Salvador Allende

Salvador Allende Gossens
File:Allende-Presidente-crop.jpg
29th President of Chile
In office November 3, 1970 – September 11 1973
Preceded by	Eduardo Frei Montalva
Succeeded by	Augusto Pinochet
Personal details
Born	July 26, 1908 Valparaíso, Chile
Died	September 11, 1973 Santiago, Chile
Political party	Socialist

Salvador Allende Gossens (July 26, 1908 – September 11, 1973) was President of Chile from November 1970 until his death, reportedly by suicide, during the coup d'état of September 11, 1973.

Allende's career in Chilean government spanned nearly forty years. As a Socialist Party and Marxist politician, he became a senator, deputy, cabinet minister and after failing in the 1952, 1958, and 1964 presidential elections was elected President in 1970 with 36.3% of the votes.

Early life

Allende was born in June 26, 1908 in Valparaíso. He was the son of Salvador Allende Castro and Laura Gossens Uribe.

Allende attended high school at the Liceo Eduardo de la Barra in Valparaíso and medical school at the University of Chile, graduating with a medical degree in 1933.

He also co-founded the Socialist Party of Chile in Valparaíso and became its leader. He married Hortensia Bussi, with whom he had three daughters.

In 1938, Allende became a minister of Health in the Popular Front government of Chile led by Pedro Aguirre Cerda, relinquishing the parliamentary seat for Valparaíso he had won in 1937. Around that time, he wrote La Realidad Médico Social de Chile (The social and medical reality of Chile). Following Aguirre's death in 1941, he returned to parliament.

In 1945, Allende became senator for the Valdivia, Llanquihue, Chiloé, Aisén and Magallanes provinces; then for Tarapacá and Antofagasta in 1953; for Aconcagua and Valparaíso in 1961; and once more for Chiloé, Aisén and Magallanes in 1969. He had been president of the Chilean Senate from 1966.

His three unsuccessful bids for the presidency (in the 1952, 1958 and 1964 elections) prompted Allende to joke that his epitaph would be "Here lies the next President of Chile." In 1952, as candidate for the Frente de Acción Popular (Popular Action Front, FRAP), he obtained only 5.4% of the vote, partly due to a division within socialist ranks over support for Carlos Ibáñez and the prohibition of communism. In 1958, again as the FRAP candidate, Allende obtained 28.5% of the vote. This time, his defeat was attributed to votes lost to the populist Antonio Zamorano. In 1964, once more as the FRAP candidate, he lost again, polling 38.6% of the votes against 55.6% for Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei. As it became clear that the election would be a race between Allende and Frei, the political right – which initially had backed Radical Julio Durán – settled for Frei as "the lesser evil".

Allende's socialist ideology and friendship with Cuban president Fidel Castro made him deeply unpopular within the administrations of successive U.S. presidents, from John F. Kennedy to Richard Nixon; they believed there was a danger of Chile becoming a communist state and joining the Soviet Union's sphere of influence; according to the Mitrokhin Archives, Allende had been codenamed "LEADER" as a KGB contact, and had been supplying the KGB with information since the 1950s. Senator Allende publicly condemned the Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956) and of Czechoslovakia (1968), but as President made Chile the first Government in continental America to recognize the People's Republic of China (1971).

Various U.S. corporations (including ITT, Anaconda and Kennecott) owned property and mineral rights in Chile. The Nixon administration feared that these companies might be nationalized by a socialist government, and was openly hostile to Allende. During Nixon's presidency, U.S. officials attempted to prevent Allende's election by financing political parties aligned with opposition candidate Jorge Alessandri and supporting strikes in the mining and transportation sectors.

Election

Chileans marching in support of Allende

Main article: Chilean presidential election, 1970

Allende won the 1970 Chilean presidential election as leader of the Unidad Popular ("Popular Unity") coalition. On September 4, 1970, he obtained a narrow plurality of 36.2 percent to 34.9 percent over Jorge Alessandri, a former president, with 27.8 percent going to a third candidate (Radomiro Tomic) of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), whose electoral platform was similar to Allende's. According to the Chilean Constitution of the time, if no presidential candidate obtained a majority of the popular vote, Congress would choose one of the two candidates with the highest number of votes as the winner. Tradition was for Congress to vote for the candidate with the highest popular vote, regardless of margin. Indeed, former president Jorge Alessandri had been elected in 1958 with only 31.6 percent of the popular vote, defeating Allende.

