Jump to content

Ta'ang National Liberation Army

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Ta'ang National Liberation Army
တအာင်း အမျိုးသား လွတ်မြောက်ရေး တပ်မတော်
LeadersTar Aik Bong
Tar Bone Kyaw
Tar Hod Plarng
Dates of operationJanuary 1992 (1992-01) – present
HeadquartersNamhsan, Myanmar
Active regionsTawngpeng, Shan State
IdeologyTa'ang nationalism
Federalism[1]
Size800 (2011)[2]

4,000 (2015)[3]
6,000 (2018)[4]
10,000 (2020, self-claim)[5]

10,000 (2023)[6]
Part of Palaung State Liberation Front
AlliesNorthern Alliance[7]

Other allies

OpponentsState opponents

Non-state opponents

Battles and warsInternal conflict in Myanmar
Organization(s)Palaung State Liberation Front
Designated as a terrorist group byMyanmar[13]
Flag
Websitewww.taangland.org
Preceded by
Palaung State Liberation Organisation/Army (PSLO/A)

The Ta'ang National Liberation Army (Burmese: တအာင်း အမျိုးသား လွတ်မြောက်ရေး တပ်မတော်; abbreviated TNLA) is a political organization and armed group in Myanmar. It is the armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF).[14]

History

[edit]

The PSLF has its origins in the Palaung National Front (PNF), a Ta’ang armed group that was founded in 1963.[15] In 1976, a PNF leader, Mai Kwan Tong, broke away with the support of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and formed the Palaung State Liberation Organisation/Palaung State Liberation Army (PSLO/PSLA), which quickly upstaged the PNF.[16][17] The PSLA then waged a guerrilla war against the armed forces of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. In the late 1980s, the group was weakened by the introduction of new counter-insurgency tactics and the signing of a ceasefire agreement by the KIO 4th Brigade, its long-time ally, who became the Kachin Defence Army and stopped supplying it with weapons.[16] On 27 April 1991, the PSLA agreed to sign a ceasefire with the State Law and Order Restoration Council.[18] In reaction, several of its members based at the headquarters of the Karen National Union in Manerplaw, on the Thailand-Myanmar border, decided to reject the decision of their mother organization and on 12 January 1992 formed the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) under the leadership of Mai Tin Moung.[14][16][19][a] In the subsequent years, the PSLO progressively lost its influence and was eventually forced by the regime to disarm and demobilize in 2005.[14] Many dissatisfied rank-and-file members of the PSLO then joined the PSLF and were provided training by the KIA's 3rd and 4th Brigades in Laiza.[18][16]

In October 2009, the PSLF held its 3rd congress and its leaders Tar Aik Bong and Tar Bone Kyaw announced the creation of the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) as the armed wing of the PSLF.[21] The TNLA then started operating in Ta'ang populated areas of northern Shan State and engaging in occasional clashes with the Tatmadaw. On 9 November 2012, it held an unofficial meeting with the junta's negotiating body, the Union Peace-making Work Committee, but contacts were not further developed.[22] The TNLA subsequently did not take part in peace negotiations with the central government partly because of their lack of confidence in the latter's ability to control the army's actions.[22] It was not a signatory of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in 2015 but joined the UWSA-led Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee.[23] In 2016, it joined the Northern Alliance along with the Arakan Army (AA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA).[24] In 2019, the AA, the MNDAA and the TNLA strengthened their military cooperation by founding the Three Brotherhood Alliance.[25]

Following the 2021 coup d'état the TNLA initially avoided conflict with junta troops and took advantage of the drop in fighting to boost its governance capacities in northern Shan State.[14] However, the group is known to have "engaged indirectly with the NUG and provided support to PDFs and anti-military forces, even if mostly covertly".[14] In December 2023, the TNLA took control of the Pa Laung Self-Administered Zone following the capture of the towns of Namhsan and Mantong as part of Operation 1027 during the current Myanmar civil war.[26][27] On January 11, 2024 the junta and the Brotherhood Alliance agreed to a China-brokered ceasefire for northern Shan State, although the truce remains tenuous, with rebel forces claiming that regime's troops regularly conduct airstrikes and shelling in the area.[28][29]

