Kadar government. The Yugoslav action elicited a sharp reaction from the Soviet leadership, which, however, was expressed primarily in private, in Micunovic's meetings with Khrushchev and other members of the CC CPSU Presidium. Moreover, the Soviets emphasized that they did not want to see difficulties arise with Yugoslavia and charged Belgrade with breaking mutual agreements. The public response to Tito's speech, made in the form of material published in *Pravda* on November 19 and 23, rejected Yugoslavia's evaluations, although, in Micunovic's opinion, in relatively measured terms, as was the Moscow leadership's general position toward relations with Yugoslavia during these days.⁴⁵

This was also said in connection with Nagy's detention by Soviet troops and his group after they had left the Yugoslav mission on November 22. The proposal for his arrest had been sent back on November 17 to the CC CPSU Presidium by Malenkov, Suslov, and the secretary of the CC CPSU, Averkii Aristov, who were present in Hungary. And Kadar, who was negotiating with Yugoslavia and on November 21 made a written statement guaranteeing safety for Nagy and the others, had been aware of this plan, endorsed by the Soviet leadership, from the beginning.⁴⁶ When Nagy and the others, upon leaving the Belgrade mission were detained and forcibly sent to Romania, the Yugoslav leadership limited itself to a protest to the Kadar government, while to the Soviets on November 24 it expressed only "surprise" regarding this incident.⁴⁷

In its private contacts with Moscow, however, Belgrade showed increasing unhappiness with Soviet encouragement of the anti-Yugoslav campaign carried out in East European countries and by certain Western

Communist parties, especially the French, as well as the Soviet manner of acting without regard to Yugoslav interests or prestige, as in the case of Nagy's arrest. The expression of such disaffection was a long letter from Tito to Khrushchev dated 3 December 1956 which, among other things, repeated and intensified criticism of Soviet policy in Hungary and argued the wrongful nature of Soviet accusations against Yugoslavia with regard to the Brioni agreement and the Nagy question.⁴⁸

In essence, each of the sides occupied a simultaneously defensive and offensive position, trying to stick the other side with public and non-public demarches and to halt criticism made in its direction. The Yugoslav leadership used its public demarches for personal justification and for raising its prestige inside Yugoslavia and in the international arena (in this respect Kardelj's speech in the Skupshchina played the same role as Tito's speech in Pula).⁴⁹ For the Soviet leadership the campaign of criticism against Belgrade functioned as one of the means for reinforcing its control over Eastern European countries of the "Socialist camp" and over the world Communist movement.⁵⁰ Such friction continued towards further escalation of mutual accusations and counter-accusations for the rest of 1956 and into the first months of 1957, both in public statements and in a continued exchange of secret letters between Moscow and Belgrade. In particular, the response to the Yugoslav letter of 3 December 1956 became the Soviet letter from 10 January 1957, after which there followed the Yugoslav answer on 1 February 1957.⁵¹ But despite the sharpness of the polemic in this correspondence, both sides came to the same basic conclusion: they negatively evaluated the revolutionary attempt to liquidate the Communist monopoly over the government in Hungary and considered the military suppression of the revolution to be lawful.

**Cable, N. Firiubin to Soviet Foreign Ministry
4 November 1956**

Strictly secret

Copying is forbidden

Coded Telegram

From BELGRADE

PRIORITY

Kardelj informed me that on the night of November 4, they got in touch with Imre Nagy, as had been agreed upon with comrade Khrushchev.

Imre Nagy, Santo Zoltan and 11 more Hungarian communists are located in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. It is not yet known, Kardelj said, whether Nagy Imre made his last statement in the name of the government in Budapest. If he made this statement, they, the Yugoslavs, will try to get him to announce that he did so

under reactionary pressure [*nazhim reaktsiia*]. They also intend to come to an agreement with Imre Nagy so that he will make a statement supporting the government headed by Kadar in Sol'nok.

In Kardelj's words, such an announcement would facilitate the discussion of the Hungarian issue in the Security Council and the recognition of Kadar's government as the legal government. Kardelj, on Tito's instructions, requested the advice of the CPSU and the Soviet government as to whether to continue further talks with Imre Nagy. Tito also asked the Soviet government to convey to Kadar's government the request that they not repress those communists who did not immediately take the correct line during the recent events in Hungary.

Tito, in Kardelj's words, also asked the Soviet government to take measures to protect the Yugoslav embassy from possible attacks on it, especially if reactionaries find out that Nagy, who is located in the embassy, is supporting Kadar's government.

4/XI-56 N. FIRIUBIN

**From the diary
of D.T. SHEPILOV**

**Secret
7 November 1956**

**On a Conversation with the
Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR, Micunovic**

At 14:10, I received the ambassador of Yugoslavia to the USSR, Micunovic. I told him that I had received his report on the conversation between Minister for Foreign Affairs Koca Popovic and the Soviet ambassador Firiubin in which Koca Popovic stated that a Soviet tank located alongside the building of the Yugoslav mission in Budapest opened fire on November 6 at 12:45 (Budapest time). The direction of the shot has not been established, but all of the windows in the Yugoslav mission were blown out and the window frames were damaged, and the event led to panic amongst the people located inside the mission.

I told Micunovic that I had just spoken with the commander of the Soviet military unit in Budapest and had instructed him to conduct a careful inquiry into the veracity of this fact. That will be done and the results of the inquiry will be conveyed to the ambassador. However, as a preliminary matter the commander of the Soviet military unit in Budapest categorically states that that sort of incident could not have taken place, since everything is completely calm in the region where the Yugoslav mission is located and since the tanks located near the mission were unlikely to have needed to open fire. However, I once again confirmed that the results of the inquiry as to the veracity or fictitiousness of the episode of which Koca Popovic had informed our ambassador would be conveyed to him as well.

In this regard I told Micunovic that on November 5 of this year, the Yugoslav ambassador in Hungary, Soldatic, made a request to the USSR ambassador in Hungary, com. Andropov, for the removal of the Soviet military unit which was located in the proximity of the mission building since at present the presence of this military unit near the Yugoslav mission was not necessary.

I told Micunovic that the Soviet military commander in Budapest for his part considers it possible to comply with the Yugoslav mission's request and to remove the Soviet military unit located near the mission.

I also told Micunovic that we cannot but be astonished by Koca Popovic's statement that "public opinion in Yugoslavia is quite strongly indignant." If we are talking about feelings, then our population, as well as every Hungarian patriot, is indignant to a far greater degree because of the fact that bankrupt degenerates and accomplices of counter-revolution such as Nagy and company, with whose knowledge worker-revolutionaries and communists were hanged on the streets of Budapest, took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy after their defeat.

Micunovic said that he had just acquainted himself with com. Khrushchev's letter of November 6 to coms. Tito, Kardelj and Rankovic. He cannot speak officially about the letter as a whole, but personally considers that its contents and conclusions contradict the understanding reached between com. Tito and coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov during their recent visit to Brioni.

Micunovic also stated that he does not differ with me in the judgment that Imre Nagy and his government cleared the way for counter-revolution. But there is an entire group of people with Nagy among whom there are honest communists. During the conversations at Brioni, it was stipulated that Imre Nagy and the others could improve the position of the new revolutionary worker-peasant government if in one way or another they announced their intention to assist this government or, at the least, not to speak out against it. The presence of Imre Nagy and others presently in the Yugoslav embassy does not contradict the understanding which took place between coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov and com. Tito and other Yugoslav figures during coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov's visit to Brioni.

I answered that insofar as I was informed of the contents of the conversation which took place at Brioni between coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov, on the one hand, and the leaders of Yugoslavia on the other, the Yugoslav government's provision of asylum to Nagy and his entourage in the Yugoslav embassy starkly contradicts the said conversation and understanding. Coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov informed the leadership of the party and the USSR government that com. Tito and the other Yugoslav leaders fully agreed with their Soviet comrades' conclusions that Imre Nagy and his confederates are not only political bankrupts, but are people who cleared the way for counter-revolution and who themselves became the accomplices of reactionaries and

imperialist forces. I know, for example, that during the conversation, com. Tito stated: "What sort of revolutionary is Nagy? What sort of communist is he if leading workers, communists and public figures were hanged and shot with his knowledge?"

In light of these facts, we are truly astonished and perplexed by the fact that the leaders of the Yugoslav government have sheltered the anti-people group headed by Nagy in the walls of the Budapest mission.

Micunovic once again repeated that he did not dissent from our assessment of Nagy. However, it is not necessary to create additional difficulties for the new Hungarian government and provoke the excitement and dissatisfaction of the Hungarian and Yugoslav population, as well as additional unpleasantness in the UN and in worldwide public opinion through certain actions relating to Nagy and his group, by which he meant that at present they are not taking part in any political activity and are keeping quiet.

I informed Micunovic that he would be received at 18:00 for a conversation with com. Khrushchev.

D. SHEPILOV.

Attested: [signature] [...]

.....

**Letter of the CC UCY to the CC CPSU
with an exposition of the views of the leadership of the
UCY on the events in Hungary**

8 November 1956, Brioni

To the first secretary of the CC CPSU,
comrade KHRUSHCHEV

Dear comrades!

We received your letter in which you stated the point of view of the Presidium of the CC CPSU on the issue of Imre Nagy and others who took refuge in our embassy in Budapest. We understand some of your arguments which are put forward in the aforementioned letter, and [we] consider them logical, but all the same we must sincerely say that in your letter we were deeply moved by the lack of understanding of our position and, especially, the lack of understanding of our readiness to resolve this issue in the spirit of reciprocal friendly relations, and not to the injury of the international reputation of Yugoslavia as a sovereign country. You agreed with us that Yugoslavia plays and in the future should play a very useful role in the world thanks to the reputation which it has acquired.

We will explain in detail to you here, which circumstances led to the current state of affairs, so that our position on this issue becomes clearer to you.

It is true that, during our conversations at Brioni, we agreed on the assessment that the weakness of Imre Nagy's government and the series of concessions made by that government to reactionary forces led to the risk of the destruction of the existing socialist achievements in Hungary. We agreed that the Hungarian communists

should not remain in such a government any longer and that they should rely on the laboring masses and resist reaction in the most decisive manner. There is no need to remind you that from the very beginning, and also throughout our entire conversation, we expressed our doubts as to the consequences of open help from the Soviet Army. But bearing in mind that, in accord with your evaluation that such help had become unavoidable, we considered that nonetheless it would be necessary to do everything possible in order to minimize harm to the task of socialism. You recall that we first stated our opinion that in such a position it would be best of all to create a government there in which people who had not compromised themselves during the regime of Rakosi would take part, and at the head of which would be comrade Kadar as a prominent communist who enjoys influence among the Hungarian laboring masses. We considered that it would be good if this government made a public appeal, and subsequently this was done. We agree with this appeal and for this reason in our public statements we gave full support to the government and the program which it announced. We believed that you agreed with this, that only such a government could once again restore contact with the laboring masses and gradually eliminate at least the serious [*tiazhelye*] consequences of the events in Hungary. You yourselves could see here [*u nas*] that in all of our arguments we were guided only by deep concern that the victories of socialism be preserved in Hungary and that the restoration of the old order, which would have had far-reaching consequences for all countries located in this part of Europe, including Yugoslavia, be prevented. In particular, in connection with all of this we put forward our thoughts on trying to keep communists, and perhaps Nagy himself, out of this government, in which different anti-socialist elements were located and which for this very reason was not in a condition to halt the [forces of] reaction on their path to power. Comrades Khrushchev and Malenkov did not reject these thoughts. On the contrary, they agreed with them, with some exceptions as to Nagy. We considered that in this government and around it there were honest communists who could be very useful in creating the new government of Janos Kadar and in liquidating the activity of anti-socialist forces. On the basis of this conversation at Brioni, we took some measures in Budapest on the afternoon of Saturday, 3 November of this year.

On November 2, Zoltan Szanto spoke with our representative in Budapest. In the course of this conversation, Szanto expressed the desire that he and some communists, if it were possible, could leave the building of the government and the CC and could find sanctuary in our embassy, since their lives were being threatened by reactionary bands of rioters. In the spirit of this conversation, our representative answered Szanto that we were ready to give them shelter if they made their escape immediately. We expected that they would answer on Sunday, the fourth of the month. However, on the morning

of the same day, the Soviet Army began its actions, and our conversations were ended. Instead of that, early in the morning of the same day, on the basis of previous conversations, Nagy and 15 other leaders of the government and the party together with their families arrived at our embassy. When we received the first report about this event from Budapest, we did not know whether the announcement which had been read, which you cite in your letter, was in fact Nagy's announcement or whether it was published without his knowledge. And so, Nagy and his group arrived on the basis of the conversations which had taken place earlier, before we from Belgrade could react to his announcement, for the authenticity of which we had no proof. As soon as we received word that Nagy and the others had taken refuge in the Yugoslav embassy, comrade Kardelj invited the counselor to the Soviet embassy in Belgrade, comrade Griaznov, and told him this fact. Despite the absence of such information, all the same, we then considered that an appropriate announcement by Nagy, if essentially in favor of the Kadar government, could still assist an easing of the situation in Hungary, as we proposed to you. Having not received an urgently requested reply from you in this regard throughout November 4, we refrained from further actions in that direction.

If attention is paid to all of this, then it becomes obvious that only as a result of the speed of events, matters were not clarified and problems were created, which it is now necessary to resolve. We believe that the question of whether our embassy in Budapest behaved correctly or not is now irrelevant, but that it is important that we jointly resolve the problem in the spirit of friendly relations, which we have already restored between our countries and our parties, since [the problem] in the final analysis appeared as a result of our conversation in Brioni, although, because of events which occurred during the night from Saturday to Sunday, things have developed in a different way than we proposed. After this, essentially, only their personal issue in regard to their request for asylum will remain to be decided.

We do not dispute some of your arguments as to the fact that granting asylum in Yugoslavia to members of the former Hungarian government, whose chairman has not resigned, could be negative, and do not think that we do not realize that all of this has also brought us some unpleasantness and complications. As we see from your letter, you have not accepted our proposal that Nagy and the rest of the group be transported, with your permission, to Yugoslavia, and that puts us, understandably, in a very difficult position. Specifically on that point, we would like you to treat the search for a joint way out of all of this with great understanding, since neither by the stipulations in our constitution on the granting of the right of asylum, nor by international custom, nor by other considerations which we cited earlier, can we break the word we have given and simply hand over these people. Here we must especially emphasize that such an action by us would provoke far-

reaching consequences in our country.

In your letter you say that this could have negative consequences for our relations as well, but we consider that this should not hinder the development of friendly relations between our parties and countries, [relations] which of late have already brought significant results. We consider that this issue can be resolved in such a way that it not harm either our country, or the Soviet Union, or the development of socialism in Hungary. We consider that the very friendship which exists between our two countries demands that the government of the Soviet Union regard the international prestige of Yugoslavia with great understanding, as it regards the prestige of the Soviet Union itself. If we did not behave in this way, the masses of our people could not understand either the politics of the Soviet Union or the politics of their own Yugoslav government. If we regard matters in this way, then we must believe that with the aid of the good will of both countries it is necessary to find a resolution which would not have a harmful influence on our friendly relations.

Bearing in mind such a state of affairs, it is difficult for us to believe that you, despite this, will not try to find another solution, all the more since we consider that, aside from transportation to Yugoslavia, there are also other possibilities for resolving this problem in keeping with international law, like, for instance, amnesty or something similar. We hope that you in the spirit of everything we have set out will once again examine your position.

In conclusion we would like once again to return to one argument from your letter. Despite the fact that some malevolent persons can interpret our relationship to Nagy and to the rest of the group in Budapest, we want to emphasize that we have absolutely no connection with this group, nor with the events in Hungary. Moreover, we reject the hint about our imaginary connection with the Petöfi club. Yugoslavia exists just as it is, with all its revolutionary past, with all its experience and understanding of socialist construction. If separate people in Hungary spoke about her [i.e. Yugoslavia], that does not give anyone the right to impute responsibility to Yugoslavia for internal events which have entirely different sources and other culprits. Precisely because we saw all of the dangers hidden in the stormy [events] in Hungary, we were extremely restrained and did all we could to act in a calm manner. This is evidenced by the arrival in Yugoslavia of the delegation of the Hungarian Workers' Party headed by Gerö. On the same principle we agreed with you in your assessment of the course of events in Hungary and publicly gave our support to the revolutionary worker-peasant government headed by comrade Kadar from the very first day. Accordingly, if someone now tries to accuse Yugoslavia of the events in Hungary, for which it bears not the slightest responsibility, we consider in such a case that it is in our common interest, and in the interest of socialism to repudiate such rumors.

With a comradely greeting

On behalf of the Central Committee

of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia
(I.B. Tito)

[Source: *AP RF*, f. 3, op. 64, d. 486, ll. 61-67. Copy. TsKhSD. f. 89, per 45. dok. No. 38. Obtained by the National Security Archive and CWIHP. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie (CWIHP).]

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¹ Practically nothing was changed in this sense by the publication of a collection of documents on Yugoslavia's policies towards Hungary in connection with the Hungarian revolution in 1959: *Politika Jugoslavije prema Madarskoj i slucaj Imre Nada* (Belgrade, 1959). It was compiled and published in connection with the trial that took place in 1958 in Hungary of the group of participants in the prominent revolutionary events of 1956 headed by Imre Nagy. The publication had a propaganda aim: to disprove the accusations made in the course of the trial of Yugoslavia's participation in statements against the pro-Soviet communist regime in Hungary. Although the collection, which consisted largely of newspaper publications, also included fragments of individual archival documents, as a result of the careful selection that had been exercised in its compilation, it lacked materials which would have exposed the behind-the-scenes dimension of Soviet-Yugoslav contacts in connection with the Hungarian revolution of 1956.

² *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970, 1971). I used the corrected Russian original of the recollections, which was published in the Moscow journal *Voprosy istorii* in 1990-1995 under the title of "Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev."

³ Veljko Micunovic, *Mockovske godine 1956-1958* (Zagreb, 1977); in this article the second edition (Belgrade, 1984) is cited. For an English-language edition, see Veljko Micunovic, *Moscow Diary* (London, 1980).

⁴ Leonid Gibianskij, *Magyarorsag, 1956: Hruscsov es Tito titkos levelezese*. - *Koztarsasag*, 1992, 25 szm, pp. 74, 76-77, 80-81; 26 szam, pp. 74, 76-77, 80-81; 27 szam, pp. 29-32; Leonid Gibianskij, "Le trattative segrete sovietico-jugoslave e la repressione della rivoluzione ungherese del 1956," *Storia Contemporanea* (Roma), 1994, no. 1, pp. 57-82. I touched on this problem briefly in: Leonid Ja. Gibianski, Witali, Ju. Afiani, Aleksandr S. Stykalin, "Zur sowjetischen Außenpolitik im Herbst 1956," in Inge Kircheisen, ed., *Tauwetter ohne Frühling: Das Jahr 1956 im Spiegel blockinterner Wandlungen und internationaler Krisen* (Berlin, 1995), pp. 42-44.

⁵ Of the most essential publications of documents, see: "Hungary, April-October 1956: Information of Iu.V. Andropov, A.I. Mikoian, and M.A. Suslov from Budapest," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* (Moscow), 1993, No. 4, pp. 103-142; "Hungary, October-November 1956: From the archives of the CC CPSU," *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 1993, No. 5, pp. 132-160; "Hungary, November 1956 - August 1957: From the archive of the CC

CPSU," *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 1993, No. 6, pp. 130-144; A "Jelcindosszie": *Szovjet dokumentumok 1956 - rol.* (Budapest, 1993); *Hianyzo lapok 1956 tortenetebol: Dokumentumok a volt SZKP KB leveltarabol* (Budapest, 1993); *Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956: Az allami- es partkapcsolatok rendezese, az oktoberi felkeles, a Nagy Imre-csoport sorsa.* *Dokumentumok* (Budapest, 1995); "How the 'Hungarian issues' were resolved: Working notes of the meetings of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, July-November 1956," *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 1996, No. 2, pp. 73-104 and No. 3, pp. 87-121. For an English translation, commentary, and annotation of the CC CPSU Presidium meetings on the 1956 Hungarian (and Polish) crises, see Mark Kramer, "Special Feature: New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises" and Mark Kramer, trans. and annot., "The 'Malin Notes' on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, nos. 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 358-384, 385-410.

⁶ In Moscow I researched documents in the former archive of the CC CPSU, now the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (henceforward TsKhSD); in Belgrade, I worked in the former archive of the CC of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia, which now is a fond in the collection of the Archive of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije [henceforward - AJ], f. 507), and in the archive of the former united secretariat on Yugoslav foreign affairs (Arhiva Saveznog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove, Politicka arhiva [henceforward ASSIP-PA]). I also used xerox copies of some archival materials kindly provided by my colleagues from the Institute of Slavic Studies and Balkanists of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vyacheslav Sereda and Aleksandr Stykalin, the latter of which I also thank for his help in translating documents from Hungarian.

⁷ See footnote 5.

⁸ For the transcript of this meeting of the CC CPSU Presidium, see "How the 'Hungarian issues' were solved," *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 1996, No. 2, pp. 82-83. For the discussion at the meetings of the CC CPSU Presidium on 28-31 October on the issue of whether to resort to a repeat operation by Soviet troops or to refrain from this, see *ibid.*, pp. 88-95, 97-102; No. 3, pp. 87, 90. The working notes of the said meetings confirm the circumstance mentioned in Khrushchev's memoirs, that the discussion of this issue in the CC CPSU Presidium was conducted in close connection with the negotiations between the Soviet leadership and the delegation of the CC of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which was in Moscow from 23-31 October to examine the events in Poland and Hungary (see: "Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev," *Voprosy istorii*, 1992, No. 11-12, pp. 83-84). In keeping with the data published in recent years in China, on 30 October 1956, the Chinese Politburo telegraphed a message to the delegation in Moscow to transmit Beijing's opinion to the Soviet leadership, that the Soviet troops should not be withdrawn from Hungary and should support communist power in that country. On 31 October, the Chinese delegation informed Khrushchev about this; see Chen Jian, "Beijing and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956," paper presented to the International Conference "Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence," Budapest, 26-29 September 1996, organized by the National Security Archive, the Institute for the History of the

1956 Hungarian Revolution, and the Cold War International History Project.

9 "Hungary, October-November 1956," p. 146.

10 "Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev," *Voprosy istorii*, 1994, No. 5 (hereafter - *Khrushchev's Memoirs*), pp 75-76; "How the 'Hungarian issues' were resolved," *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 1996, No. 3, p. 92.

11 On 31 October in the Soviet embassy in Belgrade, a telegram confirmed by the CC CPSU was sent from Moscow, in which Khrushchev proposed a secret meeting with Tito at any location in Yugoslavia or the USSR "in connection with the situation which had arisen in Hungary." On the same day, Moscow was informed in a telephonogram from the embassy that Tito agreed to a meeting and would prefer to conduct it in his residence on the island of Brioni, where he was then residing. See "Hungary, October-November 1956," p. 146; "How the 'Hungarian issues' were resolved," *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 1996, No. 3, p. 91.

12 *Khrushchev's Memoirs*, p. 77.

13 Micunovic, *Mosckovske godine*, pp. 157, 164.

14 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-91 (st. sign. 1-1/63), p. 4.

15 *Khrushchev's Memoirs*, p. 77; Micunovic, *Mosckovske godine*, pp. 158-159.

16 AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-78, l. 2; 119-95, l. 7-8, TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 84, p. 18.

17 *Khrushchev's Memoirs*, p. 77; Micunovic, *Mosckovske godine*, p. 159.

18 TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 84, s. 18; AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-95, l. 61; Micunovic, *Mosckovske godine*, pp. 159-160.

19 *Khrushchev's Memoirs*, pp. 77, 78; Micunovic, *Mosckovske godine*, pp. 159-161; AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-78, l. 3.

20 Micunovic, *Mosckovske godine*, pp. 160-161.

21 AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-77, l. 1; 119/I-78, l. 2-3; 119/I-92 (st. sign. 1-I/64), l. 3; TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 83, p. 4.

22 Gibianskij, *Magarorsag, 1956...* - Koztarsasag, 1992, 25 szam, p. 81.

23 See footnotes 53 and 54.

24 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, III/67.

25 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-78, l. 3; 119/I-95, l. 14, 64-65; TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 84, p. 21; "Hungary, October-November, 1956," p. 149.

26 *Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956*, p. 159.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 160. See Cable from Firiubin to Soviet Foreign Ministry, 4 November 1956, printed below.

28 "Hungary, October-November 1956," p. 119. Printed below.

29 *Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956*, pp. 160-161.

30 "Hungary, October-November 1956," pp. 149-150.

31 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-76.

32 About this telegram, see AJ, f. 507, CD SKJ, IX, 119/I-77, l. 1; Micunovic, *Mosckovske godine*, pp. 171-174.

33 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-77, ll. 1-4.

34 "Hungary, October-November 1956," pp. 151-153.

35 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-78, ll. 1-7. Printed below.

36 *Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956*, p. 190.

37 *Ibid.*, p. 191.

38 On the Soviet reply, see *ibid.*, pp. 194, 210; TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, ll. 4-5; Micunovic, *Mosckovske godine*, p. 178; AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-80 (st. sign. 1-I/57), l. 3.

39 TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, ll. 4-5; published in Hungarian in *Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956*, pp. 210-211.

40 Nagy demonstrated a decisive rejection of compromise with the Kadar government and the Soviet side, and in relation to sending him to Romania, gave a categorical refusal to the Romanian representative, Walter Roman, who visited him ten days later. *Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956*, pp. 195, 285-286.

41 *Ibid.*, pp. 192-193, 210; TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, ll. 4-5.

42 *Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956*, pp. 196-203, 230-232.

43 *Ibid.*, pp. 233-240; TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 5, ll. 3-4.

44 On these negotiations, see *Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956*, pp. 241-257, 259-275.

45 Micunovic, *Mosckovske godine*, pp. 184-191, 195-199, 200-201.

46 TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 5, l. 4; *ibid.*, d. 3, l. 11.

47 *Ibid.*, d. 5, ll. 19-26.

48 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-83; TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 4, ll. 24-33. See *CWIHP Electronic Bulletin*.

49 The available documents so far do not permit an explanation of the extent to which differences inside the Yugoslav leadership might have played a role here.

50 Obviously, the struggle within the CC CPSU Presidium is also expressed here. Its more conservative members, above all Molotov and Kaganovich, in the course of the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, spoke against any even purely declarative criticism of the Rakosi regime by Kadar, and in reply to the objections of Khrushchev and a series of other officials in the Soviet leadership, scared them with the danger of the Kadar government's slide on "the Yugoslav path." See "How the 'Hungarian issues' were resolved," *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 1996, No. 3, pp. 111-112, 114-117.

51 The Soviet letter of 10 January 1957, signed by Khrushchev, is in TsKhSD, f. 39, per. 45, dok. 83; AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-92. The Yugoslav response of 1 February 1957, signed by Tito, is in AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-95, l. 1-35, 58-76, and TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 84. See *CWIHP Electronic Bulletin*.

In Memoriam: Deng Xiaoping and the Cold War

In the final analysis, three main courts will pass judgement on the actions of our Parties. First of all, the masses, secondly, the communist parties, which in the course of their practical existence must figure out what is going on, and in the third instance, time and history, which makes the final conclusions.

General Secretary Deng Xiaoping in conversation with Soviet Ambassador S.V. Chervonenko (12 September 1960)¹

By David Wolff

Deng may have had something more philosophical in mind, but, his ultimate arbiter, history, is the daily output of the historians. This section of the *Bulletin* aims to provide enough archival material for historians of Chinese, Russian, and Communist history to begin a debate on the role of Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) in Sino-Soviet relations during the years 1956-1963, a period that witnessed both the final years of cooperation between the two communist powers and the emergence of tensions that finally split the alliance. Although the late paramount leader of the People's Republic of China is best remembered for the tremendous, though uneven, reforms that he introduced and oversaw during the last twenty years of his life, his earlier achievements should not be neglected.

Within weeks of the conversation from which the epigraph is drawn, Deng arrived in Moscow for ideological jousting at the highest levels with Mikhail Suslov, the Kremlin's "gray cardinal." And Deng always gave as good as he got. Of course, by 1963, when again Deng and Suslov headed the delegations, the level of vituperation had risen sharply. When Deng returned from this last encounter, the whole CCP Politburo, headed by Mao, Zhou, and Lin Biao turned out at the airport to applaud him, Peng Zhen, and Kang Sheng.² Vlad Zubok, in an insightful and provocative introductory essay, speculates that the services Deng rendered Mao in his battle with the Soviet "older brother" may have saved his life when the Cultural Revolution swept others away. Chen Jian's "Rejoinder" only strengthens this impression, while providing a fuller Chinese politics context. Both the 1960 and 1963 talks, together with six memoranda of conversations between Deng and Soviet representatives, are excerpted in this *Bulletin*. Additional materials can be found at the CWIHP website: cwihip.si.edu.

The fall of 1960 was a special time in other respects, for the USSR had just withdrawn its experts from the PRC, occasioning bewilderment, hardship and ill-will.³ Although the Soviet Union was well enough informed about affairs in China to sense the variety of reactions, newly released materials are only now making clear the depth of division. Only a few weeks after the withdrawal, the CCP

leadership had moved to seaside Beidaihe to escape the Beijing summer heat. Therefore, Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh, joined them there and met with Mao on August 10. In referring to the Soviet Union, Mao was livid.

Khrushchev can cooperate with America, England and France. He can cooperate with India and Indonesia. He can even cooperate with Yugoslavia, but only with China is it impossible on the grounds that we have divergent opinions. Does that mean that his views are identical with America, England, France and India to allow whole-hearted cooperation? [He] withdraws the experts from China and doesn't transfer technology, while sending experts to India and giving technology. So what if China doesn't have experts? Will people die, I don't believe it.

Ho's reaction was: "That's a pretty strong statement."⁴

In sharp contrast to this explosion, four days earlier on August 4, Chen Yi, the PRC Foreign Minister, had met with Ambassador Chervonenko and insisted that "speaking as one Communist to another," a full break between the parties was not a possibility.⁵ But what does this divergence of messages reveal? It is possible that in light of the disastrous famine that accompanied the "Great Leap Forward" and would claim upward of 15 million Chinese lives in 1959-61, Mao had ordered his subordinates to show restraint and moderation in the hope of continuing aid from the Soviets. After all, where else would it come from? On the other hand, it is also possible that the Chinese leadership, influenced by the same perception of China's dire straits, collectively opted for a moderate policy, despite Mao's rancor and radicalism. If this is indeed the case, we will find Deng among the moderates, placating the Soviets right up into 1962, if not further. But only additional documentation, especially from the Chinese side, can answer these critical questions.

The search for a current of moderation in a period usually identified with deepening estrangement in Sino-Soviet relations is exactly the kind of refinement that document-based studies of the Cold War can offer. An October 1997 gathering on "Sino-Soviet Relations and the

Cold War” (see conference schedule below) of Russian, Chinese, West European and American scholars in Beijing focused on new documentation, both Russian and Chinese, that made it possible to identify smaller positive eddies and swirls amidst the generally accepted trends of Sino-Soviet divergence. Similarly, the January 1996 CWIHP conference in Hong Kong examined documents from the early 1950s, the heyday of Sino-Soviet friendship, and found grounds for incipient strife.⁶

Document-based studies can also help us to draw a detailed and more human portrait of a giant of the twentieth century. What is certain is that the history of the Cold War will not be complete without an archive-based biography of Deng Xiaoping. CWIHP, together with all scholars of the Cold War and China, looks forward to the speedy release and publication of Deng-related materials by the appropriate PRC “units” with actual archival access, especially the Central Archives with their holdings of CCP documents. CWIHP is continuing its collection of materials from which to piece together the lifework of Deng Xiaoping and hopes that readers with such documents will forward copies to the Project.

¹ TsKhSD (*Tsentrāl'noe khranilishche sovremennoi*

dokumentatsii) [Central Repository for Contemporary Documentation], f. 5, op. 49, d. 327, l. 255.

² Kang Sheng’s diatribe against the Soviet treatment of Stalin is probably the most powerful piece of oratory in this *Bulletin*.

³ On the withdrawal of the Soviet experts, see Chen Jian, “A Crucial Step toward the Sino-Soviet Schism” in *CWIHP Bulletin*, 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 246ff.

⁴ See Yang Kuisong “Toward the Breakdown, 1960-3,” p.5 (Presented at the CWIHP-sponsored conference “Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cold War” (Beijing, 1997)).

⁵ See Odd Arne Westad, “Who Killed the Alliance?” pp. 7-8. (Presented at the CWIHP-sponsored conference “Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cold War” (Beijing, 1997)).

⁶ More on this can be found in *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 and 8-9, where the Russian version of a message from Mao to Stalin (2 October 1950) suggests great tensions in the earliest phases of the Korean War, a supposed highpoint of socialist internationalism. The previously accepted Chinese version, claiming identity of views on the sending of “volunteers” to Korea, now appears to have been a draft telegram never sent. Only declassification of the document and examination of its archival context can clarify this contradiction further.

Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cold War

An International Symposium Sponsored by

The Cold War International History Project, The Wilson Center; Institute of Contemporary China, CASS;
Center for Oriental History Research, Chinese Association of Historians; Fairbank Center, Harvard University
22-25 October 1997, Beijing

Wednesday, October 22, 1997

Brief Introduction of Conference Organization

SHEN ZHIHUA (Director, Center for Oriental History Research)

DAVID WOLFF (Director, The Cold War International History Project)

Reflections on Sino-Soviet Relations

Speakers: LI LIAN, ANATOLII HAZONOV, WARREN COHEN, YAN MINGFU, WU LENGXI, HUANG HUA, ZHU RUIZHEN

The Making of the Sino-Soviet Alliance

DIETER HEINZIG (Federal Institute of East European and International Studies, Germany)

The Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty Negotiations: A Reappraisal in Light of New Sources

SHEN ZHIHUA (Center for Oriental History Research)

The Signing of the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty of 1950 and Soviet Strategic Aims in the Far East

XUE XIANTIAN (Modern History Institute, CASS)

Soviet Strategy toward Xinjiang during the Postwar Period

LEONID NEZHINSKII (Russian History Institute, Russian Academy of Science)

The Changing Theoretical Foundation of Soviet Foreign Policy during the Cold War

Discussants: LIU GUOXIN (Institute of Contemporary China);

VLADISLAV ZUBOK (National Security Archive, Washington, DC)

Thursday, October 23, 1997

Sino-Soviet Economic Relations

WILLIAM KIRBY (Harvard University)

China, the Soviet Union, and East Europe: Trade Relations

ZHANG SHUGUANG (University of Maryland)

Western Economic Embargo against China and Sino-Soviet Relations

LEONID SHIROKORAD (St. Petersburg State University)

The Cold War and Soviet-Chinese Economic Relations in the Late 1940s and Early 1950s

Discussants: **LEV DELYUSIN** (Institute of World Politics and Economy, Russian Academy of Science);

ZHANG BAIJIA (CCP Central Institute of Party History)

International Conflict and Sino-Soviet Relations

KATHRYN WEATHERSBY (Independent Scholar, Washington, DC)

Sino-Soviet Relations and the Korean War

LI DANHUI (Institute of Contemporary China)

Sino-Soviet Relations and China's 'Assist Vietnam and Resist America'

HOPE HARRISON (Lafayette College)

China and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962

CHEN DONGLIN (Institute of Contemporary China)

China's Responses to the Soviet Union's Military Interventions in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia:

A Comparative Study

Discussants: **CHEN JIAN** (Southern Illinois University)

BORIS KULIK (Far Eastern Studies Institute, Russian Academy of Science)

.....
Friday, October 24, 1997

Changing Relations Between Beijing and Moscow in the 1960s

MIKHAIL PROZUMENSHIKOV (Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documents, Moscow)

The Year 1960 as Viewed by Soviet and Chinese Leaders

NIU JUN (American Studies Institute, CASS)

Changing Chinese Policy toward the Soviet Union during the Cultural Revolution

ANATOLII HAZONOV (Oriental Studies Institute, Russian Academy of Science)

Soviet Policy toward China during the Khrushchev Period

LEV DELYUSIN (Institute of World Politics and Economy, Russian Academy of Science)

Reflections on the Beginning of the Sino-Soviet Conflict

Discussants: **LI JINGJIE** (Institute of East European and Central Asian Studies, CASS)

ODD ARNE WESTAD (The Norwegian Nobel Institute)

Chinese and Soviet Leaders and Sino-Soviet Relations

ZHANG BAIJIA (CCP Central Institute of Party History)

Mao Zedong and Sino-Soviet Relations

VLADISLAV ZUBOK (National Security Archive, Washington, DC)

Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet Split

WILLIAM TAUBMAN (Amherst College)

Khrushchev and Sino-Soviet Relations

Discussants: **HOPE HARRISON** (Lafayette College); **YANG KUISONG** (Institute of Modern History, CASS)

.....
Saturday, October 25, 1997

Sino-Soviet Split and the Cold War

LI JIE (CCP Central Institute of Documents)

The Origins, Process and Consequences of the Sino-Soviet Polemic Debate

ODD ARNE WESTAD (The Norwegian Nobel Institute)

Who Killed the Alliance? An Account of Politics, Hunger, and Refugees

YANG KUISONG (Modern History Institute, CASS)

The Path toward the Split: How the CCP Leadership Dealt with the Crisis in Sino-Soviet Relations, 1961-63

BORIS KULIK (Far Eastern Institute, Russian Academy of Science)

The Sino-Soviet Split in the Environment of the Cold War

Discussants: **LI HAIWEN** (CCP Central Institute of Documents); **DAVID WOLFF** (Cold War International History Project)

“Look What Chaos in the Beautiful Socialist Camp!”

Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1956-1963

by *Vladislav M. Zubok*

In November 1957, on the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia, a high-level Chinese delegation arrived in Moscow to take part in a major conference of communist parties that was convoked by Soviet leader N. S. Khrushchev to grant a new international legitimacy to his leadership, which had already weathered years of domestic power struggle following Stalin's death. In Chinese leader Mao Zedong's entourage were CC CCP [Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party] general secretary Deng Xiaoping; director of the CC Central Administrative Office, Yang Shangkun; Mao's political secretary Hu Qiaomu; Defense Minister and Vice-Premier of the State Council Peng Dehuai; interpreter Li Yueran, and physician Dr. Li Zhisui. To the West the Communist reunion in Moscow looked like an ominous triumph of enemy forces, bent on expansion and untroubled by inner rifts. In reality, the rivalry between the Soviet and Chinese leadership was already in progress.

American journalist Harrison Salisbury, who interviewed Chinese veterans about this episode, writes that it was the first time Deng handled such a role and he “proved tireless in fighting for Mao's position.” Deng Xiaoping was the Chinese representative on the ten-nation committee that drafted the conference's final manifesto. “China swept the day,” Salisbury's Chinese sources told him. “Mao Zedong was never to forget this. It caused him to brag about his ‘little guy’ to Khrushchev—the man who ... bested Mikhail Suslov, the tall Soviet ideologue.”¹

Future biographers of Deng Xiaoping will have to pay more attention to his prominent role in the drama of the Sino-Soviet split.² New evidence from Eastern-bloc archives reveals that Deng earned many of his stripes in the ideological struggle for preeminence between Mao Zedong and Moscow. Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi alternated as ideological spokesmen in the relationship with Soviet leaders. The performance in November 1957 was one of Deng's first exploits in the Sino-Soviet ideological competition. His last was his face-off with the Soviets as the head of a Chinese delegation at the Sino-Soviet consultations on 5-20 July 1963.³ After that, the tenuous dialogue between the two communist powers degenerated into polemical brawl. Between these two dates were several significant episodes, including Deng's participation in the Beijing “summit” between Mao Zedong and Khrushchev in July-August 1958, and his participation in the Conference of the communist and workers' parties in Moscow in November 1960.

As Mao Zedong passed from cautious partnership with the Kremlin to greater assertiveness, tension, and open rivalry, Deng's political star continued to rise. He

performed his job of ideological “terrier” well: he challenged the Soviets, teased them, and knocked them off balance with a dazzling array of arguments. Besides ideological recriminations about who better interpreted Marxism-Leninism, Deng skillfully found “soft” spots in the Soviet armor, episodes of post-Stalin foreign policy and events inside the communist camp that deeply disturbed and even inwardly split Moscow echelons of power.

In this article I will trace Deng's role as Mao's agent in struggling for China's equal place and then for ideological supremacy in the communist camp. I will also compare the emerging evidence on the main events in Sino-Soviet relations in 1956-63 and the way Deng interpreted them in his polemics with the Soviets in July 1963. I will also reflect on the place of this episode in Deng's political biography.

The prelude to the story is Deng's two visits to Moscow in 1956. The first visit was in February 1956, when Deng Xiaoping and Zhu De attended the 20th CPSU congress at which Khrushchev denounced I. V. Stalin in a “secret speech” and declared that two systems, capitalist and socialist, could coexist and a world war was no longer inevitable.⁴ In his memoirs, Shi Zhe, an interpreter to the Chinese delegation at the congress, recalls that the Chinese were not invited to the closed session where Khrushchev made his famous speech, but the Soviet leader provided them with a copy of its transcript on the next day.

The Chinese delegation discussed the speech and was not quite sure how to react. It was Deng Xiaoping who emphasized that Khrushchev's attack on Stalin was not an “internal matter” of the CPSU, but had “an international impact,” and therefore it warranted extreme caution. He then refrained from further comments on the speech until the delegation returned to Beijing to report to Mao Zedong. In the following months dramatic international events demonstrated the correctness of Deng's first reaction.⁵ Through luck and political acumen, Deng Xiaoping began his perilous walk across the egg-shells of de-Stalinization.

The second visit was in October 1956, when Deng Xiaoping together with Liu Shaoqi participated in Sino-Soviet consultations on the revolutions in Poland and Hungary. It was a key turning point in the history of Sino-Soviet relations after Stalin's death, because for the first time the Chinese leadership was able to play the role of mediator between the Big Brother and its clients in Eastern Europe. For my knowledge of this episode and Deng's role in it, I am greatly indebted to Canadian historian Leo Gluchowski, and particularly to American-Chinese

historians Zhang Shuguang and Chen Jian.⁶

The notes of the head of the CC CPSU General Department Vladimir Malin on the discussions in the Kremlin reveal that Soviet leaders, even after they returned from Poland and the face-off between Khrushchev and Gomulka, contemplated military pressure and insisted that Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski, - the Soviet citizen installed by Moscow after World War Two as Polish Defense Minister whose ouster the Polish communists had demanded - should remain the head of the Polish army. Also the CC Presidium discussed inviting to Moscow "representatives from the Communist parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the GDR, and Bulgaria."⁷ However, the Polish leadership managed to appeal to the Chinese behind the Soviets back with a plea to intercede and prevent a possible Soviet military intervention. Later, after the fact, Mao Zedong asserted that "the CCP categorically rejected the Soviet proposal [for intervention] and attempted to put forward the Chinese position directly by immediately sending a delegation to Moscow with Liu Shaoqi at its head." Mao blamed the crisis in Poland on the tendency toward "great power chauvinism" in Moscow that repeated the worst patterns of Stalin's behavior from many, including himself, had suffered so much in the past. The Chinese leaders told the Polish ambassador in Beijing on October 27 that "between 19-23 October a CCP delegation...in Moscow convinced Khrushchev about the correctness of the political changes in Poland" and warned him that the use of military force would represent a return to the same Stalinist methods that Khrushchev had repudiated.⁸

There is still ambiguity regarding the exact timetable and details of Sino-Soviet consultations on the Polish, and particularly on the Hungarian crises. It is not clear why the Polish ambassador was misled about the dates of the Chinese delegation's stay in Moscow; actually it arrived on October 23, shortly after noon and stayed there until the late evening of October 31. Deng Xiaoping was still number two there after Liu Shaoqi who was considered a key ideologue and theoretician of communist bloc affairs. The rest of the delegation included lower-ranking officials Wang Jiaxiang and Hu Qiaomu, as well as interpreter Shi Zhe (Karskii). Khrushchev met the delegation at Vnukovo airport outside Moscow and already in the car began to talk with them about the Polish situation.⁹ The Malin notes mention only Liu by name, but according to Shi Zhe also Deng Xiaoping and other members of the Chinese delegation were invited to several sessions of the CC Presidium on 24, 26, the evening of 30 and the night of 30-31 October.¹⁰ On October 29 a crucial round of consultations took place between the Chinese and Khrushchev, Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin at Stalin's former dacha (Lipki) near Moscow. It was there first, Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs, that "we agreed upon a common opinion not to use our force" in Hungary.¹¹ Liu and Deng maintained regular radio-communications with Mao Zedong in Beijing.

On October 29-30, according to the Malin notes and Shi Zhe, the Chinese pushed the Russians to accept the five principles of Pancha Shila, namely equality and mutual noninterference between states (as postulated by Indian Premier J. Nehru and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai), as a new basis for relations between the USSR and its allies. After reporting on the situation in Hungary, Khrushchev informed the Presidium about his (and Molotov's) talks with "the Chinese comrades" and told them: "We should adopt a declaration today on the withdrawal of troops from the countries of people's democracy" if they demand it, and "the entire CPC CC Politburo supports this position."¹² After the declaration was drafted, the Chinese delegation, according to Shi Zhe, joined the session and approved of its text and publication.

The Chinese sources indicate that the Chinese changed their position from nonintervention to interventionist right at the moment when the Soviets agreed with their previous stand. As Chen Jian reconstructs these events on the basis of Chinese memoirs, "on the evening of October 30, after receiving a report from Liu and Deng Xiaoping from Moscow that the Soviet leaders were planning to withdraw their troops from Hungary, Mao Zedong chaired a meeting of top CCP leaders, which made the decision to oppose Moscow's abandoning of Hungary to the reactionary forces."¹³ The reversal of the Chinese position on Hungary most likely happened very late on October 30. Shi Zhe's memoirs and the Malin notes suggest that there was an urgent night session of the Presidium with the Chinese. At first Pavel Iudin, the Soviet ambassador to Beijing, informed the Presidium members about "negotiating with the Chinese comrades," then "Com. Liu Shaoqi indicate[ed] on behalf of the CPC CC that [Soviet] troops must remain in Hungary and in Budapest."¹⁴ Shi Zhe's dramatic description of this event has Deng Xiaoping making three proposals to the Soviets: the Soviet army should not withdraw from Hungary, everything should be done to help the loyal Hungarian communists to resume political control and, together with the Soviet military, restore order. Deng stressed that the Soviet troops had a chance "to play a model role, demonstrating true proletarian internationalism."¹⁵

Later Mao Zedong (and the Chinese leadership along with him) and Khrushchev greatly diverged in the reconstruction of these events. Khrushchev in his memoirs did not make a single mention of the Chinese factor when he described the Polish events, and when he came to the Hungarian events he insisted that the intervention in Hungary was his own decision, taken in a sleepless night after serious brooding. After that, he claims, he convened an emergency session of the CC Presidium, announced his new decision and made all present go to Vnukovo airport to inform the Chinese delegation about the Soviet decision to intervene.¹⁶

The differences between the Chinese and Soviet versions of that momentous discussion were not fortuitous. They, as well as zigzags in both sides' positions on

Hungary, could be explained and understood only if we look at them from within the world in which the participants themselves lived and thought. In this world each side maneuvered with a careful eye on three factors — one was the legacy of Stalin, the embodiment of power and unity of the communist camp; another was the power struggle inside Moscow and Beijing; the third was the emerging struggle between Mao Zedong and Khrushchev for seniority and revolutionary legitimacy within the communist world. Mao Zedong had been outraged when Khrushchev in February had denounced Stalin without consulting the Chinese leadership. Mao realized, to his extreme displeasure, that this funny, bald-headed Soviet leader had just undercut his, Mao's, intention to turn Stalin into a pedestal for his seniority in the world communist movement — while building his own legitimacy as a paragon of de-Stalinization. From 1956, Mao began to regard himself as the potential leader of the communist camp and Khrushchev as a time-server and political liability. Evidently Deng Xiaoping was one of those who avidly shared this new perception in Beijing.

In July 1963 Deng Xiaoping challenged the Soviets on what had happened on those fateful days. Deng Xiaoping said that “after the 20th congress of the CPSU, as a consequence of the so-called struggle against the cult of personality and the wholesale renunciation of Stalin, a wave of anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaigns was provoked around the whole world...The most prominent events which took place in this period were the events in Poland and Hungary.” Deng Xiaoping was careful to indicate that the Chinese leadership had never concealed this position from the Soviets. In fact, on 23 October 1956 when the Hungarian revolution started, Mao Zedong had told Soviet ambassador Pavel Iudin that the Soviets “had completely renounced such a sword as Stalin, and had thrown away the sword. As a result, enemies had seized it in order to kill us with it.” Khrushchev's method of criticizing Stalin, Mao had implied, was “the same as if having picked up a stone, one were to throw it on one's own feet.”¹⁷

Continuing his commentary on the events of 1956, Deng added, “We have always considered and still consider that in resolving the issues connected with the events in Poland, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union took a position of great-power chauvinism, trying to exert pressure on Polish comrades and to subordinate them by means of coercion and even trying to resort to the use of military force.”

Deng Xiaoping then glossed over the major zigzag that occurred in Beijing vis-à-vis the Hungarian events and went right to the conclusion that underlined Mao's decision on October 31 to insist on intervention: that the Hungarian events were fundamentally different from the Polish ones since it was an anti-Communist, anti-Soviet counterrevolution and not merely a protest against great-power chauvinism. “And what position did the CPSU take in regard to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary?”

asked Deng Xiaoping. “The leadership of the CPSU at one time tried to leave socialist Hungary to the mercy of fate. You know that at that time we spoke out against your position on the matter. Such a position was practically tantamount to capitulation. The course and details of these two events are well known to you and us. I do not want to dwell on them too much.”¹⁸

Yet, as an experienced orator, Deng returned to this subject again and again, reminding the Soviets of other “details:” “On 18 January 1957 in Moscow, at the fifth discussion with the government delegation of the Soviet Union, Com. Zhou Enlai touched on the events in Hungary, noting that the counter-revolutionary revolt in Hungary was connected, on the one hand, with some mistakes committed by Stalin when resolving issues of mutual relations between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, and, on the other, was connected with mistakes committed by the leadership of the CPSU in its criticism of Stalin. In discussion Com. Zhou Enlai again set out the aforementioned three points on this issue to the leadership of the CPSU: the lack of an all-round analysis, the lack of self-criticism and the lack of consultation with the fraternal countries.”

“It should be further noted that when the events in Poland arose, Com. Liu Shaoqi as head of the delegation of the Communist Party of China arrived in Moscow for negotiations [on 23 October 1956—VZ] during which he also talked about the issue of Stalin and criticized comrades from the CPSU for committing the same mistakes during the events in Poland—mistakes of great-power chauvinism.”¹⁹

On the opposite side of the table were CC CPSU Secretary Mikhail Suslov and Iurii Andropov, immediate participants in the Hungarian events. But only Suslov had taken part in the CC Presidium discussions in October 1956, and even he was not present at the crucial session on October 30-31. Therefore the Soviet delegation had no response other than to give a general rebuff and avoid a slippery debate on details.

“We do not plan to examine these issues anew,” Suslov said. “We will simply note the complete lack of foundation for your assertions to the effect that the decisions of the 20th congress led to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary. One of the reasons for those events, as is shown by the materials of the fraternal parties, as well as the errors of the fraternal parties, is the errors of the previous leadership of Hungary connected with Stalin's actions...”

“You are now trying to accumulate capital by speculating on these events and by proving that the Soviet Union allegedly committed errors and that by your interference you almost managed to save the situation. This is a strange and monstrous accusation to lay at the feet of the CPSU and a more than bizarre arrogance on the part of the Chinese leaders. Did our country not pay with thousands of its sons' lives in order to preserve the socialist order in fraternal Hungary? Did it not come to

the aid of the friendly Hungarian people in its difficult hour? Why then have you found it necessary again to rehash the past and return to the events in Hungary and Poland?"²⁰

But in fact in this particular game Deng Xiaoping held a good hand of cards and Suslov knew it. After the October 1956 events the influence of the CCP on the political moods and the power struggle in the Kremlin was at its peak. This influence had no precedent under Stalin and it declined later, when Khrushchev ousted his rivals and moved to the position of unchallenged leader of the party and state. This phenomenon, as well as the importance of the Chinese pressure on the Soviets during the Polish-Hungarian "October," has not been understood by Western observers and scholars; nor was it admitted then and later by the Soviets themselves. Yet, like the events in Hungary and Poland, the changing equation between Moscow and Beijing was a direct result of Khrushchev's cavalier de-Stalinization and the turmoil it caused in the communist movement and the ranks of the Soviet leadership itself. Internationally, Khrushchev's revelations had shattered the traditional hierarchy of the communist world, with Moscow at the top. Internally, the Soviets weakened themselves with internal strife and were eager to cater to the Chinese in order to preserve "the unity of the socialist camp." Khrushchev, who a year earlier had attacked Stalin's and Molotov's role in antagonizing Tito's Yugoslavia (See Plenums section of this *Bulletin*), was determined to avoid the same mistakes with Communist China, whatever Mao said about Stalin. And Molotov and other opponents of de-Stalinization in the Soviet leadership looked at the Chinese as their potential allies against Khrushchev.

A majority of the Presidium secretly agreed with Chinese assessments of the situation and Khrushchev felt the danger of a united front between Beijing and what would become in June 1957 "the anti-party group" of Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich, as well as Pervukhin, Voroshilov, and Dmitrii Shepilov. During Zhou Enlai's visit to Moscow in January 1957 the CC CPSU Presidium *de facto* reversed the policy of de-Stalinization and Khrushchev had to name Stalin publicly "a great Marxist-Leninist." This was Khrushchev's forced tactical concessions to the growing opposition, and as Molotov sardonically observed in June 1957: "Of course, when com. Zhou Enlai came, we began to lean over backward [*raspisivatsia*] that Stalin is such a communist that one wishes everyone would be like him. But when Zhou Enlai left, we stopped doing it."²¹

In fact, the Chinese leadership preferred to abstain from the power struggle in the Kremlin, perhaps because Mao underestimated Khrushchev's chances for political survival and triumph. At the same time they began to see the CCP and themselves as the central and more senior and experienced "unit" in the world communist movement. After his visit to Moscow, Zhou Enlai reported to the CC Politburo and Mao Zedong that the Soviet leaders (and he

meant Khrushchev, Mikoian, and Bulganin in the first place) "explicitly demonstrate weakness in considering and discussing strategic and long-term issues." The report went to describe examples of Soviet "washbuckling," internal disagreements and equivocation. Of particular interest was a comment apparently saved for Khrushchev: "extremely conceited, blinded by lust for gain, lacking far-sightedness, and knowing little the ways of the world, some of their [Soviet—VZ] leaders have hardly improved themselves even with the several rebuffs they have met in the past year...They appear to lack confidence and suffer from inner fears and thus tend to employ the tactics of bluffing or threats in handling foreign affairs or relations with other brotherly parties." On the positive side, however, Zhou's report noted with obvious satisfaction that "now the Soviet Union and China can sit down to discuss issues equally. Even if they have different ideas on certain issues, they must consult with us."²²

Soon after Khrushchev emerged victorious from the power struggle, Mao's exasperation with him began to show. Mao's agreement to participate in the Moscow international conference of communist parties in November 1957 was just a lull in the growing tension. Soon Mao's wrath was triggered by two Soviet proposals: to establish along the Chinese coast a set of long-wave radio stations to guide Soviet submarines in the Pacific Ocean, and to build a joint Sino-Soviet nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Mao Zedong interpreted the first proposal as a Soviet attempt to gain new military bases in China and the second as a rejection of an earlier Chinese request for Soviet technology, in order to enable the PRC to build its own nuclear submarines.

On 22 July 1958, Mao Zedong vented this rage at Soviet ambassador Pavel Iudin regarding the ostensible resumption of unequal treatment of China by the Soviet leadership. The transcript of this meeting, translated by Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, highlights what happened beneath the surface of the Sino-Soviet friendship around November 1957 and sheds new light on the role of Deng Xiaoping as Mao's right-hand man. As Mao told Iudin, in Moscow in November he had "often pointed out [to the Soviet leaders], there had existed no such thing as brotherly relations among all the parties because, [your leaders] merely paid lip service and never meant it; as a result, the relations between [the brotherly] parties can be described as between father and son or between cats and mice. I have raised this issue in my private meetings with Khrushchev and other [Soviet] comrades....Present were Bulganin, Mikoian, and Suslov...*From the Chinese side, I and Deng Xiaoping were present.*" [my italics—VZ].

"While in Moscow," Mao Zedong continued, he assigned "Deng Xiaoping to raise five [controversial] issues. We won't openly talk about them even in the future, because our doing so would hurt Comrade Khrushchev's [political position]. In order to help consolidate his [Khrushchev's] leadership, we decided not to talk about these [controversies], although it does not

mean that the justice is not on our side.”²³

When Khrushchev secretly flew to Beijing on 31 July 1958 and tried to resolve tension during long talks with Mao Zedong around a swimming pool at his house (and even in the pool), Deng Xiaoping was at Mao's side. According to Salisbury's sources, “Mao heard Khrushchev out, then turned Deng Xiaoping loose. Deng flew at the Soviet leader like a terrier. He accused the Russians of ‘Great Nation’ and ‘Great Party’ chauvinism.” Deng told Khrushchev that China had no objection to long-distance wireless communications for the Soviet fleet, but they must be Chinese-built, Chinese-operated, and Chinese-controlled. He criticized the conduct of Soviet advisers in China.²⁴ Chinese recollections (and apparently Deng's monologue) repeated almost word by word Mao's harangue to Iudin. But Deng could be even more blunt than Mao Zedong and he did it with relish.

Later, during the July 1963 consultations with the Soviets, he told them that in April-July 1958 the CPSU had sought “to put China under its military control. But we guessed through your intentions, and you failed to achieve this aim.” He then teased the Soviets further, claiming that Khrushchev's decision to send Soviet missiles to Cuba was dictated by the same imperialist logic. “...In shipping missiles to Cuba, did you want to help her or to ruin her? We have become suspicious that you, in shipping missiles to Cuba, were trying to place her under your control.”²⁵

The barbs hit their target, hurting Soviet pride. Suslov apparently had to dip into Soviet archives to quote from the transcript of the Khrushchev-Mao conversation, in order to respond to Deng's allegations. “Com. Deng Xiaoping,” he said on 10 July, “after all you were present at the discussion between Com. Khrushchev and Com. Mao Zedong on 31 July 1958 and took part in it. Have you really forgotten the following statement made by Com. Khrushchev in the course of the conversation: “Never have we at the CC of the CPSU ever had the thought of jointly building a fleet...We considered it necessary to talk about the issue of building a fleet, but we neither thought about or considered it necessary to construct a joint factory or a joint fleet.” According to Suslov, Mao responded to these words: “If it is so, then all the dark clouds have dispersed.”²⁶

Documentary evidence is still lacking on Deng's role in the Sino-Soviet disputes and meetings of 1959, particularly during the famous confrontation between Khrushchev and the Chinese leadership in Beijing in October 1959. The traces of Deng Xiaoping become once again visible in the first months of 1960, when he met with Soviet Ambassador Stepan Chervonenko. Clearly, Sino-Soviet tension was on both their minds. Chervonenko, the relatively new Soviet man in China, did his best to tell Khrushchev and the rest of the Politburo what they were eager to hear. When Khrushchev denounced Eisenhower and the CIA in Moscow and derailed the May 1960 summit in Paris after the infamous U-2 incident, his image in the Chinese leadership dramatically improved. The Soviet ambassador

reported that, according to Deng Xiaoping, “comrade Khrushchev's report [at the Supreme Soviet, when he revealed that the Soviets had Francis Gary Powers in captivity] made a huge impression,” and “important new measures in the area of internal policy had once again displayed the Soviet Union's strength to the whole world.” Historians would be interested to know that Chervonenko, on Khrushchev's instructions, informed Deng Xiaoping “about the position of the Soviet Union in connection with the summit conference.” Deng noted that Khrushchev “acted completely correctly by going to Paris; he should have gone.” He also said that the Soviet leader “fully uncovered the true face of Eisenhower and the imperialists.”