The United States played a role in the result of the election. ITT gave at least $350,000 to Jorge Alessandri. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) funded Alessandri's campaign through the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation and other channels similar to their actions in the 1964 elections. The CIA claim that Allende's campaign also received $350,000 from Cuba.

On October 22 General René Schneider, Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army, was shot resisting a kidnap attempt by a group led by Roberto Viaux; hospitalized, he died of his wounds three days later. Viaux's kidnapping plan had been supported by the CIA, although it seems the secretary for foreign affairs of the time Henry Kissinger ordered the plans turned off. Schneider was a known defender of the "constitutionalist" doctrine that the army's role is exclusively professional, its mission being to protect the country's sovereignty and not to interfere in politics.

René Schneider's murder was widely disapproved and, for the time, ended military opposition to Allende, whom the parliament finally chose on October 24. On October 26, President Eduardo Frei named General Carlos Prats as commander in chief of the army in replacement of René Schneider.

Allende assumed the presidency on November 3, 1970 after signing a “Statute of Constitutional Guarantees” proposed by the Christian Democrats in return for their support in Congress. In an extensive interview with Regis Debray, Allende explained his reasons for agreeing to the guarantees. Some critics have interpreted Allende's responses as an admission that signing the "Statute" was only a tactical move on his part.

Presidency

Main article: Chile under Allende

Upon assuming power, Allende began to carry out his platform of implementing socialist programs in Chile, called La vía chilena al socialismo ("the Chilean Path to Socialism"). This included nationalization of large-scale industries (notably copper mining and banking), and government administration of the health care system, educational system, a program of free milk for children (given out arbitrarily by GAP "Group of Personal Friends of the President"), and a greatly expanded plan of land seizure and redistribution (already begun under his predecessor Eduardo Frei Montalva, who had nationalized between one-fifth and one-quarter of all properties liable to takeover [Collier & Sater, 1996]). The Allende government's intention was to seize all holdings of more than eighty basic irrigated hectares [Faundez, 1988]. Allende also intended to improve the socio-economic welfare of Chile's poorest citizens; a key element was to provide employment, either in the new nationalised enterprises or on public works projects.

Chilean presidents were allowed a maximum term of six years, which may explain Allende's haste to restructure the economy. Not only did he have a significant restructuring program organized (the Vuskovic plan), he had to make it a success if a Socialist successor to Allende was going to be elected. In the first year of Allende's term, the short-term economic results of Minister of the Economy Pedro Vuskovic's expansive monetary policy were unambiguously favorable: 12% industrial growth and an 8.6% increase in GDP, accompanied by major declines in inflation (down from 34.9% to 22.1%) and unemployment (down to 3.8%). However, these results were not sustained, and in 1972, the Chilean escudo had runaway inflation of 140%. The average Real GDP contracted between 1971 and 1973 at an annual rate of 5.6% ("negative growth"); and the government's fiscal deficit soared while foreign reserves declined [Flores, 1997]. The combination of inflation and government-mandated price-fixing, together with the "disappearance" of basic commodities from supermarket shelves, led to the rise of black markets in rice, beans, sugar, and flour.

The Allende government announced it would default on debts owed to international creditors and foreign governments. Allende also froze all prices while raising salaries. His implementation of these policies led to strong opposition by landowners, employers, businessmen and transporters associations, some middle-class sectors like some civil servants and professional unions, the rightist opposition, led by National Party, the Roman Catholic Church (which in 1973 was displeased with the direction of educational policy), and eventually the Christian Democrats. It also was a reason for growing tensions with foreign multinational corporations and the government of the United States.

Allende also undertook Project Cybersyn, a system of networked telex machines and computers. Cybersyn was developed by British cybernetics expert Stafford Beer. The network transmitted data from factories to the government in Santiago, allowing for economic planning in real-time.