On June 18, the TNLA announced that one of its fighters had been killed and four others injured by a junta drone strike in Nawnghkio Township.[30] On June 25, the group declared it was resuming Operation 1027 in response to repeated ceasefire violations by the junta and launched attacks in Nawnghkio and Kyaukme townships, in coordination with local PDF units.[31] The following day, it took control of the town of Nawnghkio and seized several positions near Kyaukme.[32] On June 28, it captured the town of Kyaukme and began to encircle Mogok, taking over several military bases near the city.[33]

On 2 September, the SAC declared the TNLA as a terrorist group.[34]

Structure

[edit]

Although in theory the TNLA is supposed to simply be the defense department of the PSLF, in practice “there is little separation between the two" and "most PSLF officials are seconded from the armed wing".[14]

In 2013, the TNLA started to organize their armed forces across Ta’ang areas in five regular battalions, plus one dedicated to headquarters-defence and special forces.[17] The number of battalions has been increased to 7 in 2013 and to 21 in 2015, divided into 3 brigades and supervised by two tactical operation commands.[21][35] In 2024, Tar Hod Plarng, TNLA's commander-in-chief, claimed that the group had now "seven brigades and more than 30 battalions.”[15]

The TNLA recruits primarily through a conscription policy that obliges each household in areas under their control to provide at least one male recruit. Those with many sons often have to provide two.[14][15] The group has also been accused of enlisting child soldiers.[14][36][37]

Governance

[edit]
Palaung State Liberation Front
ပလောင်ပြည်နယ်လွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်ဦး
ChairmanTar Aik Bong
Secretary-GeneralTar Bone Kyaw
Founded12 January 1992 (12 January 1992)
HeadquartersNamhsan, Shan State, Myanmar
IdeologyPalaung interests
Federalism
ColorsGreen, Red, White
SloganPeace - Equality - Justice - Prosperity[38]
Party flag

The TNLA is known for their opposition to drug trade and drug use, which they see as they see it as a health disaster for the local population, conducting operations where they actively destroy poppy fields, heroin refineries and meth labs.[39][40][41][42] The TNLA claims that they arrest opium smugglers regularly and the narcotics seized are publicly burned on special occasions to deter drug trade.[43] In August 2012, a PSLF Central Committee meeting set up a 5 year plan for the eradication of drugs and in 2014 the group claimed to have been “able to destroy more than 1,000 acres of opium farms in Ta’ang regions” in two years.[19] The group regularly detains drug users and send them by to “detention centres” in order to cut them off from their addictions.[15] They also try to discourage local farmers from continuing to grow poppy by offering them crop substitution programs and interest-free micro-financing.[44]

In the areas they control, the PSLF has set up a bureaucracy of 1,500 staff, divided into thirteen departments.[14] Many of these lower-ranking administrators are members of the junta's administrative apparatus that were assimilated by the TNLA as they took control of their villages. This administrative network comprises "a central office, five district-level offices, eighteen offices at the township level and many more at the village-tract level".[14] The TNLA has set up their own police force since 2018 to maintain public order. The group also operates a parallel justice system with dedicated courts and prisons by recruiting civil servants and lawyers who sought refuge in their territory after defecting from the junta.[14] In June 2023, the TNLA announced that they would establish forest reserve areas to prevent deforestation and preserving local species.[45]

In terms of education, the TNLA has set up their own education system in partnership with local civil society groups and NUG workers, under the umbrella of the Ta’ang National Education Committee (TNEC). In 2023, the committee said it ran more than 420 schools, providing education to around 25,000 students.[14]