What came next from Deng Xiaoping, however, could not have pleased the Soviets. In a disingenuous twist of topic, he compared Khrushchev's denunciation of Eisenhower with Zhou Enlai's denunciation of the Indian Prime Minister Nehru during Zhou's trip to India. “Nehru's true face was uncovered,” said Deng Xiaoping, knowing perfectly well that he was talking about one of Khrushchev's great friends and allies in the third world. The Sino-Indian border conflict would drag on, Deng continued, because Nehru uses it to receive American economic assistance. “Many political figures in the countries of Asia—Nasser [Egypt], Kasem [Iraq], Sukarno [Indonesia], U Nu [Burma]—are taking the same positions as Nehru. Nehru stands out among them; he is the cleverest. He did not waste the time he spent studying in England; the English are more experienced than the Americans in political tricks.” “The struggle with bourgeois figures of this sort is one of the most important problems facing the international communist movement.”

Chervonenko, however, preferred to conclude his memo to Moscow on a brighter note. He cited Deng as saying that “the issue of developing a movement in support of Khrushchev's statement [at the Supreme Soviet] was being examined in the CC CCP” “Deng Xiaoping asked me to convey a warm greeting to comrade N.S. Khrushchev and to all of the members of the Presidium of the CC CPSU on behalf of comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and all of the leaders of the CC CPSU. The Americans are closing ranks against us, he said, but their closing of ranks is insecure. Our solidarity, and the solidarity of the countries of the socialist camp is inviolable, since it is founded on a unity of ideas and goals.”²⁷ People in the Kremlin and the Soviet embassy in Beijing apparently treated this as an encouraging signal. The Embassy's Political Letter in July 1960 specifically referred to this conversation and mentioned there were “grounds to expect” Sino-Soviet rapprochement on the basis of a common anti-American line.²⁸

It did not take long for the Soviets to see their hopes dashed to pieces. In early June 1960, at a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Beijing, Deng Xiaoping turned his “bad side” to them. The most recent evidence on this and subsequent events in Sino-Soviet

relations comes from transcripts of CPSU plenums. Reporting to the plenum on 13 July 1960, Khrushchev's party deputy Frol Kozlov reported that on 5 June the Politburo of the CC CCP "had invited around 40 communists—leaders of foreign trade unions, to dinner, followed by a conference" of trade unionists. Liu Shaoqi opened this conference, and then "com. Deng Xiaoping took the floor, and his speech contained a number of absolutely false positions, which contained an obvious distortion of the line of the CPSU." Deng, according to Kozlov's story, declared that the CPSU and other fraternal parties had "tossed overboard the main points of the Declaration" of the communist conference of November 1957.²⁹ Perhaps this pushed Khrushchev over the edge leading to the abrupt removal of Soviet advisors and technical personnel from China.

The trade union conference in Beijing was, as it turned out, China's preparation for the clash with the USSR at the congress of "fraternal parties" in Bucharest in late June 1960, where Khrushchev and the leaders of the East European countries all participated. With Deng Xiaoping absent from the Bucharest congress, the role of ideological hit-men fell to Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, Wu Xiuquan, and Liu Xiao. It is not clear what the little "terrier" was busy with at that time. Three years later he explained it away with a joke. "I said [then] I was fortunate that [instead of me] went com. Peng Zhen. His weight is around 80 kilograms, so he endured. If I had gone, and I weigh only a bit over 50 kilograms, I would not have endured." Deng Xiaoping referred to the atmosphere of heckling in Bucharest that he blamed on the Soviets.³⁰

This first open split at a major communist forum led to the first bilateral consultations in Moscow on 17-22 September 1960. Deng Xiaoping headed the delegation which included Peng Zhen, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Yang Shangkun, Hu Qiaomu, Liu Zhengqi, Wu Xiuquan and Liu Xiao. The Soviet team included Suslov (head of the delegation), Khrushchev's first deputy Frol Kozlov, Kuusinen, Pospelov, Ponomarev, Andropov, Il'ichev, philosopher Constantinov, Grishin and Ambassador Chervonenko.³¹ The transcripts of the discussions, found in the East German archives, reveal tactics and positions of both sides.³² Apparently the Soviet delegation's main goal was to rescue the November conference and, while conducting ideological polemics with the Chinese, achieve some kind of a fraternal understanding. Deng must have understood that Khrushchev and the Soviets had a vital stake in preventing an open split. Yet he deliberately tested the Soviet mettle.

In one instance he drew a distinction between Khrushchev, who "stands at the head of Soviet comrades who attack China," and Kozlov and Suslov, from whom the Chinese "have not heard [anti-Chinese] speeches." That provocative pitch evoked indignant rebuffs from both. In another instance, Deng told the Soviet delegation that allegedly Khrushchev had remarked to the Vietnamese

delegation in Moscow that the Chinese were planning to give substantial means for restoration of the tomb of Ghengis Khan and that this smacks of "yellow peril."³³

For his attack on Khrushchev, Deng singled out the Soviet Chairman's failed attempt to reach accommodation with President Eisenhower and Khrushchev's refusal to support China in its conflict with India in the second half of 1959-early 1960. "Why did comrade Khrushchev speak with such high expectations about Eisenhower?" "We would like to ask you with whom would you line up in the moment of trouble? With Eisenhower, with Nehru, or with the fraternal socialist country, with China?"³⁴ Then, to maximize the power of his attack Deng rolled out a complete list of complaints: Stalin's violation of Chinese sovereignty in the treaty of 1950, the discussion of radio stations and joint fleet in 1958, etc. He explained to the Soviets that this was necessary to overcome "father-son" syndrome in the Sino-Soviet relationship. However, the Soviets, who had heard it many times before since 1954, genuinely wondered why it was necessary to "unearth" all those issues that had been long resolved. The discussion revolved around the same issues without making any progress.

Still, the Chinese did not burn their bridges to Khrushchev at that time: the Soviet chairman definitely "improved" after the U-2 incident. For that reason Deng Xiaoping, while criticizing Khrushchev and his foreign policy of the recent past, said words that were honey for the hearts of the Soviets: that "differences in opinions" between Beijing and Moscow would be gradually overcome through the mechanism of periodic consultations and in the interests of joint struggle against "the common enemy." Reciprocating, Suslov asked the Chinese "to pass most sincere greetings on behalf of our delegation and the Presidium of our CC to the Central Committee of the CC of China and to comrade Mao Zedong." He then invited the Chinese delegation to lunch with the Soviet delegation.³⁵ Once again, Deng was a tactical winner: he put the Soviets on the defensive by his criticism and still kept them at bay by dangling the promise of renewed friendship.

Deng Xiaoping soon came to Moscow again in October to take part in the work of a Commission and an Editorial Group, to prepare documents for the congress of communist parties in November 1960—the largest ever in the history of the communist movement. After the first two quiet days, according to Suslov's report, Deng criticized a draft declaration of the congress proposed by the Soviet side as "inadequate" and directed against the CCP. After that the confrontational atmosphere came back. At that time the Chinese delegation acquired a first satellite—the Albanian delegation.³⁶

Mao's terrier leaped forward again amid the work of the great Moscow congress. After Khrushchev's major address to the meeting, in the presence of communist delegates from 67 countries Deng Xiaoping, according to Suslov's account, suddenly began to speak instead of Liu

Shaoqi who was announced on the list. Suslov remarked later that Deng “passed up in total silence the speech of com. Khrushchev.”³⁷ This figure of silence was probably meant to imply how unworthy of attention were the pronouncements of the Soviet leader who pretended to be the head of the world communist movement! Khrushchev swallowed the bait and had to give a rebuff to Deng Xiaoping in his second, unplanned speech on 23 November. Deng counterattacked on the next day and this produced a virtual pandemonium at the conference. Each and every leader of an East European country, West European communist party, and pro-Moscow organization elsewhere rushed to the podium to voice their full and unswerving support of the Soviet leader and to appeal to the Chinese not to break the “united” ranks.

The Soviet leadership, too, was horrified by a prospect of schism and preferred to offer a compromise to the Chinese, particularly on the interpretation of Stalin’s role. At this point “bad cop” Deng Xiaoping receded in the shadow, and “good cop” Liu Shaoqi, much respected in Moscow, met with Khrushchev on October 30 to reach a deal.³⁸ All this division of labor on the Chinese side was probably orchestrated in advance, with the active participation of Mao Zedong. But the Soviets pretended they did not understand it, hoping to paper over the growing chasm and eager to end the conference on the note of unity.

The consultations of July 1963 were also the byproduct of these Soviet illusions. Moscow proposed them in a CC CPSU letter of 21 February 1963. Beijing, on the contrary, geared itself for ideological battle, publicizing its so called “25 points” (Proposal for the General Line of the International Communist Movement) on the very eve of the Sino-Soviet consultations.³⁹ The Chinese “points” of 14 June 1963 fell with a thud on the proceedings of the CC CPSU plenum on ideology and naturally became the focus of discussions there.

The discussion in Moscow was a bizarre event, more reminiscent of a scholarly exercise, where each side presented “a report” replete with citations from Lenin, Trotsky, Khrushchev, Mao Zedong, etc. Essentially it was just another act in the public show, where teams of speech-writers, cued by instructions of their chiefs, produced tomes of vituperative, albeit impossibly turgid polemics.⁴⁰ Georgii Arbatov, then a scholar at IMEMO in Moscow and “consultant” for the CC International Department, became an assistant to the Soviet delegation at the Sino-Soviet talks. He recalls in his memoirs that “they consisted of endless unilateral declarations intended, first, to rip the other side to shreds and, second, to defend one’s own case and Marxist orthodoxy.” Each day of discussion was followed by “a day off.” “As we understood it,” writes Arbatov, “the Chinese would then go to their embassy and send the text of our statement by coded telegram (probably with their comments and proposals attached) to Beijing. They then would wait for the reply. We got the impression that this was in the form of a final text of their statement in reply to ours.”⁴¹

The target of the Chinese delegation at the meeting was Khrushchev and his de-Stalinization. Kang Sheng delivered a most unrestrained speech. “Comrades from the CPSU call Stalin ‘a murderer,’ ‘a criminal,’ ‘a bandit,’ ‘a gambler,’ ‘a despot like Ivan the Terrible,’ ‘the greatest dictator in the history of Russia,’ ‘a fool,’ ‘shit,’ ‘an idiot.’ All of these curses and swear words came from the mouth of Com. N.S. Khrushchev.” Kang Sheng continued sarcastically: “Frankly speaking, we cannot understand at all why the leadership of the CPSU feels such a fierce hatred for Stalin, why it uses every kind of the most malicious abuse, why it attacks him with more hatred than it reserves for its enemies?”

“Can it really be that the achievements of the national economy and the development of the newest technology in the Soviet Union in several decades have been attained under the leadership of some sort of ‘fool?’ Can it really be that the bases for the development of nuclear weapons and missile technology in the Soviet Union have been laid down under the leadership of some sort of ‘fool?’ ...Can it really be that the great victory of the Soviet Army during World War Two was won under the command of some sort of ‘idiot?’ ...Can it really be that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which for a long time had the love and respect of the revolutionary people of the whole world had a ‘bandit’ as its great leader for several decades?...Can it really be that communists of all countries considered some sort of ‘shit’ to be their flagbearer for several decades?”

“Let us take, for example, com. Khrushchev. He heaped all of the errors of the period of Stalin’s leadership...on Stalin alone while he presented himself as being completely clean. Can this really convince people? If the memory of men is not too short, they will be able to recall that during Stalin’s leadership com. Khrushchev more than once extolled Stalin and his policy of struggling with counter-revolutionary elements.”⁴²

As we have seen, Deng Xiaoping, by comparison with Kang Sheng, used specific examples from recent international history and history of the crises and tensions inside the communist camp in which he was often a direct participant. He, as a leader of the Chinese delegation, found the weakest spot in Khrushchev’s defenses—his inability to end the Cold War with the West and the zigzags of his foreign policy. First, Deng Xiaoping implied that Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU was the result of his political egotism which produced a severe crisis in the communist movement and alliance.

“After the 20th congress of the CPSU, as a consequence of the so-called struggle against the cult of personality and the full, wholesale denial of Stalin, an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaign was provoked around the whole world. Taking up a good chance, the imperialists, Titoist clique and reactionaries of various countries unleashed an offensive against the Soviet Union, socialist camp and communist parties of different countries and created grave difficulties for many parties.” “On 23

October 1956...com. Mao Zedong said that you had completely renounced such a sword as Stalin and had thrown this sword away. As a result, enemies had seized it in order to kill us with it. That is the same as if, having picked up a stone, one were to throw it on one's own feet."⁴³

Second, Deng Xiaoping condemned Khrushchev's diplomacy of detente toward the West as futile and self-destructive and here he rose to the height of his rhetoric: "Frankly speaking, into what chaos you have plunged the beautiful socialist camp! In your relations with fraternal countries of the socialist camp you do not act at all in the interests of the entire socialist camp but you act from the position of great power chauvinism and nationalist egotism." "When you consider that your affairs go well, when you believe you grasped some kind of a straw handed to you by Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nehru or somebody else, then you are beyond yourself from joy and in all fury against those fraternal parties and fraternal countries which do not obey your wand and do not want to be under your sway, and then you condemn the socialist camp to total oblivion."

"When you are in trouble, when you suffer setbacks because of your erroneous policy, then you get enraged and vent it on fraternal parties and countries who stick to principles and the truth, then you make them 'scapegoats,' then you even sacrifice the interests of the entire socialist camp in order to cater to imperialists and reactionaries and to find a way out."⁴⁴

Some of the Soviet representatives seated on the other side of the table, particularly Suslov, a crypto-Stalinist, had their own grave doubts about Khrushchev's foreign policy that coincided with Deng's observation. Yet, as loyal apparatchiks they expressed outrage at "personal attacks on com. N.S. Khrushchev." Mikhail Suslov described Khrushchev's great leadership qualities: "By his work and struggle, unshakable faith in the cause of the working class, by flexible revolutionary tactics, com. Khrushchev deals precise blows to the imperialists, cleverly uses contradictions in their camp, reveals to broad masses methods of struggle against imperialism and colonialism, for peace, democracy and socialism."⁴⁵ It was of course the same Suslov who directed criticism of the ousted Khrushchev slightly more than a year later, at the October 1964 Plenum of the CPSU.⁴⁶

There was "the dog that did not bark" in the course of the discussion. The Soviet delegation emphasized the nuclear revolution and the danger of nuclear war as the core of their rethinking of international relations. More concretely, the Sino-Soviet meeting took place in the shadows of the momentous American-British-Soviet negotiations in Moscow that began on July 15 and ended on August 5 with a signing in the Kremlin of a Limited Test-Ban Treaty. In the background exchanges and consultations with Khrushchev, the Americans implicitly and sometimes explicitly proposed to join efforts to thwart the efforts of Beijing to become a nuclear power. On July

15, Kennedy instructed his negotiator Averell Harriman "to elicit K's view of means of limiting or preventing Chinese nuclear development and his willingness either to take Soviet action or to accept U.S. action aimed in this direction."⁴⁷ Harriman and other U.S. representatives who met with Khrushchev several times in the period between July 15 and 27, noted that "China...is today Soviet overriding preoccupation" and sought to exploit it by raising the issue of joint preemptive actions against China's nuclear program. However, to the Americans' disappointment, "Khrushchev and Gromyko have shown no interest and in fact brushed subject off on several occasions."⁴⁸ Knowing the precarious state of Sino-Soviet relations, it is easy to imagine how dismayed and fearful the Soviet leader could have been. For instance, in the morning on Monday July 15 Peng Zhen talked about "serious disagreements" between the CCP and CPSU and appealed to "value unity" between the two countries.⁴⁹ And only in the evening of the same day Harriman probed Khrushchev on the Chinese nuclear threat! If the Chinese had only learned about the American entreaties, they would have had deadly ammunition for their attacks against Khrushchev. He would have been compromised in the eyes of most of his own colleagues.

Deng Xiaoping must have been under strict instructions not to touch on the Soviet-American test-ban negotiations. Only in a few instances did he let the Soviets feel how displeased the Chinese were with the rapprochement of the two superpowers on the grounds of mutual regulation of nuclear arms race. "On 25 August 1962," he said, "the Soviet government informed China that it was ready to conclude an agreement with the USA on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In our view, you were pursuing an unseemly goal in coming to such an agreement, namely: to bind China [in its attempts to join the nuclear club—VZ] by the hands and feet through an agreement with the USA." In commenting on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Deng Xiaoping said that Khrushchev "committed two errors: in shipping the missiles to Cuba, you indulged in adventurism, and then, in showing confusion in the face of nuclear blackmail from the USA, you capitulated."⁵⁰

Without seeing cables and instructions from Beijing, it is not possible to say what prompted Deng Xiaoping on July 20 to suggest suspension of the consultations. Researchers have long suggested it was a reaction to the CC CPSU open letter to the Chinese published on July 14. But it is equally plausible that the start and progress of the U.S.-Soviet test-ban talks in Moscow made Mao Zedong increasingly impatient with the consultations. Immediately after the breakup of the consultations the Chinese side began attacks on the talks and on three occasions, 31 July, 15 August, and 1 September 1963, published official statements condemning the Moscow treaty.⁵¹

What was the significance of all these episodes for Deng's political career and the development of his views? The July 1963 performance of Deng Xiaoping was highly

acclaimed in Beijing. According to one biographer, “the failure to shore up Sino-Soviet relations was greeted as a victory over revisionism by the CCP leadership who turned out in force to welcome Deng back from Moscow.” He was also the leader of the group of speechwriters that drafted CCP letters, probably including the ones criticizing the test ban.⁵² Salisbury concludes that Deng’s ideological exploits in Moscow (he mentions only one in November 1957) earned him Mao’s gratitude and a relatively mild treatment during the Cultural Revolution. If this version is true, then Deng Xiaoping proved his credentials as a loyal subordinate of Mao Zedong and demonstrated his ability to work very successfully together with the Chairman in the area of foreign policy.⁵³

But does it mean that the “little terrier” had the same views on Stalin, Stalinism and international relations as Mao Zedong? There is a more complex explanation of Deng’s role. According to recent revelations of Dr. Li Zhisui, Mao’s personal physician, Deng Xiaoping, as well as Liu Shaoqi, lost Mao’s trust at the Eighth CCP Congress in September 1956, when they spoke too fervently about the impossibility of any cult of personality in China.⁵⁴ Mao Zedong considered Deng a politician with a great future (as he told Khrushchev in November 1957) and considerable political ambitions. However, in the atmosphere of power struggle and Mao’s emerging dictatorship this praise could bring Deng as easily to the gallows as to the pedestal: Mao, like Stalin before him, had shrinking tolerance for men of political ambition in his immediate vicinity. Therefore, it is only logical that Mao should have watched Deng very keenly and tried to find tasks for him where Deng’s energy would have been utilized for Mao’s benefit rather than against his interests. According to this logic, Mao Zedong wanted to send Deng to Moscow not because he particularly trusted his loyalty, but for the opposite reason, because he wanted to neutralize his potential opposition to his rising cult of personality.

To understand this logic, it is perhaps useful to start with the opposite pole, the Soviet one. After 1960 the Chinese criticism of Khrushchev and his de-Stalinization tied the hands of the Stalinists in Moscow like Suslov. According to Georgi Arbatov’s thoughtful observation “from 1962-1964 the Chinese factor weakened the position of the Stalinists in the USSR. As it developed, the conflict with China had positive influences on the policy of Khrushchev, who had been slipping back to Stalinism only too often since 1962. The debate with the Chinese leaders provided the anti-Stalinists with the opportunity, while defending our policies, to speak out on many political and ideological subjects that had lately become taboo.”⁵⁵

Actually, when Khrushchev was overthrown at the CC Presidium in October 1964, Alexander Shelepin, Secretary of the CC and the former head of the KGB, repeated almost verbatim Deng’s criticism of the Soviet leader’s “two mistakes” during the Cuban missile crisis. Yet, the Soviet leaders were too embarrassed to repeat this criticism at the plenum, because it would have implied that the

Chinese had been right all along. Therefore, Khrushchev’s foreign policy errors were not criticized at the top party forum.

In China the same logic worked the other way around. Mao Zedong may well have cleverly decided to direct the energy of his potential critics, Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi, for external, foreign policy use. Deng Xiaoping must have been critical of Mao’s exercise of power and his disastrous “great leap forward.” Since 1960 he and Liu expressed an inclination to oppose the leftist economic experiments of the Chairman. But in foreign policy Deng enthusiastically shared Mao’s goal to strive for China’s equality in the communist camp. As a delegation head, Deng Xiaoping must have been held on an extremely short leash by Mao. In any case, Deng’s personal role in implementing the Sino-Soviet split made him a committed advocate of this policy. According to his biographer, during the early 1980s, when Mao’s role in the politics of the PRC was being reassessed, Deng was “at great pains to stress that Mao Zedong’s policy in foreign affairs had been correct and highly successful.”⁵⁶

This must be a missing part in the explanation why, in 1956-1963, the reformer of contemporary China had been the central figure fighting de-Stalinization and reform in the Soviet Union, instead of being a reform-minded analyst of the damages that Stalin and the logic of his tyranny had caused to the Soviet Union, China and other “socialist” countries.’

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¹ Harrison E. Salisbury. *The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping*. (Boston, Little, Brown, 1992), pp. 153-154.

² See on this in the existing biographies: David Bonavia, *Deng Xiaoping* (Hong Kong: Longman, 1989), p. 83; David S.G. Goodman, *Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography*, (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 71-73.

³ The bound copy of the transcripts of the meeting were found in the papers of the International Department of the former Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the GDR in the Bundesarchiv, Berlin. (SAPMO Barch JIV 2/207 698, pp. 187-330 is the Russian version.) The conference’s participants on the Chinese side were, besides Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, mayor of Beijing and secretary of Beijing’s Party Organization (Deputy Head of the delegation); Kang Sheng, Mao’s security specialist and probably his “eyes” and “ears” in the delegation; and Yang Shangkun, long-time head of the CCP’s General Office. That was a senior “troika,” who had been close to Mao Zedong and knew the history of Sino-Soviet relations well. Kang Sheng and Yang Shangkun, like Deng himself, had studied and lived in Moscow. The delegation also included the head of the All-Chinese Federation of Trade Unions Liu Ningyi and two other CC CCP

members, Wu Xiuquan and Pang Zuli. The members of the Soviet delegation were Mikhail Suslov and Leonid Il'ichev, two influential members of the CC CPSU Secretariat in charge of ideology; Viktor Grishin from the Moscow Party Organization; Iurii Andropov, head of the CC International Department (socialist countries); Boris Ponomarev, head of the CC International Department (capitalist countries); Pavel Satiukov, editor-in-chief of *Pravda*; and Stepan Chervonenko, Soviet ambassador in Beijing.

⁴ David Goodman, *Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution*, p.55. The book refers to a Chinese source, Liao Yilu, "Deng Xiaoping zai Suliangong ershihao" in Yang Guoyu and Chen Feigin, eds. *Ershiba nian jian: cong shizhengwei dao zongshuji* (Volume 3), 1992, p. 106 in claiming that Deng Xiaoping "heard" Khrushchev's speech. However, foreign guests were not invited to the last session of the Congress to hear the "secret speech."

⁵ Shi Zhe, *At the Side of Mao Zedong and Stalin: Shi Zhe's Memoirs*, Chapter 14, "De-Stalinization, Poland, Hungary: 1956" (being translated by Chen Jian; quoted with permission).

⁶ L.W. Gluchowski, "The Struggle Against 'Great Power Chauvinism': CPSU-PUWP Relations and the Roots of the Sino-Polish Initiative in September-October 1956, a paper presented at the conference "New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia," January 1996, Hong Kong; Chen Jian, "Beijing and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956," presented at "International Conference on "Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence," in Budapest, 26-29 September 1996.

⁷ Malin Notes, *CWIHP Bulletin*, no. 8-9 (Winter 1996/97), p. 388

⁸ The documents from the Polish archives were related in Leo Gluchowski's paper "Poland's 'China Card': Sino-Polish Relations and the Soviet Union, September-October 1956."

⁹ Chen Jian, "Beijing and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956," p. 9

¹⁰ Malin notes, *CWIHP Bulletin*, no. 8-9, pp. 389, 393; Shi Zhe, *At the Side of Mao Zedong and Stalin*.

¹¹ "Memuary Nikiti Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 5, (1994), p. 75

¹² Malin Notes, *Bulletin*, p. 392.

¹³ Quoted in Chen Jian, "Beijing and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956."

¹⁴ Malin notes, *Bulletin*, p. 393.

¹⁵ Shi Zhe, *At the Side of Mao Zedong and Stalin*.

¹⁶ "Memuary" *Voprosy istorii*, no. 5, (1994), pp. 75-76.

¹⁷ Stenographic Report of the Meeting of the Delegations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, 5-20 July 1963, Moscow, part 1, 8 July, p. 75. The transcripts in Russian were sent by the CC CPSU to the leadership of the SED in the GDR, which translated them into German, although with some excisions. SAPMO Barch, DY 301, JIV 2/201, Akt 697.

¹⁸ Stenographic Report of the Meeting, p. 73

¹⁹ Stenographic Report of the Meeting, p. 75

²⁰ Stenographic Report of the Meeting, pp. 117-118.

²¹ "Posledniaia antipartiinaia gruppa [The last anti-party group], Minutes of the June 1957 Plenum of the CC CPSU, June 24," *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, no. 4, (1993), p. 12.

²² Report, "My Observation on the Soviet Union," Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and the CCP Leadership, 24 January 1957 trans. by Zhang Shuguang and Chen Jian, *Bulletin*, 6-7 (Winter 1995/96); p. 154.

²³ Minutes, Conversation between Mao Zedong and Ambassador Iudin, 22 July 1958, trans. by Zhang Shu Guang and Chen

Jian, *Bulletin* no. 6-7, pp. 155-156.

²⁴ Salisbury, *The New Emperors*, p. 156.

²⁵ Stenographic Report of the Meeting of the Delegations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, 5-20 July 1963, pp. 79, 91.

²⁶ Stenographic Report, p. 142. To strengthen his arguments, Suslov cited interesting statistics on Soviet military and economic assistance to the PRC. "The 24 defense enterprises built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union were the basis for the creation of corresponding branches of Chinese industry. Another 33 defense enterprises are being built. At one time, 60 infantry divisions were equipped with arms and military-technical property supplied from the USSR, and from 1955-1956 the modernization of the Chinese army with more modern types of armaments and materiel was carried out. In past years our country has given the PRC a large quantity of technical and technological documentation by which China was able to organize the production of the MIG-17, MIG-19, MIG-21-F, and TU-16 airplanes, MI-4 helicopters, "air-to-air," "ground-to-air," "ground-to-ground," "air-to-ground," and "ship-to-ground" missiles, naval materiel, submarines, and fast boats of various types. The Soviet Union helped the PRC develop the basis of a nuclear industry." Stenographic Report, p. 141

²⁷ Memo of conversation with General secretary of the CC CCP, member of the Politburo of the CC CCP Deng Xiaoping, received at the CC on 6 June 1960. I am grateful to Odd Arne Westad and to the Cold War International History Project for bringing this and a number of other Chervonenko-Deng memcons to my attention. [Ed. note : Six are presented in this section of this *Bulletin*.]

²⁸ Political letter of the embassy of the USSR in the PRC for the second quarter of 1960 [no date recorded in my personal notes], TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 340, l. 133.

²⁹ Kozlov's report at the CC CPSU Plenum, 13 July 1960, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 458, l. 10.

³⁰ Stenographic Report of the Meeting, p. 93.

³¹ Report of Suslov to the CC CPSU Plenum, 10-18 October 1961, p. 34.

³² Kurze Wiedergabe der Verhandlungen, die zwischen einer Delegation der KPdSU mit einer Delegation der KP Chinas gefuehrt wurden, 17 September 1960, SAPMO Barch, JIV 2/202-280. The author thanks Christian Ostermann and David Wolff of the CWIHP for sharing this information. [Ed. Note : CWIHP, in turn, thanks Dr. Tim Trampedach of the Free University - Berlin for his aid in obtaining this document.]

³³ Kurze Wiedergabe, pp. 7, 13

³⁴ Kurze Wiedergabe, p. 14

³⁵ Kurze Wiedergabe, pp. 17, 31-32

³⁶ Report of Suslov, pp. 38, 40-41.

³⁷ Report of Suslov, p. 53.

³⁸ Report of Suslov, pp. 72-73.

³⁹ For this chronology and the Soviet semi-official view of the consultations, see O.B. Borisov, B.T. Koloskov, *Sino-Soviet Relations, 1945-1973: A Brief History* (Moscow : Progress, 1975), pp. 203-208.

⁴⁰ See, e.g., compilations of Peter Berton, *The Chinese-Russian Dialogue of 1963. A Collection of Letters Exchanged Between the Communist Parties of China and the Soviet Union and Related Documents*. (School of International Relations, University of Southern California, 1963).

⁴¹ Georgi Arbatov, *The System : An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Random House, 1992), pp. 97-98.

⁴² Stenographic Report, pp. 293-295.

⁴³ Ibid, pp. 73, 75

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 178

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 106

⁴⁶ “Kak snimali Khrushcheva [How Khrushchev was deposed], the materials of the Plenum of the CC CPSU, 14 October 1964, *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, no. 1 (1993), p. 10.

⁴⁷ Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), p. 239.

⁴⁸ Kohler to the Department of State, Moscow, July 18 and July 19, 1963, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961 -1963*, vol. VII: *Arms Control and Disarmament*, (Washington, GPO,

1995), pp. 808 and 814. I am thankful to James Hershberg and William Burr for bringing these documents to my attention.

⁴⁹ Stenographic Report, pp. 251-252.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 90

⁵¹ Borisov, Koloskov, op. cit., p. 226

⁵² David Goodman, op. cit., p. 73

⁵³ This is Goodman’s conclusion. op. cit., p. 64

⁵⁴ Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao’s Private Physician* (New York, Random House, 1994).

⁵⁵ Arbatov, *The System*, p. 95.

⁵⁶ Goodman, op. cit., p. 71.

Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s “Continuous Revolution,” and the Path toward the Sino-Soviet Split: A Rejoinder

By *Chen Jian*

Deng Xiaoping is a legendary figure in the political history of modern China. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Mao Zedong twice purged him, but did not destroy him (as the Chinese Chairman did to Liu Shaoqi, China’s second most important leader from 1949 to 1966, who died in disgrace in 1969). Early in 1973, after Deng had been absent from China’s political scene for more than six years, Mao pardoned him and brought him back to China’s decision-making inner circle. Three years later, when Deng was again expelled from the Party’s Politburo and Central Committee due to his alleged “unchanged reactionary attitude” toward the Cultural Revolution, he retained his Party membership and was never exposed to physical torture by the “revolutionary masses.” He would reemerge and eventually become China’s paramount leader after Mao’s death in 1976.

It is apparent that Deng Xiaoping’s purge and survival during the Cultural Revolution were primarily Mao’s work. But Deng’s image in Mao’s mind must have been extremely complicated, otherwise his experience would not have been so tortuous. While it will take a much more comprehensive study to reconstruct the relationship between Deng and Mao, thanks to available Chinese sources one thing is certain: both Deng’s purge and survival were related to Mao’s changing memories of the role he played in promoting or resisting the Chairman’s grand enterprise of continuous revolution aimed at, among other things, preventing a Soviet-style “capitalist restoration” from happening in China.

Indeed, the “Soviet factor” played a crucial role in determining Deng Xiaoping’s political fate during the Cultural Revolution. If the causes of his downfall were

symbolized in the label placed on him of “China’s Second Largest Khrushchev,” one of the main reasons for his reemergence could be found in the fact that Mao again remembered that Deng was once an “anti-Soviet revisionist” hero. On 14 August 1972, less than one year after the death of Marshal Lin Biao, Mao’s designated successor during the Cultural Revolution, who then betrayed Mao in 1971, Mao commented on a letter Deng wrote to him about ten days earlier: “After we entered the cities, it is not true to say that he [Deng Xiaoping] has done nothing that is good. For example, he led the [CCP] delegation to Moscow to negotiate [with the Soviets]. He did not yield to the pressure of the Soviet revisionists. I have talked about this many times in the past. Now I want to repeat it once more.”¹

The transcripts of the meetings in Moscow between Chinese and Soviet Party delegations in July 1963 will help us to understand why Mao’s memory of Deng’s experience of “not yielding to the Soviet revisionists” was so persistent. Deng, simply put, was a fighter. As shown by the meeting transcripts, he fully believed that truth was on the side of the Chinese Communists. Indeed, as far as the mentalities of the two sides are concerned, the Chinese exuded a strong sense of superiority. If for half a century the Chinese Communists had been willing to accept Moscow’s dominant position in the international communist movement, in 1963 they acted in accordance with a different underlying assumption. They obviously believed that Beijing, rather than Moscow, should play the leadership role in the world proletarian revolution. Deng Xiaoping’s passionate performance indicated his seemingly wholehearted embrace of this belief.

The divergence between Beijing and Moscow, as

reflected in the transcripts, was certainly substantive. While de-Stalinization was Khrushchev's most important achievement as the Soviet party's first secretary, Mao and the CCP leadership claimed that "Khrushchev had completely renounced such a sword as Stalin and had thrown it away, allowing the enemy to seize it and to kill us."² While the Soviet leadership believed in the utility of pursuing détente with the West, the Chinese leaders emphasized that the socialist camp must stick to revolutionary principles and should have no illusions regarding the evil intentions of Western imperialist countries. While the Soviets pointed out that the danger involved in a nuclear war could never be exaggerated, Mao and his comrades were unconvinced by the Soviet emphasis on the destructive effect of nuclear slaughter, and argued that communists all over the world should not shrink from revolution because of the concerns about triggering a nuclear war.

But what really distanced Beijing from Moscow was not just the divergence over these issues concerning strategy and policy. The debates between Chinese and Soviet communists focused on two more fundamental and interrelated issues: how to define "equality" and how to interpret history.

The "equality" question had been a staple of conversations between top Chinese and Soviet leaders since the mid-1950s. As a general tendency, the Chinese leaders became increasingly accustomed to accusing the Soviets of having failed to treat other fraternal parties, including the Chinese party, as equals. The Soviet leaders, on the other hand, used every opportunity to defend their own behavior, arguing that although Moscow, for historical reasons, had played a central role in the international communist movement, it never intentionally treated other parties as inferior.

Such differences over remembering and interpreting the past drove almost every meeting between top Chinese and Soviet leaders in the late 1950s and early 1960s into an extensive review of history. Indeed, the Chinese leaders, especially Mao, had endeavored to cite historical cases to argue that the Soviets (since the years of Stalin and continuing after Stalin's death) had mistakenly interfered with the internal affairs of the Chinese party and the Chinese Communist state, as well as many other fraternal parties, and that such behavior proved Moscow's failure to treat communists in other countries as equals.³ The Soviets would categorically deny that the new Soviet leadership after Stalin's death had continued to commit such mistakes. The transcripts of the July 1963 Sino-Soviet meetings indicate that this pattern was again followed.

Why, one must ask, are these two issues so important? This must be understood by keeping in mind that these issues not only are closely related to the legitimacy of each party's self-perceived position in the international communist movement, but are also interwoven with legitimizing the domestic programs pursued by each party's top leaders,

Mao and Khrushchev in particular.

In his essay, Vladislav Zubok has convincingly demonstrated that Khrushchev fully understood how intimately the legitimacy of his leadership role within the Soviet party and state was interconnected with the Soviet party's position in the world proletarian revolution. In other words, Khrushchev fully understood that his domestic programs, as well as his own position as the Soviet Party's top leader, had to be justified by maintaining and enhancing Moscow's continuous dominance of the international communist movement.

In the case of China, Mao's criticism of "Soviet revisionism" was an integral part of his constant efforts to enhance his "continuous revolution" as a dominant theme of China's political and social life. This was particularly true after 1958, when the disastrous consequences of the "Great Leap Forward" began to result in an ever increasing division among top Chinese leaders, while at the same time breaking up the myth of Mao's "eternal correctness." The criticism of "Soviet revisionism" provided Mao with an effective weapon to combine his need to create momentum for continuous transformation of China's party, state and society with one of the Chinese revolution's ultimate goals—reviving China's central position in the international community through establishing China's centrality in the international communist movement.

Under these circumstances, "equality" was given a meaning much more complicated than what may be obtained in a superficial reading of the word. In actuality, each side talked about "equality" with an assumption that they were superior to the other. For Mao and his Chinese comrades, talking about "equality" meant that they occupied a position from which to dictate the values and codes of behavior that would dominate relations between communist parties and states. This fundamental assumption made Beijing's conflict with Moscow inevitable.

Deng Xiaoping was assigned the task in 1963 of leading the Chinese delegation to Moscow for several reasons. The most obvious one was that he had long been known within the CCP as a talented leader, who was able to use concise language to effectively argue on complicated issues. As Zubok documents in his essay, the other reason was that by 1963 he was a veteran in representing the CCP in its dealings with Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders. But Mao's choice of Deng to lead the CCP delegation could also have been based on more complex considerations. As is well known, by 1963 Mao had already developed a real distrust of some of his close colleagues, including Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, because of his sense that not only were they unable to follow the logic of his "continuous revolution" programs, but also that they might attempt to weaken, or even to challenge, Mao's authority and power as China's paramount leader. By choosing Deng to head the CCP delegation, Mao would effectively use Deng's talent to bolster the international legitimacy of his "continuous revolution," while at the same time further testing Deng's

political attitude and loyalty toward his “continuous revolution.”⁴ Here, once again, Mao demonstrated his mastery of Chinese party politics.

Deng did not disappoint Mao. His stamina and eloquence in Moscow, together with that of Kang Sheng and other members of the Chinese delegation, put the Soviets on the defensive. This proved both the correctness of the Chinese stand and the superiority of the Chinese mentality. When members of the Chinese delegation returned to Beijing, they would be welcomed by Mao at the airport, which was a highly unusual gesture by the Chairman. Moreover, Mao was so confident that the transcripts of the meetings in Moscow would enhance his “continuous revolution” that, on 28 July 1963, he ordered them to be printed and distributed to low- and middle-rank CCP cadres.⁵ This was the only time in the CCP’s history, to the best of my knowledge, that the transcripts of top Party leaders’ meetings with foreign party leaders were relayed to the whole party.

Deng Xiaoping certainly made history. His outstanding performance in Moscow in July 1963, as mentioned earlier, had created such a strong impression in Mao’s mind, that it would contribute to his survival and reemergence during and after the Cultural Revolution. This would allow his name to be linked with China’s history from the late-1970s to mid-1990s in such a dramatic way that this period has become widely known as “The Deng Xiaoping Era.”

Deng Xiaoping’s debates with the Soviet leaders in July 1963 represent a historical juncture in the development of Sino-Soviet relations as this was the last substantive exchange of opinions between the Chinese and Soviet parties. The failure of the meeting led to the great polemic debates between the two parties, which would quickly expand into a confrontation between the two communist powers. Even Khrushchev’s fall from power in October 1964 could not reverse the trend of deteriorating relations. In February 1965, when Mao told Soviet Prime Minister A. N. Kosygin that his struggle with the Soviet “revisionists” would last for another 9,000 years, the CCP Chairman had virtually proclaimed the demise of the Sino-Soviet alliance.⁶ In a few short years, Beijing and Moscow would proclaim the other as primary enemy, even worse than capitalist-imperialist America.

In a broader historical perspective, Deng Xiaoping’s meetings with the Soviet leaders in July 1963 represented a defining moment in 20th-century history. Up to this point the communists in the world had acted under a profound belief that history and time were on their side. The great Sino-Soviet split, to which Deng Xiaoping made such a crucial contribution, drained both the material and spiritual resources of international communism. While the Soviet Union, with China emerging as a potent enemy, fell into an ever-worsening overextension of power, the Communist world as a whole spent much of its resources on internal fighting. This effectively weakened, and eventually eliminated, its ability to compete with the

capitalist and free world in holding the initiative of historical development.

More importantly, the great Sino-Soviet split destroyed the idea among communists and communist sympathizers all over the world that communism was a solution to the problems created in the world-wide process of modernization. Nothing could be more effective in destroying the moral foundation of communism as an ideology and a revolutionary way of transforming the world than the mutual criticism of the communists. Therefore, the events leading to the Sino-Soviet split, in which Deng Xiaoping actively participated, marked the beginning of the final decline of international communism as a 20th-century phenomenon.

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¹ Mao Zedong’s comments on Deng Xiaoping’s 3 August 1972 letter, 14 August 1972. *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu*, vol.3, part 2, p.846.

² Ed. Note: See the Deng-Suslov Talks, 1963 in this issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*.

³ See, e.g., “Mao on Sino-Soviet Relations: Two Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador,” (intro. Odd Arne Westad), *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp.164-169; Minutes, “Mao’s Conversation with a Yugoslav Communist Union Delegation,” September 1956, and Minutes, “Conversations between Mao Zedong and Ambassador Yudin,” 22 July 1958, trans. Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7, pp.148-152, 155-159.

⁴ Zubok is certainly correct in pointing out that “Mao Zedong must have cleverly decided to direct the energy of his potential critics, Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi, toward external, foreign policy use.”

⁵ After returning to Beijing, both Kang Sheng and Deng Xiaoping proposed to Mao that the transcripts of the nine meetings between the Chinese and Soviet delegations in Moscow “be read” to party cadres “above Level 17.” Mao replied in a letter to Deng Xiaoping: “It is not sufficient only reading the transcripts [to the cadres], and it seems that the transcripts should be printed. Every several (such as three to five) of the cadres above Level 17 should have a copy [of the transcripts], so that they can discuss and study them. After three months, all the copies must be taken back. Please consider this and make a decision on it.” Mao Zedong’s letter to Deng Xiaoping, 28 July 1963, *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, vol.10 (Mao Zedong’s [Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic], Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1996), p. 330.

⁶ Kosygin was then visiting Beijing on his way back from a visit to Vietnam. He suggested to Mao that China and the Soviet Union should stop the polemic between them, so that they could take joint steps to support the struggles of the Vietnamese people; Mao refused the suggestion. He then made the statement that the struggle between the Chinese and the Soviets should go on for another 9,000 years, if not 10,000 years. See Cong Jin, *Quzhe qianjin de sui yue* [The Years of Tortuous Development] (Zhengzhou: Henan People’s Press, 1989), pp.607-608.

**From the Diary of
P.A. ABRASIMOV**

**SECRET
9 July 1957**

**Memorandum of Conversation
With the General Secretary of the CCP,
com. DENG XIAOPING**

3 July 1957

On 3 July 1957, I visited Deng Xiaoping and on the instructions of the CC CPSU gave him the full texts of the decision of the CC CPSU's July Plenum on the anti-party group of Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov and the CC CPSU's closed letter to all party members and candidates. In the conversation which ensued, Deng Xiaoping talked about the struggle with rightist elements in the People's Republic of China. He said that it was calculated that this struggle would go on for a long time; the Chinese Communist Party had the strength to crush the rightists in two or three days, but there was no need for that. The rightists will be given a further chance to finish stating their case, since by doing so they are giving the people and the CCP a good lesson.

By showing their true face, they are actually helping to educate the broad masses and intermediate elements. Without encouragement from the CCP, they would not dare to open fire and begin to act on such a broad scale. The rightists, noted Deng Xiaoping, resemble a snake which has slithered out of the earth, scented danger, and wants to slither back in, but has been strongly seized by the tail.

The positive side of the struggle with the rightists which has unfolded is that it has given cadres the opportunity to garner experience and to be tempered. Some party workers were afraid to provide the rightist elements the full freedom to state their opinion. Experience, however, has shown that where the rightists had the chance to express themselves fully, the struggle with them has proceeded more successfully; in those cases, the object of the struggle has been exposed, and a target for a counterstroke has been revealed; in those cases, the masses were convinced of the obvious hostility of the rightists to socialism and the party organizations have had the support of the overwhelming majority of the people in their conduct of the struggle.

In some establishments and organizations, the rightist elements were not given the chance to speak out and thereby reveal their true face. There were even cases where "rightists" from other places were invited to give speeches. In such establishments, the struggle was aimless and did not attain its goal.

The shortcoming of the given movement was the fact that at the necessary time, not all party organizations had clarified sufficiently for themselves the goals and tasks laid out by the CC CCP for this struggle. The CC CCP

avoided micromanagement and detailed elaboration on these issues and wanted the party organizations themselves to work out the Central Committee's tactic in the course of the struggle, to understand deeply the necessity of conducting this tactical line and its advantages.

Deng Xiaoping added that great courage and calm were needed to endure the stream of abuse which the rightists unleashed on the CCP both orally and in the press. Furthermore, Deng Xiaoping observed that the campaign of struggle with the rightists was proceeding unevenly. In some places, they went over to the counterattack too early and the enemy hid himself. However, to be late in this struggle would have been unforgivable. It was necessary to deliver the blow before the opening of the session of the All-Chinese Convention of the People's Representatives. Of course, it would have been possible to listen to the rightists for another ten days, but as a whole the conditions for a counter-attack had already come together. The leaders of the rightists had already shown themselves, and their views were widely known to the masses. "The big fish was already in the net," Deng Xiaoping observed. I noted that com. Zhou Enlai's speech to the session of the All-Chinese Convention of the People's Representatives was not only a report on the government's work, but was also the first strong blow delivered by the party against the rightists. Having agreed, Deng Xiaoping added that the popular masses received com. Zhou's speech in precisely that way. The rightists also clearly acknowledged this side of the report by the Premier of the State Council.

I inquired as to how the rightist elements were behaving after the collapse of all of their attacks.

Deng Xiaoping answered that they now want to hide themselves, but they will not be able to. Squabbles and divisions have begun among the rightists. In Shanghai, prominent representatives of the rightists denounced ringleaders with the most reactionary tendencies. Some of the rightists have already capitulated, but others are continuing to resist.

The CCP is not only not crushing this resistance, but is even, in a certain sense, supporting it. The rightists are unmasking themselves completely and on that basis, it will be possible to teach the masses a good lesson. Zhang Naige and others are not recognizing their mistakes, and are continuing to resist. The CCP considers that even if they continue to hold out stubbornly for a year, the party will also conduct painstaking explanatory work with them for the entire year.

The same policy will be carried out in the country's institutions of higher learning. Rightist elements among the students will be left in the institutions of higher learning, and some of them after graduation may be left in their respective institutions of higher learning as instructors. They will even be given the opportunity, for instance, to speak their views once every three months. That will help us to conduct educational work [with] object [lessons] among the students. The same applies to the instructors of the institutions of higher learning.

To my question of approximately what percent the rightist elements comprise among the students, Deng Xiaoping answered that on average among the students, the rightists comprised only one percent, and that there were many more waiverers and individuals deceived by the rightist demagogues, but that at present they were once again reverting to the correct path.

In some institutions of higher learning, the percentage of rightists was higher, as, for instance, at Beijing University [there were] about 3%, while in some institutions of higher learning there were up to 10%.

At the conclusion of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping noted that this year prospects for the harvest were good, but that at the end of July and the beginning of August flooding often occurs.

In China every year, an average of 20 million people suffer from natural disasters. In the first five-year period, there were strong floods three times, and each time about 40 million people suffered, and last year, 70 million people suffered from natural disasters.

Having thanked com. Deng Xiaoping for the conversation, in my turn I told him about the progress of the preparation for the Sixth Worldwide Festival of Youth and Students in the USSR.

The head of the chancellery of the Secretariat of the CC CCP, com. Yang Shangkun, was present at the conversation.

Chargé d'affaires of the USSR in the PRC
(P. Abrasimov)

[Source: AVPRF (Arkhiv vneshnei politiki rossiiskoi federatsii) [Russian Federation Foreign Policy Archive], f. 0100, op. 50, p. 424, d. 8.; obtained by Paul Wingrove; translated by Ben Aldrich-Moodie.]

From the diary of
P.F. IUDIN

SECRET. Copy No. 2

**Record of Conversation
with member of the Standing Committee
of the Politburo
CC CCP, DENG XIAOPING**

17 April 1958

I visited Deng Xiaoping and on instructions from the Center informed him of the letter from the CC of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia [UCY] to the CC CPSU of 12 April of this year.

During the translation of the Yugoslav letter, Deng Xiaoping expressed his indignation at the first sentence in the letter in which the Yugoslavs state that they were "surprised" by the CC CPSU's letter. Deng Xiaoping reacted in the same way to some of the Yugoslavs' arguments in the letter about their attitude toward the Soviet Union and the international communist movement.

Referring to the Yugoslavs' words to the effect that the UCY's draft program is based on a belief in the victory of socialism, Deng Xiaoping recalled that the Yugoslavs believe in the victory of socialism in America through an augmentation of the role of the working class in the bourgeois system of government. Deng Xiaoping noted that the Yugoslav draft program devotes more space to this than to many other issues.

After the translation was completed, Deng Xiaoping said that the Yugoslav response fully accords with the Chinese comrades' expectations. He noted that "this is a very logical step by the Yugoslavs." It is difficult to imagine, Deng Xiaoping said, that the Yugoslavs could easily change their positions and quickly correct the most serious mistakes contained in the program. As for changing selected phrases, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that this would not change the character of the Yugoslav document since what was at issue in the given case was an entire system of erroneous views.

I set out for Deng Xiaoping the CC CPSU's decision regarding the CC UCY's answer. Having heard out what I had to say, Deng Xiaoping said that this was without doubt a correct decision. At present, he said, we have absolutely no basis for reviewing the resolutions which we previously adopted regarding the UCY's program and its congress.

"On the whole," Deng Xiaoping said, "it is a good thing (*khoroshee delo*)—I consider that the upcoming struggle in the international communist movement will be very lively and interesting, and that all communists, all fraternal parties should join in this struggle."

Having pointed out that the Yugoslavs talk a lot in their letter about the need to "develop Marxist thought," Deng Xiaoping noted that on that point we can support the Yugoslavs. Right now, he said, we are repulsing Yugoslav

revisionism, and in the course of this fight we will develop yet further the theory of Marxism-Leninism.

I noted that a collection of Lenin's statements about revisionism had been published in our country. Deng Xiaoping answered that he had heard about the collection and had ordered its translation into Chinese. Deng Xiaoping went on to comment that "we must study and compare the old Bernstein and the new Bernstein [to determine] the similarities and differences between them." I noted that the old Bernstein did not hold state power and that probably this was the essential difference between them. Deng Xiaoping agreed with this thought. [Ed. note: At the turn of the century, Lenin and Eduard Bernstein polemized over the correct path of social democracy. Lenin labeled his opponent a "revisionist."]

Afterwards, I informed Deng Xiaoping about the conversation between the USSR's ambassador in Poland and com. Gomulka as to the UCY's answer to the CC CPSU. Deng Xiaoping reacted to this information with great interest and was especially happy to hear com. Gomulka's statement that the PZRP [Polish United Workers' Party] would not send a delegation to the Seventh Congress of the UCY. Moreover, Deng Xiaoping said that the Poles had tried to persuade the Yugoslavs, but became convinced that this was futile. Deng Xiaoping noted that some interesting points had come up in the Poles' own position in the course of the discussion about the UCY's program, and that for that reason, he said, one could conclude that for our understanding of the PZRP's position, this too "was not a wasted episode, and also showed us something."

Deng Xiaoping warmly expressed his thanks for the information. He noted that timely information from the CC CPSU permitted them to keep abreast of these Yugoslav affairs. Deng Xiaoping furthermore stated that in connection with the most recent hostile speech by the Yugoslavs, the CC CPSU had adopted entirely correct and very good decisions.

I pointed out that an article on the UCY's draft program would be published on 18 April in "Communist." At this, Deng Xiaoping commented that of course the Yugoslavs would have to be taught a lesson, insofar as "they got themselves into this."

In the course of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping touched on the issue of other parties' attitudes to the Yugoslav congress. Having touched on the position of the Italian communist party, Deng Xiaoping stated that the Italians' motives as set out in their letter to the CC CPSU were incomprehensible to the Chinese comrades. Nevertheless, Deng Xiaoping noted, "let them, the Italians, make their own decisions."

Deng Xiaoping informed me that according to information they had received a few days ago from the PRC's ambassador in Switzerland, the Swiss comrades were planning to send their delegation to the Seventh Congress. Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the CCP had not informed the Swiss party about their [the CCP's]

decision on this issue. I said that I did not know whether that party [the Swiss] was informed of the CPSU's position. Deng Xiaoping expressed the thought that several minor (*melkie*) parties might end up not being abreast of things and might mistakenly send their representatives to Yugoslavia....

"You," Deng Xiaoping said, "are catching up with America. At present, we do not have the strength to do this, but we are trying to catch up with England. However, we are still thinking about how to present the following task to our people in some form: to catch up with the United States of America in 25 years or more." Again making the caveat that they were only thinking this issue over at present, Deng Xiaoping then added that such a slogan would help them to move forward....

AMBASSADOR of the USSR in the PRC
[signature] /P. Iudin/

[Source: *TsKhSD (Tsentral'noe khranilishche sovremennoi dokumentatsii) f.5, op.49, d.131, ll.71-74; translated by: Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.*]

.....
From the diary of P.F. IUDIN

**SECRET Copy 1
3rd June 1959**

**Report of Conversation
with the General Secretary of the CC CCP, DENG
XIAOPING**

27 May 1959

While visiting com. Deng Xiaoping on the instructions of the Center, I informed him about the course of the negotiations in Geneva.

Deng Xiaoping requested that I convey great thanks to the CC CPSU for providing this information, and also said that it would be reported to Mao Zedong and other leading figures in the PRC forthwith. In passing, Deng Xiaoping said that Mao Zedong was not feeling well—was sick with the flu. Liu Shaoqi is also not quite well—his right hand hurts. Zhou Enlai is not in Beijing at present.

Touching on the issue of a summit meeting, Deng Xiaoping agreed with the opinion that the meeting evidently would take place. He also inquired as to the background (*kharakteristika*) of the new US Secretary of State, [Christian A.] Herter. I talked about the information we have on this issue from MID [Foreign Ministry] USSR.

Having mentioned the upcoming visit by [Averell] Harriman to the Soviet Union and his intention to visit the PRC, Deng Xiaoping stated that they had already dis-

cussed the issue of the expediency of Harriman's visit to China and came to the conclusion that at present the visit would not be useful. However, he added, we are not ruling out a visit by Harriman to China in the future.

I briefed Deng Xiaoping on the basis of the information we received from MID USSR on Sukarno's stay in Turkey. Having displayed a great interest in this issue, Deng Xiaoping noted that, of all the nationalist countries in Asia at present, Indonesia is taking the best position. This is particularly evident in the example of Indonesia's attitude toward events in Tibet.

Afterwards, we touched on the issue of Yugoslavia, of Tito's trip through the countries of Southeast Asia, of Yugoslavia's position on the Tibet issue, and on the difficult state of the Yugoslav economy. In the conversation, it was noted that nationalist bourgeois circles in Arab countries were accepting Yugoslav ideology. We both agreed that it was necessary to strengthen our common propaganda in the Arab countries in the interests of exposing the Yugoslav provocational policy.

Deng Xiaoping emphasized that in some ways the Yugoslav revisionists were now more dangerous than the Americans and the social democrats of the Western countries, and that, as a result, it was a very important task to expose the Yugoslav revisionists. We are devoting a lot of attention to this issue, he said, which is the reason for the Yugoslavs' particular protest. Deng Xiaoping said that after a report by a Xinhua correspondent in Belgrade about a strike by Yugoslav students protesting poor food was published in the Chinese press, the Yugoslav authorities made a statement of protest and warned the Chinese correspondent that if such an episode occurred again they would take appropriate action against him.

Touching on the plan thought up by Tito and Nasser for a meeting of the leaders of four countries - Tito, Nasser, Nehru and Sukarno—with the aim of "coordinating neutrality policies in connection with the Geneva conference," Deng Xiaoping said that Nehru was firmly opposing the meeting. Sukarno was showing a vague interest (*kak-budto proiavliaet nekotoryi interes*) in the plan. Foreign agents report that [Indonesian Foreign Minister] Subandrio has allegedly decided to communicate with the authors of the plan (Tito and Nasser) about the concrete details of the proposal. As of yet, it is hard to say what Sukarno's final position will be on this issue, Deng Xiaoping noted, although it is already clear that Tito and Nasser are very interested in calling such a meeting.

Having noted that the Americans need an instrument like the current Yugoslav leaders and that the Americans are making fairly good use of that instrument, not economizing in their spending on it, Deng Xiaoping expressed confidence that in the end that money would be spent in vain, as was the money spent on Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-Shek].

I inquired as to the situation at present in Taiwan.

Deng Xiaoping expressed the opinion that Jiang Jieshi would probably not give up power and would remain

"president" for a third term. If Jiang Jieshi remains as "president," he said, that would be better for us than if Chen Chen or even Hu Shi occupied the post. The Americans would be happiest with Hu Shi; in the worst case, they would agree to Chen Chen. Jiang Jieshi suits them least of all. On the Tibetan issue, Deng Xiaoping noted, the views of the PRC and Jiang Jieshi coincide: both we and he consider that Tibet is Chinese territory and that we cannot permit the Tibetan issue to be put before the UN.

In answer to my question as to what the economic situation in Taiwan was, Deng Xiaoping said that the Jiang Jieshi-ites were living at the USA's expense. That, he added, is not a bad thing. Let the Americans waste their money. In the final analysis, Taiwan will be returned to the bosom of its native land - China. However, for that to happen, we need time; we must wait a bit. The circumstances are becoming more and more favorable for the PRC and less and less so for the USA. The Jiang Jieshi-ites in Taiwan are beginning to think hard about the prospects which await them. There are many factors contributing to this: the growing international authority of people's China, its economic successes, the long separation from the native land, and so on. The most important thing of all is that they know the Americans want to wash their hands of them (*otkazat'sia*). The USA does not trust Jiang Jieshi, and he does not trust the United States.

Later on in the course of the conversation, several issues of the domestic situation of the Soviet Union and China were touched on.

I told Deng Xiaoping about the preparation taking place in our country for the CC CPSU plenum.

Deng Xiaoping noted that at present throughout China, prospects for the harvest are not bad. In some regions, up to 50% more wheat will be harvested than in 1958. The overall wheat harvest will probably be up to 20% higher than the previous year's harvest. It is somewhat worse with the early rice harvest. In places, crops suffer from flooding—in others, from drought. If rains come soon to the drought-affected regions, the situation could be corrected.

Deng Xiaoping went on to note as a serious shortcoming the fact that, of last year's total harvest, a lot of grain was used as free food for peasants in communes. This, he emphasized, has had a negative effect on the supply of grain to the cities. Deng Xiaoping recounted that before the introduction of free food provision for the peasants, much less grain was consumed; they used it economically, and if the grain situation was difficult, they found a way out. Now, 500 million mouths are constantly demanding cereals, are demanding plentiful and tasty food. At present, the biggest shortcoming, he repeated, is that the peasants are consuming a lot themselves and are not giving enough grain to the state. The resolution of the Seventh Plenum of the CC CCP on regulating the communes provides for a gradual restoration of order in this important matter.

At the end of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping briefly touched on the issue of the Dalai Lama. Previously, he said, Nehru calculated that the Dalai Lama would play a huge role in the Indians' plans and that chaos would begin in Tibet without the Dalai Lama. Quite the opposite, in Tibet, things are going well without the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama has turned out to be a burden for Nehru. Nehru and the Americans are spending 200 thousand rupees monthly to maintain the Dalai Lama and his entourage. At present, Nehru intends to return the Dalai Lama to Tibet. If he returns, Deng Xiaoping added, we will pay him much more than the Indians and the Americans. In the past during each visit by the Dalai Lama to Beijing, he was given 200 thousand yuan for minor expenses. While the Dalai Lama was in Lhasa, he was given 700 thousand yuan every month (for him and his entourage).

In connection with this, I noted that the Tibetan peasants, who had been freed from dependence as serfs, had gained the most from the Tibetan events.

Having agreed with me, Deng Xiaoping said that the masses of the people in Tibet had already risen up to carry out democratic reforms.

The candidate member of the secretariat of the CC CCP, com. Yang Shangkun, translator com. Yan Mingfu, and the first secretary of the USSR Embassy in the PRC, com. F.V. Mochul'skii, were present during the conversation.

Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC

(P. Iudin)

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 49, d. 235, ll. 40-44; obtained by Paul Wingrove; translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

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**From the diary of
S.V. CHERVONENKO**

SECRET

8" December 1959

**Memorandum of Conversation
with the General Secretary of the CC CCP, DENG
XIAOPING**

6 November 1959

I had my first visit with Deng Xiaoping and had a conversation with him. Deng Xiaoping told me that he had not yet fully recovered after breaking his leg. He is going back to work in two days, but the doctors are allowing him to work for only four hours at a time. Afterwards, he asked what was my impression of the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the PRC. Answering Deng Xiaoping, I noted that the celebration had been organized on a grand scale. It demonstrated the huge enthusiasm of the people and their solidarity.