In 1971, following the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba, despite a previously established Organization of American States convention that no nation in the Western Hemisphere would do so (the only exceptions being Mexico and Canada, which had refused to adopt that convention), Cuban president Fidel Castro took a month-long visit to Chile. The visit, in which Castro participated actively in the internal politics of the country, holding massive rallies and giving public advice to Allende, was seen by those on the political right as proof to support their view that "The Chilean Path to Socialism" was an effort to put Chile on the same path as Cuba.

October 1972 saw the first of what were to be a wave of confrontational strikes. One by one, owners of trucks were joined by small bussinessmen, some (mostly professional) unions and some student groups related to these sectors, in a strategy to either press government for giving in its economic policies, or forcing its fall, by stopping most of product transport throughout the country, and thus causing a subsequent collapse of the economy - many employers from industrial and urban transport sectors also joined this strike, by stopping main bus lines and closing their factories. This, on the other hand, was responsed by a large number of workers, who organised alternative forms of urban transport, by van or estate cars, and thus reached their jobs, going on factory production in a collective, self-organised way. This was a way to reaffirm support to Allende's government and the many social achievements they had obtained from it, by supplying themselves everything that was required by the economy or population - they eventually received additional support from organised peasants and miners along countriside, as they went on occupying and collectivising unproductive lands and resources, and so making them produce. These popular initiatives often suffered from occassional direct attacks of some medium class student groups and far right sectors, as well as from attemps of sabotage to factories. Other than some inevitable damage to the economy, highly reduced by this popular support, the chief effect of the 24-day strike was to induce Allende to bring the head of the army, general Carlos Prats, into the government as Interior Minister.

Throughout this presidency racial tensions between the poor descendants of indigenous people and slaves who supported Allende’s reforms and the white settler elite increased.

In addition to the earlier-discussed provision of employment, Allende also raised wages on a number of occasions throughout 1970 and 1971; these wage hikes were negated by in-tandem inflation of Chile's fiat currency. Although price rises had also been high under Frei (27% a year between 1967 and 1970), a basic basket of consumer goods rose by 120% from 190 to 421 escudos in one month alone, August 1972. In the period 1970-72, while Allende was in government, exports fell 24% and imports rose 26%, with imports of food rising an estimated 149%. Although nominal wages were rising, there was not a commensurate increase in the standard of living.

Export income fell due to a decline in the price of copper on international markets; copper being the single most important export (more than half of Chile's export receipts were from this sole commodity). Adverse fluctuation in the international price of copper negatively affected the economy throughout 1971-2: The price of copper fell from a peak of $66 per ton in 1970 to only $48-9 in 1971 and 1972.

Throughout his presidency, Allende remained at odds with the Chilean Congress, which was dominated by the Christian Democratic Party. The Christian Democrats (who had campaigned on a socialist platform in the 1970 elections, but drifted away from those positions during Allende's presidency, eventually forming a coalition with the National Party), continued to accuse Allende of leading Chile toward a Cuban-style dictatorship, and sought to overturn many of his more radical policies. Allende and his opponents in Congress repeatedly accused each other of undermining the Chilean Constitution and acting undemocratically.

Allende's increasingly bold socialist policies (partly in response to pressure from some of the more radical members within his coalition), combined with his close contacts with Cuba, heightened fears in Washington. The Nixon administration began exerting economic pressure on Chile via multilateral organizations, and continued to back Allende's opponents in the Chilean Congress. Almost immediately after his election, Nixon directed CIA and U.S. State Department officials to "put pressure" on Allende's government.

The coup

Main article: 1973 Chilean coup d'état

File:Allende-Pinochet.jpg

Pinochet and Allende

There were rumors of a possible coup since at least 1972; in 1973, partly due to Allende's economic policies and partly as a result of the rapidly declining price of copper (Chile's main export), the economy took a major downturn. By September, high inflation (508% for the entire year) and shortages had plunged the country into near-chaos.

Despite declining economic indicators, Allende's Popular Unity coalition actually increased its vote to 43% in the parliamentary elections early in 1973. However, by this point, what had started as an informal alliance with the Christian Democrats was anything but; the Christian Democrats now joined with the right-wing National Party to oppose Allende's government, the two parties calling themselves the Confederación Democrática (CODE). The conflict between the executive and legislature paralyzed initiatives from either side.