The TNLA largely generates revenue through taxes on the transportation of goods and people.[17] Another important financing source of the group is the payment of fees by Chinese contractors conducting infrastructure projects in the region in exchange for ensuring their free access and safety.[16] The TNLA has also been accused of making money from taxing the local drug market, despite its anti-drug stance.[46] Resistance on the part of certain inhabitants to pay taxes to the group have led its members to kidnap resisters and detain them until a ransom is paid.[47]

Armed conflict

[edit]

Since its creation the TNLA has been frequently engaged in clashes with local armed militias established by the State Peace and Development Council junta, that are often involved in drug trafficking.[23]

From 2009 to 2011, more aggressive attempts by the Tatmadaw to subordinate groups in the region led to an increase in direct clashes with the TNLA, as well as with the KIA and the MNDAA.[18] Fighting between the TNLA and government troops then reached a new high in 2013 and 2014, leading to the death of 200 people and the displacement of more than 4,000 inhabitants.[48] In November 2016, Northern Alliance forces launched coordinated attacks on military targets in northern Shan State and briefly took control of a portion of the Mandalay-Muse Highway.[49] In November 2017, the TNLA attacked two Burma Army bases in Namhsan.[50]

After joining the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in October 2015, the RCSS/Shan State Army-South began expanding its operations towards the China border, thus encroaching on territories controlled by the TNLA.[15] Hostilities between the two groups broke out in November 2015 after RCSS forces ambushed TNLA soldiers near Namkham.[51][52] The two groups engaged in regular skirmishes in the following years.[53][54] In late 2020, fighting escalated again.[14] In 2021, the TNLA, in cooperation with the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), managed to register gains against RCSS troops, forcing them to withdraw south of the Mandalay-Muse Highway before pushing them back to their strongholds near the Thailand-Myanmar border.[15][14]

Alliances

[edit]