Deng Xiaoping said that he was present at the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution. [Ed. Note: Moscow, November 1957. Due to the Soviet government's 1918 conversion from Julian to Gregorian calendars, the October Revolution was feted on November 7.] In the USSR too, he added, everything had been organized well. Such round dates must be well noted. The most important point was that our great holidays demonstrate our solidarity, the great progress of the socialist camp, and the solidarity of progressive forces, of the fraternal parties.

I answered that the solidarity of the fraternal parties had found clear expression during the celebration of the CCP's tenth anniversary. During ten short years, the CCP had achieved successes which have rocked (*vskolykhnut'*) the entire world, and no one is in a position to take those achievements away from the Chinese people. The solidarity of the fraternal peoples has already shown its great significance more than once. If, for instance, after the victory of the October Revolution, Ukraine had remained alone and had not been in the family of the other Soviet republics, it could have been overwhelmed and dismembered by the imperialists. Friendship is the greatest force of all and sometimes we do not fully recognize its significance. History will show what a huge significance it has.

Deng Xiaoping responded that unity and solidarity truly were the most important thing. With our solidarity, we do not fear any imperialists. "We are exerting every effort to preserve peace, and imperialism will perish in peaceful conditions. If madmen nevertheless unleash a war, they will only meet with their downfall. The entire affair consists of the fact that we are making progress, while they are being torn apart by contradictions. We have many friends, including in the USA - [those friends] are

the working people.”

I noted that comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s visit demonstrated the great interest of the workers of America in our country and in socialism.

For that reason, Deng Xiaoping said, the ruling circles in the USA were afraid of that visit. They wanted to isolate comrade Khrushchev, but the people broke through the dike. Moreover, having agreed with [my] observation that even while making progress and augmenting socialism’s strength it is necessary to display great vigilance toward the machinations of the imperialists, Deng Xiaoping said: “The imperialists especially want to undermine the unity of our countries, but that is a futile endeavor....”

To my observation that the most important thing in overcoming every difficulty is the presence of the leading role of the CCP, Deng Xiaoping said that both the one and the other were important, the leadership of the CCP and help from the Soviet Union. “At present,” he went on, “we are in a better position than you were right after the October Revolution. If a new socialist country arises, it will, given the existence of the entire socialist camp, be in an even better position than we are. We are very happy that the situation in the Soviet Union is good in all respects. As for us, we are also not in a bad position.”

I noted that even in a situation where our affairs are going well, we [always] take measures to use all our existing capacities as much as possible; we are self-critical of ourselves, and strive to root out all our shortcomings. We also have shortcomings, Deng Xiaoping answered, and they will always exist. One must even on occasion heed criticism coming from an enemy.

At the conclusion of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping said that we would meet again and more than once.

I thanked Deng Xiaoping for the conversation and expressed the hope that in its work, the Embassy would encounter assistance from him and from the CC CCP apparatus as before.

Head of the protocol division of the CCP Foreign Ministry, Yu Peiwen, assistant head of the division for the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe Yu Zhan, [USSR] embassy counselor B.N. Vereshchagin and third secretary B.T. Kulik were present during the conversation.

Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC

(S. CHERVONENKO)

[Source: AVPRF, f. 5, op. 49, d. 235, ll. 107-110; obtained by Paul Wingrove; translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

**From the Diary of
CHERVONENKO S.V.
“/” June 1960**

**TOP SECRET
Copy No. 3**

Memorandum of Conversation

**With the General Secretary of the CC CCP
Member of the Politburo of the
CC CCP, DENG XIAOPING**

I was received on 17 May by Deng Xiaoping. The chief of the division on ties with fraternal parties, member of the CC and the Secretariat of the CC CCP, Wang Jiaxiang also took part in the ensuing conversation....

In connection with the instructions from the Center, I gave Deng Xiaoping the text of a letter of the CC CPSU with an official invitation to the party-governmental delegation of the PRC to visit the USSR. Deng Xiaoping said that the delegation of the PRC would be certain to go to the Soviet Union, and that the CC CCP without a doubt would take seriously the wishes expressed by the Soviet comrades in connection with this trip.

After this I fulfilled the Center’s instruction regarding informing the Chinese comrades about the position of the Soviet Union in connection with the summit conference. Deng Xiaoping said that comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s speech on 16 May in Paris was a very good, strong speech, and noted that on 18 May it would be fully published in the PRC press. We still do not know Mao Zedong’s and Liu Shaoqi’s opinions, since they are absent, said Deng Xiaoping, but an exchange of opinions has already taken place between the members of the CC CCP who are presently in Beijing. All of these comrades fully support N.S. Khrushchev’s address. Deng Xiaoping again emphasized that it was a very strong address, and that in it they see the CC CPSU’s firm position. That is our position and the position of the Central Committee of the CCP, he said.

Touching on the USA’s aggressive actions, Deng Xiaoping said: “Eisenhower did a good turn (*sdelal khoroshee delo*),” since by his actions he fully unmasked himself in the eyes of all the world’s peoples. This has a deep educational significance. The ruling circles of the USA are trying to justify themselves by any means possible, but the facts speak for themselves. The peoples of the world can compare the actions of the United States and the Soviet Union. Deng Xiaoping emphasized that N.S. Khrushchev’s speech in Paris and Eisenhower’s statement, with which he had also already familiarized himself, present a striking contrast. Com. Khrushchev fully uncovered the true face of Eisenhower and the imperialists.

In the course of further conversation, Deng Xiaoping said that the Soviet government’s initiative as to the summit conference was useful and necessary; he empha-

size that “this was and remains our point of view.” It would be good, if as a result of pressure by peace-loving forces, results were attained, great or small. While at present, fruitful work by a summit conference is impossible, the very fact that the imperialists unmasked themselves is not a bad result. Deng Xiaoping further said that the logic of the American imperialists is the logic of robbers; however Eisenhower tries to “white wash” (*obelit*) himself, nothing more will come of it for him; practically he is helping us. Even this result of the meeting in Paris speaks to the fact that the victory is ours. Deng Xiaoping emphasized that comrade N.S. Khrushchev “acted completely correctly by going to Paris; he should have gone.”

Throughout the course of the conversation I noted that some diplomats - representatives of the capitalist countries of Western Europe in Beijing, in particular the English and the Dutch, are trying to defend the United States, and constantly emphasize that no great significance should be lent to the incursion by the American [U-2] airplane onto the Soviet Union’s territory; that all countries behave in this way, but that the USA got caught. Deng Xiaoping said that Nehru, U Nu, and almost all the political actors of the bourgeois world make the same argument. Deng Xiaoping told about some of Zhou Enlai’s impressions in connection with his trip to the countries of Asia which had just finished. Zhou Enlai returned to Beijing today and told about the negotiations with Nehru, about which he, Zhou Enlai, had formed a particular opinion. Deng Xiaoping said that Zhou Enlai’s trip to India to a certain extent played the same role as N.S. Khrushchev’s trip to Paris for the summit conference. N.S. Khrushchev exposed the American imperialists, and as a result of Zhou Enlai and other Chinese comrades’ trip to India, Nehru’s true face was uncovered. Deng Xiaoping said: “Both of the trips were necessary, correct, and yielded a [positive] result.”

Deng Xiaoping emphasized that Zhou Enlai’s visit to India fully confirmed “our previous opinion and position in relation to Nehru.” First. Nehru is the central figure in the anti-Chinese campaign in India. Nehru is not in a position where rightist and other reactionaries are putting pressure on him; he himself seeks the attainment of his goals by all means possible. Nehru has never lost control over the situation in the country, nor has the situation ever gotten out of hand. Nehru knows how to hold the country firmly in his hands. Second. The trip confirmed that Nehru does not want to solve the issue of the Chinese-Indian border under any circumstances, even for some sort of limited period. In this, he is operating on the basis of his interests, both internal and external. Nehru speaks out against the communist party of India; for this reason, it does not profit him to resolve the border issue with China. Also for foreign-policy reasons it is not profitable for him to resolve the issue. Deng Xiaoping said that if Nehru had eliminated the conflict with China, he would not have received the latest American aid, a sum of 1.2 billion dollars.

Deng Xiaoping noted that at present in the Chinese press, articles are being published which are uncovering Nehru’s real face. He further said that many political figures in the countries of Asia—Nasser [Egypt], Kasem [Iraq], Sukarno [Indonesia], U Nu [Burma]—are taking the same positions as Nehru. Nehru stands out from them [in that] he is the cleverest. It was not in vain that he studied in England; in India he is called a half-Englishman, and the English are more experienced than the Americans in [playing] political tricks.

Deng Xiaoping emphasized that the struggle with bourgeois figures of this sort is one of the most important problems facing the international communist movement. Such figures as Nasser or Kasem unmask themselves; in India this work must be done under more difficult circumstances. Some Indian communists even praise Nehru. But in the end, said Deng Xiaoping, Nehru’s behavior is educating these communists as well. With pleasure we see, he continued, that at the last meeting of the National Committee of the Indian Communist Party, important resolutions on internal issues were adopted, namely a statute about the fact that the struggle with reaction cannot avoid a fight with the National Congress Party and with the Congress government (materials about the resolutions of the National Committee of the Communist Party of India were published on the May 17 in “The People’s Daily” -S.Ch.). The organ of the Indian Communist Party has begun to include open public statements against Nehru.

Returning to the meeting in Paris, Deng Xiaoping said that the issue of developing a [Chinese] movement in support of N.S. Khrushchev’s statement was being examined in the CC CCP. On May 18, the leaders of social organizations in the PRC will make statements in the press on this issue, and two to three days thereafter, when the circumstances become clearer, further steps will be taken in this direction. Our common position consists, he said, of exposing the imperialists and of explaining the correctness of the position of the countries in the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union.

Deng Xiaoping asked me to convey a warm greeting to comrade N.S. Khrushchev and to all of the members of the Presidium of the CC CPSU on behalf of comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and all of the leaders of the CC CCP. The Americans are closing ranks against us, he said, but their closing of ranks is insecure. Our solidarity, and the solidarity of the countries of the socialist camp, is inviolable, since it is founded on a unity of ideas and goals.

In connection with this, the great significance of the upcoming visit by the Chinese party-governmental delegation to the Soviet Union for the further development and strengthening of fraternal friendship between our peoples and parties and for the unity of the whole socialist camp was once again emphasized by me.

In conclusion, Deng Xiaoping said that he would convey everything that he had been informed of by me to comrades Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi.

The conversation took place in warm, friendly circumstances.

The counselor to the Embassy, I.I. Safronov, and the First Secretary of the Embassy, B.V. Kapralov, were present during the conversation.

Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC

Signature

(S. CHERVONENKO)

[Source: AVPRF f. 0100 op.53, p.8, d. 454, ll. 165-9; translated by Ben Aldrich-Moodie.]

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The Short Version of the Negotiations Between CPSU and CCP Delegations (September 1960)

CPSU Delegation: Suslov (leader), Kozlov, Kuusinen, Pospelov, Ponomarev, Andropov, Il'ichev, Konstantinov, Grishin, Chervonenko

CCP Delegation: Deng (leader), Peng Zhen, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Yang Shangkun, Hu Qiaomu, Liao Chengzhi, Wu Xiuquan, Liu Xiao

The first talk took place on 17 September 1960 from 1300 to 1500....

In conclusion, **Deng Xiaoping** asked, as he said, the essential question: What does the CC CPSU and the Soviet government want to do with Soviet-Chinese friendship? ... Only after the clarification of this essential question made up of many facts, can one ascertain which assumptions are necessary for us to solve our disagreements....

[Second Session : 19 September 1960]

First of all com. [Frol] **Kozlov** explained that we have always assumed that truly fraternal relations corresponding to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism must be established between our parties, states and people...

Secondly, Comrade **Kozlov** noted that as causes of the serious disagreements that supposedly have long existed between the two CCs, the Chinese comrades' letter mentions events that are related to Soviet-Polish relations as well as the events in Hungary in the fall of 1956. These questions were resolved long ago between the CC CPSU and the CCs of the Polish party and Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. We have [reached] unanimity with these parties in our evaluations of the events of fall 1956.

We do not hide that at that time the Chinese comrades really did give us advice, but this advice was completely different from that now cited in the Chinese comrades' letter. Comrade **Kozlov** rebuts the Chinese comrades'

claim and then asks : why do you now wish to return to the events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary. We think that this is not done for the sake of clarifying the evaluation of these events. One sees, however, that such a questioning can only stoke nationalistic moods in Poland and Hungary in order to undermine the tight fraternal and heartfelt relations of the USSR and the CPSU with Poland and Hungary.

[Third Session : 20 September 1960]

The next accusation by **Deng**: We are also very puzzled by the following fact. Following his meeting with Comrade Khrushchev and several other leading figures in the USSR, Comrade Ho Chi Minh made a stop-over in Beijing on his way home and reported the following news: During the conversation with him and other Vietnamese, Comrade Khrushchev stated that enormous efforts were being spent in China to restore the gravesite of Genghis-khan and that this smelled of "yellow peril." The creation of Genghis-khan's empire involved three countries—Mongolia, our autonomous territory, and Soviet Buriatia. Whereas it is usually stated in your country that it was primarily the Europeans who had to suffer from the attack by Genghis-khan, it was actually the Chinese who suffered the most from the attack.

Ponomarev: One should strike his grave, not celebrate him.

Pospelov: Why do they celebrate him as a progressive figure? Many nations had to suffer under his attack.

Peng Zhen: How could we interfere in the internal affairs of the Mongolians who want to restore the gravesite of their ancestors [?] You, for example, like Peter I. You intended to erect a monument in Port Arthur to three Russian generals—Kuropatkin, Alekseev, and Makarov, who had led an aggression against China.

Pospelov: This was never the case with Kuropatkin and Alekseev, only with Makarov; because Kuropatkin and Alekseev had betrayed the interests of Russia.

Peng Zhen: And now concerning the question of the Korean War.

Then the entire conversation with Khrushchev on June 22 was repeated and the attempt was made to whitewash Mao Zedong of any guilt. Mao Zedong reportedly stated at the beginning of the Korean War: "If the enemy transgresses the 38th parallel, China—since it is not up to the Soviet Union to send troops for the protection of North Korea—is prepared to protect the common interests of the socialist countries, to send its own volunteers."

Following further discussion of the topic **Deng** declared: in explaining all of these facts we would like to ask the Soviet comrades to rethink whether all that they have done with respect to their enemies and with respect to their friends was appropriate. We have no doubt that overall you are taking a stand against imperialism.

Ponomarev: We, however, had the impression that all our deeds were also directed to support American imperi-

alism.

Deng: But why then did Comrade Khrushchev speak with such esteem about Eisenhower?

Suslov: One cannot mix up matters of principle with the diplomacy of the struggle.

Deng: Comrade Suslov, do not jump to conclusions too easily. You are not used to listening to others. Under such conditions it is difficult for us to finish our discussion. There is no state of equality. We would like to ask you, however, on whom you can count when difficulties will arise? On Eisenhower, on Nehru or the likes, or on a fraternal socialist country, on China?

Kozlov: There is no such question for us.

Deng: It would be perfect if such questions did not exist. But in reality such facts exist, and they cause concern.

Kozlov: Then you yourself want a decline in our relations. You yourself are pushing this line. We state that there is no such question, but you maintain that it exists nevertheless. We declare in the name of our country, in the name of our people that we will defend you in case of an attack with all means [available to us]; but you doubt this.

Deng: I ask you that your actions meet your recent statements.

Suslov: This statement is offensive to us.

Deng: I declare in the name of our party, in the name of the entire Chinese people, and fully aware of the responsibility, that regardless of all the[se] circumstances and the attacks on the Chinese people, the People's Republic of China and our party will take the side of the socialist countries in all difficulties.

Suslov: Did we not act this way when there was a difficult situation in the GDR in 1955 [1953?], did we not take full responsibility when we dealt a blow to the counterrevolution in Hungary?

Deng: But during the Chinese-Indian border conflict you did not act that way.

Suslov: But you were not threatened by a dangerous aggressor.

Deng: You unilaterally withdrew your experts from China, you transferred the ideological differences to the sphere of international-state relations, and I do not agree that India did not threaten China. You declared that you took a neutral position in the question of the Sino-Indian conflict. It is news to us that a fraternal socialist country can take a neutral position in the conflict with bourgeois India with regard to another socialist country.

In his further remarks, **Deng** spoke about the disagreements which had occurred in the relations between China and the USSR, among other things about the negotiations of the supreme command of the Far Eastern military district on joint air defense on 4 February 1955 and those on air defense between the military districts of the USSR and China on 27 September 1955. **Peng Zhen** thoroughly explained once again the question of the construction of a long-wave radio station. **Deng** stated in conclusion: As is well known, an extremely unequal treaty existed according

to which China did not have the right to permit representatives of third countries to enter two provinces of the PRC. These two provinces are our territories. Is it your business whether we permit the entry of persons from third countries or not [?] These questions were discussed with Comrade Mikoian during his trip to the PRC, and it was resolved. We appreciate that you resolved these questions.

Suslov: And why do you now raise these long-resolved questions once again? What is your point?

Deng: Unfortunately, the proposals with regard to the construction of a joint fleet, a long-wave radio station, and negotiations on a basis of equality [sic?] came from Comrade Khrushchev. Comrade Mao Zedong back then had asked Comrade Khrushchev: What should we do when you raise these issues, should we act according to your proposals or according to our thoughts. If we act as you wish, we would have to cede our entire coast to you, as was the case with Port Arthur [Lushunkou] and Dalian [Dalian]. Comrade Khrushchev responded: You cannot act like that. Where would you go? Comrade Mao Zedong then stated: We will go into the mountains as partisans.

Suslov: We think this is a joke.

Deng: This was not a joke. This was a very serious conversation. It must be stated that following this conversation, you stopped delivering to us technical documentation and equipment for the construction of a nuclear submarine fleet, while the CC CPSU communicated to the CC CCP on 20 June 1959 that the USSR would terminate the deliveries of technical documentation and necessary materials for the production of atomic weapons... With regard to the Chinese-Soviet border incidents, **Deng** stated: on this question, we will communicate our response through diplomatic channels, and therefore we will not take a position at this point....

Deng:...I take advantage of the opportunity to ask you to transmit our greetings to your Party and to com. Khrushchev. At the same time, please transmit the following wish: since last September com. Khrushchev has personally attacked our country and Party many times causing us alarm. As the leader of the Soviet party and the Soviet state, com. Khrushchev exercises powerful influence over world affairs. Therefore, we ask you with all our hearts and sincerity to deliver this message [to Khrushchev], asking him to pay attention to it. With great satisfaction, we ascertain that both sides consider this meeting useful and are of the opinion that this is a contribution towards gradually overcoming our differences...

[Source : SAPMO (former Socialist Unity Party [SED] Archive) JIV 2/202-280, Bd.3; provided by Tim Trampedach (Freie Universitat-Berlin); translated by Christian Ostermann.]

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From the Diary of

S.V. CHERVONENKO
12 October 1961

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 1

**Transcript of Conversation
with General Secretary of the CC CCP
DENG XIAOPING**

30 September 1961

In connection with 27 September instructions from the Center, I made a request to meet with Mao Zedong. On September 30, the Secretariat of the CC CCP informed us that Mao Zedong had instructed Deng Xiaoping to receive the Soviet ambassador. On the same day I met with Deng Xiaoping.

At the beginning of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping by way of explaining why Mao Zedong did not receive us, said that the “other comrades of the CC are very busy receiving kings” (at that time, the king and queen of Nepal and the Belgian queen were located in Beijing).

I gave information in an oral form on the Albanian issue (it is our opinion that they were already informed of the matter). Having heard our message, Deng Xiaoping said: “Bad news. Have you reached the culmination point of mutual relations between your two countries and two parties?”

I answered Deng Xiaoping that as he knows from our formerly delivered letter, the Soviet government has more than once made efforts directed at normalizing Soviet-Albanian relations, but the Albanian leaders are taking steps in the opposite direction. Their last step is damaging the security of the member-countries of the Warsaw pact and the basic security of the entire socialist camp.

Deng Xiaoping stated that everyone must not take extreme measures in order to leave room for a settlement.

I again emphasized that after the Moscow conference, the Soviet side undertook multiple steps in order to eliminate misunderstanding in the relations between the Soviet Union and Albania. For instance, a readiness by N.S. Khrushchev to meet with the Albanian leaders was expressed, although the latter, as the Chinese comrades well know, stubbornly refused such a meeting. I added that such a position by the Albanians is incomprehensible to us.

We, Deng Xiaoping responded, are acquainted with the correspondence over this period between the Soviet Union and Albania. Between the CCP and the CPSU there were also great disputes. It is well that both you and we did not take the matter to extremes. We have always stood and stand for this. We said and still say to the Albanian comrades that relations between you should improve and not worsen.

Then Deng Xiaoping thanked [me] for the message and expressed the hope that this bad news would be the

culmination point after which an improvement would ensue.

I said that for our part, we would like to share this opinion, but that the situation was not of the Soviet Union’s making (*za Sovetskim Soiuzum*). As for the Albanians’ most recent act, it affects the interests of all of the Warsaw pact countries, of the whole socialist camp. For that reason, efforts were needed which would lead to unity on the part of all of the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

In reply, Deng Xiaoping said that he was not in the mood to immerse himself in the essence of the Soviet-Albanian differences. We have, he emphasized, a single desire—that the relations between your countries improve. In reply to my words that the CPSU had no other desire than to improve relations between the USSR and Albania, Deng Xiaoping again moved the conversation to Soviet-Chinese relations. Having mentioned that relations had been very strained between the CCP and the CPSU and the PRC and the USSR, Deng Xiaoping stated the opinion that since the Moscow conference, these relations have been developing fairly well (*neplokho*). Having noted that in Korea, F.R. Kozlov invited him to lunch, and he [invited] F.R. Kozlov, Deng Xiaoping said: “We spoke about the importance of solidarity. I said to Kozlov that, of course, on this or that concrete issue we might not have identical opinions, but on the whole after the Moscow conference, our relations have been developing fairly well. Kozlov agreed with this.” On a series of important international problems, Deng Xiaoping continued, we expressed and continue to express support for your actions. Between the USSR and the PRC, very good cooperation has been established in the international arena; for instance, at the Geneva conference on Laos. Of course, on certain questions we have not entirely identical opinions. It is true that in Korea we did not speak about the Albanian issue with Kozlov, he added.

Further, Deng Xiaoping stated that “there are 12 countries in the socialist camp, but the issue of relations between the USSR and Albania stands out most of all. Is there really no possibility of finding some way to resolve this issue? For our part, we hope and wish that such a path be found.” Deng Xiaoping reminded [us] that Zhou Enlai and he (Deng Xiaoping) had earlier already stated their opinion on Albanian affairs. It is true, he noted, turning to us, that you were not content, especially with my (Deng Xiaoping’s) statement.

On that note the conversation about the Albanian issue ended....

At the end of the conversation, I inquired as to whether the CC CCP had received the CC CPSU’s congratulatory telegram on the PRC’s national holiday. Having received a negative reply, I informed Deng Xiaoping on this issue. Deng Xiaoping expressed thanks to the CC CPSU for the congratulations. Afterwards, he noted that a solemn celebration dedicated to the PRC’s

12th anniversary was held in Moscow, and asked that thanks be conveyed to the CC CPSU for the attention paid to the Chinese people's holiday.

The candidate of the secretariat of the CC CCP, Yang Shangkun, translators for the CC CCP apparatus, Yan Mingfu and Zhu Ruizhen, as well as the counselor to the embassy, F.V. Mochul'skii, were present during the conversation.

Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC

signature

(S. CHERVONENKO)

[Source: AVPRF f. 0100, op. 53, p. 8, d. 454, ll. 175-8; translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

**From The Diary Of
S.V. CHERVONENKO**

**Top Secret.
Copy No. 1**

“28” March 1962 and “8” May 1962

**Transcripts of the Conversations (Excerpts)
With the General Secretary of the CC CCP
DENG XIAOPING**

1 March 1962

At the beginning of the meeting, Deng Xiaoping and CC CCP Secretariat candidate member Yang Shangkun were cautiously reserved, noticeably nervous, and evidently ready to receive a document of a different character.

[Deng said] “...we draw your attention to the fact that your letter talks about the necessity of improving relations with Albania. In the end, the larger party should take the initiative on such issues. Issues of prestige do not exist for a large party and a large country. In the past we had disagreements with other parties and we have experience in resolving them, as we told com. Khrushchev. As we told you earlier, we have experience in relations with Korea. The CPSU has much experience in relations with Poland. For this reason, given a desire to improve relations, of course, a resolution will be found.” ...

The meeting, which continued for about an hour and a half, took place in an even, calm tone. After the Chinese comrades had acquainted themselves with the contents of the CC CPSU's letter, their reserve (*skovannost'*) disappeared; they acted more freely and cordially. In parting with us, Deng Xiaoping said: “Your letter calls for solidarity—and that is good.”

9 April 1962

On April 5, in keeping with instructions from the Center, I turned to the CC CCP with a request to meet with Mao Zedong, or with a person to be named by him, in order to inform the Chinese side of the negotiations of com. A.A. Gromyko with [US Secretary of State] D[ean] Rusk on the German issue. After a silence lasting for four days, they replied to us that Deng Xiaoping had been instructed by the CC CCP to meet with the ambassador.

I visited Deng Xiaoping in the CC CCP building. In connection with Deng Xiaoping's question about my trip to Moscow, I told him in detail about the work of the March Plenum of the CC CPSU. Deng Xiaoping then handed me a letter from the CC CCP of 7 April 1962, which is an answer to the CC CPSU letter of 22 February 1962.

Since these letters by the CC CCP are long, Deng Xiaoping stated that he would not read it. The basic content of the letter of the CC CCP to the CC CPSU, he continued, is that, no matter what, the CPSU and the CCP must close ranks and, in a spirit of unity, resolve their problems....

Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC
(S. CHERVONENKO)

[Source: AVP RF. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

**Stenogram: Meeting of the Delegations of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the
Chinese Communist Party, Moscow, 5-20 July 1963.**

8 July

Deng Xiaoping. By law, obviously, Com. [Comrade] Grishin should not object to our working?

Grishin. Today is a work day. I don't know what Liu Ningyi thinks.

Kang Sheng. Liu Ningyi is silent, which means that he agrees.

Deng Xiaoping. Well as for today, perhaps I should speak?

Suslov. Please, [go ahead]...

Speech by the CCP delegation head Com. Deng Xiaoping.

Deng Xiaoping. First of all, I want to announce that our delegation at the request of the CC of our party came to this meeting in Moscow of representatives of the CCP and USSR with the sincere intention of removing discord and strengthening unity...

...It can be said with all candor that a whole series of disagreements of a fundamental character which exist today in the international communist movement, started at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

In the past we never spoke about this openly, because we were taking into account the situation you were in. We only mentioned that the disagreements which have arisen in the past few years in the international Communist movement were provoked by the violation of the Declaration of 1957 by comrades from several fraternal parties... We have always considered and still consider that the 20th Congress of the CPSU put forward positions on the issues of war and peace, peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition which went against Marxism-Leninism. Especially serious are two issues: the issue of the so called "peaceful transition" and the issue of the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin under the pretext of the so called "struggle with the cult of personality"...

Here I want just briefly to say the following: a criticism of some errors by Stalin is necessary; taking off the lid, so to speak, and ending superstition is a good thing. However this criticism must be correct both from the point of view of principles and from the point of view of methods.

Since the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the facts demonstrate that the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin is a serious step undertaken by the leading comrades from the CPSU with the aim of laying out the path to the revision of Marxism-Leninism on a whole series of issues... After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, as a consequence of the so-called struggle against the cult of personality and the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin, the wave of an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaign was provoked around the whole world...

The most prominent events which took place in this period were the events in Poland and Hungary.

We have always considered and still consider that in resolving the issues connected with the events in Poland, the CPSU took a position of great-power chauvinism, trying to exert pressure on Polish comrades and to subordinate them to itself by means of coercion and even tried to resort to military force. We consider that such a method is not only evidence of great-power chauvinism in relation to fraternal countries and to fraternal parties, but also evidence of adventurism.

Following this, the counterrevolutionary mutiny in Hungary took place. The Hungarian events by their character differ from the events in Poland. In resolving the issues associated with the events in Poland, which were issues of an internal order [*vnutrennego poriadka*], between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, the comrades in the CPSU resorted to coercive methods, even trying to resort to military force.

And what position did the CPSU take in regard to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary? The leadership of the CPSU at one time tried to leave socialist Hungary to the mercy of fate. You know that at that time we spoke out against your position on the matter. Such a position was practically tantamount to capitulation. The course and details of these two events are well known to you and to us. I do not want to dwell on them greatly... After the

20th Congress of the CPSU, beginning in 1956, at meetings of an internal sort [*vnutrennego poryadka*], the leading comrades of our party criticized your errors in a moderate form more than once. In his statement comrade Suslov said that we kept quiet for 7 years. There are no grounds for [saying] that.

In fact, both on the issue of Stalin and on the issue of the form of transition, that is peaceful transition, the leaders of the CCP presented their views more than once to the leaders of the CPSU. And these views are well known to you.

Back in April 1956, Com. Mao Zedong stated our opinion on the issue of Stalin in a discussion with Com. Mikoian and also after that, in a discussion with Ambassador Com. Iudin.

Com. Mao Zedong emphasized that it is incorrect to think that "Stalin's errors and contributions are divided into equal halves;" "whatever happened, all the same Stalin's contributions are greater than his errors. One must evaluate it as follows, that his contributions make up 70 percent, and his mistakes 30 percent. It is necessary to make a concrete analysis and to give an all-around [*vsestoronnaya*] assessment."... In October 1956, Com. Zhou Enlai also stated our views about Stalin in a discussion with Com. Ponomarev, who was then a member of the CPSU delegation present at the eighth Congress of our [CCP] party. In discussion with Com. Ponomarev, Com. Zhou Enlai criticized the mistakes by comrades from the CPSU: first, "no preliminary consultation was carried out with fraternal parties"; secondly, "an all-around historical analysis was completely lacking" in relation to Stalin; thirdly, the leading comrades from the CPSU "lacked self-criticism". These are the three points which Com. Zhou Enlai talked about.

On 23 October 1956, Com. Mao Zedong again talked with Com. Iudin about the issue of Stalin. Com. Mao Zedong then said that it was necessary to criticize Stalin, but that in relation to critical methods we hold to another opinion, and also have a different opinion about some other issues. Com. Mao Zedong also said that you had completely renounced such a sword as Stalin, and had thrown away the sword. As a result, enemies had seized it in order to kill us. That is the same as if, having picked up a stone, one were to throw it on one's own feet [*podniav kamen' brosit' ego sebe na nogi*].

On 30 November 1956, Com. Mao Zedong again received Com. Iudin and in a conversation with him said that the basic course and line in the period of Stalin's leadership was correct and that one must not treat one's comrade like an enemy.

On 18 January 1957 in Moscow, at the fifth discussion with the government delegation of the Soviet Union, Com. Zhou Enlai touched on the events in Hungary, noting that the counter-revolutionary revolt in Hungary was connected, on the one hand, with some mistakes committed by Stalin when resolving issues of mutual relations between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, and, on the other

hand, was connected with mistakes committed by the leadership of the CPSU in its criticism of Stalin. In discussion Com. Zhou Enlai again set out the aforementioned three points on this issue to the leadership of the CPSU: the lack of an all-around analysis, the lack of self-criticism and the lack of consultation with the fraternal countries.

Both Com. Mao Zedong on the 29 October 1957, on the eve of his departure for Moscow, in a conversation with Com. Iudin, and Com. Zhou Enlai during the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961, in a conversation with Com. Khrushchev, stated our opinion on the issue of Stalin.

It should be further noted that when the events in Poland arose, Com. Liu Shaoqi, heading the delegation of the CCP, arrived in Moscow for negotiations, during which he also talked about the issue of Stalin and criticized comrades from the CPSU for committing the same mistakes during the events in Poland—mistakes of great-power chauvinism which took place during Stalin's leadership as well... From that very time, you, considering that your internal problems have already been resolved, started to direct the cutting edge [*ostrie*] of your action against Marxism-Leninism against fraternal parties defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism and began to engage in activities directed against the CCP, against the PRC, and this activity is of a serious character.

What has been done by you over this period? Let us cite some of the facts, so as to make things clear.

From April to July of 1958 the CPSU put to China the issue of the creation of a long-wave radar station and a joint fleet, trying thereby to bring China under its military control. But we guessed your intentions and you were not able to attain your goals.

Following that you started both in statements and in actions to carry out anti-Chinese activities in an intensified manner. You continually spoke out attacking the internal policies of the CCP, in particular on the people's commune.

By way of example one can refer to the conversation by Com. Khrushchev with the American Congressman [Hubert] Humphrey in December 1958 and to the speech by Com. Khrushchev in a Polish agricultural cooperative in July 1959.

In June 1959 you unilaterally annulled the agreement on rendering help to China in developing a nuclear industry and in producing atom bombs.

Following this, on 9 September 1959, TASS made an announcement about the incident on the Chinese-Indian border and displayed bias in favor of the Indian reaction, making the disagreements between China and the Soviet Union clear to the whole world for the first time.

In November of that year Com. Khrushchev openly accused China of having acted "stupidly" and "regrettably" in a conversation with a correspondent of the Indian daily "New Age."

At the last meeting at Camp David which was held in

September 1959, Com. Khrushchev began to preach to the whole world of a "world without arms, without armies, without wars", (look good in all sorts of different ways) made the leader of American imperialism, considered peaceful coexistence the task of all tasks, and propagandized the idea that, supposedly, the American-Soviet friendship decides the fate of humanity. All of this practically signified a sermon to the effect that the nature of imperialism had already changed, that Marxism-Leninism was already obsolete.

During this very period you started to propagandize the so called "spirit of Camp David" everywhere. Incidentally, Eisenhower did not recognize the existence of any "spirit of Camp David".

During this very period you, counting on some "spirit of Camp David," clutched at the straw extended by Eisenhower and began mounting attacks upon China in your statements without restraint.

On 30 September 1959, in his speech at a banquet held by us on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the creation of the PRC, Com. Khrushchev stated that one must not test the firmness of a capitalist power with force.

On 6 October 1959 in his speech in Vladivostok, Com. Khrushchev stated that allegedly we were looking for war, like cocks for a fight [*kak petukhi k drake*].

On 31 October 1959 in his report to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Com. Khrushchev said that some, similarly to Trotskii, want "neither war nor peace." On 1 December 1959 in his speech at the 7th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Com. Khrushchev demanded "a checking of watches." In that same speech he stated that "if the leadership of this or that country becomes conceited, then that can play into the hands of the enemy."

In February 1960 during the meeting of the Political Consultative Council of the participating countries of the Warsaw Pact, Com. Khrushchev spoke rudely using an expression like "old galoshes." Meanwhile, the CC CPSU in its oral presentation to the CC CCP accused China of committing such mistakes as a "narrowly-nationalist approach," and of acting on "narrowly-nationalist interests," in relation to the issues of the Indian-Chinese border.

The sense of all these statements and speeches is understood by you and by us, and also by our enemies... In such circumstances we could not remain silent any longer. We published three articles "Long live Leninism!" and others, in which we defended Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration, and exposed some revisionist and opportunist views to criticism. But in these three articles, we as before directed the brunt of our struggle for the most part against imperialism and Yugoslavian revisionism without open criticism of comrades from the CPSU.

Following this, such events occurred as the intrusion of the American "U-2" plane into the USSR's airspace, the collapse of the meeting of the heads of government of the four powers in Paris and the collapse of the entirely non-

existent so-called “spirit of Camp-David.” All of this proved the error of the views of our comrades from the CPSU and the correctness of our views...

In June 1960 in Bucharest, the leadership of the CPSU mounted a sudden attack on the CCP, disseminated the Informational Note of the CC of the CPSU which contains an all-around attack on the CCP, and organized a campaign by a whole group of fraternal parties against us...

On 16 July 1960 the Soviet side unilaterally decided to withdraw between 28 July and 1 September over 1,300 Soviet specialists working in China. Over 900 specialists were recalled from [extended] business trips and contracts and agreements were broken...

On 25 August 1962, the Soviet government informed China that it was ready to conclude an agreement with the USA on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In our view, you were pursuing an unseemly goal in coming to such an agreement, namely: to bind China by the hands and feet through an agreement with the USA.

After India started a major attack on the border regions of China in October 1962, the Soviet Union began to supply India with even larger quantities of military materiel, to do its utmost to give [India] an economic blood transfusion, to support Nehru by political means, and to spur him on to the struggle against China.

Your position on the issues of the Indian-Chinese border conflict received praise from the USA. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State [Averell] Harriman, said: “I consider that the maintenance of relations that are as friendly as possible between India and Moscow serves its own interests well and also serves our interests well.” Harriman made this statement on 9 December 1962. Further, on 18 December 1962 in conversation with a Japanese correspondent, Harriman also stated that the USA wanted to see the Soviet Union help India in the matter of supporting its defense capabilities.

On the issue of Chinese-Indian relations you went too far. With all [bad] intention, you spoke out together with Kennedy and Nehru against China. Where then did the spirit of proletarian internationalism, which existed under Lenin and Stalin, go?

In October 1962 there was a crisis in the region of the Caribbean Sea. During these events we consider that you committed two errors: in shipping the missiles to Cuba you indulged in adventurism, and then, showing confusion in the face of nuclear blackmail from the USA, you capitulated.

People understandably [*zakonno*] ask why you began to ship missiles to Cuba. In this regard we have our own experience. Judging by our experience, your actions in this regard remind us in their character of your efforts to develop a long-wave radar station and a joint fleet in China. For Cuba’s defense no missiles are necessary at all. And so, in shipping missiles to Cuba, did you want to help her or to ruin her? We have become suspicious that you, in shipping missiles to Cuba, were trying to place her under

your control.

You failed to consult with fraternal countries on such an important issue. You daily speak about the danger of thermonuclear war. But in the given case you rashly played with nuclear weapons.

You justify your actions by saying that you wanted to obtain some sort of “promise” from the USA, and you say that you truly received such a “promise.”

But what are the facts? The facts are that under threat from the United States you were obliged to remove your missiles. By all sorts of means you tried to convince Cuba to agree to so-called “international inspection,” which encroaches upon their sovereignty and constitutes interference in their internal affairs. Besides that, you also conduct propaganda among the peoples of the world, convincing them to believe in some sort of promise by Kennedy, and thereby you adorn [*priukrashivaete*] American imperialism.

In his letters to Kennedy of the 27 and 28 October 1962, Com. Khrushchev wrote: “You are working toward the preservation of peace” and “I express my satisfaction and recognition of your manifestation of a sense of moderation and an understanding of the responsibility which now rests on you for the preservation of peace in the whole world.”

But the question remains did the USA in the end give some sort of promise? Let us look at [US Secretary of State Dean] Rusk’s statement of 11 January 1963. Rusk stated: “To whatever extent President Kennedy took on obligations not to encroach on Cuba at the moment of the Cuban crisis, these obligations have not come into force.” He further said: “In general no such obligations exist.”...

At the Congresses of these parties another strange phenomenon was observed: on the one hand at these Congresses they attacked the CCP and completely removed the Albanian Workers’ Party, and on the other hand, they forcibly dragged the Titoist clique in Yugoslavia into the ranks of the international communist movement and tried to rehabilitate that clique. In addition, at the Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, there was noise, whistling, and stamping right at the time when our representative subjected Yugoslav revisionism to criticism on the basis of the Moscow Declaration by citing the Moscow Declaration verbatim.

What do the facts we have cited above, which took place after the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, testify to? These facts testify to the fact that comrades from the CPSU have taken further steps to create a split in the ranks of the international communist movement, and, moreover, have done so in an increasingly sharp, increasingly extreme form, in an increasingly organized [way], on an increasingly large scale, trying, come what may, to crush others.

I would like to note that using such methods is a habitual affair for you. You began using such methods as far back as the Bucharest conference. During the bilateral meeting between the representatives of our two parties in

1960, I said that it was fortunate that Com. Peng Zhen went to the Bucharest meeting; he weighs approximately 80 kilograms, and for that reason he endured; if I had gone, and I weigh only a bit over 50 kilograms, I could not have endured. After that it was just as well that Com. Wu Xiuquan, who weighs more than 70 kilograms, went to the GDR, and was able to endure. Frankly speaking, such methods do not help matters. You cannot prove by such methods that you are in the right; you cannot prove that the truth is on your side. Quite the opposite; the use of such methods is an insult to the glorious Marxist-Leninist party.

Ponomarev. And Com. Grishin weighs 70 kg. After all, this started before Bucharest, in Beijing. That was the start of and the reason for the Bucharest Conference.

Deng Xiaoping. I understand you.

Peng Zhen. Wait. You will have [your] time; you will be able to say as much as you want then. We are ready to hear you out...

Deng Xiaoping. I have already taken 5 hours in my statement, and on that I end it. Are we going to continue the session today, or will we continue it tomorrow?

Suslov. We propose a break until the day after tomorrow, at 10 AM. We must acquaint ourselves with your statement.

Deng Xiaoping. We agree. Who will speak the day after tomorrow, you or we?

Suslov. By the order it will be our turn.

Andropov. By the principle: we, you, we, you.

Deng Xiaoping. That is Com. Andropov's invention [*izobretenie*]...

July 10

Suslov. Again, as in 1960, you are putting in motion the practice, which has already been condemned by communist parties, of personal attacks on Com. N.S. Khrushchev. Such a practice in the past did not provoke anything but indignation in any true communist, and will do the same now.

Com. N.S. Khrushchev is our recognized leader. Reflecting the collective will of the CC CPSU, he has gained unlimited authority for himself in our party, in the country, in the whole world through his selfless devotion to Marxism-Leninism and through his truly titanic struggle to build communism in the USSR, to preserve peace in the whole world in defense of the interests of all working people...

For obviously demagogic ends you are trying to connect the decisions of the 20th Congress with the well-known events in Poland and also with the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary in 1956... We do not plan to examine these issues anew. We will simply note the complete groundlessness of your assertions to the effect that the decisions of the 20th Congress led to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary. One of the reasons for those events, as is shown by materials of the fraternal parties, comes from the errors of the previous leadership of Hungary connected with Stalin's actions: elements of

unequal rights in the relations between socialist countries which took place during that period by the fault of Stalin. How could the 20th Congress, which abolished these elements of unequal rights and fully restored the principle of respecting national sovereignty, be reason for dissatisfaction on the part of the Hungarian people?

You are now trying to accumulate capital by speculating on these events and by proving that allegedly the Soviet Union committed errors, and that by your interference you almost managed to save the situation.

This is a strange and monstrous accusation to lay at the feet of the CPSU and a more than strange pretension [*pretenziia*] on the part of the Chinese leaders. Did our country not pay with thousands of its sons' lives in order to preserve the socialist order in fraternal Hungary; did it not come to the aid of the friendly Hungarian people in its difficult hour?...

Throughout the whole period of existence of the PRC, the CC of the CPSU and the Soviet government invariably gave help to China in creating and strengthening the defense of the country. The 24 defense enterprises built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union were the basis for the creation of corresponding branches of Chinese industry. Another 33 defense enterprises are being built. At one time, 60 infantry divisions were equipped with arms and military-technical property supplied from the USSR, and from 1955-1956 the modernization of the Chinese army with more modern types of armaments and materiel was carried out. In past years our country has given the PRC a large quantity of technical and technological documentation by which China was able to organize the production of MIG-17, MIG-19, MIG-21-F, and TU-16 airplanes, MI-4 helicopters, "air-to-air," "ground-to-air," "ground-to-ground," "air-to-ground," and "ship-to-ground" missiles, naval materiel, submarines, and cutters of various types. The Soviet Union helped the PRC develop the basis for a nuclear industry...

Several words on the issue you raised about the so-called "joint construction of a naval fleet." Com. Deng Xiaoping stated that apparently our party tried to stick China with the joint construction of a naval fleet and that by doing so we allegedly encroached upon the sovereignty of the PRC. Com. Deng Xiaoping, after all you were present at the discussion between Com. Khrushchev and Com. Mao Zedong on 31 July 1958 and took part in it. Have you really forgotten the following statement made by Com. Khrushchev in the course of the conversation. "Never have we at the CC of the CPSU even had the thought of jointly building a fleet. You know my point of view. During Stalin's reign I was against the "joint companies [*smeshannye obshchestva*]." Later, N.S. Khrushchev announced: "We considered it necessary to talk about the issue of building a fleet, but we neither thought about or considered it necessary to construct a joint factory or a joint fleet." In response to this Com. Mao Zedong stated that: "If it is so, then all the dark clouds have dispersed." There is no issue, but you have

brought it up again today. What do you need it for?...

We would also like to remind our forgetful Chinese comrades about some facts and about the assistance the USSR has given to the economic development of the PRC. Do not the 198 modern industrial enterprises built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union, the scientific-research institutes which it set up, and the technical cadres trained in the USSR, bear witness to the commitment by the CPSU to fraternal friendship with People's China? Up until 1959 almost a half of all the cast iron was produced, more than half of all the steel was smelted, and more than half of the rolled iron was made in the metallurgical enterprises constructed in China with help from the USSR. Such new branches of industry as the automobile, the tractor, and the aviation industry have been developed in China with the help of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union gave the PRC 21 thousand sets of scientific-technical documentation, including more than 1400 plans of whole enterprises...

Deng Xiaoping. Perhaps tomorrow we rest for a day? The day after tomorrow we will speak according to his principle. (He turns to Com. Andropov).

Suslov. Fine, until ten o'clock, yes?

Deng Xiaoping. Fine, we agree...

July 12

Deng Xiaoping. Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the People's Socialist Party of Cuba at one time fell to attacking the armed struggle led by Com. Fidel Castro, calling it "putschism," "adventurism," and "terrorism." It accused Com. Castro of the fact that the armed struggle led by him was a "total mistake" [*sploshnaya oshibka*], "caused by a petty-bourgeois nature, and that its leaders do not rely on the masses." It even openly demanded of Com. Castro that he renounce "putschistic activities," and "the erroneous path of armed struggle, leading to a rupture with the people."

Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the Algerian communist party from 1957 fully renounced armed struggle and, moreover, began to propagandize the "danger" of national-liberationist war, advocating the attainment of independence through compromise, and in doing so fully wasted its place in the political life of the country.

Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the Communist party of Iraq renounced the correct line, which it at one time had implemented, and began dreaming about the realization of a peaceful transition in Iraq. This led revolution in Iraq to serious failures and to defeat. During the counterrevolutionary coup of 8 February 1963 the Communist party of Iraq found itself in a condition of complete unpreparedness and suffered heavy losses...

July 13

Suslov. Com. Ponomarev will speak today for our delegation.

Speech by the representative of the CPSU Com. B. N. Ponomarev:

Comrades, yesterday we heard the second address by the head of the Chinese delegation. Our delegation cannot hide the fact that we came out of the meeting feeling deep sorrow and distress. Of course, this was not because the address allegedly contained criticism, which is what Deng Xiaoping had in mind when he talked about "bitter, but necessary medicine." We communists are steadfast people, and more than once have come across not only groundless criticism, but also malicious slander.

No, that was not what left us with a bitter taste. The second address by Com. Deng Xiaoping confirmed our worst fears, formed toward the end of his first speech. It is becoming clearer and clearer that the delegation of the CC of the CCP came here not to find agreement and to eliminate our differences. Your design, evidently, is different — to bring a whole load of dirt [*privezti...tselyi voz griazi*] to Moscow, to dump it on us, to do everything, not shying away from any tactics [*ne stesniaias' v sredstvakh*], to defame the policies of the CPSU and thereby further worsen the relations between our two parties and countries...

Ponomarev. Fabrication Number 4. You fabricated an undoubted falsehood to the effect that the USSR did not aid the Algerian people's war of liberation. Here are the facts. In the most decisive period of the war, from 1960-1962, we supplied free to the People's Liberation Army of Algeria 25 thousand rifles, 21 thousand machine guns and sub-machine guns, 1300 howitzers, cannons and mortars, many tens of thousands of pistols and other weapons. Over 5 million rubles' worth of clothes, provisions and medical supplies were supplied to Algeria by Soviet social organizations alone. Hundreds of wounded from the Algerian Liberation Army were saved and treated in the Soviet Union. Soviet wheat, sugar, butter, conserves, condensed milk, etc., streamed into Algeria.

Finally, Fabrication Number 5. You again and again repeat your lying version of Soviet policy towards Poland, Hungary and Cuba. Who are you [to set yourselves up] as judges in these matters, if the party and governmental leaders of these three countries fully, decisively and publicly for the whole world reject your insinuations and declare to you that it is impermissible for representatives of a communist party to try and split the USSR, Poland and Hungary through fabrications? Com. Fidel Castro in speeches in the USSR and on returning [to Cuba] clearly described the internationalist policies of the CPSU. By the way, why didn't you publish these speeches? They would have shown the Chinese people that your position during the Caribbean crisis [Ed. note. This is what the Russians

call the Cuban Missile Crisis.] was erroneous and contradicted the interests of the Cuban, Soviet and Chinese peoples...

Andropov. As for you, you long ago ceased any sort of consultation with us. In 1958, the Chinese side did not inform us in a timely fashion about its intentions to carry out the shelling of the coastal islands in the Taiwan straits which was carried out soon after Com. N.S. Khrushchev left Beijing. According to the later admission of Com. Mao Zedong, during Com. N.S. Khrushchev's presence in Beijing the Chinese comrades had already decided on this operation and had prepared it, but you did not consider it necessary to inform the Soviet government about it. Despite this, during a dark hour for the Chinese government, the head of the Soviet government informed the US President Eisenhower that an attack on China would be taken as an attack on the Soviet Union.

Over the last several years the government of the PRC has completely failed to inform the government of the USSR about the Chinese-American negotiations that have been going on since 1955 at the ambassadorial level in Warsaw. Judging by the press reports, over 100 meetings were held there. Since May 1958 you have twice sharply changed your political course on relations with Japan, and, in both cases, despite the Treaty of 1950, you did so without consulting with us...

Kang Sheng. In your criticism of Stalin, you do not take the position of seeking the truth and do not use methods of scientific analysis, but resort to demagoguery, slanders and abusive language.

Comrades from the CPSU call Stalin "a murderer," "a criminal," "a bandit," "a gambler," "a despot like Ivan the Terrible," "the greatest dictator in the history of Russia," "a fool," "shit," "an idiot" [*ubiitsa, ugovovnik, bandit, igrok, despot tipa Ivana Groznogo, samyi bol'shoi diktator v istorii Rossii, durak, govno, idiot*].

All of these curses and swear words came from the mouth of Com. N.S. Khrushchev.

Trying to justify Com. N.S. Khrushchev, in your address of 10 July you stated that allegedly he gave Stalin an "objective and all-around assessment," that allegedly he adhered to the "heart of the matter" [*printsipial'noe otmoshenie*]. Is this not the same as telling cock-and-bull stories with your eyes shut [*nesti nebylitsy s zakrytymi glazami*]?

Frankly speaking, we cannot understand at all why the leadership of the CPSU feels such a fierce hatred for Stalin, why it uses every kind of the most malicious abuse, why it attacks him with more hatred than it shows its enemies?

From your statements it emerges that allegedly the great Soviet people lived for thirty years under the tyranny of "the greatest dictator in the history of Russia." Can it really be that such a great leader who for many years enjoyed the general recognition of the Soviet people really turned out to be "the greatest dictator in the history of Russia?" Can it really be that the experience of the first

state in the world to be a dictatorship of the proletariat, which the Soviet people shared with the peoples of the whole world, has been the Soviet people's experience of existence in the conditions of tyranny under some "dictator?"

From what you have said it appears as if the first socialist country in the world was built thanks to the fact that a "fool" headed the leadership. Can it really be that the achievements of the national economy and the development of the latest technology in the Soviet Union during several decades have been attained under the leadership of some sort of "fool?" Can it really be that the basis for the development of nuclear weapons and missile technology in the Soviet Union has been laid down under the leadership of some sort of "fool"?

From what you have said it appears as if the Supreme Commander of the great Soviet Army turns out to have been some sort of "idiot." Can it really be that the great victory of the Soviet Army during World War II was won under the command of some sort of "idiot"?

From what you have said it appears as if the great CPSU was in the position of having some sort of "bandit" at the head of its leadership for 30 years. Can it really be that the CPSU which for a long time had the love and respect of the revolutionary peoples of the whole world had a "bandit" as its great leader for several decades?

From what you have said it appears as if the ranks of the international communist movement which grew and became stronger from year to year were under the leadership of some sort of "shit." Can it really be that communists of all countries considered some sort of "shit" to be their flag-bearer for several decades?

From what you have said it appears as if the great proletarian leader for whom imperialists and reactionaries of different countries felt fierce hatred for a long time has turned out to be all-in-all some sort of "gambler." Can it really be that the Soviet people and the revolutionary peoples of all countries struggling against imperialism and reaction considered their teacher some sort of "gambler"?

Comrades, you, so to speak, having picked up the stone, have thrown it on your own feet. How can you treat Stalin in such a way? Your actions in this regard not only go counter to historical reality, but also put you in a very awkward position.

In depicting Stalin as such a bad man, you also blacken the entire leadership of the Soviet state and the CPSU; and, at the same time, as comrades who then took part in the leadership of the state and the party, you cannot justify yourselves by saying that you do not carry your portion of responsibility for the "crimes" you talk about.

Let us take, for example, Com. Khrushchev. He heaped all of the errors of the period of Stalin's leadership, especially the excesses committed on the issue of counter-revolutionary elements, on Stalin alone while he presented himself as being completely clean. Can this really convince people? If the memory of men is not too short,

they will be able to recall that during Stalin's leadership Com. Khrushchev more than once extolled Stalin and the policy he was then carrying out of struggling with counter-revolutionary elements.

Com. Khrushchev constantly praised Stalin, calling him "a close friend and comrade-in-arms of Lenin," "a very great genius, teacher, great leader of humanity," "a great marshal of victories," "a friend of peoples in his simplicity," "one's own father" [*rodnoi otets*] and so on and so on.

On 6 June 1937 in his report at the 5th party conference of the Moscow oblast', Com. Khrushchev said: "Our party will mercilessly crush the band of betrayers and traitors, will wipe all the Trotskyist-rightist carrion from the face of the earth... The guarantee is the unshakable leadership of our CC, the unshakable leadership of our great leader, Com. Stalin... We will annihilate our enemies without a trace to the last one and will scatter their ashes in the wind."

Later, for example on 8 June 1938, while speaking at the 4th party conference of the Kiev oblast', Com. Khrushchev said: "Yakiry, balitskie, liubchenki, zatomskie" [Ed. note: Famous purge victims] and other bastards wanted to bring Polish nobles [*Pol'she pany*] to the Ukraine, wanted to bring German fascists, landowners and capitalists here... We have destroyed quite a few enemies, but not all. For that reason one must keep one's eyes open. We must firmly remember the words of Com. Stalin, that as long as capitalist encirclement exists, they will send spies and provocateurs [*diversanty*] to us...

Frankly speaking, on the issue of criticism and self-criticism you are inferior to Stalin. Having made mistakes, Stalin sometimes still practiced self-criticism. For instance, Stalin gave some mistaken advice relating to the Chinese revolution. After the victory of the Chinese revolution, he recognized his mistakes before Chinese comrades and friends. And how are you acting? You know well that you slough off [*svalivaete*] all of your mistakes onto others and ascribe all successes to yourself...

Suslov. Our delegation states a decisive protest against the distortion, falsification and slanders made in relation to the leadership of our party and to Com. N.S. Khrushchev, against our party and the decisions of its Congresses.

The delegation of the CPSU also states its protest against the sort of propaganda that has begun in the last few days on Peking radio. We consider that the entire responsibility for these actions rests with the leadership of the CCP..

Deng Xiaoping. Com. Suslov has expressed some sort of protest. If we are talking about protest, then we have an even greater basis for voicing even more protests...

Already two weeks have gone by since our meeting began. At the meeting both sides exchanged their views. Although as of yet it has been difficult to attain a unity of both sides' views right away, still, a frank exposition of

views by both sides in this circle where the representatives of the two parties have been meeting is very useful for mutual understanding, for gradually finding a common language, for searching out a way to eliminate disagreements and strengthen cohesion. For that reason we consider that it serves as a good start...our delegation is introducing a proposal temporarily to adjourn the current meeting; the representatives of the CCP and the CPSU, both sides, can continue their meeting at another time. The time and place of the next meeting will be set through a consultation between the Central Committees of our two parties...

Our delegation once again expresses the sincere hope of our party that we and you will not spare our efforts towards an all-around, repeated, and most careful discussion of the disagreements existing between our parties. If a single meeting is not enough for this, it is possible to hold a second meeting, and if two meetings do not suffice, a third can be held...

20 July

Suslov. We will give you an answer tomorrow...

Deng Xiaoping. In conclusion I would like to say a few words.

However great the disagreements between us may be, we hope that we can gradually find the way to eliminate those disagreements, since unity between us is too important.

Despite the fact that in the course of the discussion both our sides have stated more than a few views with which the other side does not agree, and despite the fact that you have said that our words are not pleasant to the ear, and that we have also said that your words are not pleasant to the ear, despite all of this, our current meeting will serve as a good start. Moreover, we have agreed with you to publish a communiqué on the continuation of our meetings. We consider this a good thing.

We have come to the agreement that it is necessary to continue our meetings and that the time and place of the next meeting will be agreed by the Central Committees of our parties.

Here I would like to express in passing the following hope of ours: if your delegation, if the CC of the CPSU agrees, then we would like to invite the delegation of the CPSU to Beijing for the continuation of the meeting. That issue, of course, could be agreed upon separately.

Suslov. This is also a question for discussion between our Central Committees. Finished [*vse*]. Will I see you [later] today?

Deng Xiaoping. At six?

Suslov. Yes, at six.

[Source : SAPMO Barch JIV 2/207 698, pp. 187-330 (in Russian); obtained by Vladislav Zubok; translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

Cold War Endpoints?: Beginning the Debate

by David Wolff

Chronology and periodization are the bread and butter of the historical profession, so it is no surprise to see the proper dating of the beginning and the end of the Cold War under discussion. 1945 is often favored, for how could a cold war be an age's dominant feature, while a hot war was still going on? Churchill's Fulton speech is also mentioned as an important turning point, but so is the Marshall Plan, the Cominform, the Truman Doctrine, the Soviet bomb, NSC-68, the Lublin Poles and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Clearly this discussion will go on for a long time.¹

Similar disagreements are also evident regarding the end of the Cold War. As we approach 1999 and the activities planned to commemorate the tenth anniversary of Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain collapse, we will certainly hear more on this topic. Although 1989, like 1945 at the beginning, has many commonsensical advantages to recommend it, different causal emphases in analyzing the end of the Cold War will produce different chronologies. If Gorbachev's appointment as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the beginning of the end, then 1985 looms large. If the Reagan build-up and Star Wars drove the Soviets to bankruptcy and despair, then the early 1980s grow in importance. Specialists who give primacy in their analytical priorities to either the fall of Leninism or the rise of nationalism are likely to pick the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union.

This section of *CWIHP Bulletin 10* begins with a remarkable essay by the director of the National Security Archive, Thomas S. Blanton, with accompanying Russian documents. It seems that on Christmas Eve 1989, with state authority crumbling in Romania and the Ceausescus only a day away from the firing squad, the United States proposed that the Russians send a peacekeeping mission to the area. The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister I. Aboimov, in refusing the offer, made a "Christmas gift" of the Brezhnev doctrine to the American ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr. This seems to have been the first direct American request for increased Soviet military activity in Eastern Europe since 1945. As such, it represented a sea change in comparison with the fears and concerns of the Cold War era. Of course, what was a key moment of mutual self-recognition for the superpowers was relatively insignificant in Romania's end of Cold War, since no Soviet troops were actually sent.