On June 29, 1973, a tank regiment under the command of Colonel Roberto Souper surrounded the presidential palace (La Moneda) in an unsuccessful coup attempt known as the Tanquetazo. On August 9, General Carlos Prats was made Minister of Defense, but this decision proved so unpopular with the military that, on August 22, he was forced to resign not only this position but his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Army; he was replaced in the latter role by General Augusto Pinochet.

In August 1973, a constitutional crisis was clearly in the offing: the Supreme Court publicly complained about the government's inability to enforce the law of the land and, on August 22, the Chamber of Deputies (with the Christian Democrats now firmly uniting with the National Party) accused Allende's government of unconstitutional acts and called on the military ministers to assure the constitutional order. Among other things, Allende was accused of disregarding the courts, attempting to restrict freedom of speech, and supporting unauthorized seizures of farms and private industry for the purpose of establishing state control of the economy. The Chamber of Deputies also attacked Allende for seeking to "establish a totalitarian system absolutely opposed to the representative system of government established by the Constitution. [2]"

In early September 1973, Allende floated the idea of resolving the crisis with a plebiscite. His speech outlining such a solution was scheduled for September 12, but he was never able to deliver it. On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military staged a coup against Allende.

Death

Main article: Death of Salvador Allende

File:Allende 9 11 73.jpg

Allende's last photograph alive

Just prior to the capture of La Moneda (the Presidential Palace), with gunfire and explosions clearly audible in the background, Allende made what would become a famous farewell speech to Chileans on live radio, speaking of himself in the past tense, of his love for Chile and of his deep faith in its future. He stated that his commitment to Chile did not allow him to take an easy way out and be used as a propaganda tool by those he called "traitors" (accepting an offer of safe passage), clearly implying he intended to fight to the end.

"Workers of my country, I have faith in Chile and its destiny. Other men will overcome this dark and bitter moment when treason seeks to prevail. Keep in mind that, much sooner than later, the great avenues will again be opened through which will pass free men to construct a better society. Long live Chile! Long live the people! Long live the workers!"

President Salvador Allende's farewell speech, September 11, 1973.

Shortly afterwards, Allende was dead. An official announcement declared that he had committed suicide with an automatic rifle, purportedly the AK-47 assault rifle given to him as a gift by Fidel Castro, which bore a golden plate engraved "To my good friend Salvador from Fidel, who by different means tries to achieve the same goals."

In his 2004 documentary "Salvador Allende", Patricio Guzmán incorporates a graphic image of Allende's corpse in the position it was found after his apparent suicide.

Foreign involvement in Chile during Allende's Reign

Soviet involvement

According to Vasili Mitrokhin, a Soviet defector and dissident, regular Soviet contact with Allende after his election was maintained by his KGB case officer, Svyatoslav Kuznetsov, who was instructed by the centre to “exert a favourable influence on Chilean government policy”. According to Allende’s KGB file, he “was made to understand the necessity of reorganising Chile's army and intelligence services, and of setting up a relationship between Chile’s and the USSR’s intelligence services”. Allende was said to react positively.

In October 1971, on instructions from the Politburo, Allende was given $30,000 “in order to solidify the trusted relations” with him. On December 7, in a memorandum to the Politburo, the KGB proposed giving Allende another $60,000 for what was termed “his work with [ie, bribery of] political party leaders, military commanders and parliamentarians.”

US involvement

The possibility of Allende winning Chile's 1970 election was deemed a disaster by a US government desirous of protecting US business interests and preventing any further spread of communism during the Cold War; and U.S. President Richard Nixon ordered the CIA to develop plans to impede Allende's election, known as "Track I" and "Track II"; Track I sought to prevent Allende from assuming power via parliamentary trickery, while Track II tried encouraging the Chilean military to remove Allende prior to his assuming the presidency. After the 1970 election, the Track I operation attempted to incite Chile's outgoing president, Eduardo Frei Montalva, to persuade his party (PDC) to vote in Congress for Alessandri. Under the plan, Alessandri would resign his office immediately after assuming it and call new elections. Eduardo Frei would then be constitutionally able to run again (since the Chilean Constitution did not allow a president to hold two consecutive terms, but allowed multiple non-consecutive ones), and presumably easily defeat Allende. The Chilean Congress instead chose Allende as President, on the condition that he would sign a "Statute of Constitutional Guarantees" affirming that he would respect and obey the Chilean Constitution, and that his socialist reforms would not undermine any element of it. Allende's decision not to abide by the Guarantees would directly lead to the Congressional Resolution of August 22, 1973 imploring the military to remove him.