The TNLA has long been allied with the KIO/KIA, with whom it maintains close ties and cooperates militarily.[16] However, in recent years, the group has increasingly turned towards the SSPP, which fought alongside it against the RCSS, as well as the UWSA, which supplies it with weapons.[14] In May 2018, the TNLA opened its first liaison office in Pangkham, the de facto capital of Wa State.[55] This turnaround has led to a deterioration in relations with the KIA, coupled with mutual accusations of mistreatment of the local populations.[49] Tensions with the SSPP over the control and administration of territories liberated from the junta have also arose in several occasions.[56]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^ Until he was assassinated in May 1994.[20]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ Hay, Wayne (17 February 2016). "Myanmar rebels continue fight despite ceasefire deal". www.aljazeera.com. Archived from the original on 11 July 2019. Retrieved 18 December 2016.
  2. ^ "Myanmar's embattled Palaung minority call for aid partners". The New Humanitarian. Retrieved 4 June 2024.
  3. ^ Keenan, Paul (2015). "All-inclusiveness in an ethnic context" (PDF). EBO Background Paper (Report).
  4. ^ Buscemi, Francesco (2019). "Armed Political Orders through the Prism of Arms: Relations between Weapons and Insurgencies in Myanmar And Ukraine". Interdisciplinary Political Studies. 5 (1).
  5. ^ Weng, Lawi (22 September 2020). "Brothers torn apart: As TNLA grows stronger, tensions rise in northern Shan". Frontier Myanmar. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  6. ^ "Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta'ang Army Expands in Myanmar's Shan State". International Crisis. 4 September 2023. Retrieved 19 November 2023.
  7. ^ Lynn, Kyaw Ye. "Curfew imposed after clashes near Myanmar-China border". Anadolu Agency. Archived from the original on 24 May 2020. Retrieved 21 November 2016.
  8. ^ Thar, Ken; Khine, Tin Aung (2 August 2018). "300 Myanmar Villagers Flee Township as Ethnic Armies Approach". Radio Free Asia. Translated by Khet Mar. Retrieved 3 December 2022.
  9. ^ "Two helicopters used in fighting near northern Shan State's Naungcho". Mizzima. 14 March 2022. Archived from the original on 16 March 2022. Retrieved 4 May 2022.
  10. ^ Veits, Chris (July 2015). "Are the TNLA a threat to peace in Myanmar? – Inside the TNLA's war on drugs". Journeyman Pictures. Archived from the original on 23 September 2015. Retrieved 6 December 2015.
  11. ^ "Rival Shan armies declare truce as other ethnic armed groups gain ground". Myanmar Now. 30 November 2023.
  12. ^ Lawi Weng (26 January 2021). "'We will not let the RCSS rule': Shan State clashes stoke inter-ethnic tension". Frontier Myanmar. Archived from the original on 7 December 2022. Retrieved 5 February 2024.
  13. ^ "Myanmar regime labels key ethnic armed groups 'terrorist' organisations".
  14. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o "Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta'ang Army Expands in Myanmar's Shan State | Crisis Group". www.crisisgroup.org. 4 September 2023. Retrieved 4 June 2024.
  15. ^ a b c d e f Frontier (4 February 2022). "Rising dragon: TNLA declares 'victory' in northern Shan". Frontier Myanmar. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  16. ^ a b c d e f Meehan, Patrick (2016). "The Continuation of War by Other Means. An Anatomy of the Palaung Ceasefire in Northern Shan State". War and peace in the borderlands of Myanmar: the Kachin ceasefire, 1994-2011. NIAS Press. pp. 364–371. ISBN 978-87-7694-188-8.
  17. ^ a b c Buscemi, Francesco (1 January 2023). "The Art Of Arms (Not) Being Governed: Means Of Violence And Shifting Territories In The Borderworlds of Myanmar". Geopolitics. 28 (1): 282–309. doi:10.1080/14650045.2021.1901083. ISSN 1465-0045.
  18. ^ a b c Buscemi, Francesco (2019). "Armed Political Orders through the Prism of Arms: Relations between Weapons and Insurgencies in Myanmar And Ukraine". Interdisciplinary Political Studies. 5 (1).
  19. ^ a b "Ta'ang (Palaung) Leader Tar Aik Bong: 'Without Proper Political Solutions, There Will Be No Lasting Peace'". Burma Link. 11 November 2014. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  20. ^ Meehan, Patrick (2016). The political economy of the opium/heroin trade in Shan state, Myanmar, 1988-2012 (PhD thesis). University of London. p. 235. doi:10.25501/SOAS.00022807.
  21. ^ a b Keenan, Paul (2013). By force of arms: armed ethnic groups in Burma. New Delhi: VIJ Books. ISBN 978-93-82652-21-2.
  22. ^ a b Thitiwut Boonyawongwiwat (2018). "Obstacles to Conflict Transformation in Myanmar: A Case Study of the Ta'ang National Liberation Army". Journal of Mekong Societies. 14: 118. doi:10.14456/JMS.2018.19.
  23. ^ a b Larsen, Niels (22 March 2016). "Dirty war, dirty tactics". Frontier Myanmar. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  24. ^ "Northern Alliance Sets Sights on Next Myanmar Peace Conference". Radio Free Asia. 24 January 2017. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  25. ^ "Three Myanmar Rebel Groups Halt Offensive Pending Further Talks". The Irrawaddy. 4 September 2019.