As this final comment makes clear, the Cold War ended differently in different places, since the historical chronologies of countries and regions overlap and diverge. In the second part of this section, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa introduces new archival evidence on Soviet-Japanese

relations in the late Cold War period that suggest that in Asia the endpoint may not yet have been reached. This implies that this relatively neglected field has much to offer as we refine analytical tools for the study of the Cold War. Unfortunately, until recently, little documentation was available. The working group transcripts are a remarkable study in Soviet-Japanese stalemate, one of the great "givens" of late twentieth-century history. Change is more exciting to study, but enduring continuities are no less important. The tit for tat back and forth of the diplomatic dialogue demonstrates one of the more arcane uses of history, too. Of course, the American role in the ties between the US's most important economic "partner," Japan, and its most important security "concern," Russia, has also been understudied, although a National Security Archive initiative on US-Japanese security relations run by Robert Wampler has recently begun to remedy that situation.

Both the Romanian and Soviet-Japanese revelations fall among that group of cases where the availability of East-bloc evidence has outpaced the more systematic and expansive declassification process in the West. Up until 1968-69, the opening of Western holdings has followed the thirty-year rule, for most classes of documents, to outnumber the East-bloc counterparts. Starting from 1969, the reverse is, by and large, true with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) offering sole recourse.² If Blanton's FOIA fails, the Matlock instructions and conversation will only emerge from the American vault in the year 2014. The fact that Blanton was able to corroborate the Russian documents with Matlock's recollections points out one of the distinguishing characteristics of Cold War studies and contemporary history, in general — the importance of oral history. When combined with and tempered by documents, these two genres of testimony are most revealing.³

Keeping this in mind, perhaps there ought to be a mechanism to accelerate release of documents deemed crucial to the learning of historical lessons from the recent past, at least for already non-existent East European regimes whose archives are open, and before the surviving participants leave us for good. These are, after all, the lessons with deepest and most immediate bearing on the present.

If the Cold War ended at different times in different places, then it is entirely possible that it is not quite over yet in some places. This is a statement of great practical import for the Cold War International History Project and all scholars associated in the endeavor of excavating the Cold War. Wherever the documents are least accessible, some strain of ongoing Cold War mentality is probably

still present. In this sense, the archival openness work of CWIHP, through relations with scholarly and archival authorities in many countries, indirectly measures the Cold War's lasting legacy. Success in obtaining documentation on a given topic is the ultimate proof that that moment of Cold War can finally be made into history, one more thread in the new international history of the twentieth century.

¹ One of the few things that all of these events have in common is that Stalin's thoughts on them were decisive in shaping Soviet policies viewed simultaneously as international actions and reactions. In order to broaden and deepen this discussion of Cold War origins, CWIHP has begun a project on "I.V. Stalin as a Cold War Statesman." Transcripts and memcons of Stalin's meetings with foreign leaders are being collected for future publication and research in

connection with a major CWIHP-sponsored international conference, scheduled for late 1998. The Yugoslavia section of this *Bulletin* has a first installment from the Stalin project. Additional conversations with Stalin will go up on the CWIHP website (cwihip.si.edu) in the course of 1998.

² Russian archives are an exception on the East-bloc side with post-1969 documents emerging only in special cases. On the American side, extensive declassifications have taken place on certain post-1969 topics due to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suits that generated the National Security Archive's foreign policy series. These include: Afghanistan, 1973-80; El Salvador, 1977-84; Iran, 1977-80; Iran-Contra Affair, 1983-88; Nicaragua, 1978-1990; Philippines, 1965-86; South Africa, 1962-89; US Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 1945-91.

³ For an insightful discussion and demonstration of "critical oral history" with reference to the Cuban Missile Crisis, see James Blight and David Welch, *On the Brink* (New York, 1989).

When did the Cold War End?

by Thomas Blanton

When the Cold War memorial rises on the Mall in Washington D.C., what exactly will be the date carved therein as the end of the Cold War?

Ambassador Robert Hutchings writes that "Americans of an earlier generation knew when V-E Day and V-J Day were; there were dates on the calendar marking victory in Europe and victory over Japan in 1945. But the Cold War ended on no certain date; it lacked finality.... The end of the Cold War thus evoked among the American public little sense of purpose fulfilled—and even less of responsibility for the tasks of postwar construction."¹

Other commentators have picked the obvious candidate—25 December 1991, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist.² Yet this date is far too neat, since by any rational measure the Cold War was already over by then. Well before December 1991, the Cold War featured many symbolic and substantive markers of its demise. Among these, and on the basis of new archival evidence from Soviet files, this article nominates Christmas Eve 1989—when a hitherto somewhat obscure U.S.-Soviet meeting in Moscow discussed the violent revolution then taking place in Romania—as a strong contender for the title of Cold War finale.

The process of carbon-dating the end of the Cold War benefits from having December 1991 as the latest outer limit of the period. Similarly, the literature gives an earliest limit as well. This occurred on 1 June 1988, when then- Vice-President George Bush, on vacation in Kennebunkport, reacted to President Reagan's bouyant May 31 stroll through Red Square in Moscow by telling reporters dourly, "The Cold War's not over."³

By the end of the year, many Cold Warriors disagreed with President-elect Bush. On 7 December 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev made his famous speech at the United Nations, which Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan summed up as follows: "In December 1988, Gorbachev went to the General Assembly

of the United Nations and declared, 'We in no way aspire to be the bearer of ultimate truth.' That has to have been the most astounding statement of surrender in the history of ideological struggle."⁴

For other observers of Gorbachev's speech, it was not so much the ideological concessions as the unilateral military cutbacks that most impressed. Retired Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, a former NATO commander and top aide to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, called the cuts "the most significant step since NATO was founded" and said they opened the way to broad military reductions on both sides.⁵

The stream of Soviet eulogies for the Cold War continued throughout 1989. In January 1989 in Vienna, for example, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze greeted the opening of the Conventional Forces in Europe talks by saying that disarmament progress "has shaken the iron curtain, weakened its rusting foundations, pierced new openings, accelerated its corrosion."⁶ Then, on 6 July 1989, Gorbachev told the Council of Europe in his famous Strasbourg speech that the "common European home excludes all possibility of armed confrontation, all possibility of resorting to the threat or use of force, and notably military force employed by one alliance against another, within an alliance, or whatever it might be."⁷

And on 25 October 1989, as Communist governments began to tumble in Eastern Europe, Gorbachev's spokesman, Gennadi Gerasimov, coined the most memorable phrase of all, when he told reporters with Gorbachev in Helsinki, Finland, that the "Frank Sinatra Doctrine" had replaced the Brezhnev Doctrine for the Soviets, referring to the singer's signature ballad, "I did it my way."⁸

From the U.S. perspective, the most important signals were not so much the rhetorical flourishes of Gorbachev's "new thinking" (since contradictory rhetoric could be found in the official Soviet press throughout this period),

but the actual shifts in power within the Warsaw Pact. These included the beginning of the “roundtable” discussions in Poland in January-February 1989, which ultimately produced free elections in the summer (swept by Solidarity), and the March 1989 multicandidate elections in the Soviet Union, which put reformers and dissidents, including Andrei Sakharov, into the Congress of People’s Deputies. By May 1989, these extraordinary developments led former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski to tell the *Washington Post*’s Don Oberdorfer: “We are quite literally in the early phases of what might be called the postcommunist era.”⁹

The most public finale of the Cold War, of course, came with the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. In the words of then-deputy national security adviser and future CIA director Robert Gates: “No one who watched on television will ever forget the images of crowds of East and West Germans dancing on top of the Wall, hacking away bits of it for souvenirs, and finally dismantling whole sections with construction machinery. If there ever was a symbolic moment when most of the world thought the Cold War ended, it was that night in Berlin.”¹⁰

One of Gates’ staff at the time, Robert Hutchings of the NSC, puts the date of his “epiphany” a little earlier. “Most of us dealing with these issues in the United States or in Europe had our epiphanies, our moments of realization that the end of Europe’s division might actually be at hand—not just as an aspiration for the 1990s but as an imminent reality,” Mr. Hutchings writes. “For many it came with the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9; others may have had premonitions already in early 1989 (although surely not as many as later claimed such prescience). Mine came with the election of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and the early steps taken by his government. The United States was working hard to persuade the Soviet Union that self-determination in Eastern Europe could be achieved in a manner consistent with legitimate Soviet security interests; now, in Poland, the Mazowiecki government was living proof of that contention, offering an early glimmer of what post-Cold War Europe might look like. (To be sure, even the most optimistic scenario for this transition was still being measured in years, not months.)”¹¹

But all of these memorable moments represented initiatives by Gorbachev or by the East Europeans themselves forcing change. Where was the evidence of “new thinking” by the United States?

For the Russian historian Vladislav Zubok, that evidence appeared at Malta, at the Bush-Gorbachev summit in early December 1989. President Bush’s restraint, his unwillingness to “dance on the Wall,” so to speak, his reassurance to Gorbachev as superpower-peer, their joint press conference (the first in the history of superpower summitry)—all adds up to the end of the Cold War.¹² More support for this view comes from Gorbachev’s own statement, which appeared in *Pravda* on 5 December that “The world is leaving one epoch, the

‘Cold War,’ and entering a new one.”¹³ Gennadi Gerasimov told reporters after Malta: “We buried the Cold War at the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea.”¹⁴

But, again, these are the Soviet announcements of the end of the Cold War. For the American announcement, we must turn to Christmas Eve, Sunday, 24 December 1989. Secretary of State James Baker, appearing on NBC Television’s “Meet The Press” show, said the United States would not object if the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies used military force to assist the Romanian revolutionaries who had just deposed the Communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu.¹⁵ Raymond Garthoff describes this statement as “an extraordinary illustration of how rapidly and far the changing situation in Eastern Europe had affected American thinking and U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.... It would have been hard to find a more striking example reflecting American recognition of the end of the Cold War.”¹⁶

For Robert Hutchings, however, Baker’s statement was “an unfortunate comment, but one that was not quite as egregious as it seemed.”¹⁷ According to Hutchings, “The context was this. The day before Baker made his remark, officials of the provisional [Romanian] government appealed to Moscow and the West for help, claiming they were running out of ammunition and feared being overwhelmed by the well-armed Ceausescu loyalists. Responding to this appeal, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas offered to send a brigade of volunteers and said he would welcome Soviet assistance as well, without specifying whether he meant sending fresh supplies of ammunition or rendering more direct ‘assistance.’ It was in response to a question about Dumas’s position that Baker made his statement. The desire not to offend his French counterpart may be part of the explanation, but Baker evidently was swayed by the argument that Soviet intervention on the side of pro-democracy forces, in response to their specific appeal for help, would be preferable to seeing the revolution fail and the Ceausescu returned to power.” Hutchings says this was by no means the “dominant view” among U.S. policymakers, and the next day a White House “clarification” of Baker’s remarks expressly opposed any Soviet intervention in Romania.¹⁸

But Baker had already sent instructions to Moscow, tasking Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr., to feel out Soviet intentions on Romania. And so, on Christmas Eve, 24 December 1989, with Moscow some eight hours ahead of Washington, Ambassador Matlock went to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and met with Deputy Foreign Minister I. P. Aboimov. According to the Soviet documents attached to this article, Matlock’s message—while veiled in diplomatic indirection—was as striking as anything Baker said on TV, amounting to an invitation for the Soviets to intervene in Romania. In 1994, the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation declassified and published these selected documents, for the obvious reason that the Soviets come off quite well in the exchange with the Americans.¹⁹ The complete record of Soviet actions and conversations

remains to be seen.

The key document for this discussion is the final one in the series published by the Foreign Ministry, a 25 December memorandum of conversation written by Deputy Foreign Minister Aboimov of his meeting the day before with Matlock. Since 24 December was a Sunday, presumably Foreign Minister Shevardnadze as well as Secretary General Gorbachev were not to be found at the office, but in their dachas.

Interestingly, Ambassador Matlock's 1995 book on the fall of the Soviet Union does not mention the discussion detailed here in the Soviet notes of the conversation. Only a very indirect hint emerges from the Matlock passage that reads as follows: "After Germany, the most traumatic event in the onetime Soviet bloc for the Communist Party and the KGB was the bloody revolution that took place in Romania at the end of the year. The violence directed at Ceausescu and his family, and members of the hated Securitate secret police, was covered in great detail by the Soviet press, and television did not spare its viewers the scenes of violence. But when the anti-Ceausescu forces invited Soviet intervention to support them, Moscow refused, signaling that the days of military intervention in Eastern Europe—even under conditions the West might have found tolerable—were over."²⁰

Compare the language Matlock uses here—"even under conditions the West might have found tolerable"—with the language his Soviet counterpart uses to describe the U.S. approach: "Then Matlock touched on the issue that, apparently, he wanted to raise from the very beginning of the conversation. The Administration, he said, is very interested in knowing if the possibility of military assistance by the Soviet Union to the Romanian National Salvation Front is totally out of question. Matlock suggested (*probrosil*) the following option: what would the Soviet Union do if an appropriate appeal came from the Front? Simultaneously, the Ambassador hinted at the idea, apparently on instructions from Washington. He let us know that under the present circumstances the military involvement of the Soviet Union in Romanian affairs might not be regarded in the context (*podpadat' pod*) of 'the Brezhnev doctrine.'"

The Soviet diplomat Aboimov quickly refused Matlock's implied invitation: "To this sounding out (*zondazh*) by the American [Ambassador] I answered completely clearly and unequivocally, presenting our principled position. I declared that we did not visualize, even theoretically, such a scenario. We stand against any interference in the domestic affairs of other states and we intend to pursue this line firmly and without deviations. Thus, the American side may consider that 'the Brezhnev doctrine' is now theirs as our gift."

This last phrase clearly refers to the American invasion of Panama which had just occurred on 20 December 1989. Some 13,000 U.S. troops had moved overnight into that Central American country to remove its dictator, Manuel Noriega, a long-time U.S. intelligence

asset. The Soviet language here indicates that they believed the U.S. invitation to be at best "stupid," as Foreign Minister Shevardnadze later told American writers Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, and at worst a provocation intended to put the Soviet Union in a position parallel to that of the U.S. in Panama.²¹

The Beschloss and Talbott account, clearly based on their interviews with Shevardnadze, leaves the impression that the Soviet Foreign Minister made his remonstrances directly to Matlock. At least according to the documents at hand (as well as Ambassador Matlock's own memory), this was not the case. Similarly, Aboimov's pointed comment—"Thus, the American side may consider that 'the Brezhnev doctrine' is now theirs as our gift"—differs somewhat from the version provided by Beschloss and Talbott, who have Aboimov saying "with unconcealed bitterness, 'It seems that we've turned the Brezhnev Doctrine over to you!'"²²

At the heart of Matlock's case to the Soviets was the notion of an "appropriate appeal" from the Romanians for military assistance. According to the Soviet memcon, his question on 24 December couched this in the conditional—what if such an appeal came?—suggesting that no such appeal had yet been made. However, Matlock's memoirs turn the conditional into a past tense: "the anti-Ceausescu forces invited" and "Moscow refused."²³ Likewise, Hutchings' account cites a Romanian appeal on "the day before Baker made his remark,"²⁴ which would have been the day before Matlock's meeting. In contrast, a contemporary account, by Don Oberdorfer in *The Washington Post* on 25 December quotes "Washington officials" as saying "the only [Romanian] requests as of yesterday [24 December, the day of Matlock's meeting and Baker's TV appearance] were part of a general appeal for medical supplies and other emergency aid."²⁵

The Aboimov memorandum of his meeting with Matlock certainly ranks as the headline document of this small batch, but the other five released by the Russian Foreign Ministry also reward close attention. They include some highly suggestive details on the Romanian situation in December 1989, in two additional categories: First, on the issue of possible Soviet involvement in plotting the fall of Ceausescu; and second, on the actual events in Timisoara and elsewhere in Romania, as expressed in Soviet discussions with the Romanian, Hungarian, and Yugoslav ambassadors to Moscow.

Did the Soviets plot the fall of the dictator Ceausescu? The second document here, of a conversation of Aboimov with the Romanian ambassador I. Bukur (on 21 December) describes specific allegations from Ceausescu, directed to the Soviet charge d'affaires in Bucharest, that the Timisoara protests arose because "the Soviet Union and other states, members of the Warsaw Treaty" were involved in "coordinated activities allegedly aimed at the SRR."

However, the first Russian document published here suggests, but does not prove, that the answer is no, at least

for the highest levels of the Soviet Union. Here we have the Foreign Minister saying to Secretary General Gorbachev, both of them leaders of the Politburo, that the Soviets were having to rely on Western telegraph services for their news of Romania as of 20 December—the day the army ceased its attack on the Timisoara demonstrations and the protesters proclaimed Timisoara a liberated city, five days after the first protests sought to protect pastor Lazslo Tokes, and three days after the army-Securitate crackdown.²⁶ This Shevardnadze-to-Gorbachev message does not mean that the lower levels of the Soviet apparatus, for example the KGB resident in Bucharest, were not plotting; indeed, based on a Ceausescu-mocking editorial in *Izvestiia* on 17 November 1989, R. Craig Nation concludes that “the involvement of Soviet security forces in the plot to topple the dictator is a distinct possibility.”²⁷ But this evidence does suggest strongly that the KGB was not providing much good information to the top. If the Soviet experience in East Germany one month earlier is any parallel, the KGB could well have become hostage in an informational sense to the very secret police forces it had nurtured and the outside world assumed to be so powerful. In that case, the Stasi completely underestimated the power of the public protests and the likelihood of the fall of the Wall.

Why should we believe this document? I think there is a relatively simple answer: If evidence existed in the Soviet files of Gorbachev plotting with the KGB to overthrow Ceausescu, against all of Gorbachev’s public speeches about non-intervention, President Yeltsin would probably have released such documents, as he did so many others derogatory of Gorbachev, during the consolidation of power after 1991 and certainly in time for the Presidential campaign in 1996, in which Gorbachev won about 1% of the vote.²⁸ The Politburo files continue to be under Yeltsin’s direct control, with access strictly limited to favored researchers.²⁹ Likewise, these Foreign Ministry files are declassified today clearly because they make the Foreign Ministry look good. We have not seen the same kinds of files on other revolutions in Eastern Europe, nor the complete record groups of any of these files, and until we do, we cannot draw complete conclusions about Soviet behavior in 1989.

But for Romanians and for historians of that epochal year 1989, these documents, limited as they are, provide some fascinating detail on Warsaw Pact diplomatic conversations at the very end of the Cold War. Almost quaint, were they not so dripping with venom, are the representations of Ceausescu’s ambassador to Moscow, I. Bukur. In this view, the heroic pastor Tokes simply serves as an agent of “outside” (read revanchist Hungarian) interests and possibly Western intelligence services as well.

The conversations with the Hungarian and Yugoslav ambassadors also give us a wealth of detail about the events in Romania from the perspective of three very concerned (and still Communist) governments. Hungary’s

Birnbauer visits the Soviet Foreign Ministry on December 22 only hours after Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu had boarded a helicopter on the roof of the Communist Party headquarters in downtown Bucharest to flee from massive street demonstrations and chaotic violence in the form of a Securitate-versus-army shootout. Referring to an atmosphere of concern and mourning in Budapest, Birnbauer says, “No doubt that the events of the past few hours will drastically alter this mood.” For his part, the Yugoslav ambassador clearly has the best information from the ground in Romania, probably because the Yugoslav consulate staff in Timisoara served as eyewitnesses to the events there.

The day after Ambassador Matlock received the Brezhnev Doctrine as a Christmas gift, a Romanian firing squad shot Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu after a farcical trial. Over the next month, the Romanian revolution turned out to be a coup d’état in effect, stage-managed by nomenklatura of the Ceausescu regime who did not hesitate to bring in the traditional Party enforcers, the truncheon-wielding miners, to crush dissent (as in the University of Bucharest student protests of April-June 1990).³⁰ This murky history exemplifies precisely the lack of finality that Ambassador Hutchings refers to in his history of the end of the Cold War. For many Romanians, the internal Cold War did not really end until November 1996, when voters replaced Ceausescu’s former aide, President Ion Iliescu, with the rector (Emil Constantinescu) of the University of Bucharest, which to this day carries the sign: “Neo-Communist Free Zone.”

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¹ Robert L. Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989-1992* (Washington, D.C. and Baltimore: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 343.

² See, for example, Charles Krauthammer, “Build a Cold War Memorial,” *The Washington Post*, 28 March 1997, p. A29: “We know its exact dates. On March 12, 1947, the United States entered the fight (late, as usual: Stalin had been at it at least since V-E Day). And it ended at the stroke of midnight, Dec. 31 [sic], 1991, when the Soviet Union didn’t just surrender, it vanished from the map.”

³ Alessandra Stanley, “More Worldly Than Wise,” *Time*, 15 August 1988, p. 18, quoted in Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era* (New York: Touchstone/Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 329.

- ⁴ Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "The CIA's Credibility," *The National Interest* (Winter 1995/96), p. 111. For the full text of Gorbachev's speech, see FBIS-SOV-99-236, 8 December 1988, pp. 11-19.
- ⁵ Quoted in Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, p. 319.
- ⁶ R. Craig Nation, *Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 308.
- ⁷ R. Craig Nation, *Black Earth, Red Star*, p. 308: "A more straightforward repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine could scarcely be imagined...."
- ⁸ Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Little Brown, 1994), p. 134.
- ⁹ Quoted in Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, p. 346.
- ¹⁰ Robert M. Gates, *From The Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 468.
- ¹¹ Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War*, p. 74.
- ¹² Personal communication, March 14, 1997; see also Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, p. 135.
- ¹³ Quoted in Raymond Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 408.
- ¹⁴ Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, p. 165.
- ¹⁵ Don Oberdorfer, "Baker Implies U.S. Would Back East-Bloc Military Aid to Rebels; French, Dutch Would Support Soviet Role in Romania," *The Washington Post*, 25 December 1989, pp. A37, A40.
- ¹⁶ Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, p. 408.
- ¹⁷ Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War*, p. 86. Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr. does not agree that Mr. Baker's comment was "unfortunate"; rather, "under the circumstances we would not have minded some limited Soviet assistance to the NSF [National Salvation Front] and it did not hurt to let the Soviets know." Matlock letter to the author, 21 May 1997.
- ¹⁸ Statement by the press secretary, White House, 25 December 1989, cited in Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War*, p. 381.
- ¹⁹ The Russian versions, in transcript rather than facsimile, are to be found in *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, No. 21/22, November 1994, pp. 74-80. The present writer has filed Freedom of Information Act requests with the State Department for Secretary Baker's instructions and Ambassador Matlock's response, neither of which has yet been declassified. Ambassador Matlock notes that the memcon accords with his own memory of the conversation. Matlock letter to the author, 21 May 1997.
- ²⁰ Jack F. Matlock, Jr., *Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 261-262.
- ²¹ Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, pp. 170-171.
- ²² Matlock letter to the author, 21 May 1997; Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, p. 171.
- ²³ Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire*, p. 262. Ambassador Matlock "was told that there had been Romanian appeals for Soviet assistance - thus the instruction to me—but I have no direct knowledge of such appeals." Matlock letter to the author, 21 May 1997.
- ²⁴ Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War*, p. 86.
- ²⁵ Oberdorfer, "Baker Implies U.S. Would Back East-Bloc Military Aid to Rebels," p. A40.

- ²⁶ For a detailed hour-by-hour chronology of the Timisoara events, based on eyewitness reports and contemporary documents, see Florin Medeleet and Mihai Ziman, *O Cronica a Revolutiei Din Timisoara 16-22 Decembrie 1989* (Timisoara: Muzeul Banatului Timisoara, April 1990, 31 pp.).
- ²⁷ R. Craig Nation, *Black Earth, Red Star*, p. 309.
- ²⁸ Ed. note: Most of these documents were gathered in the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD) as *fond* 89. It is also available on microfilm from Chadwick-Healey.
- ²⁹ For an incisive review of the Soviet archival situation, see Raymond Garthoff, "Some Observations on Using the Soviet Archives," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 243-257.
- ³⁰ For the best review in English of these events, see Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel* (New York: The Free Press, 1993 pb.), pp. 223-236. See also Martyn Rady, *Romania in Turmoil* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 1992), pp. 91-144; and for a literary view, Andrei Codrescu, "Romania Today: A Bad Novel," in *The Muse Is Always Half-Dressed In New Orleans and other essays* (New York: Picador USA, 1995).

To Comrade GORBACHEV M.S.

Mikhail Sergeevich:

On the events in Romania in the last few days we can still only judge on the basis of information that comes from news agencies, primarily Western ones. This information is often contradictory and does not allow one to construct a true picture.

Our attempts to obtain the official version via Bucharest produced no results. Today, 20 December the Romanian ambassador will be invited to the MFA USSR [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] in order to obtain from him information on this issue.

Until we have complete and objective information, we should not, in our opinion, be in haste to make a statement of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, at best we could go not further than instructing the Commission on Foreign Affairs [of the Congress' Supreme Soviet] to prepare a draft proposal on our possible reaction with all circumstances in mind.

E. SHEVARDNADZE

20 December 1989

[Source: *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, no. 21/22, November 1994, pp. 74-79. Translated by Vladislav Zubok.]

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**From the diary of
ABOIMOV I.P.**

21 December 1989

**Memorandum of conversation
with the Ambassador of the SRR [Socialist Republic of
Romania] in the USSR**

I. BUKUR

21 December 1989

I received I. Bukur, fulfilling his request.

The Ambassador recounted the address of N. Ceausescu on Romanian radio and television on 20 December and handed over its complete text.

When I asked if the events in Timisoara involved human casualties and what the present situation was in that region, the Ambassador responded that he possesses no information on this issue. He referred to the fact that the address of N. Ceausescu also says nothing on this score.

I told the Ambassador that during the meeting of N. Ceausescu with the Soviet charge d'affaires in the SRR on 20 December [the former] expressed surprise that Soviet representatives made declarations on the events in Timisoara. Besides, during the meeting it was asserted [by Ceausescu] that the Romanian side possesses information that the action in Timisoara was allegedly prepared and organized with the consent of countries [that are] members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Moreover, the actions against Romania were allegedly plotted within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

According to our information, officials in Bucharest in conversation with ambassadors of allied socialist states expressed an idea about some kind of action of interference into the internal affairs of the SRR allegedly under preparation in the Soviet Union.

I must declare on behalf of our side that such assertions can only puzzle us, have no foundation and do not correspond with reality [until this part Aboimov probably read the instructions.]

Answering the Ambassador's question as to whether my words reflected the official viewpoint of the Soviet government, I told him that so far I have no instruction to make any declarations on behalf of the Soviet government, but my words certainly reflect our official position which postulates that the Soviet Union builds its relations with allied socialist states on the basis of equality, mutual respect and strict non-interference into domestic affairs. Considering the grave character of the statements of Romanian officials I cannot help expressing in preliminary order our attitude to these statements....

[Source: *Diplomaticeskii vestnik*, no. 21/22, November 1994, pp. 74-79. Translated by Vladislav Zubok.]

**From the diary of
I.P. ABOIMOV**

23 December 1989

**Record of conversation with the Ambassador
of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]
in the USSR, MILAN VERES
22 December 1989**

I received M. Veres on his request.

He referred to the instruction of the Union Secretariat on Foreign Affairs of the SFRY and shared the available information on the events in Romania, corroborated by the General Consulate of the SFRY in Timisoara and by numerous Yugoslav citizens who returned from the SRR. He also reported on the Yugoslav evaluations of the developments in Romania.

The beginning of the dramatic development could be traced to the events of 15-16 December in Timisoara where a large group of people protested against the action of the authorities with regard to the priest L. Tokes. This process grew into a huge demonstration of the population of the city against the existing order. According to the estimates of officials of the General Consulate of the SFRY, there were up to 100,000 people, including workers, university and school students, who participated in the demonstration. Protest actions took place also in Arad, Brasov and Cluj. Large contingents of militia and military were used against demonstrators in Timisoara. According to the Yugoslavs, during those clashes several hundred people died, and according to some unchecked data the number of casualties exceeded 2,000. In the downtown area shops, restaurants, cafes were destroyed, many streetcars and automobiles were also burnt down. Timisoara is surrounded by troops, but protest actions continue in the city. Workers seized factories and are threatening to blow them up if the authorities do not satisfy the people's demands. Officials of the General Consulate of the SFRY, the Ambassador remarked, noticed that a number of soldiers and militiamen expressed their sympathies with demonstrators. There were also slogans "The Army will not shoot at students and school children."

The Yugoslav-Romanian border is practically sealed; its defenses are fortified by troops along its whole length, including check-points. So far the Romanian side authorized only the passing of people with diplomatic and other service passports. The Ambassador informed us that the Yugoslavs had evacuated members of the families of officials of their General Consulate. He disavowed reports of a number of Western news agencies that participants of the demonstration [in Timisoara] found refuge on the territory of the Yugoslav compound, whose premises allegedly were penetrated by Romanian militia.

According to Yugoslav estimates, stressed M. Veres, the main reason for disorders in Timisoara and their spread subsequently around a number of other cities, including the capital of the SRR, is rooted in profound popular dissatisfaction with the economic situation in the country

accumulated over [many] years, with low living standards, the lack of basic food and consumer goods, and with the unwillingness of the leadership to undertake at least some measures to democratize the political system.

The Ambassador pointed out that the Yugoslav public is very concerned about the situation in the neighboring country. The mass media of the SFRY are informing the population in detail about the events, including many reports about reactions abroad. On 19 December the Union Executive Vece [executive branch of the Yugoslav state] came out with an appropriate declaration, expressing profound concern and regret with regard to casualties during the crack-down on the demonstrations. On 20 December the Presidium of the CC CPY [Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia] denounced the actions of the Romanian authorities and laid political responsibility at the door of the leadership of the RCP [Romanian Communist Party]. It declared a temporary suspension of all contacts with the RCP and repealed an earlier invitation [to the RCP] to send a delegation to the 14th Congress of the CPY (January 1990). All public organizations of Yugoslavia, as well as both chambers of the Skupcina [parliament] made sharp protests. Late on 21 December the Presidium of the SFRY adopted a resolution denouncing reprisals against the demonstrators, that led to a large loss of human life.

M. Veres stressed that of particular cause for concern in Belgrade is the situation with Yugoslav ethnic minorities in the SRR. He said that the SFRY supports a peaceful resolution of the situation in Romania and is against any foreign interference into Romanian affairs....

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
I. ABOIMOV

[Source: *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, no. 21/22, November 1994, pp. 74-79. Translated by Vladislav Zubok.]

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From the diary of ABOIMOV I.P.

25 December 1989

**Record of conversation
with U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, J. MATLOCK
24 December 1989**

I received U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock at his request. Referring to instructions received from Washington, the Ambassador said that, in the opinion of the American leadership, the Soviet Union and the United States should continue the exchange of opinions with regard to the events in Romania. The situation in Romania still is very uncertain. The American side is very concerned by the fact that warfare between the forces of state security and army units continues, and casualties among the civilian population are mounting. In this regard Matlock referred

to the positive significance of the fact that the opinions of the Soviet Union and the United States coincided to the effect that there should be support given to the group that is trying to govern Romania and to fulfill the will of the Romanian people.

Then the American presented the following thought. The United States paid attention to the conviction expressed by the Soviet Union that military intervention is out of question. With equal interest the United States regarded the declaration of the Soviet government about its readiness to give immediate humanitarian assistance to the Romanian people. The American side would be greatly interested to hear the Soviet assessment of the developments in Romania, as well as the opinion of the Soviet side with regard to the most effective ways of supporting the Romanian people and the new leadership of Romania....

I informed the Ambassador that earlier, in addition to the Declaration of the Soviet government, a TASS Declaration was published. This step by our side was necessitated by grave concern over the very tense situation around the house populated by officials of the Soviet trade mission in Bucharest. It turned out to be in the epicenter of combat and for some time was partially seized by the terrorist forces. Only by the end of the day were they dispersed and we could evacuate the inhabitants from the house. I drew the attention of the American to the fact that among them two people were lightly wounded, and not one—as it was earlier reported. Now these people are located on the territory of the Soviet Embassy.

At the present moment the main task is to carry out the evacuation of Soviet citizens from Romania, first of all women and children. I informed the U.S. Ambassador of those options that are under consideration....

We maintain contact with representatives of the new Romanian leadership, if only via telephone. We informed them about our steps directed at giving humanitarian assistance to the Romanian population. Several times we inquired of the new leadership of Romania about what urgent needs they have. We received no clear answer to our question. It looks like the Front's Council still lacks clear ideas on this score.

With regard to the question raised by the American about the most effective approaches to the organization of humanitarian assistance to Romania, I repeated that there is no full clarity about it. The Soviet Union is carrying out measures to prepare such assistance, and its practical implementation, according to its own understanding of Romania's needs.

We informed the new Romanian leadership and also informed the International Red Cross Committee and the International Health Organization that we had set up hospitals in the frontier cities of the Soviet Union to receive wounded from Romania. In Moldavia they are already expecting the first group of 600 wounded.

About the means of assistance. The first load valued at a half million rubles (11 rail-cars) will be sent by rail. Trains in Romania still function. In addition, we gave instruction to the leadership of Moldavia to get in touch with border districts in Romania and clarify two issues. First, what do they need most. Second, to ask for their advice as to the best way to transport the loads.

To finish the exposition of our thoughts on the situation in Romania, I remarked that we are in close contact on these questions with our Warsaw Treaty allies as well as with all other states that approach us. So we take as a positive sign the desire of the American side to exchange opinions. We consider contacts of this kind very useful.

Reacting to our words, Matlock thought that now the United States is seeking optimal ways of cooperation in order to give assistance to Romania. According to Matlock, the United States would be ready to give assistance in medicine and food, as well as in logistics of transporting this assistance. In this context the American ambassador made the following request. If the Soviet side develops some ideas on this score, the American side is very interested in being kept up to date.

I responded that naturally we would be ready at any moment to share our considerations with the American side.

Then Matlock touched on the issue that, apparently, he wanted to raise from the very beginning of the conversation. The Administration, he said, is very interested in knowing if the possibility of military assistance by the Soviet Union to the Romanian National Salvation Front is totally out of question. Matlock suggested the following option: what would the Soviet Union do if an appropriate appeal came from the Front? Simultaneously, the Ambassador hinted at the idea, apparently on instructions from Washington. He let us know that under the present circumstances the military involvement of the Soviet Union in Romanian affairs might not be regarded in the context of "the Brezhnev doctrine."

To this sounding out by the American I gave the entirely clear and unequivocal answer, presenting our principled position. I declared that we did not visualize, even theoretically, such a scenario. We stand against any interference in the domestic affairs of other states and we intend to pursue this line firmly and without deviations. Thus, the American side may consider that "the Brezhnev doctrine" is now theirs as our gift.

Developing this thesis further, as a clarification, I drew the interlocutor's attention to the fact that it was on the basis of these considerations that the Soviet Union was and still is against convening the Security Council (SC) to consider the situation in Romania.

The American, however, immediately inquired what would be the Soviet reaction if the National Salvation Front itself appeals to convene the SC.

I said that we are still not ready to contemplate such a hypothetical possibility.

In the end both sides confirmed the positive evaluation of the exchange of opinions that took place. They expressed support of continuing contacts with regard to the rapidly changing situation in Romania.

Participants of the meeting included deputy head of the Directorate of the USA and Canada I.N. Podrazhanets, third secretary of the DUSAandC [Directorate of USA and Canada in the Soviet Foreign Ministry] N.N. Spassky and first secretary of the U.S. embassy in Moscow J. Shoemaker.

Deputy minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
I. ABOIMOV

[Source: *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, no. 21/22, November 1994, pp. 74-79. Translated by Vladislav Zubok.]

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Stalemate in an Era of Change: New Sources and Questions on Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Soviet/Russian-Japanese Relations

by *Tsuyoshi Hasegawa*

New archival materials from the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe have significantly altered previous conceptions of the Cold War. Soviet-Japanese relations, however, have made little progress. Not a single article focusing on Soviet-Japanese relations has, until now, been published in the *CWIHP Bulletin*.¹ Nor has Cold War coverage in *Diplomatic History* or the H-Diplo internet discussion group extended to Soviet-Japanese relations. The most recent monograph by Vojtech Mastny that cast a wide net over archival materials in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe reveals no new materials on the rivalry of the two giants on the remote shores of the Pacific.² Although Michael Schaller's monograph and Marc Gallichio's article shed light on important aspects of American foreign policy toward Soviet-Japanese relations, especially during the last stage of the Pacific War, their sources come exclusively from United States archives.³ Many monographs published in English in recent years have illuminated very little of the fundamental questions that have vexed Soviet-Japanese relations during the Cold War.⁴

Needless to say, the most serious stumbling block that has prevented rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Japan has been the Northern Territories dispute, and precisely on this issue there has been what might be called a "conspiracy of silence" with regard to government archival sources.⁵ Archival materials related to the Northern Territories question have been systematically excluded from the Japanese foreign policy archives that have been declassified by the Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The Soviet/Russian government has been equally protective in guarding the secrecy of its policy on the territorial question, although there have been attempts to publish archival sources on some aspects of Soviet-Japanese relations, notably the Neutrality Pact negotiations of 1941, the Malik-Hirota negotiations in June 1945, and the Moscow negotiations for normalization of relations in October 1956.⁶ To make matters worse, some of the most important U.S. documents that should illuminate the background of this dispute are still classified "due to the request of a friendly country [i.e., Japan]."⁷ The recent valiant attempt by a trilateral project headed by Graham Allison, Kimura Hiroshi, and Konstantin Sarkisov, to overcome this obstacle has not been successful.⁸ Interestingly, two of the most valuable recent works on this subject rely heavily on British archives.⁹

The only scholar, who has had systematic access to Soviet archives is Boris N. Slavinskii of Moscow's Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

In a series of articles and monographs, he has succeeded in revising the traditional official views on the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, Stalin's Kurile operation, and Soviet policy toward the San Francisco Peace Conference.¹⁰ Those archives that Slavinskii has examined remain, however, inaccessible to foreign scholars.

Because of the inaccessibility of archives, we still do not know answers to crucial questions about Soviet/Russian-Japanese relations. What was the major motivation of the Soviet government when it was approached by the Japanese government to mediate the termination of war in April 1945? What was the relationship between the U.S. decision to drop the atomic bombs and Stalin's Kurile operation in the summer of 1945? Did Stalin expect the United States to occupy all or at least some of the southern Kuriles during the last stage of the Pacific War? Why did it take two years after the occupation of the southern Kuriles for Stalin to annex the Kuriles to the Soviet territory? Why did the Soviet government decide to participate in the San Francisco Peace Conference and in the end not to sign the treaty? How did the power struggle within the CPSU affect its negotiations for normalization of relations with Japan? How did the Gaimusho and the U.S. State Department exchange information during the Soviet-Japanese negotiations for normalization of relations in 1955-56? Why did the Japanese government reject Andrei Gromyko's overtures in 1972 to settle the territorial question on the basis of the 1956 Joint Declaration? Why did the Soviet leadership fail to display a more flexible attitude toward Japan on the territorial question during the second half of the 1970s, when it took the Chinese threat seriously? Why did the Japanese government fail to appreciate the domestic difficulties that challenged Gorbachev and Yeltsin? Why did Gorbachev refuse to make any concessions on the Northern Territories question? Why did Yeltsin cancel his planned trip to Tokyo in September 1992? To answer these questions, we must push forward research in Japanese, Russian, and US archives, and pressure those governments to release those materials which remain classified.

The publication of the documents in this issue is a small step toward opening substantial archival evidence on Soviet-Japanese relations. These documents shed light on some important aspects of Soviet-Japanese relations under Gorbachev and of Russian-Japanese relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Soviet-Japanese relations in the Gorbachev era represented an anomaly in international relations. While all major powers in the world drastically improved their

relations with the Soviet Union, Japanese relations remained stalemated because of the long-standing territorial dispute preventing the conclusion of a World War II peace treaty. Gorbachev's historic visit to Japan in April 1991 did not produce a major breakthrough. How can we account for this failure?

Soviet-Japanese relations under Gorbachev experienced a pendulum movement: a positive movement was always pulled back by a negative one. In the end, neither side was willing to make a leap to settle the territorial dispute. As soon as Gorbachev assumed power in March 1985, he met Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro at Konstantin Chernenko's funeral, and signaled his intention to end the frozen state of Soviet-Japanese relations. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Japan in January 1986 was an important turning point. The mechanism of bilateral dialogue that had been disrupted under Brezhnev was restored. Later, in his 1986 Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev declared his intention to seek a more conciliatory Asian policy and to join the Asia-Pacific region as a constructive partner. Both sides began preparations for Gorbachev's visit to Japan in late 1986 or in the beginning of 1987.

This trip never materialized. Instead, after the Japanese government tightened up the COCOM regulations under U.S. pressure as a result of the 1987 Toshiba incident—in which the Toshiba Machine Company admitted selling highly sensitive technology to the Soviet Union—the Soviet government expelled a Japanese diplomat, prompting the Japanese government to retaliate with a similar action. Soviet-Japanese relations returned to the deep-freeze again.

It was not until mid-1988 that both sides began gingerly to mend fences again. Former Prime Minister Nakasone met Gorbachev in July, and the frank exchange of opinions between Gorbachev and Nakasone created a momentum for improvement. In September, Gorbachev delivered his Krasnoiarsk speech in which he declared his intention to improve relations with Japan. In December, Shevardnadze made his second trip to Tokyo. One of the major achievements at the ministerial conference was the creation of the Working Group for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty. For the first time since the end of World War II both sides established a mechanism through which to create a favorable environment for the conclusion of a peace treaty.

Nevertheless, the creation of the Working Group did not lead to a settlement of the territorial dispute. On the contrary, the negotiations revealed irreconcilable differences. During the crucial two years of 1989-90, when the revolutions swept away the East European Communist regimes and reunification of Germany was realized, the Soviet Union and Japan stood at a standstill unable to resolve the territorial dispute. By the time Gorbachev finally came to Japan in April 1991, his authority within the Soviet Union had deteriorated to such an extent that he was not in a position to offer any compromise that would

have satisfied Japan, even had he ever been inclined to do so.

Why were the Soviet Union and Japan unable to exploit the opportunity developed at the 1988 foreign ministerial conference? The documents introduced here illuminate the problems in Soviet-Japanese relations at this critical stage. The first set of documents are the minutes of the first two meetings of the Working Group as recorded by the Soviet foreign ministry officials. A careful examination of what was discussed reveals a number of important facts.

First, although we have a number of documents stating the official positions of both governments, rarely do we see a document in which both the Russian and Japanese sides confront each other behind closed doors. Here, we read, for the first time, how both sides presented their views at the negotiating table. In other words, we have the most direct positions that each government presented to the other. Although there are few surprises in both positions, there are some important revelations. For instance, in the first meeting, the Japanese side officially renounced its claim over Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands north of Uruppu. Furthermore, at the second meeting, despite its militant tone, Soviet chief negotiator Igor Rogachev tacitly conceded that Stalin's failure to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty was a mistake.

Second, there are some discrepancies between what was reported in the Japanese media and what actually happened at these meetings. The Japanese news coverage of these meetings was usually based on the official statements and briefings conducted by the Japanese Foreign Ministry (Gaimusho) officials; and therefore, it reflected, intentionally or unintentionally, the Gaimusho's bias. In both meetings, for instance, the Gaimusho kept silent about Rogachev's disagreement with the Japanese geographical definition of the "Kurile" islands, an official position that has been challenged by some Japanese scholars as well.¹¹ Likewise, from what was reported in Japanese newspapers, it is difficult to discern the atmosphere of the negotiations, but a reading of the second meeting clearly indicates that Rogachev's disposition, buttressed by well-researched legal and historical arguments, put the Japanese on the defensive. These documents remind us, therefore, that one has to treat the Japanese press coverage critically, particularly when it is filtered through the Gaimusho's briefings. In the March 1989 meeting, Rogachev himself offers some harsh criticisms of this aspect, claiming:

We had the impression that yesterday we consulted, although, judging by the Japanese newspapers, the results of our conversation were unexpected...I do not know by whose recommendation the message that the Soviet delegation was bargaining appeared: six agreements for a high-level visit. That will never be. That is a risible thesis.

Third, the exchange of arguments and counter-arguments at the Working Group indicates how widely respective positions on the territorial issue differed. The Working Group meetings were used, not to seek a mutually acceptable compromise, but rather for the two sides to present ultimatums to each other. Each time one side made a point, it was rejected by the other side at the following meeting, citing legal and historical justifications.¹² Thus, the Working Group meetings served only to harden disagreements and hostility rather than formulate concessions and compromises. As of spring 1989, there were no grounds to expect a major breakthrough from a Gorbachev visit to Japan.

This brings us to the fourth point. One is puzzled, as were the Gaimusho officials at the time, by the contradictory signals that came from the Soviet side. If the Soviet government agreed to establish a Working Group designed to produce a peace treaty, thus implying flexibility, then why did it take a rigid stance on the territorial issue? In fact, Rogachev's position did not even consider adopting any of the compromise solutions advocated by more reform-minded Russian Japanologists, who took advantage of glasnost to voice views divergent from the official position. Did the Foreign Ministry simply not consider these compromise solutions? Was there internal disagreement? Or was the tough position presented here a tactical ploy, a necessary step toward future concessions? Where did Gorbachev stand on this matter at the time? All these questions cannot be answered definitively by analyzing these documents alone.

As for Gorbachev's position, one is struck with the consistency with which he held his view on the territorial question throughout his tenure of office. From his meeting with Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro in May 1986 through his meeting with Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki in Tokyo in April 1992, he steadfastly maintained that the Soviet Union was not in a position to make *any* territorial concessions to Japan's irredentist demand. It was not that Gorbachev could not accept a compromise solution during his visit to Japan because of the domestic pressure, as is often believed, but that Gorbachev himself was the major stumbling block to such a compromise. One important source describing Gorbachev's view on Soviet-Japanese relations in general and on the territorial question in particular is the supplement made by Anatolii Cherniaev to the Japanese version of his memoirs, *Shest' let s Gorbachevym* (Moscow: Kul'tura, 1993), which was published under the Japanese title, *Gorubachofu to unmei o tomonishita 2000 nichi* (Tokyo: Uchio shuppan, 1994). Excerpts from this additional chapter, previously unavailable in English, are provided below.

Finally, a question can be raised about the relationship between the Soviet position enunciated by Rogachev here and the official position adopted by the Russian government after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As the Russian Foreign Ministry document introduced in the second group indicates, Moscow accepted almost all the

arguments that the Japanese government had presented at the Working Group meetings during the Gorbachev period. This was, however, an internal paper. It is doubtful that the Russian government conceded all these points to the Japanese government during the official negotiations with Japan. Since we have no access to the minutes of the Working Group meetings after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we do not have a definitive answer as to where the Russian government currently stands on these questions.

The second group of documents includes various position papers prepared by different organizations and experts for the parliamentary hearings on the "Kurile question" prior to Boris Yeltsin's scheduled trip to Japan to meet Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi in September 1992.

If Gorbachev failed to achieve rapprochement with Japan, Yeltsin has been equally unsuccessful in dealing with Japan. Despite initial euphoria following the collapse of the Soviet Union, rapprochement on the territorial question proved elusive. Contrary to the expectations of Yeltsin and Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Kunadze, who spearheaded Russia's negotiations with Japan, there emerged strong domestic opposition to any putative compromise on the territorial issue with Japan. In fact, the "Kurile issue" became a hotly debated issue in the summer of 1992, a few months prior to Yeltsin's scheduled September visit to Japan. Eventually this stumbling block derailed Yeltsin's scheduled trip to Japan, which was ultimately cancelled.

On 28 July 1992, a powerful opposition group within the Parliament organized parliamentary hearings on Yeltsin's forthcoming visit to Japan. Prior to these hearings, Oleg Rumiantsev, the Secretary of the Constitutional Commission, who masterminded the hearings, requested various organizations to submit their position papers on the "Kurile" issue. The documents in the second group are translations of some of these positions papers.¹³

One can see from these documents that the views expressed by various organizations and individuals varied widely. While the Second Department of the Asia-Pacific Region of the Russian Foreign Ministry took a most sympathetic view of the Japanese official position, Kiril Cherevko (Institute of History), a noted historian on Soviet-Japanese relations, and V. K. Zilanov, who represented the State Committee of Fisheries, took the opposite view, recommending that no concessions be made to Japan's irredentist demands.¹⁴ The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), headed by Vladlen Martynov, organized a team of specialists on Soviet-Japanese relations, and submitted a position paper. Its recommendation fell somewhere between these two extremes, but stood for the acceptance of the 1956 Joint Declaration. The resolution of the Sakhalin Supreme Soviet also indicated that the local voice increasingly asserted its influence. It is likely that these recommendations were also sent to Yeltsin. When Yeltsin said that he had fourteen options with regard to the territorial question, perhaps his statement reflected the truth.

Eventually, Yeltsin canceled his trip to Japan, thus, forfeiting the opportunity to create the foundation for gradual improvement of relations, if not for a quick resolution to the territorial question. Five years later, we are still waiting. The documents introduced here illustrate the complexities of the political dynamics under which Gorbachev, and then Yeltsin, had to operate. They also show how unrealistic it was for the Japanese government to press hard on Yeltsin to accept Japan's sovereignty, residual or otherwise, over the entire four islands.

Needless to say, these documents expose merely a tip of the gigantic iceberg of information which is still hidden under the sea of secrecy. They illuminate only a few tiny spots in recent Soviet/Russian-Japanese relations. Also the manner in which these documents have fallen into my hands—not through the open, systematic, institutional approach, but through coincidence and accident—is not reassuring. Of course, having only one side's account leaves many doubts that can only be fully answered by comparable openness on the Japanese side. Even the Russian materials lose much of their importance, unless they are placed in the appropriate archival context. Nevertheless, I hope that the publication of these sources will stimulate further openness, research and collaboration among scholars and governments in order to move the historical study of Soviet/Russian-Japanese relations further into the mainstream of scholarly inquiry.

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¹ *Cold War International History Bulletin*, 1-9. [Ed. note: On the other hand, several articles and documents have touched on Japan and its place in the Cold War. For an example in this issue, *Bulletin 10*, see Zhai Qiang's article on the second Chinese nuclear test.]

² Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

³ Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Marc Gallichio, "The Kurile Controversy: U.S. Diplomacy in the Soviet-Japanese Border Dispute, 1941-1956," *Pacific Historical Review*, LX, No. 1 (February 1991).

⁴ Myles I. C. Robertson, *Soviet Policy toward Japan: An Analysis of Trends in the 1970s and 1980s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Harry Gelman, *Russo-Japanese Relations and the Future of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1993); Charles E. Ziegler, *Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and Adaptation in the Gorbachev Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); William Nimmo, *Japan and Russia: a Reevaluation in the Post-Soviet Era*

(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994); and Joachim Glaubitz, *Between Tokyo and Moscow: the History of an Uneasy Relationship, 1972 to the 1990s* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995). Two excellent monographs dealing with specific aspects of Soviet-Japanese relations are: Gilbert Rozman, *Japan's Response to the Gorbachev Era, 1985-1991: A Rising Superpower Views a Declining One* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) and John J. Stephan, *The Russian Far East: A History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), but because of the specific aspects to which they are devoted, new archival evidence on Soviet-Japanese relations does not emerge in these books.

⁵ In Japanese, there exist collections of documents: Shigeta Shigeru and Suezawa Shoji, *Nisso kihonbunsho shiryoshu [Soviet-Japanese Basic Documents Sourcebook]* (Tokyo: Sekai no ugoki sha, 1988); Hopporyodo mondai taisaku kyokai, *Zoho kaitei: Hopporyodo mondai shiryoshu [Northern Territories Question Sourcebook: Revised and Enlarged]*. (Tokyo: Hopporyodo mondai taisaku kyokai, 1972). See also the joint publication by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, *Nichirokan ryodomondai no rekishi ni kansuru kyodo sakusei shiryoshu: Sovmestnyi sbornik dokumentov po istorii territorial'nogo razmezhevaniia mezhdru Rossiei i Iaponiei [Joint documentary compendium on the Russo-Japanese territorial issue's history]* (Tokyo and Moscow: Nihonkoku Gaimusho and Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1993). In Russian, *Sbornik not i zaiavlenii pravitel'stv SSSR, SSha, Kitaia, Anglii i drugikh stran po voprosu mirnogo uregulirovaniia dlia Iaponii: iul' 1947 g. - iul' 1951 g* (Moscow, 1951); *Sbornik osnovnykh dokumentov po Iaponii, 1951-1954* (Moscow: Ministerstvo inostrannykh del, 1954); *Sbornik osnovnykh dokumentov po voprosam sovetsko-iaponskikh otnoshenii, 1954-1972* (Moscow: Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, 1973), but the first collection was published in only 100 copies, and the second and the third volume 300. All collections are classified, and inaccessible to outside scholars, although I have had access to the third volume.

⁶ "Za kulisami Tikhookeanskoi bitvy: (Iapono-sovetskie kontakty v 1945 g.): Stranitsy istorii," *Vestnik MIDa SSSR*, October, 1990; "K politike SSSR na Dal'nem Vostoke v preddverii nachala Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny: Kontakty I.V. Stalina s politikami Kitaia i Iaponii," *Diplomatičeskii vestnik* No. 23-24 (1994): 71-78; "Soglasheaetsia na peredachu Iaponii ostrovov Khabomai i Sikotan," *Staraiia ploshchad': vestnik arkhiva Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, No. 6 (1996): 107-137.

⁷ For instance, the Japanese government sent seven volumes of documents dealing with territorial questions to the U.S. government during the occupation period. Of these the volume dealing with the Northern Territories has not been declassified.

⁸ Graham Allison, Hiroshi Kimura, and Konstantin Sarkisov, *Beyond Cold War to Trilateral Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Scenarios for New Relationships between Japan, Russia, and the United States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Harvard University, 1992), Appendix D, and F-N; Peter Berton, *The Japanese-Russian Territorial Dilemma: Historical Background, Dispute, Issue, Questions, Solutions, Scenarios: White Paper* (Cambridge, Mass.: Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1992).

⁹ Tanaka Takahiko, *Nisso kokko kaiku no shiteki kenkyu: sengo nissokankei no kiten: 1945-1956 [Historical Studies of the Development of Japanese-Soviet Diplomatic Relations: The*

Starting Point of Post-War Japanese-Soviet Relations, 1945-56] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1993); Fiona Hill, "A Disagreement between Allies: the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet-Japanese Territorial Dispute," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, 14, No. 3 (Fall 1995).

¹⁰ Boris Slavinskii, *Sovetskaia okkupatsiia Kuril'skikh ostrovov, avgust-sentiabr' 1945 goda: dokumental'noe issledovanie* (Moscow, 1993); *Pakt o neitralitete mezhdu SSSR i Iaponiei: diplomaticheskaia istoriia, 1941-1945 gg* (Moscow: BBK, 1995)—Japanese translation, *Kosho: nisso churitsu joyaku* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996); "San Frantsiskii mirnyi dogovor," *Znakomites' Iaponiia*, No. 5 (1994): 53-59; No. 6 (1994): 50-58; No. 7 (1995): 74-81; and No. 8 (1995): 56-61.

¹¹ Notably Wada Haruki and Murayama Shichiro. See Wada Haruki, *Hopporyodo mondai o kangaeru [Considering the Northern Territories Question]* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1990); Murayama Shichiro, *Kuriru shoto no bunkengakuteki kenkyu [Documentological Research on the Kurile Archipelago]* (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1987).

¹² The Japanese side rebutted Rogachev's argument at the third Working Group meeting held on 29 April 1989, in Moscow. Although the minutes prepared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry

are not available to me, the Japanese argument was reported in detail in *Hopporyodo*, No. 234 (20 May 1989). But the coverage in *Hopporyodo* does not say a word about the Soviet reaction to Kuriyama's presentation.

¹³ In addition to the documents translated here, the documents I obtained included other interesting materials from various experts and organizations. I should add, however, that I did not receive position papers prepared by the General Staff and the Pacific Fleet. The General Staff's view was later publicized in a Russian newspaper. See "Glavnyi shtab VMF soglasen s genshtabom," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 30 July 1992.

¹⁴ Cherevko's view in the classified document differs vastly from the view he expressed in an open publication. He and Konstantin Sarkisov were responsible for publishing a hitherto unknown archival document demonstrating that Nicholas I's instruction to the Russian chief negotiator, Artem Putiatin, clearly took the position that Etorofu was under Japan's sovereignty. Konstantin Sarkisov and Kiril Cherevko, "Putiatinu bylo legche provesti granitsu mezhdu Rossiei i Iaponiei," *Izvestiia*, 4 October 1991.

The Last Official Foreign Visit by M.S. Gorbachev as President of the USSR: The Road to Tokyo¹

by A.S. Cherniaev

Not counting a visit to Spain (already after the [August 1991] putsch) to the opening of the [October 1991] International Conference on the Near East, M.S. [Gorbachev's] visit as head of state to Japan in April 1991 was his last. He had planned to do this throughout almost all the years of *perestroika*: [Japanese Prime Minister] Nakasone, meeting with him in Moscow in 1985,² extended an official invitation, which afterwards was confirmed by all of the Japanese political figures with whom M.S. met.

Although at the moment of this visit, Gorbachev had the huge "capital" of his policy of new thinking at his back, it [the trip] turned out to be almost the least effective in a practical sense. Overcoming the "main obstacle" in Soviet-Japanese relations was, so to speak, within arm's reach. But... objective circumstances, as well as subjective ones, prevented this.

But everything [should be told] in order.

I was not yet serving "under Gorbachev" when his first contacts with the Japanese took place—in 1985. Then, after all of his meetings with people from "capitalist countries" came under my supervision, I soon began to note that he was showing definite preference toward the Japanese.

Delegations from Japan continued to arrive, and almost every one of them requested an audience with Gorbachev. I noted that he refused almost none of the Japanese, no matter what their level. And he spoke more

and more frankly with them. But just as soon as things got to the main point which had frozen our relations for decades, Gorbachev clammed up. For him from the first—he spoke both to me and in the Politburo about this—the issue of the islands had been resolved. In general terms, the post-war settlement of state borders was considered to be axiomatic. And Gorbachev took this entirely from his predecessors (although with the Japanese islands, the issue was more complicated; the demarcation [of borders] had not been formulated according to international-legal procedure)....

[There follows a discussion of V.I. Dunaev's role in drawing Gorbachev's attention to the Japanese issue.]

Thereafter, I drew Dunaev into the preparation of the majority of the materials connected with our policy on Japanese affairs. Later, he played a large role in establishing the first contacts between Gorbachev and Roh Taewoo, the President of South Korea.

Beginning in 1986, when I [Cherniaev] became an assistant to Gorbachev, I was present at practically all of his contacts with the Japanese and took notes.

My first impression from his entirely well-wishing conversations with them was not very reassuring. The first two conversations recorded in my notebooks are discussions with one of the leaders of the Japanese Communist party. I do not want to say that Gorbachev in some way

used this channel in order to acquaint himself more indirectly with the Japanese problem and was somehow influenced by the information which he received from the communists. He knew beforehand that this information would not be objective; the CPSU's relations with the Japanese communist party had been poor for decades. The conversations with Fuwa³ to a significant degree were devoted to clearing up inter-party difficulties. Outside of this framework, a significant part of these conversations was devoted to the struggle against the nuclear threat. Although on this issue too, their positions did not coincide. The anti-American aspect of the problem was very strongly present on both sides.

Of course, Soviet-Japanese relations were also discussed. And Gorbachev genuinely tried to improve them. But, as yet, we had no policy aimed at this end. Therefore an emotional approach predominated which was obviously insufficient to "draw a line under the present and begin everything from scratch" (Gorbachev used these words more than once).

He had not yet felt the significance—governmental, political, emotional, traditional, psychological, of every sort—that the Japanese invested in the problem of the islands seized from them by Stalin after their capitulation, after the end of the Second World War. In reality, they had never belonged to Russia. Knowing this, but being driven by the inertia of the Soviet superpower, the very possibility of returning these territories had been ruled out. Sometimes, [Gorbachev] expressed himself quite definitely and sarcastically as to the hopelessness of the Japanese efforts in this regard; at the first meetings he did not even want to discuss this issue, considering the post-war territorial division to be final and irreversible everywhere. He did not recognize the problem itself which supposedly had to be resolved. According to the Gromyko formula, it had been resolved "as a result of the war." And that was the only explanation for why in actuality the four islands should belong to the Soviet Union, which, as it was said, although big, "had no excess land." Sometimes he used those words to forestall the efforts of the Japanese interlocutors to begin a discussion. There was a certain [sense of playing a negotiating] game in such a statement of the issue.

The evolution of his views on this score was slow, and took almost five years to complete. I will try to illustrate this evolution with concrete examples, relying on my records of Gorbachev's conversations with figures from the Japanese state and society....