Track II was abortive, as parallel initiatives already underway within the Chilean military rendered it moot.

It has been claimed that the United States played a role in Chilean politics prior to the coup, but its degree of involvement in the coup itself is debated. The CIA was notified by its Chilean contacts of the impending coup two days in advance, but contends it "played no direct role in" the coup.

President Allende's economic policy had involved nationalizations of many key companies, notably U.S.-owned copper mines. This had been a significant reason behind the United States opposition to Allende's reformist socialist government, in addition to his establishing diplomatic relations and cooperation agreements with Cuba and the Soviet Union. Much of the internal opposition to Allende's policies came from business sector, and recently-released U.S. government documents confirm that the U.S. funded the truck drivers' strike, which had exacerbated the already chaotic economic situation prior to the coup.

After General Pinochet assumed power, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told U.S. President Richard Nixon that the U.S. "didn't do it," but "we helped." (referring to the coup itself). Recently declassified documents show that the United States government and the CIA had sought the overthrow of Allende in 1970 immediately before he took office ("Project FUBELT"), but claims of their direct involvement in the 1973 coup are not proven by publicly available documentary evidence. Many potentially relevant documents still remain classified.

Legacy and debate

Main article: Criticisms of Salvador Allende

Unborn child

On May 3 2007, Argentine newspaper El Clarín published a story claiming Gloria Gaitán —daughter of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán— had an unborn child with Allende.

Additional information

See also

• Chilean presidential election, 1970
• Schneider Doctrine
• Chile under Allende
• U.S. intervention in Chile
• Cuban packages
• Carlos Prats
• Project FUBELT
• Augusto Pinochet
• Chilean coup of 1973

• Allende's death
• Vuskovic plan
• Project Cybersyn
• Criticisms of Salvador Allende
• Isabel Allende, author and niece of Salvador Allende
• Isabel Allende Bussi, Chilean politician and daughter of Salvador Allende
• José Piñera
• Allende stamps
• Allende family

References

• Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents relating to the Military Coup, 1970-1976, (From the United States' National Security Archive).

External links and references

• Template:Es Official Government biography
• Spartacus Educational Biography
• Chile under Allende and Pinochet
• Chile during and after Allende's presidency
• History of Chile under Salvador Allende and the Popular Unity by Ewin Martinez
• Template:Es Allende Memorial Site
• Salvador Allende's "Last Words"Spanish text with English translation. The transcript of the last radio broadcast of Chilean President Salvador Allende, made on 11 September 1973, at 9:10 AM. MP3 audio available here.
• Hannah Cleaver Allende branded a fascist and anti-Semite 12 May 2005 in The Telegraph (UK).
• Template:Es Caso Pinochet. While nominally a page about the Pinochet case, this large collection of links includes Allende's dissertation and numerous documents (mostly PDFs) related to the dissertation and to the controversy about it, ranging from the Cesare Lombroso material discussed in Allende's dissertation to a collective telegram of protest over Kristallnacht signed by Allende.
• Template:Es Popular Unity of Salvador Allende
• Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin archive: How 'weak' Allende was left out in the cold by the KGB describing relations between Allende and the KGB, including KGB payments to Allende. The Times September 19, 2005
• Template:Es Previously unreleased interview with Allende by Saul Landau in 1971, published by La Nacion on September 24th, 2005.
• Alternate source of the Resolution of August 22, 1973 (English, Spanish, French, German, Polish
• "Never Again: An essay about the breakdown of democracy in Chile" by José Piñera (examination of events leading up to, and implications regarding, the Resolution of August 22, 1973. (In English, Italian, Spanish) Mirror site
• Template:Es Map of the Sorroundings of La Moneda Palace
• Power, Margaret, Right-Wing Women in Chile, Penn State Press, 2002 ISBN 0-271-02195-0