  26. ^ "Myanmar rebels seize town from military junta despite China-backed ceasefire". France 24. 16 December 2023. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  27. ^ "Brotherhood Alliance Seizes Another Ethnic Zone in Myanmar's northern Shan State". The Irrawaddy. 23 December 2023. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  28. ^ "Myanmar's military, ethnic armed groups agree to China-mediated truce". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 4 June 2024.
  29. ^ "Myanmar Junta Repeatedly Breaking China-Brokered Ceasefire: Brotherhood Alliance". The Irrawaddy. 16 January 2024. Retrieved 4 June 2024.
  30. ^ Wei, Brian (19 June 2024). "TNLA: Myanmar Junta Drone Attack on Base Kills One and Injures Four". pp. The Irrawaddy. Retrieved 25 June 2024.
  31. ^ "TNLA Restarts Operation 1027 Against Myanmar Junta". The Irrawaddy. 25 June 2024. Retrieved 25 June 2024.
  32. ^ "TNLA Seizes Town and Myanmar Regime Positions in Northern Shan State". The Irrawaddy. 26 June 2024. Retrieved 27 June 2024.
  33. ^ "Op. 1027 Update: TNLA Captures Seven Myanmar Junta Bases, Two Battalion HQs". The Irrawaddy. 1 July 2024. Retrieved 4 July 2024.
  34. ^ Myanmar Junta Designates Brotherhood Alliance Members ‘Terrorist’ Groups. The Irrawaddy. September 4, 2024
  35. ^ Keenan, Paul (2015). "All-inclusiveness in an ethnic context" (PDF). EBO Background Paper (Report).
  36. ^ "Myanmar Ethnic Armed Groups Draw Allegations of Forced Recruitment". thediplomat.com. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  37. ^ Gupte, Prajakta (9 June 2018). "Child Soldiers in Myanmar: Role of Myanmar Government and Limitations of International Law". Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs. 6 (1). ISSN 2168-7951.
  38. ^ "မြေရှားသတ္တုလုပ်ငန်း စမ်းသပ်ရှာဖွေထုတ်လုပ်ခြင်း ကိစ္စရပ်အပေါ် အမိန့်ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်". Ta'ang Land (in Burmese). Archived from the original on 31 May 2024. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  39. ^ Larsen, Niels (23 April 2015). "On Patrol With Myanmar Rebels Fighting Both the Army and Drug Addiction". Vice. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  40. ^ "Fire and Ice: Conflict and Drugs in Myanmar's Shan State | Crisis Group". www.crisisgroup.org. 8 January 2019. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  41. ^ "TNLA Attacks Five Poppy-Growing Hubs in Northern Myanmar". The Irrawaddy. 16 March 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  42. ^ Ferrie, Jared (5 November 2015). "The drug war in Myanmar's mountains". The New Humanitarian. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  43. ^ "Drug trade thrives in lawless post-coup Myanmar". Radio Free Asia. 27 June 2023. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  44. ^ "On the Frontline: Poverty, Opium and Militarisation in Modern Burma's Golden Triangle". Discover Society. 2 September 2014. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  45. ^ "TNLA Designates Forest Reserve Areas". Burma News International. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  46. ^ Weigand, Florian (2020). Conflict and transnational crime: borders, bullets & business in Southeast Asia. Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78990-519-9.
  47. ^ "Myanmar Civilians Demand Protection from TNLA Kidnappings". The Irrawaddy. 21 December 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  48. ^ Vrieze, Paul (8 October 2014). "Myanmar's embattled Palaung minority call for aid partners". The New Humanitarian. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  49. ^ a b Weng, Lawi (22 September 2020). "Brothers torn apart: As TNLA grows stronger, tensions rise in northern Shan". Frontier Myanmar. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  50. ^ "TNLA Attacks Burma Army Bases in Namhsan". The Irrawaddy. 11 January 2017. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  51. ^ "RCSS-TNLA Conflict: Proxy or mini-Cold War in display?". Shan Herald Agency for News. 23 February 2016. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  52. ^ "On the Frontline of the TNLA, SSA-S Divide". The Irrawaddy. 23 February 2016. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  53. ^ "Civilians flee as clashes between RCSS/SSA and TNLA continue". Shan Herald Agency for News. 6 July 2017. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  54. ^ Nom, Nang Seng (18 September 2019). "RCSS, TNLA Clash in Kyaukme Township". Shan Herald Agency for News. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  55. ^ "Ta'ang Armed Group Opens First Liaison Office in Wa Territory". The Irrawaddy. 18 May 2018. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  56. ^ "Tensions between TNLA and SSPP Flare up Again in Shan State". Shan Herald Agency for News. 29 May 2024. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
[edit]
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ta%27ang_National_Liberation_Army&oldid=1255628185"