Back in 1985 in his first meeting with Nakasone, who was then prime minister, the issue of a visit by Gorbachev to Japan came up. Afterwards, this theme arose in practically all of his conversations with the Japanese. In reply to the latest invitation to him in the conversation with Fuwa to which I have already referred, M.S. [Gorbachev] said: "I am not being evasive, I think, [in saying that], we must have the widest possible ties with our neighbor Japan along state, party and social lines. All

the more with those who are attached to the cause of strengthening relations with the Soviet Union. You can assume that we are ready to develop relations with Japan. If she [i.e. Japan] does not present us with ultimatums, then there is great potential for that. I would like to ask the question: why is Japan presenting the Soviet Union with an ultimatum, since, after all, we did not lose the war to her?"

To this Fuwa reacted curiously: "I am not Nakasone's deputy." "I will take that under advisement," M.S. countered.

Incidentally, Fuwa demanded of Gorbachev very firmly and insistently in Japanese, using a variety of different approaches, that the CPSU cut off relations with the Socialist Party of Japan, and when doing so always tried to play on the anti-imperialist ideology of the CPSU and to put forward examples proving that the Japanese socialists were actually playing into the hands of American imperialism, not to mention into the hands of [Japan's] own bourgeoisie. But Gorbachev was entirely unmoved by this. He politely explained that the CPSU would henceforward associate with all of Japan's "peace-loving forces" "in the name of their common interests."

It seems to me that there was something of a turning point in the evolution of Gorbachev's approaches to the Japanese theme in his conversation with the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Socialist Party of Japan, Doi Takako, on 6 May 1988. A broad review of the entire circle of Soviet-Japanese relations was made. Moreover, I must say, this was done by both sides in the most delicate way, in the most benevolent spirit, with an effort to understand one another, and somehow to get closer to a realistic evaluation of Japan's place in the development of the policy of "new thinking." Every element was present in the conversation: the emotional, the psychological, and the deeply political. Concisely put, for Gorbachev, his conversation with this very kind, very intelligent, interesting, spiritually rich woman was a sort of turning-point in his understanding of the scale of the Japanese problem as a whole and the difficulty of our relations with this nation, with this state. Of course, Doi also placed emphasis on the fact that Gorbachev should come to Japan, and that this would help resolve everything more easily. She told him that if the Japanese were asked what they wanted from Soviet-Japanese relations, the majority would answer with the question: when will General Secretary Gorbachev come to Japan?

"When the time comes," Gorbachev answered, provoking general laughter. "I am ready. But is Japan ready?"

Henceforward I will cite what they said according to the stenographic record:

Doi. Japan is ready.

Gorbachev. That is unlikely.

Doi. No, it is ready. Are you hinting that if you were told clearly by the Japanese side that they want a visit from you, you would be ready to go?

Gorbachev. If as a result of that visit we could come out with something concrete.

Doi. Do you have some concrete conditions?

Gorbachev. I have in mind some conditions, but most importantly, there must be an impulse, and not only a symbolic visit. It should really move the relations of the two countries ahead. There is not enough time simply to travel around.

Doi. I understand that. But you talked about Mrs. Thatcher, that you have a sharp dialogue with her, and that you are also conducting a dialogue with other countries. But why is there no dialogue with Japan? Perhaps you think that you can find out about Japanese affairs from the USA?

Gorbachev. No, we do not want to hear about Japanese problems in English translation. To us, Japan is an independent, great figure.

Doi. That has great significance from the point of view of the improvement of relations between the two countries.

Gorbachev. My conversation with you makes the problem of a visit an immediate issue. We will think over the issue. But we need also to know the government's point of view.

Doi. When I return, I will tell the premier about this.

Gorbachev. Good.

It must be said that, in contrast to the Communist leaders, other Japanese, starting with Doi, were very delicate in their posing of the "key," the most acute, issue—that of the islands. This word itself was not pronounced in the first conversations; it was covered in the following terms: "a series of unresolved problems,"⁴ "the 1956 Declaration," [Ed. note: The 1956 Joint Declaration is discussed at length by Deputy Foreign Ministers Rogachev and Kuriyama below] and so on. Naturally, Doi could not get around this issue and asked Gorbachev what his attitude was to the diplomatic document which was ratified in 1956 and on the basis of which diplomatic relations were restored? He answered verbosely, and this position was then maintained for a long time in different forms.

Gorbachev. First of all, let us come to an understanding that we both agree that it is impossible to approach the existing realities in any other way. The 1956 Declaration was conceived in concrete conditions, in concrete political circumstances. Concrete issues were discussed. But this discussion did not end in an agreement.

Doi. Nevertheless, Paragraph 9 [Trans. Note: Paragraph 9 stated that upon conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the USSR, the Habomai and Shikotan Islands would be returned to Japan] was agreed upon and was included in the Declaration.

Gorbachev. I am saying that this was not arrived at through a real process. A lot of time has passed, and all of that remains in history. We have only one thing today: the post-war realities. We must start from that basis.

Doi. On what basis in particular?

Gorbachev. On the basis of the existing post-war realities. What there was in different years has not come to pass, has not been formalized. What is more, this is not our fault. I do not see any need to re-animate issues which have already passed into history. Let us operate on the basis of realities and develop our relations.

Doi. Reality consists of the fact that you consider that the issue has been resolved and does not exist. But we consider that it has not been resolved. That is how we understand reality.

Gorbachev. You are placing in doubt the results of the Second World War. In West Germany there are also such forces. We will consider that this is also a reality. And all the same, there, opinion in favor of abiding by the political results of the Second World War is prevailing.

Doi. But the people's feelings have deep historical roots. Those feelings tell us that those are our lands there, that our ancestors lived there. And these feelings are very strong in Japan.

Gorbachev. We also have nationalistic feeling. The Russians have not forgotten that they discovered the Kuriles. You refer often to the agreements of 1855 and 1875. But, after all, there was the Portsmouth treaty of 1904 [Ed. Note: 1905] after that, which canceled them and made them null and void. As a whole, an approach which does not recognize the post-war realities runs into a dead-end.

Doi. But, after all, the 1956 Declaration is also a post-war act.

Gorbachev. But then our points of view did not coincide. Now that is already history. There were efforts, solutions were sought for, but nonetheless things remained as they were after the war.

Doi. But, after all, this Declaration is effectively a [legally] valid document. How can that be considered an issue of history?

Gorbachev. The Japanese side did not take advantage of its opportunity. For that reason, everything returned to the post-war results."⁵

[Gorbachev met with Nakasone Yasuhiro in Moscow in July 1988.]

Nakasone. I want to state my opinion. You must activate the links between your Pacific regions and the countries of the Japanese sea. Then friendly relations really will develop in the region. Up to six million people from Japan travel to foreign countries every year. But practically no one goes to the Eastern regions of the USSR. Here hotels must be built, some thought must be given to organizing skiing centers, and so on. After all, there are a whole lot of interesting places here. It will be better and much cheaper than going to Canada, which is very popular in Japan.

To this day, Japanese think of Vladivostok as some sort of dangerous military base. Things should be changed so that instead they think about it as an economic and

cultural center, a center of tourism. Then the view of the region as a whole will radically change, and joint enterprises will arise. Famous collectives like the orchestra of the Leningrad Philharmonic and the Bolshoi Theater should perform in Vladivostok. Then Japanese [visitors] will also go there.

Processes in the Soviet Union and the course of perestroika were also “subjected” to fundamental “joint” analysis. Gorbachev frankly and in detail informed Nakasone of his assessment of the situation at that moment. In reply, Nakasone demonstrated a fairly detailed knowledge of events in our country. At the end of the conversation, Nakasone politely, but firmly and concretely, approached the most difficult theme—the “obstacles in Soviet-Japanese relations.”

“I want very much to improve them,” said Nakasone. “For that reason, I came to Moscow. First, there is a territorial problem in our relations. When this territorial problem comes up in negotiations, the Soviet side right away gets angry and does not want to discuss it. I think that after 1956, when diplomatic relations were restored, too many statements which were political bluffs were made on both sides. Mr. Gorbachev, you are a jurist who graduated from Moscow University. I am also a jurist and graduate from Tokyo University. Let us talk about these problems cold-bloodedly, like jurists.”

He set out the history of the islands after the Second World War carefully and in detail, and ended with the following words: we do not think that our northern territories will be returned right away, but it is very important to act on the basis of the existing understandings which were fixed in international agreements between our two countries. That would be a great contribution to the development of relations. I am asking you, Mr. General Secretary, to approach this seriously and study the issue. We must ensure that the feelings of our two peoples in this issue be freed of emotion, and that the problem be resolved calmly.

How did Gorbachev react? His words were: “I can repeat our principled approach. We are interested in good relations with Japan. They must encompass a political dialogue, economic, scientific-technical, and cultural cooperation, and exchanges of people. We are for the broadest ties. In 1985, when I first met you, I also talked about this. What has happened over the three years since? With many countries, our relations have expanded and have become productive. But with Japan, they not only have not moved forward, but have frozen up. And in some ways, they have fallen back. We regret this. You should know that. It seems to us that in Japan an opinion has formed to the effect that the Soviet Union is more interested than Japan in an improvement in relations. I have been informed that the Japanese are concluding: the Soviet Union needs new technology. It will have to come hat in hand to Japan. That is a big mistake. If such an approach lies at the basis of Japanese policy, we will not be able to get anywhere. To one of my Japanese interlocutors I said:

We did not lose the war to you, but you are trying to dictate [terms] to us. A sort of stalemate has appeared in our relations.” And [he] continued: “We approach the post-war realities differently, and assess them differently. But they are what they are. They are based on the outcome of the war, and have been consolidated in documents. Japanese representatives, when they speak about Soviet-Japanese relations, begin with 1956. But they should begin with the post-war situation. Then 1956 also looks different.

Then, in the context of that period, in order to restore relations with Japan, to normalize them, the Soviet Union decided to make a noble step—to give away two islands. [Ed. note: According to the Russian scholar and former diplomat S. Tikhvinskii (*Problemy dal'nego vostoka*, 4-5(1995)), but as yet uncorroborated by documentation, the offer was made on 9 August 1955, the tenth anniversary of the Nagasaki atomic attack.] This was good will on the part of the Soviet Union. But from Japan’s side, a demand was immediately made for four islands. And it all came to nothing, although diplomatic relations were re-established in 1956. Japan embarked on a rapprochement with the US. The presence of the US in this region grew and took on its current dimensions. That required the Soviet Union to take steps in response.”

Further discussion between Gorbachev and Nakasone at that time came to nothing; they were both working from fixed positions; each considered himself in the right, and they really did assess the realities [of the situation] differently.

Nakasone recalled that when he was prime minister, he had invited Gorbachev to visit Japan, and Gorbachev had received [the invitation] with satisfaction. Now he, Nakasone, was confirming the invitation on behalf of all Japan.

On 5 May 1989, Gorbachev met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Uno Sosuke. At the beginning of the conversation, he immediately observed that since beginning his work as General Secretary, he, Gorbachev, had met with prominent Japanese ten times. But progress in relations was not very noticeable; relations with other countries were outstripping what the USSR had with Japan both in dynamism and in scale.

Gorbachev and Uno positively assessed the official dialogue at the level of the ministers of foreign affairs which had begun in December 1988. Uno also affirmed the invitation to Gorbachev to visit Japan. And he handed him “five points” on which the Japanese side considered it desirable to develop the dialogue:

- To continue work on the conclusion of a peace treaty.
- To strengthen trust in relations.
- To advance economic trade ties.
- To promote the expansion of contacts between people.
- To ensure a visit by Gorbachev to Japan.

Uno informed Gorbachev that, in his discussion with Shevardnadze the day before, he had again announced on

behalf of his government that Japan could not recognize the Soviet side's reasoning to the effect that from a legal and historical point of view, the four islands belonged to the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev observed that the atmosphere of relations was changing. The dialogue was becoming constructive, and a mechanism of working groups to conclude a peace treaty had been created. [Ed. note: Excerpts from two of these meetings in 1988 and 1989 can be found below in this issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*.] He said, I am for strengthening the shoots of trust and turning cooperation into friendly relations. I am for advancing the process of mutual understanding without excluding [from consideration] any issues. In this context, he stated, I consider my visit to Japan to be crucial.

As can be seen, a nuance, a new note, appeared in this conversation: not to back off from any issues; any of them could be the subject of discussion, (and, of course, this implied!) they could not be considered to be definitively closed.

[The role of the Japanese Ambassador Edamura is discussed.]

In the evolution of the relations between the two countries, two episodes were significant, and I cannot omit them. They were different in their character, but they both signified an "approach" by Gorbachev to solving the Soviet-Japanese problem.

The first was his meeting with Ikeda⁶ in July 1990. He is a person who is famous not only in Japan. For many years, he has headed the religious-enlightenment organization "Soka Gakkai," which has a far-flung network of cultural, academic, and university centers on every continent. It devotes huge resources to the task of spiritual renewal and moral self-affirmation for thousands and thousands of people of different nationalities and creeds. It is, in its own way, a unique system which, it would seem, could have been created only by the Japanese and which embodies all of the characteristic particularities of that nation.

Ikeda for a long time had wanted to contact Gorbachev, seeing in him a "new beginning" in world politics which introduced goodness and moral principles into it. V.I. Dunaev once again helped to "bring them together."

The meeting took place in the Kremlin in one of the reception halls which was next to Gorbachev's office.

Ikeda brought a whole "team" of people with him, twelve in all. Mikhail Sergeevich had some of his close advisers and Vladislav Ivanovich [Dunaev] with him. The very ceremony of greeting was unusually warm and somehow merry. The interlocutors right away took up an "intimate," frank discussion which had, it would seem, no practical business goals.

Gorbachev talked in detail, without hiding anything, about the situation in the country at that moment—it was

already very difficult—about the motives behind his actions from the very beginning of *perestroika*, about his evident and "hidden" intentions, and as it were, "confessed" to failures and miscalculations, to the fact that what he had counted on in a number of cases had not turned out right.

[The second episode is the Gulf War.]

When the time for Gorbachev's visit was finally settled, there took place very energetic, somewhat nervous and not entirely successful diplomatic moves by both sides, especially by certain Japanese circles which had factored the visit into their domestic political game. In this sense, the visit of the General Secretary of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Japan, Ozawa Ichiro, at the end of March 1991, is curious. Gorbachev knew of this party's role in defining and carrying out state policy in Japan. He even once joked that the LDP ruled Japan even more than the CPSU in its time did the Soviet Union.

When they met in the Kremlin in the presidential office, Gorbachev defined the format of their conversation as follows: we will talk as "the leaders of the ruling parties about what we will do in the future, about how to build our inter-state relations." I hope, he went on, that we will conduct the conversation so as to prepare the visit of the president of the USSR to Japan to make it a success both for you and for us, as well as for the entire world. We must not lose touch with the domestic component of policy in each of our countries, nor with the worldwide context. For a long time everything was simple and clear: we presented each other with ultimatums - and that was all. And what became of it? We proved that we can live without one another and have managed to do so. But what is the sense of such an approach? If we seriously think over the entire path that has been taken, there can be only one conclusion: it would be better if we had cooperated during the whole period of time that has now been lost.

Gorbachev drew some comparisons. The USSR's relations with other neighboring countries in the East have moved forward. Relations with China, he said, were developing happily. We have begun diplomatic relations and a new level of contacts with South Korea, not to mention India, the ASEAN countries, and Indonesia. [Relations] with the United States have progressed so far that changes have become possible throughout the entire world.

My term in office will soon run out, he went on. However, so far I have not done anything for Soviet-Japanese relations. But it is not I who is at issue here. After all, the USSR and Japan are two great neighboring states, two great peoples. And that obliges me and us to do something together.

Ozawa in reply emphasized, incidentally, that, if it really were possible to establish new mutual relations between Japan and the USSR, it would truly be a huge contribution not only to the improvement of the political

and economic situation in the world, but also to strengthening and assuring a stable peace for the whole planet.

It was clear that Ozawa's appearance in Moscow was not accidental. It was the result of serious forethought in Japanese ruling circles. Both in the government and in the political parties, evidently, they wanted to know in advance what Gorbachev would come with. And, naturally, Ozawa wanted to be the first to bring back something fundamentally new. Being present along with V.M. Falin (he was the leader of the International Division of the CC CPSU, and the meeting was conducted, as it were, along party lines) at this meeting—which was very diplomatic in form but substantial and fairly frank, I would argue that Gorbachev's position distinctly showed more movement on this occasion than in previous negotiations with highly placed Japanese figures. I will try to illustrate this, relying on my record of the conversation.

Gorbachev again—this had become a rule [with him]—appealed to the experience garnered by the USSR and Germany. We went by the path of increasing our cooperation, Gorbachev told Ozawa. It could hardly be thought that the Soviet Union would have come to such an understanding of the issue of relations with Germany at some other time and without what we had gone through together with Europe and with the Germans. Both we and the Germans said: let history take care of itself. As a result, a solution appeared. [Ed. note: It is interesting to compare the paucity of documented literature on Russian/Soviet-Japanese postwar relations, compared to that on the German question.]

I interpreted these words as a confirmation of my inner conviction that Gorbachev was inclined to resolve the issue. To resolve it—granted, through compromise,—but in any case in such a way that it would also satisfy the Japanese. Already there was no suggestion that the issue itself did not exist, as had been the assertion in Gromyko's time, and as it was at first under Gorbachev. The problem was recognized and, this meant, it would have to be resolved. Gorbachev also proposed to resolve it within the framework of his "philosophy" of gradual movement along the lines of an all-around improvement of relations, while ever more closely including in the process everything that was connected with the islands....

In the end, after a long and roundabout discussion from both sides, Gorbachev posed the question directly: you advocate cooperation and expect courageous steps. What do you have in mind? That was the very question Ozawa was waiting for. He said the following: the entire Japanese people expects a visit from the President of the USSR. We hope that he will turn a new historical page in our relations and will lend them a new, close character. But there are problems. I think that you understand that I am talking about the four islands—Kunashir, Iturup, Habomai, and Shikotan. We are waiting for a recognition in principle from you of our country's sovereignty over these islands. I want to assure you that from the point of view of material, practical gain, these islands mean little to

Japan. This problem is a matter of principle which touches the entire people, the foundation of the entire nation.

Gorbachev once again returned to his conception: the problem was born of a historical process. And history in one way or another will resolve it. I always say: let's get away from the old position. Let's meet each other halfway. I don't see any other way. I am revealing to you our approaches on the ways to move forward.

And he went on: in recent years, the attitude toward the Japanese in our society has significantly changed. It has become very positive. But at the same time, the [public opinion] surveys both on Sakhalin and in the Khabarovsk region do mean something. Everything is interconnected, and everything cannot be changed at once. I understand: the Japanese people do not feel any better for this, and you cannot discard the problem of the islands. For that reason, we must agree to cooperate and at the same time to conduct negotiations on a peace treaty. Both processes will cross-fertilize one another and bring about a positive result. Here history must take care of itself. Perhaps it is very close, and perhaps far away. Look at how rapidly everything happened in Germany.

Taking heart from these hints, Ozawa once again went on the attack and wanted to get a more definite [response], if not a final revelation of Gorbachev's intentions. The matter was concluded in the following passages.

Ozawa. Well then, are we to wait 50 to 100 years?

Gorbachev. I think that life will make that clear. But if [our] alienation continues, then the resolution of any issues is problematic. I am proposing what will help to resolve all the issues. And life changes the times. If we want to ennoble our relations in the future, to deepen trust, then this is just what is needed. I am convinced that this is a realistic prospect.

Ozawa. I do not fully understand what you just said. What concretely stands behind that?

Gorbachev. I have told you the most important thing. Of course, that will have to take some sort of political form. It will also take into account the problems which you are bringing up. What I am saying does not remove those problems. In Tokyo we will discuss the entire complex of issues without exceptions. As for what we will be able to agree on and what solutions we will come up with, we shall see.

Ozawa left the conversation, judging by everything, both inspired and puzzled. Because very soon thereafter, there began a flurry of activity. Calls came in from [Ozawa] himself and from his entourage with the request for a repeat conversation with Gorbachev. It was unheard of for Gorbachev, once he had concluded a conversation and said all that he wanted to, right away to return to what had been gone over. But this time he made an exception, once again considering and respecting the "specifics of the Japanese case."

Ozawa made a lengthy apology and explained that he had not had time to say everything he had come with from Japan, and that he thought that he had not been able to

articulate his position in full.

But, obviously, something else was at issue. Having contacted Tokyo or consulted with his entourage, he came to the conclusion that he had not fulfilled the task which he had set himself, or which had been set for him before his departure for Moscow: he absolutely had to bring back some sort of definite answer. Evidently, this was important for some sort of internal configuration of political or party forces in Japan. That is my guess. Ozawa began by making an exposition of a concept which, it seemed to me, had been agreed on in Japan before his conversation with Gorbachev. There were three points in it: “We agreed that the conversations with the President will touch on the following three points in the framework of the issue of the “northern territories.”

- To recognize the validity of the joint declaration of 1956 and to take it as the basis for beginning new negotiations on a peace treaty.
- To confirm that in the future, what is meant by the territorial issue between the USSR and Japan is a resolution of the fate of the other two islands—Kunashir and Iturup.
- The negotiations which will begin after the visit will touch on, along with all of the other issues, a definition of the status of Kunashir and Iturup. Although it is difficult to specify the precise period of time during which the negotiations will take place, both sides are assuming the necessity of completing them before the end of this year, and, more precisely, in the fall. It was assumed that I would give you an explanation for the reasons for setting such time constraints during the meeting with you.”

At this point, Ozawa suddenly hinted that in the case of such a resolution, Japanese firms would be ready to render substantial economic aid to the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev reacted first and foremost to this hint, saying that he was not inclined to and could not conduct a discussion according to such a plan: you give us something and in turn we will give you what you want. That is not a conversation which we can have with you. You are a politician. You are an energetic person and I understand that you want a concrete result. But the approach: “you give—I give” is entirely unacceptable not only between Japan and the Soviet Union, but in general terms as well.

Gorbachev reacted as follows to Ozawa’s three-point formula.

Unfortunately, he said, I cannot give a concrete answer to all of these points. I consider that we are not yet ready for concrete solutions. The general course of events and the situation itself have not yet brought us to that point. I consider that the main task both of your visit here and of my visit to Japan is to prepare the conditions for moving our relations onto a new level, to give a powerful impulse to their development. On that new basis, we can begin a discussion of the entire complex of issues, including a peace treaty and, in this context,—the location of the border.

By saying this—and this is also worth establishing—Gorbachev recognized that there was as yet no final internationally recognized boundary between the USSR and Japan. I well understand, he added, the temper of public opinion in Japan and the link between it and your position. But in the Soviet Union, the authorities must also take public opinion into consideration now.

However, this did not satisfy his interlocutor. Ozawa moved the conversation onto the following plane: he said in so many words, we will not announce your concrete decision. That will remain between us. But let us already agree on what you will be willing to agree to during your visit to Japan.

Gorbachev rejected such an approach. I once again advocate—he said,—beginning to move and moving forward consistently. We will still think about it and work out formulations. I hope that you have grasped and have correctly understood our stance. There will be no surprises; of course, some sort of formulations will be worked out. Nuances are possible.

At that point, I—and not only I, but everyone who participated from our side in Ozawa’s visit—came to the conclusion that in the second conversation which [Ozawa] had insisted on, he had “spoilt Gorbachev’s mood” before the visit [to Japan]. M.S. had been put on his guard. If his other official partners during the visit to Japan were also going to act in this way, he would end up in a very awkward position. They were putting pressure on him. And his “forward movement” on the “main issue” would be judged from this point of view, both in the USSR and in the world as a whole.

And so, we approached Gorbachev’s visit to Japan, which began on 16 April 1991....

[Source: *Excerpted from Anatolii Cherniaev, Gorubachofu to unmei o tomonishita 2000 nichii (Tokyo: Uchio shuppan, 1994), the translation of Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, and supplemented by the original Russian manuscript kindly provided by the author. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie and Mie Nakachi.*]

¹ Chapter Ten, “The Japan Visit” (*Nihon homon*), was written especially for the Japanese edition of A.S. Cherniaev, *Six Years with Gorbachev*.

² Ed. note: Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro was in Moscow to attend Konstantin Chernenko’s funeral.

³ Ed. note: In 1986, Fuwa Tetsuzo was Chairman of the Presidium of the Japan Communist Party.

⁴ Ed. Note: Nakasone in a meeting with Gorbachev two months later used the exact same phrase.

⁵ Ed. Note: In April 1991, during Gorbachev’s visit to Japan, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki referred to this “lost opportunity” and Gorbachev snapped back: “I am afraid the second chance will also be missed.” It was. For more information on the Tokyo visit, please visit our website: cwihip.si.edu.

⁶ Ed. note: Ikeda Daisaku—the head of the Soka Gakkai, the largest of Japan’s post-war “new religions.” With close ties to the Komeito (“Clean Government”) Party and six million adherents, it is a political, as well as spiritual, force.

**Basic Contents
of the meeting of the working group
on peace treaty issues.**

Tokyo, 20 December 1988

At the beginning of the session I.A. Rogachev and T. Kuriyama [both Deputy Foreign Ministers] exchanged greetings.

Kuriyama. I understand the meeting of this group in the following manner: on the instructions of our [Foreign] Ministers, we have formed a working group with the aim of opening a new page in Japanese-Soviet relations through the efforts of both sides. I would like us, in the course of the group's work, to have a frank discussion in friendly circumstances, as we did at yesterday's meeting of the ministers.

I would like to propose the following order of work for the group. We have approximately 1.5 hours of time before 12 noon, and we would like to use it with maximum effectiveness. In the first half of our meeting, based on the conversation between the ministers yesterday, I would like to make a series of additions to what Mr. Uno said, as well as some elucidations of our position on the territorial issue. If you do not object, I would also like to hear your opinion on the given issue.

Yesterday Mr. Shevardnadze put forward a very interesting proposal on the creation of a continuously active group on the issues of the peace treaty which will study the issue of the conclusion of a peace treaty, and in the second half of our meeting we would like to exchange opinions on this issue.

Rogachev. I would like to note that the atmosphere at yesterday's consultations of ministers and at today's meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR with Prime Minister Takeshita was peaceful and benevolent [and], one could even say, friendly, and to express my confidence that our discussion today will proceed in the same circumstances. Moreover, we have experience conducting such discussions with you [personally], and I always recall our previous meetings with satisfaction.

We are ready to hear out your additional comments (*raz'iasneniia*) on the issue which interests you, and afterward we will make some comments from our side.

In short, we agree to the order of work which the Japanese side is proposing to us.

Kuriyama. Then permit me briefly to make an exposition of our comments, which are based on what Mr. Uno said at the second round of negotiations, and also take into account what was said yesterday by the Soviet side. Above all I would like to bring the principled position of our side to your attention.

In Mr. Gorbachev's speech in the UN, he mentions the possibility of developing Japanese-Soviet relations on the basis of mutual advantage and friendship, and emphasizes that such a development of Japanese-Soviet relations will benefit not only the cause of peace, stability and prosperity

of the countries in the Asian-Pacific region, but also throughout the entire world. In order to take advantage of such an opportunity, we consider that it is crucial for us to resolve the territorial issue, to conclude a peace treaty, to normalize in full our relations and thereby to approach the achievement of those potentialities as much as possible.

In light of previous experience we do not think that it will be easy to come to agreement on a resolution of the territorial issue, which constitutes the single obstacle on the way to the conclusion of a peace treaty. However, the constructive changes which have been observed of late in the USSR's foreign policy give us hope that a fruitful dialogue on this issue will be conducted between our countries.

In connection with this, permit me to touch on some more concrete points. First, I would like to dwell on a couple of antebellum realities about which Minister Uno spoke yesterday. The historical facts of the 90-year period from the 1855 treaty to 1945 convincingly show that the four islands whose return our country is demanding differ from the southern [part of] Sakhalin and the Kurile islands, which Japan renounced in the San Francisco treaty. They also convincingly show that these islands were never under the control of your country and that it never had pretensions towards them. In this way, these four islands have received, through a peaceful process, recognition by the international community as a part of Japanese territory.

In order that the Soviet side understands us correctly, I would like to note that our frequent mentions of and references to the treaties of 1855 and 1875 are made not to dispute the period during which they are in effect, but with the aim of reminding you that, beginning from the 1875 treaty, there were a succession of disputes between Japan and your country on the issue of the geographical composition of the Kurile islands and to show what the historical understanding of and relationship toward the four islands was. Precisely for these reasons, both the government and the people of our country are convinced that we have just grounds for demanding the return of the four northern islands from your country.

Secondly, the occupation of the four islands by Soviet troops, which was accomplished over the course of the month after 15 August 1945, when Japan had accepted the Potsdam declaration, is nothing other than a territorial expansion through the use of armed force, and in conditions when Japan had unequivocally denied any intention to continue the war. At the same time, I cannot but note that as a consequence there have been no signs that the Soviet Union's occupation of the four northern islands might be recognized in the international arena.

As for the issue of post-war realities, we, as the side which suffered defeat in the Second World War, have accepted and accept these realities, but [do so] within the confines of the agreed norms of international law.

In my opinion, the post-war realities consist of the following facts.

First is the San Francisco peace treaty. As Minister

Uno stated yesterday, the Japanese government's principal position consists of the fact that Japan will not demand the return of the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kurile islands, which it renounced in that peace treaty.

Secondly, the Japanese-Soviet Joint declaration of 1956. The contents of the 9th article of the Joint Declaration is well known to all present, and I think there is no need to set it out again.

Thirdly, the Japanese-American security treaty.

The security treaty, which was concluded by Japan to guarantee its security, has a deeply defensive character, and the fact that the USSR, referring to this treaty, in a unilateral fashion changed its attitude toward the territorial issue as expressed in the 9th article of the Joint Declaration, and, figuratively (*obrazno*) speaking, "took the four islands hostage," in our view is not compatible with the principle of leadership by [doing] right (*verkhovenstvo prava*), towards which the USSR has of late been striving.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact the presence of NATO does not pose an obstacle to normal relations between the Soviet Union and European countries which are members of that bloc. I think that the security treaty should have the same influence on Japanese-Soviet relations that the treaty on the creation of NATO has on the relations between the USSR and European states.

Yesterday Mr. Shevardnadze referred to the letters which were exchanged between the plenipotentiary of the government of Japan S. Matsumoto, and the first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, A.A. Gromyko on 29 September 1956. In regard to this, I would like to say that it is difficult for us to understand what was said yesterday by the minister of foreign affairs of the USSR.

In the course of the whole period of Japanese-Soviet negotiations at that time, the Soviet side insisted that it would resolve the territorial issue by transferring the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, although the Japanese side insisted on the return of all four islands, including the islands of Kunashir and Iturup. Because of this very issue, an agreement was not reached and it was not possible to conclude a peace treaty. That is a well-known fact, which no one can deny.

The principled position of our side is that the negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty should be conducted on the basis of a recognition of the Japanese-American security treaty and the confirmation of the understanding of 1973 between the leaders of our two countries on the fact that the problems left unresolved from the Second World War include the issue of the four islands [and should be conducted] in keeping with the ninth article of the Joint Declaration of 1956.

On that I would like to conclude the statement of our position and am ready to hear out your opinion on the Soviet side.

Rogachev. Thank you, Mr. Kuriyama. We have listened to your thoughts and comments with great attentiveness....

The USSR's position on the issue of a peace treaty with your country has been stated by us more than once. We considered and [still] consider that it is important to conclude a peace treaty that would make our relations stronger and more stable.

In connection with this there arises the issue of the contents of a treaty. Many issues which are usually the subject of such a treaty have already been resolved and fixed in a whole series of Soviet-Japanese agreements and in other documents, including the Joint Declaration of 1956. Besides this, it is necessary to keep in mind another factor as well, that much time has passed since the restoration of diplomatic relations between our countries.

In view of the aforementioned particularities, it seems to us that the peace treaty should first generalize and sum up the post-war development of Soviet-Japanese ties, and secondly, should define the basic principles underlying mutual relations between the two countries, the main directions and reference points for their further forward movement.

In other words, we see this document as being all-embracing, complex, and encompassing all spheres of relations between our countries. And namely the political, economic-trade, scientific-technical, fishing, and other spheres, and, of course, one of the composite parts of the treaty would be the location of the border.

I want to emphasize that the peace treaty is a complex of issues and not some single, separable issue.

Yesterday the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR made an exposition of our thoughts in connection with the historical points which you mentioned today. We consider that the excursion into history which Mr. Uno made yesterday and which we heard from you today, is useful.

A comparison of your and our evaluations of the events of the distant and recent past show that you and we differently interpret these historical events.

It is very important that neither side become emotional about this, but instead try to comprehend historical lessons and take them into account in building our future relations.

You believe that the historical facts bear witness in favor of the correctness of your position, but we have another point of view—we believe that an historical approach bears witness to the justice of our position.

You say that in the treaties of 1855 and 1875 it was made clear that the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup are not included in the Kurile islands, but we consider that in the aforementioned treaties there are no articles which geographically define a concept of the "Kurile islands" and for that reason your understanding of these treaties is insufficient (*ne sostoiatel'no*).

Although the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke about this yesterday, for my part I want again to draw your attention to the fact that there is a whole series of works by Russian and Japanese scholars which bear witness to the fact that priority in the discovery, study and integration [*osvoenii*] of the Kurile islands, including their southern

part, belongs to Russia.

We do not deny the fact that, according to the Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1855, the border between Russia and Japan went between the islands of Iturup and Urup, and that in the 1875 treaty Russia ceded the northern part of the Kurile islands in exchange for the cession by Japan of a part of Sakhalin island to Russia.

We also paid attention to the fact that the Japanese side, referring to these agreements, at the same time prefers not to recall the Russo-Japanese war and the Portsmouth treaty. Meanwhile, it is well known that Japan, having seized the southern part of Sakhalin and torn it away from Russia, itself ignored and violated the agreements of 1855 and 1875.

Japan's treacherous attack on Russia in 1904 and the seizure of the southern part of Sakhalin through the Portsmouth treaty of 1905 deprives the Japanese side of the right to refer to the treaties of 1855 and 1875.

I can also repeat that your assertion that the Kurile islands, which Japan renounced in the San Francisco peace treaty, extend only to the northern part of this archipelago, clearly contradicts all scholarly geographical understandings. Besides this, it is generally known that in documents which treat the Kurile islands issue (the Yalta agreement, the San Francisco peace treaty and other international agreements), these islands are in no way divided.

You speak about the fact that the USSR completed a territorial expansion only after Japan had capitulated in the Second World War. However, I would like to remind you that the liberation of the Kurile islands by Soviet troops was accomplished in keeping with preliminary understandings between the allies, and that the issue of time periods here cannot have principled significance. At the same time, it can be pointed out that even after 15 August 1945, Japanese troops continued military actions, as a result of which the Act of Capitulation by Japan was signed only on 2 September 1945.

And I want once again to note that your denial of the applicability (*deistvennost'*) of the Yalta agreement to Japan is entirely incomprehensible to us. Of course, Japan did not participate and could not participate in the Crimean [Yalta] agreement, insofar as it was concluded between countries which were at war against Japan; however, having signed an act of unconditional capitulation, it accepted all of the conditions which were determined by the allied powers, based on the relevant existing agreements among them, including the Crimean [agreement].

Today in international practice a precedent is being created whereby the side which has suffered defeat, having signed an act of unconditional surrender subsequently begins to put forward conditions. Where is the unconditionality here? We call upon the Japanese side to think seriously about this fact.

Yesterday you and I already discussed the issue of how we understand the contents of the Joint Declaration of 1956. The agreement by the USSR, as fixed in the Declaration, to transfer the islands of Habomai and

Shikotan to Japan was a gesture of good will (*zhest dobroivolii*) by our country toward Japan, but was not our obligation toward your country. In the Declaration the agreement by the sides to "continue negotiations on concluding a peace treaty after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations" is also talked about, and the concept of the "territorial issue" does not figure in the Declaration. I want to remind you that, as is mentioned in the Declaration, the actual transfer of the islands Habomai and Shikotan "will be carried out after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan." However, the Japanese side refused to conclude a peace treaty on the basis of the Joint Declaration. As for the islands Kunashir and Iturup, they are not mentioned either in the Declaration or in the letters which were exchanged on 29 September of this year. For this reason the Japanese side's assertions that according to the Joint Declaration the sides agreed to put aside the territorial issue for future discussion are arbitrary and the Soviet side declines them. In the memorandum from the government of the USSR to the government of Japan of 22 April 1960, it is said that the territorial issue between the USSR and Japan has been resolved and confirmed by appropriate international agreements, which should be observed.

Some words on the subject of the exchange of letters between A.A. Gromyko and S. Matsumoto on 29 September 1956. Yesterday we already spoke about this issue. I want to remind [you] that these letters were signed at the moment when the sides had agreed that they would not broach the territorial issue in the Joint Declaration and would discuss it after it had been signed. However, at the final stage of the negotiations the Japanese side again brought up in a categorical form the issue of making an obligatory reference to this theme in the text of the Joint Declaration. By way of accommodating the Japanese side, the Soviet side gave its agreement to including the known formulation in the text of the Joint Declaration, having in mind that this was our final position, on the basis of which the USSR was ready to conclude a peace treaty. However, the Japanese side did not take advantage of the opportunity that presented itself, and declined to conclude a peace treaty on the terms of the Joint Declaration of 1956. And in January of 1960 a new Security Treaty was signed between Japan and the USA. You again repeated that this treaty has an exclusively defensive character. However, we have full reason to believe that that is absolutely not the case. We have already explained to you our position on this issue. I want to remind you that the effective sphere of the 1960 treaty, unlike the previous 1951 treaty, was spread beyond the limits of Japanese territory. Japan's role changed after this treaty; that is, it took different obligations upon itself in terms of its augmentation (*narashchivanie*) of military might. The contents of the treaty, as well as the development of events after the conclusion of the treaty, confirm that it led to a substantive change in the situation (*obstanovka*) in the region.

Just now you drew a parallel between the Japanese-

American Security Treaty and NATO, noting that the presence of NATO does not hinder the USSR from developing relations with the European member-countries of that bloc. However, here we have an entirely different understanding. We believe that the existence of blocs poses an obstacle to the development of normal relations, and over the course of many years our country has consequently advocated the dissolution of military blocs. Both in the East and the West we have a single approach to this issue.

Another few words about the Soviet-Japanese announcement of 1973, in which “unresolved issues” are referred to. We have more than once pointed to the fact that our Japanese colleagues here are making a one-sided and false interpretation of the contents of the formulation there. We did not recognize the “unresolvedness” (*nereshennost*) of the so-called “territorial issue.” The issue of a peace treaty is another matter. We were then and remain now advocates of underpinning Soviet-Japanese relations with a stable base of agreement by concluding a peace treaty.

Kuriyama. We have listened to the comments of Deputy Minister Rogachev on the Soviet side’s position on the territorial issue with great attentiveness.

We understand your comments in the following way: that the Soviet side has made an exposition to us in a complex form of its position, which we have earlier heard in parts. Frankly speaking, while listening to your comments it did not seem to me that a broadening of understanding and a convergence of both sides’ positions on this issue have occurred. At the same time, just now we received from you a frank, detailed, and composite explanation of the Soviet side’s position on the territorial issue.

We agree with what you have said about the necessity for us to leave aside emotion and to approach the resolution of this issue calmly.

We would like to state our thoughts and comments on the explanations of the Soviet position which you have made today, although, unfortunately, the time which has been allotted for today’s meeting does not permit us to do this.

For this reason I want to propose that we prolong the meeting of our working group and, using the additional time, consult with you about the proposals Mr. Shevardnadze made yesterday.

Rogachev. We agree with your proposal to extend the time of our group’s meeting and I would like to say several words right away on the issue you have touched upon.

On a general level of principle, we see this working group as a working organ which would also function between the consultative meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of our countries. If you recall, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR said yesterday that we make use of such a practice with a whole series of countries, especially when resolving complex issues.

For instance, we have two such [joint] institutions

with the PRC [People’s Republic of China] [for] political consultations and territorial negotiations. Incidentally, during his last visit the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs said that the political consultations had fulfilled their functions and that there was no longer a need to continue the negotiations in that form. At present, this organ has fulfilled its goals and it is possible to move to other forms. We agreed with that. Another mechanism—the mechanism of territorial negotiations—continues to operate at present.

We will return to our bilateral issues.

We have differences of opinion on the issue being discussed and, in order that our positions be brought together and that the points on which we disagree be reduced, the creation of a working group in the capacity of a standing organ is being proposed, at the level, let’s say, of deputy ministers. The group could conduct its meetings successively in Tokyo and in Moscow. The leaders of the groups could report to the ministers on the work that had been completed during their successive meetings and continue working in keeping with whatever understandings might be achieved on the given issue at the ministers’ meetings.

This is how we conceive of this working mechanism, and, of course, we are ready to hear out your proposals and thoughts on the given issue.

Kuriyama. I thank you for your comments in this regard. We have listened to yesterday’s proposal by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, as well as to your elaborations on this proposal today with great interest.

We, in principle, regard the idea of creating such a group at a working level in the interests of assisting the progress of the negotiations on the issue of concluding a peace treaty between the regular meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of our countries as positive (*polozhitel’no*).

At the same time I believe that at the current meeting of our groups we should decide how it would be best to express in the joint communiqué the understandings that have been arrived at here, based on Mr. Shevardnadze’s proposals from yesterday as well as on additional elaborations you have made today on this issue.

In this connection, I would like to propose for your attention the Japanese side’s draft text on the issues which have been discussed in our working group, taking into account the results of the meeting of our group today, which could be included in a joint communiqué.

“The Ministers, in keeping with the understanding fixed in the Joint Japanese-Soviet statement of 10 October 1973, conducted negotiations related to the conclusion of a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty, including the issues which could constitute its contents. The sides agreed to assist the continuation of negotiations bearing on the conclusion of a peace treaty.

In this connection, the Ministers, noting the fact that the territorial issue, which, returning to historical facts, is a real obstacle to the development of bilateral relations, was

also discussed in the working group on the peace treaty, and recognizing that the settlement of the given issue and the conclusion of a peace treaty benefits the establishment of genuinely good-neighborly and friendly relations between both of our countries, agreed to continue the negotiations in the given working group in the interests of assisting the further progress of negotiations bearing on the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both countries.

Rogachev. I would ask you to give us that text [to take] with us so that we can discuss it, and I think, we will be able to work out a mutually acceptable version.

Kuriyama. We have significantly extended our working time, and I would like to express our thanks to you that we have been able to exchange opinions so frankly and work seriously.

Rogachev. We have been in session with you for more than two hours already, but unfortunately, we have not yet been able to move our positions closer together. We will hearken to the saying that a journey of 1000 miles begins with a single step. Our conversation today was useful; we have learned more about each other's position. Thank you for your cooperation.

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**Transcript of the Basic Contents
of the meeting of the working group
on the peace treaty**

Tokyo, 21 March 1989

The following persons took part in the negotiations:
for the Soviet side: coms. I.A. Rogachev, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR...
for the Japanese side: T. Kuriyama, deputy minister of foreign affairs of Japan ...

Evening session

Kuriyama. We will begin the evening session. According to our agreement, we will listen to Mr. Rogachev.

Rogachev. I would like to touch on the international-legal aspects of the ownership of the Kurile islands.

Our position and arguments about the Soviet Union's ownership of the islands of Iturup, Kunashir and Lesser Kurile chain (Habomai and Shikotan), just as with all of the Kurile islands, as well as the southern part of Sakhalin island, have been put forward by us already more than once. Nevertheless, today again I would like, more broadly than before, to touch on some of the aspects which, in our view, bear principal importance....

[Rogachev then expatiates on the following issues: the Yalta agreement, the San Francisco peace treaty, the

Russian discovery and annexation of the Kuriles reaching back into the 17th century, and the definition of "Kurile islands." This monologue is reproduced in full on the CWIHP website: cwihip.si.edu.]

Now permit me to move on to the next issue.

Today you referred to the Joint Declaration of 1956 and the letters which were exchanged between Gromyko and Matsumoto. It seems to us that there arises a need to dwell on the contents of these documents, and also on their interconnections. It is well known that they were composed at different times and reflected the level of understanding between the sides of problems connected with the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations and with the conclusion of a peace treaty. In December of last year we already spoke about this, and I want once again to direct attention to the circumstance that the exchanged letters between A.A. Gromyko and S. Matsumoto were signed during the intermediate stage of Soviet-Japanese negotiations when the sides were operating on the understanding that bilateral relations would be normalized as of yet without signing the peace treaty and that in the concluding document of the negotiations—the Joint Declaration—the territorial issue would not be touched upon, but would be discussed in the framework of negotiations on concluding a peace agreement after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

However at the last stage of the negotiations the Japanese side stated an insistent request that the territorial theme must be reflected in the text of the Joint Declaration. The Soviet side acceded to the request (*poshla navstrechu*) and gave its agreement to the inclusion in the Joint Declaration of the well-known point.

This, however, did not signify the recognition by the Soviet side of the justice of Japanese territorial claims. It was a gesture of good will, which the Soviet Union undertook, acceding to Japan's desires and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state. And by doing this it was meant that it was the final position on the territorial issue upon which the USSR was ready to conclude a peace treaty with Japan.

In other words, the "territorial issue" which was spoken about in the letters exchanged between Gromyko and Matsumoto, was actually the formulation in a final form in the Joint Declaration of the Soviet Union's agreement to transfer Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. This is confirmed in the text itself of Point 9 of the Declaration, in which it speaks only about the continuation of the negotiations relative to the conclusion of a peace treaty and does not at all mention the territorial issue.

This is tangentially confirmed in the clause contained in the given agreement about the fact that the actual transfer of the mentioned islands will take place after the conclusion of the peace treaty between the USSR and Japan.

It is impossible not to mention as well that the

expression “territorial issue” is not present in any of the subsequent Soviet-Japanese documents.

Afterwards, however, Japan did not make use of any of the available opportunities and refused to conclude a peace treaty on the terms of the 1956 Declaration, having put forward additional territorial claims toward the USSR. Moreover, the Japanese government began to conduct a policy toward the Soviet Union which contradicted the spirit of the Joint Declaration and the peaceful intentions expressed in the course of the negotiations on the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations. The conclusion of the Japanese-American security treaty in 1960, directed essentially against the Soviet Union, changed the situation and confronted our country with the necessity of taking appropriate steps to defend its interests.

As is known, the law on international treaties (art. 44 of the Vienna convention on the law on international treaties of 1969) permits a unilateral refusal to observe a part of a treaty in case the treaty is violated by the other side or the situation fundamentally changes.

Now for several words on the character of the Japanese-American Treaty on mutual cooperation and security guarantees. Today, you, Mr. Kuriyama, tried to convince us that it has an exclusively defensive character....

[A short disquisition on the Japanese-American Treaty follows.]

It must be said that the destabilizing influence of the Treaty on the situation in this part of the world continues up until now and even into the future. The fact is that in keeping with the Treaty, more than 120 US military bases and establishments are located on Japanese territory, including means for delivering offensive nuclear weapons. We have in mind, in particular, F-16 fighter-bombers at the Misawa base, the cruiser “Bunker Hill” and the destroyer “Fife,” which are equipped with “Tomahawk” cruise missiles [and are] assigned to the port of Yokosuka. These are all realities which cannot be ignored.

I want once again to say that we recognize the right of each country to individual and collective self-defense, but we cannot but assess the Japanese-American “Security Treaty” as a military alliance having in addition an anti-Soviet direction....

[A presentation on the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905, its precedents and results, follows.]

Now one more thought in connection with today’s discussion.

The Japanese side asserts that the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Habomai, and Shikotan were not seized by Japan “by force and as a result of avarice” and for that reason the relevant clause of the Cairo declaration does not apply to them.

It is well known that in the course of a long period of

time Japan used these islands as bases for aggression, including for the attack by a [naval] aviation formation on Pearl Harbor and attacks on peaceful Soviet vessels. For this reason, the confiscation of these islands from Japan after the war cannot be seen as a “territorial expansion” on the part of the victor, but should be seen as a measure taken in order to “halt and punish Japan’s aggression,” that is, in keeping with the principle of responsibility for aggression as was voiced in the very same Cairo declaration.

We have already explained our assessment of the environment in which the neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan was annulled. It is incontrovertible that responsibility for the outbreak of World War Two belongs to Hitlerist fascism together with Japanese militarism. Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union and Japan’s on the United States, as well as subsequent events, fundamentally changed the environment in which the neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan was made. The Soviet Union’s entrance into the war against Japan at the request of the Allies was a logical consequence of these changes and was dictated by the interests of ridding [all] peoples, including Japan’s, of death and suffering, [and of] restoring the foundations of peace throughout the whole world.

In your statement, you again refer to the Soviet-Japanese statement of 1973, in which unresolved issues are mentioned. I want once again to repeat that, as we have said more than once, the Japanese side is committing a one-sided, false interpretation of the sense of the formulas contained therein.

On that, permit me to finish my “short” statement.

Kuriyama. Today at the meetings of the working group on the peace treaty, the Soviet side in a comprehensive and detailed manner made an exposition of its position on each concrete aspect of the territorial issue which was raised by the Japanese side. I think that in the course of the negotiations which have taken place up until now, the Soviet side has never before given such a detailed exposition of its views. I express my sincere recognition for the comprehensive elucidation. At the same time I express a feeling of respect for the fact that the Soviet side in the process of preparation undertook very detailed research and study of the territorial issue in clarifying its position. I have materials on the table which have been prepared by my colleagues, which contain many points elucidating our position on the points you have put forward. However, insofar as today the Soviet side presented us with new arguments, I consider it expedient that we must make additional preparations for the discussion of the territorial issue and to clarify our position in the course of the following session of the working group on the peace treaty. In keeping with today’s explanations by the Soviet side of its position we again see that the positions of the Japanese and Soviet sides on this issue diverge widely, which I regret. But on the other hand, during the morning session, Mr. Rogachev touched on geographical aspects which should be included in the

contents of the peace treaty, and in doing so, if I am not mistaken, he said that the Soviet and Japanese sides have their views, but that it is necessary to apply effort to eliminating differences in our approaches, and that the Soviet side, in its turn, is ready to do so. I highly appreciate the given statement, and, making use of the opportunity, want to note that we share this opinion.

I think that the discussion which has taken place today is far from futile in the prospect for the continuation of the efforts of both sides. Today Mr. Rogachev stated the Soviet side's conception about the contents of the peace treaty. We would like to put forward our own thoughts on the contents of the peace treaty at the next meeting of the working group.

Mr. Rogachev said that the Soviet side does not adhere to a severe approach to the issues, but takes a businesslike and flexible position. At the same time the hope for an analogous approach from our side was stated. We are ready to display a similar approach within the framework of the working group on the peace treaty.

However, I want to dwell on one point connected with the statement which was made this morning by the Soviet side. You made reference to the islands of Takeshima, Senkaku and Okinawa as an example of Japan's flexible approach to other countries in cases when it wants to.

First, on the Senkaku islands. We received the impression that a definite misunderstanding exists on the Soviet side. The islands of Senkaku after the return of administrative rights over Okinawa were under the administrative control of Japan, as our original territory. We never agreed to a settlement of this issue by way of putting it on the "slow burner" (*putem otkladyvaniia ego v dolgii iashchik*).

Secondly, about Okinawa. The character of the given issue is essentially different from the character of the issue of the northern territories. After the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty, administrative rights were recognized for the USA. The essence of the issue consisted in the return to Japan of the administrative rights on Okinawa.

And, finally, on Takeshima. In contacts with the Korean Republic we consistently speak out against putting this issue aside. According to the principle that the given issue should be resolved by peaceful means, Japan consistently states, even at the ministerial level, that the Korean side has no juridical basis for ruling these islands.

Your phrase about a flexible approach misses the mark. We would like the Soviet side to understand: from the political point of view there can not be the same approach to the northern territories which before the war were inhabited by 16 thousand Japanese, and which have an area of five thousand square kilometers, and to the Takeshima islands, which are uninhabited. If the Soviet Union considers it possible to adhere to the aforementioned approach, it thereby ignores political realities and the political significance of the issue of the northern territories, on the one side, and of the issue of the Takeshima islands, on the other hand.

Finally, one request. Mr. Rogachev, you said that you can give us a list of the sources which were referred to during the exposition of your position. We will probably make a request about this in the course of working procedure.

Rogachev. We will do so.

Kuriyama. If the Soviet side has no further questions, I would like to consult relative to the press briefing. Insofar as the attention of journalists is focused on the content of the discussion in the course of the meeting of the working group, I want to consult about the contents of the briefing with the goal of avoiding unnecessary misunderstandings. Up until now such a practice has existed.

Rogachev. We had the impression that yesterday we consulted, although, judging by the Japanese newspapers, the results of our conversation were unexpected. We showed our text, which we intended to publish, and you said that in principle you agreed [to it]. We sent the text to Moscow, but something entirely different appeared in the Japanese press. I do not know by whose recommendation the message that the Soviet delegation was bargaining (*vedet torg*) appeared: six agreements for a high-level visit. That will never be. That is a risible thesis. We will conduct no negotiations, if we see that the Japanese side shows no interest. And you have no interest. I do not object to a consultation on the briefing, but I have doubts as to the results.

Kuriyama. If there are no more questions, I want thereby to finish the work of our committee. Several words in conclusion. In the course of two days we have held consultations, and today there was a meeting of the working group on the peace treaty. Although difficult problems exist between Japan and the Soviet Union, we were able to conduct a more detailed discussion of the issues, and our work benefited from a deepening of mutual understanding. During Mr. Uno's visit to the Soviet Union in May of this year, we will have to exert even more efforts to move forward our bilateral relations in the direction of realizing M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Japan. In conclusion I thank you for the Soviet side's cooperation with us over the course of these three days. I also express our recognition of the translators. I wish you, Mr. Rogachev, pleasant travels in Japan.

Rogachev. Permit me to say a few words. We are finishing the meeting of the working group on a peace treaty. I want once again to emphasize that the Soviet Union is conducting an honest, principled, open policy in all areas of the world, in relation to all countries and, in particular, in relation to its close neighbor, Japan. At the end of last year, following the conception of new political thinking, we took on an active role in improving our relations with Japan. After the meeting of our Minister of Foreign Affairs with Japanese leaders in December of last year there were hopes that perhaps a new stage in the history of Soviet-Japanese relations was beginning. An understanding was reached between the ministers of foreign affairs on the creation of a working mechanism to

prepare a summit meeting and a working group on a peace treaty, and it was approved by the Prime Minister of Japan and the Soviet leadership. The Soviet side honestly fulfilled the obligations it had taken upon itself, seriously preparing for the meeting of the working group in Tokyo and made a statement on all of the issues which constitute the concept (*poniatie*) of a peace treaty. We counted on the same approach from the Japanese side.

Unfortunately, I am obliged to state that from you we heard only a statement on the so-called "territorial issue." I am left with the impression that you are avoiding the use of the term "peace treaty." We also did not hear what the Japanese conception is, [that is] your understanding of a peace treaty. We consider that this will be a serious study, and hope that the Japanese side will make its answer at the next session of the working group.

Of course, there still remains the meeting with Mr. Uno. This is the high point of our entire work here, I mean both the consultations and the meeting of the working group. So far we have nothing about which to inform Moscow, aside from the fact that we heard the old Japanese theses on the "territorial issue." The question arises: how has the preparation for the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs benefited, let alone a summit meeting? It seems to me that our Japanese colleagues themselves will

make their own assessment of the scale of this benefit.

[Ed. note: The May 1989 Uno-Gorbachev meeting is covered in A.S. Cherniaev's memoirs, excerpted elsewhere in this *Bulletin*.]

I want to assure you that the Soviet side will make efforts toward normalizing relations with Japan. I agree that as a result of the meetings we have begun to understand each other's positions better and in this sense have deepened our mutual understanding.

Deep differences remain on the issue which you call "territorial." We will await your thoughts on the subject of our statement today after you study it.

On behalf of my comrades I want to thank you sincerely for your attention, for your hospitality, for organizing our trip around the country, and finally, for creating [good] work conditions. And on the subject of when I will meet with you, Mr. Kuriyama, we will agree separately. I mean the next meeting of the working group on the peace treaty.

Kuriyama. I agree.

[Source: Obtained by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPERS

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Research Notes

New Evidence on Soviet Intelligence

The KGB's 1967 Annual Report

With Commentaries by Raymond Garthoff and Amy Knight

[The State Seal]

Top Secret. Extremely Sensitive

Committee of State Security [KGB]
of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR

TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF CC CPSU

6 May 1968
no. 1025-A/ov
Moscow

Comrade L.I. BREZHNEV.

On the results of the work of the Committee of State Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and its local branches during 1967.

[For information—P.B. Ulanov]

[Signatures: L. Brezhnev, A. Kosygin, D. Polianskii, A. Pel'she, K. Mazurov, Podgornyi, Suslov, Kuusinen]

Guided by the decisions of the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] and by the instructions of the CC CPSU, the Committee of State Security and its local branches took measures during the year [covered in this] report to raise Chekist work to a level adequate for the needs flowing from the present international situation and the interests of communist construction in our country. [Ed. Note: The original KGB founded in 1917 was known as the *Chrezvychainyi komitet* or Extraordinary Committee, from which comes the acronym ChK. One who worked for the ChK was known as a "Chekist."]

In accordance with the tasks set by the June (1967) CC CPSU plenum, the main attention of the KGB has been devoted first and foremost to strengthening foreign intelligence, so that it could actively contribute to the successful implementation of Soviet foreign policy and could reliably ensure the timely discovery, foiling and unmasking of subversive plans of imperialist countries and their intelligence services. One of the first-priority measures in this regard was the reinforcement of the intelligence services by experienced KGB professionals in the central apparatus, as well as in the KGB stations abroad.

In the period under review, special attention was given to the organization of active countermeasures against the enemy's ideological diversions. Following the decree of the CC CPSU on this issue, passed on 17 June 1967, a

Fifth Directorate was created in the Committee of State Security and fifth bureaus, divisions and departments in territorial branches of the KGB.

In the interests of increasing the level of agent work [*agenturno-operativnoi raboty*] in the local branches of the KGB, Chekist organs were created in regions and cities that in recent years have grown economically or acquired important military significance and have therefore now become objects of intelligence interest for the enemy. The local party organizations gave positive marks to the intensification of the Chekist work in those regions. At the present time, the Committee is examining a number of proposals from the CCs of Communist Parties of the Union Republics, area [*krai*] and regional [*oblast'*] party committees forwarded during 1967 to create KGB offices in other cities and districts where this is dictated by interests of state security.

Implementing the instructions of the CC CPSU, the Committee of State Security carried out a set of measures aimed at increasing the struggle with the anti-Soviet activities of the Chinese splitters [*raskolniki*] and at ensuring the reliable protection of the borders of the USSR with the PRC. To this end, we set up a Trans-Baikal border district, organized new detachments, maritime units, checkpoints of the border troops and battalions of government communications troops. In the KGB branches of the [Union] republics, areas and regions bordering on the PRC, we organized intelligence subdivisions, and in the frontier areas we created several new city and regional offices of the KGB.

The improvement of the operational and service activities of the KGB branches and troops has also been ensured through administrative measures aimed at further perfection of their structure and personnel. In particular, to achieve more efficient use of operative equipment we transformed the second department of the Operational-Technical Directorate into a separate department of the Committee. We carried out some required structural changes in the subdivisions of the KGB in charge of engineering, cryptography and the development of new special devices. We set up several special departments in the KGB in connection with the establishment of new and the deployment of existing large formations and large units [*ob'edineniia i soedineniia*] of the Soviet Army. We set up an Inspectorate under the Chairman of the KGB with the purpose of improving the system of control and inspection of activities of the Chekist offices and units of the KGB troops.

In the period under review the branches of State Security had to fulfill their prescribed tasks in an aggravated operational situation. The governments and intelligence services of the USA and other imperialist states have intensified their aggressive policies and subversive activities with respect to the socialist countries. They made intense efforts to take advantage of this jubilee year in the life of the Soviet people [Ed. Note: 50th anniversary of the 1917 Revolution] to carry out ideological operations and to organize large-scale anti-Soviet propaganda.

In view of the developing situation, the intelligence service of the KGB carried out a number of measures to help promotion of foreign policy and other initiatives of the Soviet Union, to unmask aggressive plans of imperialist states, to compromise policies of the American government and the most dangerous enemies of the Soviet state as well as to foil subversive ideological operations targeted by the enemy at the 50th anniversary of Soviet power.

