The Mercantile Movements Division[1] originally known as the Convoy Section[2] was a former Directorate of the British Admiralty, Naval Staff that coordinated, organised and plotted all Merchant Navyconvoys, routing and schedules from 1917 until 1920.
Responsibility for the convoy system was administered by the Admiralty as early as 1914.[3] A specific Convoy Section [4] of the Naval Staff was originally established 25 June 1917 as part of the Anti-Submarine Division with the appointment of an Organizing Manager of Convoys the Convoy Section coordinated with the Ministry of Shipping[5] who was responsible for Merchant Shipping and the Naval Intelligence Division to organise all convoy, routings and schedules.[6] Although planning of routes for all convoys including there escorting vessels was usually supervised by the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff[7] as he was responsible for trade protection and anti-submarine operations.
In September 1917 the Admiralty dually became responsible for the control of the ships of the British Merchant Navy together with the movements of the British Fleet. It established the Mercantile Movements Division under the control of a Director of Mercantile Movements [8] to administer this arrangement. However, in the case of convoys a different system had to be devised, This was owing to the difficulty of transmitting information and the problems it caused unless complete control over any convoy when it was finally at sea had to come under jurisdiction of the Admiralty [9] when this was agreed to the movements of convoys for the majority of there journey would then be directed by the Mercantile Movements Division and convoys were usually “plotted” from day to day.
In order to avert as many problems as possible certain alternative measures were adopted, for example convoys when travelling at night without lights had to be diverted of one another.[9] In order to achieve this use of wireless telegraphy was employed to transmit course changes to convoys, particularly if they came within close 'proximity' of each other. They were also directed to avoid certain areas where it was known German U-boat's were operating. Other measures put in place involved altering agreed destination of some ships as they approached home waters.[9]
As convoys approached from the North East Atlantic and U.K. home waters, usually being the Celtic, Irish, North Sea's and English Channel, they would then be within the strategic responsibility of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Coast of Ireland, Devonport, Portsmouth,[10] and the Commander of the Dover Patrol,[11] at that point they were taken in charge by one or other of them. Port staff would keep a record of all movements of ships passing through or working within in each Command, this enabled area Commander-in-Chief to action operational requirements where they deemed necessary. During the interwar years the division was disbanded as a distinct entity and its previous functions were amalgamated within the Tactical Division.[12] In 1939 at the beginning of World War II the Trade Division assumed overall responsibility for planning, control and protection of all British merchant shipping from the Tactical Division until 1945.
Office of the Director of Mercantile Movements............Office of the Secretary to the Director of Mercantile Movements and Division Staff Paymaster.
Note Each inbound port served a certain area of trade, and vessels engaged in that trade met at the port of assembly for convoy to the United Kingdom or to France.
^Fontenoy, Paul.E.; Tucker, Spencer. ed. (2005). "Convoy System", The Encyclopedia of World War I: A Political, Social and Military History, Volume 1. Santa Barbara: ABC Clio. pp. 312–314. {{cite book}}: |first2= has generic name (help)
^Tucker, Spencer, ed. (2005). World War I : encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO. pp. 312–314. ISBN1851094202.
^Jellicoe, John Rushworth, Admiral of the Fleet (1920). The crisis of the naval war. London: Cassell and Company, Ltd. pp. 102–119.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^Jellicoe, John Rushworth, Admiral of the Fleet (1920). The crisis of the naval war. London: Cassell and Company, Ltd. pp. 102–119.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^ abcJellicoe, John Rushworth, Admiral of the Fleet (1920). The crisis of the naval war. London: Cassell and Company, Ltd. pp. 119–153.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^Jellicoe, John Rushworth, Admiral of the Fleet (1920). The crisis of the naval war. London: Cassell and Company, Ltd. pp. 119–153.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^Jellicoe, John Rushworth, Admiral of the Fleet (1920). The crisis of the naval war. London: Cassell and Company, Ltd. pp. 197.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
Black, Nicholas. "‘The Admiralty War Staff and its influence on the conduct of the naval between 1914 and 1918.’" (PDF). discovery.ucl.ac.uk. University College London, 2006.
Black, Nicholas (2009). The British Naval Staff in the First World War. Boydell Press. ISBN9781843834427.
Hunt, Barry D. (2006). Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond 1871-1946. Wilfrid Laurier Univ. ISBN9780889207660.
Jellicoe, John Rushworth, Admiral of the Fleet (1920). "The crisis of the naval war". London: Cassell and Company, Ltd.
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