The intelligence service of the KGB attributed primary significance to the timely acquisition of secret information on subversive plots of the enemy and took measures to develop agents' access, primarily in the USA and other countries of the main enemy, but also took measures to create intelligence potential for operations against the Chinese splitters. During 1967 [the KGB] recruited 218 foreigners, among whom 64 possess operational capacities for work against the USA.

Reinforcement of agent networks of the intelligence service contributed to obtaining important information on political, military and scientific-technological problems.

During 1967 the KGB stations abroad received and acted on a total of 25,645 informational materials. Beside that, the intelligence services of socialist countries sent 7,290 materials in the course of informational exchange. During 1967 the KGB carried out operations of clandestine pilfering of secret documents from intelligence services of the enemy. These and other measures resulted in obtaining the codes of seven capitalist countries and in implanting eavesdropping radio-devices at 36 installations of interest for Soviet intelligence.

On the basis of the data obtained by the intelligence services, there were prepared and sent to the CC CPSU 4,260 informational reports, to the CC CPSU departments—4,728, to the Foreign Ministry of the USSR—4,832, to the Ministry of Defense and the GRU [Military Intelligence] of the General Staff of the Soviet Army—4,639. The Politburo CC CPSU members received 42 bulletins of foreign intelligence information. At the same time we sent to various ministries and agencies of the USSR 1,495 informational reports, as well as 9,910 materials and 1,403 samples of foreign technology. This year, at the request of the Military-Industrial Commission, we obtained 1,376 works on 210 subjects and over 330 most recent samples of foreign technology.

In carrying out measures of counterintelligence, KGB stations prevented the compromise of 22 officers and agents of the KGB and GRU and 8 officers and agents of

the intelligence services of socialist countries. They also uncovered 42 double agents planted by the enemy.

The main attention in improvement of counterintelligence work inside the country was focused on its further perfection so as to ensure more efficient struggle with military, economic and political espionage.

Fulfilling this task in practical terms, the counterintelligence branches directed their efforts at carrying out measures to gain agents' access to intelligence and other special services of imperialist states. During 1967 to this end the KGB arranged the planting of 31 agents in the enemy's intelligence; of them 12 were located by the enemy's special services and subjected to their intense scrutiny, which creates preconditions for the accomplishment of these "plants" in the future. Measures were also carried out to ensure agents' access to foreign centers that plan and implement ideological diversions, and also to anti-Soviet nationalist and religious organizations. Seven agents were planted into their leadership structures.

In order to intercept and control channels of penetration by the enemy into our country, [the KGB] continued working on successful accomplishment of operational games. Currently, 9 such games are being conducted, including 4 games with the intelligence of the USA, 8 games with the center of the [Russian émigré organization] NTS and 2 games with the centers of Ukrainian nationalists abroad.

As a result of these measures we succeeded in uncovering the encroachments of the enemy intelligence services in some regions of the Soviet Union, particular in the Far East, the Baltic, frontier areas of Ukraine, as well as at a number of enterprises and scientific research institutes. We also succeeded in obtaining data on some modes of communication between the enemy's intelligence and agent networks in spotting specific intelligence officers engaged in enemy activities against the USSR, and in passing to the enemy advantageous information and disinformation, [even] regarding operational activities.

More successful fulfilment of the task of penetrating the enemy's special services has been facilitated also by measures of recruiting foreigners. During 1967, 42 agents were recruited, among them 8 diplomats.

The counterintelligence service carried out special measures which resulted in photocopying 54 documents of ambassadors from member countries of NATO, annual reports of some embassies, reports of military attachés, and other classified materials on political, military-economic, operational and other matters. In addition, we worked out ciphers and codes in 11 embassies of capitalist countries, which will allow us to decode their correspondence.

Among the personnel of diplomatic missions as well as tourists, businessmen and members of various delegations arriving in the USSR (in 1967 their numbers came up to more than 250 thousand), we spotted over 270 foreigners suspected of links to the enemy's special services. On the charges of intelligence activities, participation in acts

of ideological diversion, smuggling, illegal currency operations and violations of the norms of behavior, [the KGB] deported from the USSR 108 foreigners and brought 11 foreigners to justice. The organs of military counterintelligence of the KGB, jointly with the organs of security of the GDR, unmasked 17 agents of Western intelligence services who conducted espionage work against the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

In the course of counterintelligence countermeasures with regard to enemy intelligence officers under diplomatic cover and other foreigners under suspicion of being affiliated to the enemy's special services, a number of Soviet citizens who established contact with the aim of passing secret information were discovered and unmasked. Among those persons brought to justice were a senior economist of the scientific research institute of the MVT [Foreign Trade Ministry] of the USSR Salov, a senior engineer of the all-union association "Stankoimport" of the MVT of the USSR Seregin, and a technician from an installation of special significance of the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building [cover for the Atomic Energy Program] Malyshev.

While organizing ever more effective struggle with military and economic espionage, the counterintelligence branches of the KGB took measures to reinforce the regime of secrecy, to bring to further perfection the protection of state secrets from the radio-technical and aerial-space means of reconnaissance of the enemy and to foil the enemy's attempts to use for reconnaissance purposes the expansion of the scientific-technical exchange between the USSR and capitalist countries.

The organs of military counterintelligence of the KGB did significant work on camouflaging rocket launching pads, depots of nuclear weapons and other objects from the enemy's space reconnaissance. They worked hard on spotting and prevention of violations in concealed control and command of troops and operating means of communication, as well as on the counterintelligence support of military exercises and maneuvers, and transfers of military equipment.

A place of high visibility in counterintelligence activity went to the measures taken along the lines of trips of Soviet citizens abroad, with the purposes of their protection from machinations of the enemy's intelligence services and for the solution of other operative tasks. As part of delegations, tourist groups and exhibition participants in 1967 the KGB sent 378 operatives to the capitalist countries, and also over 2,200 agents and 4,400 persons-in-confidence [*doverennykh lits*]. With their help we spotted 192 foreigners affiliated or suspected of being affiliated with special services of the enemy, thwarted 60 attempts to work on Soviet citizens [to persuade them] not to return to the Motherland; disclosed 230 persons who compromised themselves through incorrect behavior (18 of whom were recalled early to the USSR).

The establishment of subdivisions of the so-called fifth line in the structure of the KGB branches allowed us

to concentrate the needed efforts and means on the countermeasures to fight ideological diversions from outside and anti-Soviet manifestations inside the country. The measures taken in this regard succeeded in general in paralyzing the attempts of enemy special services and propaganda centers to carry out in the Soviet Union a series of ideological diversions, time-linked with the half-century anniversary of Great October. Along with unmasking a number of foreigners who arrived in the USSR with assignments of a subversive character, materials were published in the Soviet and foreign press disclosing subversive activities of the enemy's special services, and over 114 thousand letters and banderoles containing anti-Soviet and politically harmful printed materials were confiscated in the international mail.

Since the enemy, in its calculations to unsettle socialism from inside, places its stake mainly on nationalistic propaganda, the KGB branches carried out a number of measures to disrupt attempts to conduct organized nationalist activities in a number of areas of the country (Ukraine, the Baltics, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Armenia, Kabardino-Balkar, Chechen-Ingush, Tatar and Abkhaz Autonomous SSRs).

The measures to spot and undercut the hostile activity of anti-Soviet elements, including church officials and sectarians, were carried out with consideration of the existing data on the growth of hostile and ideologically harmful activity by religious and Zionist centers. To uncover their plots and to foil their subversive actions under preparation, and serve other counterintelligence tasks, the KGB dispatched 122 agents abroad. We also managed to suppress and disrupt hostile activities by the emissaries of foreign religious centers who were sent to the USSR, and to unmask and bring to justice for illegal activity a number of active sectarians.

In 1967 the distribution of 11,856 leaflets and other anti-Soviet anonymous documents on the territory of the USSR was registered. In addition, in the Armenian SSR we confiscated and prevented distribution of another 6,255 leaflets. During the year the KGB established the identity of 1,198 anonymous authors. The majority among them did this because of their political immaturity, and also because of shortcomings in required educational work at the collectives where they work or study. At the same time some select hostile elements chose this way to struggle against Soviet power. Because the number of anonymous authors who distributed malicious anti-Soviet documents owing to hostile convictions increased, there was an increase of those convicted for this type of crime: in 1966 there were 41 of them, and in 1967—114.

An integral part of the activities of KGB military counterintelligence in maintaining combat readiness of Soviet Armed Forces is the prevention of ideological diversions in smaller and larger units of the Army and Navy, to sever in a timely manner the penetration channels of bourgeois ideology. During 1967 we aborted 456 attempts at distribution among military personnel of

manuscripts, foreign magazines and other publications with anti-Soviet and politically harmful content, as well as 80 attempts to set up among the troops various groups of a hostile character.

In the system of measures undertaken to better resolve counterintelligence tasks there were important initiatives aimed at reinforcing agent networks. During 1967 the branches of the KGB recruited 24,952 agents, i.e. a figure constituting 15% of the total network personnel, the overall size of which did not change substantially during the year owing to the dropping of others. At the same time forms and methods of "shadowing" [*naruzhnoe nabludenie*] and operations equipment were improved. Special attention was paid to the development of state-of-the-art special devices and their supply to the units of intelligence and counterintelligence. Work in this direction is being conducted keeping in mind that the intensification of struggle with an enemy who is equipped with state-of-the-art science and technology requires a wider employment in Chekist work of modern technological devices and therefore a drastic improvement of technological level in the KGB branches which, in turn, leads to a considerable increase in material expenditures for this purpose.

In assessment of the state of operational cases [*operativnykh uchetov*] of the KGB, one should note that they continued to decrease quantitatively, although only to a small degree. According to the statistics on January 1 of this year, counterintelligence offices of the KGB are working on 1,068 persons, searching for 2,293 persons, and shadowing 6,747 persons.

In 1967 the KGB branches brought to justice 738 persons, 263 for particularly dangerous, and 475 persons for other state crimes. Among those who were convicted for criminal offenses, 3 carried out diversion operations, 121 are traitors and war criminals from the German-Fascist occupation, 34 were indicted for treason to the Motherland and for treasonous plotting, 96 persons—for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, 221 persons—for illegal crossing of state borders, 100 persons—for embezzlement of state and public property in large amounts and for corruption; 148—for illegal smuggling of goods and for violations of currency operations rules; and one foreigner and one Soviet citizen have been arrested for espionage.

During this year the Committee of State Security took a number of effective measures to strengthen legality in the work of the state security organs. Investigation of criminal cases was conducted according to the norms of legal procedures. The cases prepared by the KGB organs in 1967 led to 13 court trials with wide public participation. KGB investigators, acting upon citizen appeals, reviewed 6,732 criminal cases involving 12,376 persons; in 3,783 cases the conclusion was reached to close them.

Great importance was attached to measures of a prophylactic character aimed at prevention of state crimes. In 1967 the KGB branches subjected to prophylactic

treatment 12,115 persons, most of whom revealed manifestations of an anti-Soviet and politically harmful character without hostile intent.

Great importance was attached to further improvement of the protection of the state borders. As before, the borders with Turkey, Iran and Norway were guarded with high-density concentrations of forces and measures. The concentration of forces guarding the borders with the PRC has been almost tripled. To ensure border control along the seacoasts of the Arctic Ocean, a separate Arctic borderguards detachment and a separate air wing were formed.

The borderguard troops in 1967 processed through the borders more than 7.8 million persons, including over 3.5 million foreigners; they did paperwork on and searched 815,564 vehicles; detained 2,026 violators of state borders, among whom they discovered 2 enemy agents and 3 traitors to the Motherland.

In 1967 the border-guard troops at frontier checkpoints and the investigative personnel of the KGB confiscated from smugglers and currency-traders about 30 kilograms of gold bullion and coins, artifacts in precious metals and stones, foreign and Soviet currency and other goods totaling 2,645,000 rubles.

A special service of the KGB carried on interception of encoded communication from 2,002 active radio stations of 115 countries of the world. The units of radio counterintelligence of the service worked on 24 radio-centers of intelligence services of capitalist countries which maintained communications to 108 agent points. 3 new agents' radio-transmitters were detected in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. No agent radio-transmissions were found on the territory of the Soviet Union. The search squads established the addresses of 500 owners of unregistered radio-transmitters in the USSR.

As a result of decoding and deciphering work we read communications in 152 cipher-systems of 72 capitalist countries; in 1967 we broke 11 cipher-systems, and decoded 188,400 telegrams overall.

For the needs of ministries and agencies of the USSR, [the KGB] created 217 codes and other means of hand-ciphering, prepared 1,241,113 key- and recyclable cipher pads, 29,908 copies of codes and code tables, and 305,182 copies of other special documents. All current requests from ministries and agencies of the USSR have been entirely fulfilled. Industry supplied to the lines of communications 8,785 sets of cipher-making and scrambling equipment, which accounted for 100.6% of the planned amount. Tests of operational quality in 217 ciphering bodies and the departments of classified communications of ministries and agencies of the USSR were carried out, and also in 190 ciphering units in Soviet institutions abroad. Random radio-surveillance of 200 radio-networks of public communications and of 102 secret lines of communications of ministries and agencies of the USSR was carried out.

Cooperation of the organs of the KGB with the

security organs of socialist countries developed successfully. The mutual exchange of intelligence data increased considerably. In bilateral consultations, prospective plans for intelligence work were periodically shared, joint measures to study enemy intelligence officers for recruitment purposes and to work on and check on those who were suspected of espionage and other hostile activity, were carried out. The security organs of Poland and Hungary gave us assistance in maintaining security of Soviet troops abroad. There was interaction in counterintelligence protection for training exercises of the armies of the Warsaw Pact. Cooperation with the organs of security of Romania was limited to the minor exchange of information. The restored contacts with the MOB [Ministry of Security] of the KNDR [North Korea] have received some further development.

In the last year [the KGB] guaranteed security for leaders of the Communist Party and Soviet government during their 134 trips on the territory of the USSR and abroad. Special measures of a protective nature were also carried out for more than 70 events of the party and the state and during the most important visits by foreign delegations.

Measures were also carried out to raise the quality and reliability of the national system of [internal] government communication, to ensure its further development and automatization, and also to keep it equipped with secure equipment; a new communication network linking government objects was put into effect that increases the combat-ready qualities of the whole communication system.

For the purposes of increasing mobilization readiness, a set of measures to create the conditions propitious for organization of intelligence and counterintelligence work was carried out, and also for timely deployment of organs and troops of the Committee in a special [wartime] period.

As far as decisions related to financial and economic activities of the organs and forces of the KGB were concerned, special importance was attached to further reinforcement of the regime of savings of material and financial resources, as well as to strict observation of state and accounting discipline.

Last year more systematic efforts were made to exercise control over the activities of local branches of the KGB and to provide them with assistance in implementing decisions and instructions of the party, state, and KGB. Improvements were made in the way collegiums of the committees of state security and councils advising the heads of KGB directorates worked in that field.

Higher quality of operative-service activities has been achieved in the period under question due to measures to upgrade selection, appointment and education of the Chekist cadres. In 1967 the organs and forces of the KGB enrolled 11,103 new employees, including 4,502 to positions requiring officer ranks. Simultaneously, the KGB laid off 6,582 persons, including 2,102 officers. The new recruits to the KGB included 470 employees who

were recruited from positions in Party, Komsomol [communist youth movement] and soviet organizations. Six hundred one persons were selected and appointed to positions of *nomenklatura* leadership in the CC CPSU and KGB.

All organizational and educational work with KGB cadres during the last year has been aimed at paying homage to the half-century anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution as well as all-sided improvement of the operative-service activities of the branches of the central apparatus, organs and forces of the Committee of State Security. To commemorate successes in fulfilling the tasks set by the Party and government, 10 military units received awards—memorial banners of the CC CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Seven military units and three educational institutions have been decorated. For exemplary results in work and achievements in building Soviet state security, 5,665 servicemen, workers and employees of the organs and forces of the KGB have been decorated with orders and medals of the USSR; 24 [KGB] officers and generals have been promoted to the ranks of major general, lieutenant-general, colonel general and general by Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

The measures adopted in accordance with the resolutions of the CC CPSU June (1967) plenum increased the role of the party organizations of the central apparatus, organs and forces of the KGB in the area of more successful implementation of Chekist tasks, in their greater impact on the improvement of work with cadres, in reinforcement of military discipline, and in the growth of political vigilance over personnel.

In their constant building and expanding of their ties with the Soviet people, the organs and forces of the KGB in all their practical activities rely on the assistance and care of the CC CPSU, the CC of the Communist Parties of Union republics, area and regional party committees. Receiving with enthusiasm the congratulation of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the 50th anniversary of the VChK-KGB and [gratified] by the high evaluation of the work of the Chekist organs, the personnel of the organs and forces of the KGB continues to toil selflessly in fulfillment of the decisions of the Twenty-Third Party Congress, considering as their main task a further improvement of work to ensure state security.

One of the conditions for a successful resolution of this task is removal of important weaknesses in intelligence and counterintelligence work, as well as in other activities of the Committee of State Security and its local branches.

First of all, one should mention that the intelligence service of the KGB has not yet established the necessary agent access to governmental, military, intelligence and ideological centers of the enemy. Therefore it is not

possible to obtain information on the enemy's plans and designs, to inform in a timely manner the CC CPSU and Soviet government about the most important actions of imperialist states along the major lines of their foreign and domestic policies. For the same reason the intelligence service of the KGB exercises, as yet, only weak influence on the development of political events in crisis situations in the direction advantageous for the Soviet Union, and it is not always able to exploit weaknesses in the imperialist camp and contradictions among capitalist countries.

The counterintelligence service of the KGB, possessing data on the presence of an enemy agent network [*agentura*] inside the USSR, failed to achieve during the period under review any substantial results in unmasking these agents, in revealing and plugging all possible channels for leaks of state secrets. One still has to work out a system of effective countermeasures to thwart the enemy, who is using illegal means to penetrate our country. The organization of the work of the counterintelligence service needs further improvement, including broader use of active measures to spot and foil subversive plans and designs of the enemy.

The struggle with the enemy's ideological subversion is still not sufficiently capable and effective. Chekist work along these lines could not as yet be unfolded in full because of weak development of agent networks of the KGB organs in those layers of the population which might provide a good breeding ground for the acts of ideological subversion. This in part can explain the fact that the KGB organs failed to prevent in a timely manner individual anti-Soviet and anti-public manifestations, including mass disorders that took place in several cities.

One should also note that, because of insufficient quality and the not always timely manner of initial investigations and because of weaknesses in the operative-investigative work in local branches of the KGB, it failed to uncover over 50 crimes, on which the preliminary investigation had to be suspended and the culprits were not found.

In the practical work of some of the KGB organs there were examples of superficial study of persons suspected of committing state crimes. This resulted in three arrests of people without sufficiently checked materials, who then were released in the course of investigation.

The potential of counterintelligence for acting against the enemy's attempts to carry out acts of ideological subversion by encouraging politically and morally unstable persons to defect [while abroad], was weakly employed. This factor largely explains the fact that in 1967 seventeen persons stayed abroad; it also failed to prevent 3 cases of betrayal of the Motherland by servicemen of the Soviet Army.

There are a number of shortcomings in the practice of selection, appointment and education of cadres. Of special importance is the problem of preparation of officer cadres for the organs and troops of the KGB. For years there was no well-organized practical system in this field. As a

result officer personnel fell short of the required number by 7% (about 4,000), and perhaps will do so even more, when one considers increasing demand in cadres and expected retirement of officers in view of the new law of universal military conscription. Meanwhile, the existing sources of replenishment of officer cadres do not meet current demand and will not do so in the future. To this effect testifies the relative decrease, for various reasons, of the number of graduates of the educational institutions of the KGB in the new cohorts of officers (from 75% in 1966 to 51% in 1967). The task of persuading young officers to remain on service in the organs and forces of the KGB still remains problematic: recently, on the average, about 140 of them submitted resignations annually, and moreover half of this number are graduates of the educational institutions of the KGB.

The Committee of State Security and its local branches suffer from visible lack of other cadres: a certain delay in wage increases for a number of categories of the personnel of state security, particularly technical personnel, not only creates certain difficulties in their recruitment, but also affects negatively the maintenance of security in certain aspects of operational work, and also the attitude of this part of the personnel to their fulfillment of service duties.

In taking measures to remove the above-mentioned and other shortcomings, the Committee of State Security attaches particular importance to the practical solution of tasks related to reinforcement of the Chekist cadres, improvement of their selection, appointment and increasing qualification to meet the present-day requirements.

The Committee deems necessary first of all to attract the most promising workers from the periphery to the central apparatus of the KGB and the apparatus of the republican committees of state security, as part of the process of retraining and promotion. It is advisable also to send to the peripheral organs some experienced officers of the central apparatus of the KGB and the republican committees of state security, as part of the process of promotion to command positions, and to make them aware of the local working conditions. In order to increase the quality of selection and training of national (*natsional'nye*) cadres, there are plans to expand the practice of promotion of Chekists from the major national [Union] republics to positions in the central apparatus of the KGB, having in mind their preparation for subsequent employment as leading cadres in the organs of the KGB in those republics.

In resolving the tasks of qualitative improvement of cadres, particularly the directorates of intelligence, counterintelligence and investigation, the Committee of State Security acts on the assumption that these cadres should by their qualifications and Chekist acumen be able to ensure under modern conditions further upgrading of methods and means of struggle with the enemy on the basis of the newest achievements in the social science and scientific-technological spheres.

This report has been discussed and approved at a

meeting of the Collegium of the Committee of State Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY

ANDROPOV

[Source: *TsKhSD* f. 89, op. 5, d. 3, ll. 1-14. Translated by Vladislav Zubok who thanks Ray Garthoff for his kind assistance.]

**Andropov's Report to Brezhnev
on the KGB in 1967**

by Raymond L. Garthoff

Although, with a few exceptions, the archives of the KGB remain closed, a number of KGB reports in the files of the Communist Party are now available. Among the most revealing are several annual reports sent by the head of the KGB to the paramount Soviet leader, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party. The report covering the year 1960, although the text is not available, has been read and reported on in the *Bulletin*. (See the discussion of that report, together with other contemporary KGB reports, in Vladimir Zubok, "Spy vs. Spy: The KGB vs. the CIA, 1960-62," *CWIHP Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 22-33.) The annual KGB reports covering 1985, 1986, 1988 and 1989 are now also available and have been summarized and analyzed elsewhere. (See Raymond L. Garthoff, "The KGB Reports to Gorbachev," *Intelligence and National Security* 11:2 (April 1996), pp. 224-244.)

The report on the work of the KGB in 1967 is the only other such report now available. It is presented below in full translation. It was submitted by Iurii Andropov, his first annual report since becoming chairman of the KGB, to General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, on 8 May 1968. Brezhnev, in turn, had the report circulated to members of the Politburo. (Gorbachev, incidentally, did not circulate the reports he received twenty years later.) The reports on 1967 (and 1960) were more detailed than the later reports on 1985-89. In all cases, the sensitivity of the information is reflected not only in the highest classification and single-copy distribution, but also in the fact that virtually all of the specific details on numbers of recruitments, agents, hostile penetrations, and the like had been left blank in the typed version of the report and subsequently filled in by hand, so that even the KGB typist would not see them.

I will not summarize the contents since the full text is provided, but it may be useful to note some of the key

disclosures and their implications. Perhaps first of all, although not surprising, is the explicit reaffirmation at the outset that the KGB was working on the basis of Communist Party guidance and direction. In addition to routine references to the most recent Party Congress and Central Committee plenum, for 1967 this included the creation in accordance with a Central Committee decree of 17 June 1967, of a new special directorate with local branches to counter more actively "ideological diversions of the enemy," in practice, to suppress dissidence. This infamous Fifth Directorate carried on the struggle against ideological and political nonconformity until it was abolished under Gorbachev in 1989.

A substantial portion of the report deals with the concerns and activities of the KGB with respect to the situation inside the country. This no doubt reflected the concern of the political leadership as well, and of course is a reminder that the major part of the KGB was devoted to ensuring internal security. One reference in the report indirectly indicates that the total number of KGB "agents" within the USSR in 1967 was 167,000 people. The total number of KGB staff officers, in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as well as internal security, was evidently about 57,000—judging by a reference that the KGB was then 4,000 officers short, representing seven percent of the total authorized complement.

Incidentally, this report (and the others we have seen) pays a great deal of attention to statistics, rather than to qualitative assessments. Perhaps that is understandable in an annual accountability report (as indeed they were called in the 1980s). But it also reveals something of the Soviet mindset. For example, learning that the KGB had sent nearly 5,000 "informational reports" to the Central Committee (and similar numbers of reports to departments of the Central Committee, to the Foreign Ministry, to the Defense Ministry, and to the General Staff) is less interesting and important than knowing what they had learned. (Having seen a number of these KGB "informational reports," I can attest that they varied greatly in quality, competence, and value—and many look as though they were designed to meet and beat quantitative quotas.)

There are several interesting sidelights on foreign policy. The West, and in particular the United States, was of course "the main enemy." (Incidentally, Western analysts frequently state that the United States was identified as "the main enemy"; sometimes it was, but the term was also applied to the West as a whole, as in this report which refers specifically to "the USA and other countries of the main enemy.") Western efforts at subversion were taken for granted and the KGB report indicates that enough real or apparent cases were found to warrant that assumption, although it was clearly much exaggerated in scope and as an element in Western policy.

One foreign policy matter of particular concern to the KGB was the hostile activity of the People's Republic of China, the "anti-Soviet splitting activity" of which clearly referred to the then ongoing struggle within the fractured

world communist movement. The KGB also reported that in 1967 it had almost tripled its borderguard posts on the Chinese frontier. While several references were made to routine cooperation and exchanges of information with Warsaw Pact allies, it was noted that KGB cooperation with the security services of Romania was extremely limited.

The statistics on KGB interception and decoding of foreign communications is quite interesting. Although in this report the countries whose systems were compromised are not identified, the statement that the KGB was reading communications in 152 ciphers of 72 capitalist countries, and in 1967 had decoded in all 188,400 telegrams, shows the wide scale of this activity. So, too, do the reports of microphone plants at 36 installations and the stealing of 7 Western codes (as well as, apparently, "breaking" four others).

During the year, the KGB recruited in all 218 foreigners, of whom 64 were believed to have potential for operational work against the United States. In addition, in targeting possible penetration of Western intelligence services they had recruited 47 foreigners, including 8 diplomats. In attempting to neutralize and control enemy and emigre penetration of the USSR, KGB counterintelligence was conducting nine "operational games," as they called them, involving infiltration of such channels, intended for subversive or intelligence penetration of the Soviet Union. (The report says that of these 9 operational games, 4 involved U.S. intelligence, 8 the Russian emigre organization NTS, and 2 Ukrainian nationalist emigres. Although there could have been an overlap, as U.S. intelligence did have ties to the NTS, more likely the person writing in the numbers by hand made a mistake and wrote "8" instead of "3" for the NTS; if that was the case, the numbers total nine.)

The KGB also reported on the successes of its counterintelligence in unmasking Soviet traitors who were found to have passed secret information to the enemy, naming three cases and referring to others in various categories (34 tried for "treason and attempted treason," three attempting to sneak out of the country, and one for espionage). Nonetheless, despite all its statistics on successes, in an admission of shortcomings toward the conclusion of the report, it was said that despite "possessing data on the presence of an enemy agent network (*agentura*) inside the USSR" KGB counterintelligence had "failed to achieve during the period under review any substantial results in unmasking these agents." Moreover, "the struggle with the enemy's ideological subversion is still not sufficiently capable and effective," in part because of "weak development of agent networks of the KGB organs in those layers of the population which might provide a good breeding ground for acts of ideological subversion." And this notwithstanding 167,000 KGB agents!

Similarly, in its foreign intelligence work the KGB had "not yet established the necessary agent access in

government, military, intelligence and ideological centers of the enemy," and as a result could not "obtain information on the enemy's plans and designs" or influence the development of events in crisis situations to the advantage of the Soviet Union or to exploit contradictions in the enemy camp.

The report, then, while reviewing in some statistical detail the accomplishments of the KGB in its foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and internal security functions, still had to acknowledge considerable shortcomings. We do not have subsequent annual reports by Andropov over his long incumbency as chairman of the KGB for comparison, but it seems likely that they too would have described the large-scale efforts, and cited extensive accomplishments, but would still have had to acknowledge incomplete success.

The report on the work of the KGB in 1967 in any case provides a window not only into the Soviet security and intelligence services, but more broadly into the Soviet political world of that day. The flavor and general impression that the report provides can, of course, best be appreciated by reading the full text.

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Annual Report of the KGB to Leonid Brezhnev on its Operations for 1967

by Amy Knight

This document, submitted to Brezhnev in May 1968 by KGB Chairman Iurii Andropov, is one of five annual KGB reports now available from the former Central Committee archives, the others being reports for the years 1985, 1986, 1988 and 1989. As Raymond Garthoff pointed out in his analysis of the four reports for the 1980s, these materials provide unique insights into the activities of the KGB at home and abroad, as well as new perspectives on its relationship to the party leadership.¹

1967 was a key year for the KGB, in large part because of the appointment of Andropov to the chairmanship in May. Widely considered to be a "party man" because of his years of service in the Central Committee Secretariat overseeing relations with socialist states, Andropov was made a candidate member of the Politburo in June 1967. His expertise in foreign affairs (he had served as ambassador to Hungary in the 1950s before moving to the Central Committee) and the fact that he was not linked to any faction or coalition within the party leadership conferred a new legitimacy and professionalism upon the KGB.

This did not mean, however, that Andropov would attempt to reform the KGB in a liberal direction. By 1967 Brezhnev had consolidated much of his power as party leader and was able to implement his program of re-Stalinization without obstacles. A harsh crackdown on dissent and curbs on cultural freedom at home were accompanied by an increasingly aggressive and anti-Western foreign policy, all of which were implemented effectively by Andropov in 1967.

The report reveals that, just a month after Andropov became KGB chairman, a new directorate, the Fifth Directorate, was created within the KGB, with divisions and departments in the KGB's local branches. This Directorate, charged with struggling against "ideological subversion," carried out a ruthless campaign of repression against political, ethnic and religious dissent for the next twenty years. The statistics presented in this document confirm that the KGB was devoting significant resources to suppressing any manifestations of discontent within the Soviet system. In 1967 the KGB not only arrested and charged 96 citizens with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, it also searched 2,293 persons and shadowed 6,747. In addition, over 12,000 individuals were subjected to so-called prophylactic treatment, which means the KGB called them in for a "chat" and threatened them with severe sanctions if they manifested any anti-Soviet tendencies.

Because the Soviet regime considered internal security problems to be inspired by foreign subversion, a crackdown domestically usually went hand in hand with increased suspicion of and hostility toward the West. The document claims that in 1967 the KGB identified over 270 foreigners in Russia with links to western intelligence services and uncovered 22 double agents. The KGB also carried out an active program of foreign intelligence-gathering, strengthening its agent network in the United States and other enemy countries by recruiting 218 foreigners, 64 of whom possessed "operational capacities for work against the USA." The KGB also obtained the codes of seven capitalist countries and had intercepted coded messages from 2,002 radio transmitters from 115 countries. On the basis of its intelligence-gathering abroad, the KGB sent over 4,000 informational reports to the party's Central Committee and several thousand reports to various ministries.

In addition to providing the party leadership with information about the KGB's accomplishments, the 1967 report also contains the requisite "self-criticism." There were, it seems, three arrests without sufficient justification, and several Soviet citizens did not return from abroad, which was considered treason. The biggest problem, according to the report, was in recruitment. The KGB's officer corps fell significantly short of the required numbers, and greater attention was required, it seems, to attract and train qualified personnel.

The 1967 annual report offers concrete evidence, often in terms of numbers, that the KGB was engaged in a

massive program of intelligence collection and "active measures" abroad, along with a rigorous campaign against internal dissent. As the report suggests, the party leadership, which had the ultimate authority over the KGB, was the inspiration for these policies.

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¹ See Raymond L. Garthoff, "The KGB Reports to Gorbachev," *Intelligence and National Security* 11:2 (April 1996), pp. 224-244.

Memorandum from the KGB Regarding the Planning of a Demonstration in Memory of John Lennon

20 December 1980. Confidential.
To the Central Committee.

The KGB has learned that in many of Moscow's establishments of higher education ([Moscow State] University, Institute of History and Archives, Radiotechnical Institute...) anonymous posters have appeared calling for all interested persons to take part on 21 December at 11:00, on the esplanade of the university, in a demonstration organized in memory of the English singer, John Lennon, composer and founder of the "Beatles." The tragic disappearance [murder] of the singer was announced in a number of major newspapers (*Komsomolskaia Pravda, Sovetskaia Rossiia, Moskovskii Komsomolets*), as well as on major television broadcasts.

The KGB has taken the necessary measures to identify the instigators of this gathering and is in control of the situation. The management of the cited establishments is cooperating in the prevention of all participation by their students in this unauthorized meeting

Communicated for informational purposes only.

KGB Chairman

Iu. V. Andropov

[Source: *TsKhSD, f.5, op.77, d.994, l.164* obtained by Gael Moullec and translated by Christa Sheehan Matthew.]

A NKVD/NKGB Report to Stalin: A Glimpse into Soviet Intelligence in the United States in the 1940s

by *Vladimir Pozniakov*

The Soviet intelligence community, comprising the NKVD/NKGB First Chief Directorate (FCD),¹ the Fourth Department of the Red Army General Staff (later called the GRU), the Communist International's Division of International Communications (DIC), and the Intelligence Department of the People's Commissariat of the Navy, had built a number of formidable networks abroad by the outset of World War Two. Working separately and coordinated by I.V. Stalin himself, they were severely decimated during the Great Terror² but still managed to supply the Soviet political leadership with all kinds of information to counter the Axis.³ The majority of these networks, aside from notable exceptions such as the Sorge ring in Tokyo, Rote Kapelle centered on Germany⁴ and the Sandor Rado group in Switzerland,⁵ survived the war. A November 1944 joint report sent to Stalin by L.P. Beria and V.N. Merkulov gives a clear indication of the scale of NKVD/NKGB activities abroad, particularly in the United States.

Moscow

The State Defense Committee

To: Comrade Stalin I.V.

During the period of the Patriotic War employees of the 1st (intelligence) directorate, NKVD/NKGB undertook substantial work in organizing intelligence networks abroad and in obtaining political, economic, technical and military information.

During this period 566 officers have been sent abroad for illegal work, 1,240 agents and informers have been recruited, 41,718 various items including many documents have been obtained by intelligence. Out of 1,167 documents obtained by technical intelligence, 616 have been used by our country's industries!

Attaching herewith a draft for a USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree, we request that the most distinguished employees of the 1st (intelligence) directorate, NKVD/NKGB, USSR, mostly those who have served and do serve abroad, be decorated with orders of the Soviet Union.

Appendix: according to attached text.

November 4, 1944
No. 1186

L.P. Beria
People's Commissar
Of Interior, USSR

1st copy

V.N. Merkulov
People's Commissar of State Security, USSR

Unfortunately, the appendix mentioned above—the so

called "award list"—is still classified and can not be reproduced here. It contains names of officers who in the opinion of Beria and Merkulov deserved medals for "successful realization of tasks safeguarding state security during the period of the Patriotic War" in ways that might interest an international audience.⁶ The list reflects the growing importance of Soviet intelligence activities in the United States from the pre-war to wartime to the post-war period.⁷

Before the war, the United States was at the periphery of Soviet intelligence's main interests, especially regarding military intelligence. In late May 1934, in setting the tasks for Soviet military intelligence (then called the Fourth Directorate of the Red Army), the Politburo made a decision to focus intelligence activities primarily on Europe and the Far East. The decision of the Politburo read: "The center of gravity of military intelligence's work is to be transferred to Poland, Germany, Finland, Romania, England, Japan, Manchuria and China. Any studies of other states' armed forces are to be undertaken by legal means by official military representatives [military attaches], visitors and trainees, examiners of military equipment, etc."⁸ Thus, the principal efforts of the NKVD/NKGB New York and Washington rezidenturas [intelligence mission] as well as those of the GRU and DIC were focused on the collection of economic, scientific and industrial information.⁹ At least four out of the eight officers mentioned in the appendix were occupied with such matters, with heavy emphasis on information related to radio and electronic equipment, weapons, military aircraft construction, shipbuilding, chemical technology, etc.¹⁰

World War Two brought a dramatic rise in the United States' standing in Soviet political, and especially military, priorities,¹¹ including a number of important mission changes for Soviet intelligence in America. According to A. Feklisov's memoirs, these tasks were stated by Stalin to Vasilii Zarubin as follows: "...to watch Churchill and Roosevelt and to learn whether they are going to reach a separate peace agreement with Hitler and then go to war against the Soviet Union together; to obtain Hitler's plans of war against the USSR which the Allies might possess; to learn any secret goals and plans of the Allies related to the war; to find out when exactly the Allies are going to open the second front in Europe; to obtain information on the newest secret military equipment designed and produced in the USA, England and Canada." According to the instruction received by the FCD rezident in the United States, Stalin had also requested any information related to the "Allies' secret plans on postwar global settlement."¹²

The broader spectrum of tasks facing Soviet intelligence in the US required additional personnel, both Soviet and local. The pre-war staff of the NKGB and GRU rezidenturas was rather modest. For example, in the New York consulate and in Amtorg there were only 13 intelligence officers, most of them well known to the FBI.¹³ Also, because the USSR and the US had become wartime

allies, both branches of Soviet intelligence had to limit their usage of the clandestine structures of the American Communist Party (CPUSA).¹⁴ The usage of local Communists was also limited by two other reasons: many of them were well known to the FBI, while many others were drafted after Pearl Harbor by the US Army and Navy¹⁵ or interned, as had happened to a number of CPUSA members of Japanese extraction on the West Coast.¹⁶

The lack of trained personnel in 1941 and early 1942 was soon supplemented by the growing flow of Soviet military and civilian specialists coming to the United States to work in the Soviet Purchasing Commission (SPC) and other agencies that mushroomed after the USSR became a part of the Lend-Lease program. According to Feklisov, by 1944 the staff of Amtorg and the SPC in New York City alone reached some 2,500, with an equal number of officials, engineers and other specialists serving at the SPC branch in Washington, DC.¹⁷ The majority of these people worked directly or indirectly either for the GRU or NKVD.¹⁸ Also, the limitations imposed on the usage of the CPUSA membership did not mean that Soviet intelligence ceased recruiting both Americans and non-Americans in America.¹⁹ And though the actual number of agents and informers recruited by Soviet intelligence officers in the United States will probably never be known, according to British estimates, out of 1,200 cryptonyms that “littered the traffic” of the New York/Moscow and Washington/Moscow channels of the FCD and GRU communications, “more than 800 were assessed as recruited Soviet agents.”²⁰

The first name mentioned in the appendix was that of Lieutenant Colonel Iskhak A. Akhmerov, the NKGB illegal rezident [chief of intelligence mission] in the United States during the prewar period. In 1940 he returned to Moscow for a short tenure in the American division of the 5th Department of the NKGB (the FCD since 1941) only to be sent back in 1942 to Washington, DC as the head of an illegal sub-rezidentura.²¹ A Volga Tartar by origin, he spoke English better than Russian and was married to an American who worked along with him in the United States both before and during the war. Throughout his second stay in the US, he ran a number of agents supplying Soviet intelligence with a large amount of extremely valuable political, military and scientific-technical information.²²

The next high ranking officer recommended for decoration with the Red Banner Medal, number five on the list, was NKGB Commissar III (roughly equal to the army rank of Major General) Gaik B. Ovakimyan,²³ a veteran of Soviet intelligence in America, operating there since 1932. Working under the cover of an Amtorg official and nick-named by the Federal Bureau of Investigation “the wily Armenian,” he controlled in 1933-1941 a vast network of agents scattered not only throughout the United States, but also as far afield as Mexico and Canada. His name first cropped up in the 1930s in conjunction with an

extensive industrial espionage operation tied to a certain Armand Feldman.²⁴ He also laid the foundation for a network later used by Moscow “Center” to penetrate the American nuclear program by recruiting a number of its important agents, including Harry Gold, who was approached in 1935 through Thomas L. Black and in the late 1940s became a key member of the Klaus Fuchs-David Greenglass spy ring.²⁵ Ovakimyan was caught red-handed by the FBI in April 1941 while contacting one of his agents who, according to the memoirs of another FCD officer, Aleksandr S. Feklisov, was a plant.²⁶ In July, Ovakimyan was exchanged for a number of Americans detained in Russia.²⁷ He was replaced in the New York City rezidentura temporarily by his deputy Pavel P. Pastel’nyak and then by Vasilii Zarubin who headed both the NYC and Washington, DC branches of the NKGB American networks until late 1944.²⁸

Several other names mentioned in the appendix should also be familiar: NKGB Major Stepan Z. Apresyan, who in 1944 replaced Vasilii Zarubin as the Soviet rezident in Washington, and Major Leonid R. Kvasnikov, deputy rezident in NYC and the chief of scientific and technical intelligence in the United States. Captain Semion M. Semenov is there, the other “Amtorg official” who played an important part in sci/tech intelligence and later, in 1944-1947, played a crucial role in Soviet atomic espionage in the United States. Lieut. Col. Grigory G. Dolbin is also listed, since 1946 the NKGB (MGB) rezident in Washington, DC. Among the younger generation of FCD officers mentioned in the appendix were Captain Alexander S. Feklisov of the NYC network, who in 1947-1949 ran Klaus Fuchs in Britain and in 1960-1964 became the KGB rezident in Washington, DC, and Senior (First) Lieut. Constantin A. Chugunov, also in the NYC FCD group.²⁹

Among those Americans who (in the NKGB parlance) helped Soviet spymasters were the names of several Red Star medal nominees. These included: 1) Elizabeth T. Bentley, a liaison agent assigned by her Soviet controller (along with Joseph Katz) to collect information from some of the Washington rings, 2) Harry Gold, a courier for Klaus Fuchs, and 3) George Silvermaster (an apparent NKGB typist misprint [Ed note: Or tongue-in-cheek alias]), a top official of the Department of the Treasury and one of the most successful and productive Soviet agents. By Pearl Harbor he had gathered together “a group of ten government officials working in Washington” in various branches of the Roosevelt administration.³⁰

The results appear to be impressive. Tons of “diplomatic” mail was being sent home monthly by the Soviet embassy in the US.³¹ Hundreds of NKGB informants provided a wide range of information, with scientific-technical secrets in the forefront. With the release of further intelligence documents, the structure and importance of Soviet espionage efforts in the US will become clearer. For now, the available documentation can only sketch some outlines and whet the appetite.

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¹ Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs), and Narodnyi Komissariat Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (People's Commissariat of State Security) are the predecessors of the KGB.

² In early 1937 the NKVD/NKGB Chief N.I. Ezhov sent a special agent (code name "Journalist") to the US and Britain to investigate supposed penetration of the US and British Communist Parties' apparatus by the Trotskyites as well as by the FBI and MI5. Though the investigation was focused on "Trotskyist functionaries and their entourage" it led to accusations that a number of Soviet illegals working within the underground structures of the CPUSA and British Communist Party had ties to Trotsky and his followers.—see: Minaev (NKGB Deputy Chief) to Dimitrov (Comintern Secretary General) 23 April 1937—Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Contemporary History Documents (RTsKhIDNI), Moscow, f. 495 (Communist International), op. 74 (G. Dimitrov's Secretariat), d. 465, ll. 1-4. Soon after this mission, many Soviet residents and agents abroad were charged with being a part of a Trotskyist conspiracy. They were summoned to Moscow for execution. Among them were such outstanding intelligence officers as Theodor Maly, Ignace Poretzkii (aka Reiss), Walter Krivitskii and Alexander Orlov. Krivitskii defected and Poretzky refused to return and was subsequently killed in Switzerland. For details see: E. Pretsky, *Our Own People*. (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1969), pp. 214-216, 231; A.Orlov, *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes*. (New York, 1953), pp. 231; B.Starkov, "The Tragedy of Soviet Military Intelligence" in V. Krivitsky, *I Was Stalin's Agent*. (Moscow, 1991), pp. 39-52 (in Russian); J. Costello, O. Tsarev, *The Deadly Illusion*. (New York, 1993), pp. 293-314, 315-340.

³ More generally on information provided by Soviet intelligence throughout WWII see: V.A. Novobranets, "Memuary," *Znamia* (June 1990), pp. 165-192; P. Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*. (Boston, 1994), pp. 116-120, 126-171, 172-220; A. Foote, *Handbook for Spies*. (London, 1964), pp. 88-99, 118-125; L. Trepper, *The Great Game*. (New York, 1989), pp. 126, 136-137, 140-197; S. Rado, *Codename Dora*. (London, 1990), pp. 53-59, 61-114, 130-151, 196-211; Christopher Andrew and O. Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev*. (New York, 1991), pp. 270-279, 305-311, 312-340.

⁴ For details see: C. Willoughby, *Shanghai Conspiracy*.; G. Prange et al., *Target Tokyo: The Story of the Sorge Spy Ring*. (New York, 1985); Trepper, especially pp. 96-329; D. Dallin, *Soviet Espionage*. (New Haven, 1955), pp. 234-272.

⁵ See: Foote, pp. 37-148; Dallin, pp. 182-233.

⁶ State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), f. 9401 (Stalin and Molotov Special Files), op. 2, d. 67, l. 275.

⁷ Ed. Note: The evaluation of intelligence's historical role is problematic. The case of atom spying will serve to illustrate, since the procurement of an industrial method or bomb design represents an idea that might take a Russian scientist but a moment to have. It is also possible that the crucial moment might not come for years. Furthermore, since the Venona project had cracked the Soviet radio code, most of this information was available to the enemy.

⁸ Minutes of Politburo Decisions, No. 7, paragraph 229/213, 25 May 1934—RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 16, l. 65. One can probably assume that NKVD/NKGB priorities were basically the same.

⁹ Dallin, pp. 396-414; Andrew and Gordievsky, pp. 226, 228-229, 279.

¹⁰ A. Feklisov, *Beyond the Ocean and On the Island*. (Moscow, 1994), pp. 55-58, 77-78, 81-107.

¹¹ Circumstantial evidence of this shift was reflected in the list of salaries set by Politburo decision for Soviet diplomats posted abroad. According to this "Table of Ranks" the United States was listed second, right after Germany. Britain, Japan and China followed.

¹² Feklisov, pp. 51-52.

¹³ Feklisov, pp. 50, 60-63. [Ed. note: Amtorg was the Soviet organization responsible for trade with America.]

¹⁴ Sudoplatov, pp. 186-187. [Ed. note: The Comintern, previously the main conduit to the American party, was disbanded in 1943.]

¹⁵ Sudoplatov, p. 187; also, see: Information from "Brother" and "Son" (codenames of Rudy Baker and of an unidentified American Communist functionary) to Georgii Dimitrov, Approx. Jan. 1943. Photocopy of the original typewritten report in English—RTsKhIDNI, f. 495, op. 74, d. 480, ll. 1-4. On R. Baker see also: *The Secret World of American Communism*. Ed. by Klehr, Haynes, and Firsov. (New Haven, 1995), pp. 205-216.

¹⁶ Information from "Brother" and "Son" for G. Dimitrov, ca. Jan. 1943—*ibid.*, ll. 3-4.

¹⁷ Feklisov, p. 32; V. Kravchenko, *I Choose Freedom*. (Garden City, 1945), p. 465.

¹⁸ Feklisov, pp. 100-101; Kravchenko, pp. 445, 461, 465; Dallin, pp. 428-432.

¹⁹ Feklisov, pp. 65-105; M. Vorontsov, Capt. 1st rank, Chief Navy Main Staff, Intelligence Directorate, and Petrov, Military Commissar, NMS, ID to G. Dimitrov, 15 August 1942, No. 49253ss, typewritten original; G. Dimitrov to Pavel M. Fitin, 20 November 1942, No. 663, t/w copy; P. M. Fitin to G. Dimitrov, 14 July 1944, No. 1/3/10987, t/w copy; P. M. Fitin to G. Dimitrov, 29 September 1944, No. 1/3/16895, t/w copy. All these documents are NMS ID and FCD Chiefs' requests for information related to Americans and naturalized American citizens working in various US Government agencies and private corporations, some of whom had been CPUSA members. The last two are related to a certain Donald Wheeler (an OSS official), Charles Floto or Flato (who in 1943 worked for the "...Dept. of Economic Warfare"), and Harry Magdoff (War Production Board)—the request dated 29 Sept. 1944—and to Judith Coplon who according to the FCD information worked for the Dept. of Justice.—RTsKhIDNI, f. 495, op. 74, d. 478, l. 7; d. 484, l. 34; d. 485, l. 10, 14, 17, 31, 44.

²⁰ P. Wright, *Spy Catcher*. (New York, 1987), p. 182. This is close to the NKVD/NKGB statistics cited above in the Beriia/Merkulov document.

²¹ GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 67, l. 276.

²² Feklisov, pp. 14, 106.

²³ GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 67, l. 276.

²⁴ Lamphere R.J., Shachtman T. *The FBI-KGB War. A Special Agent's Story*. (New York, 1986), pp. 25-26.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 164-165, 167-177.

²⁶ Feklisov, pp. 23, 51.

²⁷ Lamphere and Shachtman, pp. 25-26; Feklisov, p. 51.

²⁸ Feklisov, pp. 23, 51-53.

²⁹ GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 67, l. 281. On Feklisov's role in atomic espionage see: Feklisov, pp. 154-163. On Klaus Fuchs see also: R. Williams, *Klaus Fuchs, Atom Spy*. (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), pp. 100-101; Sudoplatov, pp. 200-210, 212-220.

³⁰ GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 67, l. 278.

³¹ Dallin, pp.436-7.

The Pitsunda Decision: Khrushchev and Nuclear Weapons

By Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali

Nikita Khrushchev has left us with tantalizing clues with which to solve one of the essential mysteries of the Cold War: were the Soviets ever close to using nuclear weapons? Two documents photocopied by General Dmitrii Volkogonov from the Defense Ministry files in Moscow and now available at the Library of Congress (where they were located and obtained for CWIHP by Vladislav M. Zubok, James G. Hershberg, and David Wolff) shed additional light on what we described in our book, *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (WW Norton and John Murray, 1997), as the Pitsunda decision.¹

On the face of it, these two Defense Ministry documents do not appear that startling. The first discusses the movement of tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba. The second lists all of the components of Operation ANADYR. But it is the dates of these documents, 6 September and 8 September, respectively, that arguably make them more revelatory about Khrushchev's understanding of nuclear weapons than any other documents currently available from Russian archives. As has been known for some time, Khrushchev decided to send ballistic missiles to Cuba in May 1962. Since the Havana conference organized by James Blight, David Welch and Brown University in January 1992,² we have known that the Kremlin included tactical nuclear weapons along with the ballistic weapons. But Khrushchev's personal role in adding the tactical weapons, which, unlike the SS-4s (R-12) and SS-5s (R-14), were not primarily weapons of deterrence, was not known. Moreover, it was assumed by some scholars that the Defense Ministry simply added these weapons as a matter of course to the large shipment.

Historians naturally look for turning points, when actions of human beings or a timely gust of *force majeure* shifted or could have shifted subsequent events. September 1962, as these documents attest, belongs in the pantheon of Cold War turning points. The planners of the original version of Operation ANADYR, and Khrushchev himself, assumed that the United States would not try to invade Cuba in 1962. Soviet intelligence detected increased US planning, without creating any basis for belief that an attack would come that year. The single most important piece of information in shaping Khrushchev's understanding of the threat to Soviet interests in the Western Hemisphere seems to have come from President Kennedy himself. At a meeting with Khrushchev's son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei on 30 January 1962, Kennedy promised the Kremlin that he expected to be able to treat Cuba as Khrushchev had handled Hungary in 1956. Neither the KGB nor the GRU could detect a timetable for aggression, but Khrushchev understood that Kennedy was as unwilling to accept a challenge to the US

sphere of influence in the Caribbean as the Soviets had been to theirs in Eastern Europe.

From May 1962 to September 1962, the Kremlin mounted an operation to create a deterrent to US aggression in Cuba. "The thing is we were not going to unleash war," Khrushchev later explained to his Kremlin colleagues when the operation began to unravel in

October, "[w]e just wanted to intimidate them, to deter the anti-Cuban forces."³ The operation was cloaked in secrecy because the Kremlin assumed that Kennedy would only accept a deterrent if presented as a *fait accompli*.

From the very beginning, the Kremlin was aware that the plan had a glaring flaw. As of spring 1962, Soviet intelligence and presumably the Communist Party leadership knew that Washington regularly flew U-2 reconnaissance missions over Cuba. Yet Khrushchev apparently only began to worry about the effect these flights would have on the secrecy of the operation in July, two months after the plan was adopted. He decided at that point that SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, which were credited with shooting down Gary Powers' U-2 in May 1960, would be erected around the island before the strategic missiles arrived. Up to that point, no priority had been assigned to these weapons. Later, American analysts, chiefly CIA Director John McCone, would "deduce" the existence of nuclear missiles in Cuba from the elaborate SA-2 net arrayed around the island. Until July 1962, however, the Kremlin had not considered the SA-2s as a possible shield to ward off U-2 spying.

By September 1962, Khrushchev had successfully willed himself to believe that the operation would remain secret and, even if it did not, that Kennedy would somehow swallow the deployment without incident. Then an event in Washington roiled these assumptions, triggering a dramatic reassessment by Khrushchev of ANADYR. On September 4, in an effort primarily to quell domestic criticisms of his Cuba policy, John F. Kennedy had his press secretary, Pierre Salinger, read a statement that "[t]he gravest issues would arise" if the Soviets sent organized combat troops, offensive ground-to-ground missiles or anything else with "significant offensive capability" to the island.⁴ This was the signal that Khrushchev had dreaded. There had been some information from the Cubans in August that suggested the Americans knew the missiles

were going to the island. In Khrushchev's mind, it appears, the Kennedy statement was Washington's way of signaling that it knew about ANADYR and was planning to do something about it.

Khrushchev had a chance to stop the operation. As of September 5, when he learned of Kennedy's statement, there were no missiles or nuclear warheads in Cuba. As he would do on October 25, he could have terminated the deployment. But he didn't. As these two "Pitsunda" documents show, Khrushchev not only decided to stay the course, but his reaction to Kennedy's effort to deter the deployment of missiles was to ratchet up the incipient crisis by introducing tactical nuclear weapons into the picture.

Pitsunda was the location of Khrushchev's dacha on the Black Sea. As his daughter Rada Adzhubei recalls, Khrushchev ordered this dacha to be built after he discovered that his rival Georgii Malenkov had a similar one down the road.⁵ It was here that foreign leaders caught a glimpse of the famous Khrushchev pool and the rotund Khrushchev posed in his inflatable rubber ring. As he did every summer, Khrushchev had left Moscow in August and was carrying on the affairs of state by his pool when the news from Washington arrived.

The first thing that needs to be said about the two Volkogonov documents evidently sent to Khrushchev at Pitsunda is that they were handwritten. So obsessive was Soviet security that the marshals and generals at the Defense Ministry, who did not themselves know how to type, did not trust their own secretaries to prepare these documents on nuclear deployments.

The first document, which is a report to Khrushchev from Defense Minister Marshal Rodion Malinovskii, makes plain that Khrushchev had asked his armed forces for a crash program to save Cuba. The US military might be preparing to move against Cuba in the next few days or weeks and as of September 5, the Soviet Union was in no position to save Castro. According to the schedule of deployments approved in July, the medium-range missiles would not be operational until mid-October, and the intermediate range missiles would not be ready until even later, at least the end of November. Since abandoning Cuba was not an option that Khrushchev would consider at that time, the Soviet leader reached for a dramatic stopgap measure. He needed weapons that were small enough that they could be rushed to Cuba in a matter of days, but powerful enough to stop a US amphibious landing. In 1962, only tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons could meet both criteria. With this in mind, Khrushchev asked his defense minister Rodion Malinovskii whether tactical nuclear weapons could be flown to Cuba immediately.

In this report, Malinovskii explained that the short-range Luna missiles, with their nuclear warheads, and the newest nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, the "R-11m" could go by plane.⁶ Although the operation was feasible, the Defense Ministry discouraged rushing the tactical weapons

to Cuba by airplane. Either the generals did not share Khrushchev's anxiety or the risk of flying nuclear weapons was too great. In light of these concerns, the Ministry recommended to Khrushchev that one squadron of Il-28 light bombers, with six 8-12 kiloton nuclear bombs, be shipped in crates. The Soviet Defense Ministry also recommended sending an R-11m missile brigade and between two and three divisions of Luna missiles.⁷ In terms of the timing of these reinforcements, the Ministry suggested sending the missiles and the bombers in the first half of October. The warheads would go separately on board the ship *Indigirka*, which was already supposed to take 45 warheads for the medium range ballistic missiles, and would be leaving the Soviet Union on September 15.

Because Khrushchev annotated the report in his own hand, we can see Khrushchev's extraordinary response to the Defense Ministry. On 7 September 1962, he chose to put the maximum reliance on nuclear weapons. The document bears his signature where that day he personally authorized the sending of 6 atomic bombs for the Il-28s and where he asked for Luna missiles. The Ministry had suggested two or three detachments, with 8-12 missiles. Khrushchev, betraying his concerns and his belief in the value of battlefield nuclear weapons, chose the higher figure. Khrushchev, however, decided not to send a regiment of R-11m cruise missiles.

Khrushchev understood the importance of the decision he had just made and took pains to maintain direct control of these special weapons. The day after Khrushchev authorized the new shipment, the Defense Ministry drafted an order permitting the Soviet Commander in Cuba, General Issa Pliiev, to use these battlefield nuclear weapons in the event that communications to Moscow were cut and a US-led invasion had begun. The order required two signatures. Malinovskii's deputy, Marshal Zakharov, signed in his capacity as Army Chief of Staff, but Malinovskii did not. Malinovskii was Khrushchev's man, selected to replace the independent-minded Marshal Georgii Zhukov in 1957. [Ed. Note: On Zhukov's replacement, see Mark Kramer's essay in the "Plenums" section of this *Bulletin*.] Since Khrushchev did not want to lose control over the decision to use nuclear weapons, the document would sit unsigned in the files until events in Cuba warranted a change.

The second document, also classified the equivalent of "eyes only" for Khrushchev and dated 8 September, reflected the Soviet leader's new concerns in September 1962, too. A revised operation plan for ANADYR, it stresses two very significant points:

- a) That the mission of ANADYR was to defend Cuba
- b) That the use of nuclear weapons can only be authorized by a direct order from Moscow (*po signalu iz Moskvy*). Khrushchev is clearly girding himself for a limited war in Cuba, something he had perhaps not really contemplated before. To be able to defend the island, he might have to use nuclear weapons; but he wished to retain final control over that momentous decision. This second

document should dispel any remaining doubt that the Soviet commander in Cuba, General Pliev, was *not* given oral authorization to use the tactical nuclear missiles.

The other principal rationale for ANADYR, improving Moscow's position in the strategic balance, is not completely absent from the new operational plan. But it is indirectly expressed. As part of this new version of Operation ANADYR, Khrushchev approved an order that equipped Soviet submarines with nuclear-tipped torpedoes and instructed them to be prepared, upon receipt of an additional order from Moscow, to launch nuclear torpedo attacks on US coastal targets. A list of these targets was appended to this mission statement. It is inconceivable that Khrushchev would have envisioned making nuclear strikes on the US coastline as a means of retaliating for a US strike on Cuba. Certainly, these coastal attacks were designed only to play a part in a general US-Soviet war.

Khrushchev read and approved the revised plan as he did the new tactical deployments. Although the formal date on the document is 8 September, it bears Khrushchev's signature and the marking 9.7.62 (7 September 1962). Khrushchev was shown this reworked plan in Pitsunda at the same time he formally selected which additional means would be deployed to defend Cuba (Document 1).

Khrushchev's embrace of a nuclear warfighting strategy in September 1962 has widespread implications for understanding the Cold War. Few would have predicted that in response to a US challenge to Cuba that Moscow would put tactical weapons in harm's way. There is no evidence, and there is unlikely to be any, that Khrushchev intended to announce the existence of the Lunas, the FKR cruise missiles and the nuclear payloads for the IL-28s as he was planning to do in the case of the ballistic missiles. The conclusion is inescapable that Khrushchev sent the tactical weapons to Cuba for use in battle, not as a deterrent. In addition, there is much to learn from the celerity with which Khrushchev made this decision about the Soviet Union's willingness to use nuclear weapons. There is no evidence that Malinovskii or the Defense Ministry provided Khrushchev with any military assessment of the implications of placing tactical weapons in Cuba.⁸ This was not included with the report for Khrushchev. The sequence of events happened too fast. It seems we must come to the conclusion that Moscow placed tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield without any analysis of the threshold between limited and general nuclear war.

The timing of Khrushchev's decision also has interesting implications for students of US foreign policy. Kennedy designed his statement of 4 September for dual-purpose deterrence. He hoped to deter Khrushchev from placing missiles on Cuba—an unlikely event—while deterring (or placating) domestic critics with a stern statement. Now we can say with confidence that Kennedy's maneuver had the opposite effect from what he

had intended. Instead of deterring Khrushchev, Kennedy provoked him to take a greater risk of nuclearizing the superpower conflict over Cuba. The presence of tactical nuclear weapons, which the Soviet leadership intended to use, increased the danger of nuclear war far more than the presence of ballistic missiles, which Khrushchev had always understood to be a deterrent.

What should one make of this? In brief, as we demonstrated in *One Hell of a Gamble*, the Soviet Union in 1962 was both an insecure and a risk-taking power. These two characteristics are the equivalents in international politics of dry wood and gasoline. All that was needed was a spark to set off a conflagration. In his "Long Telegram" of 1946, the father of containment theory, George F. Kennan, argued that Soviet leaders were insecure but unlike Adolf Hitler, they were risk-averse.⁹ Paul Nitze, in NSC-68, suggested that the Kremlin was self-confident and prepared to take reasonable risks for world domination. But, as high-level materials from the Cuban crisis make clear, the Soviet Union did not consider itself equal to the United States, or as Khrushchev put it so colorfully, "a member of the World Club": yet Khrushchev was prepared to risk the battlefield use of nuclear weapons to defend his interests in the Caribbean. It is no wonder that Washington proved incapable of predicting Khrushchev's behavior in the summer of 1962.

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¹ Ed. Note. Discussed on pp. 206-212 of *One Hell of a Gamble*.

² Ed. Note: For a description of the Havana Conference and an account of the discussions among the participants, see CWHIP *Bulletin* 1, 2-4.

³ "Kratkie zametki o zasedaniakh Prezidiuma TsK KPSS" [Brief notes on the sessions of the Presidium of the CC of the CPSU], Protocol 60, 22 October 1962, Archives of the President of the Russian Federation.

⁴ "President Kennedy's Statement on Soviet Military Shipments to Cuba," 4 September 1962, *New York Times*, 5 September 1962.

⁵ Interview with Rada Khrushchev Adzhubei, 5 January 1995.

⁶ For technical reasons, only two aircraft in the Soviet Air Force, the AN-8 and AN-12, were capable of transporting the missiles and the warheads. The workhorse of the Soviet air force, the larger Ilyushin 114, had the necessary range, 8,000 kilometers, but lacked a cargo opening large enough to move the nuclear weapons and the missiles onto the plane intact. The Defense Ministry calculated that the smaller AN-8 and AN-12 could each carry 2 Lunas and one R-11m. Because these planes were smaller than the IL-114, there would be no room for any additional equipment or the personnel to operate the missiles.

⁷ An R-11m brigade comprised three divisions, 18 missiles, and a support crew of 324. A Luna division would have two missile launchers and 102 people.

⁸ We did not find any in the Cuba files at the APRF; and Volkogonov apparently did not find any in the files he consulted at the Defense Ministry archives.

⁹ Ed. Note: The "Long Telegram" can be found in *Foreign Relations of the United States* 1946, Vol. 6, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, pp. 696-709; NSC-68 is in the same series, 1950, Vol. 1, pp. 238ff.

Top Secret (Sovershenno sekretno)
Particularly Important (Osoboi vazhnosti)
Sole Copy (ekz. edinstven.)

**To the Chairman of the Defense Council of the USSR,
 Comrade N. S. Khrushchev**

I am reporting (dokladivaiu)

I. About the possibility of strengthening Cuba by airplane

1. [Numeration follows the original] About the transport by plane of special battle parts (spetsial'nye boevye chasti) [Trans. note: atomic warheads] for the Luna and R-11M rockets.

Training tests have been conducted and practical instructions have been worked out for the transportation of the special battle parts for R-11M rockets on board AN-8 aircraft for two [rockets] and AN-12 for four.

The transport of battle parts for the Luna rocket is practically analogous to that for the R-11M. The transport of special battle parts by TU-114 is not possible for lack of a freight hatch and fasteners.

2. About the transport by plane of R-11M and Luna rockets

The loading, fastening and transport of training R-11M and Luna rockets has been carried out in practice on AN-8 and AN-12 aircraft

3. The size of the freight hold and carrying-capacity of AN-8 (5-8 tons) and AN-12 (7-16 tons) do not permit air transport of launch pads, [etc.]

II. Proposal of the Defense Ministry for reinforcing Group troops on Cuba

In order to reinforce the Group troops on Cuba, send:

1) one squadron of IL-28 bombers in a group of 10-12 aircraft including cargo and guard (countermeasures) (postanovshchiki pomekh) planes, with PRTB (?) of the automobile kind and six atomic bombs (407N), each of 8-12 kilotons [of explosive] power.

[In Khrushchev's handwriting on top of "II." and "1" above]: Send to Cuba six IL-28s with atomic warheads (atomnymi golovkami). [three words illegible] [signed] N. S. Khrushchev 7.IX.1962.

2) One R-11M rocket brigade made up of three divisions (total : 1221 men, 18 R-11M rockets) with PRTB (324 men) and 18 special battle parts which the PRTB is capable of storing/defending (khranit')

3) Two-three divisions of Luna included in separate motorized infantry regiments in Cuba. Each Luna division

will have two launch installations and 102 men.

[Overwritten:] Three Luna divisions. N. S. Khrushchev 7.IX.62

With the Luna divisions, send 8-12 rockets and 8-12 special battle parts. For the preparation and storage of special battle parts for the Luna rockets, send one PRTB (150 men).

The indicated squadron of one R-11M rocket brigade with PRTB and two-three Luna divisions with PRTB with rockets to be sent to Cuba in the first half of this October. Atom bombs (six pieces), special head pieces [warheads] for the R-11M rockets (18 pieces) and for the Luna rockets (8-12) to be transported on board the [ship] *Indigirka* on 15 September.

The Defense Ministry has just conducted successful onland firing tests of C-75 anti-aircraft installations in flat areas. For distances of 24 kilometers, [they were] exact within 100-120 meters. The results of computer checks indicate the possibility of successful use on naval targets.

Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Malinovskii
 6 September 1962

[Source: *Volkogonov Papers, Reel 6 (Library of Congress—Manuscript Division). Translated by David Wolff.*]

Top Secret
Highly Important
copy # 1

Personally

**To the commander of the
 Soviet Armed Forces Group in Cuba**

The temporary deployment of Soviet Armed forces on the island of Cuba is necessary to insure joint [defense] against possible aggression toward the Union of SSR and the Republic of Cuba.

The decision to use Soviet Armed Forces for [illegible] actions in order to repel aggression and reinstatement of [illegible] is undertaken by the Soviet Government.

1. The task of the Soviet armed forces group on the island of Cuba is not to allow an enemy landing on Cuban territory [either from the sea] or from the air. The island of Cuba must be turned into an impenetrable fortress (*nepristupnuiu krepost'*).

Forces and means: Soviet troops together with [Cuban] Armed forces.

2. In carrying out this task, the Commander of [the group] of Soviet troops on the island of Cuba must use the following considerations (*rukovodstvovat'sia sleduiushchim*):

a) Regarding missile forces

The missile forces that form the backbone for the defense of the Soviet Union and the island of Cuba, must be prepared, upon signal from Moscow (*po signalu iz Moskvy*), to deal a nuclear missile strike to the most important targets [*ob'ekty*] in the United States of America (list of targets included in attachment #1) [Ed. Note: This attachment has yet to be located.]....

d) Regarding the Naval Fleet

The Naval Fleet Group must not allow ships and transport vessels of the enemy to approach the island of Cuba and carry out naval landings on the coast. They must be prepared to blockade from the sea the US naval base in Guantanamo and provide cover for their transport ships along lines of communication in close proximity to the island.

Nuclear missile-equipped submarines should be prepared to launch, upon signal from Moscow, a nuclear missile strike on the most important coastal targets in the USA (list of targets provided in attachment #1).

The main forces of the fleet should be based in the region around Havana and in ports to the west of Havana. One divisional brigade of high-speed cruisers should be located around Banas.

6. The operational uses of the Soviet Military Group in Cuba should be formulated by 01 November 1962. [Ed. Note: 1 November is written in a different hand from the rest of the document.]

Attachments:

1. List of targets for missile forces and nuclear missile submarines for working out flight paths—attached separately.
2. List of the battle composition of the Soviet Military Group in Cuba on 3 pages, r[ecord] r/t #164
3. List of launching mechanisms, missiles and nuclear warheads possessed by the Military Group, on 2 pages, r[ecord] r/t #164.

USSR Minister of Defense [signature]
 Marshal of the Soviet Union
 R. Malinovskii

Chief of the General Staff [signature]
 Marshal of the Soviet Union
 M. Zakharov

8 September 1962 [Ed. Note: 8 September is written over the original version of “_____July 1962,” suggesting the possibility that this document was drafted at an earlier date.]

Send in cipher
 [Various illegible signatures dated July and October 1962]

Source: Volkogonov Papers, Reel 6 (Library of Congress—Manuscript Division). Translated by Daniel Rozas.]

Zhou Enlai Explains China's Decision to Explode the Second Atomic Bomb

Introduction and Translation by Qiang Zhai

On 16 October 1964, China successfully detonated its first atomic bomb, an underground explosion at the Lop Nur test facility.¹ Seven months later on 14 May 1965, Beijing succeeded in testing its second atomic bomb, this one an aerial drop. On May 21, Zhou Enlai made a speech at a war-planning meeting of the Central Military Commission, explaining the party's decision for the explosion of the second bomb. Zhou's remarks are notable for two things: first they highlight Mao Zedong's role in setting the general time frame for the test; second, they demonstrate that Chinese leaders fully considered the pros and cons of the possible effects of the explosion on international opinion, especially in the Third World, and believed that they could persuade world opinion to support China's action.

Zhou's speech was published in *Dangde wenxian* (Party Documents), No. 3, 1994. Translation excerpts follow.

Zhou Enlai's Speech at the War-Planning
 Meeting of the Central Military Commission,
 21 May 1965

The current international situation—particularly the national, democratic, and revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—is a developing one. Take a look at Asia, Africa, and Latin America. There are incidents everywhere and all of them are the direct results of American imperialism. The United States has created all these problems, causing many of its allies and friends to break away. [Ed. Note: Within the past month, the United States had sent Marines to suppress what it called a communist revolt in the Dominican Republic, arousing heavy international criticism.] The atomic test we have just conducted is the best proof. We decided this year to explode the second atomic bomb. Because the bomb would be air dropped, we decided to carry out the test between April and May. The test could not be done too early. It had to be done between April and May. We chose May. Are we going to encounter more opposition this time than we did last year? Just the opposite. It was a test for us when we set the time during the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference. The Chairman [Mao Zedong] made the decision to press ahead with the explosion in anticipation of condemnation. Of course, the specific date of explosion was left for the Special Committee² to decide. The front command made decisions on specifics, and in the rear I discussed [broader issues] with Luo Ruiqing.³ Politically, this was the moment when the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference met in Ghana.

There is a historical lesson, that is, at the time of the

First Non-Aligned Meeting in Yugoslavia in [autumn] 1961, Khrushchev wanted to test a big atomic bomb in order to show off, to intimidate and frighten people, but he triggered opposition from all over the world. Delegations were sent to the United States and the Soviet Union to appeal for a suspension of the test. Last year, before we exploded our bomb, India asked China not to conduct the nuclear test. But India obtained only two votes and its proposal did not pass. We went ahead with our explosion. Last year, we selected the time of explosion after the Second Non-Aligned Meeting. This time we chose to test before the Second Afro-Asian Conference. We did consider the issue of possible reactions when the Afro-Asian Solidarity Meeting was in session. Maybe the situation has changed this time. At the Afro-Asian Solidarity Meeting, we met a lot of people, who in public expressed regret and advised us to stop testing. But in private they congratulated us. This shows that nationalism has two sides. On the one hand, because nationalist countries oppose imperialism, they support us. Our possession of the nuclear bomb has not only encouraged them but also strengthened their power. On the other hand, pressured by imperialism, induced by the Soviet Union, and influenced by the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty [signed by the United States and Soviet Union in the summer of 1963], they expressed regret. Wherever we went, we came across such mixed feelings. But this time we did not expect that so many people would hail our test. This year, only the United States showed little reaction because it wanted to downplay our role. Although it did not respond in public, it was actually worried at heart. This time, the people of the world, including the Japanese people, hailed and congratulated us, and expressed happiness.

I have also conducted a survey: when we were carrying out the nuclear test, two entertainment groups from Japan were in China. Because Japan has been attacked by two atomic bombs and has suffered, it opposes nuclear tests. The members of the two groups were middle-of-the-roaders. Some were to the left of the middle and others to the right of the middle. I had two conversations with them. I said: "When we possess atomic bombs, it means that the Japanese also possess them. We all oppose nuclear bombs. You have been hit by two atomic bombs and you have made contributions to the whole world, because everybody in the world now opposes nuclear war. Without the sacrifice caused by those two atomic bombs, how could international attention be focused? Without the harm done by poisonous gas, how could people come to oppose gas warfare? There is always a price to pay." Chairman Mao has also said that when a heavy price had been paid, people would not dare to use such weapons again. At the moment, there is the atomic bomb [in China's possession]. In the future, there will be the hydrogen bomb as well as long-distance missiles. The United States may employ tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam. It may use such weapons against China later. As

Chinese we must be confident that no matter how many people will die in a nuclear war in the future, we will win world peace eventually. Just as Chairman Mao has pointed out, we will win peace, and win the victory of anti-imperialist war. If the United States attacks us, it will mean the coming of the time to eliminate nuclear war once and for all. That is because, when the United States drops a nuclear bomb on us and causes damage to part of China, it will alienate the people of the world, including the American people. If the Soviet Union refuses to intervene in such a situation, then it is taking the first step in the direction of sitting on the top of a mountain to watch tigers fight. In that case, the American people need to consider the consequences and so do the Japanese people. When the atomic bomb is shot over their heads toward us, the Japanese will suffer more damages than we will. Japan has a population of one hundred million concentrated on several large islands. It has many industries. At present, Japan is doing the opposite of what we are doing: instead of building an underground railway, it is constructing a railway above ground from Tokyo to Osaka. We can not do that. If we do that, we do not know how much damage we will incur when nuclear war comes. Therefore, we must be prepared to pay a price to win international sympathy and support. As to those visitors from the Japanese entertainment world, most of them are afraid of war. After my talks with them, they felt that they had confidence when they stood beside China. One of them revealed his true feeling. He said that "I was unhappy when I first learned about your test. After hearing your talk, I have come to believe that we should hail your test. We should stand together." This shows that people's minds can be changed. From this perspective, our current prestige in the world has risen.

At present, the Soviet Union is also deliberately underestimating us. In reality, it is afraid of us. At the moment, the United States is afraid of us and so is Britain. France also feels that it is lagging behind. It realizes that it has not developed the manufacturing technique that we have now. Although France has been engaged in its nuclear program for many years, it has only tested a few devices and it can not air drop the atomic bomb. Its uranium-235 factory will not be put into production until 1969. For this reason, the United States has decided to fight a large war and the Soviet Union will participate. But it will take many steps to reach that point. It is not a simple matter. We should be prepared for that eventuality. The more we are prepared, the more the enemy wants to retreat.

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¹ John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), is by far the best source available in English on the history of China's nuclear weapons program, but its treatment of the explosion of China's second atomic bomb is quite brief (see p. 208).

Since the publication of Lewis and Xue's book, a number of fresh Chinese sources have emerged, adding new detail to the knowledge of the role of such leading figures as Mao, Zhou Enlai, Nie Rongzhen, and Song Renqiong in the development of China's nuclear weapons. The most notable among them are: Wei Wei, chief comp., *Nie Rongzhen zhuan* (Biography of Nie Rongzhen) (Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 1994) and Song Renqiong, *Song Renqiong huiyilu* (Memoirs of Song Renqiong) (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1994). Based on party and military archives, Wei's book is the official biography of Marshal Nie Rongzhen and part of the Contemporary China series. Song Renqiong served as head of the ministry in charge of nuclear industry between 1956-1960. Among other revelations in his memoirs, Song described the rise and fall of Sino-Soviet nuclear cooperation between 1956-1959. He discussed in detail his participation in Nie Rongzhen's 1957 trip to Moscow, where the two countries signed the New Defense Technical Accord, in which the Soviet Union agreed to provide China with the prototype atomic bomb, missiles, and related data.

² This refers to the Fifteen-Member Special Committee, headed by Zhou Enlai, which was created in November 1962 to take charge of China's nuclear program.

³ Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army.

The Conference on Poland, 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions

Raymond L. Garthoff

[Co-editor's Note: The following essay by Raymond Garthoff is a first report on the conference "Poland 1980/81: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," held in Jachranka/Warsaw on 7-10 November 1997, opening what promises to be a controversial debate on the results of the meeting. Co-organized by the National Security Archive, the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences and CWIHP, the conference produced a great amount of new documentation and testimony by participants from all sides of the conflict. The conference was covered in New York Times articles (by Jane Perlez and Tina Rosenberg), the Los Angeles Times (by Malcolm Byrne and Pawel Machcewicz), and the international press. Future issues of the CWIHP Bulletin and CWIHP Working Papers, as well as a comprehensive National Security Archive Document Reader will feature further new evidence and analyses. The conference was made possible by financial support from the Open Society Institute (New York), John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (Chicago), the Smith Richardson Foundation (Westport, CT), the German Marshall Fund of the United States (Washington, D.C.), the Committee for Scientific Research (Warsaw), as well as the Batory Foundation (Warsaw). CWIHP is pleased to note the efforts of major contributors to the success of both conferences: Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive), Jim Hershberg (George Washington University), Andrzej Paczkowski, Pawel Machcewicz, Dariusz Stola and Ryszard Zelichowski (all at the Institute of Political Studies/PAS). For further information on the conference, contact Malcolm Byrne at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C. (Fax: 202-994-7005; Tel: 202-994-7000; email: nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu) or Andrzej Paczkowski at the Institute of Political Studies in Warsaw (Fax: 48-22-252146, email: POLITIC@ISPPAN.WAW.PL).]

The fourth in the series of international conferences on Eastern European "flashpoints"¹ in the Cold War, dealing with the crisis in Poland in 1980-82, was held in Jachranka, Poland, on 8-10 November 1997. The conference was co-sponsored by the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. As in the earlier conferences in this series, new documentary sources were made available, mostly before the conference began, and the conference included both participants in the crisis and the scholars studying it. Most of the new archival materials in this instance were Polish, but some very useful new documents were found in other Eastern European and Moscow archives. A number of

newly declassified U.S. documents were also made available. Partly owing to the fact that this was historically the most recent of the crises examined, a large number of important participants in the events were present, especially among the Polish leaders and Solidarity protagonists (not, however, including Lech Walesa, who had been expected). General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who as party First Secretary and Prime Minister promulgated martial law in December 1981, his colleague and predecessor Stanislaw Kania, who held back from martial law in 1980-81, and their colleague and in 1982 Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski, were among the Polish leaders. Zbigniew Bujak, Karol Modzelewski, Wieslaw Chrzanowski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki and others represented Solidarity.

American policy advisors present included Zbigniew Brzezinski, a key figure in 1980 as President Carter's National Security Advisor and Richard Pipes, as the senior Soviet and East European affairs NSC staff officer in President Reagan's administration in 1981. (Secretary Alexander Haig was unable to attend, and no U.S. representatives from the Departments of State and Defense or CIA were present.) From Moscow, Marshal Viktor Kulikov and General of the Army Anatolii Gribkov, in 1980-82 respectively the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact, were joined by Georgii Shakhnazarov and Valerii Musatov, well-placed senior Central Committee experts on relations with Eastern Europe in 1980-82, with Shakhnazarov having served as secretary of a key Politburo subcommittee on Poland chaired by Mikhail Suslov. These, and others (for example Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, the influential long-time head of Radio Free Europe's Polish Service), held forth in very interesting exchanges.

Marshal Kulikov, resplendent in the beribboned regalia of a Marshal of the Soviet Union, and with a bevy of aides, was the only participant to come in uniform. General Jaruzelski wore the dark glasses that are his hallmark (not an affectation, but needed ever since his eyes were weakened during his family's early wartime exile in Siberia). Initially nervous, and high strung, he clearly was still reliving the experience of 1980-82 more than any of the others (and was constantly attended by bodyguards). Kania, often short-changed as a weak leader in 1980-82, was unexpectedly impressive, and an articulate spokesman. Some of the Solidarity leaders, in particular Bujak who was the only one to escape internment in 1981 and remain underground, are still young men even fifteen years later, in contrast to the fading generation of the leaders of that time.

The conference began by examining the internal Polish situation, and as was to be expected that part of the program could have been titled "Poles apart." One of the key questions directly and indirectly addressed, but never fully answered, was whether there had been sufficient common ground for a compromise between the government and the opposition that could have averted martial

law, had there been better reciprocal understanding of the minimum requirements of the sides. With a realistic evaluation of the perceptions of the two sides at that time, I believe there was not. In the concluding session, there was however a striking comment by Rakowski, who had negotiated with Solidarity leaders on behalf of the regime in 1981, that at that time he had never received signs of Solidarity thinking on a possible compromise *modus vivendi* that had just been expressed at the conference by former Solidarity leader Modzelewski. On the other hand, another Solidarity spokesman, Wieslaw Chrzanowski, admitted that some in Solidarity had sought to provoke repression so as activate popular participation in a show-down. As was acknowledged, one problem was that Solidarity was a diffuse movement with differing views.

An important related question was whether *Soviet* hegemonic influence permitted any alternative to martial law, other than Soviet military intervention. Some, perhaps most, participants regarded martial law as a serious setback, as in some respects it undoubtedly was. Yet Jaruzelski had a point in reminding the conference that martial law not only brought a virtually bloodless end to the immediate crisis, it was also not the end of the road. Only eight years later, the same Polish leaders and the same leaders of Solidarity agreed on a peaceful evolutionary transfer of power with revolutionary consequences. One of the Solidarity leaders suggested there had been eight years wasted, but it was far from clear that the events of 1989 could have taken place in 1981—not only in terms of the internal political dynamics in Poland, but also in terms of critical differences in Moscow between Brezhnev's encrusted policies and those born of Gorbachev's new thinking, and in East-West relations.

Much of the discussion, not least by Jaruzelski himself, was directed to the question of whether General Jaruzelski was a traitor to Poland doing Moscow's bidding in imposing martial law and suppressing Solidarity, or a hero in taking the only action that could have saved Poland from the burden (and possible internal explosion) following Soviet military intervention and occupation. Such extreme characterizations are hardly appropriate for historical analysis but the matter is not in Poland merely a matter of historical curiosity. (In fact, having been in effect tried on a treason charge by a special commission of the Polish parliament and found not guilty last year, Jaruzelski faces a possible retrial on reformulated charges by the recently elected parliament, in which the Socialists have lost the majority they held when the first commission reached its verdict.)

The conference could not of course reconcile divergent Polish views on such questions (and possibly not even differing views among non-Polish historians), but much of the conference deliberation turned and returned to such questions as whether the Soviet leaders planned (or even might have decided) to intervene, justifying Jaruzelski's position, or whether Moscow had decided not to intervene and Jaruzelski could have avoided martial law.

Marshal Kulikov adamantly contended that the Soviet Union at no time had plans to intervene militarily. When confronted with evidence to the contrary, he retreated into distinctions between full and final plans for a specific action, and mere outline plans. The distinction may be valid, but he did not explain evidence of concrete plans for use of East German and Czech forces (or the published account of one Russian general at the time commanding a division earmarked for intervention). He seemed to protest too much, and finally General Jaruzelski in exasperation noted that only since the question of entry of Poland into NATO had been posed in 1993 did Russian officials argue that Moscow had never intended to intervene in Poland in 1980-82 (thus presumably seeking to deny Polish justification of a requirement for security against a possible Russian threat). Again, though the conference could not establish the full picture, the preponderance of evidence supports a conclusion that the Soviet leaders were planning (and certainly had fully prepared for) an intervention on 8 December 1980, but decided not to do so only on December 5 after a long discussion with Kania and Jaruzelski in which the latter argued that they could deal with the situation. The Soviet leaders may also have been influenced by a Hot Line message from President Carter on June 3 warning that the U.S.-Soviet "relationship" would be "most adversely affected if force was used" (while also reasserting that it was "the firm intention of the United States not to exploit the events in Poland, nor to threaten legitimate Soviet security interests in that region"). Brzezinski, in particular, argued that this warning was a crucial element, along with the pleas of the Polish leaders. No doubt it did play some part, but there is no available evidence as to whether it was a contributory re-enforcing element or a decisive factor in the thinking of the Soviet leaders.

Whether there was a specific plan to intervene in December 1981, before Jaruzelski made his decision to impose martial law, is less clear. Notes of a Politburo meeting on 10 December 1981 (two days before Jaruzelski's decision) show a Politburo consensus at that time not to intervene with Soviet troops. Whether that was known to Jaruzelski is not certain, but in any event it would be surprising if he had not believed that the Soviet leaders might intervene at some point, and he evidently decided for that reason (and perhaps also others) to act. He vividly recalled personally seeing Brezhnev embrace and reassure Alexander Dubcek at Bratislava in the summer of 1968, not long before the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Whether the Soviet leaders ever went beyond preparing for contingent intervention, they clearly did use the capability for intervention to place pressure on the Polish leaders to suppress Solidarity. Kulikov and Gribkov acknowledged that the partially mobilized forces in military "exercises" ending in late 1980 were ordered by Moscow to be kept going for another three months or so, through the next crisis in March 1981, for political reasons.

In sum, it is clear that there was a strong preference, if not determination, by the Politburo not to resort to direct Soviet military intervention. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests at least a short-lived reluctant decision to act in early December 1980, soon set aside. There were probably also contingent preparations for possible intervention in March and November-December 1981, although these military preparations in 1980 and 1981 were also calculated to exert pressure on the Polish leaders. In an extreme situation, such as an outbreak of civil war in Poland or threat of US-NATO intervention, most observers believe Soviet military forces would almost certainly have been sent in. But as in so many cases, this must remain a judgment rather than a certainty, and will probably remain so even after the archives are fully opened.

There were also disputed questions as to whether General Jaruzelski had agreed in late 1980 to open Polish borders to Soviet troops, a contention Jaruzelski vehemently denied. East German documents showed that Polish officers had assisted in route reconnaissance in Poland for German officers who would have led an intervention contingent. Similarly, there was an issue as to whether Polish leaders had encouraged the Soviet Union to keep their military exercises going in early 1981 in order to justify resort to martial law. There were indications to that effect, yet it is clear that Kania and Jaruzelski held back from imposing martial law on those occasions despite Soviet pressure to do so. In short, uncertainties on a number of matters remain.

This conference, as the earlier ones in the series, brought out that the other communist regimes of the Warsaw Pact were also parties to these crises and more generally to Soviet bloc politics. Although the Soviet Union was the hegemonic power in the bloc and made the final decisions, its leaders also were influenced by considerations as to the impact of developments, in this case in Poland, on the other Eastern European bloc countries, and to some extent by the views of their leaders. As in 1968, the leaders of East Germany and Bulgaria, and in 1980-81 of Czechoslovakia as well, urged Soviet intervention in Poland before the virus of Solidarity would spread to their countries. They were quite prepared to participate. In this case their views were not adopted, but this does not mean that the Soviet leaders in Moscow did not weigh considerations of the impact of events in Poland on the other bloc countries seriously. Indeed, in a very different way, the evident brittle weakness of these Communist regimes later played a role in a more enlightened Moscow leadership's conclusion that the whole edifice of the bloc and internally of its members required restructuring.

These questions of Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and U.S., decisions and influences on the situation in Poland, interacting with the decisions of the Polish leaders, were the second major focus of the conference deliberations.

In November-December 1981, unlike December 1980, the United States did not issue a clear warning, despite the

fact that an American spy, Polish General Staff Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, had delivered the full plans for martial law, except for the date. Moreover, on November 7 Kuklinski was spirited out of the country, and the Polish and Soviet governments became aware that the United States knew all about those plans. (Kuklinski had also provided CIA with the most explicit and full information on the planned Soviet intervention in December 1980.) Yet neither the Soviet nor Polish leaders were warned, and public American warnings that the Polish crisis must be solved by the Poles themselves, intended to discourage possible direct Soviet intervention, could by December 1981 be seen almost as an invitation for Polish resolution of the crisis by martial law. Kuklinski himself had intended that the United States at least warn Solidarity, and some Solidarity representatives at the conference were still asking why the United States had not done so. The answer appears to have been a desire not to trigger bloodshed, although there were no U.S. documents or authorities to confirm that assumption or clarify the U.S. inaction. Kuklinski himself, living incognito in the United States, although recently pardoned by the present Polish government (rescinding fully a death penalty earlier imposed by a trial *in absentia*) and invited to the conference, feared to attend. Three of his hundreds of messages to CIA, the only three declassified by CIA for Kuklinski's use in successfully appealing his earlier conviction, were however made available.

Shakhnazarov several times posed the question of the extent of a U.S. role in inspiring and supporting Solidarity. There was no clear answer, but the consensus seemed to be that Solidarity arose and acted on its own initiative, that Western sources including private American entities such as the AFL-CIO and later the quasi-governmental National Endowment for Democracy provided valuable support in communications and printing supplies. Brzezinski and Pipes affirmed that direct covert U.S. government assistance was given only after martial law was imposed. (Even then, one Solidarity leader remarked, a requested computer was denied because its dispatch would have contravened the U.S. embargo imposed as a sanction!)

In a broader sense, however, a much more important U.S. role was ascribed by two rather disparate groups at the table. Marshal Kulikov and General Gribkov blamed the United States government for having carried out a master plan for breaking up the Warsaw Pact (and the Soviet Union), Gribkov even referring back to Churchill's proposed wartime second front in the Balkans to head off a Soviet presence in central Europe! Kulikov brandished a paperback Russian translation of Peter Schweizer's book *Victory*, ascribing victory in the Cold War to Reagan's early militancy including covert operations in Poland. This charge was, to many unexpectedly, supported by Richard Pipes and General William Odom, Brzezinski's NSC military aide in 1980 and the chief of U.S. Army Intelligence in 1981-82. (Brzezinski was no longer present at this session of the conference, but had earlier ascribed a

major role to the Carter administration's policy of seeking the "delegitimization" of the Soviet Union and bloc.)

Some other American participants disagreed with this view that the United States had played the main role in bringing about the fundamental changes in the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and none of the Poles even addressed the question. Much as such changes may have been consistent with U.S. aims and desires, and were welcomed, they were not caused by U.S. policies or actions. Rather, these historical (and historic) changes in the 1980s occurred because of objective internal necessities, and subjective actions by Soviet and Eastern European leaders and peoples.

The ultimate transformation of Eastern Europe climaxing in 1989 deserves, however, to be the subject of another conference—and such a conference is planned.

¹ Co-ed.: Previous "flashpoints" conferences included a conference on the "Prague Spring," held in Prague in 1994 (co-sponsored by the National Security Archive, CWIHP and the Institute for Contemporary History of the Czech Academy of Sciences); the conference "Hungary and the World, 1956," held in Budapest in September 1996 (co-sponsored by the National Security Archive, CWIHP, and the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Budapest) and the conference "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," held in Potsdam (Germany) in November 1996 (co-sponsored by the National Security Archive and Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam). For further information see *CWIHP Bulletin 8/9* (Winter 1996/97), 355-357; and Malcolm Byrne, "Cold War 'Flashpoints,'" *CWIHP Bulletin 5* (Spring 1995), 14. A final conference on "The End of the Cold War" is being planned.

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“You, Mr. Vance, are a new person.”

**Talks Between A.A. Gromyko and C[yrus] Vance
28-30 March 1977**

[*Ed. Note* : In *Bulletin 5*, pp. 144-154, 160, *CWIHP* published a selection of declassified documents generated by the multi-year Carter-Brezhnev Project on US-Soviet Relations and the Collapse of *Détente*. Supported by a multinational consortium of research institutions and organizations, the Carter-Brezhnev Project was spearheaded by Dr. James G. Blight of the Thomas J. Watson Institute of International Studies at Brown University. The documents in *Bulletin 5* brought the reader up to US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's departure for Moscow, but the fateful visit itself was not covered. At both ends of his stay, Vance met with CPSU General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev. Sandwiched in between were four meetings with veteran Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko. The main topic of discussion was US President Jimmy Carter's "comprehensive" proposals for the SALT-2 Treaty, views that the Soviets saw as contravening the Vladivostok accords reached with US President Gerald Ford in 1974. The Soviet rejection of Carter's initiative was certainly the newsmaking centerpiece of the Vance visit. Other, more positive, discussions covered a wide range of topics, including the Vienna talks on arms limitations in Central Europe, the Middle East, non-proliferation, Cyprus, and others. Below is a brief sampler.]

28 March (17:30-20:00)

A.A. GROMYKO. [Opening the attack on the SALT-2 issue] How should we evaluate the current situation in this light? You, Mr. Vance, are a new person. But try to see the situation with our eyes. What conclusion should the Soviet side come to for itself on the basis of the experience which we have had so far with the new American administration, the conclusion that the next government of the USA which will replace the current one, will just as easily throw everything that we are able to agree upon now into the trash? If such is the case, one must ask where is the minimum of stability that should exist in the relations between our two countries?

29 March (11:00-13:00)

GROMYKO. The situation in the Middle East has been a subject of discussion between our countries, including on the highest level, for many years. We discussed this issue with President Johnson, with President Nixon, and with President Ford. We discussed it, although not in such a deep or detailed way, with the new Administration. However, there is [still] no solution to the problem, and the situation in the Middle East is extremely dangerous and fraught with the possibility of a new explosion. We are deeply convinced that you are mistaken if you believe that it is possible to buy peace in the Middle East by giving 200-300 million, even a billion dollars to some country.

C. VANCE. We don't believe that (*My tak ne*

schitaem).

GROMYKO. Good. That is encouraging. Consequently, it is necessary to seek political solutions. Does the USA consider that Israel is ready to recognize the right of the Palestinians to an independent nation-state? You understand that these issues are interconnected.

VANCE. I cannot speak for Israel, but I agree that this is the stumbling block (*kamen' pretknoventiia*).

GROMYKO. I can say the same regarding the Palestinians. If Israel will recognize the rights of the Palestinians, they will recognize Israel's rights. The issue here is who will speak first, but we do not consider that an insoluble issue. This is why diplomacy exists.

29 March (16:30-19:45)

VANCE. I agree that cessation of the state of war is the most important issue. But normalization of relations can facilitate the preservation of peace.

GROMYKO. That does not contradict what I said. May we consider that we have here with you a common understanding?

VANCE. We have an understanding.

GROMYKO. Can't we say that our positions coincide?

VANCE. We put a somewhat greater accent than you on normalization of relations as a means of maintaining peace.

GROMYKO. We stress the significance of achieving peace, not belittling the significance of normal relations between states. For example, in a state of normal relations with Israel, we would with satisfaction eat Israeli oranges. I have heard that they have good oranges.

30 March (11:00-14:00)

VANCE. I want now to touch on the issue of the radiation which the employees at our embassy in Moscow are subject to. I know that in the recent past its level has decreased, but it is still being observed, which, of course, provokes concern among our people. The full cessation of this radiation would be valued highly and positively by us.

GROMYKO. I must say quite frankly that I am pretty fed up with this issue. I cannot add anything to the response which has been given by us to the American side. Despite the fact that in the recent past some industrial enterprises have been moved out of Moscow, they are, unfortunately, still inside the city limits, including its central part.

Of course, I will keep in mind what you have said, but I must frankly state that in the USA you have lovers (*liubiteli*) of various contrived "issues." Without this, they simply get bored (*Bez etogo im prosto skuchno zhit'*)....

Present at the negotiations were: for the Soviet side—Coms. L.V. Smirnov, A.F. Dobrynin, G.M. Kornienko; for the American side—M[alcolm] Toon, P[aul] Warnke, A[rthur] Hartman, W. Highland.

[*Source: TsKhSD f. 89, op. 76, d. 1, ll. 1-80. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.*]

Ukraine and the Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968

(Part 1): New Evidence from the Diary of Petro Shelest

Edited, Introduced, Translated, and Annotated by Mark Kramer

Petro Shelest served for many years in the upper levels of the Soviet hierarchy. From 1961 to 1975 he was a member of the Central Committee (CC) of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), and from 1964 to 1973 he was a full member of the CPSU Presidium/Politburo. He also served as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party (UkrCP) from 1963 to 1972 and as Soviet first deputy prime minister in 1972 and 1973. Following the removal of Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964, Shelest was a close ally of the new CPSU First Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev. Later on, however, the two men had a falling-out, which culminated in Shelest's ouster from the leadership in April 1973. Shelest remained in a low-level economic post in Moscow until 1978, when he was forced to retire. He lived as a private pensioner in Moscow until his death in early 1996.

During his years in power, Shelest kept a meticulous, handwritten diary, which eventually came to thousands of pages. The diary is an invaluable source for those studying key events in the Soviet Union in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. An abridged edition was put out in Russian in 1995 by the German publisher "edition q" and the "Kvintessentsiya" publishing house in Moscow, but unfortunately the publishers omitted many crucial passages, including detailed remarks about the role of Ukrainian nationalism in Shelest's removal.¹ The publishers also allowed Shelest to insert occasional post-hoc clarifications and reminiscences alongside his original diary entries. Through most of the book it is easy to distinguish between the original entries and Shelest's later comments, but in a few cases the two are not easily separated. It would have been much better if the publisher had typeset the diary in its original, unabridged form without supplementary material, and if Shelest's memoirs had then appeared separately. To prevent any confusion, researchers are well advised to consult the original diary, which is now stored along with the rest of Shelest's personal and official papers at the former Central Party Archive in Moscow.²

The diary, written mostly in Russian but interspersed with Ukrainian, covers both domestic and foreign developments. Of particular interest are the lengthy sections dealing with the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. Western scholars long ago surmised that Shelest played a key role during the 1968 crisis, and that he was a strong proponent of military intervention. Those judgments have been amply confirmed by the diary as well as by the newly released transcripts of CPSU Politburo meetings from 1968 and a vast quantity of other declassified materials in the Ukrainian and Russian archives (a selection of which

will be published along with my commentary in the next *CWIHP Bulletin*). During interviews in 1989 and the early 1990s, Shelest insisted that he had not favored military action in 1968, but his diary, the CPSU Politburo transcripts, and countless other items in the Ukrainian and Russian archives all belie this claim.³ The diary also sheds fascinating light on aspects of the 1968 crisis that had not previously been known from the many thousands of documents that have been declassified since 1990 in Moscow, Kyiv, Prague, and other former Warsaw Pact capitals. No serious study of the 1968 crisis will be able to neglect this remarkable source.

The four excerpts below will be introduced separately. The first excerpt highlights the concerns that Shelest had in 1968 about the political spillover from Czechoslovakia into Ukraine. The second, third, and fourth excerpts deal with the function that Shelest carried out on behalf of the CPSU Politburo as an intermediary with the pro-Soviet hardliners in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (*Komunistická strana Československa*, or KSC). That function, as shown below, was a vital factor in the emerging consensus in Moscow on the need to use military force.

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EXCERPT No. 1 Shelest's Concerns About the Spill-Over Into Ukraine

Throughout the 1968 crisis Shelest and other Soviet leaders feared that events in Czechoslovakia were emboldening Ukrainian intellectuals and nationalist elements. Newly declassified materials, including Shelest's diary, the CPSU Politburo transcripts, and a plethora of other documents from the Ukrainian and Russian archives (a selection of which will be published in the next *CWIHP Bulletin*), bear out Grey Hodnett's and Peter Potichnyj's earlier conclusion that "there was an important linkage between the situation in the Ukraine and the developments in Czechoslovakia."⁴ The new sources also confirm that Soviet leaders themselves, especially Shelest, were fully aware of this linkage. On numerous occasions, Shelest informed Brezhnev that Ukrainian intellectuals and students were being affected by "the stepped-up activity of anti-socialist, opportunist, and anarchist elements" in Czechoslovakia.⁵ He warned that the media in Czechoslovakia were "adopting rightist, anti-socialist positions" to "weaken the role of the [Communist] Party," causing "disarray" among residents of western

Ukraine. Heeding Shelest's complaints, Brezhnev raised the matter with the KSC leadership during a meeting in Moscow in early May 1968:

Comrades, you know about the CPSU's principled position based on full respect for the independence of all fraternal Parties and countries. But not every question is a purely internal matter. . . . After all, your newspapers are read also by Soviet citizens, your radio is listened to in our country as well, which means that all such propaganda affects us, too.⁶

Shelest, for his part, complained in much stronger terms to the Czechoslovak authorities. During bilateral negotiations with the KSC Presidium at Cierna nad Tisou in late July, he explained why the "alarming developments" in Czechoslovakia were a matter of "common concern" to the Soviet Union:

Soviet Ukraine is an integral and inseparable part of the USSR. We have a population of 46 million, including many nationalities, of whom nearly 2.5 million are Communists. We and you, our Czech friends, are direct neighbors, and, as is customary with neighbors, we know a lot about each other that is not known or even noticed by those further away. . . . We see and hear your radio and television broadcasts, and read your newspapers. Hence, for us in Ukraine it is all the more insulting what is going on in Czechoslovakia, a state supposedly friendly to us.⁷

Shelest accused the KSC leaders of approving "the publication of counterrevolutionary tracts which are then sent through special channels into Ukraine."⁸ In the weeks after the Cierna negotiations, Shelest continued to warn that the "counterrevolutionary and revanchist" influences in Czechoslovakia would increasingly filter into Ukraine unless "decisive measures" were taken.

This first set of excerpts from Shelest's diary provides further evidence of the Ukrainian leader's belief that events in Czechoslovakia were "causing unsavory phenomena here in Ukraine as well." The situation, he wrote, was especially bad in Ukraine's "western provinces, where the inhabitants receive information directly from their neighbors across the border" and "watch both Czechoslovak and Western radio and television." Shelest also noted that vigorous steps had to be taken to curb the "distribution of political and nationalist leaflets" and to prevent the circulation within Ukraine of newspapers published by the Ukrainian community in Czechoslovakia. He repeatedly warned his colleagues on the CPSU Politburo about these matters, as is evident not only from the Politburo transcripts but from the documents in the next issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*.

Because of Shelest's standing as a full member of the CPSU Politburo, his close ties with Brezhnev, his role as the leader of a key Soviet republic bordering on Czecho-

slovakia, and his participation in high-level bilateral and multilateral talks with KSC officials, his views about a growing spill-over from the Prague Spring were bound to have a major effect on Soviet decision-making.

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26 March: *I had a lengthy conversation with the first secretary of the UkrCP Kyiv municipal committee, A. P. Bovin. He reported to me that political and nationalist leaflets were being widely disseminated at T. G. Shevchenko State University in Kyiv and at the agricultural academy. In these two institutions of higher education, roughly 600 leaflets had been discovered. Measures are being devised to prevent the distribution of such leaflets.*

An unhealthy situation has arisen in the Kyiv branch of the Union of Writers with respect to organizational, creative, and political matters. We also considered this matter and proposed measures to improve the [party's] work among artists.

28 March: *The first secretary of the party's Ivano-Frankivsk oblast committee, Ya. P. Pogrebnyak, called to inform me about the situation in his oblast. He said that in certain regions former members of the Ukrainian nationalist underground had begun to turn up, and that in the oblast as a whole there were more than 40 thousand of them.⁹ Local authorities were taking measures to intensify ideological and organizational work among the population.*

11 April: *I arranged a conversation in my office with the UkrCP CC Secretary responsible for ideological matters, Ovcharenko, and the head of the UkrCP CC department for academia and higher educational institutions, Tsvetkov.¹⁰ We reviewed matters connected with the work of the republic's scholarly establishments and higher educational institutions. We concluded that we needed to conduct further study of the state of instruction and how to improve the lectures in economics and humanities departments and faculties in the republic's universities and colleges. We must give special attention to the state of affairs in T. G. Shevchenko State University in Kyiv. Here, as before, there is great confusion and political disorientation [induced by the events in Czechoslovakia]. All sorts of leaflets and pamphlets are being distributed. All of this is being done not by students or instructors, but by outsiders, since there is free access to the university. A decision was reached to restrict free attendance at the university's building.*

21 May: *Today I had a phone conversation with L. Brezhnev; we considered all aspects of my forthcoming meeting and negotiations with A. Koscelansky¹¹ and V. Bil'ak about the state of affairs in the KSC and in the country as a whole, as well as about the political situation.¹² Unsavory phenomena are beginning to show up in Ukraine as well—we've found pamphlets intended for the leadership of the country. Brezhnev requested that I give him a detailed report*

after my meeting with the Czechoslovak comrades.

14 June: I informed Brezhnev about my impressions of popular sentiments in the western oblasts, which I was visiting yesterday evening.¹³ In those oblasts the population has a much more vivid sense of the alarming events in Czechoslovakia, and is receiving information through direct contacts with inhabitants of regions along the border. For this reason, they can more urgently and objectively assess all the events in Czechoslovakia.

24 July: The chairmen of the party's Volyns'ka and Chernihiv oblast committees gave reports at the UkrCP CC Secretariat: "The situation in these oblasts regarding social science instruction and training of university and high school students is deplorable, especially in rural areas. The situation with radio, television, and telephones is very bad. Extremely urgent measures must be adopted to set matters straight. We have received no answer to the letters and requests we have sent about these matters to the CPSU CC and to the Council of Ministers and Gosplan in the hope of getting suitable technical equipment for the republic. In these oblasts the [official] radio and television practically don't work at all. At the same time, the residents are listening to Western radio stations and watching Western television."¹⁴ I instructed the oblast party chairmen to write, for the third time, a letter to the center requesting help.

21 August: Some young person called the switchboard of the UkrCP CC, identified himself as a student of Kyiv University, and said: "Let Cde. Shelest know that we don't attach any truth to the items published in Pravda about Czechoslovakia. We, the youth of the country, will do the same thing here that young people in Czechoslovakia were doing. We regret that our troops have invaded Czechoslovakia."¹⁵

29-30 August: I spoke with the oblast committee secretaries about current economic, administrative, and political matters. Overall, according to the information available to the secretaries, the population's reaction to the communique from our negotiations with the Czechs in Moscow was positive.¹⁶ However, in two parts of Kyiv and in numerous other cities in the republic, leaflets and graffiti turned up in public places denouncing the CPSU and Brezhnev, calling for freedom of speech, expressing support for the Czechoslovak events, and condemning our military intervention in Czechoslovakia's affairs and our political pressure on the new elements in Czechoslovakia.¹⁷ Measures have been taken to track down and bring to account the authors of the leaflets and graffiti.

There have been instances, especially in Crimea, Odessa, and Voroshylohrad, when some members of the party as well as non-party members have expressed their disagreement with our actions in Czechoslovakia. All of this must make us very wary.

EXCERPT No. 2

Shelest's First Meeting with Vasil Bil'ak

On 6 May 1968 the CPSU Politburo, at Brezhnev's behest, authorized Shelest to begin serving as a clandestine liaison with the "healthy forces" (i.e., pro-Soviet hardliners) in Czechoslovakia headed by the Slovak Communist Party leader, Vasil Bil'ak.¹⁸ This action, coming two days after Brezhnev and his colleagues had denounced the Prague Spring during bilateral negotiations in Moscow with senior KSC officials, reflected Brezhnev's growing belief that the existing leadership in Czechoslovakia might be unwilling to fulfill Soviet demands. Although Brezhnev maintained close contacts with the KSC First Secretary, Alexander Dubcek, until mid-August (just a few days before the invasion), the establishment of back-channel contacts with Bil'ak facilitated Soviet planning for an invasion and the installation of a new regime.

This excerpt from Shelest's diary describes his first meeting with Bil'ak. The initiative for the discussion had come from Bil'ak in mid-April, but Shelest had not wanted to set up a meeting without Brezhnev's approval. When Shelest spoke about the matter with Brezhnev in late April, the Soviet leader was wary of establishing a back-channel liaison with Bil'ak; but after the 4 May negotiations, Brezhnev's view of the situation changed, and he decided to have the Politburo authorize Shelest's secret contacts with Bil'ak. With help from the secretary of the UkrCP's Transcarpathian oblast committee, Yu. Il'nyts'kyi, Shelest arranged to meet with Bil'ak and Jan Koscelansky in Uzhhorod on 24-25 May.

Shelest's detailed account of his discussions with Bil'ak was based both on notes and on a tape-recording of the sessions. The account in his diary is identical to a classified report he provided to the other members of the CPSU Politburo on 27 and 29 May.¹⁹ Hence, there is no doubt about its authenticity.

Shelest's account of the meeting proved to have a far-reaching impact on Soviet decision-making. During the first part of the CPSU Politburo's session on 27 May, Soviet prime minister Aleksei Kosygin offered impressions from his recent visit to Czechoslovakia, which had ended the same day that Shelest was meeting with Bil'ak. Kosygin had gone to Czechoslovakia ostensibly for a vacation at the spas in Karlovy Vary, but the real purpose of his trip was to assess the state of the KSC leadership. Kosygin's report on 27 May largely discredited the notion that the Soviet Union would be able to work with "healthy forces" in the KSC to establish an alternative regime:

An analysis of all my conversations, meetings, and materials indicates that at present, in the given situation, there are no more authoritative people in the party and the country than Dubcek, Cernik, Smrkovsky, and Svoboda. For this reason, obviously, we must shape our policy accordingly.²⁰

By the time Kosygin finished his presentation, the other members of the CPSU Politburo were largely in agreement that, at least for the time being, attempts to rely on “healthy forces” were bound to be fruitless. Without a suitable alternative, Soviet leaders would have to deal as best they could with the existing authorities in Prague.

No sooner had this consensus emerged, however, than Brezhnev received an urgent phone call from Shelest, who wanted to convey the results of his discussions with Bil’ak. Shelest offered a detailed account of the trends described by the Slovak leader: the growing strength of “rightist” and “anti-socialist” forces, the persecution of “honest Communists,” the use of sabotage by “rightists” to prevent Warsaw Pact military exercises in Czechoslovakia, the emergence of a “second center” of latent “counterrevolutionaries” in the upper levels of the KSC, and the possible “loss of Czechoslovakia” as a member of the socialist camp.²¹ Shelest left no doubt that the only hope of salvaging the situation was by relying on Bil’ak and the other “healthy forces,” who had assured Shelest that they were “ready to move openly against the creeping counter-revolution, even to the point of waging an armed confrontation” against the KSC’s “second center.”

When Brezhnev reported back to his colleagues on the alarming picture conveyed by Shelest, the mood within the Soviet Politburo changed. The notion of relying solely on Dubcek and his aides no longer seemed particularly viable. Brezhnev summed up the new consensus when he argued that Bil’ak was “more perceptive” than Dubcek in his assessment of events, and that “we must maintain close contact with the healthy forces.”²² The impact of Kosygin’s visit was thus largely dissipated.

Although Soviet leaders continued to have serious doubts over the next few months about the ability of the “healthy forces” to rectify the situation in Czechoslovakia, Shelest’s initial meeting with Bil’ak marked a turning point in the crisis. Had Shelest not provided such a dire report and spoken so strongly about the need to work with the “healthy forces,” the Soviet Politburo might well have been inclined to wait longer before resorting to military force. But once the prospect of relying on “healthy forces” seemed feasible, the Soviet authorities had an incentive to act before the Slovak Party Congress on 26 August and the KSC’s Extraordinary 14th Congress in September, when these “healthy forces” were likely to be removed from the scene. Hence, a tentative deadline for resolving the crisis, either peacefully or through military force, was set by Shelest’s meeting with Bil’ak.

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18 April: From information provided by Yu. Il’nyts’kyi and V. Nikitchenko (KGB) I learned that V. Bil’ak and A. Koscelansky²³ from Slovakia expressed a desire to meet with me in Uzhhorod.²⁴ It would be good to receive information about the state of affairs in Czechoslovakia from first-hand sources. But I can’t do this independently, without permission from Moscow.

30 April: *On the eve of the May Day holiday, I called L. Brezhnev and wished him well for the forthcoming holiday. I laid out my thoughts about a possible meeting I might have with Bil’ak and Koscelansky at their request. Brezhnev reacted quite agitatedly and warily to what I said, and his mood even seemed to change. He only managed to say: “It would be better if Bil’ak and Koscelansky came to Kyiv for a meeting with you.”*

19-20 May: *I carefully pored through the briefing materials coming in from various sources in the Czech lands and Slovakia about my forthcoming meeting with A. Koscelansky and V. Bil’ak.*

21 May: *The secretary of the UkrCP’s Transcarpathian oblast committee, Yu. Il’nyts’kyi, called me and reported that my meeting with V. Bil’ak and A. Koscelansky might take place on 24-25 May. They’re requesting that we put them up for the night on our territory on 23 May, and that this be done very covertly and inconspicuously.²⁵ They’re afraid that they will be persecuted for having contacts with us. We cleared up all matters pertaining to the organization of the meeting and the “covert” lodging for Bil’ak and Koscelansky. We decided that we’ll put them up for the night and hold the first meeting and negotiations in the same place (at a dacha in the mountains, not far from Uzhhorod). . . .*

24-25 May: *In Uzhhorod I twice met and had prolonged discussions with V. Bil’ak and A. Koscelansky. The first meeting occurred outside the city in a cottage in the Carpathians, where we spent almost the whole night having a discussion. The second was in Uzhhorod, at the headquarters of the party’s Transcarpathian oblast committee. I tried to memorize both discussions as accurately as possible, and in addition I made notes from recording equipment, knowing that I would have to write a detailed and precise memorandum to the CPSU CC because this information is of great importance to us—it is first-hand, objective, and truthful. I spoke very little because I mainly wanted to listen and to clarify numerous points.*

Here is the basic outline of the discussion.

Bil’ak and Koscelansky informed me in detail about the situation in the party and the country in the leadup to the May plenum of the KSC CC. They informed me about the complexities of the struggle against rightists. A. Dubcek is at loose ends, and he is unable (and isn’t particularly willing) to expose the role of rightist elements in the country and the rightist forces in the party. There is no unity of action in the KSC CC Presidium. “We, the Slovaks, will fight to the end in the struggle for a Marxist-Leninist line in the party; we will not retreat a single step. It’s obvious that we, the Slovaks, together with you will again have to liberate the Czechs.” Continuing his remarks, V. Bil’ak said: “To cool off the hotheads, it’s urgently necessary that you conduct maneuvers

of your troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia. Once Russian soldiers turn up, all of these political rats will go hide in their burrows. The appearance of your I. Yakubovskii (commander of the Warsaw Pact forces) alone will do a lot to cool down the situation. In the struggle against the rightist elements, the nation, including all Communists, must behave more boldly.”

Among the party activists and state security agents there have been many instances of suicide induced by threats from rightists. For their part, the rightist elements have been making open threats: “Soon the time will come when we will hang all Communists, stringing them up by their feet.” Without any let-up, the extremist elements are demanding and achieving the retirement of Communists, particularly the leaders of regional committees and municipal committees who support Leninist positions. This is happening often. Murders of secretaries of party organizations in enterprises and collective farms and other such incidents are occurring even in Slovakia. Former kulaks are infiltrating the agricultural cooperatives and are threatening the leaders of the farms and the secretaries of party organizations. They’re demanding the return of their land and property.²⁶ Sabotage is being carried out at the railroad junctions to hinder the transport of Soviet troops who are coming to take part in the exercises planned by the Warsaw Pact. They’re disconnecting the water fountains so that the locomotives will fill up with water and are diverting them from the switching points.

We’re all afraid of the upcoming KSC CC plenum; we’re not fully certain that we will win because of the divisions within the Presidium. We also don’t have an organizational plan for our actions. A. Dubcek is not capable of doing anything even if it would “stabilize” our acrimonious situation. If we don’t gain control of the situation within a month, Dubcek will perish, and so will we along with him. I’ve been discussing matters a good deal with A. Dubcek, and I say to him: “Sasha (and I myself lament), why don’t you return to Bratislava, this isn’t what you were after, Sasha.” If today Slovakia were to deviate from the line of the KSC CC, this would lead to the collapse of the Czechoslovak republic. We will do everything possible to preserve Czechoslovakia as a socialist country. In Slovakia threats have been made against Communist activists. If something extraordinary should happen, we request that you grant refuge in Uzhhorod to our wives and children. The directives of the minister of internal affairs are not being carried out in Slovakia because we know that he is taking part in another “center,” headed by Kriegel and Spacek.²⁷

The loss of Czechoslovakia would be equivalent to sacrificing the gains of the Great Patriotic War.²⁸ This cannot be permitted. Czechoslovakia occupies a very important place on the map of Europe; the dark forces simply want to blackmail the entire socialist camp. You are our friends, and you won’t allow this to happen. We are ready to move openly against the creeping counterrevolution, even to the point of waging an armed confrontation. We’re certain that you will help us in our trying hour. Perhaps if this should happen, even that “apostle” A. Dubcek would sober up and

begin acting decisively.

Bil’ak again began characterizing A. Dubcek. He said: “Dubcek is now the most popular man in the country. The rightist elements revere him as their standard-bearer. They’re shrewdly and slyly using him in pursuit of their nefarious aims. I regard Dubcek himself to be honorable, but very ambitious; he’s clearly not a politician of such scale. He has come to believe, based on their assurances and suggestions, that Czechoslovakia can provide an example of a new development of socialist society—a new, socialist democracy—and that Czechoslovakia will become the ‘hub of the world.’ But I’m worried that this little hub could come undone and cause a bad stomach ache.”²⁹

I asked V. Bil’ak a leading question: “On whom can you rely in your struggle against the rightist forces? Who and where are your healthy forces?” Bil’ak then characterized several leaders of the KSC and the government.

D. Kolder:³⁰ Bil’ak said about him that he is an honest, fine, and committed Communist, who himself is a worker; but he has little tact in his dealings with comrades, and recently has been consuming too much hard liquor. He believes 100 percent in A. Dubcek, and Dubcek believes in him. It’s true that they [i.e., the rightists] view him with hostility and regard him as a dangerous man, and that at the first opportunity they will try to remove him from the political arena through Dubcek’s own hands.

J. Lenart:³¹ He’s an honorable man, an engineer by training, who is versed in both technology and economics. He’s rather frightened by the events under way in the country and the party, but he’s not sufficiently resolute in his actions. One can count on him in the right circumstances, but he wavers in his positions. He is preparing to speak at the CC plenum and to expose Dubcek’s mistakes, but Sasha (Dubcek) is recommending to him not to do this. Lenart is now perplexed and has become withdrawn. He has consulted with me several times. I support him in every way.

J. Janik:³² He’s a principled Communist; he firmly supports Leninist positions and believes that without the Soviet Union there can be no socialist Czechoslovakia. Against him, too, the rightists are waging vicious attacks and are trying, through all possible means, to find or create some pretext for compromising him.

C. Cisar: He has known Moscow for many years and has been to the Soviet Union numerous times. Outwardly he’s well disposed toward you. But now his position toward you has changed 180 degrees; he has even begun displaying a certain degree of contempt for Russians. I don’t myself understand what happened, but it’s obvious that it was spawned under the influence of the rightists. Cisar has great influence in Czechoslovakia and especially in the Czech lands. For the sake of achieving his aims, he’s capable of engaging in all manner of political fraud and deception.

A. Indra:³³ He’s the most honest and truthful of all the KSC CC secretaries. He’s 46 years old and is a railroad engineer who acquired practical leadership experience from work at a factory. He knows economics reasonably well. He’s a cultured and thoughtful man with a good moral

character, but unfortunately he doesn't have adequate schooling in political leadership. Dubcek could rely on him in his work, but for some reason he ignores him, seeing in him a rival.

V. Bil'ak: *I'll speak personally about him.*³⁴ *I also knew him previously. I'd met briefly with him on occasion, and had heard a lot about him from the comrades in Transcarpathia. He is a fine and vigorous Communist, who is himself a Ukrainian, a native of our Transcarpathia. His mother, sisters, and brothers live in a mountain village in Transcarpathian oblast. Bil'ak often visits them. He has good professional contacts with the party and council officials of Transcarpathian oblast, particularly with the first secretary of the oblast committee, Yu. Il'nyts'kyi. Their families are friendly with one another. V. Bil'ak is a politically literate, cultured, and well-read individual, with a fine knowledge of the history of his country, especially the period of the Austro-Hungarian empire. My impression of Bil'ak is of a principled man who supports correct positions, and of a cunning, far-sighted politician.*

V. Bil'ak spoke further about some aspects of A. Dubcek's activity: "At his (Dubcek's) suggestion, to please the rightist forces, the department in the KSC CC for security and defense matters was disbanded. As a result, the CC was essentially deprived of the instrument needed to supervise the activity of the administrative organs, the army, and the state security forces."³⁵ *He gave a detailed description of the activity of the right-opportunist Czech center in the KSC, and cited the following names: J. Smrkovsky, O. Sik, F. Kriegel, C. Cisar, V. Slavik, V. Prchlik, M. Vaculik, and B. Simon.*³⁶ *The forces of this center define the tactics and strategy of the anti-party struggle within the KSC. This, in essence, is an alternative Central Committee of the KSC. In the territories and regions, groups and cells have been well conceived and organized for a struggle against Communists who support correct positions.*

Bil'ak and I arranged to maintain contact. He requested that all due assistance be given to the healthy forces in the party and the government. I assured V. Bil'ak that all matters of a confidential nature would be reported personally by me to L. Brezhnev. The political and economic situation in the party and the country will be reported by me in an official memorandum to the CPSU CC Politburo. Bil'ak and I agreed that we would definitely meet after the May plenum of the KSC CC. He will let me know about this through appropriate channels.

EXCERPT No. 3

Shelest's Account of His Secret Meeting on Lake Balaton with Vasil Bil'ak, 20-21 July 1968.

This next excerpt from Shelest's diary recounts his secret meeting with the Slovak Communist Party leader, Vasil Bil'ak, on the shore of Lake Balaton in Hungary. The meeting took place late in the evening of 20-21 July, exactly a month before the Soviet-led invasion of Czecho-

slovakia. Nothing was known about this meeting—not even the fact that it was held—until Shelest released his diary in the mid-1990s. Other information that had previously been available, particularly about Shelest's contacts with hardline, antireformist members of the KSC Presidium led by Bil'ak, lends strong credence to the diary account. The excerpts below are therefore of immense historical significance, filling in a crucial and hitherto unknown part of the 1968 crisis. All existing accounts of the crucial period between mid-July and early August 1968 will need major revision.

As noted above, in early May 1968 Brezhnev and the other members of the CPSU Politburo designated Shelest to act as a liaison with the anti-reformist members of the KSC Presidium. It is now clear from Shelest's diary that this role took on enormous importance in the latter half of July, shortly after the Warsaw Meeting (14-15 July) and the publication of the Warsaw Letter on the 18th.³⁷ In his diary Shelest describes how he suddenly received a phone call from Brezhnev on the afternoon of 20 July. Brezhnev instructed the Ukrainian party leader to be ready to fly within a few hours to Hungary, where he would first meet with the General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSzMP), Janos Kadar, and then set off for a highly confidential discussion with Bil'ak. Shelest duly complied with Brezhnev's wishes, flying first to Budapest and then traveling to Kadar's dacha on Lake Balaton. (Balaton is the largest inland lake in central Europe, and Kadar's main dacha was on the northwestern shore.) Shelest encountered some difficulty in finding Bil'ak along the shoreline, but with the help of a few assistants who had come along from Kyiv, he finally hooked up with the Slovak party leader.

Shelest's detailed notes of his conversation with Bil'ak were derived from a tape recording that was made of the entire session without Bil'ak's knowledge. The full recording has not yet been released (though presumably it is stored in some archive in Moscow, perhaps in Shelest's personal file in the Russian Presidential Archive), but the diary account is a worthy substitute. The relevant portions from the diary are translated here in full because of their great historical value.

Five key points about the Shelest-Bil'ak meeting are worth highlighting:

First, it shows, once again, what an overriding priority the Czechoslovak problem was for the Soviet leadership in 1968. Shelest had many pressing duties to attend to in Kyiv, but he was willing to fly off immediately to Hungary when Brezhnev called him on the afternoon of 20 July. Because Shelest believed that a resolution of the Czechoslovak crisis would be essential for the future stability of Ukraine (and thus for the stability of the USSR as a whole), he was willing to subordinate his immediate concerns at home to the management of the foreign crisis.

Second, the meeting casts a whole new light on Janos Kadar's role after the Warsaw meeting. It is clear, both from newly released documents and from Kadar's own

recollections published in 1989, that the Hungarian leader's position on Czechoslovakia became much less conciliatory after Dubcek declined to attend the Warsaw Meeting. Shelest's account underscores just how far-reaching Kadar's change of heart was. Not only did Kadar express strong criticism of Dubcek at the Warsaw Meeting, but he followed this up by abetting the formation of an anti-Dubcek group of hardliners who could "request" Soviet military assistance. No doubt, Kadar was still hoping that military intervention could somehow be averted, but he was actively taking part in the secret political and military preparations for an invasion. Just two days after the Shelest-Bil'ak meeting, Soviet troops in Hungary were ordered by Moscow to make final arrangements for large-scale military "exercises" north of the border, a process that was completed by the beginning of August. Hungarian leaders, despite their earlier reservations about military action and their efforts to find a compromise, were now finally willing to concede that a military solution might be unavoidable.

Third, it is striking how diffident Bil'ak was during the meeting with Shelest and how unconvincing his assurances were. Shelest himself noted at several points that Bil'ak seemed to be promising far more than he could deliver, at least at the time. Later on, when Bil'ak finally transmitted the "letter of invitation" to Shelest, it was signed by fewer than a dozen officials, hardly an encouraging sign that an alternative regime could be swiftly established. Yet by mid-August, in the leadup to the invasion, Soviet leaders deluded themselves into believing that the "healthy forces" had "consolidated themselves and now constitute a majority." Shelest's own view may have been less sanguine—not least because in the meeting on 20-21 July, Bil'ak had been "inhibited and guarded" and had "failed to clear up certain matters and to discuss certain things fully"—but Shelest was willing to overlook or at least downplay these concerns in the Politburo's subsequent deliberations.

Fourth, Shelest's account reveals that the "letter of invitation" was more important than often thought. Interestingly, the reason that Soviet leaders wanted the letter well in advance was *not* so that they could foster an appearance of legality around the invasion. They planned to do that instead with a letter to be published in Moscow *Pravda* the day after Soviet troops entered Czechoslovakia, when hardline KSC officials presumably would no longer be hesitant to associate themselves openly with a call for "fraternal assistance." Shelest promised Bil'ak that the initial letter would be kept secret and that the signatories would not be disclosed—a promise that was steadfastly upheld. (The letter was tightly sealed away for 24 years.) It is clear, therefore, that the reason Brezhnev was so intent on securing a letter from Bil'ak was to ensure that the anti-reformist group would consolidate its ranks and act cohesively in the leadup to the invasion and at the moment when Soviet troops entered Czechoslovakia. The "letter of invitation" was thus intended to

establish a "credible commitment" by the hardliners to form an alternative regime.³⁸ As Shelest put it during his secret conversation with Bil'ak:

Wouldn't it be worthwhile if your [hardline] group now wrote a letter to us requesting help? For you, won't this provide a guarantee that you will be bolder and more cohesive in your struggle against the nefarious activities of the rightists, and won't it strengthen your actions?

The hope in Moscow was that if the "healthy forces" took the decisive step of affixing their signatures to a document, they would no longer have any leeway to "opt out" of their projected role in welcoming an invasion.

Fifth, the fact that Shelest was chosen by Brezhnev to play such a sensitive role in late July and early August militates against the notion that there was a power struggle between the two men in 1968. A senior Czechoslovak official in 1968, Zdenek Mlynar, claimed in his first-hand account of the 1968 crisis (published in the West in the late 1970s) that someone on the Soviet Politburo—whom he presumed to be Aleksandr Shelepin—was seeking to exploit the crisis to replace Brezhnev.³⁹ Subsequently, a few Western observers speculated that Shelest might have been the one who was trying to dislodge Brezhnev in 1968. Neither the CPSU Politburo transcripts nor Shelest's diary provides any substantiation for this argument (or for Mlynar's claims about Shelepin⁴⁰). On the contrary, both the transcripts and the diary suggest that, at least in 1968, Brezhnev still looked warmly upon Shelest and was willing to entrust the Ukrainian leader with a vital political function in the preparations for military action. Although Shelest clearly ran afoul of Brezhnev later on and was ousted from the Politburo in 1973, the falling-out between the two seems to have followed, rather than accompanied, the 1968 crisis. It is certainly conceivable that the events of 1968 helped embolden Shelest in the early 1970s and contributed to Brezhnev's perception of a threat from the Ukrainian leader, but there is no evidence that Brezhnev was already seeking to fend off such a challenge in 1968. Had he perceived an urgent threat from Shelest during the Czechoslovak crisis, he never would have selected him for the crucial role of liaison with the "healthy forces."

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Sometime after noon, L. Brezhnev telephoned me from Moscow and said that today, 20 July, I must urgently fly to Budapest, where I would have a meeting and discussion with J. Kadar: "He will tell you everything and what you need to do." And Brezhnev added: "You are to have a meeting on Lake Balaton with Bil'ak. He's vacationing there with a group of Czechoslovak comrades. You must act cautiously and discreetly there so that you don't attract the attention of the rest of the Czechoslovak group. During the meeting with Vasil, act independently and try to gauge what V. Bil'ak's

situation and mood are like." A special military transport plane of the Air Force had left from Moscow at 1:00 p.m. to fly to Kyiv, and I would fly on that plane to Budapest, landing at a military airbase of our Southern Group of Forces. Guards from the KGB, a technician with hidden recording equipment, and my assistant, A. Pakhareno, will fly with me.

From Borispol airport, we left for Budapest at 5:00 p.m. At the military airbase I was met by representatives of the military administration and a representative of the Hungarian Party's CC. One of Kadar's automobiles was driven up to avoid attracting attention with an embassy car, and no one from our embassy met me. Nonetheless, after the meeting with Kadar, I stopped by our embassy and met and talked with Ambassador F. Titov and all the embassy staff. They told me a good deal about the reaction in Hungary to the Czechoslovak events. Hungary itself had many problems of its own, and J. Kadar had to do a lot of finagling.

The meeting with J. Kadar was held in the CC building in his office, in the constant presence of his attractive and charming Nadja. J. Kadar's mood was good, and he was expecting me. At L. Brezhnev's instruction, I conveyed greetings to Kadar from Brezhnev, Podhornyi, Kosygin, and the other members of the Politburo. Kadar thanked me for the greetings and best wishes. Then he and I discussed all matters pertaining to my trip to Lake Balaton to meet with V. Bil'ak. Kadar assigned a trusted aide, the head of the MSzMP CC's International Relations Department, to accompany me.⁴¹ "You'll stay at my dacha," Kadar said. "This will be a good cover. You are my guest. As far as the meeting with Bil'ak is concerned, you yourself must take care of it. He knows that you must fly to Budapest and that you must be on Lake Balaton, but he doesn't know when and where the meeting must take place. You'll need to arrange all of that once you arrive at Lake Balaton."

At L. Brezhnev's instruction, I informed J. Kadar about the recent CPSU CC plenum and about the consideration being given to the plenum documents around the country and in the republics, territories, and provinces.⁴² At the CPSU CC Plenum our delegation's actions at the Warsaw Meeting were endorsed. Kadar, in turn, told me that their CC Presidium had just endorsed the actions of their delegation at the Warsaw Meeting. He has information that overall the Party and the people support measures aimed at regulating the situation in the KSC and the country. Continuing the conversation, Kadar said: "It's too bad that the Czechoslovak comrades so far don't understand or don't want to understand the full seriousness and, above all, the danger for the KSC and their whole country."

Kadar told me that this morning, 20 July, he had spoken for around two hours in the CC with some Czechoslovak comrades, including Svestka, the editor of *Rude pravo*. "The conversation took place by chance under the following circumstances: Our editor of the Party newspaper long ago knew Svestka very well; they even became good friends with one another. For some days with our permission he visited Prague and had detailed conversations there at various levels. Our editor invited Svestka to visit us in Budapest,

where he could meet with journalists and have a bit of a vacation on Balaton.⁴³ Svestka mentioned that the situation was quite complicated in the KSC and the country, as well as in the CC itself and in the mass media, where the rightist elements have seized all the key positions and are successfully carrying out their activities."

After a long but extremely important conversation with J. Kadar, which was very useful in clarifying all points, I left for Balaton. We arrived there when it was already dusk, around 7:00 p.m. local time. We stayed at Kadar's personal dacha. It was a modest, two-story house that was quite comfortable and cozy, and was located on the very shore of the lake. The weather we encountered on Balaton was not very hospitable; it was cold and a strong wind was blowing, causing yellowish-gray waves to rise up on the lake amidst a great roar. I went out onto the shore for a walk in the hope of meeting V. Bil'ak, since the Hungarian comrades had told me that, at the moment, he was out for a walk. Although I also knew which dacha Bil'ak was staying in with his family, I decided not to do there lest I attract the attention of the Czechs.

Time passed, it was already 9:00 p.m., but I hadn't yet succeeded in making contact with Bil'ak. I decided to send my comrades who arrived with me, A. Pakhareno and K. Glushko, to the club to see Bil'ak. They reported to me that Bil'ak was there, and that they, the Czechoslovaks and Hungarians, were having some sort of heated and lively conversation. I had to solicit the help of the Hungarian comrade who had been assigned to me by J. Kadar. He went to the club and discreetly informed Bil'ak that I had arrived and was waiting to meet him at Kadar's dacha. But Bil'ak requested that we arrange to meet on the shore of the lake at 10:00 p.m.

I went out along the shore: It was dark and there was noise from the waves and the wind. It was hard even at a close distance to notice anyone, much less hear his voice distinctly. The designated time passed, and Bil'ak was still not there, when suddenly, close beside me, a man came up. I was about to call out to him "Vasil," but I restrained myself. It turned out that this was a man who had been sent out on a "reconnaissance mission." Within a certain time Vasil himself showed up; I called out to him, and he responded. That is how we met. We initially decided to hold the meeting on the shoreline by Kadar's dacha, but the wind and the noise of the waves on Balaton interfered too much with our talk, and besides that, it was impossible to record our conversation.

We went inside the dacha, and our conversation lasted from 11:00 p.m. until 5:00 in the morning. This is what I heard and recorded, and how I kept track of our discussion and the entire conversation:

In his side of the conversation, V. Bil'ak dwelt mainly on the general situation and the state of affairs in the KSC and in the country as a whole. He said that in the KSC CC and in the country, and especially among rightist elements, the publication of the letter from the five Warsaw Pact countries had caused shock, terror, and even panic. Kriegel had ordered an overseas passport for himself, and Dubcek had

said that the letter was like a knife stabbing him in the heart. In addition to this a nationalist frenzy had surged; they spoke a good deal about how the letter of the five Parties infringed on the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. This gave a strong fillip to anti-Soviet hysteria.

"The situation is such that even the fiercest and most notorious enemies of the Party are ready to support us, the Communists, so long as we are united in opposing the Soviet Union. But Dubcek and Cernik are persuaded that these people support their policy." Continuing the conversation, V. Bil'ak said: "I will frankly tell you that you were quite fortunate in having chosen Warsaw as the place to hold the conference. There are many reasons for this, but one of the most important is the vehement position that Gomulka has adopted toward our leadership.

It is of the utmost importance to hold a bilateral meeting with you, the Soviet Union. If there isn't one in the near future, this might lead to the final rupture and the departure of the KSC from our common line, which means it will collapse. We—and I have in mind here my comrades—are speaking in favor of the soonest possible meeting with you. But you are correct in insisting that you don't want to come to Prague for such a meeting and negotiations. If you were to come to Prague, these 'Schweikists' would think they had triumphed.

I think that they won't come to bilateral negotiations with you with the full membership of the Presidium—they're afraid. Indeed, Cernik, Smrkovsky, Kriegel, and Dubcek are afraid to travel to the Soviet Union at all for a meeting with you: They're afraid that they won't be permitted to go back to Czechoslovakia.⁴⁴ If a bilateral meeting with you is to be held, the issues must be discussed sharply, precisely, and concretely, a timeframe must be set for rectifying the situation in the country, and they must be warned about the possible serious consequences. Undoubtedly, a demand must be put forth to seal off all of Czechoslovakia's borders on the West."

Continuing his line of thought, Bil'ak said: "I say to you personally and directly that you must shield us with your 'umbrella' against the acrimonious attacks of the leaders of Poland and the GDR. These attacks have provoked well-founded annoyance and indignation, since they say a lot that is non-objective."⁴⁵ Bil'ak further said: "Our economy is stretched to the limit; you must give us help through solid credits. Preparations for the 14th KSC Congress are going badly, and we're not sure that we'll be able to win out at this congress; although A. Dubcek is placing all his hopes on victory, there is no basis for such hopes. The KSC statutes are revisionist; rightist elements helped draft them. If we publish these statutes, all the Communist and workers' parties will criticize us and not one of them will come to our congress."⁴⁶

I asked Bil'ak to express his opinion about Smrkovsky. He did so in four words: "He's a political prostitute." He said no more about Smrkovsky at this point. Continuing the conversation, Bil'ak said: "Cernik is under the complete influence of the Yugoslav ambassador; he won't do anything without him and consults with him about all matters. We even

were waiting for Tito to arrive in Prague; we'd prepared a grandiose reception and lavish meeting for him. Tito was at the airport all set to take off, but for some reason, Prague didn't end up receiving him." (V. Bil'ak didn't know the real reason that Prague had declined to receive Tito's plane. Essentially it was because we had expressed an ultimatum against Tito's arrival in Prague, and the leadership in Czechoslovakia became frightened and beat a retreat.⁴⁷)

I asked Bil'ak a question: "Tell me who among you in the KSC CC Presidium supports correct positions, and which of you is it possible to depend on in organizing a strong bloc of healthy forces?" Bil'ak named about a dozen-and-a-half people. Of these, the top spot goes to Indra, Kolder, Svestka, Rigo, Barbirek, J. Piller, and Kapek. Not to mention Bil'ak himself. After that I asked him: "Why haven't you been making a greater effort?" Bil'ak thought a bit and said: "We're afraid that they'll accuse us of betraying the motherland, with all the consequences that implies. We're prepared to support you with all possible means, but we don't know what we need to do." I said to Bil'ak: "We need a letter from you containing your request for assistance. We give a full guarantee that neither the letter nor its authors will be revealed in public." To this, Bil'ak responded: "You must understand our position; we are ashamed that, having done nothing in our country, we are appealing to you for help. What must you think about us?"

Bil'ak continued: "We have certain measures in place, and our devoted, pro-Soviet party activists are mobilized. The Workers' Militia and many military officers support us and, in the event of danger, will come to our defense."⁴⁸ Our program and declaration are all ready to go." (When he was saying all this, I sensed that he was speaking with a degree of ambivalence, and it seemed to me that he was conflating what he wished with what was actually the case.) I said to V. Bil'ak that they are clearly letting the chance slip away to put up an active struggle. "No," said Bil'ak firmly, "we won't permit this. We simply don't have enough forces on our own. We will appeal to you for help." "But wouldn't it be better if your group now wrote us a letter requesting help? For you, won't this provide a guarantee that you will be bolder and more organized in your struggle against the nefarious activities of the rightists, and won't it strengthen your actions?" "Yes, this would strengthen our cohesion and our resolute actions." I openly raised a question with Bil'ak: "Perhaps we could act through Slovakia?"⁴⁹ Bil'ak said: "We'll see; if there's an absolute necessity for that, we can proceed without the Czechs in order to save Czechoslovakia." Bil'ak further said that they had frittered away time, including the moment when they could have put up a resolute struggle against the rightists with their "2000 Words Platform." In response to this I said to Bil'ak: "You made a mistake; you let the moment slip away when you could have strengthened your influence and the solidity of the struggle against the nefarious activities of the rightists, the moment when they refused to take part in the Warsaw Meeting. The KSC CC plenum, which you sought and proposed, essentially gave no greater hopes to you and created even deeper fissures

in the ranks of the KSC.”⁵⁰ In response to this Bil’ak said: “That wasn’t a plenum, it was a carnival or a circus. Pressure was brought to bear against us, and we were unable to do anything at that plenum.” I said to Bil’ak: “Perhaps you can do something at your forthcoming KSC Congress?” He answered: “We will appeal then to you for assistance.” I responded to him: “Your request for assistance might come too late. We need an appeal today.” Bil’ak fell silent in response to this.

Taking the discussion further, he said: “We need a conflict; we can get into gear within a week, but you’re right that time is already working against us. When we gave final consideration to the question of a possible trip to the Soviet Union for negotiations with you, three of them—Cernik, Smrkovsky, and Kriegel—said they’re afraid to travel to Moscow, and Dubcek, for his part, said ‘I won’t go without you.’ That’s how the most important issues and complex questions get decided in our country.”

Bil’ak spoke about “freedom of speech” and the press and cited this instance: “After the ill-fated CC Plenum I returned to Bratislava. Representatives of the press, radio, and cinema asked me what I could say about the recent Warsaw Meeting and the letter from the five Parties of socialist countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact. I said that I had a positive view of the meeting and the letter from the five socialist countries, and that we should pay heed to their voice and their reason. Following this, the entire press assailed me with invective and threats; the radio didn’t broadcast my words; and the television suddenly found that all the lamps in its cameras had ‘burned out.’”

“Everyone of course knows that we have an alliance treaty with you, and indeed the journalists asked Cernik and Smrkovsky to express their views about the Warsaw Pact and the letter from the five socialist countries. Cernik and Smrkovsky were unable to say anything more intelligent than to recommend to the journalists that they not write anything about this anywhere before the 14th of August.” I asked Bil’ak: “What’s so important about the 14th of August?” Bil’ak was unable to answer me directly, but later he said: “Cernik and Smrkovsky said to the journalists: ‘Then you will write about how the Soviet Army is occupying our country.’”

My conversation with V. Bil’ak was open and candid, but nonetheless there was a certain inhibition and guardedness about it, and Vasil failed to clear up certain questions and did not fully discuss certain things.

Dawn came, and we both were exhausted, but both of us were satisfied by the meeting and the conversation we had had. He and I drank a glass of Hungarian port and warmly bid farewell. I promised V. Bil’ak that I would personally convey to L. Brezhnev the content of our entire meeting and our whole discussion, as well as give a presentation about it to the CPSU CC Politburo.

EXCERPT No. 4

Shelest’s Account of the Transfer of the “Letter of Invitation”

In early August 1968 a small group of pro-Moscow hardliners in the KSC, led by Vasil Bil’ak, prepared a written appeal for urgent military assistance from the Soviet Union to thwart an imminent “counterrevolution” in Czechoslovakia. As shown above, Soviet leaders had been urging Bil’ak for some time to turn over such a document. One of the signatories of the appeal, Antonin Kapek, had already written a letter of his own to Brezhnev in late July in which he deplored the “anti-socialist and anti-Soviet” trends in Czechoslovakia and requested “fraternal assistance” from the Soviet Union. Kapek’s letter, however, evidently had little or no impact. The collective “letter of invitation” that was transmitted to Brezhnev on 3 August at the Bratislava conference proved to be far more significant.⁵¹

The passages below from Shelest’s diary reveal how the collective “letter of invitation” was conveyed by the KSC hardliners to Brezhnev. Some of this story has been known since the early 1990s, but the account here adds some crucial information. In particular, Shelest’s diary provides strong reason to believe that more than one “letter of invitation” was handed over to the Soviet Politburo, most likely at different times. The letter that was released from the Russian Presidential Archive in July 1992 contained only five signatures: those of Bil’ak, Alois Indra, Drahomir Kolder, Oldrich Svestka, and Antonin Kapek. By contrast, Shelest reports that eleven KSC officials signed the letter. In addition to the five who were previously known to have signed the document, the signatories mentioned by Shelest include Frantisek Barbirek, Emil Rigo, Jan Piller, Karel Hoffmann, Jozef Lenart, and Lubomir Strougal. The appearance of Strougal’s name among the signatories is particularly striking. Although Strougal never was a supporter of the Prague Spring, he had not yet taken a vigorous public stance against the reforms. Documents released from the Czechoslovak archives in 1990 revealed that Strougal had been pursuing secret contacts with Brezhnev in the leadup to the invasion, but Shelest’s diary indicates that Strougal’s complicity in the military action was even greater than had been suspected.

Five weeks after the invasion, on 25 September 1968, Kapek’s letter and the collective appeals were transferred to the Kremlin archive and locked up in a folder stamped “TOP SECRET” and marked with personal instructions from the head of the CPSU CC General Department, Konstantin Chernenko: “To be preserved in the Politburo Archive. Not to be opened without my express permission.” For many years afterwards, one or more letters were thought to exist, but no one except Bil’ak and the members of the CPSU Politburo was quite sure how many had signed and who the signatories were, or even whether such documents had actually been sent to Moscow. Not

until July 1992, when Russian president Boris Yeltsin gave the Czechoslovak government a copy of one of the collective letters and of Kapek's earlier appeal, was the existence of these documents finally confirmed. Several observers in Czechoslovakia, citing materials from the KSC archives, speculated at the time that more than one collective letter must have been turned over in 1968. Some evidence supporting that notion had surfaced as early as 1989.⁵² This contemporary account by Shelest, who was the actual conduit for the letter at Bratislava, leaves little doubt that at least two (and perhaps more) collective letters were dispatched to the CPSU Politburo as the number of signatories gradually increased.

.....

On 1 August 1968 we were at the border station of Chop. From there we were due to go to Bratislava. This is the first time I've ridden by train to Czechoslovakia. We will be passing by the Lower Tatra mountains, one of the most beautiful spots in the Czechoslovak Republic.⁵³ Aside from the meeting itself among the fraternal Parties, I'm particularly eager to link up with V. Bil'ak to receive the letter that is of such great interest to us. During one of my conversations with Bil'ak in Cierna, he told me that he'll have the letter and will transmit it to me. It's very difficult to believe there will be positive results from the Bratislava meeting. It would be nice if there were such results, but things have gone so far already that you can't believe anything.

Late in the evening I managed to link up and speak with V. Bil'ak. All of this was done after taking great precautions. I reminded Bil'ak that we were awaiting the letter promised by him and his group. During the conversation with me, Bil'ak was very ill at ease and disturbed by something, but he did not renege on his promise and requested only that he be given a bit more time, until the following day. Bil'ak was not entirely clear in indicating the reason for this delay. I consulted with our liaison, Savchenko, a KGB employee, and he knew that I must receive a letter from Bil'ak. We decided to wait for a while and give Bil'ak more time to snap into action, since the step he was taking was important and risky.

Toward evening [of 3 August] I met again with Bil'ak, and he and I arranged that at 8:00 p.m. he would go into the public lavatory, and that I also should show up there at that time. He would then transmit the letter to me via our KGB employee, Savchenko. This is precisely what happened. We met "by chance" in the lavatory, and Savchenko inconspicuously transferred from his hand to mine an envelope containing the long-awaited letter. It assessed the situation in the KSC and the country, the nefarious activities of rightist elements, and the political and psychological terror being waged against Communists, that is, people supporting correct positions. The gains of socialism are under threat. An anti-Soviet frenzy has overtaken the country, and the economy and politics of Czechoslovakia are fully oriented toward the West.

A very alarming and complicated situation has emerged in the country. The letter expresses a request that if circumstances so warrant, we should intervene to block the path of counter-revolution and prevent the outbreak of civil war and bloodshed. The letter was signed by Indra, Bil'ak, Kolder, Barbirek, Kapek, Rigo, Piller, Svestka, Hoffmann, Lenart, and Strougal.⁵⁴

Aside from me and the authors of the letter I'd received, no one knew about the contents of the document. Finally, the [top-level] commission finished its work, and Brezhnev appeared. I went up to him and said, "Leonid Ilyich! I have good news." He somehow pricked up his ears, and I hurried to tell him that I'd received the letter from Bil'ak. I then gave the letter to Brezhnev. He took it with his hands trembling and his face pale. . . . While I was handing over the letter to Brezhnev, he expressed gratitude to me by saying: "Many thanks to you, Petro; we won't forget this."

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¹ *Da ne sudimy budete: Dnevnikovye zapisi, vospominaniya chlena Politbyuro TsK KPSS* (Moscow: Kvintessentsiya, 1995).

² Shelest's large personal archive in Moscow, amounting to 135 voluminous files, is stored in Fond (F.) 666 of what is now known as Rossiiskii Tsentri Khraneniya i Izucheniya Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (RTsKhIDNI). For a brief summary of the contents of Fond 666, see RTsKhIDNI, *Putevoditel' po fondam i kolleksiyam lichnogo proiskhozhdeniya* (Moscow: RTsKhIDNI, 1996), pp. 321-322. I am grateful to Shelest's son Vitalii (a distinguished theoretical physicist), who has arranged for me to have unrestricted access to Fond 666 as well as all of Shelest's materials stored in Ukrainian repositories.

³ For typical denials by Shelest in the waning years of the Soviet regime, see "Cheloveku svoistvenno oshibatsya . . . : Uroki istorii," *Komsomol'skaya pravda* (Moscow), 19 October 1989, p. 2; "Petr Shelest: 'On umel vesti apparatnye igry, a stranu zabrosil,'" in Yu. V. Aksyutin, ed., *L. I. Brezhnev: Materialy k biografii* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991), pp. 217-218; and "Brezhnev u ya tak i skazal: 'Ty plokhio konchish'," in Andrei Karulov, *Vokrug kremlya*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Slovo, 1993), Vol. 1, pp. 121-123.

⁴ Grey Hodnett and Peter J. Potichnyj, *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis*, Occasional Paper No. 6 (Canberra: Australian National University's Research School of Social Sciences, 1970), p. 2.

⁵ "TsK KPSS," Memorandum No. 15782, 1/51 (Secret), 11 June 1968, from P. Shelest, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, to the CPSU Secretariat, in Tsentri Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Moscow, Fond (F.) 5, Opis' (Op.) 60, Delo (D.) 1, Listy (Ll.) 86-90.

⁶ "Zapis' peregovorov s delegatsiei ChSSR 4 maya 1968 goda," 4 May 1968 (Top Secret), in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), Moscow, F. 3, Op. 91, D. 100 L. 31.

⁷ "Zaznam jednani presednictva UV KSC a UV KSSS v Cierna n. T., 29.7-1.8.1968," 1 August 1968 (Top Secret), in Statni Ustredni Archiv, Prague, Archiv Ustredniho Vyboru KSC, F. 07/15, Svazek (Sv.) 12, Archivna jednotka (A.j.) 274, Ll. 297-298.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Ll. 311, 313.

⁹ From the mid-1940s through the mid- to late 1950s, underground nationalist groups in western Ukraine put up armed resistance against the Soviet security forces. Much the same occurred in Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. An enormous amount of declassified documentation pertaining to these campaigns has been released since 1991 in the Baltic republics and Ukraine (in Kyiv, L'viv, Kharkiv, and numerous other cities). The resurgence of underground nationalist activity in 1967-68 is highlighted in the Soviet KGB's massive, top-secret history of its own activities, edited by V. M. Chebrikov *et al.*, *Istoriya sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti* No. 12179, Moscow, 1977, pp. 543-545.

¹⁰ The officials mentioned here are Leonid Ovcharenko and Mykhailo Tsvetkov.

¹¹ Shelest is referring here to Jan Koscelansky, a senior Slovak Communist Party official. In Russian or Ukrainian, Koscelansky's first initial should have been "Ya," not "A."

¹² For Shelest's lengthy account of this meeting, see Excerpt No. 2 below.

¹³ See Document No. 2 in the collection of documents from the Ukrainian archives to be published in the next CWIHP *Bulletin*.

¹⁴ For further complaints about this matter from the Chernihiv party secretary, see the memorandum from Shelest cited in Note 5 *supra*.

¹⁵ This sentiment corresponded to the views of students in Odessa before the invasion, as discussed in a secret KGB report; see "Studenchestvo i sobytiya v Chekhoslovakii," transmitted by Yu. Andropov, 5 November 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 48, Ll. 120, 148-150. (Excerpted translation available in CWIHP *Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994) p. 67-8.) Curiously, Shelest chose not to mention these incidents in his initial report to the CPSU Politburo on reactions in Ukraine to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The report suggested that everyone in Ukraine had approved of the military action. See "Tsentral'nyi Komitet KPSS: Informatsiya o reagirovanii trudyashchikhsya Ukrainskoi SSR na sobytiya v Chekhoslovakii," Report No. 1/89 (Secret), from P. Shelest, 22 August 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 1, Ll. 17-21.

¹⁶ Shelest is referring here to the negotiations held on 23-26 August, which culminated in the signing of the Moscow Protocol.

¹⁷ See Document No. 30 in the collection of documents from the Ukrainian archives to be published in the next CWIHP *Bulletin*.

¹⁸ "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 6 maya 1968," 6 May 1968 (Top Secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 45, D. 99, L. 218.

¹⁹ On the 27th, Shelest conveyed his report orally in a phone call to Brezhnev; see "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 27-ogo maya 1968 g.," 27 May 1968 (Top Secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 45, D. 99, Ll. 270-274. He followed up with a written report on the 29th.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, L. 268.

²¹ Shelest followed up on these themes many times in June and July, as is evident from the collection of documents to be published in the next issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*.

²² *Ibid.*, L. 275.

²³ As noted above, Shelest is referring here to Jan (not A.) Koscelansky.

²⁴ See Document No. 4 in the collection of documents from the Ukrainian archives to be published in the next CWIHP *Bulletin*.

²⁵ Most likely, these concerns about secrecy were attributable mainly to Bil'ak, not Koscelansky. Documents from the Ukrainian archives in the next issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin* show that Koscelansky was not as preoccupied with secrecy as Bil'ak

was in his contacts with Soviet officials.

²⁶ As elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, Czechoslovakia underwent a rapid process of forced collectivization in the early 1950s, which caused great upheaval and bloodshed. Peasants who tried to resist were simply branded as "kulaks" (wealthy farmers), leaving them vulnerable to persecution, arrest, and confiscation of all their property. Although rural areas in Czechoslovakia were not as heavily affected by the Prague Spring as urban areas were, demands were soon raised in 1968 for the rectification of injustices committed against farmers. Proposed remedies included rehabilitation and compensation of the roughly 30,000 peasants who had been unjustly accused of being "kulaks" and the return of property that had been illegally confiscated. Although Czechoslovak leaders ruled out the possibility of doing away with collectivization, anti-reformist members of the KSC began complaining (as Bil'ak does here) that genuine kulaks were reemerging to exploit the situation. It turned out, however, that the proposals for rehabilitation and compensation were never implemented, and the Soviet invasion put an end to any further consideration of the matter.

²⁷ The notion that reformist officials in Prague had formed a "second center" outside the Communist Party, which they would convert into a "counterrevolutionary underground," was a common theme in Soviet and anti-reformist KSC propaganda in 1968. This alleged "second center" would have included such figures as Frantisek Kriegel, Cestmir Cisar, Josef Spacek, Vaclav Slavik, Bohumil Simon, Vaclav Prchlik, Jiri Pelikan, Ota Sik, and Jiri Hajek. The interior minister, Josef Pavel, also was regarded as belonging to this group.

²⁸ In Soviet parlance, World War II was known as the "Great Patriotic War" (*Velikaya otechestvennaya voina*).

²⁹ The Russian word "pup" literally means "navel," but the phrase "pup mira" (as used by Bil'ak) is appropriately translated as "hub of the world." Bil'ak's play on the literal meaning of the word therefore does not come through in the translation.

³⁰ Shelest mistakenly gives Drahomir Kolder's first initial as "O" rather than "D."

³¹ Shelest misspells Jozef Lenart's surname as "Lopart" and gives an incorrect first initial (Zh).

³² Shelest mistakenly gives Jan Janik's surname as Jasik. It is remotely possible that he was referring to Ladislav Jasik (who was then the head of the Slovak National Council's Economics Department), but it is far more likely that he meant Janik. (The information provided by Shelest is too general to make a conclusive identification.)

³³ Shelest mistakenly lists Alois Indra's first initial as "Zh" rather than "A."

³⁴ Shelest temporarily has shifted back to his own observations here rather than recording what Bil'ak said.

³⁵ In fact, this department (formally known as the State Administrative Department) had not yet been disbanded. The KSC Action Program, adopted in April 1968, pledged to eliminate the State Administrative Department, which had been a notorious organ of repression under Dubcek's predecessor, Antonin Novotny. Not until late July, however, was this proposal actually implemented. Bil'ak must have been referring to the proposal, not to the implementation of it.

³⁶ At the time, most Soviet leaders would not have placed Josef Smrkovsky in this group. Although they were wary of Smrkovsky, they believed that he and Dubcek might still be willing to heed Soviet demands.

³⁷ The Polish transcript of the Warsaw Meeting, "Protokol ze spotkania przywocow partii i rzadow krajow socjalistycznych—

Bulgarii, NRD, Polski, Wegier i ZSRR—w Warszawie, 14-15 lipca 1968 r.," Copy No. 5 (Top Secret), 14-15 July 1968, in Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), Arch. KC PZPR, P. 193, T. 24, Dok. 4, shows why this shift would have occurred. The Warsaw Meeting proved to be a turning point in the crisis in many respects. It marked the first time that Hungarian officials, including Janos Kadar, joined with their East German, Polish, and Bulgarian counterparts in expressing profound doubts about the ability of the Czechoslovak authorities to regain control of events. Kadar even pledged, in a conversation with Brezhnev, that "if a military occupation of Czechoslovakia becomes necessary, [Hungary] will take part without reservation." See "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 3 iyulya 1968 g.," 3 July 1968 (Top Secret) in APRF, F. 3, Op. 45, L. 367. The Warsaw meeting also marked the first time that Soviet officials who had earlier adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude began roundly condemning the Prague Spring and calling for "extreme measures." Far more than at previous gatherings of Warsaw Pact leaders in 1968, the option of military intervention loomed prominently throughout the deliberations in Warsaw.

³⁸ The concept of "credible commitments" in international politics is developed at length in the works of Thomas C. Schelling, among others. See, for example, Schelling's *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 22-52; and *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 35-91, 116-125. For a concise game-theoretic analysis of the concept, see David M. Kreps, *Game Theory and Economic Modeling* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 45-72.

³⁹ Zdenek Mlynar, *Nacht frost: Erfahrungen auf dem Weg vom realen zum menschlichen Sozialismus* (Koln: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1978), pp. 187-188.

⁴⁰ The CPSU Politburo transcripts reveal that even a senior Czechoslovak official like Mlynar had no idea about the real alignment of forces in Moscow *vis-a-vis* Czechoslovakia. The transcripts indicate that Shelepin adhered to a relatively cautious position during the crisis, which was largely similar to Brezhnev's position. The most vehement supporter of military intervention was consistently Yurii Andropov (whom Brezhnev elevated to full membership on the Politburo in 1973), followed closely by Shelest, Mykola Podhornyi, and Dmitrii Ustinov (whom Brezhnev later elevated to full membership on the Politburo and the post of defense minister).

⁴¹ At the time, the head of the MSzMP Central Committee Department of International Relations was Andras Gyenes, who had been appointed to that post a month earlier.

⁴² Shelest is referring here to the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 17 July. The session was convened to endorse the Soviet delegation's performance at the Warsaw Meeting. For a full, top-secret transcript of the meeting as well as accompanying documents, see "Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS—17 iyulya 1968 g.," 17 July 1968 (Top Secret), and "Materialy k protokolu zasedaniya Plenuma TsK KPSS," July 1968 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 3, Dd. 211-214 and Op. 4, Dd. 133-136, respectively.

⁴³ For top-secret cables from Soviet diplomats in Hungary assessing Oldrich Svestka's visit to Budapest in July 1968, see the relevant items in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, Dd. 30, 32, and 33.

⁴⁴ Bil'ak is overstating the case here, but it is true that some concerns existed about the prospect of not being allowed to return to Czechoslovakia. These sentiments were spurred in part by memories of what happened on the eve of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in November 1956, when a delegation of senior

Hungarian military officials were suddenly arrested by Soviet KGB troops during what were supposed to be negotiations about a Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary. The head of the Hungarian delegation, General Pal Maleter, who had recently been appointed national defense minister, was imprisoned for twenty months and then executed.

⁴⁵ Bil'ak's statements here about Polish and East German leaders provide important evidence that there was little attempt made by the KSC hardliners to forge a direct alliance with Ulbricht or Gomulka. Instead, Bil'ak's group worked almost exclusively with the Soviet Union. Previously, some Western analysts, notably Jiri Valenta in his *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: The Anatomy of a Decision*, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), had argued (without citing specific documentation) that there was direct and active collaboration between the KSC hardliners and the East German and Polish authorities. This excerpt tends to undercut Valenta's claim.

⁴⁶ The draft KSC statutes were published as a supplement to *Rude pravo* on 10 August. Local and regional party elections in Czechoslovakia in early and mid-July for the KSC's upcoming 14th Congress had given an overwhelming share of seats to reform-minded officials.

⁴⁷ It is unclear whether Shelest is referring to a specific incident here or a more general statement by the Soviet leadership. In any event, Tito arrived in Prague on 9 August and was accorded a lavish welcome, so the Soviet "ultimatum" may not have been as efficacious as Shelest had evidently believed.

⁴⁸ Bil'ak is underestimating the growth of reformist sentiment among senior military officers, but it is true that on 21 June 1968 a "letter to the Soviet people" from the KSC People's Militia, the paramilitary units who were traditionally among the most orthodox, pro-Soviet elements of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, had been published in the Soviet press. The letter and a resolution were approved on 19 June at a nationwide gathering in Prague of some 10,000 to 12,000 members of the People's Militia. According to the declassified transcript of Brezhnev's speech at the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 17 July 1968, the People's Militia conference was convened on the basis of the Soviet Union's "repeated recommendations and urgent advice." See "Rech' tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva," in "Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS—17 iyulya 1968 g.," L. 18. Newly declassified documents (e.g., the items in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 1, Ll. 101-104 and D. 24, Ll. 104-126) also reveal that a highly publicized campaign of letter-writing by Soviet "workers" in support of the KSC People's Militia in late June and early July was entirely orchestrated by the CPSU CC Propaganda Department.

⁴⁹ It is not entirely clear what Shelest had in mind here. Soviet leaders assumed, with some justification, that support for the Prague Spring was stronger in the Czech lands than in Slovakia, and that the Slovak Communist Party was a more orthodox Marxist-Leninist party than the KSC was. (Bil'ak had said to Shelest during their first meeting on 24 May 1968 that "we, the Slovaks, will fight to the end in the struggle for a Marxist-Leninist line in the party; we won't retreat a single step. It's obvious that we, the Slovaks, together with you will again have to liberate the Czechs." This latter point was virtually identical to a statement by Koscelansky during a conversation with Il'nyts'kyi on 14 May. See Document No. 8 in the collection of documents from the Ukrainian archives in the next CWIHP *Bulletin*.) Even so, it is doubtful that these differences alone would have provided much basis for action. After all, Alexander

Dubcek himself was a Slovak, and the Prague Spring held out the promise of fulfilling Slovak demands for federalized representation and greater autonomy. Shelest may have been implying that the Soviet Union could exploit latent Slovak desires for outright independence. During the closing months of World War II, when Slovakia was still an independent entity, some prominent members of the Slovak Communist Party had proposed to Stalin that Slovakia be absorbed as a union-republic of the Soviet Union, rather than being reintegrated with Bohemia and Moravia in a Czechoslovak state. Stalin did not take up this suggestion, but Shelest may have believed that something roughly similar could be pursued if no other options were left.

⁵⁰ Dubcek hastily convened an extraordinary plenum of the KSC Central Committee on 19 July to approve the KSC Presidium's response to the Warsaw Letter. The Warsaw Letter had been addressed to the KSC Central Committee, but Dubcek initially handled it within the KSC Presidium, at a session on 16-17 July. Using a draft prepared by Cestmir Cisar and Zdenek Mlynar, the Presidium adopted a point-by-point response to the Warsaw Letter. The final document, entitled "Stanovisko Predsednictva UV KSC k dopisu peti komunistickyh a delnickyh stran," was not originally intended for publication, but after the Soviet Union and the other participants in the Warsaw Meeting unexpectedly published their collective letter on 18 July—despite Dubcek's urgings that the matter be handled quietly—Czechoslovak leaders realized they would have to publish a full reply. They did so the following day (19 July), the same day that the extraordinary plenum of the KSC Central Committee voted unanimously in support of the Presidium's actions.

⁵¹ See my translation of the letter released in July 1992 in "A Letter to Brezhnev: The Czech Hardliners' 'Request' for Soviet

Intervention, August 1968," *Cold War International History Bulletin*, Issue No. 2 (Fall 1992), p. 35. The text of the letter released in 1992 is clearly identical to the version that Brezhnev received on 3 August 1968, but Shelest's diary indicates that the two documents are not the same (i.e., more than one collective letter was sent to Brezhnev), as explained below.

⁵² For example, in a detailed, first-hand account of the Prague Spring published in Hungary in 1989, Janos Kadar recalled that the collective letter had been signed by eighteen, not five, KSC officials. See "Yanosh Kadar o 'prazhskei vesne'," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 7 (May 1990), p. 102. Kadar first saw the letter during a hastily convened meeting in Moscow on 18 August (when Brezhnev informed Hungarian, East German, Polish, and Bulgarian leaders about the previous day's decision by the CPSU Politburo to send troops into Czechoslovakia on the night of 20/21 August), so it is possible that by the 18th Bil'ak would have dispatched another letter to Moscow (perhaps via the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Stepan Chervonenko) with seven additional signatories.

⁵³ The Tatra mountains, located in the central portion of the Carpathian mountain range along the Slovakian-Polish border, include the highest peak in the Carpathians, Mt. Gerlachovka.

⁵⁴ Shelest lists the surname "Kofman" rather than Hoffmann, but he clearly meant Karel Hoffmann, a notorious hardliner who abetted the Soviet invasion. No official with the name Kofman was around at the time.

Potichnyj Collection on Ukrainian Resistance Opens in Toronto

"The Peter J. Potichnyj (PJP) Collection on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine" has been officially opened and is available for use by interested scholars. Carol Moore, Director of the Robarts Library at the University of Toronto, and Robert E. Johnson, Director of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto, officially opened the PJP Collection on 18 March 1997 at the Petro Jacyk Slavic and East European Resource Centre of Robarts Library. The PJP Collection, as its name implies, contains two large groups of documents: those representing the Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine during the period 1941-1954.

Insurgency in Ukraine

The Insurgency documents fall into six groups, depending on their origin, and relate directly to the Ukrainian Liberation Movement. Most of them are on paper, but some are on film and a large number of these documents are immediately accessible to scholars. A very rough count estimates this group as containing over 100,000 pages of documents.

1. A group of 16 microfilm reels that contain documents from the Polish Ministry of Public Security (Ministerstwo Bezpieczenstwa Publicznego) covering underground activities in the ethnically Ukrainian territories of Poland from 1945 until 1948. This collection is often called the Onyshkevych Papers because they were used in the military trial against him and because each document carries his signature. (Myroslav Onyshkevych was the military commander of the UPA—Ukrainian Insurgent Army—Military Okruha Nr. 6 "Sian".) These are underground documents and only two microfilm reels belong to the Counter-Insurgency category. Call Number: DK/508/.79/P482/1990 MICR mfm reel. 1-16.

2. A group of documents from the Archive of Misiia UPA in Germany. These documents cover the period 1943-1951 and were brought by couriers from Ukraine. They were in the possession of Dr. Lev Rebet, a noted Ukrainian revolutionary, who was assassinated by a Soviet agent. A list of these documents is available, but due to their fragile nature they cannot be made available at this time.

3. The third group of documents is contained in 28 volumes of the *Litopys UPA* (Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), Old Series, edited by P.J. Potichnyj and Ie. Shtendera (Toronto: Litopys, 1976-1997). These volumes contain underground documents that were deposited in the Archive of the ZP UHVR (Foreign Representation of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council) of New York City. Each volume has an introduction and summaries of documents in English as well as an index. A New Series of the *Litopys UPA*, which is based on the rich archival holdings in Ukraine has appeared in a volume that was published in Kiev in 1995 through the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the Chief Archival Directorate of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, is also part of the PJP Collection. The *Litopys UPA* is currently being prepared for the Internet and can be reached at the following address: <http://www.infoukes.com/commercial/litopys-upa/index.html>.

4. The fourth group contains the published and as yet unpublished materials of the *Litopys UPA*, such as memoir materials, which contain very interesting, personal accounts of the underground struggle. These papers are currently being processed and will be available to scholars in the near future.

5. The fifth group of documents contains archival holdings of the two veteran organizations of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army of the USA and Canada. Of special interest are the papers of Wolodymyr Makar, who played a visible role in the anti-German resistance, and especially his wide correspondence with various Ukrainian political figures. These materials are in the process of being classified and will be available to scholars sometime in the near future.

6. The sixth item is immediately and completely accessible. This is a microfilm of the Toronto newspaper *Homin Ukrainy*, and includes some 50 reels. It contains much that is of direct value to the collection, such as the special page "Voiaats'ka Vatra", edited by the late Wolodymyr Makar.

Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine

1. The first group of materials covers the years 1941-1945 and pertains to the counter-insurgency activities of the German occupational forces. These documents, some 100 reels of microfilm, come mostly from the National Archives of the United States in Washington, D.C., and represent a portion of the documents that were seized by the Allies at the end of World War II. These documents can be used almost immediately. They contain not only counter-insurgency material, but also some underground material in German translation. Here one will also find a wealth of material on the activities of the notorious Einsatzgruppen against the Jews and Ukrainians. Some materials from this collection have already been published in three volumes under the title: "The UPA in Light of German Documents" in the *Litopys UPA* series. There are also a number of paper documents that come from various German archives, mostly from Koblenz, but they still need to be catalogued.

2. The second group of the Counter-Insurgency documents comes directly from Soviet archives. This collection of over 150,000 pages of documents, on 428 reels of film, covers the activities of the NKVD-NKGB, and the MVD-MGB internal forces of the Ukrainian Okrug against the Ukrainian Liberation Movement during the years 1944-1954. After Ukraine proclaimed independence in August 1990, this archive was removed to Moscow. With the assistance of the Ukrainian Government, a microfilm copy of the archive was returned to Kiev. A second complete copy of this invaluable archive is now a part of the PJP Collection.

This collection contains detailed operational information on the activities of Soviet internal forces against the Ukrainian underground. It will give researchers an opportunity to learn not only how the Soviet security apparatus actually functioned in the seven *oblasti* of Western Ukraine, but also many other details about the underground itself, including its tactics, its successes and failures, its leading personalities, its heroes and traitors, etc. For example, in these documents there are over 400 detailed drawings of underground hideouts and bunkers. Based on this information, a book is being prepared under the title *Architecture of Resistance: Hideouts and Bunkers of the Ukrainian Underground in KGB Documents*. Call number: DK/508/.79/P48/1994 MICR mfm reel. 1-60, 70-437.

3. A third group contains Soviet paper documents which come from the Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromads'kykh Ob'ednan' Ukrainy (State Archive of Community Organizations of Ukraine) in Kiev, the former Central Party Archive. These are largely political decisions pertaining to the underground, reports by the Obkom First Secretaries, orders from the top, speeches by N.S. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders, summaries of Soviet and underground casualties, the deportation of the civilian population, etc. A list of these documents is currently being prepared.

The PJP Collection is a unique archival holding of great value that brings together both sides of the story on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine, 1941-1954. All interested scholars of the early Cold War period are invited to take advantage of this historic collection.

Report From Sarajevo : The Bosnian Archives Survive

By *Jim Hershberg*

The cover of *Glasnik*, the official journal of the archives of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, starkly captures the impact of the four-year war on archival holdings, historical research, and other such civilized endeavors: it pictures a close-up of a wrecked building, with twisted metal grating surrounding a gaping hole, inside which one can see a bomb atop an ancient historical document.¹

In August 1997, I visited Sarajevo on behalf of the Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive in order to meet with archival authorities and scholars in the Bosnian capital, to establish contacts for CWIHP and the Archive, to ascertain the prospects for future scholarly collaboration, and to obtain information regarding the condition of the Bosnian archives and their availability for research—if, indeed, they had survived the war and the Serb siege which lasted from March 1992 until the Dayton Accords ended the fighting (at least temporarily) in late 1995.²

Two days of conversations and meetings yielded more positive assessments than one might expect, given the years of bloody fighting that killed and maimed hundreds of thousands of Bosnians, destroyed thousands of homes and buildings, and left the country a divided, angry, smoldering wreck—littered with millions of landmines, divided into ethnic enclaves (a “Serb Republic” and a still largely theoretical Bosnian-Croat federation), and patrolled by an international military force trying to prevent the tensions from re-igniting all-out war. The good news is, first of all, that despite serious damage and disarray caused by the fighting and the division of the country, the Bosnian archives still exist and that the records of the post-World War II Bosnian government and communist party in Sarajevo survived the war; and second of all, there are no legal barriers to unhindered scholarly research into these materials, according to Matko Kovacevic, Director of the Archives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and his deputy, Slobodan Kristic, whom I interviewed in their offices in the Bosnian government headquarters building on Marshal Tito Boulevard.³ At the same time, the archivists said, little if any work along these lines had taken place since the cease-fire due to the lack of international scholarly interest in conducting such research; to limited resources on the part of Bosnian archival authorities to consolidate, repair, and organize collections; to legal confusion and uncertainty over access rules; and, of course, to the higher priority of other reconstruction projects.

Although many materials had been lost, Kovacevic and Kristic said, archivists had managed to preserve most of the records of the Yugoslav-era Bosnian government

and communist party—prior to Yugoslavia’s disintegration in 1991-2, Bosnia and Herzegovina had constituted one of the country’s six federated republics, along with Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Montenegro—by dispersing them at the beginning of the war to four different sites. Even though those buildings sustained varying levels of damage, Kovacevic said, the documents were kept below ground where they reportedly escaped destruction. To illustrate this unorthodox preservation method, the two archivists, accompanied by a Yale University doctoral candidate in history, Attila Hoare, who was in Sarajevo to research a dissertation on World War II Bosnian partisan activities and kindly helped translate during my visit, escorted me to the underground archives in the bullet-scarred government building in which we were meeting. There, in the musty warren of crowded shelves and pulpy aromas common to pre-electronic archives, several staff members of the archive spread out some yellowing documents and matter-of-factly confirmed that they had continued to work regularly at the archive throughout the four-year Serb siege, despite regular sniping and shelling outside.

Kovacevic and Kristic said that, in principle, Bosnian communist party documents for the period 1945-1977 were freely available in the state archives, although no researchers had worked in them since the war and the collections remained largely disorganized; as for more recent party materials, they were said to be temporarily in the possession of the CP’s successor, the Bosnian Social Democratic Party, pending transfer to the Bosnian National Archives when resources and circumstances permit. For the time being, access was said to be “not a problem,” although the SDP was not under any legal obligation to open the materials.⁴ They also said that until 1974, most important decisions in Bosnia-Herzegovina (at least those left to Sarajevo by the central government in Belgrade) were made by the party rather than the state, but that after that date state ministries and authorities exerted greater power. These post-1974 state materials, the archivists said, are open (again, in principle), but not well-organized, and many state documents for the period 1960-1990 had been lost in the war.

Kovacevic said that despite archives receiving some limited assistance (notably from the Soros Foundation, which underwrote the publication of the archives journal referred to above), the Bosnian-Herzegovinian archives desperately need help to recover from the war, for such basic requirements as microfilm equipment, computers, education, photocopiers, catalogs, “everything.” Sitting in a darkened, empty office, Kovacevic noted what he said were two typical examples of the sad straits of the archives amidst the war’s debris: a project on the holdings from the Austro-Hungarian period had to be abandoned and a lack of contacts with international archival colleagues reached a nadir when he was denied a visa to attend a conference in London. As for Bosnia’s archival relations within the former Yugoslavia, Kovacevic said

some contacts had taken place with Croatian and Slovenian colleagues, but that such exchanges had not yet occurred with Serbian archivists in Belgrade.

Other archival and scholarly centers in Sarajevo also appeared hungry for foreign aid and contacts. From a brief visit and conversation with staff members (the director was absent), I gathered that the Sarajevo Municipal Archives, whose collections were said to include the city's communist party records from the Yugoslav period, was at an early stage of reorganization and reconstruction after the war.⁵ Furthermore, scholars interested in modern Bosnian history and Bosnian-Soviet/Russian relations, or simply in initiating exchanges with colleagues and students struggling to maintain academic life amid hardship and ruin, may wish to contact Prof. Ibrahim Tepic in the History Department at Sarajevo University. During a relaxed evening conversation over Cokes and tea in an office building with blown-out windows, Prof. Tepic and his colleagues expressed enthusiasm at the prospect of visits from foreign scholars and collaborative work in Bosnian archives and sources.⁶

Probably the best method of arranging a research trip to Sarajevo, of course, would be to contact local archivists and scholars for help. The Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive look forward to working with colleagues (both historians and archivists) in Bosnia, as well as in other parts of the former Yugoslavia and in Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, and Turkey, as part of their joint project on the Cold War in the Balkans. The project seeks to gather new sources and perspectives on events in southeastern Europe from the end of World War II through the beginning of the Yugoslav war of 1991-2, including such topics as the Greek Civil War, the Stalin-Tito split, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Scholars interested in participating in the project—which is slated to encompass conferences and publications—should contact CWIHP and the National Security Archive.

Jim Hershberg, the former CWIHP Director, is assistant professor of history and international relations at The George Washington University, and editor of the CWIHP book series.

1 *Glasnik: Arhiva i Društva Arhivskih Radnika Bosne i Hercegovine*, XXXII/1992-93 and XXXIII/1994-95 (financed by Soros Foundation) Arhivu R/F Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo, tel 071/640-175. The journal was designed and printed at amh studio 9, Livanjska Broj 32, Sarajevo BiH; tel. 071/440-824; tel./fax 071/655-841. According to the journal's editor, Matko Kovacevic, a 1997 issue was scheduled for publication, but had not yet appeared by the time of my visit in August.

2 I am grateful to CWIHP and the National Security Archive for their support in enabling this visit, which marked the final leg of a survey trip to former communist countries in the summer of 1997 that included stops in Laos, Vietnam, Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Russia, Moldova, and others. Materials gathered during these visits, by Mark Kramer, David Wolff,

Vladislav Zubok, and myself, will appear in future CWIHP *Bulletins*.

3 Bosnia and Herzegovina National Archives: Matko Kovacevic, Director Arhiva BiH; Kristic Slobodan, Deputy (Assistant) Director; Anto Marsanovic, Direktor Arhiva Federacije; Address: Reisa Causevica 6, Sarajevo 71000 BiH Tel/fax: 071/640-175.

4 I visited the SDP's headquarters at 41 Alipasina street near the U.S. Embassy in an effort to clarify the situation but was unable to meet with anyone in authority who could describe research regulations and conditions. Scholars interested in further information may contact the SDP-BiH [Socijaldemokratska Partija Bosne i Hercegovina], Alipasina 41, Sarajevo BiH; telephone: 071/663-750, 071/664-044, or 071/663-753; fax: 071/664-042 or 071/663-625.

5 For further information regarding the Sarajevo city archives, contact: Grbela Tonci, Director; Istorijski Arhiv Sarajevo; Koturova 3; Sarajevo, BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina).

6 For further information, contact Universitet u Sarajevu/ University of Sarajevo, Filozofski Fakultet/Faculty of Philosophy; Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Franje Rackog br. 1; Postanski pretinac br. 653; Ziro racun: 10100-603-8404; Dev. Racun: 10100-603-2008404; Prof. Dr. IBRAHIM TEPIC, tel. 444-805; Prodekani: Doc. Dr. Ilijas Tanovic, tel. 444-805; Prof. Dr. Josip Baotic, tel. 444-805; Sekretar: Azra Kreso, tel. 444-279; Telefax: 667-873; Tel. Centrala: 667-844; 667-845; 667-846; 667-847. All Sarajevo numbers are preceded by the prefix 071.

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